Agrarian Law & Social Legislation

JULY 7, 2022 ASSIGNMENT

Notes

Agrarian Law – the term “agrarian” is derived from the Latin word “ager” which means a field. Lexically, the word
agrarian means “relating to land or to the ownership or division of land.”

Agrarian Law, therefore, basically refers to the distribution of public agricultural lands, large estates and regulation of
the relationship between the landowner and the farmer who works on the land. It embraces all laws that govern and
regulate the rights and relationship over agricultural lands between landowners, tenants, leasees, or agricultural
workers.

Presently, the focus of agrarian laws is on agrarian reform, the thrust of which is the redistribution of agricultural
lands. Our basic law on Agrarian Reform is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, supplemented by the Tenant
Emancipation Law and the Code of Agrarian Reforms.

The primary objective of the agrarian reform program is to breakup agricultural lands and transform them into
economic-size farms to be owned by the farmers themselves, with the end in view of uplifting their socio-economic
status.

The agrarian reform program is founded on the right of the farmers and regular farm workers who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in case of other farm workers, to receive a just share in the fruits
thereof.

Social Legislation – there is no precise definition for social legislation. Social legislation is so broad that it covers
labor laws, agrarian laws, and welfare laws. The emphasis is more on the aspect of general public good and social
welfare. Essentially, these are laws or statues enacted pursuant to the social justice clause of the Constitution.

1. RA 6657 (as amended by RAs 7881, 7905, 8532 and 9700)

Republic Act No. 6657

(As amended by Republic Act Nos. 7881, 7905, 8532 and 9700)
AN ACT INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE
AND INDUSTRIALIZATION, PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

“Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988”

Agrarian law embraces all laws that govern and regulate the rights and relationship over agricultural lands between
landowners, tenants, leasees, or agricultural workers.

AGRARIAN REFORM means the redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced to farmers and regular
farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement, to include the totality of factors and support
services designed to lift the economic status of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the
physical redistribution of lands, such as production or profit-sharing, labor administration, and the distribution of
shares of stocks, which will allow beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work.
It is not confined to distribution of lands to landless farmers and regular farmworkers, it includes other alternative
modes, such as: (a) labor administration; (b) profit-sharing; and (c) stock distribution. The reason is because to
confine agrarian reform to land distribution is simply not feasible considering there is not enough agricultural land that
can be distributed to every farmer or regular farmworker.

Applicability: it applies only to agricultural lands. It does not apply to lands classified as residential, commercial,
industrial, mineral, or forest land.

Agricultural Land refers to land devoted to agricultural activities. It contemplates lands that are arable and suitable for
farming.

Constitutionality: The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is not unconstitutional because it is a valid exercise of
police power.

SECTION 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies. — It is the policy of the State to pursue a Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest
consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization,
and the establishment of owner cultivatorship of economic-size farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture.

To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due regard to the rights of landowners to just
compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farmworkers with
the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of
agricultural lands.

The agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits
thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to
the priorities and retention limits set forth in this Act, having taken into account ecological, developmental, and equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. The State shall respect the right of small
landowners, and shall provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers and landowners, as well as cooperatives and other
independent farmers’ organizations, to participate in the planning, organization, and management of the program,
and shall provide support to agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial
production, marketing and other support services.

The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform, or stewardship, whenever applicable, in accordance with law,
in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain, under lease or
concession, suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates, which shall be distributed to
them in the manner provided by law.

By means of appropriate incentives, the State shall encourage the formation and maintenance of economic-size
family farms to be constituted by individual beneficiaries and small landowners.
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of
communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through
appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production and marketing assistance and other services.
The State shall also protect, develop and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing
grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in
the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

The State shall be guided by the principles that land has a social function and land ownership has a social
responsibility. Owners of agricultural lands have the obligation to cultivate directly or through labor administration the
lands they own and thereby make the land productive.

The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian reform program to promote
industrialization, employment and privatization of public sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment
for lands shall contain features that shall enhance negotiability and acceptability in the marketplace.
The State may lease undeveloped lands of the public domain to qualified entities for the development of capital
intensive farms, and traditional and pioneering crops especially those for exports subject to the prior rights of the
beneficiaries under this Act.

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: The primary objective of agrarian reform is to breakup agricultural lands and transform them
into economic-size farms to be owned by the farmers themselves, with the end in view of uplifting their socio-
economic status.

FOUNDED on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. At best, it merely provides a
favorable chance of uplifting the economic status of the agrarian reform beneficiaries, which may or may not be
attained.

Economic Family-Size Farm – means an area of farm land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of
the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family’s
needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the
land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly functions in income.

SECTION 3. Definitions. – For the purpose of this Act, unless the context indicates otherwise:

(a) Agrarian Reform means the redistribution of lands, regardless of crops or fruits produced to farmers and regular
farmworkers who are landless, irrespective of tenurial arrangement, to include the totality of factors and support
services designed to lift the economic status of the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the
physical redistribution of lands, such as production or profit-sharing, labor administration, and the distribution of
shares of stocks, which will allow beneficiaries to receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work.

(b) Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops,
growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other
farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons
whether natural or juridical.

(c) Agricultural Land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’ associations
or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions
of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether
the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.

(e) Idle or Abandoned Land refers to any agricultural land not cultivated, tilled or developed to produce any crop nor
devoted to any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of three (3) years immediately prior to the receipt
of notice of acquisition by the government as provided under this Act, but does not include land that has become
permanently or regularly devoted to non-agricultural purposes. It does not include land which has become
unproductive by reason of force majeure or any other fortuitous event, provided that prior to such event, such land
was previously used for agricultural or other economic purpose.

(f) Farmer refers to a natural person whose primary livelihood is cultivation of land or the production of agricultural
crops, either by himself, or primarily with the assistance of his immediate farm household, whether the land is owned
by him, or by another person under a leasehold or share tenancy agreement or arrangement with the owner thereof.

(g) Farmworker is a natural person who renders services for value as an employee or laborer in an agricultural
enterprise or farm regardless of whether his compensation is paid on a daily, weekly, monthly or “pakyaw” basis. The
term includes an individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a pending agrarian
dispute and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular farm employment.

(h) Regular Farmworker is a natural person who is employed on a permanent basis by an agricultural enterprise or
farm.

(i) Seasonal Farmworker is a natural person who is employed on a recurrent, periodic or intermittent basis by an
agricultural enterprise or farm, whether as a permanent or a non-permanent laborer, such as “dumaan”, “sacada”,
and the like.

(j) Other Farmworker is a farmworker who does not fall under paragraphs (g), (h) and (i).

(k) Cooperatives shall refer to organizations composed primarily of small agricultural producers, farmers,
farmworkers, or other agrarian reform beneficiaries who voluntarily organize themselves for the purpose of pooling
land, human, technological, financial or other economic resources, and operated on the principle of one member, one
vote. A juridical person may be a member of a cooperative, with the same rights and duties as a natural person.

 The raising of livestock, poultry or fish is not embraced in the term “Agriculture.”

In the case of Luz Farms v Sec of Agrarian Reform 192 SCRA 51, the Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional the inclusion of lands devoted to raising livestock, poultry and swine within the term
“agriculture.” The reason is because in livestock, poultry, or swine farming no land is tilled and no crop is
harvested. Land is not the primary resource in raising livestock, poultry or even swine. Livestock, poultry, or
swine do not sprout from the land, hence, they are not “fruits of the land.”
SECTION 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands, as provided in Proclamation No. 131
and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking
into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of
the public domain.

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding
paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon.

COVERAGE: As a general rule, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law covers the following lands:
(a) All public and private agricultural lands; and
(b) Other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

Not covered by CARL:

(a) Private lands with a total area of five (5) hectares and below;
(b) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively use for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and
breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves;
(c) Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds;
(d) Lands actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary for:
(i) national defense;
(ii) school sites and campuses;
(iii) experimental farm stations operated for educational purposes;
(iv) seeds and seedling research and pilot production center;
(v) church sites and convents appurtenant thereto;
(vi) mosque sites and islamis centers appurtenant thereto;
(vii) communal burial grounds and cemeteries;
(viii) penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates;
(ix) research and quarantine centers; and
(x) all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developed.

SECTION 5. Schedule of Implementation. – The distribution of all lands covered by this Act shall be implemented
immediately and completed within ten (10) years from the effectivity thereof.

- The implementation was extended as per Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9700. The acquisition and
distribution of agricultural lands was extended up to June 30, 2014.
SECTION 6. Retention Limits. – Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or
indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable
family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following
qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly
managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall
be allowed to keep the areas originally retained by them thereunder: Provided, further, That original homestead
grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner:
Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have
the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with
similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a
leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary
in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant
must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area
for retention.
In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be
respected.
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management, contract or transfer of possession of private
lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void: Provided, however, That those
executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3)
months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares.
RETENTION RIGHT OF A LANDOWNER: The landowner has the right to retain not more than five (5) hectares of
his landholdings. The retained area need not be personally cultivated by the landowner – the cultivation can be done
indirectly through labor administration.
If the landowner has already exercised his right of retention under Presidential Decree 27, he can no longer exercise
the retention right under the comprehensive agrarian reform law.
However, if the landowner chooses to retain the five (5) hectares under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the
seven (7) hectares previously retained by him under Presidential Decree 27 shall be immediately placed under the
coverage of the comprehensive agrarian reform law.
SPOUSES: (a) if the property regime is conjugal or absolute community – the spouses can retain only five (5)
hectares. (b) if the property regime is separation of property – the spouses can retain five (5) hectares of five (5)
hectares each to total of 10 hectares.
RIGHT TO CHOOSE THE RETENTION AREA: Landowner.
[READ THE LAW]
2. History Philippine Agrarian Laws
Spanish Era
- Civil Code (Codigo Civil), Special Provisions for Rural Leases

American Regime
- Rice Share Tenancy Act
- Sugar Tenancy Act

Commonwealth Period
- Commonwealth Act 53 – (tenant’s testimony as prima facie evidence of the terms of tenancy contract not
reduced in writing in a language known to him)
- Commonwealth Act 178 (amended Rice Share Tenancy Act)
- Commonwealth No. 271 (amended Act No. 4119 by extending its application to sugar farm workers)
- Commonwealth Act 461 (enacted to provide security of tenure to agricultural tenants) which was later
amended by Commonwealth Act 608

After the grant of Independence (1946)

- Republic Act No. 34 (amended Rice Share Tenancy Act by introducing changes in crop division)
- Agricultural Share Tenancy Act (repealed all the earlier tenancy laws except the Sugar Tenancy Act)
- Republic Act No. 2263 (amended RA 34)
- Republic Act No. 1400 (expropriation of all tenanted estates)
- Agricultural Land Reform Code (enacted on August 13, 1963, abolished share tenancy and instituted the
agricultural leasehold system)
- Republic Act No. 6989 also known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms (Amended the Agricultural Land
Reform Code)

Marcos Regime
- PD 27 Tenant Emancipation Law (provided the transfer of lands primarily devoted to rice and corn to the
tenants)
- Presidential Decree No. 946 (reorganized the Court of Agrarian Relations)
- Presidential Decree No. 1038 (strengthened the tenure of tenants in non-rice or corn agricultural lands)
- Presidential Decree Nos. 251, 444, 1039 and 1817 (amended the Code of Agrarian Reforms)

1987 onwards
On July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino, exercising her powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution issued Executive Order No. 228 (declaring full land ownership in favor of beneficiaries under Presidential
Decree No. 27) and Executive Order No. 229 (providing the mechanics for its implementation). Subsequently,
Proclamation No. 131 instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program was issued.

