Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 116719 January 18, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PATRICIO AMIGO alias "BEBOT", accused-appellant.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

Initially, Patricio Amigo was charged with frustrated murder in an Information reading as follows:

The undersigned accuses the above-named accused of the crime of FRUSTRATED

MURDER, under Art. 248, in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife,
with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and stab with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy, thereby
inflicting injuries upon the latter, the following injuries, to wit:

MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS-LEFT ARM, LEFT CHEST, ABDOMEN AND LEFT

THIGH WITH PENETRATION TO LEFT PLEURAL CAVITY, DIAPHRAGM
STOMACH, DUODENUM, PANCREAS AND MIDTRANVERSE COLON.

thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
murder as a consequence but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is, because of the timely and able medical assistance
immediately rendered to the said Benito Ng Suy.

(p. 1, Rollo.)

to which he pleaded not guilty.

Subsequently, due to the death of the victim, an amended Information was filed charging now the
crime of murder, to wit:

That on or about December 29, 1989, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, armed with a knife,
with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attacked, assaulted and stabbed with said weapon one Benito Ng Suy,
thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds which caused his death and the
consequent loss and damage to the heirs of the victim.

(p. 3, Rollo.)

After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision, disposing:
 WHEREFORE, finding the accused Patricio Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER punishable under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with no
modifying circumstance present, the accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, which is the medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum to death and to pay the cost; to indemnify the offended party the amount of
P93,214.70 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

(p. 32, Rollo.)

Reversal thereof is now sought, with accused-appellant arguing that error was committed by the
trial court in imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact
that Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was
committed.

The facts of the case, as briefly summarized in the brief submitted by the Office of the Solicitor
General and as borne out by the evidence, are as follows:

On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., after having spent half-day at their store,
located at No. 166-A, Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City, Benito Ng Suy was
driving their gray Ford Fiera back home, situated at the back of Car Asia, Bajada, Davao
City. With him during that time were his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one
together with his two year old son, who were all seated at the front seat beside him while
a five year old boy was also seated at the back of the said vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991,
pp. 3-5; TSN, March 31, 1992)

On their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an
orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in
front of the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao City, without noticing the Ford Fiera coming
from the opposite direction. This Tamaraw was heading for Sterlyn Kitchenette, which
was situated at the comer of the said hospital. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 4; TSN, March 31,
1992, pp. 3 and 13)

With Virgilio was Patricio Amigo alias Bebot, a vulcanizer at Lingling's vulcanizing shop
owned and operated by a certain Galadua. He was also seated at the right front seat
beside Virgilio.

Due to the unexpected veer made by Virgilio, an accidental head on collision occurred
between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight damaged to the right bumper of the
latter. (TSN, March 31, 1992, p. 4)

Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's seat and confronted
Virgilio Abogada who also went down from his vehicle. (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 5)

Benito, who was a big man with a loud voice told Virgilio, "You were not looking," to
which Virgilio retorted, I did not see you". (TSN, April 29, 1991, p. 16)

While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who was merely a
passenger of Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of the Tamaraw and
instantaneously approached Benito and advised the latter to leave since it was merely a
small and minor accident. (TSN, April 29, 1991, pp. 16-18)

A bit irritated with the actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the former and told
him not to interfere, since he had nothing to do with the accident. (ibid. p. 7)
 Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio sarcastically asked; "You are Chinese, is
it you?" With a ready answer Benito said; "Yes, I am a Chinese and why?" Patricio in turn
replied; So, you are a Chinese, wait for a while," then left. (ibid. pp. 7 and 19)

Immediately thereafter, Benito ordered Jocelyn to call a policeman, but after a lapsed of
about one minute, Patricio returned and arrogantly approached Benito, asking the latter
once again, "You are a Chinese, is it not?" To this Benito calmly responded in the
affirmative. (ibid. pp. 7, 19-20)

Upon hearing the response, Patricio mumbled "Ah, so you are a Chinese," and suddenly
took a five inch knife from his waist and simultaneously stabbed Benito hitting him twice
on the chest. (Ibid. p. 20)

After being hit, Benito wounded and sensing that his life was in peril, tried to evade his
assailant by pushing Patricio away and run around the Tamaraw but Patricio wielding the
same knife and not content with the injuries he had already inflicted, still chased Benito
and upon overtaking the latter embraced him and thrusted his knife on the victim several
times, the last of which hit Benito on the left side of his body. (ibid. pp. 8, 10, 22)

It was at this juncture that Jocelyn who was still inside the Ford Fiera, pleading for mercy
to spare her father tried to get out of the vehicle but it was very unfortunate that she could
not open its door. (Ibid. p. 10)

Knowing that Patricio was really determined to kill her father by refusing to heed her
pleas, Joselyn shouted for help, since there were already several people around
witnessing that fatal incident, but to her consternation nobody lifted a single finger to help
them. (ibid. pp. 6, 10, 18, 21-22) Only after her father lay seated on the floor of their Ford
Fiera after being hit on the left side of his body that she was able to open the door of the
said vehicle. (Ibid. p 12)

After this precise moment, her younger sister, upon seeing their father bathing with his
own blood, embraced him, causing Patricio to cease from his ferocious assault and
noticing the presence of several people, he fled. (Ibid. p. 22)

Thereafter, an enraged Jocelyn chased him, but since the assailant ran faster than her,
she was not able to overtake him, thus, she instead decided to go back to where her
father was and carried him inside the Tamaraw who bumped them and consequently
brought him to San Pedro Hospital where he was attended to at the Emergency Room.
(ibid. p 13)

