CONTENTS

Cover
Front Matter
1 What is the Digital Divide?
Introduction: the concept of the digital divide
The dangers of a metaphor
Is the digital divide special?
Is the digital divide a problem for society?
A brief history of the digital divide
Chapter overview
2 Research into and Theory of the Digital Divide
Introduction
Research into the digital divide
Theories concerning the digital divide
3 Motivation and Attitude
Introduction: who wants digital media and feels fine about
them?
Basic concepts
Causes of differences in motivation
The consequences of differences in motivation
The evolution of motivation and attitudes
4 Physical Access
Introduction: who possesses digital media?
Basic concepts
Causes of divides in physical access
The consequences of divides in physical access
The evolution in divides of physical access
5 Digital and Twenty-First-Century Skills
 Introduction: who is able to deal with digital media?
Basic concepts
Causes of divides in digital skills
The consequences of divides in digital skills
The evolution in the level and nature of digital skills
6 Usage Inequality
Introduction: who frequently and variously uses digital
media?
Basic concepts
Causes of divides in digital media use
The consequences of divides in digital media use
The evolution of divides in digital media use
7 Outcomes
Introduction: who benefits and is harmed by digital media
use?
Framing the outcomes
Positive outcomes of digital media use
Negative outcomes of digital media use
The balance sheet
8 Social and Digital Inequality
Introduction: does digital inequality reduce or reinforce
social inequality?
Social inequality and digital divides
Separate worlds: the trend of segmentation
The evolution of digital technology and inequality
Conclusions
9 Solutions to Mitigate the Digital Divide
Introduction: can the digital divide problem be solved or
only mitigated?
Goals: policy perspectives for the digital divide
International comparison of digital divide policies
 Means: solutions to bridge the digital divide
Future directions
References
Index
End User License Agreement

List of Illustrations
Chapter 2
Figure 2.1. Acceptance of technology theories in their
various phases of acceptance
Figure 2.2. A causal model of resources and appropriation
theory
Figure 2.3. A causal and sequential model of digital media
access
Chapter 3
Figure 3.1. A sequential model of psychological factors
behind media behaviour
Figure 3.2. Causal model of differences in motivation and
attitude for access
Chapter 4
Figure 4.1. Internet users per 100 inhabitants in the
developed and developing world
Figure 4.2. Causal and sequential model of divides in
physical access
Figure 4.3. The evolution of the digital divide of physical
access over time
Chapter 5
Figure 5.1. A general framework of six medium- and
content-related digital skills
 Figure 5.2. Ways of acquiring computer and Internet skills
in the European Union
Figure 5.3. Causal path model of four independent factors
explaining digital skills
Figure 5.4. Causal and sequential model of divides in
digital skills
Figure 5.5. Framework of core twenty-first-century skills
Chapter 6
Figure 6.1. Percentages of adult Internet users or owners
of a smartphone in thirty-seven co…
Figure 6.2. Causal and sequential model of divides in
digital media use
Chapter 7
Figure 7.1. Causes and consequences of digital media
appropriation for outcomes and the rein…
Chapter 8
Figure 8.1. Tripartite participation in the network society
Figure 8.2. A cycle of segregation in various life domains
Chapter 9
Figure 9.1. A wheel of policy instruments to bridge the
digital divide

List of Tables
Chapter 1
Table 1.1. Definitions of the digital divide
Table 1.2. Perspectives on the digital divide
Table 1.3. Perspectives of the digital divide as a problem
Chapter 2
 Table 2.1. The main research questions concerning the
digital divide
Table 2.2. The top seven research themes into the digital
divide
Table 2.3. The four elements of a scientific theory and
their characteristics
Table 2.4. Theoretical perspectives on the digital divide
Chapter 3
Table 3.1. Reasons for the non-use of computers and the
Internet over time
Table 3.2. Needs, motives and gratifications in seeking
and using digital media/the Interne…
Table 3.3. Spectrum of Internet users: from non-users to
frequent users, 2017
Chapter 6
Table 6.1. Typology of Internet use domains, activities and
applications
Chapter 7
Table 7.1. The most important positive outcomes of
Internet use as achievements
Table 7.2. The most important negative outcomes of
Internet use as liabilities
Chapter 8
Table 8.1. Estimated levels of characteristics of social
classes in developed countries
Chapter 9
Table 9.1. Policy perspectives to solve the digital divide
and the characteristics of their…
The Digital Divide
JAN VAN DIJK

polity
Copyright © Jan van Dijk 2020
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First published in 2020 by Polity Press
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Title: The digital divide / Jan van Dijk.
Description: Cambridge, UK ; Medford, MA : Polity, 2019. | Includes bibliographical
references and index. | Summary: “Contrary to optimistic visions of a free internet for all,
the problem of the ‘digital divide’ has persisted for close to twenty-five years. Jan van Dijk
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Acknowledgements
This book is a result of twenty-five years of research on the digital
divide by me and others. Fifteen years ago I summarized my first
thoughts about this topic in The Deepening Divide: Inequality in the
Information Society (2005). At first sight this book looks similar. In
fact, it is quite different, because here the assumptions of the former
volume are tested in a large number of surveys, experiments and
analyses of official statistics. The resources and appropriation theory
I sketched previously has matured and is elaborated here. This book
covers not only the so-called first-level digital divide research of that
time (concerning physical access) but also the second level (digital
skills and usage) and the third level (the outcomes of using or not
using digital media). However, the inconvenient message is new: that
digital inequality reinforces existing social inequality.
The framework of The Digital Divide is broad enough to summarize
not only my own work and that of my staff since 2005 but also that of
others. This is the first textbook on the digital divide aimed at those
in higher education, especially in the social sciences and media
courses covering the social aspects of digital media, and the
numerous figures, tables and lists render the results accessible to all.
I am very grateful to those who have read earlier drafts and made
useful comments, in particular Professor Alexander van Deursen,
with whom I have collaborated on several articles and a book on
digital skills. I am also indebted to the reviewers at Polity Press for
their suggestions.
Finally, I want to thank my wife Ineke for her patience, support and
love while her now officially retired husband ‘is working harder than
ever before’.
1
What is the Digital Divide?

Introduction: the concept of the digital divide

In the year 2020 both the concept of and the research into the digital
divide will be twenty-five years old. In 1995 the term ‘digital divide’
was first used in a number of newspapers in the United States. It was
backed by data in the report Falling through the Net, published by
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration,
which talked about ‘haves and have nots’ (NTIA 1995). Soon the
concept spread to Europe and the rest of the world, and by the
millennium both the idea and the problematic of the digital divide
were firmly established on the societal and scholarly agenda.
But what does the concept actually mean? It has produced so many
definitions, controversies and misunderstandings that several people
were in favour of discarding it after a few years (Compaine 2001;
Gunkel 2003). The most common definition runs as follows: a
division between people who have access and use of digital media
and those who do not. The term ‘access’ was emphasized in the first
years of discourse, though later the word ‘use’ was highlighted.
A common synonym for digital media is the general term
‘information and communication technology’. Access can refer to its
devices, connections or applications. The first device to be accessed
was a stand-alone computer or a PC, to be followed by a series of
digital media, both mobile (mobile phones, laptops, tablets and
smartphones) and digitized analogue media (television, radio,
cameras and game devices). Connections mentioned were the
Internet, mobile telephony and digital broadcasting, with either
narrowor broadcasting capacities. Finally, the applications of most
interest were e-mail, search engines, e-commerce, e-banking and
social-networking sites.
Before the concept of the digital divide, other terms were used,
mostly related to the concepts of the information society and
(in)equality: information inequality (Schiller 1981, 1996), knowledge
gap (Tichenor et al. 1970) and participation in the information
society (Lyon 1988). Access and use became linked to digital skills or
literacy, motivation (‘want-nots’) and such outcomes as a democratic
divide and an economic opportunity divide (Mossberger et al. 2003).
Table 1.1. Definitions of the digital divide
Type Definition
General A division between people who have access to and use of
digital media and those who do not

Specific WHO (individuals vs. organizations/communities vs.

societies/countries/regions),
with WHICH characteristics (individuals: income,
education, age, gender; organizations: public or
private ownership, size, sector; countries: developed
or developing, urban or rural)

connects

HOW (access, skills, usage)

to WHAT type of technology (computer, Internet,
phone, digital TV)?
(Hilbert 2011a)

Process Divisions in the access to and use of four phases in the

adoption of digital media: motivation, physical access,
digital skills and usage
In this book I will offer my own framework of four phases of access
and use of digital media in order to understand better the concept of
the digital divide: motivation, physical access, skills and usage. A
descriptive framework is offered by Hilbert (2011a: 19), who defines
the digital divide by answering four specific questions (see table 1.1).
We will see that the focus of digital divide research is, first, on
individuals and, second, on divisions between countries or within
countries (urban and rural). There has also been attention paid to
the individual demographics and characteristics of countries (rich
and poor or developed or developing). The short history of the
discourse below shows that the emphasis on ‘how’ runs from access
to skills and usage. Finally, the technology in question has moved
from PCs and dial-up or narrowcast Internet to hand-held
computers, mobile devices and broadband Internet.

The dangers of a metaphor

The term ‘digital divide’ is a metaphor. A metaphor is a vivid figure
of speech applying a word or phrase to something to which it is not
literally applicable. In English, a divide is both a point or a line of
division – a specific term indicating a geographical dividing line,
such as a watershed. In other languages, digital divide is also defined
in metaphorical terms, such as an opening (brecha in Spanish), a
gorge (Kluft in German) or a fracture (fracture numérique in
French). Thus the digital divide also indicates a social split between
people in a divided society. Here the distinction inclusion in or
exclusion from society is relevant.
The metaphor has also caused a number of misconceptions. The first
misunderstanding is that the digital divide is a simple division
between two clearly separated social categories. However, because in
contemporary societies we exhibit an increasingly multifaceted
social, economic and cultural variation, it is more helpful to see it as
a range of positions extending across whole populations – from
people having no access and use at all to those with full access and
using several applications every day. If any delineation is required, a
tripartite society might be a better definition than a two-tiered one.
At one extreme we perceive an information elite and at the other the
digitally illiterate or the fully excluded. In between are the majority
of the population, having access in one way or another and using
digital technology to a certain extent (see van Dijk [1999] 2012,
2000).
The second misconception is that this gap cannot be closed and that
it will lead to structural or persisting inequality. It has been shown
that this is not the case in terms of physical access to digital
technology – a bridge that has been crossed in the developed
countries. Bridging different skills and usage opportunities might be
more difficult. However, in this book I will show that these
differences can also be mitigated by sensible policies of governments,
businesses, educational institutions, and consumers or citizens.
A third misconception is the assumption that the digital divide is
about absolute inequality, as it is often framed in the concepts
‘inclusion’ in and ‘exclusion’ from society. In fact, all types of access
to digital technology discussed in this book are relative distinctions.
As different people have different degrees of motivation, physical
access, skills and usage opportunities leading to different outcomes,
as well as different levels of support, a relational and network view of
inequality will be discussed.
A fourth danger of the metaphor is that it suggests a single digital
divide. In fact the actual state of digital inequality is much more
complex (van Dijk and Hacker 2003) and is linked to existing social,
economic and cultural divisions in society.
Finally, the term ‘digital’ suggests that the digital divide is a
technical issue when, in fact, it is more of a social problem. Technical
properties of digital media are important for access and use – they
can be complicated or relatively simple – but the causes and effects
of (in) equality are social. The digital divide is not brought to an end
when everybody owns and commands the technology concerned. In
this book I argue that the digital divide is here to stay even when all
such problems are overcome.

Is the digital divide special?