On June 10, 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 was enacted. Thereafter, Republic Act Nos.
7881, 7905, 8532, and 9700 were enacted to amend certain provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
 3. DAR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 02-09
October 15, 2009
SUBJECT: Rules and Procedures Governing the Acquisition and Distribution of Agricultural Lands under Republic
Act (RA) No. 6657, as Amended by R.A. No. 9700.
COVERAGE: These rules and regulations shall govern the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands yet to
be acquired and/or to be distributed under the CARP in accordance with R.A. No. 6657, as amended by R.A. No.
9700.
[READ FULL TEXT]
 CASES

(a) TITLE: LUZ FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondent.

REFERENCE: G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990.

PONENTE: PARAS, J

FACTS: The case is a petition for prohibition with prayer for restraining order and/or preliminary and permanent
injunction against the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for acting without jurisdiction in
enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988 and in promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No.
6657, insofar as the same applies to herein petitioner, and further from performing an act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioner.

R.A. 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines on June 10, 1988, which includes the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage. Consequently on January 2, 1989 and January 9, 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage; and promulgated its Rules and Regulations
implementing Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657, respectively.

On the other hand, the petitioner, Luz Farms, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and
together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of the
aforementioned guidelines and rules. Thus, in this petition it prays that it be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it
is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from
enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers.

Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it:

(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural
Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock,
poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine
the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 —
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands
are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and
other farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive:
Provided, That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per
annum unless the DAR, upon proper application, determine a lower ceiling.
 In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the
net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers within ninety (90)
days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."
Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of RA 6657 in its entirety, however, it argued that the said
law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage.

The premise is that livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource
in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and
poultry raisers.

The main contention here is that whether Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are
unconstitutional.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not livestock, poultry and swine raising is included in the scope of the term “Agriculture” under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. (No)

RULING: The Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the inclusion of lands devoted to raising livestock, poultry and
swine within the term “agriculture.” The reason is because in livestock, poultry, or swine farming no land is tilled and
no crop is harvested. Land is not the primary resource in raising livestock, poultry or even swine. Livestock, poultry,
or swine do not sprout from the land, hence, they are not “fruits of the land.”

In ruling, the Supreme Court cited Article XIII, Section 4 on AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM
which provides, viz: Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the
case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners.
The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

The question raised in the instant case is one of constitutional construction, the primary task of which is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers in the adoption of the Constitution. Ascertainment
of the meaning of the provision of Constitution begins with the language of the document itself. The words used in the
Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the
significance thus attached to them prevails.

It is generally held that, in construing constitutional provisions which are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the
courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as throwing light on the intent of the framers of the
Constitution. It is true that the intent of the convention is not controlling by itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary
to the adoption by the people of the Constitution the understanding of the convention as to what was meant by the
terms of the constitutional provision which was the subject of the deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining the
understanding of the people when they ratified it.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word
"agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and
poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.

The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud
devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record,
CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).

The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to
insert the word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and industrial
lands and residential properties because all of them fall under the general classification of the word "agricultural".
This proposal, however, was not considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are limited
to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands
(Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 30).

Taking into consideration the discussion of the Commission, it is evident that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes
"private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial
farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian
reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of
agrarian reform.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13
and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well
as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and
void for being unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.
CONCURRING: J. SARMIENTO
(b) TITLE: FROILAN DE GUZMAN, ANGEL MARCELO and NICASIO MAGBITANG, petitioners, vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and the MUNICIPALITY OF BALIUAG, BULACAN, respondents.
REFERENCE: G.R. No. 156965, October 12, 2006
PONENTE: Tinga, J.
FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari involves the Court of Appeals decision which affirmed the Resolution of
the Office of the President dated October 4, 1999, dismissing petitioners' appeal from the Order of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform declaring that the disputed property cannot be placed under the coverage of the agrarian reform
program or the Operation Land Transfer.
The petitioners Froilan De Guzman, Angel Marcelo and Nicasio Magbitang were among the tenants of a parcel of
land situated at Barangay Pagala, Baliuag, Bulacan, measuring six (6) hectares, and was formerly owned by the
Vergel De Dios family. Sometime in 1979, respondent Municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan (municipality) sought the
expropriation of the land before the now defunct Court of Agrarian Relations. During the pendency of the
expropriation proceedings, the municipality and petitioners entered into a compromise agreement, whereby
petitioners irrevocably withdrew their opposition to the expropriation of the land in consideration of the payment of a
disturbance compensation of P25,000.00 per hectare or P2.50 per square meter. Petitioners also waived "all claims
and demands" against the municipality. Said compromise agreement was approved by The Court of Agrarian
Relations in its decisions dated April 16, 1979 and August 9, 1979.
The municipality eventually acquired ownership of the land through expropriation but it still allowed the petitioners to
continue cultivating their lots pending the construction of the Baliuag Wholesale Complex Market. For this
arrangement, petitioners remitted rentals to the municipal treasurer. Despite the lapse of several years, construction
of the market did not push through. This prompted petitioners, who had continually occupied and cultivated the land,
to file in 1996 a petition with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Baliuag, praying that the land be
placed under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) in accordance with Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Following the
filing of their petition for CARP coverage before the MARO, petitioners filed a complaint on 13 May 1997 with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) against the municipality. In their complaint docketed as
DARAB Case No. 03-02-5054'97, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order to secure their peaceful possession over the land. The Provincial Adjudicator render judgment in
favor of the petitioners on July 17, 1997. On January 6, 1997, the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) issued an order granting the petition and declaring the land as covered by OLT. The municipality
moved for its reconsideration in vain. Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the municipality elevated
the matter to the DAR Secretary who, in his Order dated 8 August 1997, reversed the Order of 6 January 1997 of the
Regional Director.
The petitioners argued that the land involved in the instant case remained agricultural.
ISSUE/S: Whether the subject land can be reclassified to agricultural after the purpose of its conversion to a non-
agricultural land had not materialized. (NO)
RULING: The petition has no merit.
Under Section 3(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL), an agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity as defined therein and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land . The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm
this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not
include commercial, industrial and residential lands."
In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, it was held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity
are outside the coverage of CARL including lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity
of CARL by government agencies other than the DAR. This rule has been reiterated in a number of subsequent
cases. Despite claims that the areas have been devoted for agricultural production, the Court has upheld the "non-
agricultural" classification made by the NHA over housing and resettlements projects, zoning ordinances passed by
local government units classifying residential areas, and certifications over watershed areas issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
The land had ceased to be classified as agricultural when the municipality extended petitioners' occupation of the
land. After the municipality acquired ownership over the land through expropriation and passed the ordinance
converting said land into a commercial area, any transaction entered into by the municipality involving the land was
governed by the applicable civil law in relation to laws on local government. At this point, agrarian laws no longer
governed the relationship between petitioners and the municipality. While it was not established whether the
relationship between petitioners and the municipality was that of a lessor and lessee or that of an employer and
laborer, as the supposed written agreement was not offered in evidence, the fact remains that the subject land had
already been identified as COMMERCIAL in the zoning ordinance. Certainly, petitioners' occupation of the land,
made possible as it was by the tolerance of the municipality, was subject to its peremptory right to terminate. As
absolute owner of the land, the municipality is entitled to devote the land for purposes it deems appropriate.
It is noteworthy that even prior to its expropriation and reclassification, the land was never placed under the coverage
of the agrarian reform program. Although it appears that petitioners had been tilling the land as tenants of the Vergel
De Dios family, the municipality's predecessor-in-interest, the records do not show that petitioners had applied for
coverage of the land under the agrarian reform program. Before a claimant becomes a qualified beneficiary of
agrarian reform, the administrative process for coverage under the CARP must be initiated. The mere fact of
cultivating an agricultural land does not ipso jure vest ownership right in favor of the tiller. Since petitioners had not
applied for CARP coverage prior to the reclassification of the land to commercial, their occupation by mere tolerance
cannot ripen into absolute ownership.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55710 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

