CH A PT ER 6

Propaganda 2.0: Herman and

Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in the Age
of the Internet, Big Data and Social Media
Christian Fuchs

1. Introduction

Herman and Chomsky’s book Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy

of the Mass Media1 was published nearly 30 years ago. Today, not only has the
Soviet Union disappeared, but we have also experienced the progressive inten-
sification of neoliberalism and financialization, the 2008 world economic crisis,
austerity, constant growth of inequalities, and the extension and intensifica-
tion of nationalism, new racism, and xenophobia. The news media are in crisis.
Advertising has shifted from print towards targeted online ads. Today we not
only have the World Wide Web and mobile phones, but also Big Data, Google,
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr, Instagram, Wikipedia, blogs, etc. have
become important means of information and communication. Given these
changes, the question arises if and how we can make sense of the propaganda
model in the age of the internet and social media.
Herman and Chomsky summarise the propaganda model in the following words:

The essential ingredients of our propaganda model, or set of news ‘filters’,

fall under the following headings: (1) the size, concentrated ownership,
owner wealth, and profit orientation of the dominant mass-media firms;

How to cite this book chapter:

Fuchs, C. 2018. Propaganda 2.0: Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model in
the Age of the Internet, Big Data and Social Media. In: Pedro-Carañana, J.,
Broudy, D. and Klaehn, J. (eds.). The Propaganda Model Today: Filtering Per-
ception and Awareness. Pp. 71–92. London: University of Westminster Press.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.16997/book27.f. License: CC‐BY‐NC‐ND 4.0
72 The Propaganda Model Today

(2) advertising as the primary income source of the mass media; (3) the
reliance of the media on information provided by government, busi-
ness, and ‘experts’ funded and approved by these primary sources and
agents of power; (4) ‘flak’ as a means of disciplining the media; and (5)
‘anticommunism’ as a national religion and control mechanism. These
elements interact with and reinforce one another. The raw material of
news must pass through successive filters, leaving only the cleansed
residue fit to print. They fix the premises of discourse and interpreta-
tion, and the definition of what is newsworthy in the first place, and
they explain the basis and operations of what amount to propaganda
campaigns.2

The key aspect is that wealth and power inequalities shape what is consid-
ered newsworthy, what gets reported, and what is heard, read and watched.
It should be noted that the propaganda model is not a theory. A theory of
propaganda and ideology requires a systematic theory of society and capital-
ism, in which the role of culture, ideology and propaganda is clearly defined.
It is for example unclear why exactly there are five elements and how they
are theoretically justified. Moreover, entertainment and the spectacle as a fil-
ter that displaces and colonises political communication is missing from the
model. Jürgen Habermas argues that entertainment is part of the process of
the feudalisation and de-politicisation of the public sphere: ‘Reporting facts
as human-interest stories, mixing information with entertainment, arranging
material episodically, and breaking down complex relationships into smaller
fragments – all of this comes together to form a syndrome that works to depo-
liticize public communication.’3 It is therefore best to view the Propaganda
Model (PM) as a not necessarily complete list of elements that are ideologi-
cally influencing factors on the agenda of the news media. The fifth element
of anti-communism should probably best be generalised in terms of dominant
ideologies that influence the media.4 Also Joan Pedro suggests to term the fifth
dimension ‘dominant ideology’.5 In the thirty years since the publication of the
book, especially the neoliberal ‘belief in the “miracle of the market” (Reagan)’6
has become dominant.
In respect to criticisms arguing that the model is functionalist and does not
take resistance and contradictions into account, Herman argues that ‘the sys-
tem is not all-powerful,’7 that there are ‘uncertain and variable effects’ and ‘con-
testing forces.’8

2. Social Media and Power

One often hears that social media and the decentralised character of the internet
overcome hierarchies and foster a participatory culture and democratic commu-
 Propaganda 2.0 73

nication. Edward Herman has voiced scepticism about this assumption: ‘Some
argue that the internet and the new communication technologies are breaking
the corporate stranglehold on journalism and opening an unprecedented era of
interactive democratic media.’9 He argues that new technologies ‘permit media
firms to shrink staff even as they achieve greater outputs, and they make possible
global distribution systems that reduce the number of media entities.’10

2.1 Size, Ownership, Profit Orientation

The dominant social media platforms have concentrated ownership. Google-

co-founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin own 42.4% and 41.3% respectively
of Alphabet’s class B common stock. Page controls 26.6% of the voting power;
Brin 25.9%.11 Facebook owner Mark Zuckerberg controls 85.3% of the compa-
ny’s class B common stock and 60.1% of the voting power.12 Social media is also
a highly concentrated market: Google controls 71% of the world’s searches, and
Facebook and its subsidiary WhatsApp account for 48% of users worldwide of
the top 10 social media platforms.13
Both Google searches and the Facebook news feed are very important sources
of news today. In respect to the 2016 US presidential election, the group of
18–29-year-olds considered social media the most important news source:14 For
all who are 30 or older, TV news was the most important source. Taking the
entire adult population together, 78% used television during one week for learn-
ing about the election, 65% used digital information sources (48% news websites;
44% social networks), 44% used the radio, while 36% read print newspapers. The
data indicate that the internet does not substitute but merely complements tra-
ditional news sources. Among younger people, however, it is the most important
source of news.
Algorithms determine the ranking of Google’s search results and Facebook’s
news feed. The centralised ownership of these companies (from which users are
excluded), combined with the huge market share of users the two companies
hold and the fact that both platforms are important news sources, results in the
circumstance that ownership also means control over algorithms that deter-
mine news sources for a significant part of the population. Both algorithms are
intransparent; they are corporate secrets. As capitalist companies, Google and
Facebook want to protect themselves from competition. Factors that play a role
in Facebook’s news feed algorithm e.g. include your closeness to a person post-
ing content (closeness meaning how regularly you interact with them through
messaging, likes, etc.), the type of a post or the achieved popularity of a post.15
It is also possible to boost a particular post by paying for it, or to buy a spon-
sored ad that targets a specific group of users’ news feeds. Google’s PageRank
algorithm ranks web pages using various criteria, such as the number of sites
that link to them – a weight is given to each link. So, if the New York Times links
74 The Propaganda Model Today