Some people question whether the phenomenon of the digital divide
is new or special. Society has seen the introduction of many
problematical technologies. How is the introduction of digital media
different from that of compulsory reading and writing in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for example? This question can
be answered from several perspectives. We might look to the
innovation, the acceptance and the development of new technology
by individuals and societies. The phenomenon can also be framed in
terms of (in)equality, when some people have more opportunities to
adopt and use new technology than others. A third perspective is the
effect of the introduction of this technology for people and society in
terms of participation (see table 1.2): in which respects are people
more or less included in or excluded from society?
In terms of innovation, acceptance and development, information
and communication technology created after the Second World War
was introduced relatively speedily, in about a generation. It was even
called a ‘digital revolution’. The majority of the population took to
particular media and applications pretty quickly, first of all in the
developed countries. The World Wide Web, created in 1993, was
already in use in the vast majority of these countries after fifteen
years. The uptake of social media, starting in 2004, showed the
fastest adoption rate of any mass medium in history. About 2 billion
people in the world became Facebook users in only ten to twelve
years. The ‘digital revolution’ happened so fast that it is not
surprising that large numbers of people, especially in the developing
countries, lagged behind and so led to a digital divide.
The digital divide is framed primarily in terms of (in)equality. The
question is whether it is special in this respect in comparison with
former technologies or media. This depends on the aspect of
(in)equality we are considering: as Amartya Sen asked, ‘Equality of
what?’ (Sen 1992: ix). Is it (in)equality of opportunities, life chances,
freedoms, capital, resources, positions, capabilities, skills?
Unfortunately, the answer is not made clear in most books and
articles about the digital divide. In this book I will refer to all of these
aspects or expressions of (in)equality. A special characteristic of the
digital divide in terms of (in)equality is that, more than was the case
with former technologies, it touches every imaginable part of society.
The main reason is that digital media are used in all types of
activities in daily life, while for example reading books or
newspapers and watching television are only mental activities (see
chapter 6).
Table 1.2. Perspectives on the digital divide
Perspective Description
Innovation Adoption or not of information and communication
technology for progress or development
(In)equality More or fewer opportunities to adopt and use
information and communication technology
Participation Inclusion in or exclusion from society by adopting
in society and using information and communication
technology
One of the main aspects of the digital divide is inequality of
capabilities or skills. This is often linked to the concept of ‘literacy’.
We often read about a comparison between digital and traditional
literacy. Is digital literacy different from the traditional literacy of
reading and writing? There are many similarities between the two,
but there also are differences in skills required (van Dijk and van
Deursen 2014; van Deursen and van Dijk 2016). On the one hand,
digital media simplify the finding of information – for example,
using a search engine would seem to be easier than consulting a
library catalogue or index cards. On the other hand, digital media are
also more complicated: they require new and special skills in the use
of search engines.
The third perspective of the digital divide is in terms of participation
– whether individuals are included in or excluded from society in
such domains as work, education, the market, community,
citizenship, politics and culture. Is the access to and use of digital
media more important for participation in these domains than the
access to and use of print media, television, radio and the telephone?
My answer in this book is that they are even more important. ICTs
are general-purpose technologies. While older technologies are
important for knowledge, entertainment or communication, digital
media are used for every act, purpose or need in society.
Increasingly, access to and use of digital media is needed to
participate as a worker, entrepreneur, student, consumer or citizen,
or in any other role in contemporary society. In this respect the
digital divide is special too.
Is the digital divide a problem for society?
Nevertheless, it has to be demonstrated that people can no longer
play any other role in contemporary society without using digital
technology. In many ways, printed media, television, radio and the
telephone are still working in apparently satisfactory ways. However,
in this book we will see that, increasingly, access to and use of digital
media is needed at least to enjoy all benefits in society. In most
developed countries governments expect that citizens have an e-mail
address and access to the Internet. More and more jobs require
digital skills at a particular level. You cannot take advantage of
education without being able to use a computer and the Internet.
Without using social-networking sites people may lose friends or
contacts and miss invitations for parties and the like. A lack of fast
digital connections may lead to people finding that concerts and
festivals are sold out. So the digital divide is increasingly a problem
for society. Here again the perspective is threefold (see table 1.3).
Table 1.3. Perspectives of the digital divide as a problem
Perspective Problem
Innovation Lack of innovation, development and economic
and growth of a country
economic
growth
Inequality Economic, social and cultural inequality and
and exclusion of people from society
exclusion
Security People without access are a security risk for society
because they cannot be kept under surveillance by
governments and by businesses.
International institutions such as the UN, the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), the OECD and the World Bank
frame the digital divide primarily as a socio-economic indicator for
growth and development. Their reports reveal strong correlations
between the number of Internet connections and ICT use in a
country and its rate of development, innovation and economic
growth (see a summary in the report of the World Bank (2016), with
its telling title Digital Dividends). From this perspective,
governments and international economic bodies and technical
institutions (such as the ITU) see the digital divide primarily as a
matter of economic policy and international competition. In
developed countries, the digital divide limits the innovative capacity
of an economy because a proportion of the population cannot keep
up. In developing countries, it impedes economic growth and the
capacity to keep pace with the developed countries.
The second perspective, which prevails in social and media or
communication science, is a social one: (in)equality and inclusion in
or exclusion from society. Here the main question is whether the
digital divide is a byproduct of old inequalities or whether it is a new
inequality. This is also one of the most important questions I ask in
this book. Does the digital divide intensify existing inequalities or
does it cause new ones? It is often claimed that inequality changes in
the context of the information or network society (Schiller 1996;
Castells 1996; van Dijk, [1991] 2001, [1999] 2012). Equality and
inclusion are important norms in any social and liberal democracy
and in the perspective of equal global development. This perspective
leads to the introduction of social, cultural and educational policies
by governments and NGOs.
A third perspective is often ignored: the importance of the digital
divide for security in society. However, as early as the first year in
which the digital divide was discussed, an appeal was published for
so-called universal access for all Americans to e-mail (Anderson et al.
1995). The argument was that those without e-mail access would
become a security liability: the government should support e-mail
access for all citizens not only to communicate with them but also to
keep an eye on them. After more than twenty years of massive
government and police surveillance of the Internet and other digital
connections, this appeal now seems more urgent than ever. For
example, a terrorist who uses only secret face-to-face conspiracy and
old technologies such as bombs, trucks, knives and guns to kill
people is a nightmare for the security organizations. This third
perspective is now part of every security policy. Better a connection
for all than no connection at all.
A brief history of the digital divide
The first-level divide: focus on physical access, 1995–
2003
This brief history looks at the research or scholarly perspective of the
digital divide and the societal perspective of media, politics and
policy. Presumably, the Los Angeles Times journalists Webber and
Harmon coined the term in their article of 29 July 1995 describing
the social division between those who were involved in information
technology and those who were not (Gunkel 2003: 501). A short time
afterwards, the NTIA (part of the American Department of
Commerce) popularized the term and supported it with census data,
but at that time it used only the terms ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. The
term spread both in the media and in American politics.
In 2001 the first, frequently cited scientific book about the digital
divide appeared: Pippa Norris (2001) distinguished a global divide
(industrialized and developing countries), a social divide (access of
rich and poor individuals in each nation) and a democratic divide
(those who do and those who do not use Internet resources for
community engagement). Although her theory was much broader,
she treated the concept of the digital divide primarily in terms of
physical access, which means having a computer and an Internet
connection. Norris framed the divide with reference to the diffusion
of innovations theory. This theory, best known in the work of Everett
Rogers ([1962] 2003), defines a number of groups who take up new
technologies (innovators, early adopters, early and late majority
people, and laggards) and the evolution of their endorsement in an
S-curve.
This first phase of discourse and research was marked by a very rapid
uptake of computer possession and Internet connections among the
general population, first of all in the United States. Espousal was first
by the innovators (the first 2.5 per cent) and the early adopters (from
13.5 per cent of the population), and then by the early majority
(between 34 and 50 per cent). After 1993 the graphical interface of
the World Wide Web considerably increased the popularity of the
Internet. In 1995 less than 30 per cent of Americans owned a
computer and less than 20 per cent a modem, while less than 10 per
cent were permanently online among others using e-mail (NTIA
1998). However, in 2001 the figure was 56 per cent for computers
and 50 per cent for the Internet (NTIA 2002) and several European
countries had already passed the US in take-up (NTIA 2002).
Between 1995 and 2004 the gap in the adoption of computers and
Internet connections between people with higher education, income
or employment, the young, and those of the majority ethnicity in a
country were increasing in comparison with people with low
education, income or employment, seniors and ethnic minorities
(van Dijk 2005). The first nationwide representative surveys to
report this was one by Katz and Rice (2002), covering surveys from
1997 through 2001, and those published by the Pew Internet and
American Life Project (Horrigan 2000; Lenhart 2000; Spooner and
Rainie 2000).
In the second part of the 1990s the mood concerning the potential of
the Internet and ICTs in general was very positive and optimistic.
Approaching the millennium, even an Internet hype was observed.
According to policy-makers, every citizen, worker and consumer
should have access to the opportunities of the Internet, and this
seemed to be confirmed by the fast uptake. Soon critics pronounced
that the digital divide was a myth (Brady 2000; Compaine 2001),
non-existent (Thierer 2000) or rubbish (Crabtree 2001). The
problem could be solved by the market offering ever cheaper and
simpler computers and connections. Via the ‘trickle-down principle’,
affluent first users would pay for cheaper products to be purchased
later by users with lower income. Just as with other mass media,
such as radio, television, video players and telephones, those in
higher social classes would merely adopt computers and the Internet
a bit earlier than others. American government agencies reached the
conclusion that the digital divide was closing naturally. While the
titles of the first reports of the NTIA contained references to people
as ‘have nots’ and ‘falling through the net’, or were trying to define
‘the digital divide’ (NTIA 1995, 1998, 1999), around the election of
George W. Bush as president the titles suddenly included words such
as ‘toward digital inclusion’ (NTIA 2000) and ‘a nation online’ (NTIA
2002). At the start of the Bush administration all funds and
initiatives supporting access created in the Clinton years were
cancelled and the NTIA budget was severely cut. According to
Hammond, the boss of the NTIA in 2000, the term ‘digital divide’
sounded too divisive. Instead, he preferred to talk about ‘digital
inclusion’ (Rappoport et al. 2009). So, five years after its appearance,
the digital divide was officially buried.
Yet, this was not the conclusion of scholarly debate and research into
the digital divide; the number of publications reached a climax
between the years 2000 and 2005 (Berrío Zapata and Sant’Ana 2015:
6). At that time research and debate were dominated by economists,
telecommunications researchers and government or business policy-
makers, almost exclusively American. The attitude of these
researchers and policy-makers was technical and deterministic: the
diffusion of this strong new technology, full of opportunities, was
inevitable and would lead to near universal dissemination when
market forces were enacted.

The second-level divide: focus on skills and usage, 2004

– present
In the following period, first scholars and then policy-makers moved
beyond the parameter of physical access. Social scientists indeed first
used such expressions as ‘beyond the digital divide’ (Mossberger et
al. 2003), ‘rethinking the digital divide’ (Warschauer 2003),
‘reconceptualizing the digital divide’ (Selwyn 2004) and ‘the digital
divide as a complex and dynamic phenomenon’ (van Dijk and Hacker
2003). Paul Attewell (2001) coined the terms ‘first-’ and ‘second-
level divide’, the latter referring to computer use and literacy. A year
later this term was made popular by Eszter Hargittai (2002), who
primarily raised issues of unequal online skills. The core idea and
critique of the shift was that having physical access was useless
without the requisite skills, knowledge and support for effective use
and that the digital divide problem was not first and foremost
technological but social, economic, cultural and political (Selwyn
2004).
This period was marked by an even faster uptake of Internet
connections and purchase of computers, which became smaller,
faster and cheaper every year. While in 2004 less than 15 per cent of
the world’s population used the Internet, in 2014 that figure was
already approaching 45 per cent (World Bank 2016). During this
decade the early majority of the potential population in the
developed countries using the Internet turned into a late majority, in
some countries reaching the 90 per cent mark. The gap in computer
and Internet access among people in the developed countries with
different education, income, employment or social status, which had
previously been widening (van Dijk 2005), was turned upside down.
Now it was those with low education and income, together with
seniors and females, who were adopting the technology faster than
the others.
The popularity of the Internet grew considerably with the
appearance of social media around the year 2004 and the arrival of
mobile web access with powerful phones (3G), leading to a user
experience that was altogether different. In the early 1990s the
Internet was seen as a foreign and intimidating space that required
technical expertise and digital competencies (Oggolder 2015). Now it
became part of daily life for more than 70 per cent of the population
in the developed countries. Using e-commerce, e-banking, e-
government and social-networking sites became normal daily
activities. In 2012 van Dijk and van Deursen (2014b) observed that,
in the Netherlands, people with low education spent more leisure
time on the Internet than those with higher education.
When, between 2010 and 2015, in a growing number of
technologically advanced countries, home Internet access exceeded
90 per cent or more, often with broadband capacities, policy-makers
in government and business tended to play down the problem of the
digital divide. Simultaneously, faster connections and all kinds of
terminals apparently made use of the Internet extremely easy:
laptops, tablets, smartphones and touchscreens were everywhere.
The digital divide was buried for the second time. The majority of
people were using the web to find simple information and for
messages, shopping, every kind of service and social networking.
‘Even a two-year-old child can manage a tablet’ was a popular
expression at that time. In the US, only broadband diffusion was left
as a problem for the government to solve, starting in the Obama
years after 2008.
That the digital divide was dead was not the conclusion of most
researchers and policy-makers pretending to have insight and a
vision of the future. It was certainly not the conclusion of policy-
makers and researchers at that time in the developing countries,
where physical access and Internet use reached (far) less than 50 per
cent of the population. In both developed and developing countries,
many government and educational authorities realized that there
was more than physical access to be considered. It became clearer
that all those new users needed skills and useful applications to
support the economy, society and culture. Unfortunately, policy
directions to reinforce this were exploratory, occasional and not very
effective (see chapter 9).
So it is not surprising that, following the fast adoption and
popularization of the Internet, at least in the developed countries,
the biggest concern for digital divide research became the skills of all
those new users. The scope of research became considerably broader,
to include the new issues of opportunity and inequality. The key term
‘digital divide’ was used less and less in publishing after 2004 (Berrío
Zapata and Sant’Ana 2015). It seemed that between the early 2000s
and 2009 the interest in such research was diminishing (Reisdorf et
al. 2017: 108). In fact, the key words were changing, to ‘Internet use’,
‘social media use’, ‘mobile use’, ‘digital or information literacy’,
‘digital skills or competencies’, and others related to unequal
opportunities and applications.
Between 2004 and 2012, new conceptual frameworks and
operational definitions were created for digital literacy and
typologies of Internet use or applications. Discussions started
concerning what the differences might be between traditional and
digital literacy and whether ‘literacy’ or ‘skills and competencies’ was
the more appropriate term to use. Together with creating new
conceptual frameworks, some researchers tested the literacies, skills
or competencies in laboratories, field experiments and surveys
(Hargittai 2002; Bunz 2004, 2009; van Deursen 2010).
The second issue of primary intention in this phase of digital divide
research was Internet use and user groups. Several classifications
were created, some based traditionally on general social-
psychological gratifications or needs (Flanagin and Metzger 2001;
LaRose and Eastin 2004), others on special Internet activities
(Livingstone and Helsper 2007; Brandtzæg 2010; Kalmus et al. 2011;
van Deursen and van Dijk 2014a, 2014b). These were studied in
several wide-scale surveys of Internet use internationally.
A number of investigators observed that a usage gap was unfolding
similar to the so-called knowledge gap that occurred in the 1970s
with the mass media. This was seen as a gap between people using
primarily information, education and career-oriented Internet
applications and those using mainly entertainment and simple
commercial and communication applications (Bonfadelli 2002;
Madden 2003; van Dijk and Hacker 2003; van Deursen and van Dijk
2014a; Zillien and Hargittai 2009).
From 2004 onwards, most research was dedicated to differences and
inequalities among computer and Internet users. Most popular were
projects about the unequal use of a series of new media and
applications perceived as hypes: blogs, chat or messaging boxes,
social media, mobile phones and wearables. Studies were still
predominantly American, though there were European scholars
(mainly in the UK, the Netherlands and Spain). In Latin America, a
number of Brazilian, Chilean and Mexican authors were active (see
Berrío Zapata and Sant’Ana 2015 for the international distribution)
while, in Asia, South Korea, Singapore and, more recently, China
have been prominent in this research, showing that work in this area
has become global.

The third-level divide: focus on outcomes, 2012 –

present
While the focus of research on skills and usage continues today, in
the last five years a new perspective has appeared. As the process of
diffusion of computers and the Internet seems to be reaching
saturation point, at least in the developed countries, some
investigators and policy-makers wonder what its effect has been on
people, organizations and societies. What are the outcomes (neutral)
or benefits (normative) of computer and Internet access and use?
Again, some individuals ask whether the digital divide has finally
closed.
In 2010, José Robles Morales, Cristóbal Torres Albero and Óscar
Molina coined the term ‘third-level digital divide’ (in Spanish). Two
years later Robles and Torres Albero (2012) again suggested the term
as a logical step after their survey of access and use of the Internet in
Spain, although they did not account for outcomes in their study.
They hypothesized that people without access and the necessary
skills would not benefit from a growing number of online services
that did not have offline equivalents, and they were afraid that digital
inequality would reinforce classical social inequalities. In 2011, Wei
and his colleagues from Singapore not only used the term but also
demonstrated the third-level divide in a local experiment. They
observed the effects of access (first level) and capabilities or skills
(second level) on the self-efficacy and learning outcomes of 4,000
students.
Van Deursen and van Dijk demonstrated a much broader focus of
outcomes or benefits of Internet use in two nationwide
representative surveys in the Netherlands. The first was in the
economic domain. In the spring of 2012 they reported on
productivity loss among the Dutch workforce on account of a lack of
digital skills (estimated at about 4 per cent of working time) and
malfunctioning digital technology (another 4 per cent loss). See van
Deursen and van Dijk (2014b). In the autumn of that year their
representative survey of the Dutch population contained a long list of
questions concerning the potential benefits of using the Internet on
all domains, economic, social, political, cultural, educational and
personal development. It showed that people with higher education
and jobs and the young generations were benefiting much more from
the Internet than those with low education or jobs and the elderly.
Examples of such benefits were lower prices for products, greater
chances of securing a job or finding a party to vote for, better
education opportunities, more and better health information and
treatment, opportunities to acquire new friends, and even more
chance of forming romantic relationships (see van Deursen and van
Dijk 2012). At that time only the positive outcomes of Internet use
were taken into account.
In 2015, Helsper, van Deursen and Eynon published a comparison of
British and Dutch survey data, called Tangible Outcomes of Internet
Use, which observed and conceptualized Internet outcomes in four
fields of resources: economic, cultural, social and individual well-
being. Two years later Ragnedda (2017) offered a theory focusing on
the third-level digital divide, dealing with the question of whether
the outcomes simply extend traditional forms of inequality or
whether they also include new forms of social exclusion.
In the last five years of this recent phase of research, there has been
universal access to the Internet and their terminal devices in the
most technologically advanced developed countries. The so-called
laggards and the digitally excluded now comprise less than 10 per
cent of the population, whereas in other developed countries this
figure is 20 per cent to one-third of the population. However, in the
developing countries it is variously between 50 and 90 per cent of the
population – far from universal access (ITU 2017).
As, in the developed countries, all parts of the population are using
the Internet daily and digital media in every activity – work
education, leisure, social networking, commerce and services – the
effects or outcomes of these activities register with both researchers
and policy-makers. The positive and negative effects of Internet and
digital media use are observed and discussed in all media. Policy-
makers are no longer focusing only on physical access or digital skills
and useful applications of the Internet. The 2016 World Bank Digital
Dividends report is about the many, mostly positive, effects of
Internet use in several domains of society. The outcomes of Internet
use are also outlined in the Inclusive Internet Index of the Economist
Intelligence Unit (2019). This policy think tank concludes that ‘an
inclusive Internet is not just accessible and affordable to all. It is also
relevant to all, allowing usage that enables positive social and
economic outcomes at individual and group level.’ The indicators for
assessing countries in this index were not only availability and
affordability but also relevance and readiness to use the Internet.
The focus on outcomes of the third-level digital divide is also the
main focus of this book. The emphasis in my earlier general book
was the second-level digital divide, highlighting digital skills and
inequalities of use (van Dijk 2005). The main questions I want to
answer here are 1) does digital inequality or the digital divide reduce
or reinforce existing, traditional inequalities?, and 2) does the digital
divide create new, previously unknown, social inequalities? These
questions will be highlighted in the last part of the book. In the first
part I shall deal with the causes of the outcomes of Internet and
digital media: motivation for or attitudes towards using digital
media, physical conditions of access, digital skills and usage patterns.
Chapter overview
Chapter 2 is about the empirical investigations and the theories
created concerning the digital divide in almost twenty-five years of
research. Has the body of research grown or diminished in these
years? Have there been times of rising and declining interest? Was
the research primarily quantitative or qualitative? What were the
main methods of data collection? Who were the most important
subjects of research and which were the most important countries?
Which were the most important empirical questions in the first-,
second- and third-level phases of digital divide research? The second
part of this chapter discusses the theories about the digital divide
offered so far. What is the nature of these theories? Are they
specifications of existing general theories or new theories focusing
only on the digital divide? Have these theories been validated and
tested in empirical research?
Chapters 3 to 6 are the core of this book. They describe and explain
four phases of access or adoption of digital media: a) motivation or
attitude towards gaining access, b) actually obtaining physical access,
c) acquiring digital skills or literacy, and d) actual use of these media.
These phases are in fact parts of my own theoretical framework
proposed many years ago (van Dijk 2005), but they can still be used
as neutral distinctions because they follow the focus of the three
levels of digital divide research. I have no problem in describing
different approaches than my own or research results of other
investigators.
In chapter 3 the primary motivations for gaining access are
discussed. In general, such motivations, and positive attitudes
towards the use of digital technology, have increased considerably in
the last twenty-five years. However, even when universal access is in
sight in the most technologically advanced developed countries,
motivations and attitudes remain important where unequal use is
involved. Some people are much more motivated than others to
purchase new hardware and software, to learn digital skills, and to
use all kinds of Internet applications every day. We have in society
not only have-nots but also want-nots. Who are they? This chapter
contains mostly psychological research.
Chapter 4 summarizes the main research about physical access. This
is the ‘classical’ and best-known part of digital divide research. It is
primarily economic, technological and sociological. Here familiar
schemes of diffusion of innovation theory are examined, such as the
adoption curves of current and future users. What is the current
situation of computer possession and Internet connection rates in
developing and developed countries? Does the physical access gap
disappear when everybody has a computer and an Internet
connection?
In chapter 5 the discussion turns to research into digital skills or
literacies. I will first list several conceptual frameworks invented for
the study of digital skills, competencies, literacies, so-called twenty-
first-century skills and others. Then I will list all the relevant causes
and consequences of the digital skills divide according to those
frameworks. Who has the best skills and to what level? Are the more
highly educated and young people better than others, as presumed in
public opinion?
Chapter 6 is about divides in the use of the Internet and other digital
media. The most important typologies of users and applications on
(mainly) the Internet will be enumerated. Concerning unequal use,
we look principally at the frequency and diversity of applications. We
will see that all known social differences in society are reflected in
the use of the Internet and other digital media. However, does this
use only reflect or also reinforce usage patterns? The knowledge gap
thesis of the 1970s assumed that the use of the traditional mass
media leads to more information for people with higher educational
attainment and more entertainment experience for those with lower
educational attainment. Is a similar gap also growing on the
Internet?
Chapter 7 is about the positive and negative outcomes of access and
use of the Internet and other digital media. Who benefits most from
access and usage: people with higher education and income, people
in professional jobs, young people in general? Or are all categories of
the population benefiting equally? Who is better able to cope with
such negative outcomes as excessive use, cybercrime or abuse, and
loss of security or privacy?
Chapter 8 concerns the relation between digital and social inequality.
This chapter contains the main messages of the book. Here again the
principal question is whether digital inequality is merely a reflection
of social inequality or whether it might lead to more or less
inequality in general. The second question is whether the use of
digital technology will reduce or reinforce existing inequalities.
When the Internet and other digital media first appeared, people
thought that inequality of information and media use would be
reduced. Once people obtained access and acquired a minimum of
usage skills, information would be relatively easy to find everywhere
(online) and at any time. The Internet was cheap or even free to use,
as costs were paid via advertising.
In the last twenty years this optimistic expectation began to fade. It
was observed that social, economic and cultural inequality was rising
in large parts of the world. The entire societal context is significant
for the evolution of the digital divide. This chapter focuses, first, on
the context of those other inequalities that existed before the advent
of the Internet and, second, on new types of inequality in the context
of the information society and the network society.
The final chapter of this book is about policy perspectives to solve the
problem of the digital divide. But can the digital divide be closed
completely, or can it only be mitigated? In this chapter several policy
measures in all domains of society will be discussed that at least
ameliorate the problem. They are listed with reference to the four
phases of access discussed in chapters 3 to 6 along the main social
domains: work, education, business, leisure, citizenship and culture.
I will address both governments and the business world (producers,
users and designers of digital technology), together with educators,
politicians, community or civilian organizations and users
themselves.
2
Research into and Theory of the Digital
Divide