(c) TITLE: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
REFERENCE: G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777 July 14, 1989
PONENTE: CRUZ, J.
FACTS: The instant case pertain to consolidated petitions involving the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228
and 229, and R.A. No. 6657, for allegedly violating the due process and equal protection clause of the constitution.
Likewise, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is assailed for apparently being an oppressive exercise of police
power. The question on whether the said law is a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain of the state was also
raised.
Basically, the consolidated petitions revolve around the question on whether or not P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and
229, and R.A. No. 6657 should be declared unconstitutional as the petitioners perceived that the said laws and
issuance are oppressive to small landowners affected by its implementations.
G.R. No. 79777 - Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and
R.A. No. 6657. The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare Riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner
Nicolas Manaay and his wife; and a 5-hectare Riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin
Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by virtue of E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers
under P.D. No. 27. The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.
They contend that then President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said
measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention
limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a
valid appropriation. In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same
may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases
of EPZA v. Dulay and Manotok v. National Food Authority on just compensation. Moreover, the just compensation
contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of
value. In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of
their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order
places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is
imposed on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands
occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure
would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
G.R. No. 79310 - The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members.
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise
legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the
transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised,
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection. They also assailed the Agrarian Reform Fund.
G.R. No. 79744 - The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due
process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused
payment of lease rentals to him.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous
and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President
under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise
of the police power.
G.R. No. 78742 – The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their
respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
ISSUE/S: Whether the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law is constitutional. (YES)
RULING: The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has
already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the
power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under
Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
- The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one
subject, to be expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not
have to be a catalogue of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each
other and may be inferred from the title.
RA 6657 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER - There are traditional distinctions between the police power
and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same
subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal
waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power
being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use.
Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the
verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed
in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property
under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a famous
aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which might
cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a coal
company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder, with
the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained without
compensating the grantor.
EMINENT DOMAIN - Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private
lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to
expropriate where the owner is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary
deed of sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the
price or other conditions offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the
paramount authority of the State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the
irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the
welfare of the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is
absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this
principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
CARP LAW - The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter
attack from those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be
sure, these enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that
they may be sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In
the pursuit of agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and
expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use
Justice Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward,
and, if necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means.
Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for
so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are
removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not
only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and
helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be
his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it
bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last
can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the
dream."
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their
respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights
granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
(d) TITLE: HACIENDA LUISITA, INCORPORATED, Petitioner, LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORPORATION and
RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioners-in-Intervention, vs. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN
REFORM COUNCIL; SECRETARY NASSER PANGANDAMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM;
ALYANSA NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID NG HACIENDA LUISITA, RENE GALANG, NOEL MALLARI, and
JULIO SUNIGA1 and his SUPERVISORY GROUP OF THE HACIENDA LUISITA, INC. and WINDSOR ANDAYA,
Respondents.
REFERENCE: G.R. No. 171101, July 5, 2011
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS: Following the promulgation of the Courts Decision in the above-captioned case on July 5, 2011, the
petitioners present for resolution several issues concerning the said Decision. To recall, in the 2011 Decision, the
Court ordered, among others, that the lands subject of Hacienda Luisita Incorporated's (HLI) stock distribution plan
(SDP) be placed under compulsory coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme of the CARP and declared that
the original 6,296 qualified farmworker beneficiaries (FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI.
ISSUE/S:
I. Is the operative fact doctrine applicable to the present case?
II. Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 constitutional?
III. Did the Court properly determine the coverage of compulsory acquisition?
IV. Has the matter on just compensation been correctly passed upon by the Court?
V. May the subject agricultural lands be sold to third parties though they have not been fully paid?
VI. Did HLI violate any of the provisions under the SDP?
VII. Is the ruling that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI valid?

RULING: [1] The Operative Fact Doctrine is not limited to invalid or unconstitutional laws. Contrary to the stance of
respondents, the operative fact doctrine does not only apply to laws subsequently declared unconstitutional or
unlawful, as it also applies to executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. The "operative fact" doctrine is
embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being
declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with. Evidently, the operative fact doctrine is
not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued by the executive department that are accorded the same
status as that of a statute or those which are quasi-legislative in nature.

[2] As We have succinctly discussed in Our July 5, 2011 Decision, it took the Farmworkers Agrarian Reform
Movement (FARM) some eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the constitutionality of
Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The question of constitutionality will not be passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised
and presented in an appropriate case at the first opportunity. FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly questioning the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second requirement that the constitutional question should be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting. The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional
issue must be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not present, the
constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid,
whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act. If some other grounds
exist by which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of a law, such recourse is favored. Based
on the foregoing disquisitions, We maintain that this Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31
of RA 6657.

[3] FARM argues that this Court ignored certain material facts when it limited the maximum area to be covered to
4,915.75 hectares, whereas the area that should, at the least, be covered is 6,443 hectares, which is the agricultural
land allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco). We cannot
subscribe to this view. Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which
only involves 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then We are constrained to rule only as regards
the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.

[4] In Our July 5, 2011 Decision, We stated that "HLI shall be paid just compensation for the remaining agricultural
land that will be transferred to DAR for land distribution to the FWBs." We also ruled that the date of the "taking" is
November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2.

We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP per PARC
Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess
the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage
through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such
approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition.
[5] There is a view that since the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through
the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989, then the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA
6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999, and, consequently, the qualified FWBs should already be allowed to sell these lands
with respect to their land interests to third parties, including HLI, regardless of whether they have fully paid for the
lands or not. The proposition is erroneous. Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or
conveyed after ten (10) years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land
ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the
instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of
the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage.

[6] AMBALA and FARM reiterate that improving the economic status of the FWBs is among the legal obligations of
HLI under the SDP and is an imperative imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10. FARM further asserts that "[i]f that
minimum threshold is not met, why allow [stock distribution option] at all, unless the purpose is not social justice but a
political accommodation to the powerful."
Contrary to the assertions of AMBALA and FARM, nowhere in the SDP, RA 6657 and DAO 10 can it be inferred that
improving the economic status of the FWBs is among the legal obligations of HLI under the SDP or is an imperative
imposition by RA 6657 and DAO 10, a violation of which would justify discarding the stock distribution option.

[7] Upon a review of the facts and circumstances, We realize that the FWBs will never have control over these
agricultural lands for as long as they remain as stockholders of HLI. In line with Our finding that control over
agricultural lands must always be in the hands of the farmers, We reconsider our ruling that the qualified FWBs
should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control
given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI.
Moreover, bearing in mind that with the revocation of the approval of the SDP, HLI will no longer be operating under
SDP and will only be treated as an ordinary private corporation; the FWBs who remain as stockholders of HLI will be
treated as ordinary stockholders and will no longer be under the protective mantle of RA 6657.
In addition to the foregoing, in view of the operative fact doctrine, all the benefits and homelots received by all the
FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return them, since, as We have mentioned in our July 5,
2011 Decision, "the benefits x x x were received by the FWBs as farmhands in the agricultural enterprise of HLI and
other fringe benefits were granted to them pursuant to the existing collective bargaining agreement with Tadeco."

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS PARC
Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated 22 December 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated 03 May 2006. I dissent
from the majority’s position with respect to how they modified the questioned PARC Resolutions. I would direct the
modifications of the PARC Resolutions in the following manner.
The agricultural lands of TADECO and petitioner HLI are hereby ordered to be subject to compulsory coverage by
the DAR. The previous approval of the SDOA is hereby REVOKED, and the parties thereto are hereby ordered
restored to their previous states, subject to the following conditions:
1. Agricultural lands covered by CARL and previously held by TADECO, including those transferred to petitioner HLI,
shall be subject to compulsory coverage and immediately distributed to the 6,296 original qualified FWBs who signed
the SDOA or, if deceased, their heirs, subject to the disposition of the converted lands expressed in the paragraph
after the next, but shall necessarily exclude only the following:
a. 300 out of the 500 hectares of converted lands, now in the name of LIPCO and RCBC;
b. 80-hectares of SCTEX lands; and
c. homelots already awarded to the qualified FWBs.
2. Petitioner HLI and Luisita Realty, Inc., shall be entitled to the payment of just compensation for the agricultural
lands and the 200-hectare converted lands, respectively, at the time of the actual taking at fair market value, which
shall be determined by the DAR; petitioner HLI shall not be held liable for the payment of rentals for the use of the
property.
3. All shares of stock of petitioner HLI issued to the qualified FWBs, as beneficiaries of the direct land transfer, are
nullified; and all such shares are restored to the name of TADECO, insofar as it transferred assets and liabilities to
petitioner HLI, as the spin-off corporation; but the shares issued to non-qualified FWBs shall be considered as
additional and variable employee benefits and shall remain in their names.
4. Petitioner HLI shall have no claim over all salaries, wages and benefits given to farmworkers; and neither shall the
farmworkers, qualified or not, be required to return the same, having received them for services rendered in an
employer-employee relationship.
5. Petitioner HLI shall be liable to the qualified FWBs for the value received for the sale or transfer of the 300 out of
the 500 hectares of converted lands, specifically the equivalent value of 12,000,000 shares of Centennary Holdings;
for the 300-hectare land assigned, but not less than ₱750,000,000; and the money received from the sale of the
SCTEX land, less taxes and other legitimate expenses normally associated with the sale of land.
6. Petitioner HLI’s liability shall be offset by payments actually received by qualified FWBs under the SDOA, namely:
a. Three percent (3%) total gross sales from the production of the agricultural lands;323
b. homelots awarded to qualified FWBs;
c. any dividend given to qualified FWBs; and
d. proceeds of the sale of the 300-hectare converted land and SCTEX land, if any, distributed to the FWBs.324
The DAR is DIRECTED to determine the scope of TADECO’s and/or petitioner HLI’s agricultural lands that should
have been included under the compulsory coverage of CARL at the time the SDOA was executed on 11 May 1989,
but excluding the lands mentioned above. The lands of TADECO not covered by the SDOA should be covered by
this ruling, after appropriate determination by DAR, considering that they were covered by CARL but operationally
excluded therefrom when TADECO unilaterally assigned to the spin-off HLI only 4,916 hectares of the 6,443 hectares
it owned. The DAR is also ORDERED to monitor the land distribution and extend support services that the qualified
farmworker-beneficiaries may need in choosing the most appropriate and economically viable option for land
distribution, and is further REQUIRED to render a compliance report on this matter one-hundred eighty (180) days
after receipt of this Order. The compliance report shall include a determination of the exact land area of Hacienda
Luisita that shall be subject to compulsory coverage in accordance with the Decision.
Petitioner HLI is REQUIRED to render a complete accounting and submit evidentiary proof of all the benefits given
and extended to the qualified FWBs under the void SDOA – including but not limited to the dividends received,
homelots awarded, and proceeds of the sales of the lands, which shall serve as bases for the offset of its liabilities to
the qualified FWBs – and its accounting shall be subject to confirmation and verification by the DAR.
All titles issued over the 300-hectare converted land, including those under the names of petitioners-in-intervention
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and Luisita Industrial Park Corporations and those awarded as homelots are
hereby AFFIRMED and EXCLUDED from the notice of compulsory coverage. The 200-hectare converted lands
transferred to Luisita Realty, Inc., by petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc., is deemed covered by the direct land transfer
under the CARP in favor of the qualified FWBs, subject to the payment of just compensation.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 14 June 2006, enjoining the implementation of the questioned PARC
Resolution and Notices of Coverage, is hereby LIFTED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
[SHORT VERSION]
Hacienda Luisita v. PARC
G.R. No. 171101, Jul 05, 2011, 653 SCRA 154 (2011)
Facts: In 1957, the Spanish owners of the Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera) sold to Tarlac
Development Corporation (TADECO) Hacienda Luisita and their controlling interest in the sugar mill within the
hacienda. The Philippine Government, through the Central Bank of the Philippines, aided the buyer to obtain a dollar
loan from a US bank. Also, the GSIS Board of Trustees extended loan in favour of TADECO with a condition that
said lots shall be divided at cost to the tenants, should there be any, under Land Tenure Act.
In 1963, the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) was enacted, abolishing share tenancy and converting it to
leasehold tenancy. Subsequently, Congress passed the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) declaring the entire
country a land reform area. A month after the declaration of Martial Law in 1972, then President Marcos Sr. allowed
tenant-farmers to purchase the land they tilled or to change from shared-tenancy to fixed-rent leasehold tenancy. In
1980, the Martial Law Administration filed a suit before the RTC of Manila against TADECO to surrender Hacienda
Luisita to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now the DAR) for its distribution to farmers. The RTC ordered TADECO to
surrender the hacienda to the MAR.
Then during the time of President Corazon C. Aquino, after Marcos was ousted, she instituted Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) in 1988 and created the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) as its
policy-making body, thru RA 6657 (CARP Law of 1988) ushering a new process of land classification, acquisition,
and distribution. Consequently, the CA dismissed the case the Marcos administration initially instituted and won
against TADECO, et al. However, the dismissal was conditioned that there be an approval of a stock distribution plan
(SDP) to be submitted, approved by PARC, and implemented as an alternative mode of land distribution, and failure
to comply will cause the revival of previous decision. Thereafter, the Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) was formed as a
spin-off corporation to facilitate the SDP.

