Tac80 09
Tac80 09
Tac80 09
R1!!:;!;~ft USAF
are there, even during our normal daily duties .
Some tasks are enjoyable-they're easy to do
because we like them . Still others are "not so
enjoyable " -and we do them because we need
to-they are part of the job. We can 't expect
Chief of Safety
everyone to want to do every job-everytime; but
it's a lot easier when we understand the reasons
1oing a job a certain way. Here 's what I
__,. 1
3
Angle of Attack
Flight Lead Responsibilities
Congratulations! After being subjected to the avoid the mistakes you've seen other lead
abuses of flight leads through long. arduous make . That's just one part of it. You need to
hours of light on the star. your unit has ftnally come knowledgeable and adept in four areas .
recognized your leadership talents and selected planning. briefing. leading the flight. and
you to enter the unit flight lead upgrade debriefing. In this two-part article. I'll talk about
program . No doubt you are well deserving and the first two areas in this issue. and next month.
indeed are a " . .. most highly qualified and we'll cover the others .
experienced individual ...... Your peers will be
in awe of your aerospace skills and aerial
expertise-hopeful ly.
PLANNING
I shouldn't have to remind you that as leader What would seem like the easiest portion of
you will be responsible for millions of dollars the mission is actually one of the more difficult.
worth of valuable iron. the lives of your flight Whatever you do or do not do in this stage w1ll
members. and in the worst case. the safety and affect the entire mission . Let's start with the
freedom of the United States and its allies . Quite schedule . Your upgrade program may include a
a responsibility for a guy who . up to now. was four-ship ground attack sortie with other
only qualified to say: Two. Bingo. and Mayday. experienced pilots as your wingmen .
How do you accept the responsibility for such a You probably have an extensive background in
heady experience? Not many manuals. regula- ground attack. your wingmen are experienced.
tions. or pamphlets have been published on the and you've flown the route a thousand times .
subject. A lot of accident reports offer htnts on What can go wrong? Brief the weather and
how not to lead. but Monday morning quarter- NOTAMS. a little on formation . cover the manda-
backing is a poor substitute for preparation . tory special subjects. hit the emergency
Don't plan on being able to lead a four-ship procedure of the day. and go . Right? Wrong!
into the valley of doom on your first mission First. what is your flight's real experience? If one
either. Becoming a good flight leader is usually pilot has been on leave or TOY for 30 days. yo
a lengthy. experience-filled process . You don't will want to tailor your scenario appropria
become a good flight lead simply by trying to How about low altitude training? If someon
4 SEPTEMBER 1980
Maj Mike Ridnouer
is this month's
Fleasle T-shirt winner
lAC ATTACK 5
Flight .Lead Responsibilities
importantly. you must know when to call off the may work-to your disadvantage. Make sure the •
whole show and regroup. Improving weather. it confusion rests with your foe and not your
seems. is a situation we don't deal with enough. wingmen! The briefing need not cover every de-
However. if the weather is better than forecast. tail you have learned in your flyin-g career. If
be prepared to take advantage of it and maxi- something will be standard . it is sufficient to say
mize training. exactly that. The briefing should be detailed
Always plan an alternate mission . If the range enough there is no doubt in any flight member's
you are scheduled for becomes unacceptable mind concerning the mission objectives and
for any reason and another is available. be pre- method of accomplishment.
pared to take advantage of it . If weather pre- Keep everyone 's attention . One good tech-
cludes air-to-ground training but intercepts may nique is to have flight members take some of the
be accomplished. be prepared. If weather. muni- responsibility . Weather. NOTAMS. mil settings.
tions loading. and range space all work against low-level routes are only a few areas that your
you. everyone can usually use formation and /o r wingees can handle for you. Make certain,
instrument approach practice. Some scenarios however. that they understand exactly what is
do not lend themselves to alternate missions . required . You don't need a 20-minute briefing
Live-weapons delivery is one sortie of this type. on weapons delivery parameters when all the
time you have left is 25 minutes .