While at the Emergency Room, Benito who was on a very critical condition, due to
multiple (13) stabbed wounds, was operated by Dr. Rolando Chiu. After the operation, he
was subsequently brought to the ICU and stayed there for three (3) weeks. (July 12,
1991, pp. 3 and 4)

In a last ditch effort to save his life, having only 10 to 20 percent survival, Benito was
airlifted to Manila and was directly confined at the Chinese General Hospital. After three
(3) weeks of confinement, Benito expired. CAUSE OF DEATH — SEPSIS (an
overwhelming infection). This means that the infection has already circulated in the blood
all over the body. (ibid. pp. 6-7)

(pp. 59-65, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to the promulgation of
Republic Act No. 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the penalty that should
have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by accused-appellant without the
attendance of any modifying circumstances, should be reclusion temporal in its medium period
or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day, to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

Reasons out accused-appellant:

. . . Since the death penalty (or capital punishment) is not imposable when the stabbing
and killing happened, the computation of the penalty should be regarded from reclusion
perpetua down and not from death penalty. Indeed, the appropriate penalty is deducible
from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, there
being no modifying circumstances present (p. 5 Decision, ibid.), the correct penalty
should be in the medium period (Art. 64, par. 1, Revised Penal Code) which is 17 years,
4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal.

(p. 10, Appellant's Brief, ff. p. 50, Rollo.)

The question raised by accused-appellant was settled by this Court in People vs. Muñoz (170
SCRA 107 [1989]) thusly:

In People vs. Gavarra, Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the
abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the
penalty that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua," thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later,
without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-
Herrera in People vs. Masangkay and through Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People
vs. Atencio, divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were
specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People vs. Intino, as follows: the lower half
of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.

The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to
the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the
framers as embodied in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution. This conclusion is
not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which
was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The majority of the Court,
however, is of the belief that the original interpretation should be restored as the more
acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.

The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death
penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the
minimum and the medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in
keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree
feel that Article III, Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and
has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining
penalties. These should be maintained intact.

A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really nothing therein
which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says
that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough.
And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is
plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of
the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.

xxx xxx xxx

The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death
penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should
determine is whether or not they also meant to require a corresponding modification in
the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.

It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in
Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and
unmistakable implication. It would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it
categorically and plainly, leaving no doubts as to its meaning.

One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The writer of this
opinion makes the personal observation that this might be still another instance where
the framers meant one thing and said another or — strangely, considering their loquacity
elsewhere — did not say enough.

The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio and Intino cases
represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it was then constituted. All but two
members at that time still sit on the Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look
at the doctrine on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in the
composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is changing its mind after
reflecting on the question again in the light of new perspectives. And well it might, and
can, for the tenets it lays down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not
petrified rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to change as
all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best, this should not prevent us from
opening a fresh trial or exploring the other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of
continuing inquiry.

Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our) tasks," whatever
that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine providing for three new periods for
the penalty for murder as reduced by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original
interpretation and hold that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the
penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The
range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.

The Court realizes that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities that would not
have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before its modification. Thus, a
person originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed the murder
without the attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both punishable with
the same medium period although the former is concededly more guilty than the latter.
True enough. But that is the will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a
question of wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in the
Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of one penny although he
had worked longer than others hired later in the day also paid the same amount. When
he complained because he felt unjustly treated by the hoe jurisdiction of the court over
the person. An appearance may be madt agree with me for a penny?

The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the Congress. Penalties
are prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative. As judges, we
can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify them or revise their
range as determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on this
prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic aggravating or
mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the offenses, the applicable
sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised
 Penal Code which, conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is
still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we imposed on all the accused-appellants for
each of the three murders they have committed in conspiracy with the others. The award
of civil indemnity for the heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is
hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.

(at pp. 120-125.)

The above ruling was reiterated in People vs. Parominog (203 SCRA 673 [1991]) and in People
vs. De la Cruz (216 SCRA 476 [1992]).

Finally, accused-appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh a
penalty and pleads for sympathy. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of
courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA
LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere — clemency from the executive or an amendment of
the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court can but apply the law.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22301 August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General F. R. Rosete and
Solicitor O. C. Hernandez for plaintiff-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or
not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor
would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14,
1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of
Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody
and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds
of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the
corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked
the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of
the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and
that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can
hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from
the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the
understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly
specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for
his firearm."

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass
on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this
pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in
his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the
necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the
appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a
statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the
accused admits."

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for
the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent
of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another
document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to
proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2 the oath of office of the
accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused
"is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the
presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether
or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt
from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties
were given time to file their respective memoranda. 1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused
"of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from
one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated
from him are forfeited in favor of the Government."

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be
affirmed.

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and
lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines],
the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal
police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers,
municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such
firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their
official duties."6

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
"Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them." 7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be
set aside.

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on
appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within
the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly
covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set
aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this
decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with
authority.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro
and Angeles, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179334 April 21, 2015

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT

ENGINEER CELESTINO R. CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents-movants spouses Heracleo
1

and Ramona Tecson imploring the Court to take a second look at its July 1, 2013 Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated July 31, 2007 in CAG.R. CV No. 77997 is MODIFIED, in that the
valuation of the subject property owned by respondents shall be P0.70 instead of ₱1,500.00 per
square meter, with interest at six percent (6%) per annum from the date of taking in 1940 instead
of March 17, 1995, until full payment.
2

In view of the contrasting opinions of the members of the Third Division on the instant motion,
and the transcendental importance of the issue raised herein, the members of the Third Division
opted to refer the issue to the En Banc for resolution.