In 1989, about 93% of the Farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) accepted and signed the proposed SDOP. Then, Stock
Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) was entered into by TADECO/HLI and 5,848 qualified FWBs. A referendum
conducted by DAR showed that 5,177 FWBs out of 5,315 participants opted to receive shares in the HLI.
A petition (Petisyon) was then filed for the revocation and nullification of the SDOA and the distribution of the lands.
The Petisyon was filed by the AMBALA (composing about 80% of the 5,339 FWBs of Hacienda Luisita). DAR
constituted a Special Task Force toattend to the issues relating to the SDP of HLI and the latter found that HLI failed
to comply with their undertakings. On December 22, 2005, PARC affirmed the recommendation of DAR to
recall/revoke the SDOP of TADECO/HLI and the land be placed under compulsory coverage or mandated land
acquisition.
Issue: Whether or not PARC has jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLI’s SDP.

Held: Yes. Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve the plan for stock
distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC also
has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive
issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such
power or authority, however, is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary implication, a basic
postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the conferment of express power to approve a
plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or
recall the approval of the plan.
(e) TITLE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM,
through the HON. SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN, Petitioner, vs. SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRI-
BUSINESS CORP., represented by SALVADOR N. LOPEZ, JR., President and General Manager, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
SALVADOR N. LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP., represented by SALVADOR N. LOPEZ, JR., President and
General Manager, Petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, through the Honorable Secretary,
Respondent.

REFERENCE: G.R. No. 178895, and G.R. No. 179071; January 10, 2011

PONENTE: SERENO, J.

FACTS: The instant case pertains to two (2) consolidated Rule 45 Petitions filed separately by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), through the Office of the Solicitor General, and by the Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business
Corp. (SNLABC). Each of which partially assails the Court of Appeals Decision dated June 30, 2006 with respect to
the application for exemption of four parcels of land - located in Mati, Davao Oriental and owned by SNLABC - from
Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).

Four (4) Parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez
Agri-Business Corporation are the subject of this petition.

On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga issued a Notice of Coverage to
petitioner with regards (sic) to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under Compulsory
Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed
with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), Davao Oriental, an Application for Exemption of the lots covered
by TCT No. T-12637 and T-12639 from CARP coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR
Secretary said parcels of land are exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455
hectares are used for grazing and habitat of petitioner’s 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats
and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). On December 13,
1992 and March 1, 1993, the MARO conducted an onsite investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the
presence of the livestock, however, notwithstanding the presence of livestock in the area, the presence of coconut
trees in the area was also taken into account.

The main issue for resolution by the Court is whether the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered
grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL under the Court’s
ruling in Luz Farms v. DAR. The DAR questions the disposition of the Court of Appeals, insofar as the latter allowed
the exemption of the Lopez lands, while SNLABC assails the inclusion of the Limot lands within the coverage of the
CARL.

ISSUE/S: Whether the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business
and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL under the Court’s ruling in Luz Farms v. DAR.

RULING: The Court finds no reversible error in the Decision of the Court of Appeals and dismisses the Petitions of
DAR and SNLABC.
The Lopez lands of SNLABC are actually and directly being used for livestock and are thus exempted from the
coverage of the CARL.
Briefly stated, the DAR questions the object or autoptic evidence relied upon by the DAR Regional Director in
concluding that the Lopez lands were actually, directly and exclusively being used for SNLABC’s livestock business
prior to the enactment of the CARL.

In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL
provisions that included lands devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural" showed that it was
never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of
the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government. Thus, lands devoted to the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus exempt from agrarian reform.

Under the rules then prevailing, it was the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) who was primarily responsible
for investigating the legal status, type and areas of the land sought to be excluded; and for ascertaining whether the
area subject of the application for exemption had been devoted to livestock-raising as of 15 June 1988. The MARO’s
authority to investigate has subsequently been replicated in the current DAR guidelines regarding lands that are
actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising. As the primary official in charge of investigating the land
sought to be exempted as livestock land, the MARO’s findings on the use and nature of the land, if supported by
substantial evidence on record, are to be accorded greater weight, if not finality. Verily, factual findings of
administrative officials and agencies that have acquired expertise in the performance of their official duties and the
exercise of their primary jurisdiction are generally accorded not only respect but, at times, even finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence. The Court generally accords great respect, if not finality, to factual
findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their
jurisdiction.

In the instant case, the MARO in its ocular inspection found on the Lopez lands several heads of cattle, carabaos,
horses, goats and pigs, some of which were covered by several certificates of ownership. There were likewise
structures on the Lopez lands used for its livestock business, structures consisting of two chutes where the livestock
were kept during nighttime. The existence of the cattle prior to the enactment of the CARL was positively affirmed by
the farm workers and the overseer who were interviewed by the MARO. Considering these factual findings and the
fact that the lands were in fact being used for SNLABC’s livestock business even prior to 15 June 1988, the DAR
Regional Director ordered the exemption of the Lopez lands from CARP coverage. The Court gives great probative
value to the actual, on-site investigation made by the MARO as affirmed by the DAR Regional Director. The Court
finds that the Lopez lands were in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used as industrial lands for livestock-
raising.

The Limot lands of SNLABC are not actually and directly being used for livestock and should thus be covered by the
CARL.

In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are thus not
subject to exemption from CARP coverage. In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that conducted the
inspection found that the entire Limot lands were devoted to coconuts (41.5706 hectares) and rubber (8.000
hectares) and recommended the denial of the application for exemption. Verily, the Limot lands were actually, directly
and exclusively used for agricultural activities, a fact that necessarily makes them subject to the CARP. These
findings of the inspection team were given credence by the DAR Regional Director who denied the application, and
were even subsequently affirmed by the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals.
SNLABC’s treatment of the land for non-livestock purposes is highlighted by its undue delay in filing the application
for exemption of the Limot lands. SNLABC filed the application only on 07 February 1994, or three years after the
Notice of Coverage was issued; two years after it filed the first application for the Lopez lands; and a year after the
titles to the Limot lands were transferred to the Republic. The SNLABC slept on its rights and delayed asking for
exemption of the Limot lands. The lands were undoubtedly being used for agricultural purposes, not for its livestock
business; thus, these lands are subject to CARP coverage. Had SNLABC indeed utilized the Limot lands in
conjunction with the livestock business it was conducting on the adjacent Lopez lands, there was nothing that would
have prevented it from simultaneously applying for a total exemption of all the lands necessary for its livestock.

In any case, SNLABC admits that the title to the Limot lands has already been transferred to the Republic and
subsequently awarded to SNLABC’s farm workers. 31 This fact only demonstrates that the land is indeed being used
for agricultural activities and not for livestock grazing. The confluence of these factual circumstances leads to the
logical conclusion that the Limot lands were not being used for livestock grazing and, thus, do not qualify for
exemption from CARP coverage. SNLABC’s belated filing of the application for exemption of the Limot lands was a
ruse to increase its retention of its landholdings and an attempt to "save" these from compulsory acquisition.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petitions of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Salvador N.
Lopez Agri-Business Corp. are DISMISSED, and the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the DAR Regional Director
are hereby AFFIRMED.
(f) TITLE: THE TENANTS OF THE ESTATE OF DR. JOSE SISON, Represented by FERNANDO CAYABYAB,
petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SECRETARY PHILIP ELLA JUICO of the DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, AND THE HEIRS OF DR. JOSE SISON, represented by MANUEL SISON, respondents.

REFERENCE: G.R. No. 93045, June 29, 1992

PONENTE: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision dated March 29, 1990 of the Court of Appeals upholding an order
of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Philip Ella Juico, setting aside the previous orders of his predecessors who had
issued certificates of land transfer to the tenants of the rice and corn lands of the late Dr. Jose Sison without due
regard for the right of his legal heirs to retain ownership of their shares if they did not own more than seven (7)
hectares of rice or corn land.

Pursuant to the Operation Land Transfer Program of the Government under Presidential Decree No. 27, certificates
of land transfer were issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform to the petitioners, tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose
Sison, for their respective areas of cultivation. Upon discovering that certificates of land transfer were being issued to
the petitioners, the heirs of Dr. Sison protested to the then Minister of Agrarian Reform, Conrado Estrella, who
ordered that the certificates of land transfer be marked, "UNDER PROTEST."

Minister Estrella ordered an investigation of the case. The investigation report dated November 17, 1980, revealed
that the landholdings of the late Dr. Jose Sison at Bayambang, Pangasinan, were subdivided among his heirs pro-
indiviso under a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated April 2, 1966. Consequently, the acting MAR District Officer of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, recommended the cancellation of the certificates of land transfer that had been issued to the
petitioners-tenants.
However, a Reinvestigation Report, dated October 8, 1981 recommended that the landholdings be included in the
Operation Land Transfer. This was affirmed in a second Reinvestigation Report dated February 9, 1982. Still another
(third) Reinvestigation Report, dated September 29, 1986, affirmed the previous recommendation that the
landholdings of the Heirs be covered by the Operation Land Transfer. On February 17, 1987, then Minister Heherson
Alvarez dismissed the petition filed by Manuel Sison, as representative of all the Heirs of Dr. Sison, for exemption of
their landholdings from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. The heirs' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order
was denied on July 6, 1987. On December 8, 1987, the heirs reiterated their request for reconsideration when
Secretary Philip Ella Juico succeeded Secretary Alvarez. They stressed the fact that their individual landholdings
were too small, not exceeding 7 hectares each, to come under the coverage of the Operation Land Transfer.