Forty minutes is a good time to shoot for in a
normal training mission-the type you do day-
BRIEFING
to-day. If your briefing lasts longer. examine it
If your preflight planning was thorough, the for content. mission complexity. or perhaps the
briefing will be an easy part of the mission. Just mission really demands more briefing time. Re-
a few rules . Keep it simple. The normal training member. you have violated a cardinal rule if
mission is more effective if tactics are simple your flight members don 't have time for a r\
and straight forward. If it is too complicated to stop prior to step time .
brief comfortably. it probably won't work in the That pretty well covers the important aspect~
air. Your esoteric plans to confuse the enemy of flight planning and briefing. Remember. this
short rehash is far from the final word in either
area. The points I have made should serve as a
beginning guide to a prospective leader as well
as a mind jogger to you old heads . In the next
issue I'll tackle some considerations in leadin g
the flight and mission debriefing. ~
6 SEPTEMBER 1980
AIRCREW of DISTINCTION
TAC ATTACK
... interest items,
mishaps with
morals, for the
TAC aircrewman
8 SEPTEMBER 1980
TAC Tips Reason and Judgement are the qualities of a leader Tacitus
ary unit's local operating procedures list a
standard" arresting gear configuration . Do you
know what's "standard"? Do the members of
your flight? The squadron duty officer"? The SOF?
It's information you need to know. Several in-
cidents of this type have occurred during the
past year. Fortunately, none of the aircraft really
had a tough emergency. Would you know where
all the cables are if you had to make an arrested
landing this afternoon with radio failure? I hope
so.
One more aside. The Dash 1 recommends
landing a minimum of 300' prior to the cable. If
you have to aim 1 .000 ' short of the cable from a
dragged-in approach just to make sue you don't I!!
miss-you may be in the wrong business. esting his 429 Hemi in the quarter-
mile. trying to grope something attractive in his
"'...
passenger seat. etc. She appreciated Murphy's
MOTHER Law even if she didn't know it by that name .
Think about it. Have things really changed that
By Capt John Braves much even though you're no longer under her
366 TFW/DOV tutelage? A recent midair provided graphic .
dramatic proof that two objects still can't share
Ah yes. a word that evokes the warm fuzzies in the same spot in space at any given instant.
even the most hardened of men. a warm. won - Said accident also proves that the BIG SKY
·rful word. But wait! What has this sentimental THEORY is just that-a theory. Take a minute
ff got to do with me. a fighter jock? Well. and read the final report . Any one of a number
~en you think about it. ol' Mom was nobody's of actions by either aircrew or other agencies
fool in preparing a runny-nosed rug rat to deal could have dramatically increased the odds in
with the hard world; perhaps some reflection is favor of the aircrews and prevented the tragic
in order. Consider her knowledge of basic turn of events. Murphy was really at work.
science and philosophy. Was there ever a time Next time you're out flying. and especially
when you put her heart in her mouth as you when you're in the vicinity of an airfield. re-
heedlessly darted out into a busy street without member Mom. She knew enough to teach you
looking? She was concerned because she knew the basics. LOOK''! The big sky theory doesn't
that two objects can 't occupy the same space at apply; you don't even have to hit something very
the same time. ergo. a badly bruised or slightly big to have it hurt a lot. Eyes out of the cockpit
flattened kiddo. Basic science . Another increase the odds in your favor and remember
example : Given the sheer land area of the planet the ubiquitous Murphy. When your windscreen
earth. what are the odds that two minute bits of fills up with another airplane. your last exclama-
matter. automobile and curtain climber . would tory remark may be MOTHER!!! She wouldn't
come into conflict? Well. Mom knew there was want it that way. She taught you better.
no immutable LAW which said this couldn't hap-
pen . a THEORY perhaps. but not a law. Enough
of science. what about philosophy? She knew
LISTEN--
that if your time had come. well . there were AND PAY ATTENTION
somethings even she couldn't control . But she Hecently a TAC aircrew was the subject of a
could increase your odds . That's why she ham- Hazardous Air Traffic Report. It seems our in-
mered it into your head to look left and right trepid aviators were on a cross country prepar-
prior to crossing a street . If you did run out. she ing to depart an en route stop. The aircraft was
knew the chances were fair that the driver bear- taxiing to the runway and the aircrew was copy-
, down on you was blind. drunk. any combina- ing their ATC clearance and climb restrictions
J of the latter two. inattentive. had defective on ground control frequency. Approaching the
~
TAC ATIACK 9
TAC TIPS
A slightly steep final flown by the T-39 m-
runway. the crew was directed to tower fre - have prevented them from seeing the F
quency. The crew did not check in on tower fre- sooner-but their visual lookout helped avoid a
quency. but continued across the "ho ld" line closer conflict
and taxied into takeoff position without I guess this is just a reminder that all our
clearance. Another aircraft on short final to land fellow professional aviators don 't always perform
was forced to go around . in a "professional" manner.
Our folks apparently had their heads "up
and locked" during this one-and admitted as
much. For some undetermined reason they were WHO'S THE
certain they had been cleared onto the runway
and never gave it a second thought .
REAL FLIGHT LEAD?