For a proper perspective, we briefly state the factual background of the case.

In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took respondents-movants'
subject property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the
MacArthur Highway. In a letter dated December 15, 1994,respondents-movants demanded the
payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of land. Celestino R. Contreras
(Contreras), then District Engineer of the First Bulacan Engineering District of the DPWH, offered
to pay for the subject land at the rate of Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, per
Resolution of the Provincial Appraisal Committee (PAC) of Bulacan. Unsatisfied with the offer,
respondents-movants demanded the return of their property, or the payment of compensation at
the current fair market value. Hence, the complaint for recovery of possession with damages
3

filed by respondents-movants. Respondents-movants were able to obtain favorable decisions in

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA), with the subject property valued at
One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, with interest at six percent
(6%) per annum.

Petitioners thus elevated the matter to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. The only
issue resolved by the Court in the assailed decision is the amount of just compensation which
respondents-movants are entitled to receive from the government for the taking of their property.
Both the RTC and the CA valued the property at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(₱1,500.00) per square meter, plus six percent (6%) interest from the time of the filing of the
complaint until full payment. We, however, did not agree with both courts and ruled instead that
just compensation should be based on the value of the property at the time of taking in 1940,
which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter. In addition, and by way of compensation,
4

we likewise awarded an interest of six percent (6%) per annum from 1940 until full payment. 5

Aggrieved, respondents-movants hereby move for the reconsideration of said decision on the
following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY LOOK INTO THE "JUSTNESS" OF THE

MISERABLE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION BEING AWARDED TO THE HEREIN
RESPONDENTS; and

B. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY SETTLE FOR A HAPPY MIDDLE GROUND IN THE
NAME OF DOCTRINAL PRECISION AND SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. 6

Citing the views of Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen in their
Dissenting and Concurring Opinion and Separate Opinion, respectively, respondents-movants
insist that gross injustice will result if the amount that will be awarded today will be based simply
on the value of the property at the time of the actual taking. Hence, as proposed by Justice
Leonen, they suggest that a happy middle ground be achieved by meeting the need for doctrinal
precision and the thirst for substantial justice.
7

We maintain our conclusions in the assailed July 1, 2013 Decision with modification on the
amount of interest awarded, as well as the additional grant of exemplary damages and attorney's
fees.

At the outset, it should be stressed that the matter of the validity of the State's exercise of the
power of eminent domain has long been settled. In fact, in our assailed decision, We have
affirmed the ruling of the CA that the pre-trial order issued on May 17, 2001 has limited the
issues as follows: (1) whether or not the respondents-movants are entitled to just compensation;
(2) whether or not the valuation would be based on the corresponding value at the time of the
taking or at the time of the filing of the action; and (3) whether or not the respondents-movants
are entitled to damages. Moreover, it was held that for failure of respondents-movants to
8

question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have
waived and are estopped from assailing the power of the government to expropriate or the public
use for which the power was exercised. What is, therefore, left for determination in the instant
9

Motion for Reconsideration, in accordance with our Decision dated July 1, 2013, is the propriety
of the amount awarded to respondents as just compensation.

At this juncture, We hold that the reckoning date for property valuation in determining the amount
of just compensation had already been addressed and squarely answered in the assailed
decision. To be sure, the justness of the award had been taken into consideration in arriving at
our earlier conclusion.

We have in the past been confronted with the same issues under similar factual and procedural
circumstances. We find no reason to depart from the doctrines laid down in the earlier cases as
we adopted in the assailed decision. In this regard, we reiterate the doctrines laid down in the
cases of Forfom Development Corporation (Forfom) v. Philippine National Railways
(PNR), Eusebio v. Luis, Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, and Republic v.
10 11 12

Sarabia. 13

In Forfom, PNR entered the property of Forfom in January 1973 for railroad tracks, facilities and
appurtenances for use of the Carmona Commuter Service without initiating expropriation
proceedings. In 1990, Forfom filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or
damages against PNR. In Eusebio, respondent's parcel of land was taken in 1980 by the City of
Pasig and used as a municipal road without the appropriate expropriation proceedings. In1996,
respondent filed a complaint for reconveyance and/or damages against the city government and
the mayor. In MIAA, in the early 1970s, petitioner implemented expansion programs for its
runway, necessitating the acquisition and occupation of some of the properties surrounding its
premises. As to respondent's property, no expropriation proceedings were initiated. In 1997,
respondent initiated a case for accion reivindicatoria with damages against petitioner. In
Republic, sometime in 1956, the Air Transportation Office (ATO) took possession and control of
a portion of a lot situated in Aklan, registered in the name of respondent, without initiating
expropriation proceedings. Several structures were erected thereon, including the control tower,
the Kalibo crash fire rescue station, the Kalibo airport terminal, and the Headquarters of the PNP
Aviation Security Group. In 1995,several stores and restaurants were constructed on the
remaining portion of the lot. In 1997, respondent filed a complaint for recovery of possession with
damages against the storeowners wherein ATO intervened claiming that the storeowners were
its lessees.

These cases stemmed from similar background, that is, government took control and possession
of the subject properties for public use without initiating expropriation proceedings and without
payment of just compensation; while the landowners failed for a long period of time to question
such government act and later instituted actions for recovery of possession with damages. In
these cases, the Court has uniformly ruled that the fair market value of the property at the time of
taking is controlling for purposes of computing just compensation.