Petitioners herein question the propriety and legality of the order of former Secretary Philip Ella Juico of the
Department of Agrarian Reform dated September 7, 1988, reversing and modifying the orders of his predecessors
which allegedly had attained finality after the lapse of more than five (5) months since the order sought to be
reconsidered therein contained a proviso that "so far as this Office is concerned, this case is considered already
closed" (p. 26, Rollo). He ruled that the Ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno and Peter Sison are exempt from the
Operation Land Transfer and that Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison,
are entitled to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their Ricelands, since they are not owners of more than
seven (7) hectares of other lands, and that Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sison are not entitled to retention or exemption
of their Ricelands from the Operation Land Transfer because they each own more than seven (7) hectares of other
agricultural land. Respondent Secretary allegedly violated the rule on estoppel, which prohibits the resurrection of a
case after the decision has become final and executory.
ISSUE/S: 1. that the order dated September 7, 1988, of respondent Secretary Philip Ella Juico, reconsidering and
reversing the orders of his predecessors dated February 17, 1987 and July 6, 1987, violates the rule on estoppel,
which prohibits the resurrection of a case after it has become final and executory;
2. that the respondents Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison having failed to file any application for retention within the period
required by law, and having filed their intentions to apply for retention and/or exemption only on March 13, 1987,
which was beyond the period required by law, are estopped and totally barred from claiming such retentions or
exemptions;
3. that even assuming that the said Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison are still entitled to file such applications for retention
and/or exemption, still they are disqualified by law to be granted the same under the provisions of P.D. 27, in relation
to LOI 474, which grant such retentions or exemptions only "if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now
cultivate it" (p. 6, Rollo); and
4. that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no more authority or jurisdiction to cancel the Certificates of Land
Transfer after they have been issued to the tenants beneficiaries.

RULING: The petition has no merit.

The first and fourth grounds of the petition for review are not well-taken. The orders for the issuance of Certificates of
Land Transfer to the petitioners had not become final and executory because the certificates had been marked
"under protest" on orders of Secretary Estrella.

The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the technical rules of court practice and procedure do not apply to
administrative proceedings in the Department (formerly Ministry) of Agrarian Reform:

. . . In the present case, respondent Secretary was not in estoppel when it reconsidered the
previous ruling of his predecessor, because the latter's ruling is plainly and directly against the law.
As the order of September 7, 1986, stated, and to repeat, the concerned heirs are entitled under
the law to a retention of seven (7) hectares of agricultural lands which is mandatory and the office
had no discretion to alter the disposition on the retention limits accorded by law to the landowners.
No one, not even the petitioners tenants, nor any court of justice can deprive or deny the land
owners of the retention of seven (7) hectares which the law has reserved for them. Otherwise, the
law would be set to naught or would lose its very reason for being. Besides, there is no
administrative rule or regulation, and Our attention has not been called to it, which would preclude
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, to change the decision of his predecessor if the ruling is patently
against the law; on the contrary justice and equity demand, that the wrong should be righted and
the error should not be made to prevail over what is correct and legal. . . . " (p. 22, Rollo.)

The failure of the private respondents to apply for retention of seven (7) hectares each of their agricultural
landholdings did not constitute an estoppel or waiver of their respective right of retention. The omission was cured by
their timely protest against the issuance of the certificates of land transfer to the petitioners. In the 1st Indorsement by
Gregorio Sapera, Legal Office, of the Kagawarang Pangsakahan, it was noted that as early as December 20, 1973,
the Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison had been seeking exemption of their landholdings from the Operation Land Transfer.

Whether or not each of their Heirs of Dr. Jose Sison owns more than seven (7) hectares of Riceland and other
agricultural lands, is a factual issue which we generally do not review. We are bound by Secretary Juico's finding,
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that their respective landholdings are as follows:

Riceland Other Agricultural

Lands
 1. Elisa S. Reyes 9.3370 Has. 5.3135 Has.
2. Consuelo S. Nazareno 2.4972 Has. 6.1460 Has.
3. Alfredo Sison 5.4584 Has. 9.1935 Has.
4. Renato Sison 9.4091 Has. 5.2435 Has.
5. Peter Sison 4.6663 Has. 5.3135 Has.
6. Jose Sison 9.4069 Has. 5.2435 Has.
7. Josefina S. Zulueta 9.4066 Has. 5.2435 Has.
8. Manuel Sison 2.4972 Has. 12.1529 Has.
9. Jaime Sison 9.1496 Has. 5.2435 Has.
(p. 19, Rollo.)

Secretary Juico and the Court of . Appeals correctly ruled that:

Consequently, the landholdings of Consuelo and Peter, are exempted from the OLT Coverage, and
Elisa, Renato, Jose, Josefina and Jaime are entitled to a retention of not more than seven (7)
hectares of their Ricelands since they are not the owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other
agricultural lands. However, the excess areas of the retained portion are covered by Operation
Land Transfer. With respect to Alfredo and Manuel, they are not entitled to the exemption and/or
retention of their Ricelands because they are owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other
agricultural lands.

Anchored on the rule of law, the applicability of LOI No. 474 (Oct. 21, 1976) as the Implementing
measure of P.D. No. 27 (Oct. 21, 1972) on the foregoing facts and circumstances is mandatory.
This office does not even have the discretion to alter the above disposition on retention limits
accorded the landowners as the law is clear and explicit on this point.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the orders dated February 17, 1987 and July 6, 1987 of this
Office are hereby modified in the following manner as it is declared and ordered that:

1. The Ricelands of Consuelo S. Nazareno situated at Labrador, Pangasinan, and the Ricelands of
Peter Sison situated at Labrador and Bayambang, Pangasinan, are exempted from the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer;

2. Petitioners Elisa S. Reyes, Renato Sison, Jose Sison, Josefina S. Zulueta and Jaime Sison are
to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of their respective Ricelands situated in Bayambang,
Pangasinan, but the excess areas thereof situated in Labrador, Pangasinan, which are covered by
the OLT and the CLTs already issued, if any, to the tenants are hereby affirmed;

3. Petitioners Alfredo Sison and Manuel Sison are not entitled to this exemption and/or retention of
their Ricelands as they are owners of more than seven (7) hectares of other agricultural land, and
the tenant-tillers thereon, if they have not yet been issued the Certificates of Land Transfer, shall
be issued such Certificates by the Regional Director of Region I, DAR, San Fernando, La Union;

4. The tenants in the exempted and retained Riceland areas of the petitioners shall remain as
agricultural lessees thereon and the Certificates of Land Transfer issued to them, if any, shall be as
they are hereby recalled/cancelled; and
 5. The tenant-farmers within the exempted and retained Riceland areas are hereby ordered to pay
to the landowners the lease rentals due them; or if such lease rentals were deposited with the Land
Bank, the landowners are therefore, authorized to withdraw the said deposits. (pp. 19-20, Rollo.)

There is no merit in the petitioners' contention that the Heirs of Dr. Sison are disqualified to retain their shares of the
agricultural lands of the estate for failure to comply with the requirement that "such landowner is cultivating such
area, or will now cultivate it" (p. 23, Rollo), The Secretary interpreted that provision to mean "that the tenants in the
exempted and retained Riceland areas of the concerned Heirs of Sison, shall remain as agricultural lessees therein.
Which means, that while ownership of the exempted and retained Riceland areas shall pertain to the concerned
Heirs of Sison, the petitioners-tenant, as agricultural lessees, shall remain as such and cultivate the same. The
concerned Heirs of Sison therefore, do not have to cultivate the retained and exempted areas, unless the petitioners,
as agricultural lessees, would voluntarily relinquish the task of cultivation and vacate and surrender the said areas to
the Heirs" (p. 23, Rollo; Emphasis ours).

Respect should be accorded to the Secretary's construction of the law which his department administers and
implements (Asturias Sugar Central Inc. vs. Com. of Customs, 29 SCRA 617; Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 166; Sierra Madre Trust vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, 121 SCRA 384).

Hence, personal cultivation by the Heirs of Sison is not a mandatory precondition for them to be entitled to their
retention right.

Secretary Juico's interpretation of the owner's right of retention conforms with our own construction in Association of
Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reforms , G.R. No. 78742, August 23, 1990,
where we ruled that:

. . . in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the
option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural
land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area,
he shall be considered as leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In
case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a
leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a
period of one (1) year from the time the land owner manifests his choice of the area for retention.
(En Banc, Minute Resolution.)

Petitioners' contention that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had no mare authority or jurisdiction to cancel the
Certificates of Land Transfer after they had been issued to the tenants-beneficiaries, is not correct. The issuance,
recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer fall within the Secretary's administrative jurisdiction as
implementor of P.D. 27. Having found that certain heirs of Dr. Sison were entitled to retain their Ricelands (which did
not exceed seven [7] hectares) and had been illegally denied that right, Secretary Juico properly ordered the
cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer which had been erroneously issued to the petitioners.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
Court hereby AFFIRMS it in toto.
(g) TITLE: EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D. DAEZ, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT
OF APPEALS MACARIO SORIENTES, APOLONIO MEDIANA, ROGELIO MACATULAD and MANUEL UMALI,
respondents.

REFERENCE: G.R. No. 133507, February 17, 2000

PONENTE: DE LEON, JR., J.

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 28, 1998
which denied the application of petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez for the retention of a 4.1685-hectare Riceland
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, thereby
reversing the Decision of then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres and the Order of then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona, both of which had earlier set aside the Resolution and Order of then Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao denying exemption of the same Riceland from coverage under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.

Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare Riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan,
Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and
Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
Program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 278 as amended by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 4749. Thus, the then
Ministry of Agrarian Reform acquired the subject land and issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) on December 9,
1980 to private respondents as beneficiaries. However, on May 31, 1981, private respondents signed an affidavit,
allegedly under duress, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers. Armed with such document,
Eudosia Daez applied for the exemption of said Riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as
for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents.

In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064
hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of Riceland, sixteen (16)
hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands 11 in Penaranda, Nueva
Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare Riceland in
Meycauayan.