An incident at one of our units had all
If the weather had been 200' and 1/2 mile vis. I the potential for turning into a real de-
wonder if the aircraft on final would have seen bacle-over a very simple thing . Let me relate
the other guy . Makes ya· wonder. doesn't it? what happened; you can draw your own conclu-
AND WATCH OUT sions ...
A flight of two F-1 01 s took the runway for a
TOO! formation takeoff. During the initial portion of
In the same vein as our previous item. at the takeoff roll , the number one A/ Bon the lead
another TAC base an F-4 from a sister service aircraft failed to light . The lead had delayed
and a MAC mini-lifter came close to tangling initiating afterburner to make certain the
themselves up. wingman could maintain position
The T-39 was on a visual approach about 5 When the burner failed to light. the leader
miles from the field when he was cleared to judged there wasn't enough runway left for
tower frequency . The Sabreliner was advised he abort. so he continued the takeoff .
was number three behind an F-4 . The crew Meanwhile . number two was in minimum A/ B
couldn 't find the F-4 but were advised by tower and had passed the lead aircraft assuming tr
the Phantom was one mile on final . When the lead . The real leader succeeded in getting
'39 was 1- 1/z miles on final. the crew observed burner light at or about rotation speed and was
the F-4 emerge from under the nose about 200' moving back into the picture ..
lower. heading towards the runway. The '39 did Meanwhile . number two had broken ground
a 360° turn for spacing and landed. and was reaching for the gear handle when lead
After everyone got on the ground safely, transmitted. " Hang in there ." This caused him to
things were sorted out. The F-4 had been directed stop his gear retraction and try to stay with the
by tower to break out from downwind because leader as he came past .
he did not have' a GCA final in sight . The F-4 Meanwhile. as lead (the original one) passed
driver then called the traffic in sight and said he number two. he raised his gear and flaps . Two
could maintain separation. Even though tower attempted to stay in position . but lead pulled
directed the F-4 to break out once more. he away from him. It was then two realized his gear
remained in the pattern . Tower then issued the was still down and the airspeed was above 300
F-4 clearance to land . kts . He slowed to gear limit speed and asked for
a visual check from the flight leader . The leader
discovered the right main landing gear fairing
door missing from the number two aircraft RTB
and subsequent landing were uneventful .
Considering what went on. a landing gear fair-
ing door costing less than $300 is a small price .
Considering what could have happened from a
few instances of ignoring directives and lapses
in common sense-we were unbelievably lu cky .
Flights of aircraft are only supposed to have
one leader at a time . Any more than that in vit ~
confusion and potential disaster . Make sure Y'
aren't party to one of those .
10 SEPTEMBER 1980
TAC SAFETY AWARDS
Individual Safety Award
Senior Airman Robert E. Boothe, 834th Equip-
ment Maintenance Squadron, 1st Special Opera-
tions Wing, Hurlburt Field, Florida, is the
recipient of the Tactical Air Command Individual
Safety Award for September 1980. He has been
responsible for many innovations in his section
involving protective equipment. His actions have
been successful in eliminating injuries on the
unit's wash racks.
SrA
Crew Chief Safety Award
Staff Sergeant Robert M. Stover, 1st Aircraft
Generation Squadron, 1st Tactical Fighter Wing,
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. is the recipient
of the Tactical Air Command Crew Chief Safety
Award for September 1980. During a recent pre-
flight inspection, Sergeant Stover's attention to
detail resulted in his identification of several air-
craft discrepancies which could have had serious
consequences had they gone unnoticed.
12 SEPTEMBER 1980
LADDER STABILIZER
The stabilizer is a U-shaped device that
clamps onto the top of the extension adder. It
has nonskid pads and gives a broad base of
support. It enables you to bFidge across a single
LADDER JACK SCAFFOLDING window and hfts the ladder away from the wall
for easier access to roof overhangs.
STAIRWELL SCAFFOLDING
A straight ladder, stepladder, and a 2- by -10- LADDER HOOKS
inch scaffold-grade plank are all that is needed Access to steep roofs is accomplished by us-
to make a stairwell platform. Lean the straight ing a straight ladder and a pair of ladder hooks.
ladder against the wall as illustrates (to prevent The hooks clamp to the top two rungs of the
scratching the wall, wrap the ends with rags). ladder and connect to the ridge. of the roof. A
Place the stepladder at the top of the stairs with block of wood should be paced under the
the plank resting on the rungs of each ladder. hooks to prevent damage to the shingles and to
The following ladder accessories help with distribute the weight. This set-up gives secure
unique problem areas. toeholds up the sloping roof
rADOMONAL SAFETY TIPS support.)