to your web page, then this link is likely to have a higher weight than the link
your best friend posts on her/his site. Also, on Google is it possible to purchase
sponsored links that are boosted to prominent screen positions.
The discussion shows that social media’s ownership matters in several
respects. Firstly, social media markets tend to be highly concentrated. Private
ownership locks users out from the control of algorithms that determine the
priorities of how search results and news are presented. The specifics of the
algorithms are secret because of the secret nature of intellectual property and
because capitalism’s laws of competition foster secrecy.
Online advertising is, however, contradictory. On average, users only click
on one out of one thousand advertisements.16 And even then, it is uncertain if
they really stay on a linked page and if they buy something there. The effects of
targeted online advertising may therefore be overstated. Because of the fetish-
istic idea that algorithms and Big Data allow perfect interest-based targeting,
advertisers gain the impression that they can sell commodities via social media.
If it turns out that this is a misconception, then targeted advertising may lose
credibility and social media capitalism’s financial bubble may burst and cause
the next dot-com crisis.

2.2 Advertising

Figure 6.1 shows statistics about the development of the distribution of global
advertising spending.
The data shows that the share of online advertising has increased from 17.9%
to 28.3% in the years from 2010 until 2015. During the same time, news­paper
advertising revenue has dropped significantly and its share has decreased from
20.5% to 14.8%. Online advertising has globally become the second most

Fig. 6.1: The development of global ad spending’s distribution.17

 Propaganda 2.0 75

important form of advertising after television advertising. Especially in times

of crisis, online advertising seems to appear to advertisers as the more secure
option because it is individualised through extensive surveillance of online
behaviour and algorithmically targeted. Traditional news journalism is in a
crisis of a commercial character, notably in relation to its advertising revenues.
Google, Facebook and Twitter are not just sources of news and informa-
tion. These websites are also among the world’s largest advertising agencies.
They are in the business of selling targeted ad space as a commodity and
derive their revenues almost exclusively from targeted advertising.18 Her-
man and Chomsky remarked in an interview about the PM in respect to the
second filter that Google and Yahoo ‘are heavily dependent on advertising
revenue.’19 Given their high numbers of users, platforms such as Google and
Facebook can expect to attract large shares of ad investments seeing that
companies are interested in reaching a large number of people from their
targeted audience. Social media advertising allows both broad reach and
precision targeting.
Herman and Chomsky argue that advertisers prefer to run ads during TV
programmes that are ‘culturally and politically conservative,’20 i.e. entertain-
ment and spectacle oriented programmes and news and discussion pro-
grammes that have a right-wing, conservative and pro-capitalist bias. The
effect is that media that focus on entertainment and spectacles tend to attract
more advertisements, whereas independent media ‘suffer from the political

Fig. 6.2: Example of a promoted tweet. Data source: twitter.com, accessed on

11 November 2016.
76 The Propaganda Model Today

discrimination of advertisers.’ On social media, the situation is slightly dif-

ferent, but not necessarily better: on Facebook and Twitter, users can pay to
promote postings. Facebook, Twitter and Google allow targeted ads. On Twit-
ter, it is also possible to promote trends. Figure 6.2 shows a promoted posting
from Twitter.
Promoted posts show up on Twitter users’ news feeds, profiles or tweet detail
pages. Figure 6.3 shows that on Twitter, targeting is not only possible based on
gender, languages and devices, but also based on search keywords, followers of
particular users, interests, TV shows, behaviours, and events. Figure 6.4 shows
details of Twitter’s behavioural targeting feature.
On television, advertisers target particular audiences who watch specific pro-
grammes. In newspapers, they target the typical reading audience. On social
media, multiple audiences can be targeted at once because there are micro and
niche publics. This makes the logic of advertising different on social media than
in traditional media. The overall effect is an online advertising-user-spiral, in
which more and more advertising revenue shifts from print to digital due to
the targeting possibilities. The advertising-circulation-spiral was first observed
in the realm of newspaper advertising,21 but it certainly also contributes to
the monopolisation of online markets. In 2015, the finance and insurance
­industry, followed by the retail industry, comprised the largest share of ad
­spending on Google. Amazon was the largest advertiser with investments of
US$ 157 million.22 In 2013, Samsung was with US$ 100 million the biggest
advertiser on Facebook.23

FPO

Fig. 6.3: Targeting of ads on Twitter.

 Propaganda 2.0 77

FPO

Fig. 6.4: Behavioural targeting on Twitter.