In Forfom, the payment of just compensation was reckoned from the time of taking in 1973;
in Eusebio, the Court fixed the just compensation by determining the value of the property at the
time of taking in 1980; in MIAA, the value of the lot at the time of taking in 1972 served as basis
for the award of compensation to the owner; and, in Republic, the Court was convinced that the
taking occurred in 1956 and was thus the basis in fixing just compensation.

As in the aforementioned cases, just compensation due respondents-movants in this case

should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time of taking in 1940 which is
Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, and not One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(₱1,500.00) per square meter, as valued by the RTC and CA.

While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents-
movants as they would be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it should be
noted that the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner for the property taken but
to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure of the property, as upheld by
a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the taking, when the loss resulted. This
principle was plainly laid down in Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of
the Philippines, to wit:
14

x x x In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Orilla, a valuation case under our agrarian reform law,
this Court had occasion to state:

Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property,
broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course
of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as between the one who receives
and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court
that the true measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to
modify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. [Emphasis
supplied.]
15
Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the
latter's property; it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due
consideration of the circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. More, the concept
of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must
also be just to the public, which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
16

Notwithstanding the foregoing, we recognize that the owner's loss is not only his property but
also its income-generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value
17

must immediately be paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential income
lost. Accordingly, in Apo, we held that the rationale for imposing the interest is to compensate
18

the petitioners for the income they would have made had they been properly compensated for
their properties at the time of the taking. Thus:
19

We recognized in Republic v. Court of Appeals the need for prompt payment and the necessity of
the payment of interest to compensate for any delay in the payment of compensation for property
already taken. We ruled in this case that:

The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market
in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property
as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, i[f] fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must
include interest[s] on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to
the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between
the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interest[s] accrue in order to
place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in
before the taking occurred.[Emphasis supplied] 20

In other words, the just compensation due to the landowners amounts to an effective forbearance
on the part of the State-a proper subject of interest computed from the time the property was
taken until the full amount of just compensation is paid-in order to eradicate the issue of the
constant variability of the value of the currency over time. In the Court's own words:
21

The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interests on the zonal value
of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and
"took" the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be
the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective
forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation
and inflation of the value of the currency over time x x x. 22

On this score, a review of the history of the pertinent laws, rules and regulations, as well as the
issuances of the Central Bank (CB)or Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)is imperative in arriving
at the proper amount of interest to be awarded herein.

On May 1, 1916, Act No. 2655 took effect prescribing an interest rate of six percent (6%) or
23

such rate as may be prescribed by the Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB)for loans or
forbearance of money, in the absence of express stipulation as to such rate of interest, to wit:

Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money goods, or credits and the
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall
be six per centum per annum or such rate as may be prescribed by the Monetary Board of
the Central Bank of the Philippines for that purpose in accordance with the authority
hereby granted.
Sec. 1-a. The Monetary Board is hereby authorized to prescribe the maximum rate or rates of
interest for the loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, and to
change such rate or rates whenever warranted by prevailing economic and social conditions.

In the exercise of the authority herein granted, the Monetary Board may prescribe higher
maximum rates for loans of low priority, such as consumer loans or renewals thereof as well as
such loans made by pawnshops finance companies and other similar credit institutions although
the rates prescribed for these institutions need not necessarily be uniform. The Monetary Board
is also authorized to prescribe different maximum rate or rates for different types of borrowings,
including deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries.
24

Under the aforesaid law, any amount of interest paid or stipulated to be paid in excess of that
fixed by law is considered usurious, therefore unlawful. 25

On July 29, 1974, the CB-MB, pursuant to the authority granted to it under the aforequoted
provision, issued Resolution No. 1622. On even date, Circular No. 416 was issued,
1âwphi1

implementing MB Resolution No. 1622, increasing the rate of interest for loans and forbearance
of money to twelve percent (12%) per annum, thus:

By virtue of the authority granted to it under Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended, otherwise
known as the "Usury Law," the Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated July 29, 1974,
has prescribed that the rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or
credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such
rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent (12%) per annum. 26

The foregoing rate was sustained in CB Circular No. 905 which took effect on December 22,
27

1982, particularly Section 2 thereof, which states:

Sec. 2. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the
rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of express contract as to such rate of interest, shall
continue to be twelve per cent (12%) per annum. 28

Recently, the BSP Monetary Board (BSP-MB),in its Resolution No. 796 dated May 16, 2013,
approved the amendment of Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982, and accordingly,
issued Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, effective July 1, 2013, the pertinent portion of which
reads:

The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following
revisions governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby
amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:

Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits
and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate
of interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum.

Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial
Institutions are hereby amended accordingly.