- Keep metal ladders away from overhead - Place the top of a ladder so it never rest:). on
electric wires. a windowpane or screen.
- Lean a ladder against a wall so that the - Remember to keep your belt buckle within the
-stance between the bottom of the ladder and space between the ladder's side rails. This rule
wall equals one fourth the working length of of thumb will prevent you from trying to over-
,,leladder. (The working length is the length reach and losing your balance or twisting the
along the ladder between the foot and the top ladder.
The man received first aid treatment for mine ~
cuts and abrasions-and walked out of the ho~
pital the same night. Seat belt and harness were
used .
Now that's a contrast! Remember the decision
is yours . Are you sure that belt and harness are
uncomfortable?
CONTRASTS
Two automobile accidents . from the same
wing. about a week apart. are real food for
thought . ..
#1 . Four airmen were traveling in a 1969
model sedan . The driver attempted to take a
dangerous " S" curve at well over the posted
speed limit . He lost control. and th e vehicle
rolled one and a half times . coming to rest
wheels up . The passenger compartment was al-
most completely intact-the doors stayed closed
. and the top was only slightly c rushed . The ve-
hicle appeared almost driveable.
All occupants were hospitalized . One may be
paralyzed from the neck down-for life . Another
is in serious condition with two spinal fractures.
Seat belts were available . but not used .
#2 . Another airman in a 1979 sport model
2-door was returning home after a long day of
work and socializing . He fell asleep at the wheel . Metal is an excellent conductor of electricity-
left the road. and impacted a solid tree at 45 and heat. This incident should remind all
MPH . The tree met the car directly in front of the amateur and professional welders once more
driver's position . perfectly head-on . The car was that whatever you 're welding isn't the only thir
demolished and is almost unrecognizable . that's getting hot!
14 SEPTEMBER 1980
He used his brake a total of 1.339 times over
HORT CUTS the trip.
By contrast, the slow driver passed only 645
Two major manufacturers in the auto industry cars, but was overtaken by 142. His brakes were
took two identical cars, fitted them with special used only 652 times.
instruments, and sent each on an identical trip. The slow car achieved almost the same
One driver was told to make the best time he average speed!
could, while the other was told to avoid risks The fast driver arrived sooner, taking 20 hours
and move as fast as the traffic flow permitted. and 12 minutes. The slow driver took 20 hours
Results showed the first, or fast driver, passed and 43 minutes, a difference of less than three
2.004 cars and was passed by only 13 vehicles. per cent.
TAKE THAT!!
Being a crew chief ain't always too safe. Case
in point ...
A transient alert crew was preparing to park
an aircraft . The marshaller was in position giving
the taxi signals. and another crew chief was engine was then shut down with the main fuel
standing by to chock the aircraft. When the switch .
marshaller gave the stop signal. the aircraft Investigation revealed the throttle linkage was
didn't . We're not sure why . The man with the disconnected at the main fuel control. Previous
chocks ended up with a wing in his midsection maintenance had been accomplished requiring
and a couple of busted ribs . disconnect of the linkage . When the linkage was
Don 't ever assume that aircraft can or will being reconnected . the flight mechanic did not
stop. It could cost you more than it did this have a cotter key of the correct size and asked
troop. another mechanic to obtain one. The other
mechanic went to get one . but on his way had
to park another helo and forgot about the cotter
key.
Meanwhile . the maintenance crew continued
their work; and probably because of the
perc~ived pressure to get the aircraft ready for
an FCF. neglected to complete the final inspe c-
tion. The engine cowling was installed. and the
aircraft towed out for the FCF. The linkage nut
then backed off due to vibration and the lack of
the cotter key.
Now what if that nut had backed off com-
pletely while the chopper was airborne ?
18 SEPTEMBER 1980
CRUNCH!!
An assistant crew chief was helping in the
recovery of an RF-4 . While parking the aircraft.
he attempted to install the aux air door lock
while the engines were motoring down. When
the electrical power dropped off the line . as
designed . the doors slammed shut. Fortunately
for the assistant crew chief. the only thing in the
way at the time was the down lock . Substantial
damage was done to doors 81 L and 82 L. But
even more "damage" could have been done to
the maintenance troop.
Old heads are familiar with all the places a
person can get into trouble around aircraft. It is
the old heads' responsibility to pass that
knowledge to the new troops. Don't let your
daily familiarity with hazards blind you to the
need to point them out to other people . That's
the only sure way we can make certain our new
termined the number 5 pivot pylon was rotated
troops are really well trained .