Introduction
In this chapter I will describe the characteristics of the research
tradition concerning the digital divide over the last twenty years.
There have been various approaches, so I will outline the general
methodologies and theories, listing the most important research
questions, themes, disciplines involved, strategies and methods, and,
finally, the published results and their impact.
I will then go on to describe the theories formulated from four
perspectives: the acceptance of technology perspective, the
materialist perspective, the social-cultural perspective and the
relational perspective. Deriving from these I propose a broad
theoretical framework that can be used to explicate in the following
chapters the results of research so far.

Research into the digital divide

Questions
At the turn of the twenty-first century the main question was who
possessed a computer and an Internet connection and who did not.
Researchers considered the primary demographics such as income,
educational level, gender, ethnicity and employment status. The first
institutions producing the statistics were national government
departments and bureaus of official statistics, international bodies
such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the European
Commission (Eurostat), and telecom corporations with their branch
organizations, such as the ITU. At the same time, scholars found the
statistics produced by these bodies to be rather superficial. They
wanted to know why particular people had computers and Internet
connections and why others did not. To find answers their primary
method was to conduct surveys, either on a large scale for whole
countries or on a smaller scale for specific communities, such as
students.
These scholars also asked what might be the development of access
among populations in both rich and poor countries. Would
everybody gain access to computers and the Internet as rapidly as
had been the case with the television a generation before? Would
there be only 5 or 10 per cent of the population in rich countries left
without access, as for example with landline telephones, or would
particular segments of the population lag behind permanently?
Pippa Norris (2001) called the first projection normalization and the
second stratification. To create these projections scholars used
existing economic theories or those regarding social stratification
and diffusion of innovation. One of the economic projections of
normalization was the trickle-down principle, in which the adoption
of new technologies always shifts from higher to lower social classes
of income, education and occupation (Compaine 2001). Those who
have the necessary resources first pay for the cost of a new
technology, which makes adoption cheaper later on for those of
lesser means.
However, others thought that the continuing stratification and
cultural divisions among status, lifestyle and innovativeness were
responsible for persisting inequalities of access. Finally there were
the more technically oriented scholars who expected that digital
media would become more and more easy to use, thus closing the
access gap.
When physical access surged after 2000, another question arose: did
those with access have sufficient skills to use digital media? In
response, Eszter Hargittai (2002) announced the second-level digital
divide, which focused on skills and usage. It was soon discovered that
the skills needed were not only technical or operational but also
information- or content-related. To investigate this, researchers
began to use performance tests in laboratories and school classes. A
subsequent question was whether people exhibiting inadequate
digital skills were the same individuals as those with problems
gaining physical access. Were differences of income, occupation,
education, age, gender and ethnicity the same where both skills and
access were concerned?
After 2005, questions about inequality of usage came to the fore.
What was the frequency of use (time), the amount of use (number of
applications) and the diversity of use (types of applications) among
different social categories of users? Several Internet user typologies
were created and a number of large-scale surveys were conducted to
describe and analyse all these aspects.
Between 2012 and 2015 a growing number of researchers asked what
were the benefits of having and using the Internet and what were the
real disadvantages of not being online. Examples of benefits were
cheaper products and services, the possibility of finding a job,
maintaining and increasing social contacts, chancing on a partner,
searching for information and help with health problems, examining
political information, signing up for an educational course and
following a cultural activity. The potential negative outcomes –
excessive use, unwanted, unsafe and even criminal behaviour, and
loss of privacy and the quality of face-to-face communication – were
not examined. Researchers observed that the negative effects meant
that some people didn’t use the Internet, but there was no particular
focus on this (see table 2.1).
Table 2.1. The main research questions concerning the digital divide
Issue Question
Possession Who has computers, the Internet and other digital
media?
Motivation Who wants computers, the Internet and other digital
media?
Evolution What is the growth in access to digital media in
developed and developing countries?
Skills Who shows sufficient digital skills?
Usage What are the frequency of use, the amount of use and
the diversity in use among all social categories of
users?
Benefits and What are the benefits of being online and what are
disadvantages the disadvantages of not being online?
Themes and disciplines
During the years of the first- and second-level digital divide,
particular research themes became important. According to a
systematic analysis of the literature between 1997 and 2012 by Berrío
Zapata and Sant’Ana (2015), the seven themes shown in table 2.2
were the most popular. Top of the list was access for consumers – to
know who has access to digital media and networks and why; this
was seen from both a supplier and a consumer perspective.
The second most popular theme was development, in the context of
the level of development of a country and the innovativeness of its
society. The enormous gap of physical access between developed and
developing countries was a major topic of research, alongside the
assumed boost given to development by gaining access to and the use
of digital technology.
Table 2.2. The top seven research themes into the digital divide
Source: Berrío Zapata and Sant’Ana (2015).

Research theme
1 Access for consumers
2 Development and innovativeness of countries
3 Education
4 Empowerment: community-building and participation in society
5 e-Health
6 e-Government and e-Participation
7 Capacities and applications of digital technology
A third important theme was education, primarily the teaching of the
necessary skills and competencies and the integration of ICTs in
schools and universities.
In fourth place was empowerment, which could mean either the
power of digital media for community-building and self-organization
or the increase in active participation in several domains of society
through digital media.
The fifth theme was e-health, particularly where the unequal use of
health applications was concerned. It was assumed to be literally
vital that people should have the skills to make use of such
applications.
Issues of e-government and e-participation formed the sixth most
popular topic. Inequality of access and the use of online public and
social services, information about citizen benefits and the sources of
information to participate politically were the points of investigation.
The last theme consisted of the capacities and applications of digital
technology, which involved the differences in access, skills and usage
entailed by particular versions of digital media. Often discussed were
the differences between narrowband and broadband access, the
opportunities of mobile technology for general use, and the evolution
of the computer from mainframes and PCs to laptops, tablets and
smartphones.
According to Berrío Zapata and Sant’Ana’s summary (2015: 12), ‘the
main areas of research are education, administration, development
communication, telecom and IT, medical sciences, information
science and economy.’ The question is whether these disciplines have
investigated the digital divide.
The disciplines dominating the first-level digital divide were
economics, primarily the consumer economy, together with telecoms
and IT. The main researchers were the authors of the NTIA reports
and the ITU reports, as well as individual authors such as Compaine
(2001) and the marketing scholars Hoffman et al. (2000).
An early political scientist investigating the digital divide was Norris
(2001). She was followed by education scientists such as Warschauer
(2003), Solomon et al. (2003) and Selwyn et al. (2006); Warschauer
also introduced the field into development studies by focusing on the
digital divide in developing countries.
Sociologists and media and communication scholars showed an
interest at the time the second-level divide was introduced. American
scholars such as Servon (2002), Mossberger et al. (2003), DiMaggio
et al. (2004) and Witte and Mannon (2010), Europeans such as
Mansell (2002), van Dijk (2005), Zillien (2006), Livingstone and
Helsper (2007) Robles and Molina (2007) and van Deursen (2010),
and the South Korean Park (2002) combined sociology and media or
communication science.
Currently, digital divide research is an interdisciplinary activity, with
scholars scarcely making a distinction between economic, social,
political, cultural, psychological, technical and information or
communication science. Similarly, this book aims to be fully
interdisciplinary in describing and explaining the digital divide.

Strategies and methods

Which strategies and methods of research have been used to ask all
these questions? The most general strategy is making a choice
between basic and applied research. Although the digital divide is
clearly a societal problem, so far most research has been fairly basic,
describing the current state of affairs. Only a small minority of
projects investigate solutions applicable in practical settings. It
seems that both scholars and policy-makers want first to understand
the development of the digital divide before trying to find solutions.
The second characteristic of digital divide research is that it is more
descriptive than explanatory. As I will argue in the rest of this
chapter, it lacks a fully fledged theory. Much of it contains
correlations between access, skills or use and personal demographics
of age, gender and ethnicity or socio-economic factors such as
income, occupation and education (Scheerder et al. 2017; van Laar et
al. 2017). The deeper social, economic, cultural and psychological
causes of the correlations are seldom addressed.
Digital divide research also is overwhelmingly quantitative. Most of
it is based on data collected from large-scale surveys and attempts to
capture the wider picture. Although this produces vast amounts of
information, it does not come up with the precise mechanisms
explaining the adoption and use of the technology concerned in
everyday life. Qualitative ethnographic or field research is relatively
sparse; examples are by Stanley (2003), Wyatt et al. (2005), Katz
(2006), Ito et al. (2009), Clark (2009), Loos (2012) and Correa
(2014). The dominant demographic and socio-economic variables in
survey research lead more to socio-economic than to socio-cultural
or psychological determinants of Internet use (van Dijk 2006;
Scheerder et al. 2017).
By far the most frequently used strategy in digital divide research is
the survey and the resulting official statistics, which are used for all
phases: motivation, physical access, skills, usage and outcomes.
Nationwide representative surveys, the predominant type, are most
often in the form of self-administered questionnaires. Experiments
are a second common strategy, mostly used for registering usage
patterns and outcomes in particular situations in the field; they can
also, for example, provide different connections, devices and support
for comparison. The third strategy is performance tests administered
by educational institutions or by scholars investigating digital skills.
These are mainly used to observe skills or levels of literacy, although
surveys are employed most for this purpose. The least frequently
used strategy is ethnography or research observing actual, daily use
in restricted fields.
So, the methods of data collection in digital divide research are
primarily questionnaires that lead to scientific reports or official
public statistics. Direct observation of behaviour is seldom practised
except for in performance tests. Longitudinal research is scarce so it
is difficult to show trends such as the evolution of phases of the
digital divide. International comparisons made by international
institutions such as the UN, the ITU, the World Bank, the EU and the
World Internet Project, combining reports of universities in more
than thirty-five countries (www.worldinternetproject.com), are more
frequent.
Data analysis comes mainly from descriptive data. For major data
sets, correlations or at best regressions are most popular. Causal
modelling of big data sets is not frequent because of the lack of a
comprehensive digital divide theory (see the second part of this
chapter). Comparisons mostly involve only two models with a
combination of a few variables.

Publications and their impact

Wang et al. (2011) mapped the ‘intellectual structure’ of the digital
divide research community between 2000 and 2009 with a
bibliographical and social-network analysis of 852 scientific journal
papers and their 26,966 citations. They concluded that ‘the digital
divide has gained the reputation as a legitimate academic field, with
digital divide specific journals gaining the status required for an
independent research field’ (2011: 54). A broader bibliographical and
network analysis, including books, theses, conference and working
papers and policy documents from 1997 through 2015, found
102,000 key terms in the text and 5,970 in the titles of English-
language publications (Berrío Zapata and Sant’Ana, 2015). Spanish
publications showed 13,400 key terms in the text and 672 in the
titles and Portuguese publications 486 in the text and four in the
titles. Other languages were not covered.
This brings us to an important observation. More than half of the
scientific publications and their citations of research into the digital
divide come from the US, followed by the UK and other European
countries. In the Spanish-language sphere, Spain, Mexico and Chile
have most publications and citations, while in Portuguese it is Brazil
(Berrío Zapata and Sant’Ana, 2015). Other languages and countries
are not covered, but they comprise a small minority in the scholarly
domain. This means that the majority of research originates in
English-speaking developed and (relatively) rich countries. Policy-
oriented publications issued by (inter)national institutions (the ITU,
the UN, the World Bank and others) focus on both developed and
developing countries.
Another striking observation is that there is a divide between the
academic publication domain and the policy-oriented domain of
(inter) national institutions and official public statistics. The
academics tend to cite each other, as do the policy researchers,
meaning that the policy impact of academic research is possibly less
than that of policy research and official statistics about computer and
Internet access or use. This issue will be discussed in the final
chapter.
Digital divide research is publicized much more in journal articles,
conference and working papers and reports than in books.
Nevertheless, books receive relatively higher rates when it comes to
citations (Berrío Zapata and Sant’Ana 2015: 7). Most articles are
publicized by the English journals First Monday (open access), New
Media & Society, Information Society, Information, Communication
& Society, Telematics and Informatics and Telecommunication
Policy. The most important authorities in the first decade of the
twenty-first century were Pippa Norris, Mark Warschauer, Eszter
Hargittai, Jan van Dijk and Donna Hoffman (see Berrío Zapata and
Sant’Ana 2015: 8, 10).

Theories concerning the digital divide

The current status of theories
It was claimed above that digital divide research is predominately
descriptive and that it has not yet produced a fully-fledged theory.
However, many people have attempted to provide a theory, some of
whom are developing fresh ideas and others are adopting or adapting
existing theories. A fully-fledged theory requires at least four
elements (see table 2.3).
Current and past research has produced many empirical statements
and operational definitions of concepts used for mostly descriptive
and correlational research. However, coherent theoretical statements
or axioms and causal analysis are frequently lacking. Even when
causal analysis is used, for example with structural-equational
modelling, the model is not a reflection or a test of a basic theory
explaining phenomena related to the digital divide. Most often they
are merely an assembly of factors or variables which are statistically
related and seem to follow a logical causal path.
Table 2.3. The four elements of a scientific theory and their
characteristics
Element Characteristic
Theoretical A coherent number of statements or axioms
statements containing basic concepts and their relationships,
perhaps to be portrayed in a model, which provide the
so-called hard core of a theory
Basic Concepts with definitions for empirical research
concepts
and
operational
definitions
Empirical Statements that have been tested and supported in
statements empirical investigations
Heuristics A method of research appropriate to the statements
or preferred
method
We are looking for systematic theories containing both theoretical
and empirical statements and heuristics or empirical methods to test
them in the future. Presently we have only a number of perspectives
of developing or adopting theories. I will now discuss four
perspectives.