This Circular shall take effect on 01 July 2013. 29

Accordingly, the prevailing interest rate for loans and forbearance of money is six percent (6%)
per annum, in the absence of an express contract as to such rate of interest.
In summary, the interest rates applicable to loans and forbearance of money, in the absence of
an express contract as to such rate of interest, for the period of 1940 to present are as follows:

Law, Rule and Regulations, Date of Effectivity Interest Rate

BSP Issuance
Act No. 2655 May 1, 1916 6%
CB Circular No. 416 July 29, 1974 12%
CB Circular No. 905 December 22, 1982 12%
CB Circular No. 799 July 1, 2013 6%

It is important to note, however, that interest shall be compounded at the time judicial demand is
made pursuant to Article 2212 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, and sustained in Eastern
30

Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals, then later on in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, save for the
31 32

reduction of interest rate to 6% for loans or forbearance of money, thus:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money,
i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have
been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code. 33

Applying the foregoing law and jurisprudence, respondents-movants are entitled to interest in the
amount of One Million Seven Hundred Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Eight
Pesos and Thirty-Two Centavos (₱1,718,848.32) as of September 30, 2014, computed as 34

follows:

January 1, 1940 to July 28, 1974

35
P 10,553.49 37

July 29, 1974 to March 16, 1995 26,126.31 38

March 17, 199536to June 30, 2013 232,070.33 39

July 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014 250,098.19 40

Market Value of the Property at the time of

taking including interest P 518,848.32

Market value of the property at the time of

taking including interest P 518,848.32
Add: Exemplary damages 1,000.000.00
Attorney's fees 200,000.00
Total Amount of Interest due to Respondents-
Movants as of September 30, 2014 ₱1,718,848.16

Considering that respondents-movants only resorted to judicial demand for the payment of the
fair market value of the land on March 17, 1995, it is only then that the interest earned shall itself
earn interest.
Lastly, from finality of the Court's Resolution on reconsideration until full payment, the total
amount due to respondents-movants shall earn a straight six percent (6%) legal interest,
pursuant to Circular No. 799 and the case of Nacar. Such interest is imposed by reason of the
Court's decision and takes the nature of a judicial debt.

Clearly, the award of interest on the value of the land at the time of taking in 1940 until full
payment is adequate compensation to respondents-movants for the deprivation of their property
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings. Such interest, however meager or enormous it
may be, cannot be inequitable and unconscionable because it resulted directly from the
application of law and jurisprudence-standards that have taken into account fairness and equity
insetting the interest rates due for the use or forbearance of money. Thus, adding the interest
41

computed to the market value of the property at the time of taking signifies the real, substantial,
full and ample value of the property. Verily, the same constitutes due compliance with the
constitutional mandate on eminent domain and serves as a basic measure of fairness. In addition
to the foregoing interest, additional compensation shall be awarded to respondents-movants by
way of exemplary damages and attorney's fees in view of the government's taking without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings. As held in Eusebio v. Luis, an irregularity in an
42

expropriation proceeding cannot ensue without consequence. Thus, the Court held that the
government agency's illegal occupation of the owner's property for a very long period of time
surely resulted in pecuniary loss to the owner, to wit:

However, in taking respondents' property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and
without payment of just compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter disregard of
respondents' proprietary rights. Such conduct cannot be countenanced by the Court. For said
illegal taking, the City of Pasig should definitely be held liable for damages to
respondents. Again, in Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, the Court held that
the government agency's illegal occupation of the owner's property for a very long period of time
surely resulted in pecuniary loss to the owner. The Court held as follows:

Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form of actual or
compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value
of the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment by the MIAA. This is
based on the principle that interest "runs as a matter of law and follows from the right of the
landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the
taking."

The award of interest renders unwarranted the grant of back rentals as extended by the
courts below. In Republic v. Lara, et al., the Court ruled that the indemnity for rentals is
inconsistent with a property owner's right to be paid legal interest on the value of the property, for
if the condemn or is to pay the compensation due to the owners from the time of the actual taking
of their property, the payment of such compensation is deemed to retro act to the actual taking of
the property; and, hence, there is no basis for claiming rentals from the time of actual taking.
More explicitly, the Court held in Republic v. Garcellano that:

The uniform rule of this Court, however, is that this compensation must be, not in the
form of rentals, but by way of 'interest from the date that the company [or entity]
exercising the right of eminent domain take possession of the condemned lands, and the
amounts granted by the court shall cease to earn interest only from the moment they are
paid to the owners or deposited in court x x x.

xxxx

For more than twenty (20) years, the MIAA occupied the subject lot without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings and without the MIAA exerting efforts to ascertain ownership of the lot
and negotiating with any of the owners of the property. To our mind, these are wanton and
irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and corrected. Hence, the award of
exemplary damages and attorneys fees is in order. However, while Rodriguez is entitled to
such exemplary damages and attorney's fees, the award granted by the courts below should be
equitably reduced. We hold that Rodriguez is entitled only to ₱200,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees equivalent to one percent (1%) of the amount due. 43

Similarly, in Republic v. CA, We held that the failure of the government to initiate an
44

expropriation proceeding to the prejudice of the landowner may be corrected with the awarding
of exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of litigation. Thus:

The Court will not award attorney's fees in light of respondent's choice not to appeal the CA
Decision striking down the award. However, we find it proper to award temperate and
exemplary damages in light of NIA's misuse of its power of eminent domain. Any arm of the
State that exercises the delegated power of eminent domain must wield that power with
circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements. A government instrumentality
that fails to observe the constitutional guarantees of just compensation and due process abuses
the authority delegated to it, and is liable to the property owner for damages.

Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered if pecuniary loss has been suffered but the
amount cannot be proved with certainty from the nature of the case. Here, the trial and appellate
1âwphi1

courts found that the owners were unable to plant palay on 96,655 square meters of the Property
for an unspecified period during and after NIA's construction of the canals in 1972. The passage
of time, however, has made it impossible to determine these losses with any certainty. NIA also
deprived the owners of the Property of possession of a substantial portion of their land since
1972. Considering the particular circumstances of this case, an award of ₱150,000 as temperate
damages is reasonable.