7 5 degrees from its norma I position with the
front end pointing towards the wing tip. After a
controllability check. the aircrew safely
recovered the aircraft.
Since the pylons had been recently loaded on
the aircraft. primary investigation centered on
the correct loading of the pylons Only two
members of the normal team loaded the pylons .
A third individual (recently arrived and not
qualified on the aircraft) was sent with the team
to observe and help . The two members of the
team hung the pylons from underneath the wing
and did not check for proper teeth alignment at
the top except by shaking the pylon. Proper
teeth alignment is supposed to be checked both
visually and by feel through the pylon access
ports on top of the wing . Likewise. the crew did
not accomplish several other T.O . required ac-
tions.
The two team members were properly trained .
but only the team chief had actually load ed py-
lons during the past year . Furthermore. the team
A NEW TWIST chief was not qualified to perform in-progress
An F-111 was being prepared for a ferry sortie inspections. A maintenance supervisor should
to the programmed depot maintenance facility . have completed this inspection prior to reinstall-
As a part of the mission . four unserviceable ing the pylon panels.
pivot pylons were installed on the aircraft for de- At any rate. it was the disregard of tech data
livery to the repair facility also. The mission which was the real cause of this incident. The
proceeded normally until just after takeoff . As load crew chief felt he could properly hang the
the aircraft accelerated through 250 kts. the air- pylon by using his own techniques . He got by
crew felt a moderate airframe buffet which they with three out of four-but .750 is a lousy
rould not identify or correct . After another air- average in a league where 1 .000 is the only ac-
ft joined with the incident aircraft. they de- ceptable one'
TAC ATIACK 19
By Maj Di Johnson they cleared when the throttles were retarded .
4 TFW/SEF The aircraft was recovered successfully. Phew!
Hey Coach. what happens if one or both
Whazzat? An unknown freeway interchange in ramps are extended?
Los Angeles? No . it's a go-fast door for the a. The worst thing is a compressor stall ar
Phantom that restricts and deflects supersonic flameout at throttle settings above 80% RPM .
air in the J-79 engine intake . thus en(lbling b. As a rule . afterburner operation . airstarts .
mach 1.7 plus flight. Here at our wing we don't and stall margin degrade as you climb .
think too much about going real fast . But. I'm c. Range. altitude. and go-around perform-
talking about "machity mach fast"-fast enough ance are also degraded .
to wonder if the vc::ri-ramps will do their trick at How do you know you have a ramp problem ?
mach 1 .5 . However. very little of our time is The first key is a visual inspection :
spent in that regime anyway. a. A/Cs can use the rearview mirrors.
At the other end of the speed range . how b. WSOs and IPs look at the indexing marks
'bout when they cycle out (extended) when on top of the ramps.
you're going 250 kts on takeoff leg7 In the sum- c. Retracted is the position you normally see
mer? At noon? With three bags? When this hap- where the ramp is flush with the fuselage . For
pened recently. the aircraft was on takeoff leg. those who haven't seen the ramp extended. the
Both ramps had been checked retracted before photo should give you an idea of what they look
brake release . At about 250 kts. the WSO like from the pit. Fully extended travel is about 4
alerted the pilot that the ramps extended . inches. measured inside the intake .
KERWHUMP! went the left engine as it During the before-takeoff che c k. you should
compressor stalled in A/B and rolled back. The always inspect the ramps during the 85 % RPM
right engine hung on in A/B but the RPM rolled runup. The scramble procedures che c klist in the
back to the low 90s . The jet was struggling in F-4E Dash One puts it this way: "Variable inlet
the climb and was nosed over at 800' AGL to ramps-check fully retracted . As the throttles are
accelerate. The left throttle was stopcocked to advanced . to 85% RPM . c heck the variable
clear the stall. The airstart caught on the first ramps are in the fully retracted (flush) position ."
try. After climbing to a safe alititude. the ramps How come this check is not in the normal
cycled several more times at RPM above 92%. At before-takeoff checklist? We dunno. but we 'r \
one point. both engines rolled back to 80% but working on getting it in there .
20 SEPTEMBER 1980
How do you know if you have an open ramp(s)
in flight? Well, if you experience:
a. Signiticartly reduced fuel flow at power
settings above 85% RPM or,
b. High pitched howl at airspeeds above 300
kts or,
c. Reduced thrust (approx 35%) at throttle
settings above 90% RPM or,
d. An associated duct temp high light, then
you probably should check the vari-ramps. After
all, if all the engine instruments are normal.
there isn't much else but the ramps to check if
you're having a thrust problem. If the ramps are
cycling or extended, there's a good chance you
will stop your problems by watching when they
are both retracted and pulling circuit breakers
G-6 and G-7 on panel #2. This will capture the
ramps where they are. Retracted ramps pose no
operational restriction below mach 1.5. It may
be possible to retract a ramp which has failed in
the extended position by pulling or cycling the
Right Vari-Ramp view from rear cockpit. appropriate ramp control circuit breaker G-6
and G-7, #2 panel.