The discussion shows that online advertising acts as a filter in several ways:
(i) It allows large transnational corporations with large ad budgets to confront
a large targeted audience with content and ads; (ii) Regular content becomes
ever more difficult to discern from advertising. There is no clear temporal or
spatial differentiation. Corporations are interested in native online advertising
and branded online content as it allows them to deceive users and to almost act
like news media, effectively undermining the independence of reporting. Com-
panies can increase reach via social media; (iii) The online advertising-user-spiral
increases social media’s power in advertising and news-making and advances
monopoly tendencies in the online economy; (iv) An important fourth dimen-
sion that needs to be added which Herman and Chomsky do not discuss is that
advertising means exploitation of audience labour.24 On social media, users’ digi-
tal labour produces a data commodity and is exploited by the platforms for sell-
ing targeted ad spaces.25

2.3 Sourcing

Colin Sparks argues for an extension and refining of the PM:

The central departure from the classical formulations of the PM is
that, in place of the stress it gives to the uniformity of the media, we
now expect to find diversity. The divided nature of the capitalist class,
the presence of powerful critical currents which find legitimate public
expression in a capitalist democracy, the need to address the concerns
78 The Propaganda Model Today

of a mass audience, political differentiation as a marketing strategy, all

point to the necessity for any viable media system to include a range of
different opinions. […] Of course, it is entirely true that the range of dis-
senting voices is carefully controlled. There tends to be a preponderance
of elite voices, and those in turn will tend to reflect the views of power-
ful groups in economics and politics. […] Sometimes, however, radical
individuals do get regular exposure in the media […] partly at least for
the good business reason that it fits the marketing strategy of particular
media to attract the substantial number of radical individuals towards
their niche in the market.26

Des Freedman27 discusses the example of the British tabloid the Daily ­Mirror
that during the 2003 Iraq war substituted its usual focus on celebrities and
scandals with an anti-war campaign. The example shows that also mainstream
media, especially in situations of crisis, can take alternative positions, and that
such exceptions matter. Freedman argues for giving attention to ‘both structure
and agency, contradiction and action, consensus and conflict.’28 Herman and
Chomsky acknowledged the possibility for diversity: ‘The mass media are not a
solid monolith on all issues.’29
Sourcing as a filter is different online than in broadcasting because the inter-
net has a decentralised and global architecture. Manuel Castells30 argues that
the internet allows mass-self-communication, which means that a larger num-
ber of producers online as compared to the broadcast model can reach a larger
audience. The basic difference between computer networks and broadcasting
is that the network is a universal machine, at once a technology or production,
distribution and consumption. Combined with its global reach and significant
bandwidth rates, this allows the phenomenon of user-generated content. User-
generated content does however not automatically imply political plurality and
diversity. The key question about communication power shifts from the control
of production towards the control of attention and visibility. Attention and vis-
ibility, however, also need to be produced and are thus aspects of production.
Gaining online attention and visibility requires money, time and labour-force.
Everyone can in principle produce content online, but in a capitalist society
only a minority attracts online visibility and attention.31
A first online asymmetry concerns the fact that ‘the traditional media them-
selves have occupied the internet and are dominant news providers there; […]
they have the resources and pre-existing audiences to give them a huge advan-
tage over alternative media potential rivals.’32 In November 2016, the most
popular online news site was CNN.com. While CNN was on 11 November,
2016, the 72nd most accessed website in the world, the independent news sites
alternet.org and democracynow.org were only ranked in positions 5,967 and
9,493 respectively on the list of the world’s most accessed websites.33 Notwith-
standing, alternative online media certainly attract significant audiences. At the
same time, they tend to face resource problems because they are not organised
as capitalist businesses.
 Propaganda 2.0 79

Fig. 6.5: An example for online attention as commodity. Data source: http://
www.followersandlikes4u.com.

Second, money is an important factor in attaining online visibility and attention.

It is possible to boost one’s online attention by buying likes, followers, re-tweets,
etc. Figure 6.5 shows an example of a company that sells Facebook followers. Users
with a budget to spend can buy more visibility online. If your number of followers
is large enough, then it is also more likely that others start following you because
there are reputational hierarchies and the artificially inflated number of likes, re-
tweets and followers is a form of psychological impression management.
Third, there are reputational inequalities. Social media attention is highly
stratified. A small elite group of users dominates online visibility and a­ ttention.34
As an example, table 6.1 shows the Facebook pages that have the largest ­number
of fans.
The data indicate that corporations and entertainment dominate social media
attention. News and information therefore tend to focus on popular topics.

Rank FB Page Number of Fans Type

1 Facebook for Every iPhone 500 300 326 App
2 Facebook 174 559 960 Corporation
3 Cristiano Ronaldo 117 252 364 Footballer
4 Shakira 104 416 196 Musician
5 Vin Diesel 100 378 269 Actor
6 Coca-Cola 99 713 570 Brand, corporation
7 FC Barcelona 94 669 625 Football team
8 Read Madrid C.F. 92 645 690 Football team
9 Eminem 91 308 332 Musician
10 Leo Messi 87 147 610 Footballer
Bernie Sanders 4 653 316 Politician
Karl Marx 1 450 139 Political theorist

Table 6.1: The most popular pages on Facebook. Data source: https://www.
socialbakers.com, http://www.facebook.com, accessed on 12 November, 2016.
80 The Propaganda Model Today