On July 27, 1987, DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying Eudosia Daez's application for
exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid
agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares12. On June 29, 1989, Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to DAR Secretary
Benjamin T. Leong requesting for reconsideration of Undersecretary Medina's order. But on January 16,
199213 Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the
subject land. Secretary Leong disregarded private respondents' May 31, 1981 affidavit for having been executed
under duress because he found that Eudosia's son, Adriano, who was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor of
Meycauayan, pressured private respondents into signing the same.
Undaunted, Eudosia Daez brought her case on February 20, 1992 to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari.
The Court of Appeals, however, sustained the order of Secretary Leong in a decision dated April 29, 1992. Eudosia
pursued her petition before this court but we denied it in a minute resolution dated September 18, 1992. We also
denied her motion for reconsideration on November 9, 1992. Meantime, on August 6 and 12, 1992, the DAR issued
Emancipation Patents (EPs) to private respondents. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs). Exemption of the 4.1685 Riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27
having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same Riceland, this time
under R.A. No. 6657.

ISSUE/S:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT DISTINCTION BETWEEN
EXEMPTION FROM AGRARIAN REFORM COVERAGE AND THE RIGHT OF RETENTION OF LANDOWNERS IS
ONLY A MATTER OF SEMANTICS THAT AN ADVERSE DECISION IN THE FORMER WILL FORECLOSE
FURTHER ACTION TO ENFORCE THE LATTER CONSIDERING THAT THEY CONSTITUTE SEPARATE AND
DISTINCT CAUSES OF ACTION AND, THEREFORE, ENFORCEABLE SEPARATELY AND IN SEQUEL.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE PRINCIPLE OF RES
JUDICATA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS CASE CITED (EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE DUE TO
NON-TENANCY) AND THE PRESENT CASE (RETENTION RIGHT) ARE OF DIFFERENT CAUSES OF ACTION.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED/OPINED THAT THERE WAS A CUT-OFF
DATE (AUGUST 27, 1985) FOR LANDOWNERS TO APPLY FOR EXEMPTION OR RETENTION UNDER PD 27
AND THOSE WHO FAILED TO FILE THEIR APPLICATIONS/PETITIONS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR
RIGHTS.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS (RESPONDENTS
THEREIN) ARE GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL.
V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF THIS
CASE IS NO LONGER OWNED BY PETITIONERS SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN
ISSUED NOT ONLY THEIR RESPECTIVE CERTIFICATES OF LAND TRANSFER BUT ALSO THEIR INDIVIDUAL
CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE DISPUTED AREA.

RULING: First. Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.
P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted rice or corn lands.
The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn
crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a
landowner may apply for exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence,
a landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is intact and undisturbed.

P.D. No. 27 grants each tenant of covered lands a five (5)-hectare lot, or in case the land is irrigated, a three (3)-
hectare lot constituting a family size farm. However, said law allows a covered landowner to retain not more than
seven (7) hectares of his land if his aggregate landholding does not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares. Otherwise, his
entire landholding is covered without him being entitled to any retention right20.

Consequently, a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does not exceed the
retention limit of seven (7) hectares. In effect, his land will not be covered at all by the OLT program although all
requisites for coverage are present. LOI No. 474 clarified the effective coverage of OLT to include tenanted rice or
corn lands of seven (7) hectares or less, if the landowner owns other agricultural lands of more than seven (7)
hectares. The term "other agricultural lands" refers to lands other than tenanted rice or corn lands from which the
landowner derives adequate income to support his family.

Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice or corn crops even if it
is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to rice or corn crops.

On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are the following: (1) the
land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining
therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than
twenty-four (24) hectares provided that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven
(7) hectares of it consist of "other agricultural lands".

Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT and those for the
grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner's right of retention, are different.

Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the same
thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other.
There was, thus, no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject
4.1865-hectare Riceland, even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became
final and executory.

Second. Petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez may exercise their right of retention over the subject 4.1685 Riceland.

The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to qualification by the legislature 21. It
serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant
and by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner 22.
A retained area, as its name denotes, is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion,
thus sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards,
which would be a pointless process.

In the landmark case of Association of Small Landowners in the Phil., Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform23, we held
that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27 are entitled to the new retention
rights under R.A. No. 665724. We disregarded the August 27, 1985 deadline imposed by DAR Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1985 on landowners covered by OLT. However, if a landowner filed his application for retention after
August 27, 1985 but he had previously filed the sworn statements required by LOI Nos. 41, 45 and 52, he is still
entitled to the retention limit of seven (7) hectares under P.D. No. 27 25. Otherwise, he is only entitled to retain five (5)
hectares under R.A. No. 6657.

Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, which provides, viz.:

Sec. 6. Retention Limits — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or
indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable
family-size, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications:
(1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the
farm; Provided, That landowners whose land have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to
keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long
as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

The right to choose the area to be retained , which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the
landowner. Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant
shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land
with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be
considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be
a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a lease-holder to the land retained by the landowner.
The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice
of the area for retention.

In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be
respected.
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of possession of private
lands executed by the original landowner in violation of this Act shall be null and void; Provided, however, That those
executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the Register of Deeds within a period of three (3)
months after the effectivity of this Act. Thereafter, all Register of Deeds shall inform the DAR within thirty (3) days of
any transaction involving agricultural lands in excess of five (5) hectares26.

defines the nature and incidents of a landowner's right of retention. For as long as the area to be retained is compact
or contiguous and it does not exceed the retention ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be
retained, must prevail. Moreover, Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1991, 27 which supplies the details for the
exercise of a landowner's retention rights, likewise recognizes no limit to the prerogative of the landowner, although
he is persuaded to retain other lands instead to avoid dislocation of farmers.

Without doubt, this right of retention may be exercised over tenanted land despite even the issuance of Certificate of
Land Transfer (CLT) to farmer-beneficiaries.28 What must be protected, however, is the right of the tenants to opt to
either stay on the land chosen to be retained by the landowner or be a beneficiary in another agricultural land with
similar or comparable features.29

Finally. Land awards made pursuant to the government's agrarian reform program are subject to the exercise by a
landowner, who is so qualified, of his right of retention.

Under P.D. No. 27, beneficiaries are issued CLTs to entitle them to possess lands. Thereafter, they are issued
Emancipation Patents (EPs) after compliance with all necessary conditions. Such EPs, upon their presentation to the
Register of Deeds, result in the issuance of the corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCT) in favor of the
beneficiaries mentioned therein30.

Under R.A. No. 6657, the procedure has been simplified 31. Only Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) are
issued, in lieu of EPs, after compliance with all prerequisites. Thereafter, upon presentation of the CLOAs to the
Register of Deeds, TCTs are issued to the designated beneficiaries. CLTs are no longer issued.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area
covered thereby. Under Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994 32, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land
covered is later found to be part of the landowner's retained area.

A certificate of title accumulates in one document a comprehensive statement of the status of the fee held by the
owner of a parcel of land.33 As such, it is a mere evidence of ownership and it does not constitute the title to the land
itself. It cannot confer title where no title has been acquired by any of the means provided by law34.

Thus, we had, in the past, sustained the nullification of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent
because the land covered was not part of the public domain and as a result, the government had no authority to
issue such patent in the first place35. Fraud in the issuance of the patent, is also a ground for impugning the validity of
a certificate of title36. In other words, the invalidity of the patent or title is sufficient basis for nullifying the certificate of
title since the latter is merely an evidence of the former.

In the instant case, the CLTs of private respondents over the subject 4.1685-hectare Riceland were issued without
Eudosia Daez having been accorded her right of choice as to what to retain among her landholdings. The transfer
certificates of title thus issued on the basis of those CLTs cannot operate to defeat the right of the heirs of deceased
Eudosia Daez to retain the said 4.1685 hectares of Riceland.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated January 28, 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Office of the President,
dated July 5, 1996, is hereby REINSTATED. In the implementation of said decision, however, the Department of
Agrarian Reform is hereby ORDERED to fully accord to private respondents their rights under Section 6 of R.A. No.
6657.
(h) TITLE: LUCIA RODRIGUEZ AND PRUDENCIA RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, vs. TERESITA V. SALVADOR,
Respondent.

REFERENCE: G.R. No. 171972, June 8, 2011

PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.

FACTS: The Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the August 24, 2005 Decision and the
February 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 86599. However, per Resolution of this
Court dated August 30, 2006, the instant petition shall be treated as a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the same Rules.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Agricultural tenancy relationship exists in the instant case. (NO)

RULING: Agricultural tenancy is not presumed but must be proven by the person alleging it.

Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case.

Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5)
there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) the harvest is shared between
landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee.

In this case, to prove that an agricultural tenancy relationship exists between the parties, petitioners submitted as
evidence the affidavits of petitioner Lucia and their neighbors. In her affidavit,40 petitioner Lucia declared that she and
her late husband occupied the subject land with the consent and permission of the original owners and that their
agreement was that she and her late husband would cultivate the subject land, devote it to agricultural production,
share the harvest with the landowners on a 50-50 basis, and at the same time watch over the land. Witness
Alejandro Arias attested in his affidavit41 that petitioner Lucia and her husband, Serapio, have been cultivating the
subject land since 1960; that after the demise of Serapio, petitioner Lucia and her children continued to cultivate the
subject land; and that when respondent’s predecessors-in-interest were still alive, he would often see them and
respondent get some of the harvest. The affidavit42 of witness Conseso Muñoz stated, in essence, that petitioner
Lucia has been in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property since 1960 and that the harvest was
divided into two parts, ½ for the landowner and ½ for petitioner Lucia.

The statements in the affidavits presented by the petitioners are not sufficient to prove the existence of an agricultural
tenancy.

In the instant case, petitioners failed to prove consent and sharing of harvest between the parties. Consequently,
their defense of agricultural tenancy must fail. The MTC has jurisdiction over the instant case. No error can therefore
be attributed to the CA in reversing and setting aside the dismissal of respondent’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the remand of the case to the MTC for the determination of the amount of damages due respondent is
proper.
As correctly found by the CA, the element of consent is lacking. 43 Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia, no
other evidence was submitted to show that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest consented to a tenancy
relationship with petitioners. Self-serving statements, however, will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner;
independent evidence is necessary.

Aside from consent, petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest. The affidavits of petitioners’ neighbors
declaring that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest received their share in the harvest are not sufficient.
Petitioners should have presented receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest 45 and that
there was an agreed system of sharing between them and the landowners. As we have often said, mere occupation
or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural tenant. 47 It is incumbent upon a
person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural
tenancy.

RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO THE FAIR RENTAL VALUE OR THE REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR THE
USE AND OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND – The Court however clarifies that "the only damage that can be
recovered [by respondent] is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
leased property. The reason for this is that [in forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases], the only issue raised in
ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which could be recovered are those which the
[respondent] could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of
the property, and not the damages which [she] may have suffered but which have no direct relation to [her] loss of
material possession."