Ramp is fully extended. Pencil shows Ramp failure can occur singly or in pairs. We
had three vari-ramp-associated mishaps here in
stripes that may or may not be
one month. If you see an open write-up about
painted on top of the ramp. the vari-ramps, you sure aren't going to take the
aircraft off the ground. No need to set yourself
up for a compressor stall, or a ride like I
TAC ATTACK 21
Phantom Vari-Ramp
TAC ATTACK
23
CLOSE
BUT NO CIGAR--
THANKFULLY
At one of our TAC -gai ned bases recently, the
F-4 WSO was preflighting the ordnance prior to safety pins when BDU-33s are loaded on a TER .
a range mission . The weapons consisted of The lock pin hole is the rear hole on the TER
BDU-33s loaded on TERs. When the troop rack. The checklist discrepancy is in the process
grasped one of the practice bombs to make sure of being corrected.
it was secure. it came loose. twisted out of his
hand. and fell to the ramp. The spotting charge
functioned but the WSO wasn't injured since the
tail of the bomb was pointing away from him
and the aircraft .
The safety pin had been placed in the safety
pin hole in the TER instead of the lock pin hole
as required by T.O. 1 F-43-33-1-2 . Placing the
pin in the safety pin hole only means the rear
hooks are safe. The hooks are released si-
multaneously but can be cocked inde-
pendently-unless the pin is in the lock pin hole.
When the pin is inserted in the lock pin hole it
safes both sets of hooks. If the pin cannot be
inserted in the lock pin hole. it's an indication
that one or both sets of hooks are not properly
set . ·
It's amazing how potentially tragic incidents
can result from such seemingly simp le mistakes.
Watch out.
An aside for you aircrew members. the -34
checklist doesn't indicate the correct hole for
22 SEPTEMBER 1 980
weapons words
r MAKE WEAPONS CROSSTELL WORK
By Maj Gerald Isaac
12 AF/SEW
Is weapons mishap crosstell working at your copy of a crosstell message to the AGS and then
base? If not. it's a shame because a lot of effort forgetting about it isn't creative . Sticking the in-
and money are going into this program at all formation on a seldom-used bulletin board and
levels of command. In addition . it is co nsidered hoping that someone will come along and read
one of the key means of achieving the Air Force it isn't creative either . But. ensuring that
goal of reducing the number and severity of pertinent mishap information is included in the
weapons mishaps . Air Force co nstantly "hands on " portion of cockpit familiarization
publishes mishap informatio n; TAC takes mishap training is creative. Ensuring that swing shift
information from other commands and sends and mids are briefed is creative . Helping es-
pertinent extracts to the field ; numbered air tablish a good system for rapid dissemination of
forces get mishap information from a variety of crosstell throughout the working level of large
sources and send it to subordinate units in care organizations such as AGS is creative. Verifying
of SEW. What happens to it then? Is it filed? Is it your crosstell program by seeing if specialists
sent to the AGS or EMS for the additional duty on the job are familiar with specific recent mis-
safety person to file in a management book? Is it haps is also creative .
posted on a bulletin board in a hangar? If any of The bottom line is the same type mishaps are
the above constitutes final action on mishap in- occurring over and over . Crosstell remains one
formation . then mishap crosstell is not working of our best weapons for preventing recurring
for you . Mishap crosstell is not intended to mishaps. if it receives proper emphasis at the
amaze and amuse headquarters . wing safety. or working le\Lel. Don't neglect crosstell informa-
additional duty safety personnel . The intent is to tion in your Weapons Safety Program. It's im-
ensure that a person doing a particular job portant. and it can work.
r ·r:10ws WHAT accidents have occurred in that
b. and HOW and WHY they happened .
You in Weapons Safety play an important role
in ensuring that crosstell information is handled EVER BEEN PAINTED?
effectively. How you do this is up to you and IS
limited only by your creativeness . Sending a Two egress technicians were performing a
TCTO on a T-38 ejection seat . After the TCTO
was completed. they were also performing a vi-
sual and physical inspection of the automatic
inertia reel lock. The technicians raised the leg
braces and the reels locked properly. They
began to, lower the braces and about 1-2 inches
above the full down position . the M-27 initiator
activated and fired the M-26 initiator . No inju-
ries resulted and little damage was done.