NIA's irresponsible exercise of its eminent domain powers also deserves censure. For more than
three decades, NIA has been charging irrigation fees from respondent and other landowners for
the use of the canals built on the Property, without reimbursing respondent a single cent for the
loss and damage. NIA exhibits a disturbingly cavalier attitude towards respondent's property
rights, rights to due process of law and to equal protection of the laws. Worse, this is not the first
time NIA has disregarded the rights of private property owners by refusing to pay just
compensation promptly. To dissuade NIA from continuing this practice and to set an example for
other agencies exercising eminent domain powers, NIA is directed to pay respondent exemplary
damages of ₱250,000. 45

Applying the aforequoted doctrines to the present case, considering that respondents-movants
were deprived of beneficial ownership over their property for more than seventy (70) years
without the benefit of a timely expropriation proceedings, and to serve as a deterrent to the State
from failing to institute such proceedings within the prescribed period under the law, a grant of
exemplary damages in the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) is fair and reasonable.
Moreover, an award for attorney's fees in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱200,000.00) in favor of respondents-movants is in order.

In sum, respondents-movants shall be entitled to an aggregate amount of One Million Seven

Hundred Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos and Thirty-Two Centavos
(₱1,718,848.32) as just compensation as of September 30, 2014, computed as follows:

Market value of the property at the time P 518,848.32

of taking in 1940 including interest
Add: Exemplary Damages 1,000,000.00
Attorney's fees 200,000.00
Total Amount due to Respondents-
movants as of September 30, 2014 ₱1,718,848.32
This Court is not unaware that at present, stringent laws and rules are put in place to ensure that
owners of real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly
paid just compensation. Specifically, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974 (R.A. 8974), which took
46

effect on November 26, 2000, provides sufficient guidelines for implementing an expropriation
proceeding, to wit:

Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. - Whenever it is necessary to acquire real

property for the right-of-way or location for any national government infrastructure project through
expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the expropriation proceedings
before the proper court under the following guidelines:

(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount
equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR);
and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7
hereof;

(b) In provinces, cities, municipalities and other areas where there is no zonal valuation,
the BIR is hereby mandated within the period of sixty (60) days from the date of the
expropriation case, to come up with a zonal valuation for said area; and

(c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and
importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing
agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value taking into
consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.

Upon compliance with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue to the
implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of
the project.

Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the
court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned.

In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency's proffered value,
the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from
the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the court becomes final and
executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount
already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court.

Failure to comply with the foregoing directives shall subject the government official or employee
concerned to administrative, civil and/or criminal sanctions, thus:

Section 11. Sanctions. - Violation of any provisions of this Act shall subject the government
official or employee concerned to appropriate administrative, civil and/or criminal sanctions,
including suspension and/or dismissal from the government service and forfeiture of benefits.
While the foregoing provisions, being substantive in nature or disturbs substantive rights, cannot
be retroactively applied to the present case, We trust that this established mechanism will surely
deter hasty acquisition of private properties in the future without the benefit of immediate
payment of the value of the property in accordance with Section 4 of R.A. 8974. This effectively
addresses J. Velasco's concerns that sustaining our earlier rulings on the matter would be
licensing the government to dispense with constitutional requirements in taking private
properties. Moreover, any gap on the procedural aspect of the expropriation proceedings will be
remedied by the aforequoted provisions.
In effect, R.A. 8974 enshrines a new approach towards eminent domain that reconciles the
inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental equity. 47

Despite the foregoing developments, however, We emphasize that the government's failure, to
initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate
the State's exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of expropriation
is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy imposes upon the public utility the
obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of
lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the State's inherent powers, the
ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good. Thus, the non-filing of the case for
expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left
to the landowner is the right of compensation. 48

All told, We hold that putting to rest the issue on the validity of the exercise of eminent domain is
neither tantamount to condoning the acts of the DPWH in disregarding the property rights of
respondents-movants nor giving premium to the government's failure to institute an expropriation
proceeding. This Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty
is the application of the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only
when such literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula for computing just
49

compensation, contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying
interpretation of economic policies - a matter which this Court has no competence to take
cognizance of. Time and again, we have held that no process of interpretation or construction
need be resorted to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application. Equity and
50

equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence. As 51

we have shown above, established rulings of this Court are in place for full application to the
case at bar, hence, should be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997]

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO

ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and
MARY ANN, all surnamed ABISTADO, Respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land

registration case mandatory or directory?

Statement of the Case

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to
cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the
application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set
aside the Decision1 promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent
Resolution2 promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of Appeals3 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged Decision reads:4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from is

hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of
applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel,
Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa
Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to the
parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D located in Poblacion Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro.
The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are
hereby dismissed for want of evidence.

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on this
land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued."

The Facts

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for

original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529.5 The application was docketed as Land Registration Case
(LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro.6 However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died.
Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed
Abistado -- represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their
guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition
for want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
possession of the subject land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the provisions
of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial
Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit
`E' was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and `G'). Consequently,
the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction
over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory provision
requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation."

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982, which in
its pertinent portion provides:8
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529]
has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the
aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is
jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the
same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a
newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably
necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume jurisdiction
over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication of the notice of
initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary
as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the court
may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as

earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA
Resolution dated November 19, 1991.

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this
recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his petition on
Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he is
appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his
petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari under Rule 65.9 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Issue

Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of

discretion10 in holding

x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need
not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not dismissing LRC
Case No. 86 for want of such publication.