The acceptance of technology perspective

Currently, a series of so-called acceptance of technology principles is
available for a theory which might explain many aspects of the digital
divide. Most theories of technology acceptance are psychological,
drawing on behaviour, attitudes, motives, expectancies and
intentions. Behavioural intention is the most important factor in
such psychological theories.
The oldest theory in this domain is the theory of planned behaviour
(Ajzen 1991; Ajzen and Fishbein 2005). This is a rationalist theory
describing the ways in which people consciously choose or reject a
particular technology. The initial causes are threefold, relating to
behavioural, normative and control beliefs. Some people have a
positive attitude towards computers, mobile phones and the Internet
and others have negative attitudes towards them. In the following
chapter I will show that these attitudes are very important in
adopting or rejecting digital media. Normative beliefs here are
stimulated (or not) by people’s social environment to become part of
the digital world. Clearly this holds for the present young generation
– ‘the digital natives’ – who have grown up with digital media.
Finally, the perceptions of people that they are able to apply digital
media, for example by means of skills, are the control beliefs. These
three beliefs come into play before people accept a technology. So
behavioural intention is treated here as a dependent variable.
A second theory frequently used to explain the intention to use a new
technology is called the technology acceptance model (Davis 1989).
In this theory the perceived usefulness and ease of use are what
initially determine the attitude towards a new technology. These are
in fact the attributes of a particular technology as perceived by
potential users. In the history of digital media they have become ever
more important in closing the digital divide. Generally, in the last
twenty-five years both the usefulness and the ease of use of computer
and Internet applications have dramatically increased. However,
these measures remain different for different parts of the population.
The third psychological theory of technology acceptance is the
unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (Venkatesh et al.
2003). This theory claims to combine all statistically significant
factors of technology acceptance for individuals in the context of
organizations. Here the expectancies of the effort needed and the
performance of the technology concerned, together with the
influence people perceive from their social environment, are decisive
for the intention to use it.
Probably the most popular technology acceptance theory in digital
divide research is the diffusion of innovations theory (Rogers [1962]
2003). The psychological backbone of this broad interdisciplinary
theory is the process involved in the decision to adopt or reject a new
technology. The focus and dependent variable here is not the
behavioural intention to adopt, as in the former theories, but
adoption itself. This entails both personal characteristics, such as
innovativeness, and societal factors, such as social norms for change,
and the decision process is informed by communication sources.
People are persuaded by the perceived technical characteristics of the
innovation concerned. Digital media might be accepted when it is
seen that they have a relative advantage over other or older media,
when they are compatible with familiar media, when they are not
very complex to use, or when people are able to observe and
experiment with them in their own environment.
These four theories focus only on the first phases of access to a new
technology, while the following theories concentrate on the use of a
technology (see figure 2.1). The first is the uses and gratifications
theory (Rosengren et al. 1985). The core of this theory of media and
communication science is the sequence of basic needs, motives and
gratifications searched for and obtained in using particular media.
Some researchers, for example, list various gratifications gained
through using the Internet (Cho et al. 2003; Song et al. 2004;
Stafford at al. 2004; LaRose and Eastin 2004). Users seeking these
gratifications are motivated to gain access and develop the
corresponding skills.

Figure 2.1. Acceptance of technology theories in their various phases

of acceptance
The sociological and communication theory known as domestication
theory (Silverstone and Hirsch 1992; Silverstone and Haddon 1996)
focuses on the initial and continued use of media in everyday life.
The ethnographic method used here is to observe how people
(re)design available media to suit their own context and their own
purposes.
The last acceptance theory here is social cognitive theory (Bandura
1991, 2001). This is a theory of social learning, as people observe the
media use of others in order to inform their own learning. After a
while their expectations of the results are raised and they develop
habitual use (LaRose and Eastin 2004 combine this theory with the
uses and gratifications theory).
The materialist perspective
The materialist perspective looks primarily at the economic means
and the social opportunities people have to acquire digital media.
Previously in this chapter we have seen that socio-economic
demographics form the most important variable in digital divide
research. Income, socio-economic status, occupation, job and level of
education have here been framed in more abstract categories
emerging from existing social and economic theories.
Consumer economic theory attempts to explain the digital divide of
(mainly) physical access through market costs. When prices drop –
for instance, as chips, batteries and screens become cheaper –
consumers are more able to purchase the relevant hardware. When
new digital media first emerged, purchases were made largely by
people with substantial incomes, while those on low incomes waited
for prices to go down. This mechanism is called the ‘trickle down
principle’ (Compaine 2001; see chapter 1).
From the perspective of Marxian economics, however, the digital
divide would still exist because people’s living conditions and access
to digital media are determined by more than market costs. One of
the most popular theories from the materialist perspective is the
capital theory of Bourdieu (1986), whose types of capital have been a
source of inspiration for digital divide researchers in constructing
variables for surveys. Economic capital – money, property and other
assets – is exemplified by questions about income and the possession
of connections, devices, software and subscriptions. Social capital –
social relationships and network connections – is identified by
questions about social support in gaining access, learning skills and
using digital media. Cultural capital is acquired in three forms:
embodied (learning knowledge and language), objectified (obtaining
cultural goods) and institutionalized (diplomas, credentials and
professional qualifications). It is seen in digital divide surveys in
questions about the educational level attained by respondents and
the status acquired by using digital media.
However, in digital divide research the variables identifying these
types of capital are usually used only descriptively by finding
correlations between kinds of access and these variables. The
background of Bourdieu’s theory of social stratification, distinction,
status and power in society (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990) is rarely
discussed.
The second theory in this materialist perspective is the structuration
theory of Giddens (1984), which states that social structures are
made by human action via their rules and resources. Social and
cultural rules constrain actions and several kinds of resources make
them possible. In digital divide research, a set of resources is
assumed to be supporting access in all phases. The most important
are material resources (income and property), mental resources
(knowledge and social or technical skills), social resources
(connections and relationships) and temporal resources (time to
spend in any activity, including using digital media). Social and
cultural rules point to the way in which people are supposed to
employ digital media.
Similar to Bourdieu’s capital theory, Giddens’s structuration theory
is mostly used by digital divide researchers to derive lists of
resources and rules in order to correlate them with access.

The socio-cultural perspective

The socio-cultural perspective shows more interest in the meaning,
signification and (re)construction of the use of and access to digital
technology. The point of departure is that access to and the use of
digital media are embedded in everyday life and the socio-cultural
context. The domestication theory mentioned earlier also belongs to
this perspective. Researchers writing from this perspective are active
in sociology, anthropology and media studies.
One of the pioneers is the classical sociologist Max Weber ([1922]
1978). Some digital divide researchers have recently called attention
to a Weberian approach (Ragnedda and Muschert 2013; Blank and
Groselj 2014; Regnedda 2017). While Weber was also an economist,
he did not think that inequality was determined only by economic
factors; factors such as status and prestige were important too. His
argument starts with (un)equal life chances, comparable to the
materialist concepts of resources and capital. Through these chances
people conduct their life (in this context, they use digital media in
their own way in everyday life). In so doing they have a number of
life choices. The result is a particular lifestyle – here in which digital
media have more or less importance. These four aspects of life in the
work of Weber are explained by Regnedda (2017: 70).
Lifestyles determined by a particular possession and use of digital
media create prestige and status; people with the same lifestyle
create status groups of which many people wish to be a part. For
young people, mobile phones and wearable computers form an
important lifestyle and status marker. Without these symbols they
are likely to be excluded socially. However, it is not only age that
leads to cultural distinctions in the digital divide. Cultural differences
of gender, ethnicity, social class, jobs or professions, and knowledge
of languages can lead to unequal access and use of digital media.
We have seen that socio-cultural factors have been neglected in
earlier digital divide research. Nevertheless, this perspective is useful
for all phases of access, not least in the phase of motivation and the
cultural distinctions of digital media usage.

The relational perspective

The last perspective to be discussed is a particular methodological
approach which might possibly lead to a new basic paradigm. Most
digital divide research is undertaken on the basis of so-called
methodological individualism (Wellman and Berkowitz 1988). It
often deals with individuals and their characteristics – level of
income and education, employment, age, sex, and ethnicity. This is
the usual approach in survey research, which measures the
properties and attitudes of individual respondents.
A different perspective is the relational or network approach
(Wellman and Berkowitz 1988; Monge and Contractor 2003). Here
the most important units of analysis are not individuals per se but
the relationships between individuals. Inequality is not just a matter
of individual attributes but also one of categorical distinctions
between groups of people. This is the view of the American
sociologist Charles Tilly: ‘The central argument runs like this: Large,
significant inequalities in advantages among human beings
correspond mainly to categorical differences such as black/white,
male/female, citizen/foreigner, or Muslim/Jew rather than to
individual differences in attributes, propensities, or performances’
(Tilly 1998: 7). Other important categorical distinctions are
employers and (un)employed, management and executives, people
with high and low levels of education, the elderly and the young, and
parents and children, while at the macro-level we may observe the
categorical inequality of developed and developing countries,
sometimes referred to as the core and periphery. The first of these
pairings is generally the dominant category as far as the possession
and control of digital media is concerned; the exceptions are the last
two mentioned above – the elderly and parents.
The dominant category is the first to adopt the new technology, thus
gaining an advantage to increase power in its relationship vis-à-vis
the subordinate category. The example of gender inequality is
instructive:
Gender differences in the appropriation of technology start very
early in life. Little boys are the first to pick up technical toys and
devices, passing the little girls, most often their sisters and small
female neighbours or friends. These girls leave the operation to
the boys, perhaps at first because the girls are less secure in
handling them. Here a long process of continual reinforcement
starts in which the girls ‘never’ learn to operate the devices and
the boys improve. This progresses into adulthood, where males
are able to appropriate the great majority of technical and
strategically important jobs and, in practice, keep females out of
these jobs. (van Dijk 2005: 11–12)
Table 2.4. Theoretical perspectives on the digital divide
Perspective Focus or core
Acceptance of Attitudes, motivations, expectancies,
technology intentions, adoptions
Materialist Capital and resources
Socio-cultural Meanings, life chances, life choices and
lifestyles
Relational Relations and power
An advantage of the relational perspective is that it reveals the
concrete mechanisms of growing inequality as compared to the more
superficial explanations found among individual attributes (e.g. that
females are supposed to be less technical). The perspective is also
useful in the context of the rise of the network society, where
interactions become ever more important (van Dijk [1999] 2012).
However, unfortunately the relational perspective is not yet much
utilized in digital divide research.

A general framework for understanding the digital divide

With these different perspectives (see table 2.4) it is not easy to find
a neutral framework for understanding the digital divide. Any such
framework will have to be derived from a very broad theory
combining these four perspectives. With some hesitance I wish to
propose my own theory for this task. It combines four of these
perspectives, and it is open enough to allow for interpretation of
almost every factor or variable of digital divide research (see figure
2.2).
The resources and appropriation theory (van Dijk 2005) is first of
all a theory of technology acceptance, which it understands as a
process – appropriation – rather than as a single intention or
decision. This process is behavioural: first people have to be
motivated, then they have to acquire or purchase the technology,
and, finally, they have to learn to use it by developing the relevant
skills. This process follows the first and second level of the history of
digital divide research.
Figure 2.2. A causal model of resources and appropriation theory
This theory has its origins in the materialist perspective on account
of the resources and personal and positional characteristics of
individuals. In fact the theory conforms to structuration theory
(Giddens 1984), since its core is a continual interplay of structures
(rules and resources) and people’s actions or behaviours. Resources
are not only material but also mental, social and cultural, so the
socio-cultural perspective of meaning has a place in this theory too.
Finally, the relational perspective is relevant because of the personal
and positional characteristics of the categorical pairs.
The backbone of the theory is presented in figure 2.2. Personal and
positional inequalities lead to different amounts of resources. These
resources determine the process of technology appropriation in four
phases of ICT access (motivation, physical access, skills and usage),
and the outcomes of this process lead to more or less participation in
society in several domains (economic, political, cultural, etc.). ICT
access also depends on the technical characteristics of the digital
media concerned.
The hard core of this theory can be summarized as follows.

1. Categorical inequalities in society produce an unequal

distribution of resources.
2. An unequal distribution of resources causes unequal access to
digital technologies.
3. Unequal access to digital technologies also depends on the
characteristics of these technologies.
 4. Unequal access to digital technologies brings about unequal
outcomes of participation in society.
5. Unequal participation in society reinforces categorical
inequalities and unequal distribution of resources.

In this book the term ‘access’ in statements 2, 3 and 4 is a sequence

of four phases: motivation/attitude, physical access, digital skills and
usage. This is a linear logic in the model as a whole. In fact the model
can also be applied in a circular manner. For example, motivation
and attitude also influence skills and usage, and more usage often
leads to more motivation.
The following personal categorical inequalities are often observed in
digital divide research:

age (young/old)
gender (male/female)
ethnicity (majority/minority)
intelligence (high/low)
personality (extrovert/introvert; self-confident/not self-
confident)
health (abled/disabled).

The same goes for the following positional categorical inequalities,

which operate on both a personal and a societal level:

labour position (entrepreneurs/workers;

management/employees; employed/unemployed)
education (high/low)
household (family/individual)
network (core/peripheral)
nation/region (developed/developing; urban/rural).

In most empirical observations the first of these relational pairings

have more access to digital technology than the second.
The following resources frequently figure in digital divide research,
sometimes under other labels, such as economic, social and cultural
capital:

temporal (time to use digital media)

material (income and property)
mental (cognitive capacities and technical abilities)
social (a social network to assist in acquiring and using digital
media)
cultural (lifestyle, status markers and habits in using digital
media).

These factors are summarized in the full empirical model of this

theory presented in figure 2.3. The theory was tested in several
nationwide surveys in the Netherlands and the UK between 2010 and
2015 and, using the statistical method of sequential-equation
modelling, was found to fit the data in causal path analysis (see van
Deursen and van Dijk 2015b; van Deursen et al. 2017; van Deursen
and van Dijk 2019).
This model will be used as a general framework and source of
inspiration for understanding the results of digital divide research in
the remainder of the book. However, the following five chapters will
also review approaches and results of research other than those of
the author.
Figure 2.3. A causal and sequential model of digital media access
3
Motivation and Attitude

Introduction: who wants digital media and

feels fine about them?
The nature of the first stage of access to and adoption of digital
media is psychological. Human needs, motives, attitudes,
expectancies, gratifications and intentions drive the decision to
purchase a computer or other digital medium and to connect to a
network such as the Internet. The following stages are also driven
primarily by the general motivation to engage (or not) with the
digital world. Without sufficient motivation and a positive attitude,
individuals will not develop digital skills or competencies. Similarly,
they will not use digital media very often – only perhaps for one or
two purposes. Finally, the outcomes of digital media use will be
disappointing for those with low motivation and a negative attitude.
The following section deals with basic concepts. There is an
abundance of psychological concepts in the literature concerning
motivation. How are these related to each other? What are the most
important needs, motives, gratifications, attitudes and expectancies
to use or, indeed, not to use digital technology?
The third section is about the causes of different motivation. These
are not only personal (age, gender, personality and the like) but also
positional, partly societal characteristics. Those in gainful
employment and students might well have more motivation to use
digital technology than the unemployed. Those who are part of a
social network where everybody uses digital media are also likely to
be motivated. People living in developed and technologically
advanced countries are assumed to be more motivated than people
in developing, less technologically advanced countries. People with
these personal and positional characteristics have resources that
partly determine motivation and attitude for access and for use.
These resources are not only of a mental kind. They might also be
material, social, cultural and temporal resources.
The next section discusses the consequences of motivation and
attitudes. Since different people purchase different quantities of
hardware, software and services, they will develop different levels of
digital skills, and the frequency and variety of their use of digital
media will be different. Finally, the benefits they attain will be
different. So, the digital divide will become wider with a lack of
motivation in all phases of access.
The final section will describe the evolution of the level of motivation
and attitudes towards digital technology. In the 1980s, even in the
developed, technologically advanced countries, the majority of the
population was apprehensive about the advent of the digital age.
When the use of computers, the Internet and mobile telephony
spread in the 1990s, motivation and positive attitudes increased
considerably. Currently, close to 90 per cent of the population in the
developed countries are motivated to use computers and the Internet
(van Deursen and van Dijk 2012; van Deursen 2018). Even people in
their eighties want to learn to use computers and the Internet, if only
to e-mail and chat with their grandchildren. Nevertheless, we
observe that computer anxiety and technophobia remain even in
developed high-tech countries and that the motivation of those in
developing countries is still lagging behind. See the emphasis on the
perceived lack of relevance of digital applications in these countries
(ITU 2017; Economist Intelligence Unit 2019). Evolution also means
that the range between people who are complete non-users of the
Internet, at one end of the spectrum, those who are low-frequency
users, and those, at the other end, who are high-frequency users,
online for perhaps more than twelve hours a day, is becoming wider
in every part of the world.