­ olitics is less visible and more marginalised. Bernie Sanders and Karl Marx,
P
two symbols of left-wing politics, have significantly fewer fans. In an interview,
­Herman and Chomsky point out this development: ‘[M]uch of the new media on
the internet is oriented toward facilitating social connections, with politics sec-
ondary at best, and the best of the new alternative media have limited resources
and outreach and specialize in critical analysis rather than news-making.’35
The tabloidisation of social media is, however, just a tendency, not a deter-
minism or totality. Social movements often use social media because they are
not adequately represented in the mainstream media. They tend to understand
how to use online communication as a tool for political organisation well. The
capitalist online public sphere is not totally, but predominantly, an entertain-
ment sphere, and only to a lesser extent is it a political public sphere.
Fourth, political bots play a role in online political communication. A bot is
a piece of software code that performs certain online behaviour based on an
algorithm. Examples are automatic tweets or re-tweets or the posting of images
and texts from a database at particular times. The problem of bots in politi-
cal communication is that they can appear human-like, can distort attention,
harass and scare people, etc. They are an expression of the online automation
of human action, the replacement of humans by machines. There are concrete
humans who own, control, and programme bots. So, whereas the political bot
does not have political attitudes, morals and interests, its behaviour is shaped
by human beings who have particular political interests.
Kollanyi, Howard and Woolley have analysed around 10 million tweets men-
tioning Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump around the time of the third US
presidential election debate.36 They found that political bots posted 36.1% of the
pro-Trump tweets and 23.5% of the pro-Clinton tweets. Given that political opin-
ion and sentiment analysis is increasingly conducted on Twitter and with the
help of Big Data analytics, political bots can manipulate the public perception of
public opinion. Considering that a certain degree of online politics is automated,
political attitudes should probably not at all be measured with the help of Big
Data analytics. Political bots, Big Data analytics and computational social science
methods can colonise, distort, instrumentalise and manipulate the public sphere.

2.4 Flak/Mediated Lobbying

Herman and Chomsky do not properly explain the name of the fourth dimen-
sion: Flak. This German term stems from military jargon. The Nazis used Flak
as an abbreviation for Fliegerabwehrkanone. In a comprehensive overview, Joan
Pedro suggests to speak of ‘countermeasures to discipline the media’37 instead
of flak. We could also simply speak of mediated lobbying attempts.
Herman and Chomsky define flak the following way: ‘‘‘Flak” refers to nega-
tive responses to a media statement or program. It may take the form of letters,
 Propaganda 2.0 81

telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress,
and other modes of complaint, threat, and punitive action. It may be organized
centrally or locally, or it may consist of the entirely independent actions of indi-
viduals.’38 In the digital age, lobbying for certain interests has been extended to
social media and is no longer simply aimed at centralised media organisations,
but now aims to directly transmit political messages to as many internet users
as possible.
At the time of the 2011 Arab Spring and the subsequent Occupy movements,
there was much euphoria about protest and revolutionary movements’ use
of social media for public engagement and political organisation.39 After the
world economic crisis had started in 2008, it seemed like revolution was pos-
sible. The role of social media in revolutions and protests was often overstated.
Empirical analysis shows that in protests, social media communication tends
to interact with other forms of political communication, especially face-to-
face-communication.40 Revolutions and protests are not virtual, but take place
offline and online simultaneously.
Political groups and movements from all parts of the political spectrum uti-
lise the internet and social media for political communication. The example
of political bots mentioned in the previous section shows that both support-
ers of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton used bots for trying to boost their
candidate’s popularity. Automated lobbying is a particular form of flak in the
digital age.
In the early days of the internet, sometimes the impression was conveyed that
left-wing and green movements such as the Zapatista solidarity campaigns were
very skilled at utilising the internet for political communication because they
are grassroots organisations and that far-right groups were very bad at it due
to their hierarchical leadership ideology. The basic argument was that grass-
roots movements as well as the internet have a flat and decentralised structure
and therefore are suited for each other. This assumption underestimates the
internet’s social hierarchies and power structures that are not technically deter-
mined. Today right wing lobbying is a large-scale affair on the internet.
In November 2016, Hillary Clinton had 10.9 million Twitter followers, while
Donald Trump had 14.6 million. French President François Hollande had 1.78
million followers, the National Front leader Marine Le Pen 1.18 million. In the
UK, left-wing Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn had 662k followers, Nigel
Farage 516k.41 The data indicate that right-wing groups and individuals are at
least just as active and popular on social media as left-wing activists and groups.
Figure 6.6 shows a typical tweet by Donald Trump. It achieved a high number
of likes and re-tweets: More than 7,500 likes and 20,000 re-tweets. The example
shows that right-wing politics today to a significant extent takes place online
and on social media.
Right-wing lobbying is not limited to established parties and politicians, but is
to a significant degree carried by right-wing social movements. The alt-right
82 The Propaganda Model Today

Fig. 6.6: A tweet by Donald Trump. Source: twitter.com.

movement is a far-right movement that is predominantly active on the internet.