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial hearing
shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general
circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary to
confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and xxx in xxx a newspaper of general
circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process.11 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the
requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural
defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction.12 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled:13 chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a

newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be
gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the Official
Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity
to explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its disposition in this
wise:14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure
prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other requirements of: publication in the
Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other
conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party
who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration.

The Courts Ruling

We find for petitioner.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring
publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five
days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety
days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

1. By publication. --

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette
shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be
addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including
the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may concern.' Said notice
shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time
to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

xxx xxx xxx

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that
publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any
publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can
validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.

We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of
statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication
requirement.

The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner
of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order setting the time for
initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the
mandatory character of a statute.15 While concededly such literal mandate is not an
absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its
context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case the term must be
understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs. Marasigan,16 the Court
through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires
notice of the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting,
all of which must be complied with. If the intention of the law were otherwise, said
section would not have stressed in detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all
persons named in the petition who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of
adjoining properties, and occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is
essential, then by parity of reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is likewise imperative since the law included such requirement in its
detailed provision.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.17 Being in
rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who may
be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred from
contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been ruled, a
party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration court
must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership thereof
but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who institutes an
action for recovery of realty.18 He must prove his title against the whole world. This
task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved when all persons
concerned -- nay, the whole world -- who have rights to or interests in the subject
property are notified and effectively invited to come to court and show cause why
the application should not be granted. The elementary norms of due process require
that before the claimed property is taken from concerned parties and registered in
the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to
oppose.

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be

deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the
Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been
complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the
Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes
delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the
interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of
neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the
all-encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of
default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the
notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication, mailing and posting.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of
the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it would
not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly, this
Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The law is
unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has declared that
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for
interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for application.19 There
is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private
respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after
all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private respondent for land
registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), on leave.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated
November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
1 2

Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional
3

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised
Penal Code.

The antecedent facts follow.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of
lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry
for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the
said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence,
he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's
bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of
₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit
the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days.
The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of
jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former
that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.

Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as follows:

That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received from
one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht
men's bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth ₱12,000.00,
or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under
expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said
items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with
intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with
his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the
proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to
return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00),
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned
amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo
Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can
be summarized, as follows:

Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged
in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection made, they
earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private complainant.

However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made
to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used
as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which
he did not even see.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the
Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;

there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the
penalty imposable;

accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty
consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND
TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS
MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of ₱98,000.00 as
actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and
affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the
RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the
imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the
decision stands.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present
petition stating the following grounds:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND

APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS
EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST
EVIDENCE RULE;

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S

FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY
DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE
315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -

1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE

SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR
THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;

2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE

INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM
THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02
MAY 1991;

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S

FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD,
OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S

FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT ALTHOUGH -

1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE

INCIDENT;

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE

STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN
EXPERIENCE;
 3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO
THIS CASE;

4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following
counter-arguments:

The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.

The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the
offense and the acts complained of.

The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.

This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.

The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight
when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are
totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual
4

findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive
issues.

According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence
a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was
merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records show that
petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that
petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of
evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that
when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in
evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5

Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information
filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces
of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different
from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err
in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to
the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph
(b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice
of the owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
6

exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:

x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the
offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;

the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the
subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of
the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the
prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the
precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the
crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus,
aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential element of the
crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the
Information ipso facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which
accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as
testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-
appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the
charges proferred against him. 7

It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow.

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property; x x x

The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other
personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on
his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. 8

Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on
the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant
narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave
the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay
them. Thus:

PROS. MARTINEZ

q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been
finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?

a I went looking for him, sir.

q For whom?

a Lito Corpuz, sir.

q Were you able to look (sic) for him?

a I looked for him for a week, sir.

q Did you know his residence?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you go there?

a Yes, sir.

q Did you find him?

a No, sir.

q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?

a I talked to him, sir.

q How many times?

a Two times, sir.

q What did you talk (sic) to him?

a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.

q Referring to Exhibit A-2?

a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are
and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.

q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?

a No, sir. 9

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need not even be
10

formal; it may be verbal. The specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has
11

indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of
the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand. As expounded in Asejo v.
12

People: 13

With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of
estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with
regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:

When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary,
the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be interpreted in its general
meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to
present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.

In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to
the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime
of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property
held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be
established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14

In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of
jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation
when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took
place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite
demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the
same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court
gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe
the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the
appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case. The assessment by the trial court
15

is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth
16

is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in
determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not
numbered. 17

As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property
came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and
property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division
reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they decided
to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae
were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among
those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria,
Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with
Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.

After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the
following:

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts
continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the
legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be
remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of
another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without
any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:

ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not
covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of
any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render
the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition
of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury
caused by the offense. 18

The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which
is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the
proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice,
the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that
a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked
to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation.
The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is already
punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The
remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to
submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-
commensurate with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive,
this time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.

In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in
19

Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation
for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:

This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that
there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal
statute.

No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to
prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to
punish such act.

Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the
ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh
penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief
Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which
it believes to be harsh.
20

Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C.
Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal
Code, echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
21

The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must
be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of
the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of
violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to
which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will
of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the
prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency
should be addressed to the Chief Executive. 22

There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the
current inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be dangerous
as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must
be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in
crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the
RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper
to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties
in order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the
same penalties in order to deter the further commission of those punishable acts which have
increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is
apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of
Plunder, from its original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature
lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount
upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.