Basic concepts
People’s reasons for use and non-use of digital media expressed in
surveys can be conceptualized differently in psychological terms.
Positive reasons can be framed in intentions (before) and
gratifications (after) using specific applications. Negative reasons are
mostly given by non-users and ex-users and are of a more general
kind. The reasons for non-use listed in table 3.1 can be understood as
explicit needs, motives, attitudes or expectations, though they may
hide some implicit reasons. Someone who says that they don’t want a
computer or smartphone might not genuinely like such tools, but it
may be that they are not able to afford them or do not know how to
work them.
The negative reasons found in surveys and listed in an average order
of frequency in table 3.1 have remained much the same over the
years. In rich countries the affordability explanation may have
declined over time, but it still exists. Rejection of digital media was
high in the 1980s and lower at the time of the Internet hype around
the millennium. However, it recently began to increase again when
many negative uses of the Internet and social media were reported.
The most surprising thing is that the reasons for rejecting digital
media are the same today as they were fifteen years ago; compare the
lists of surveys in several countries in van Dijk (2005: 29–30),
Reisdorf and Groselj (2017), Helsper and Reisdorf (2017), World
Bank (2016) and Digital Inclusion Research Group (2017).
Table 3.1. Reasons for the non-use of computers and the Internet
over time
Source: Summary of many international surveys.

Order of Reason
importance
1 I do not want it (not interested).
2 I do not need it (not useful).
3 I reject the medium (cybercrime, Internet addiction,
unreliable information, poor communication and
others).
4 I have no computer or Internet connection.
5 I do not know how to use it; it is too complicated.
6 It is too expensive.
7 I have no time/I am too busy.
The distinction between the basic psychological concepts of needs,
motivations, gratifications, attitudes and expectancies is
insufficiently made in digital divide research. Figure 3.1 shows the
series of psychological factors behind media behaviour. The first
concepts or factors in this model derive from uses and gratification
theory (see chapter 2). Needs are basic drives, motivations are
conscious intentions, and gratifications come from satisfying rational
and emotional goals. Needs are requirements for survival. Maslow
(1943), for example, lists basic needs ranging from physical needs
(food, water and sex) and safety to those of love/belonging, esteem
and selfactualization. While digital media cannot at present be said
to fall into the category of basic needs, in the future almost every job
might require ICTs and online dating may become dominant.
Currently, it is primarily the ‘higher’ needs of identity,
communication, sociality and status that are met by the use of digital
media.

Figure 3.1. A sequential model of psychological factors behind media

behaviour
While needs can be partly unconscious, the motivations derived
from these needs are always conscious. A single reason to act might
be a motive, and motivation often involves several motives. For
example, the use of social media and online gaming might be
motivated by such reasons as socializing, learning, the wish for
personal development, or just passing time.
Gratifications are the desired results of a goal-oriented act – the
fulfilment of one or more motives. When the goal is reached and also
creates a positive emotion, such as pleasure, it will be repeated.
When goals are not reached and negative emotions occur,
gratifications will no longer be sought.
In the literature we find many lists of needs, motivations and
gratifications for the adoption and use of digital media. For example,
in the perspective of uses and gratification theory, Katz et al. (1973)
identified the needs of traditional media; Cho et al. (2003)
transformed these for digital media. Papacharissi and Rubin (2000)
enumerated the motivations and Sundar and Limperos (2013) and
Dhir et al. (2016) list gratifications for specific new media. These are
summarized in table 3.2. The right-hand column of the table gives a
number of gratifications that are recognized as important goals,
especially of using the Internet, while the other two columns give the
background needs and motives of these goals. (Gratifications are not
concrete applications such as using social-networking sites, which
are discussed in chapter 6, ‘Usage’.)
Table 3.2. Needs, motives and gratifications in seeking and using
digital media/the Internet
Needs Motives Gratifications
Material/practical Managing daily life – Coordination
– Utility/shop
– Convenience
Cognitive Learning – Information seeking
– Novelty/news
Affective Feeling – Excitement/arousal
– Self-assurance
Personal Personal development – Identity creation
– Status gain
Social Socializing – Social connection
– Social interaction
– Finding other opinions
Escape/play Passing time – Entertainment
– Gaming
– Consuming
Needs, motives and gratifications are not the only psychological
factors affecting intentions to adopt and use digital media (see figure
3.1.). The theory of planned behaviour and the technology acceptance
model focus on perceptions and attitudes. Attitudes may be cognitive
(knowledge about digital media), emotional (experiences or feelings)
or normative (judgements). They may also be general (liking or not
liking technology) or specific (liking or not liking a particular
technology/medium). General attitudes vary from technophilia and
computer mania to technophobia and computer anxiety (see below).
Specific attitudes may be positive or negative. For example, at the
time of the Internet hype around the year 2000, positive attitudes
were dominant. Fifteen years later the downsides of Internet use
became evident. Negative attitudes towards digital media are one of
the most important causes for non-use and ex-use (van Dijk 2005;
Reisdorf and Groselj 2017; Helsper and Reisdorf 2017).
Expectations are the hopes that using digital media will have
particular outcomes and are based on knowledge and perhaps past
experience of using these media. These are the basic concepts of
social cognitive theory, discussed in chapter 2, which focuses on the
experience and habits of people who have already used such media
for some time. LaRose and Eastin (2004: 370) observed the
following six expected outcomes of Internet use. With novel
outcomes, people expect to find information or news. In activity
outcomes they assume that they will be entertained – for example, by
playing games. The third expectation is to find monetary outcomes –
searching out cheap or free products and services or saving time by
e-shopping. The fourth expectation contains self-reactive outcomes:
these are benefits for the self, such as passing the time, relieving
boredom or feeling less alone. The fifth expectation is gaining status:
an individual might find others respect them because they are using
the Internet. The final expectation is finding social outcomes, such as
coming across friends and love partners or obtaining support from
others. Following the rise of social media since 2004, the expectation
of social outcomes has become the most important.
Intentions are mental states determining whether people wish to act
or not. This is the last step before accepting and adopting or rejecting
a technology (see figure 3.1). This decision can be blocked by external
factors, for instance facilitating conditions. Someone who clearly
wants to purchase a computer or find an Internet connection can be
prevented from doing so because they have no money, while
someone else might not want a computer and Internet connection
but is obliged to accept and use them because their job or course of
study requires them to do so.

Causes of differences in motivation

Having defined the basic general concepts of motivation and attitude
concerning digital media, we are now looking for their causes. We
will use the model shown in figure 2.3 (see p. 33), which is broad
enough to contain all the relevant causes found in the literature. We
will start with the resources important for the first stage of access
(motivation and attitude), followed by the particular personal and
positional categories of individuals.

Resources and motivation

Among the five resources to be discussed (temporal, material,
mental, social and cultural), the first three – temporal, material and
mental – are primary, while the other two – social and cultural –
come to the fore when digital technology is fully incorporated in
society.
To be motivated to use digital media, people must first have the time
to do so. Positive conditions are having a job or being engaged in a
course of a study in which you have to use technology for several
hours a day; thus workers or students are motivated whether or not
they actually like digital media. People with much free leisure time
might also have motivation. To our surprise, we found in a
nationwide survey in the Netherlands in 2011 that the unemployed
and those unable to work were the most frequent Internet users (van
Deursen and van Dijk 2014b), taking advantage of it for passing
time, entertainment or finding a job.
Negative conditions arise of course when people are busy with other
activities, such as housework or childcare, being engaged in manual
labour, or being involved in sports. On the other hand, digital media
in daily life may lead to an increase in positive stimuli and attitudes
and a decrease in negative ones. The result may be that an excessive
use of smartphones, computer games and Internet activities
dominates and harms other activities and needs, such as sleeping,
regular eating, face-to-face communication and physical exercise.
The second conditional resources are material and consist of
income, property and appliances for the household, work or study.
When people have fewer of these material resources, or simply
cannot afford them, they will be less motivated towards their use.
This is a major aspect in poor countries. However, in rich countries
there is a substantial proportion of the population that can afford
perhaps only one device and connection, while the wealthy may have
access to several types of computers and connections.
Mental resources are capacities such as intelligence, technical ability
and literacy rather than characteristics of motivation or attitude.
People who have these capacities will be much more inclined to use
digital technology. While intelligence is partly hereditary, technical
ability and literacy are learned and improved in practice. People who
are good at numbers, fluent in reading and writing and tech-savvy
are much more motivated to use digital media than those who are
illiterate, who cannot calculate and who lack the ability to use
complicated devices.
Related to technical ability, people who lack self-confidence or who
have neurotic personalities (see below) may show computer anxiety
(Brosnan 1998; Chua et al. 1999; van Dijk 2005). This is a feeling of
discomfort, stress or fear experienced when confronting computers,
though it can also be caused by frustration arising from bad
experiences. Another phenomenon is technophobia – fear of
technology driven by a particular negative attitude or opinion. It is a
rejection of the world of computers and a distrust about their
positive outcomes. Today such fears are also about privacy and
security, a loss of freedom through government control or corporate
tracking and when confronted with disinformation.
The fourth type of conditional resources are social. Social relations
and networks are crucial in learning and to support and motivate
people to use digital media or to develop a positive attitude towards
them. People with a wide social network are more likely to look for
access to digital media than those who are isolated socially (van
Deursen et al. 2014; Courtois and Verdegem 2016). For young
people, relations with peers are the first trigger to gaining access to
and mastering digital applications; the alternative is to become
socially excluded. There is a certain status in, for example, uploading
a video to YouTube or owning the latest new device or app, and this
is extremely motivating in particular for the young. For older people,
the social context and support of friends, family, colleagues and
neighbours also is vital for motivation: in particular they participate
in social media in order to communicate with family, friends and
(grand) children.
Finally we come to cultural resources – cultural capital or goods as
well as such properties as status and esteem. In the developed
countries people live in a material environment of computerized
workplaces and homes full of devices and screens and generally have
a positive attitude towards using digital media. In developing
countries such technology is often limited to universities, schools,
hospitals, government departments, workplaces, libraries and
Internet cafés, so people do not routinely come into contact with it.
Positional categories and motivation
There are five positional categories, the first of which is the labour
position. The unemployed, people unable to work and many
pensioners will have fewer resources and less motivation to use
digital media, and perhaps negative attitudes as well. Those who are
part of the workforce may have jobs that require computer skills, and
so many unemployed people looking for a job have the motivation to
learn such skills. However, all research indicates that individuals in
higher occupations are the most motivated and in general have the
most positive attitudes.
Similarly, twenty-five years of research have shown that people with
higher education have both more resources and greater motivation
and positive attitudes where using information and communication
technology is concerned. The information aspect of digital media is
particularly attractive for such individuals (van Dijk 2005, 2013),
while the communication aspect is popular among all levels of
society.
Being part of a family household also indicates a probability of being
motivated to use digital media. In every country, households with the
highest rate of computer possession and Internet access are those
with school-age children. Single-person households have the lowest
rates, especially among those with low levels of education. Larger
families increase the efficiency and reduce the individual cost of
using devices and connections.
Being part of a social network is also very relevant for the motivation
and attitudes towards using digital media. The network helps in
developing skills and locating attractive applications such as social
media and phone apps. Being in a central position in a wide network
is also more beneficial than being in an isolated or marginal position.
The last positional category is being an inhabitant of a particular
nation or region. The average motivation and positive attitude
among residents of rich and technologically advanced countries and
for people in urban areas is obviously much stronger, as advanced
countries and urban regions offer all the necessary infrastructure not
only to motivate but also to use digital media. This is rarely the case
in less advanced countries. For example, a university professor in
Burundi has less chance of being motivated and less necessity to use
digital media than a professor in Sweden.

Personal categories and motivation

The first personal category is age or generation. All research in this
area shows that young people are more motivated and positively
oriented towards digital media use than seniors. Young people are
more inclined than older people to accept every new technology, but
today’s young people have grown up with digital technology – they
are digital natives. They cannot imagine a world without digital
media, and it helps shape their identity. People over the age of forty,
on the other hand, have had to adapt to the new technology, but
when they manage to do so it may well become part of their everyday
lives.
The second category is gender. Males were the first to be motivated
to adopt digital technology, but females were quick to catch up, and
in developed countries gender differences are becoming smaller and
smaller. However, in countries with strong patriarchal cultures, both
rich and poor, there remains a gender gap in motivation.
The third category is ethnicity. This is a sensitive category because it
is often combined with race. In fact the differences in motivation and
attitude among specific ethnic, migrant or native, majority or
minority groups in a country are related more to economic
deprivation, discrimination and cultural preferences than to race.
Minority and migrant groups actually use digital media as tools to
communicate with their home communities and for support in
difficult situations. A survey in the United States showed that Asian
Americans have the highest motivation to use digital media, more
than Anglo-Americans and much more than African and Hispanic
Americans (Perrin and Duggan 2015). However, this was related not
to race but to socio-economic status and cultural or online
preferences.
One of the reasons why the highly educated are more motivated to
use digital media is their assumed cognitive intelligence. This is
related not only to the individual’s level of education but also to the
nature of information and communication technology, which
addresses the capacity to process information. A related personal
category is the level of literacy. Computer software requires a high
level of literacy, so people who have a low level of literacy will have
less motivation. The latter tend to use digital media for pictures,
videos and music. In developing countries a large proportion of the
population is illiterate, and even in developed countries perhaps 10
to 30 per cent is functionally illiterate. Such people have to rely on
remembering which key strokes to use.
Another personal category often related to motivation to use digital
media is personality. The evidence here is inconclusive (Russo and
Amnå 2016). The influence of personality depends on the particular
applications and technologies used. In the literature, the ‘Big Five’
dimensions of personality (openness to experience, extroversion,
conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism) are linked to
computer and Internet use with applications such as social media.
People having the trait of openness to experience (curiosity,
appreciation of news and new ideas) like to explore the web (Tuten
and Bosnjak 2001) and to find new and old relationships via social
media (Correa et al. 2010).
Extroversion (assertiveness, sociability, liveliness and having
positive emotions) used to be negatively related to Internet use
because the web was assumed to be impersonal, while introverts
liked the advantage of being able to protect their anonymity
(Hamburger and Ben-Artzi 2000). However, it was found that
extroverts were drawn to social media for its sociability and potential
for expression (Ryan and Xenos 2011).
Conscientiousness (being organized, structured, reliable and dutiful)
was observed to be positively related to the use of a computer
because of its routine and reliable operations (Finn and Korukonda
2004). However, the Internet environment, especially the chaotic
settings of social-networking sites, was found to be too unstructured
for conscientious people (Landers and Lounsbury 2006).
Agreeableness (being kind, considerate, likeable, prosocial and
helpful towards others) was also negatively related to Internet use
(ibid.), since such individuals prefer face-to-face communication.
However, this might change with the development of social media.
Finally, neuroticism (feeling anxious, nervous and insecure) has been
linked with computer anxiety (Hudiberg 1999; Chua et al. 1999) and
the unsafe environment of the Internet (Tuten and Bosnjak 2001).
Those with neurotic personalities have found more positive
experiences in the relatively safe setting of social networks among
existing friends (Correa et al. 2010).
The last personal category to be discussed is health or ability. It
might be thought that disabled people would be highly motivated to
use digital media to compensate for a handicap, especially if they
have a mobility problem. However, their position in fact means that
many disabled people are less motivated: on average only half of the
disabled people in the world are in the workforce, and many are
isolated socially (OECD 2010; WHO 2011). Other problems are that
interfacing aids for the disabled are underdeveloped and that many
organizations do not follow official web guidelines of accessibility for
such individuals (Velleman 2018).
The causal argument is summarized in figure 3.2. The order of
elements in the categories follows my own estimations observed
from survey results.