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed August 24, 2005 Decision and the
February 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 86599 are AFFIRMED. This case is
ordered REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete, Cebu, to determine the amount of damages suffered
by respondent by reason of the refusal and failure of petitioners to turn over the possession of the subject land, with
utmost dispatch consistent with the above disquisition.
(i) TITLE: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and GREEN CITY ESTATE & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

REFERENCE: G.R. No. 139592, October 5, 2000

PONENTE: GONZAGA-REYES, J.

FACTS: This is a petition for review by certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 9, 1998
that reversed the Order of petitioner, the Department of Agrarian Reform (petitioner DAR), by exempting the parcels
of land of private respondent Green City Estate and Development Corporation (private respondent) from agrarian
reform. Also assailed in this instant petition is the Resolution dated May 11, 1998 issued by the same court that
denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner DAR.

The five parcels of land in issue has a combined area of approximately 112.0577 hectares situated at Barangay
Punta, Municipality of Jala-Jala, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. M-45856, M-45857,
M-45858, M-45859 and M-45860 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal. Private respondent acquired the land by
purchase on May 26, 1994 from Marcela Borja vda. De Torres. The tax declarations classified the properties as
agricultural.

On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage of the subject parcels of land under compulsory
acquisition pursuant to Section 7, Chapter II of R.A. 6657 or the Comprehensive Land Reform Law of 1998 (CARL).
On July 21, 1994, private respondent filed with the DAR Regional Office an application for exemption of the land from
agrarian reform, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1994 2 and DOJ Opinion No. 44, series of
1990. Administrative Order No. 6 provides the guidelines for exemption from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) coverage while DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, authorizes the DAR to approve conversion of
agricultural lands covered by RA 6651 to non-agricultural uses effective June 15 1988. On October 12, 1994, the
DAR Regional Director recommended a denial of the said petition, on the ground that private respondent "failed to
substantiate their (sic) allegation that the properties are indeed in the municipality’s residential and forest
conservation zone and that portions of the properties are not irrigated nor irrigable".

On February 15, 1995, private respondent filed an Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from CARP coverage.
This time, private respondent alleged that the property should be exempted since it is within the residential and forest
conservation zones of the town plan/zoning ordinance of Jala-Jala. The amended petition for exemption showed that
a portion of about 15 hectares of the land is irrigated riceland which private respondent offered to sell to the farmer
beneficiaries or to the DAR. On October 19, 1995, the DAR Secretary issued an Order denying the application for
exemption of private respondent, on the grounds that the land use plan of Jala-Jala, which differs from its land use
map, intends to develop 73% of Barangay Punta into an agricultural zone; that the certification issued by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is not definite and specific; and that the certification issued by the National
Irrigation Authority (NIA) that the area is not irrigated nor programmed for irrigation, is not conclusive on the DAR,
since big areas in the municipality are recipients of JICA-funded Integrated Jala-Jala Rural Development Projects.
The motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent was likewise denied by the DAR Secretary. Private
respondent then appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the course of the appeal, said court created a commission
composed of three (3) members tasked to conduct an ocular inspection and survey of the subject parcels of land and
to submit a report on the result of such inspection and survey. To verify the report of the commission, the DAR
constituted its own team to inspect and report on the property in question. The verification report of the DAR, duly
filed with the Court of Appeals, objected to the report of the commission mainly due to the lack of specific boundaries
delineating the surveyed areas.
ISSUE/S: Whether the subject parcels of land in issue are exempt from the coverage of the CARL.

RULING: The determination of the classification and physical condition of the lands is therefore material in the
disposition of this case, for which purpose the Court of Appeals constituted the commission to inspect and survey
said properties. Petitioner DAR did not object to the creation of a team of commissioners21 when it very well knew that
the survey and ocular inspection would eventually involve the determination of the slope of the subject parcels of
land. It is the protestation of petitioner that comes at a belated hour. The team of commissioners appointed by
respondent court was composed persons who were mutually acceptable to the parties. 22 Thus, in the absence of any
irregularity in the survey and inspection of the subject properties, and none is alleged, the report of the
commissioners deserves full faith and credit and we find no reversible error in the reliance by the appellate court
upon said report.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION: Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) of 1998 covers all public and private agricultural lands. The same law defines agricultural as "land devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial
land".5

Private respondent sought exemption from the coverage of CARL on the ground that its five parcels of land are not
wholly agricultural. The land use map of the municipality, certified by the Office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (MPDC) of Jala-Jala and the report of the commission constituted by the Court of Appeals
established that the properties lie mostly within the residential and forest conservation zone.

Petitioner DAR maintains that the subject properties have already been classified as agricultural based on the tax
declarations.6 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and petitioner DAR are one in contending that the
classification of lands once determined by law may not be varied or altered by the results of a mere ocular or aerial
inspection.7

We are unable to sustain petitioner’s contention. There is no law or jurisprudence that holds that the land
classification embodied in the tax declarations is conclusive and final nor would proscribe any further inquiry.
Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of a land. In fact, DAR
Administrative Order No. 6 lists other documents, aside from tax declarations, that must be submitted when applying
for exemption from CARP.8 In Halili vs. Court of Appeals9 , we sustained the trial court when it ruled that the
classification made by the Land Regulatory Board of the land in question outweighed the classification stated in the
tax declaration. The classification of the Board in said case was more recent than that of the tax declaration and was
based on the present condition of the property and the community thereat.10

In this case, the Court of Appeals was constrained to resort to an ocular inspection of said properties through the
commission it created considering that the opinion of petitioner DAR conflicted with the land use map submitted in
evidence by private respondent. Respondent court also noted that even from the beginning the properties of private
respondent had no definite delineation and classification. 11 Hence, the survey of the properties through the court
appointed commissioners was the judicious and equitable solution to finally resolve the issue of land classification
and delineation.
The OSG stresses that to be exempt from CARP under DOJ Opinion No. 44, the land must have been classified as
industrial/residential before June 15, 1988. 12 Based on this premise, the OSG points out that no such classification
was presented except the municipality’s alleged land use map in 1980 showing that subject parcels of land fall within
the municipality’s forest conservation zone.13 The OSG further argues that assuming that a change in the use of the
subject properties in 1980 may justify their exemption from CARP under DOJ Opinion No. 44, such land use of 1980
was, nevertheless, repealed/amended when the HLURB approved the municipality’s Comprehensive Development
Plan for Barangay Punta for the years 1980 to 2000 in its Resolution No. 33, series of 1981. 14 The plan for Barangay
Punta, where the parcels of land in issue are located, allegedly envision the development of the barangay into a
progressive agricultural community with the limited allocation of only 51 hectares for residential use and none for
commercial and forest conservation zone use.15

The foregoing arguments are untenable. We are in full agreement with respondent Court when it rationalized that the
land use map is the more appropriate document to consider, thus:
"The petitioner (herein private respondent) presented a development plan of the Municipality of Jala-Jala, which was
approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) on December 2, 1981. It also presented
certifications from the HLURB and the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of Jala-Jala that the subject
properties fall within the Residential and Forest Conservation zones of the municipality. Extant on the record is a
color-coded land use map of Jala-Jala, showing that the petitioner’s land falls mostly within the Residential and
Forest Conservation zones. This notwithstanding, the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform denied the
petitioner’s application on the ground that the town plan of the municipality, particularly Table 4-4 thereof, shows that
Barangay Punta is intended to remain and to become a progressive agricultural community in view of the abundance
of fertile agricultural areas in the barangay, and that there is a discrepancy between the land use map which
identifies a huge forest conservation zone and the land use plan which has no area classified as forest conservation.

However, a closer look at the development plan for the municipality of Jala-Jala shows that Table 4-4 does not
represent the present classification of land in that municipality, but the proposed land use to be achieved. The
existing land use as of 1980 is shown by Table 3-3, wherein Barangay Punta is shown to have a forest area of 35
hectares and open grassland (which was formerly forested area) of 56 hectares. The land use map is consistent with
this."16

Moreover, the commissioner’s report on the actual condition of the properties confirms the fact that the properties are
not wholly agricultural. In essence, the report of the commission showed that the land of private respondent consists
of a mountainous area with an average 28 degree slope containing 66.5 hectares; a level, unirrigated area of 34
hectares of which 5 to 6 hectares are planted to palay; and a residential area of 8 hectares. 17 The finding that 66.5
hectares of the 112.0577 hectares of land of private respondent have an average slope of 28 degrees provides
another cogent reason to exempt these portions of the properties from the CARL. Section 10 of the CARL is clear on
this point when it provides that "all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already
developed shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act".

Petitioner DAR and the OSG contest the finding of the Court of Appeals that the subject parcels of land have a
mountainous slope on the ground that this conclusion was allegedly arrived at in a manner not in accord with
established surveying procedures.18 They also bewail the consideration given by the Court of Appeals to the "slope"
issue since this matter was allegedly never raised before the DAR and the Court of Appeals.19 Petitioner DAR and the
OSG thus claim that laches had already set in.
(j) TITLE: CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA,
petitioner, vs. THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE COURT OF APPEALS
and ALVIN OBRIQUE, REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS
ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO), respondents.

REFERENCE: G.R. No. 100091, October 22, 1992

PONENTE: CAMPOS, JR., J.

FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the proceedings and
decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for brevity) dated September 4, 1989
and to set aside the decision the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of
the DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the
Central Mindanao University (CMU for brevity) land and their inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP for brevity) for distribution to qualified beneficiaries, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The case originated from the complaint filed by complainants calling themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and
Agricultural Laborers Organization (BUFFALO for brevity) under the leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso
against the CMU, before the Department of Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants, under the CARP.
On the other hand, the petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural educational institution owned and run by the state
located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon in early 1910, in
response to the public demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao. It expanded into the Bukidnon National
Agricultural High School and was transferred to its new site in Managok near Malaybalay, the provincial capital of
Bukidnon.

In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college with campus at Musuan, until it became what is now known as the
CMU, but still primarily an agricultural university. From its beginning, the school was the answer to the crying need for
training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and
established the school had a vision as to the future development of that part of the Philippines. On January 16, 1958
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the late Carlos P. Garcia, "upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 53, of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended", issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the
Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area
comprising 3,080 hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner under OCT Nos. 160,
161 and 162.