The investigators traced the cause to a bit of
painting which had been done on the seat dur-
ing some previous corrosion control procedures.
Paint had been inadvertently deposited on the
clevis between the M-27 and the handgrip . Th e
clevis became bonded to the handgrip. You
know the rest.
Egress personnel have now been directed to
drop the seat side panels and install the safety
pins before the inertia reel check and an AFTO
22 has been submitted requir ing seat dearming
during these checks. All because of a drop or
two of paint. . .
TAC ATIACK 23
SEPTEMBER
September Song
ONG
teach our way of doing things . At school they
have all them fancy mockups and stuff."
TAC ATIACK 25
occur because the crew cannot "process" all the
warnings and "he lp" they're given.
Task saturation is directly related to an indi-
vidual's aptitude and trained capability to
process information. An individual 's ability to or-
ganize and make decisions about information
that has been received by the senses (sight.
sound . smell. taste. touch) may well result 1n
mentally setting up priorities.
The cognitive domain (our thinking cap . .. or
better . . . our own on-board computer) does
have varying levels of capability based on how
the system is matured . The growth process oc-
curs throughout our lifetime . Our experiences
are kin to training, or programming. of our on ~
board computer. This prepares us for inform< \
tion processing and organizing of the variou
By Robert E. Coward
tasks that come along with flying today's
William H. Nelson
missions. At times you may well be "max'd " out
AFHRL/OTO
mentally by the extensive information provided
"fox 41 , this is Berkley Control. squawk 2041 for visual. auditory. and kinesthetic systems to
and turn to heading 055 . Contact Berkley Ap- process . Vital safety-related messages from the
proach prior to leaving your assigned altitude . .... aircraft systems may be overshadowed by other
"Fox 41. this is Fox 42 . Do you have engine information being presented to you. Radar
problems? You're trailing a heavy smoke presentations and the various heads-up displays
plume . .. "Fox 41 . do you read ?" provide compelling visual inputs that demand
A busy day in the cockpit for ole 41. Sounds your attention. Do you ever remember being so
as though he has lots of information coming in engrossed in a movie or show that you shut out
from the many systems of the aircraft. not to people? It can happen in the air' Cathode Ray
mention what's coming from outside . His prob- Tube (CRT) technology and instrument miniaturi-
lem is something like the bells ringing and zation have allowed many features to be placed
lights flashing at the desk of a very busy execu- into .all corners of the cockpit.
tive office. Information processing can be dif- However. with today's complex aircraft. can
ficult at such times. aircrews and training managers help in the
We've always been concerned with our human "programming" of the executive in the cockpit of
capability to process data compared to the vast Fox 41 before critical mission or safety deci-
amount of information blasted at our sensory sions must be made? Absolutely! Information
systems such as might occur in the cockpit envi- processing must be approached from two an-
ronment of today's fighter /attack aircraft. We've gles: the aircrew's potential and the training
only recently recognized the hazards of task systems' responsibilities. First. the aircrew must
saturation-in particular we've found there are understand that potential for increased informa-
critical times in an aircraft. when an emergency tion processing and decision making is simil
condition exists and an incident or accident may to physical fitness potential. Your mind ar.
26 SEPTEMBER 1 980
TACATIACK 27
Aircraft recognition 28
properly executed by the aircrews is the key, and
would relegate every Safety Officer to mundane
report filing. "Safety is the by-product of doing the
job correctly"; I love it! When each service breaks
that code and trains to that goal and demands that
type performance from their aircrews, we'll need no
more safety officers.
John M. Nash
Commander, USN
VX-4, Pt Mugu, CA 93042
AMEN!
Ed
Readers,
Dear Editor,
We goofed! In the August issue, we neglected to
Your June edition had several great articles indicate that Lt Col James Bustle, 23 TFW: SE was
worthy of "sister services" reading, but I most the Fleagle T-Shirt winner for his article, "The
enjoyed the "Angle of Attack" safety message. 1 And The Man."
.