It is racist, white supremacist, anti-Semitic, homophobic, anti-feminist, and
Islamophobic. It uses social media, internet memes, and right-wing sites such
as Breitbart News. Donald Trump has appointed Breitbart’s executive chair-
man Steve Bannon as his White House chief strategist. The alt-right move-
ment uses hashtags such as #WhiteGenocide, #MAGA (Make America Great
Again), #ccot (Conservative Christians on Twitter), #tcot (Top Conservative
on Twitter), #WhiteSupremacist, #AltRight, #AntiWhite, #WhiteLivesMatter,
#WarOnWhites, #NRx (Neoreaction). The Guardian has reported that Trump
supporters spread fake news stories and conspiracy theories about Hillary Clin-
ton on social media.42 Empirical research confirms such tendencies.43 As dia-
lectical counter-pole to the fact that there are fake online stories, one must also
stress that fact-checking organisations that work on professionally revealing
truths and falsehoods have emerged. They are organisations such as the Inter-
national Fact-Checking Network.
The Norwegian Nazi terrorist Anders Breivik was quite digitally savvy. He
gathered information online, purchased weapons and bomb equipment online,
was an online gaming enthusiast (World of Warcraft, Call of Duty) participated
in far-right discussion fora such as Stormfront, nordisku.nu and document.no,
 Propaganda 2.0 83

gathered more than 9,000 friends on Facebook, and spread propaganda videos
with the help of YouTube and Vimeo.44
Even if we do not like it, fascism and right-wing extremism on social media
are to a significant degree public forms of communication. They constitute
a reactionary public sphere that is mediated by the internet, social media,
mobile communication, etc. The point is to create a political climate in soci-
ety that advances democratic and civil public spheres, which is however not
just an issue that concerns how we communicate. It is also a political task
that needs to aim at overcoming inequality, discrimination exploitation and
domination in society. Online fascism is online communication that aims to
advance creating a fascist society by spreading hatred, prejudices, authori-
tarian populism, friend/enemy propaganda, and fetishist political ideology.
Right-wing extremism online appropriates certain elements of fascism (e.g.
hatred against immigrants and refugees, anti-Semitism, anti-socialism, etc.)
in online speech.
In an interview Herman and Chomsky argued that right-wing media,
including Fox News, right-wing talk radio and blogs, form ‘a right-wing attack
machine and echo-chamber.’45 In the current political climate of nationalism,
racism, xenophobia and elements of fascism, social media is certainly a right-
wing attack machine. It must, however, also be seen that the political left is
skilled at using social media, which maintains online politics as a contradictory
space.

2.5 Ideologies

Ideology is a complex term with many meanings that range from individual
or collective meanings or worldviews to the notion of false consciousness.46
The advantage of a critical notion of ideology over a general one is that it
allows normative judgements about how a good society looks like. Her-
man and Chomsky speak of neoliberal ideology,47 Western ideology,48 anti-­
Communist ideology,49 the national-security ideology,50 right-wing ideol-
ogy,51 and the ideology of national security.52 But they never define the term.
Ideology can in a critical manner be understood as a semiotic process in
which humans practice the production and spreading of information, mean-
ings, ideas, belief, systems, artefacts, systems, and institutions that justify or
naturalise domination and exploitation.53 Ideology is the semiotic level of
domination and exploitation.
In times of crisis, it is highly likely that all sorts of ideologies are expressed
and challenged in public communication. There are both ideologies of the
internet and ideologies on the internet. Ideologies of the internet are a form of
public communication that fetishises instrumental control of online communi-
cation. It is instrumental communication about instrumental communications,
a meta-form of communication that justifies and defends the application of
84 The Propaganda Model Today

instrumental reason to the internet. Neoliberal ideologies of the internet pre-

sent the online world as a frontier for investments that create a better world.
They leave out questions of inequality, digital labour, class and exploitation. An
example is that Google describes itself as showing that ‘democracy on the web
works,’ reducing democracy and participation to the issue that ‘Google search
works because it relies on the millions of individuals posting links.’ Questions
relating to the secrecy of Google’s search algorithm, its monopoly power in
the search market, users and employees’ lack of control of its means, etc. are
not asked. State ideologies of the internet justify state surveillance, censorship
and control of the internet and leave out questions of privacy and freedom of
speech.
Britain’s Prime Minister Theresa May said that without advanced surveil-
lance capacities and technologies, ‘we run the risk that murderers will not be
caught, terrorist plots will go undetected, drug traffickers will go unchallenged,
child abusers will not be stopped, and slave drivers will continue their appall-
ing trade in human beings.’54 Compare this quote to Donald Trump’s tweet
in figure 6.6. Both present society as being full of illegal immigrants, crimi-
nals, drugs, terrorism, child abuse, slavery, and other dangers. The ideological
trick is to first create the impression of ubiquitous danger and to then call for
quick fixes by calling for deporting or locking up or monitoring scapegoats,
enhancing the use of surveillance technologies, etc. The problem is that there
is no technological fix to political and socio-economic problems. Categorical
suspicion turns the presumption of innocence into a presumption of guilt so
that certain humans are automatically considered terrorists and criminal until
proven innocent.
Ideology on the internet is the phenomenon of fascism, racism, right-wing
extremism, nationalism, classism, sexism, anti-Semitism, etc. online. Given
that right-wing ideology is flourishing in many societies, it is also exceed-
ingly present online and on social media. Ideology on the internet tends to
make use of visual means and tabloidisation (simplification, using few words,
emotionalisation, scandalisation, polarisation, banalisation, manipulation,
fabrication, etc.). User-generated ideology is the phenomenon that ideology
production is no longer confined to professional ideologues, but has become
possible on the level of everyday life. Ideologies are sensational, populist,
simplistic, emotional, and speak directly to particular subjects. Because of
these features, online ideology tends to attract a lot of attention. Algorithms
reward those who gain significant levels of attention by helping to further
amplifying them. Therefore, there is a tendency of algorithmic amplification
of online ideologies.
The 2016 Austrian presidential election saw a run-off between far-right
­candidate Norbert Hofer representing the Freedom Party of Austria and the
Green Party candidate Alexander Van der Bellen. Hofer’s supporters m ­ obilised
especially on Facebook, where they often spread violent threats against Van
der Bellen, refugees, immigrants, and others. An analysis of such ­comments
 Propaganda 2.0 85

showed that the important elements of political communication were:

(1) authoritarian populism guided by the leadership principle, (2) nationalism,
(3) the friend/enemy scheme, and (4) militancy and violent threats.55
Herman remarks that the ‘fifth filter – anti-communist ideology – is pos-
sibly weakened by the collapse of the Soviet Union and global socialism.’ The
situation has again changed since with various Occupy movements, Jeremy
Corbyn, Bernie Sanders, Syriza, Podemos, etc., once again putting the idea of
socialism on the political agenda. We see both liberal and right-wing main-
stream media in Britain waging an ideological war against such people and
movements. As an example, a study of journalistic representations of Jeremy
Corbyn found that in 89% of 812 analysed news stories, Corbyn’s views were
absent, distorted or challenged. Forty-three per cent of all stories ridiculed or
personally attacked Corbyn. The study concludes that ‘the degree of viciousness
and antagonism with which the majority of the British newspapers have treated
Corbyn is deemed to be highly problematic from a democratic perspective.’56
Another study showed how anti-socialist ideology directed against Corbyn also
spread on Twitter and was organised as a red scare 2.0.57 ‘In the analysed data-
set, users for example argued that because of being left-wing, Corbyn is loony,
an extremist and dangerous (compressed general ideology), is a friend of ter-
rorists, radicals and dictators and thereby supports Britain’s enemies (foreign
policy discourse topic), wants to create a state-controlled economy that will
result in poverty and deprivation for all (command economy-discourse topic),
wants to create a totalitarian state like Stalin or Mao did (authoritarian and
totalitarian politics discourse politics), and is an old, badly dressed, vegetar-
ian, bike-riding loony-left hippie with a beard (culture and lifestyle discourse
topic). The foreign policy, command economy, and lifestyle-discourse topics
were also prominently featured in the right-wing media. User-generated ideol-
ogy on Twitter in these cases is closely related to ideologies spread by the mass
media. It copies the latter’s contents by linking to articles, using certain head-
lines or biased phrases such as ‘the Loony Left’ and at the same time feeds these
media by showing that there is an interest in and positive response to stories
that scapegoat the Left.’58
But social media and society are not exclusive terrains of the right. There is
always the potential for contestation. The same study showed that left-wing
activists can challenge ideology by characterising those attacked in positive
terms, using satire, humour, sarcasm, provide links and arguments showing
the world’s complexity and contradictions, argumentative dialectical reversals.
Such strategies tend to be smart, complex, and dialectical.

3. Assessment

Table 6.2 summarises the discussion of the online propaganda model.

On the one hand it seems like the propaganda model is also relevant in
the online world because we continue to live in a society shaped by class
86 The Propaganda Model Today

and domination. On the other hand, the model also needs to be adapted
and extended because of particular features of digital capitalism and digital
media.
Above we have discussed the role of algorithms that partly automate propa-
ganda in the form of intransparent search and ranking algorithms as well as
political blogs. Native advertising and branded content enhance the power of
corporations and enable them to displace journalism’s autonomy and to present
product propaganda as editorial content. A further differentiation that must be
taken into account is that in computer networks and on networked computers,
the production, diffusion and consumption of information converges. Audi-
ences become users and prosumers (productive consumers). This model is dif-
ferent from the broadcast model of communication. Power asymmetries are,
however, not automatically sublated, but further complicated. Another impor-

Dimension Internet
Size, Ownership, Concentrated social media markets, concentrated ­ownership,
Profit Orientation intransparent and secret algorithms that determine the
­priorities of how results and news are presented
Advertising Transnational corporations are able to confront users with
targeted ads and content;
Native online advertising and branded online content threaten
news-media’s-independence;
The online advertising-user-spiral increases social media’s
power in advertising and as news media and advances
­monopoly tendencies in the online economy;
On social media, users’ digital labour produces a data
­commodity and is exploited by the platforms in order to sell
targeted ad spaces
Sourcing Traditional news organisations are powerful actors in online
news;
Online attention as commodity manipulates political
­communication;
Corporations and entertainment dominate social media
­attention;
Political bots distort the political public sphere
Flak, Mediated Bots and other tools for automated lobbying;
Lobbying Social media use by politicians, parties, movements;
Online hate speech
Ideologies Ideologies of the internet;
Ideologies on the internet and user-generated ideologies;
Algorithmic amplification of online ideologies

Table 6.2: The Online Propaganda Model (PM).