Figure 3.2. Causal model of differences in motivation and attitude for

access
The consequences of differences in
motivation
Effects in other phases of digital media access
There are consequences for all subsequent phases in the process of
acceptance of this technology of having more or less motivation to
use digital media and having either positive or negative attitudes
towards them (see the test of the model in figure 2.2 in van Deursen
and van Dijk 2015b). The first is the decision to access the Internet:
people have to weigh the cost of the purchase of a computer against
the cost of everything else they need to buy. Less motivation and a
negative attitude will also lead to less practice in developing
advanced operational and content-related digital skills (see chapter
5). However, the biggest effect may be observed in the phase of usage
(ibid.). Increasing motivation and maintaining positive attitudes lead
to more frequency and variation of use in particular applications.
People with high motivation tend to become frequent users of apps.
The final consequence is whether or not people take advantage of the
benefits of digital media (van Deursen et al. 2017). The higher the
motivation, the more benefits, although negative effects may arise
when too much use results in addiction and other excessive
behaviour.
Table 3.3. Spectrum of Internet users: from non-users to frequent
users, 2017

Shifts in the spectrum of Internet users

The level and change of motivation and attitudes towards digital
media causes shifts in the spectrum of Internet users. This spectrum
comprises at least five categories of Internet use (see table 3.3).
The motivations and attitudes of non-users were discussed at the
beginning of this chapter (see table 3.1, p. 36). Lack of motivation
and negative attitudes are major causes of non-use, especially in rich
countries. Next to the have-nots we find the want-nots. Ex-users are
the ‘dropouts’ of the Internet, temporary or permanent. About fifteen
years ago in the US they formed perhaps 10 per cent of (former)
Internet users (Katz and Rice 2002; Lenhart et al. 2003). Today, this
figure may be less than 5 per cent. For example, in the UK in 2013 it
was 3.5 per cent (Reisdorf and Groselj 2017). However, in poor and
developing countries the figure may be higher. Structural causes of
dropping out are becoming unemployed, getting divorced and
becoming homeless, while individual causes include a growing
negative attitude towards and dislike of the Internet or computers.
Low users in 2017 are people using the Internet for up to 4 hours a
week and for relatively few online activities. In the UK in 2013 they
accounted for 21 per cent of the population, while non-users
comprised 18.1 per cent (Reisdorf and Groselj 2017). Low users
generally have negative attitudes towards technologies and the
Internet in general (ibid.: 1172). For those in the developed
countries, motivation and attitude factors are probably more
important than the usual demographics of deprivation mentioned in
the literature (education, job, income, gender, age and social
network). Regular users in 2017 are estimated to be online for 4.1 to
24 hours a week. In the developed countries this category
accommodates the biggest proportion of the population. Frequent
users today – the digital information elite of society – engage in
Internet use for more than 24 hours each week. On average they are
extremely motivated to use digital media, and they also enjoy the
greatest benefits, as well as suffering from high workloads and
excessive Internet use.

The evolution of motivation and attitudes

Three epochal shifts are occurring in the level and nature of
motivation and attitudes towards the use of digital media. The most
important is that positive motivations and attitudes are growing in
the general population following the diffusion of digital media in
society. Non-users become low users and low users tend to become
regular or frequent users. In the 1980s and 1990s, when traditional
media held sway, motivations to use digital media were low and
attitudes were marked by negativity. Even in 2002 more than half of
American and European non-users (roughly half of the population)
declared in surveys that they did not plan to use the Internet
(Lenhart et al. 2003; Katz and Rice 2002; Van Dijk 2005). But soon
afterwards the mood changed and, increasingly, larger numbers of
people were inspired to go online.
Today, I think it likely that more than 90 per cent of the populations
of technologically advanced countries now make use of the Internet
(see for instance the Dutch surveys of van Deursen and van Dijk
2012 and van Deursen 2018). It is becoming increasingly necessary
to have access in order to function as a member of society in these
countries. The populations in developing countries are probably still
lagging behind. However, positive and negative attitudes are mixed
worldwide because of the appearance of the detrimental effects of
Internet use (see chapter 7).
The second shift in the level and nature of motivation and attitude is
that the gaps between the various positions on the spectrum
probably become wider. The frequency of use and amount of activity
between non-users, ex-users and low users, at the one end, and
regular and frequent users, at the other, is growing. While the latter
develop greater motivation and more positive attitudes, non-users
and low users remain at the same level.
The related third shift is that those on the right-hand side of the
spectrum benefit more and more from the use of the digital media
(see chapter 7), resulting in a feedback loop of greater motivation
and more positive attitudes.
4
Physical Access

Introduction: who possesses digital media?

At the time when research was taking place into the first-level digital
divide (1995–2003), physical access was the main focus of scholars,
policy-makers and public opinion. Today a common misconception
is that the problem of the digital divide has been solved because
almost everybody in the developed world is assumed to have some
kind of computer, smartphone and Internet connection. In this book
I argue that the problem only starts when everybody has a computer,
smartphone or Internet connection! This is why my previous book
was called The Deepening Divide (2005). Here I will show that this
deepening divide tends to lead to more digital and social inequality,
and I will make suggestions as to how to prevent this or at least to
ameliorate it. This does not mean that the lack of physical access is
no longer a problem. On the contrary, physical access is a
prerequisite for reaching the next phases: developing digital skills,
properly using computers or the Internet, and benefiting from them.
In this chapter I show that the problem of physical access is here to
stay, not only in the developing countries but also in the developed
countries with very wide access. To demonstrate this, the concept of
physical access has to be refined and specified.
In the following section the basic concepts concerning the types of
physical access will be defined. A vast number of computer devices or
applications and types of Internet connections have arrived in the
last twenty years, which makes the problem of physical access more
complicated. It is not only a quantitative problem but also a problem
of quality: the nature and capacity of the technologies concerned.
In the third section, we will look first at the causes of not having
physical access. What are the resources shaping physical access?
What are the positional categories such as work and education and
the personal categories such as age and gender? A fourth set of
background factors has to be added here, which consists of the
technical designs and characteristics of the vast number of types of
digital media now on offer. The price, the complexity, the user-
friendliness and usability of all these types also affect physical access.
This will be followed by a discussion of the consequences of more or
less physical access. What are the concerns of not having physical
access? In which way will it affect the following phases of skills,
usage and outcomes? What will be the diffusion of digital media in
society as compared to traditional media and what will be the result?
Will everybody acquire physical access to digital media in the future,
or will part of the population be excluded permanently?
The last section deals with the evolution of the digital divide vis-à-vis
physical access. What is the historical pattern observed? Did the
division in physical access start with a growing gap among
populations and countries? Did this gap close at all? What will be the
future: will there perhaps be other gaps following the arrival of
various new types of digital media?

Basic concepts
In this book, as in previous ones (van Dijk 2005; van Dijk and van
Deursen 2014), I want to make a distinction between three concepts:
physical access, material access and conditional access. My definition
of physical access is the opportunity to use digital media by
obtaining them privately in homes or publicly in collective settings
(schools, libraries, community centres, Internet cafés and other
places). The first option is private ownership and the second is
collective use. In the history of diffusion of digital media in society,
physical access was at first largely collective, and this remains the
case in developing countries. Today, however, there has been a shift
from collective to individual adoption in the use of mobile computing
with smartphones. This is also the case in developing countries,
where mobile phones are increasingly displacing the need to go to a
centre such as an Internet café. Currently, the collective setting
needed for mobile computing is to be within reach of some kind of
Wifi. However, powerful or advanced computers and broadband
connections are still needed for work and education in collective
settings and for leisure applications requiring a high capacity in
private settings.
The second concept, material access, is broader than physical access.
It can be defined as all means needed to maintain the use of digital
media over time, including subscriptions, peripheral equipment,
electricity, software and print necessities (e.g. ink and paper). In an
even broader definition, it also includes the expenses of elementary
computer courses required to be able to use digital media, additional
expenses which tend to increase over time as software changes and
which may eventually exceed the cost of the devices and connections.
The third, more limited concept is conditional access. Devices and
connections are often not enough to acquire a particular service.
Every Internet user is familiar with the numerous user names and
passwords needed to get access to websites. Conditional access can
be defined as the provisory entry to particular applications,
programs or contents of computers and networks. The conditions
are payment or a particular position, membership or allowance
that is required at the workplace or schools and for membership of
organizations or activities. Payment and entitlements are becoming
increasingly important in the commercial and insecure World Wide
Web.
All three types of access defined here are becoming more and more
complicated when we look at the expansion of the types of devices
and applications and network connections available today. Digital
divide researchers and (non-)governmental organizations still focus
on simple individual and country figures revealing the number of
computer, mobile phone and Internet users per population. More
researchers now break down such figures to include the type of
computer (PC, laptop, tablet, etc.) and mobile phone (smartphone or
feature phone), as well as whether narrowband or broadband
connections are used, but there are few statistics of this kind and
even fewer concerning the newest digital media and their capacities
– equipment linked to the Internet of Things, devices of augmented
reality such as smart glasses, virtual reality headsets and wearables
(watches and activity trackers). The focus of research needs to shift
from measuring separate digital media to taking into account the
processing and communicating capacities of the total information
system or networks linking separate devices. This means having an
eye for the quality and capacity of all digital media connected in a
system.
Hilbert et al. (2010) and Hilbert (2016) criticised the simple and
stand-alone traditional approach and instead measured the amounts
of information processed and transmitted by digital media and
networks. These measurements are of the information-processing
capacity of countries and individual installations, with the value of
bits that each piece of equipment can store, the amount of kilobits
per second (Kbps) it can communicate and the amount of MCps
(million computations per second) it can compute (Hilbert et al.
2010: 168, table 2). This might appear to be a rather technical
approach. Still, most users know that a broadband connection is
much faster than a narrowband connection, that a smartphone gives
a much better performance than a feature phone, and that a desktop
or laptop computer can accomplish more than a tablet.
In this chapter I will try to take into account both this diversity and
the technical quality and capacity of digital media.

Causes of divides in physical access

Resources and physical access
The immediate differences observed in physical, material and
conditional access are due to people’s resources. Evidently, material
resources are by far the most important. Almost all research shows
that income is most relevant for gaining access to digital media.
Although basic digital media have become cheaper in the last thirty
years, many people around the world, including those of modest
means in rich countries, still cannot afford them.
Clearly, income is strongly related to employment or occupation and
the level of education attained. Surveys often show that it has an
independent effect (Zhang 2013; Bauer 2017). The wealthy have a
good number of the best computer devices and phones, broadband
Internet at home and mobile access via smartphones, and expensive
and extended subscriptions. Those of modest means may own only
one type of computer and one phone, lack home broadband, and
perhaps have only a cheap feature phone and a basic subscription.
The second important resources are social. People enjoying many
social relationships benefit from support, perhaps in acquiring a
second-hand or borrowed computer, together with all kinds of
software, peripherals and appliances and the use of an Internet
connection at the home of others. Such relationships are vital in
getting access to the world of digital media, especially in developing
countries. Unfortunately, many poor people have fewer social
relationships than rich people, and their social isolation can amplify
digital exclusion.
In this book I often claim that social and cultural causes are just as
relevant to the digital divide as economic causes. Cultural resources
are ideas and values solidified or materialized in habitual
behavioural patterns, cultural distinctions and artefacts. The most
important of these are observable status markers, lifestyles, and how
people react to the social world around them. Flashy new media
devices are status markers for many, and some tech-savvies
immediately want to attain distinction by having the latest gadget.
They part with large amounts of money to purchase such items.
Others may have lifestyles marked by spending all day using several
kinds of digital media. This applies particularly to those living in the
colder countries of the northern hemisphere, who pass more time
indoors, while those in the sunnier southern countries are
accustomed to living a more outdoors life. Finally, those involved in
using digital media all day for entertainment purposes require more
hardware, software and high-quality Internet access than those who
use digital media occasionally for information and communication
tasks (Robinson 2009).
Compared to material, social and cultural resources, temporal and
mental resources are less important for physical access. People who
do not have the time to use digital media might still possess them,
and mental resources, while crucial for motivation, have no direct
influence on physical access. A notable exception, though, are
individuals with serious mental and physical handicaps, who actually
seldom purchase digital media.
Positional categories and physical access
Work and education are the principal factors driving the distribution
of material, social and cultural resources. In the 1990s, those with
office jobs and in management positions were the first to obtain
computers, though, while academics, teachers and technicians
actually used them themselves, managers and directors tended to
delegate computer work to their secretaries. At that point manual
and unskilled workers were unlikely to have access to computers,
while using both computers and the Internet became a necessity in
administrative and commercial jobs in most middle-class
occupations.
Today, it remains the case that, in almost every national survey
undertaken in the developed countries, people in such occupations
have more access to computers and the Internet than manual and
unskilled workers. Although the gap has closed since the 1990s,
those employed in middle-class jobs tend to have 100 per cent access
while those in the lower occupations have approximately 70 to 80
per cent access. For example, Arabs in the state of Israel, who
generally have lower incomes and less education, hold primarily
manual and unskilled jobs and so have less access (Mesch and
Talmud 2011). In the developing countries overall, the gap between
the employed and the unemployed and between the well-educated
and those of low education is still very pronounced (World Bank
2016; ITU 2017).
The second positional category is education, which is closely related
to the category of labour but also has an independent effect.
Individuals in education simply need a computer and Internet
connection, at least in developing countries. In the 1990s the gap in
use between those with high and low education was very wide,
though it began to close about 2005. For example, in the US in 2000,
the gap in physical access between people with at least a college
degree and those with high school education or less was 59
percentage points (Perrin and Duggan 2015). In 2015, 95 per cent of
people with college education or a graduate degree said they were
Internet users, while the figure for those who had not completed high
school was 66 per cent.
In the developing countries the gap is still growing today (World
Bank 2016; ITU 2017), with the uneducated lagging considerably
behind those who have completed schooling. In the future the gap
will close here too, but most likely it will persist to a larger extent
than in the developed countries.
The third positional category determining physical access is being an
inhabitant of a particular nation, together with living in an urban
versus a rural or a rich versus a poor region. Despite the fact that
some individuals may have plenty of personal resources, they also
depend on the economic and technological infrastructure and wealth
of their country or region. There are differences in the reliability of
the electricity supply, technological support after frequent
breakdowns, the availability and reach of public access points, the
economic support of governments and businesses with their
subsidies or prices, and the educational support of schools.
The divides between developing and developed countries have
always been wide, and in the 1990s and between 2000 and 2010 they
were only becoming wider (see figure 4.1). Since 2010, Internet
access has been growing at the same speed in all countries, so that
after 2020 the gap will become narrower. A saturation phase is
approaching in many developed countries, and the proportion of
those online in the developing countries is nearing 50 per cent.
Figure 4.1. Internet users per 100 inhabitants in the developed and
developing world
However, access in the developing countries is not growing at the
same speed in middle-income and low-income countries. In the
middle-income countries, among whom are the new emerging
markets in East Asia, South Asia and South America, access is
growing fast, while the poorest countries are lagging behind, with
figures of less than 10 per cent (Zhang 2013: 522; Hilbert 2016; ITU
2017: 13).
In every country, urban regions have much more physical access
than rural regions. Remote places often have less reach and
broadband capacity. The countryside offers less work and fewer
schools requiring information and communication technology than
cities, with their schools of higher education, government
departments, and financial and industrial concerns. Poor inner-city
districts, however, have less access than affluent suburban
neighbourhoods.
The fourth positional category is living in a particular household. On
average, single-person households have less access to computers and
the Internet than multiple-person households, especially families
with school-age children. These benefit from a single connection and
are able to share computers, other devices and subscriptions.
The last positional category is having a particular position in a social
network. Networking allows new ideas and practices to spread
(Valente 1996), and a central role in a large network enables
individuals to find and share the best hardware, software and
applications. People who are socially isolated offline and gain only a
marginal place in a social network online find less support and fewer
opportunities (Tilly 1998).