In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the aforementioned grant of
agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain
ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the
present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.
In the early 1960's, the student population of the school was less than 3,000. By 1988, the student population had
expanded to some 13,000 students, so that the school community has an academic population (student, faculty and
non-academic staff) of almost 15,000. To cope with the increase in its enrollment, it has expanded and improved its
educational facilities partly from government appropriation and partly by self-help measures.
True to the concept of a land grant college, the school embarked on self-help measures to carry out its educational
objectives, train its students, and maintain various activities which the government appropriation could not adequately
support or sustain. In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang
Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees.
This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program the faculty and staff combine themselves to
groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of
assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. Each group pays the
CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to
establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was
expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees.
This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to
utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff
opportunities within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries. The
location of the CMU at Musuan, Bukidnon, which is quite a distance from the nearest town, was the proper setting for
the adoption of such a program. Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven
Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a Physics Instructor
at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. The other complainants who were not
members of the faculty or non-academic staff CMU, were hired workers or laborers of the participants in this
program. When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the agri-
business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training
Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the
complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri-business project,
Obrique was found guilty of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of Executive Order
No. 17, the re-organization law of the CMU.
Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a self-help project called CMU-Income
Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-
reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the
income of the faculty and the staff.
Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement 2 among the CMU, the CMU-Integrated Development
Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups or "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5
hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year. The CMU-IDF would provide researchers and specialists to
assist in the preparation of project proposals and to monitor and analyze project implementation. The selda in turn
would pay to the CMU P100 as service fee and P1,000 per hectare as participant's land rental fee. In addition, 400
kilograms of the produce per year would be turned over or donated to the CMU-IDF. The participants agreed not to
allow their hired laborers or member of their family to establish any house or live within vicinity of the project area and
not to use the allocated lot as collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship
would exist as a result of the Agreement.
Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who were still employed with
the CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees. In the middle of 1987, to cushion the impact
of the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project on the lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed
them to participate in the CMU-IEP as special participants.
Under the terms of a contract called Addendum To Existing Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Participation To
the CMU-Income Enhancement Program, 3 a former employee would be grouped with an existing selda of his choice
and provided one (1) hectare for a lowland rice project for one (1) calendar year. He would pay the land rental
participant's fee of P1,000.00 per hectare but on a charge-to-crop basis. He would also be subject to the same
prohibitions as those imposed on the CMU employees. It was also expressly provided that no tenant-landlord
relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.
The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not
renewed were served with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to
termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and
precipitated the filing of the complaint.
On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot
therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of
suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to
qualified beneficiaries.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the subject land is covered by CARP Law. (NO)

RULING: The 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in its
Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:
It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific
limits as determined by Congress; It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the Central
Mindanao University; and, It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually,
directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school site and campus, including experimental farm
stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers
(k) TITLE: STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN B.
AMANTE, FRANCISCO L. ANDAL, LUCIA ANDAL, ANDREA P. AYENDE, LETICIA P. BALAT, FILOMENA B.
BATINO, ANICETO A. BURGOS, JAIME A. BURGOS, FLORENCIA CANUBAS, LORETO A. CANUBAS, MAXIMO
A. CANUBAS, REYNALDO CARINGAL, QUIRINO C. CASALME, BENIGNO A. CRUZAT, ELINO A. CRUZAT,
GREGORIO F. CRUZAT, RUFINO C. CRUZAT, SERGIO CRUZAT, SEVERINO F. CRUZAT, VICTORIA DE
SAGUN, SEVERINO DE SAGUN, FELICISIMO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO A. GONZALES, GREGORIO
GONZALES, LEODEGARIO N. GONZALES, PASCUAL P. GONZALES, ROLANDO A. GONZALES, FRANCISCO
A. JUANGCO, GERVACIO A. JUANGCO, LOURDES U. LUNA, ANSELMO M. MANDANAS, CRISANTO
MANDANAS, EMILIO M. MANDANAS, GREGORIO A. MANDANAS, MARIO G. MANDANAS, TEODORO
MANDANAS, CONSTANCIO B. MARQUEZ, EUGENIO B. MARQUEZ, ARMANDO P. MATIENZO, DANIEL D.
MATIENZO, MAXIMINO MATIENZO, PACENCIA P. MATIENZO, DOROTEA L. PANGANIBAN, JUANITO T.
PEREZ, MARIANITO T. PEREZ, SEVERO M. PEREZ, INOCENCIA S. PASQUIZA, BIENVENIDO F. PETATE,
IGNACIO F. PETATE, JUANITO PETATE, PABLO A. PLATON, PRECILLO V. PLATON, AQUILINO B. SUBOL,
CASIANO T. VILLA, DOMINGO VILLA, JUAN T. VILLA, MARIO C. VILLA, NATIVIDAD A. VILLA, JACINTA S.
ALVARADO, RODOLFO ANGELES, DOMINGO A. CANUBAS, EDGARDO L. CASALME, QUIRINO DE LEON,
LEONILO M. ENRIQUEZ, CLAUDIA P. GONZALES, FELISA R. LANGUE, QUINTILLANO LANGUE, REYNALDO
LANGUE, ROMEO S. LANGUE, BONIFACIO VILLA, ROGELIO AYENDE, ANTONIO B. FERNANDEZ, ZACARIAS
HERRERA, ZACARIAS HERRERA, REYNARIO U. LAZO, AGAPITO MATIENZO, DIONISIO F. PETATE, LITO G.
REYES, JOSE M. SUBOL, CELESTINO G. TOPI NO, ROSA C. AMANTE, SOTERA CASALME, REMIGIO M.
SILVERIO, THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAGUNA,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR
REGION IV, and REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER FOR REGION IV, respondents.

REFERENCE: G.R. No. 112526 October 12, 2001

PONENTE: PARDO, J.

FACTS: The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals1 affirming the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board 2 (hereafter DARAB)
ordering the compulsory acquisition of petitioner's property under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP).

Petitioner, Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (SRRDC) was the registered owner of two parcels of land,
situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, with a total area of 254.6
hectares.

The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK" by a Zoning Ordinance adopted by the municipality
of Cabuyao in 1979, as certified by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.

On December 12, 1989, Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices of acquisition
to petitioner, stating that petitioner's landholdings had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.

On April 6, 1990, petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property under the
aforesaid land titleswere exempt from CARP coverage because they had been classified as watershed area and
were the subject of a pending petition for land conversion.
On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution voiding the zoning
classification of the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land is now classified as agricultural land.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire property formed
part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of R. A. No. 6657.

RULING: In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs (DAR) Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court held that lands classified as non-
agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL may not be compulsorily acquired for distribution to farmer
beneficiaries.
However, more than the classification of the subject land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey
showed that the parcels of land in question form a vital part of a watershed area.
Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing, petitioner presented proof that
the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted the land from the coverage of CARL.
Hence, the Court remanded the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the parcels
of land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.In the meantime,
the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the
temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision on the
case.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G. R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination of the nature of the
parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.
In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be
stayed by the temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final
decision on the case.
(l) TITLE: ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR REGION IV,
MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.

REFERENCE: G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999

PONENTE: PUNO, J.

FACTS: This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the
acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988.

This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition
of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988.
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas
Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024
hectares in area and is registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 985. This land is covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 0465, 0466, 0468, 0470, 0234 and 0354. Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area, registered
under TCT No. 924 and covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 0236, 0237 and 0390. Hacienda Caylaway is 867.4571
hectares in area and is registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665.
The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C. Aquino. In February 1986,
President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional Constitution. As head of the provisional
government, the President exercised legislative power "until a legislature is elected and convened under a new
Constitution." 1 In the exercise of this legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No. 131
instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the mechanisms
necessary to initially implement the program.
On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative power from the
President. 2 This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of
1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and took effect on June 15, 1988.
Before the law's effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda
Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under
compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law;
and whether or not assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural, Supreme Court
has the power to rule on this issue. (NO)

RULING: There was a violation of due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
when the petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before
acquisition of the property was to be undertaken.

The failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not
give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA's already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to
short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the
chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings.
Finally, we stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition
proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOA's already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To
assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent
DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico
alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. 92 Since then until the present, these farmers have
been cultivating their lands. 93 It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these
people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust
for the rightful owner of the land.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over
the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process therein. In accordance with the
guidelines set forth in this decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is hereby remanded to
respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner's application for conversion.
(m) TITLE: HEIRS OF NICOLAS JUGALBOT, Represented by LEONILA B. JUGALBOT, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and HEIRS OF VIRGINIA A. ROA, Represented by LOLITA R. GOROSPE, Administratrix, Respondents.

REFERENCE: G.R. NO. 170346: March 12, 2007

PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:

Petitioners allege that they are bona fide tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27. Private
respondents deny this, citing inter alia, that Virginia A. Roa was not given a notice of coverage of the property subject
matter of this case; that Virginia A. Roa and the private respondents did not have any tenant on the same property;
that the property allegedly covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 was residential land; that the lot was paraphernal
property of Virginia A. Roa; and the landholding was less than seven (7) hectares.

ISSUE/S: Whether a tenancy relationship exists between petitioners Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, and private
respondents, Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, under Presidential Decree No. 27. (NO)

RULING: The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27 due to the
absence of the essential requisites that establish a tenancy relationship between them.

As clearly laid down in Qua v. Court of Appeals12 and subsequently in Benavidez v. Court of Appeals,13 the doctrine is
well-settled that the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not automatically make the
case an agrarian dispute. It is necessary to first establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between the party
litigants. The following essential requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent; (d) the purpose is
agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there is a sharing of harvests between
the parties.14
Valencia v. Court of Appeals15 further affirms the doctrine that a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Claims
that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements of tenancy must first be proved
in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. There must be evidence to prove the allegation that an
agricultural tenant tilled the land in question. Hence, a perusal of the records and documents is in order to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship does exist between petitioner
and private respondents. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.16
Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a
legal relationship, as ruled in Isidro v. Court of Appeals.17 The intent of the parties, the understanding when the
farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are
even more important.

Without the essential elements of consent and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist between the petitioner and
the private respondents.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 81823 promulgated on October 19, 2005 is AFFIRMED. The Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City is
ordered to CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. E-103 for having been issued without factual and legal basis,
and REINSTATE Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-11543 in the name of Virginia A. Roa. The city Assessor's Office
of Cagayan de Oro is likewise directed to CANCEL Tax Declaration No. 80551 issued to Nicolas Jugalbot
and RESTORE Tax Declaration No. 270922 in the name of Virginia Angcod Roa. The heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot,
represented by Leonila B. Jugalbot or any other person claiming a right or interest to the disputed lot through the
latter's title are directed to VACATE the premises thereof and peaceably turn over its possession to petitioners Heirs
of Virginia A. Roa, represented by Lolita R. Gorospe. No pronouncement as to costs.