 Propaganda 2.0 87

tant aspect is that we should always think of potentials for resistance and study
actual oppositional developments.
I find the PM a useful model for the analysis of power structures in media
systems, as this chapter demonstrates. But we also need a further refinement
and extension that brings us beyond the PM and takes critiques of capitalism,
anti-democratic elements of state power, acceleration, etc. into account when
analysing media systems. There is a range of topics, such as the exploitation of
labour and surveillance, that relates to (digital) media that need to be critically
analysed.59 Wherever there are communications systems in capitalism, there
are also workers. And a specific share of them is exploited in class relations.
In the production of digital media, there is an international division of digital
labour in which we find diverse workers, such as African slave-miners, Chi-
nese hardware-assemblers working at Foxconn, highly paid and highly stressed
software engineers, precarious clickworkers and call centre agents, online free-
lancers, precarious creative workers, social media user-workers, etc.60 Edward
Snowden unveiled the existence of a surveillance-industrial internet complex,
through which secret services bulk-monitor users’ online activities, which has
resulted in concerns about the violation of basic rights. Social media are accel-
erated, high-speed media. Nobody can read all tweets posted about an impor-
tant topic. Tweets and online information flow at such a speed that there is no
time for real debate and controversy. Postings tend to be short, entertaining,
and superficial. Online brevity provokes superficiality and the negation of the
world’s complexity. Online communication tends to take place in fragmented
and isolated publics, filter bubbles, and echo chambers that lack constructive
controversy.
All of these problems are not problems of propaganda but of power in gen-
eral. We therefore need a model of power on social media. It needs to stress
various dimensions, conflicts, and lines of potential struggle. For doing so, we
also need a model of society. Society is the totality of communicative, social
relations that take place in the context of dialectics of structure and agency.
An understanding commonly used in sociology is that society and all social
systems have three dimensions: the economy, politics, and culture. These are
realms for the production of use-values (economy), collective decisions (poli-
tics), and meanings (culture). Any particular social system has an economic, a
political and a cultural dimension. One of these dimensions may be dominant,
which situates this social system in a particular subsystem of society. Table 6.3
shows the role of power structures in society in general and modern society in
particular.
The internet and social media platforms are social systems. Power should there-
fore be analysed in the context of the economic, political and cultural d
­ imensions.
Modern society has a capitalist economy that is based on the ­accumulation
of monetary capital. It is, however, according to Pierre Bourdieu, also based
on the accumulation of political (influence) and cultural power (­reputation).
88 The Propaganda Model Today

Dimension of Definition of power Structures of power in modern

society society
Economy Control of use-values and Monetary capital: Control of
resources that are produced, money and capital.
distributed and consumed.
Politics Influence on collective decisions Influence: Control of
that determine aspects of the ­governments, bureaucratic
lives of humans in certain com- state institutions, parliament,
munities and social systems. military, police, parties, lobby
groups, civil society groups, etc.
Culture Definition of moral values and Reputation: Control of
meanings that shape what is ­structures that define moral
considered as important, reputa- values and meanings in society
ble and worthy in society. (e.g. universities, religious
groups, intellectual circles,
opinion-making groups, etc.).

Table 6.3: Three forms of power.61

Accumulation of power is the defining feature of modern society that there-

fore not only has a capitalist economy but also is a capitalist society. Table 2
therefore also shows the forms that power take on in capitalist society.
Table 6.4 shows a theoretical model of power in digital capitalism.
As mentioned above, this model is based on a theoretical distinction between
three realms of society: the economy, politics, and culture.62 It is also grounded
in the philosophical dialectic of the subject and the object that contains three
dimensions: human subjects, inter-subjective processes, and objective struc-
tures/social systems. Power in class societies is contradictory. It is organised
in the form of economic, political and cultural contradiction. Which pole is
more powerful under particular conditions is not pre-determined. Those who
control resources normally tend to have power advantages. Given that there are
structural contradictions, there is always the potential for actual social strug-
gles. These potentials are, however, not automatically realised.
Table 6.4 shows a power structure model for digital society that could also be
more generalised for modern society as a whole, for class societies, etc. Herman
and Chomsky’s PM covers some aspects of the power structure model, espe-
cially those that focus on politics, economy, the system, and dominant subject
groups.
This chapter has shown that the PM remains relevant for the critical study of
the internet, social media, and Big Data. Given the dialectical and historical
character of both communications and society, we need to think of subjects,
processes, objects, contradictions, the economy, politics, and culture, as well as
the interaction of these dimensions, when analysing power in class societies.
 Propaganda 2.0 89

Subjects Processes System

Economy Digital labour Exploitation, concentration, Digital capitalism
(users) vs. digital commodification vs. digital
capital vs. socialism/
common ownership, self-­ commonism
management, commonification
Politics The Left online Political control, propaganda, Surveillance-
vs. the Right hate speech, surveillance, industrial internet
online algorithmisation of politics, war complex vs.
vs. participatory
self-determination, democracy
dialectical discourse,
­humanisation, peace
Culture Everyday users Stratification of attention, Disrespectful
vs. online acceleration, tabloidisation, society vs. solidary
celebrities and spectacles, malrecognition society of mutual
influencers vs. respect and aid
Equalisation, deceleration,
critique, dialectisation of
­discourse, recognition

Table 6.4: Power structures and power contradictions in digital capitalism.