Personal categories and physical access

The most frequent personal categories affecting physical access
observed in research are age, gender and ethnicity/race. Rarely
noted is the category of (dis)ability. Intelligence and personality have
influence on motivation and attitude but no direct effect on physical
access.
By far the most important personal category is age. In all countries
young people have more and earlier access to computers, mobile
phones and Internet connections than older people. This is both a
generational and a structural effect. Generational effects are the
strongest, since individuals over the age of forty did not learn to use
the digital media in their youth and have to learn to use them at work
or by themselves at home. Those born after 1980 (the Millennium
generation) have grown up with and been educated with digital
media. As this generation ages, a shift will take place: middleaged
people and the youngest generation will tend to have equal access to
and use of digital media.
However, at the same time structural effects are at work. Digital
media have become so vital for society that the elderly are catching
up. In the developed countries a majority of people over sixty-five
now have computers, smartphones and Internet connections and
also use social media and other Internet applications.
A negative structural effect in terms of equal access among older
people is also evident. Young people are naturally more innovative
and want to experiment with digital media, while seniors are more
attached to traditional media. Another structural effect is that young
people are required to follow modern educational systems, while
older people have to learn to use digital media via adult education
computer classes. Structural effects tend to remain, while
generational effects will disappear after a couple of generations.
The balance of the generational and structural effects today is that
the gap in physical access between the young and the old continues
to be pronounced. It is not as wide as it was twenty years ago, but in
both developed and developing countries it is still noticeable. For
example, in the US in 2015, only 58 per cent of people aged over
sixty-five had Internet access, while people between eighteen and
twenty-nine had 98 per cent access and those between thirty and
forty-nine had 93 per cent. Worldwide, the young between the ages
of fifteen and twenty-four had 71 per cent Internet access in 2017,
while those older than twenty-five had only 48 per cent. However, in
the developing countries the distribution was larger (67.3 versus
40.3 per cent) than that in the developed world (94.3 versus 81.0 per
cent; see ITU 2017).
The second important category is gender. In terms of physical access,
the gender gap between women and men is much smaller than the
age gap. In 2017, it was 11.6 per cent worldwide (ITU 2017). In
developing countries, people have less access at home, and many
women, if employed, are only in manual or unskilled jobs. The result
is that the gender gap in the developing countries is much wider than
that in the developed world. In 2017 it was 16.1 per cent on average
(25.3 per cent in Africa) as compared to the average of 2.6 per cent in
the developed world. The Americas even reveal more access for
females than males – +2.6 per cent! (see ITU 2017: 19).
The third important personal category is ethnicity, though in the
domain of the digital divide this category pertains mostly to
economic and educational disadvantage, social isolation, or spatially
concentrated poverty and cultural preferences. The only independent
effect of ethnicity consists of particular cultural preferences in
wanting or using particular digital media.
In multi-ethnic countries such as the United States and Brazil, gaps
in Internet access between the ethnicities are significant but not as
wide as we have seen with age. In the US, English-speaking Asian
Americans had the highest figure of access in 2015, at 97 per cent,
while white Americans had 85 per cent, Hispanics 81 per cent and
African Americans 78 per cent (Perrin and Duggan 2015). In Brazil,
whites had significantly more Internet access than non-whites
between 2005 and 2013, while access to a mobile phone was not
significant; divides in age, income and education were more
important (Nishijima et al. 2017).
The last personal category affecting physical access is (dis)ability.
Although the disabled could find many advantages from Internet
use, especially those with mobility problems, they in fact have less
physical access to and use of digital media. In all parts of the world
this gap is significant (Fox 2011; Ofcom 2015; Duplaga 2017). Here
again, disadvantages of low income, less education and
unemployment are responsible, but there is an independent effect of
disability too. In this case, the design of hardware and the web is to
blame. Many devices are not adapted for people with physical
handicaps, and official web guidelines for the blind and deaf are
often ignored.

Technical characteristics
While digital divide research has primarily used simple and basic
indicators of physical access, such as the percentage of computer and
mobile phone possession and Internet access, after the year 2000
these indicators became less and less adequate to determine the
distinction between inclusion in and exclusion from the digital
world. Digital technology is changing very fast, and at least four
characteristics require differentiation.
The first is the technical capacity of devices, software and
connections. The range of power in the various devices is enormous,
software is available in basic and extended versions, and Internet
connection speed ranges from very limited narrowband through to
super high-speed broadband. The quality of digital technology
defines its potential use. Martin Hilbert (2016) argues that the gap in
Internet access between the developed and developing countries is in
fact much wider when compared with basic access, and that the
digital divide in physical access is here to stay. He measured the
installed bandwidth potential of 172 countries between 1986 and
2014 and found that the inequality between developed and
developing countries is extremely high and concentrated in Asia
(including Russia), with more than 50 per cent.
The second characteristic is diversity. Digital media have multiplied
since 2000, and we now have a growing number of types of
computer, from mainframes and PCs through laptops and tablets to
smartphones with big or small screens. Software is available from
very advanced versions to very simple apps. Internet connections are
focusing on the web, fixed and mobile phones, television and radio,
and the Internet of Things. The crucial fact here is that some people
have all of these devices, together with their software, while others
have at best only one, meaning that the inequality of technical
potential is growing (van Deursen and van Dijk 2019).
Along with this growing diversity we see that replacement of basic
devices and connections is taking place. The most striking trend is
the transition to mobile devices and connections. The developing
world went mobile from the start because fixed connections were too
expensive. In the developed countries today, a shift is occurring from
home broadband to smart mobile phones (Perrin and Duggan 2015).
Similarly, people are exchanging PCs for laptops, tablets and
smartphones. However, the importance for the digital divide is that
these replacements do not necessarily have the same use potential.
Feature mobile phones, laptops, tablets and even smartphones have
less advanced applications and contextual convenience and offer less
enjoyment to the user than powerful PCs with their big screens and
broadband connections. The main advantages are in their mobility
and price.
A fourth technical characteristic of digital media is that they are
unstable, regularly break down, often have to be repaired, and
continually require updates. This is the problem of technology
maintenance (Graham and Thrift 2007; Gonzales 2014, 2016). In
developing countries there are frequent electricity blackouts and
often a lack of transport for people to reach places such as Internet
cafés; it can be difficult and expensive to repair broken mobile
phones and old PCs. Figure 4.2 shows the causal argument so far
(the order of factors in the boxes, apart from that for technical
characteristics, is estimated).
The consequences of divides in physical
access
Divides in physical access are a necessary condition of all the
subsequent phases arising from the adoption of digital media: skills,
usage and outcomes. The early assumption was that, once everybody
had access to a computer and the Internet, the digital divide would
be over.

Figure 4.2. Causal and sequential model of divides in physical access

Physical, material and conditional access leads to the opportunity to
learn digital skills. However, the quality of the hardware, software
and connection available, and the time they are accessible to a user if
they are sharing them in the context of public access, also affect the
opportunity of obtaining digital skills.
Physical, material and conditional access affects usage too. Quality
and time determine the type and frequency of digital media use. A
broadband Internet connection that is constantly live stimulates
much more daily use and high-quality application than a narrow-
band dial-up connection. An advanced high-capacity PC offers more
usage opportunities than a tablet. A smartphone makes a world of
difference compared to a simple feature phone.
Finally, the outcomes of unequal use of disposable hardware,
software and connections can be quite different. Someone who
possesses high-quality examples of all available technical resources
will benefit more than someone who has only one inferior device, a
slow connection and a basic Internet subscription.

The evolution in divides of physical access

While the common perception, based on theories of market
economics and the diffusion of innovations, is that the physical
access divide will eventually close, I call this into question.
The principal market economic theory is the trickle-down
mechanism, whereby status products that are first adopted by the
rich or the elite later become affordable for the less well-off. The
mechanism was first applied to the digital divide by Thierer (2000)
and Compaine (2001), who stated that the digital divide was a myth
and that it would soon disappear. The market would solve the
problem once cheaper and simple computer products appeared. It
was just that people with lower incomes would only gain access later,
as was the case with previous media innovations – the telephone, the
radio, the television and the video recorder.
Computer products and connections are indeed much cheaper than
before and in the developed countries are now within reach of even
relatively poor people. However, the digital divide of physical access
has not disappeared because the technology constantly requires
more, and more complex, investment than did radio, television and
the telephone.
Diffusion of innovations theory, based on sociology, communication
science, marketing and development theory (Rogers [1962] 2003),
describes with the aid of the so-called S-curve the evolution of
physical access or adoption of new media by various groups: the
innovators (2.5 per cent), the early adopters (13.5 per cent), the early
majority (34 per cent), the late majority (34 per cent) and the
laggards (16 per cent). This model might be attractive for marketing
scholars, but I have many problems with it (see van Dijk 2005: 62–
5), as it is too deterministic (why should every medium reach 100 per
cent of the population?) and normative (think only in terms of the
names of the adoption groups: the first are good and the last are
bad).
To ‘save’ the model of the S-curve, several qualifications are
required. One is to define different groups of adopters. Pippa Norris
(2001) distinguished two patterns in terms of the S-curve:
normalization and stratification. In the normalization pattern,
groups are only earlier or later in starting on the curve and faster or
slower in following it; eventually all of them will reach the same goal
of universal access. In the stratification pattern, groups from
particular social strata (in terms of status, income and power) follow
a different path on the curve. These groups have different resources
at the start, so that the higher strata reach their peak earlier than the
lower strata, who may never reach universal access (Norris 2001; van
Dijk 2005).

Figure 4.3. The evolution of the digital divide of physical access over
time
These two patterns also occur at the level of countries. Figure 4.3
shows that countries in the first stages of physical access exhibit
widening gaps between people with high or low income, education
and age combined. These gaps begin to close after a second tipping
point, when about 50 per cent of the population gain access. In the
figure, the lower line represents older people with low education and
low income and the upper line younger people with higher education
and a high income. The average physical access of individual
countries can be mapped at a particular time and place. For example,
in 2018 developing countries such as Eritrea, Chad and Burundi
would be at the bottom left of the figure, while South Korea and
Northern European countries would be at the top right.
A summary of statistics about computer and Internet access shows
that, between 1984 and 2002, the gaps in income, education,
employment, ethnicity and age were indeed widening in the
developed countries (van Dijk 2005: 51–2). Between 2003 and 2006
these gaps started to close in these countries (see regular surveys by,
among others, the Pew Research Center and NTIA in the US and the
Oxford Internet Institute in the UK). However, in 2018 these gaps
are still widening inside the developing countries (see annual reports
by the ITU and the UN’s World Development Reports).
Two major conclusions can be arrived at in the shape of
expectations:

1. Near universal access to a basic computer and Internet

connection should be available to the vast majority of the
population in developed countries within one or two decades.
However, if the stratification pattern holds, ‘near’ universal
access might mean that 10 per cent or more of the population
still have no access. In the developing countries, on the other
hand, near universal access might take two or three decades,
and in the meantime a stratification pattern will account for
perhaps a quarter or third of the population being excluded.
2. However, the digital divide of physical access is here to stay in
another guise. Increasingly, having basic hardware and a slow
connection is not enough for an individual to be included in the
digital world. General material access and specific conditional
access will become more important. This does not mean that
 hardware is no longer a problem. On the contrary, its quality or
capacity, its diversity and continuous replacement and
maintenance will create new physical access divides.

The final conclusion is that closing the gaps in physical access will
not put an end to the digital divide: there will remain inequality in
skills and usage, which I will now discuss.
5
Digital and Twenty-First-Century Skills

Introduction: who is able to deal with digital

media?
Learning how to work with digital technology is a crucial step.
Researchers in the early twenty-first century understood that skills
and usage would become their primary focus, and Eszter Hargittai
(2002) framed this research as the second-level digital divide.
This does not mean that, in the 1980s and 1990s, the operation and
management of computers and Internet connections was believed to
be unimportant. On the contrary, computers were not considered to
be user-friendly machines. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s only
experts and programmers were able to handle them. Even when the
general population started to work with PCs in the 1990s, their
operation was still thought to be more difficult than that of other
media.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century the capacity to work
effectively with digital media was extended with content-related
skills, as people began working with sources of information and
communication. Twenty-first-century skills are problem-solving and
decision-making, critical thinking, creativity, and cooperating with
peers or in teamwork.
The following section will deal with the various concepts of these
skills. I will explain why I prefer the term skills rather than
competencies, capabilities, literacies or other terms. The early
twenty-first century was marked by numerous attempts to find a
framework for digital skills, competencies or literacies. I shall
explain some of these frameworks and discuss the similarities and
differences between digital skills and traditional media skills or
literacies. Finally, I will ask whether digital skills are learned in
formal courses and training or whether they are developed via
informal social and public support and through self-study or
practice.
The third section summarizes research into why people have
different levels of digital skills. The causes are comparable with those
we found in the stages of motivation or attitude and physical access.
Are the same resources, positional and personal categories effective
in the gaps in digital skills?
I will then explore the consequences of the differences of levels of
digital skills. How do they affect the uses and outcomes of digital
media? Will people with low levels of skill be excluded from society?
Will a highly skilled information elite secure the best jobs and decide
what happens in society?
The final section draws together the potential trends in the evolution
of digital skills. Will ever more demanding and advanced skills be
required in the future for employees, citizens and consumers, or will
they be simplified because apparently accessible devices such as
tablets are offered and because a growing number of applications
work autonomously? Will the most recent skills be required for all
people in the information and network society or for an information
elite only?

Basic concepts
The core term
There are many terms that designate the individual ability to operate
and use digital media. In the last twenty-five years those found most
often are literacy, competence, capability, fluency, skill, and
computer or web knowledge. The first term proposed in the 1980s
and 1990s was computer literacy. Tobin (1983: 22) defined this
simply as ‘the ability to utilize the capabilities of computers
intelligently’. At the end of the 1990s Gilster (1997) extended this
term to become digital literacy, which he defined as the usage and
comprehension of information in the age of digital technologies –
which means more than just computers.
Literacy is probably the most frequently used term, in combination
with various adjectives: computer literacy, media literacy, digital
literacy, information literacy and many others. The word ‘literacy’
has the connotations of reading or writing texts and cognitive
processes such as understanding. However, researchers using this as
the core term are also employing it for more comprehensive
meanings (Bawden 2008). Media literacy, for example, is much
broader than computer and digital literacy (Potter [1998] 2008;
Hobbs 2011); it means being able to access, analyse, evaluate and
create messages in a wide variety of media, including traditional
media. It is often a normative concept too, because audiences are
supposed to be critical in using media and their messages, and
children in school have to be educated accordingly.
Competency is the most general term on the list. It often means
having the capacity to evaluate knowledge appropriately and apply it
pragmatically (Anttiroiko et al. 2001), notably in computer-mediated
communication (Bubaš and Hutinski 2003; Spitzberg 2006) and in
general Internet use (Carretero et al. 2017).
The most specific term is digital skills or e-skills, which focuses on
(inter) action rather than on knowledge and its application. This
interaction is with programs and web sources, as well as with other
people (communication); it enables the transaction of goods and
services and involves making decisions continually (van Dijk and van
Deursen 2014: 140). Because the concepts of knowledge and literacy
are so strongly associated with using more traditional media, I prefer
to use the core term ‘digital skills’ in this book. However, in
specifying these skills, I will show that particular knowledge and
literacy are also necessary in order to attain specific goals in digital
media use.

Literacy, competence or skill for which digital media?

In the previous chapter it was observed that there is an increasing
diversity in types of digital media. To which of these do the concepts
of digital literacies, competencies and skills apply? Working with
advanced PCs, laptops, smartphones, feature phones, wearables,
game consoles, Internet television and the Internet in general
require different abilities. Some researchers refer to computer
literacy, others to Internet skills. Most focus on one type of device
and connection. In this chapter I propose a general framework of
digital skills that applies to all digital media but concentrates on
Internet skills, because it is the Internet that links and integrates all
devices and connections.

The importance of technology change

Researchers into digital literacy, competence and skill are confronted
with continual technological change. The evolution from PC to laptop
to tablet, although retaining the same information and
communication tasks, has demanded new skills of the user. The
advent of the Internet of Things, marked by autonomous devices and
systems, also requires fresh expertise: people have to evaluate and
control these automatic decisions. Such examples demonstrate that
digital literacy research has to react to a moving target of
technological change.

General frameworks of digital literacy, competence and

skill
In the last fifteen years multiple general frameworks, covering all
digital literacies, competencies and skills, have been constructed and
proposed to the scholarly and policy community (see summaries in
van Deursen 2010; Litt 2013; and van Dijk and van Deursen 2014). It
is very important to define any target group of people requiring these
literacies or skills. In formal education they will be students, whose
learning goals can be specified. In adult education, for instance, it
might be the modules of a computer driving licence offered by
training institutions in many countries. Training courses for
employees can be designed for particular work tasks. For the general
population, tuition in online digital skills is sometimes offered by
local authorities and other organizations. Unfortunately, it is likely
that businesses believe that their relatively simple and standard
websites are easily managed by all consumers.
In this chapter I am concerned with basic digital media skills or
competencies for the general public and, so, to establish a
comprehensive framework aimed at everyone who wants to use a
computer or phone with an Internet connection.
There are numerous proposals of such frameworks which cannot be
discussed fully in this section. From 2001, Bawden formulated a
number of very general ‘new literacies’, consisting of computer
literacy, general information literacy, digital information literacy,
network literacy and media literacy (Bawden and Robinson 2001;
Bawden 2008). Warschauer (2003) offered five specific literacies:
computer literacy (basic forms of computer and network operation),
information literacy (the ability to manage vast amounts of
information), multi-media literacy (the ability to understand and
produce multi-media content) and computer-mediated literacy
(managing applications such as e-mail, chatting and video-
conferencing, and practising ‘netiquette’). Amichai-Hamburger et al.
(2004) published the first experiments with assessments of five
literacies: photo-visual (reading computer and Internet graphics),
reproduction (to create new content from older material),
information (evaluating information), branching (reading non-linear
hyper-texts) and socio-emotional literacy (understanding the rules of
Internet discourse), while Livingstone et al. (2005) offered a very
broad list of literacy items for adults specified for every medium,
both traditional and digital. Later, Livingstone and Helsper (2007,
2010) concentrated on Internet literacies and skills for children and
teenagers.
A framework based on competencies was first proposed by Gilster
(1997), who listed ten very general competencies, ranging from
problem-solving and searching skills to critical judgement of
contents found online and understanding network tools and hyper-
text. Spitzberg (2006) itemized competencies of communication in e-
mail and on the Internet. Finally, I come to The Digital Competence
Framework for Citizens, by Carretero, Vuorikari and Punie (2017),
published by the European Commission. The authors propose five
general competence areas: information and data literacy,
communication and cooperation, digital content creation, safety, and
problem-solving.
The tradition of using skills as the core theme in research started
with Hargittai (2002), who interviewed and assessed fifty-four
randomly sampled Internet users in observational sessions and gave
them tasks to find several types of information online. Bunz (2004)
also asked for operational skills in using e-mail and websites to
create a so-called computer–e-mail–web fluency scale. Van Dijk
(2003, 2005) also proposed a framework to observe digital skills,
which was elaborated and extended by van Deursen (2010) and fully
described in the book Digital Skills: Unlocking the Information
Society (van Dijk and van Deursen 2014). A summary is provided
below.