What's Happening
To Master Sergeant
To TAC Safety Folks TSgt Ronald Landram, USAFTFWC
-Congratulations to SSgt Gary W. Gwaltney, TSgt Thomas E. Danihel, 56 TFW
Safety NCO for Det 2, 20 ADS, Patrick AFB, FL, TSgt Kenneth N. Wodrt, TT Holloman
on his selection for OTS. Roberts, 9 AF
-Captain Eugene "Gino" Arnold, formerly with TSgt Billy Hester, 507 TAIRCW
the 1st TFW flight safety office, left Langley in Junc TSgt Ellis Mann, HQ TAC
for Test Pilot School at Edwards AFB. TSgt Michael Mehalko, 4 TFW
-Congratulations to the following personnel TSgt Raymond Chisolm, 347 TFW
recently selected for promotion: TSgt Philip Henriksen, TT George
To Major TSgt Edward Monteiro, 27 TFW
Capt James D. Franks, HQ TAC TSgt Roger Cox, 27 TFW
Capt Robert L. Herklotr, 355 TTW
Capt Henry Fiumara, 49 TFW To Technical Sergeant
Capt Robert Giacomazza, 67 TRW SSgt Ronald J. Kunkle, TT Holloman
Capt Richard S. Baldwin, 552 AWACW SSgt Wallace King, 31 TFW
Capt Robert K. Akers, 9 AF SSgt Edward Klima, 823 CES
To Senior Master Sergeant SSgt James Hayes, ADWC
MSgt Peter Donohoe, b7 TRW SSgt Richard Papinchek, 56 TFW
Ivor Frasier. ADTAC, 1G (Safety) SSgt Richard Barkalow. 552 AWACW
TAC ATTACK 29
Dear Editor,
I opened the cover of the July 1980 issue of TAC
ATTACK and couldn't believe the title of Colonel
Ely's article, "When You've Done All You Can Get
Out ." When you have done "all you can" is a pretty
indefinite point in an emergency situation. You can
be doing "all you can" as you impact the ground.
Like it or not, statements by full colonels do in-
fluence young, low ranking fliers, and the reason
they stay with aircraft and die is because they have
heard statements like, "when you've done all you
can, get out." There is a subconscious pressure that
they need to do something to save the iron beast that
is letting them down. ..
I agree with the bulk of Colonel Ely's article,
however it is time to tell the troops that when ejec-
tion parameters are reached, it doesn't matter if you
have done all you can or not, it is time to pull the
handle.
Major David Hudlet
Letters
C Stan Hardison, 1971 124 TROf SE (ANG)
Boise, Idaho
Dear Editor,
Dear Major !ludic.
As always, enjoyed the magazine and Stan Since you state you agree with the bulk of the
Hardison's "Fleagle", but...
article, I can only guess you let the title get in the
In the June issue, Maj Tim Brown's article in-
way as you read the article. TAC and USA have
cluded a chart and referenced elsewhere the
hieroglyphic F-100. Unless I'm seriously mistaken
lost too many people who got into trouble well
above minimum ejection altitude and had plenty of
you will find that an F-100 is a vintage century series
time to perform emergency procedures and still get
aircraft. On the other hand, you will find F100 (sans
out- but for reasons unknown, never made it. In
the dash) is "state of the art" turbo fan engine.
five short paragraphs we didn't intend to say
As an old maintenance officer with fond memories
everything which could be said on this subject. We
for the "Hun" and as an F-15 maintenance person
tried to convey the philosophy that too many of our
today, I take pride in using the proper nomencla-
folks are jeopardizing themselves needlessly by trying
ture-so please-an F-I00 is an aircraft and F100 is
to save the "iron beast." If we got the troops think-
an engine!
ing along those lines, we may have done the most we
Lt Col William C. Morrison can. The folks with the most influence on our line
405 EMS: CC aircrews are the line supervisors - flight leads, flight
Luke AFB, AZ commanders, ops officers, and squadron com-
manders. They're the ones who can, and should,
Dear Col Morrison, carry the message.
You're right. Fortunately, we're in good company
Ed
since AEROSPACE SAFETY made the same "mis-
take." Sure seems to be a lot of fuss over a little Answers to AIRCRAFT RECOGNITION, page 28
hyphen. Perhaps we should use hyphens for aircraft
and asterisks. for engines or periods. All in favor of
1. 1-348 2. C-12A 3. OV-1
30 SEPTEMBER 1980
TAC Tally
TAC GAINED FTRjRECCE TAC GAINED AIR DEFENSE lAC/GAINED Other Units
class A mishap free months class A mishap free months class A mishap free months
137 152 TRG (ANG) 96 191 FIG (ANG) 132 182 TASG (ANG)
99 188 TFG (ANG) 77 102 FIW (ANG) 125 193 TEWG (ANG)
91 138 TFG (ANG) 73 177 FIG (ANG) 117 110 TASG (ANG)
90 917 TFG (AFR) 39 125 FIG (ANG) 112 USAFTAWC (TAC)
87 116 TFW (128 TFS)(ANG) 21 119 FIG (ANG) 108 919 SOG (AFR)