Notes and Bibliography

1
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Polit-
ical Economy of the Mass Media (London: Vintage, 1988).
2
Ibid, p.2.
3
Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse
Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 377.
4
See: Edward S. Herman (1996), ‘The Propaganda Model,’ Monthly Review
48 (3): 115–128.
5
Joan Pedro (2011), ‘The Propaganda Model in the Early 21st Century,’ Inter-
national Journal of Communication 5 : 1865–1926.
6
Edward S. Herman, ‘The Propaganda Model: A Retrospective,’ Journalism
Studies 1 (1) (2000), 101–112, 109.
7
Ibid, p.122.
8
Ibid, p.127.
9
Ibid, p.109.
10
Ibid, p.109.
11
Data source: Alphabet, 2016 Proxy Statement.
12
Data source: Facebook, Form DEF 14A for the period ending 20 June, 2016.
13
Data source: netmarketshare.com, accessed on 15 September, 2016.
90 The Propaganda Model Today

14
PEW Research Center, ‘The 2016 Presidential Campaign – a News Event That’s
Hard to Miss,’ accessed 6 August , 2017, http://www.journalism.org/2016/02/04/
the-2016-presidential-campaign-a-news-event-thats-hard-to-miss.
15
Victor Luckerson, ‘Here’s How Facebook’s News Feed Actually Works,’ Time
Online, 9 July, 2015.
16
Christian Fuchs (2017), Social Media: A Critical Introduction (London:
Sage) 2nd edition.
17
Source: Ofcom, International Communications Market Report 2015. Avail-
able from: https://www.ofcom.org.uk, 26.
18
Fuchs, Social Media.
19
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, ‘The Propaganda Model After
20 Years: Interview conducted by Andrew Mullen,’ Westminster Papers in
Communication and Culture 6 (2) (2009): 20.
20
Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 17.
21
Lars Furhoff (1973), Some Reflections on Newspaper Concentration. Scan-
dinavian Economic History Review 21 (1): 1–27.
22
http://www.sekkeistudio.com/blog/2015/08/who-are-adwords-biggest-ads-
spenders/
23
http://www.businessinsider.com/top-advertisers-on-facebook-2013-11?IR=T
24
Dallas W. Smythe (1977), ‘Communications: Blindspot of Western Marx-
ism,’ Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 1 (3): 1–27.
25
Christian Fuchs (2015), Culture and Economy in the Age of Social Media
(New York: Routledge); Christian Fuchs (2014), Digital Labour and Karl
Marx (New York: Routledge).
26
Colin Sparks (2007), ‘Extending and Refining the Propaganda Model,’ West-
minster Papers in Communication and Culture 4 (2): 68–84, 81.
27
Des Freedman (2009), ‘“Smooth Operator?” The Propaganda Model and
Moments of Crisis,’ Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture 6
(2): 59–72.
28
Ibid, 71.
29
Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, xii.
30
Manuel Castells (2009), Communication Power (Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
31
Fuchs, Social Media.
32
Herman and Chomsky, ‘The Propaganda Model After 20 Years’: 12–22, 20.
33
Data source: alexa.com, accessed on November 11, 2016.
34
Fuchs, Social Media.
35
Herman and Chomsky, ‘The Propaganda Model after 20 Years’, 20.
36
Bence, Kollanyi, Philip N. Howard, and Samuel C. Woolley, ‘Bots and Auto-
mation over Twitter during the Third U.S. Presidential Debate,’ accessed
6 August 2017, http://politicalbots.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Data-
Memo-Third-Presidential-Debate.pdf
37
Pedro, The Propaganda Model in the Early 21st Century, 1871.
38
Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, 26.
 Propaganda 2.0 91

39
Fuchs, Social Media.
40
Christian Fuchs (2014), OccupyMedia! The Occupy Movement and Social
Media in Crisis Capitalism (Winchester: Zero Books).
41
Data source: twitter.com. Accessed on 12 November 2016.
42
‘Facebook’s failure: did fake news and polarized politics get Trump elected?’
The Guardian Online, 10 November 2016.
43
Anikó Félix (2015), ‘‘‘Migrant Invasion” as a Trojan Horseshoe,’ In Trust
Within Europe, (Budapest: Political Capital), 63–79.
44
Jacob Aasland Ravndal (2013), ‘Anders Behring Breivik’s Use of the Internet
and Social Media,’ Journal EXIT-Deutschland 1 (2): 172–185.
45
Herman and Chomsky, The Propaganda Model after 20 Years, 14.
46
Fuchs, Culture and Economy in the Age of Social Media.
47
Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, xiv.
48
Ibid, 29.
49
Ibid, 35.
50
Ibid, 99.
51
Ibid, 145.
52
Ibid, 113.
53
Fuchs, Culture and Economy in the Age of Social Media, chapter 3.
54
https://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2014-07-15a.704.0&s=iain
+wright
55
Christian Fuchs, ‘Racism, Nationalism and Right-Wing Extremism
Online: The Austrian Presidential Election 2016 on Facebook,’ Momentum
­Quarterly – Zeitschrift für sozialen Fortschritt (Journal for Societal Pro-
gress) 5 (3) (2016): 172–196.
56
Bart Cammaerts, Brooks DeCillia, João Carlos Magalhães, and César Jime-
nez-Martínez, (2016), Journalistic Representations of Jeremy Corbyn in the
British Press: From Watchdog to Attackdog (London: LSE), 12.
57
Christian Fuchs (2016), Red Scare 2.0: User-Generated Ideology in the Age
of Jeremy Corbyn and Social Media. Journal of Language and Politics 15 (4):
369–398.
58
Ibid, 393.
59
Fuchs, Social Media.
60
Christian Fuchs, ‘Digital Labor and Imperialism,’ Monthly Review 67 (8)
(2016): 14–24.
61
Source: Christian Fuchs, Social Media, chapter 2.
62
Christian Fuchs (2008), Internet and Society: Social Theory in the Informa-
tion Age (New York: Routledge); Christian Fuchs, Social Media.