It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to
be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the
provisions state that:

Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the
value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum
period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may
be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of
the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the
value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50
pesos.

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5
pesos.

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of
the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the
provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.

8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value
of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the
impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.

In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-provision states that the
penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the
penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum
period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law,
the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by
one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum
period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after
serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the
proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor
in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far
from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty
imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23

Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime
of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the
maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be
too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed and
the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:

I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the
penalties are not changed:

1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punished by

prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).

2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punished by

prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and
1 day to 6 years).24

3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by prision

correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months).

4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor

medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1

month and 1 day to 6 months).

6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor
medium.

x x x x.

II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the
penalties are not changed, as follows:

1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punishable

by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day
to 8 years).25

2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punishable by

prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). 26

3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by

arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years
and 4 months).
 4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months
and 1 day to 6 months).

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that
the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection
Clause.

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a
valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness, which has four requisites:
27

(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 28

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial
distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which
violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher
amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a person
who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of
millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering
that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that
no longer exist today.

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental
penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the
penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime
exceeds ₱22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which
leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to
Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.

Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the
remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as
unconstitutional because it is absurd.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty-
Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00)
Pesos ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

JUSTICE PERALTA:

For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
(₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you
right?

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

But if we de ... (interrupted)

DEAN DIOKNO:

....then....

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unconstitutional, the court cannot fix the
amount ...

DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand

(₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The Court cannot do that.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Could not be.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The only remedy is to go to Congress...

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and determine the value or the amount.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

Thank you, Dean.

DEAN DIOKNO:

Thank you.

xxxx 29

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm, Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal
30

Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court
therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a
specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the
penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e.,
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3)
Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.

However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem
what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South
Dakota after it took into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for
uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have
been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakota’s recidivist statute because
of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the
present controversy.

With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the
offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a
domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely
abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing
the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection
and safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust
is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission
of such wrongful acts.

There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the
subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications.
For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the
money malversed by the public official, thus:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount
involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than
twelve thousand pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos.
If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value
of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he
is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the
unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is ₱200.00
(under the existing law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The
penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to the
acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3, wherein the injury caused to the
31

government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month
to 15 years) under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case,
32

because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public position to
embezzle the fund or property of the government entrusted to him.

The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or
uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the
bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of
imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.

In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing
unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value
of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering the
premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling
under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a
fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the
premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in
the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6
years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the
fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful
taking.

Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be
imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months)
if the value of the damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the
damage will now become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month
and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not exceed ₱200.00, the
penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more
than ₱200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under
the proposal, ₱200.00 will now become ₱20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00
under the existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will
now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is categorized as
a light felony penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC. Unless we also amend
33

Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the
same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and
constitutionally feasible.

There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by
the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the
value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and
National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling),
Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of
malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or
paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213
(Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of
accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to
render accounts before leaving the country).

In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes which
are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of
Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended. The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and
34

possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the
35

penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the
36

penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products
involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this
particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because
the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is in the negative
because the soundness of this particular law is not in question.

With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special
Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is
needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that
should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of
the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the applicability of the
penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of
the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal
luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the
questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.

Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code.
During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty-six
(56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code, each one 37

proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated decades
ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far different from today’s
conditions.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not
usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation,
modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is
repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to
38

their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put,
the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of
the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can
be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least
three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his
death;
 (2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291,
the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate
or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a
period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter
by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity.
Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the
offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly,
this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to
the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper
penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded
in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested
ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for
awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus,
although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded
as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants
it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount
39

of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental
anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount
to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature.
Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left
to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear
and not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly written.

Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the
incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only
impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount
involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law is properly
amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate
penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused
convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that
should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly
runs counter to what the law provides.

It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice
by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 in December 1993. The said
40

law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than
that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June
2006 by Republic Act No. 9346, the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on
41

the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1), Article III of the
42

Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the
death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the
provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present
action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the concerned
parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality issues must
be pleaded directly and not collaterally, more so in the present controversy wherein the issues
43

never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally
aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or
amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete,
for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking
on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the
prohibition.
44

It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be
obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe
does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come
under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community." 45

Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to
our modern time.

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned
monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate. There are
other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated
upon before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the
society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be
painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us
believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no
resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and
surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and
appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:

xxxx

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you
have to take into consideration several factors.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Per capita income.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Per capita income.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Inflation ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of
those economic terms.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, but ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to
One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

JUSTICE PERALTA:

That is legislative in nature.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yeah, okay.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the
adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

Thank you, Professor.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Thank you. 46

Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that
the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice.
Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an
obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as
simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration
"changed conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the
substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in
crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in
the case of People v. Pantoja. Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption
47

that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being
repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to
legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from
crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to
civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly
based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated,
penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since
the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum
sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted
in light of current conditions.

Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the
RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional
₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.

In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People is 48

highly instructive, thus:

With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case,
Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three
equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three
portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the
penalty prescribed are:

Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days

Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49

To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to
prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion
shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. In the present
50 51

case, the amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the maximum
penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the
penalty for every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall
the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.

Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00 ceiling set
by law, then, adding one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8
months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking
the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the
maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa
charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty
next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.

Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1
day to 4 years and 2 months.

One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making
and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito
Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision
dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-
paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15)
YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.