Research strategies to investigate digital literacy,

competence or skill
The basic concepts of digital literacy, competence and skill acquire
different meanings through the ways in which they are observed,
whether surveys, interviews, assessments or tests, and ethnography
or field research.
The most frequent strategy is to conduct a survey with printed or
online questionnaires or with interviews. Respondents are asked to
report on their computer and Internet behaviour and rate their own
performance in terms of literacy, competence and skills.
Unfortunately, this strategy is poor in validity: most people overrate
their performance, and males, especially young males, rate
themselves higher than do females.
A relatively better type of survey is to ask proxy questions about the
tasks, steps or procedures people have actually accomplished
through using computers and the Internet. But the best strategy in
validity and reliability is direct observation of performance. Hargittai
(2002) Alkali and Amichai-Hamburger (2004) and van Deursen
(2010) charged subjects in laboratory settings with tasks such as
finding something on the Internet. The problems with this strategy
are that it is very laborious and expensive and that only a small
sample of subjects can be measured. So, in practice, researchers
often turn to proxy questions in surveys.
The third strategy is ethnography or field observation. This means
observing Internet users both online and offline and then
interviewing them (Leander 2007). Tripp (2011) observed the
Internet skills of Latino parents and children both at home and in
the classroom, interviewed them, and analysed children’s homework
for potential skills developed. This strategy offers a wide perspective
of literacies or skills in the social context, but it involves only micro-
settings and so presents no chance of generalization.

The specific framework of digital skills used in this book

In this section, my own general framework, developed in the last
fifteen years with my colleague Alexander van Deursen, will be used
for the following reasons to describe the most important specific
digital skills (van Dijk 2005; van Deursen 2010; van Dijk and van
Deursen 2014). First, all specific digital skills discussed in the
remainder of the book can be directly related to this framework.
Second, the framework is broad enough to cover most of the other
literacies, competencies and skills previously mentioned. Third, it
has been validated in several empirical laboratory assessments with
representative groups of the Dutch population, in skill tests for
employees, and in surveys with proxy questions for specific skills.
Currently, it is being used in several international research projects,
as it is part of the larger ‘from digital skills to tangible outcomes’
(DiSTO) approach (see www.lse.ac.uk/media-and-
communications/research/research-projects/disto).
Before describing our framework, I have to explain that it follows a
particular approach. The notion of digital skills is instrumental.
While literacies focus on the perception, understanding and creation
of contents and competencies on potential use and its results, skills
concentrate on what users can actually do with and within digital
media. They act and react with hardware, software and applications
for a particular goal. The question is whether or not they are
successful.
The framework has four other general characteristics (van Dijk and
van Deursen 2014: 141):

A distinction is made between medium- and content-related

skills.
This distinction is sequential and conditional: without sufficient
medium-related skills, content-related skills cannot be
accomplished.
 The framework is empirical and not normative. For example, to
assess information skills, only the accuracy and validity of
information found in online sources and via search engines are
evaluated.
So far, the framework has been applied mainly to Internet skills,
although it can easily be adapted to other (digital) media.

Special medium-related skills are involved in the use of digital

media. For computers, the first requirement is operational skills.
Users need to command keyboards and all kinds of peripherals, and
they have to learn the interfaces of all programs and content,
particularly operating systems and applications. Additionally, they
need to understand the formal structures of the medium. Just like
books, with their chapters, paragraphs, notes and indexes,
computers and the Internet have specific structures. Computers have
maps, files, menus and access codes and the Internet has websites,
hyperlinks, fields for addresses and searches, and many other special
entries. Browsing and navigating on the Internet is not as
straightforward as people tend to believe. Obtaining the formal skills
to find your way around the Internet requires exploration and
practice.
In the 1990s these operational and formal skills were mainly
understood as abilities of a technical kind, command of which was
believed to solve the skill problem. In the first decade of the twenty-
first century, information literacy, competence or skill was added to
the mix. Information skill – the ability to search, select and evaluate
information online – is the first and most important of these and
involves, for instance, a systematic and accurate use of search
engines. The evaluation of information is a critical accomplishment.
An example is tackling disinformation or ‘fake news’. An empirical
approach towards evaluating information might detect only specific
statements as being evidently ‘fake’; a normative approach
encounters problems in evaluating many more statements because
almost every news item is biased to a certain extent.
Communication skills involve the effective use of e-mail and other
message applications and the ability to contact people online
successfully, to construct an attractive profile online, and exchange
information or give opinions. Such skills are becoming more and
more important in the network society.
The third type of content-related skill is content-creating skill. Most
people contributing to the web are amateur writers, moviemakers
and musicians, not professionals, and the quality of what they
produce is highly diverse. A minimum of writing and creation skills
is required to be effective and attractive in a web environment.
The last type of digital skill, and the one most difficult to achieve, is
the strategic skill of using the Internet as a means to reach a
particular professional and personal goal. Strategic skills require the
mastering of all the other skills. None of the four content-related
skills can be deployed without sufficient operational and formal
skills, and strategic skills cannot be achieved without information,
communication and content-related skills. Additional strategic
operations are needed to work with privacy settings and security aids
on the Internet.
I will give two examples of professional and personal goals. Writing a
letter or application for a job requires first the information skill to
find that suitable post among the many thousand online.
Communication skill is needed to write an e-mail introducing a
convincing application letter, and content-creating skill is necessary
to write the letter and to generate an effective job profile. Second1ly,
looking for a partner though online dating needs information skill to
select the preferred candidate from a huge pool of contenders,
content-creating skill to represent an attractive profile, and
communication skill to write an effective introduction or invitation
in order to realize the strategic skill of addressing the best match
available.
Figure 5.1. A general framework of six medium- and content-related
digital skills
These six conditional and sequential skills are summarized in figure
5.1. Medium-related skills are needed to realize content-related
skills. In a wealthy country such as the Netherlands, with 98 per cent
Internet access, the majority of the population has sufficient
medium-related skills, but most strategic skills are mastered by only
about 20 per cent of the population (van Deursen 2010, van Deursen
and van Dijk 2015a). The six digital skills of the framework are
specified for the Internet by van Dijk and van Deursen (2014: 42).

Causes of divides in digital skills

Divides in digital skills can be explained by people’s resources and
positional or personal categories. Digital skills primarily require
cognitive characteristics such as intelligence, knowledge and
technical ability, though motivation also remains important.

Resources supporting digital skills

Evidently, if people do not have sufficient material and temporal
resources, they will not develop digital skills. However, we will see
that, while considerable Internet experience is likely to support
medium-related skills, there is no guarantee that it will help develop
content-related skills (van Deursen and van Dijk 2011).
Mental, social and cultural resources, then, are more important for
explaining differences in people’s digital skills. Mental resources –
technical proficiency or know-how, knowledge of technological and
societal affairs, and analytic capabilities – are the most significant.
Søby (2003), Mossberger et al. (2003) and Carvin (2000) found that
technical proficiency or competence – an accumulated knowledge of
hardware, software, applications and connections – is a basic
component of digital literacy. It is well known that people turn to
tech-savvies to help them with technical problems.
Most people do not develop digital skills on their own, and their
social context is very relevant when they meet problems and require
assistance. However, not everyone benefits from the social resources
of colleagues, family members and friends with better skills or is able
to consult a help desk or find a computer course.
figure 5.2 shows the various ways of acquiring computer and Internet
skills in the European Union. Unfortunately, the statistics date from
2011, but in my estimation they are an indication of a distribution
that still holds, and not only in the EU but also elsewhere. The figure
shows that informal ways of acquiring digital skills are much more
important than formal ways. Seeking social support from others is
the second most common course of action.

Figure 5.2. Ways of acquiring computer and Internet skills in the

European Union
Source: Eurostat, Internet Use in Households and by Individuals in 2011.
Van Deursen et al. (2014) created a typology of users acquiring
digital skills and, in a representative survey of the Dutch population,
found that their characteristics confirmed the distribution shown in
figure 5.2. The first group, the independents, learn skills by doing or
through trial and error, though they might also make use of manuals,
DVDs or websites. This type significantly consists largely of young,
male and highly educated people. The second group, the socially
supported, ask colleagues, relatives and friends for assistance when
they find a problem. This type is made up mainly of seniors, females
and people with low education. The third group are the formal help
seekers, who follow classes of formal adult education or special
computer classes and courses, either on their own initiative or via
their employer. They also consult computer experts and help desks.
Formal help seekers are mainly employed, relatively old, and have
followed low- or medium-level education.
According to surveys, the independents have the highest levels of all
kinds of skills. The socially supported learn some operational and
formal skills but no information or strategic skills. This mode of
learning is unreliable because relatives or friends often provide
partial or wrong solutions and answers. Thus, the socially supported
are the worst performers, even in operational and formal skills.
Unfortunately, people with the lowest digital skills obtain the worst
social support (Helsper and van Deursen 2017; van Deursen et al.
2014). Formal help seekers obtain information and strategic skills in
their courses and classes.
As far as cultural resources are concerned, a lifestyle that involves
using digital media throughout the day, and for every imaginable
purpose, makes it easier for such ‘digirati’ to develop their skills
(Ragnedda 2017), especially operational and formal skills. The status
earned by an expert in the operation of ICT stimulates their
motivation to maintain their reputation by acquiring even more
skills. Advising people also helps such experts to have a better
understanding of problems. Finally, status markers motivate owners
who have purchased a number of flashy new devices and apps to
master them thoroughly in order to demonstrate them to others.

Positional categories determining resources and digital

skills
The first series of background factors determining all these resources
are positional categories. In all observations of digital skills,
literacies or competencies, by both assessments and proxy survey
questions, the attainment of education, whether in school or via
adult education, is the most important factor (Bonfadelli 2002; Gui
and Argentin 2011; Hargittai 2010; van Deursen 2010; van Deursen
and van Dijk 2009, 2011, 2015b). Van Deursen (2010) and van
Deursen and van Dijk (2009, 2011) have found in both laboratory
assessments and surveys that people with higher education perform
better, particularly in content-related skills and strategic decision-
making.
An individual’s labour position is the second important category
explaining differences in digital skills. Clearly, people with a job that
requires the use of computers have more opportunities to improve
their skills (van Deursen and van Dijk 2012).
On average people in a developing country have fewer opportunities
to learn digital skills, even when they are part of the elite, than
people in a developed country. The availability and quality of a
nation or region’s information and communication infrastructure,
together with its educational institutions, dictate the opportunities
available to the population. Unfortunately, there is no international
comparative research concerning the level of digital skills attained by
different countries. Institutions such as the World Bank (2016), the
Economist Intelligence Unit (2019) and Unesco (Broadband
Commission et al. 2017) have tried to estimate the national level of
digital skills mainly through educational performance.
People living in multi-person households clearly have more
opportunities to improve their skills. In particular, parents can help
their children with content-related skills, though many children have
better medium-related skills than their parents.
The final category is a position in a social network. People with large
social networks are the first to receive strategic information from
others in their circle (Kadushin 2012), a position that allows them to
‘hoard’ all kinds of opportunities (Tilly 1998). In every society there
is a big overlap between the information elite and the social,
economic, political and cultural elite.
Personal categories determining resources and digital
skills
The most important personal category determining technical
proficiency, knowledge and analytic capabilities is intelligence and
the technical ability to understand and operate digital technology.
Unfortunately, these have not been directly measured in digital
divide research, where IQ tests are rarely conducted. Intelligence and
technical ability are sometimes tested in research in computer
classes and the like in schools. However, the results are valid only for
the particular course and not for the levels of intelligence and digital
skills in the general population.
In my view, digital divide research has turned a blind eye to the
importance of intelligence. In most research, education has been
found to be the most significant background factor in the digital
divide and so is the most important key to solving this problem.
However, what actually explains the role of education in differences
in skill?
Whether we like it or not, natural science has shown that intelligence
is partly hereditary (Lee et al. 2018). Intelligence is related to the
ability to process information. According to Guilford (1967), this
requires five mental operations: 1) to recognize information quickly
and to give it meaning, 2) to recall information immediately, 3) to
find many solutions to problems, 4) to bring different things in a
common denominator and 5) to evaluate information to make a
judgement. Clearly, these mental operations are needed for content-
related digital skills, especially information and strategic skills.
Technical ability is a kind of practical intelligence related more to
medium-related than to content-related skills. At all levels of
education some people are more tech-savvy – ‘being good at
computers’ and the like – than others.
In contrast to the other personal categories, age is frequently
investigated in digital skills research. The general conclusion is that
young people are better than older people in medium-related digital
skills, but the results are mixed as far as content-related skills are
concerned (Litt 2013). A popular notion is that young people are
better at using digital media and the Internet, and new terms have
been created to describe them, such as ‘digital natives’ and ‘net
generation’ (Tapscott 1998; Prensky 2001). However, this notion
largely is a myth: in fact, the level of digital skills among the young
generation is very wide-ranging (Hargittai and Hinnant 2008;
Hargittai 2010; Helsper and Eynon 2010; Calvani et al. 2012). What
is more surprising is that research has shown that older generations
might be better at using the Internet than the young! This is
explained by the fact that young people have better medium-related
skills such as ‘button knowledge’ and fast navigation, while seniors
have superior content-related skills (provided that they have
sufficient medium-related skills to start with). Figure 5.3 is a causal
model of the results of a representative Dutch survey that supports
these statements (though note that communication and content-
creating skills were not measured in this survey). The figure shows
that increasing age has a negative impact on medium-related skills
and a positive effect on content-related skills. While older people
have less Internet experience and spend fewer hours online than
young people, experience is barely significant and the number of
hours spent online is not meaningful. Adequate medium-related
skills are needed for content-related digital skills to be developed.
Finally, the figure shows that age and education are very important
personal categories affecting the level of digital skills. These results
have been confirmed in other countries by Alkali and Amichchai-
Hamburger (2004), Helsper and Eynon (2010) and Gui and Argentin
(2011).
Figure 5.3. Causal path model of four independent factors explaining
digital skills
Source: van Deursen et al. (2011).

Gender is the third personal category often investigated in digital

skills research, though most does not find significant differences
between the skills of males and females (Litt 2013) – at least, not in
advanced high-tech countries. The situation might well be different
in developing nations and in countries where there is a lack of female
emancipation. I have already stated in this book that people,
especially (young) males, overrate the level of their skills as
compared to the objective results of tests. Just before conducting his
laboratory assessments, van Deursen (2010) gave a questionnaire to
all participants and asked them to rate their own level of skill. While
males rated their expertise at a much higher level than did females,
the actual performance of both in the assessment was shown to be
equal. The same observation was also made by Hargittai and Shafer
(2006) and Hargittai and Hinnant (2008).
The last personal categories to be discussed are health or disability
and illiteracy. Disabled people are less likely to go online than the
able-bodied (Dobransky and Hargittai 2016), and the disabled on
average show lower levels of skill (van der Geest et al. 2014; van Dijk
and Van Deursen 2014: 129–31). Complete and functional illiterates
will have no content-related and very few medium-related digital
skills since they cannot handle words, documents or the names of
menus or links. The Human Development Report 2009 (UNDP
2009) estimated the proportion of functional illiterates to be 20 per
cent in the US, 22 per cent in the UK and 7.5 per cent in Sweden (the
lowest figure). The number of illiterate people in modern society, let
alone in the information and network society, is a persisting problem
that is very difficult to solve.

Figure 5.4. Causal and sequential model of divides in digital skills

The various causes of inequality in digital skills are shown in figure
5.4. The order of factors in the boxes is estimated.

Technical characteristics
Finally, there are a number of technical characteristics of
contemporary digital media that affect the possibility of developing
digital skills. The first of these is accessibility. Being able to access
the same kind of hardware, software and applications – for instance
at work, in school, at home, while commuting or at public access
points – is particularly helpful when one is learning digital skills.
Taking advantage of mobile access at all times is an option. However,
many applications can better be performed on PCs or laptops, with
their bigger screens, keyboards and often faster connections (see the
characteristic of mobility below).
The second characteristic is usability – the ease of use and
learnability of the hardware, software and applications. Shneiderman
(1980) and Nielsen (1994) have created a framework for usability
with the following attributes: learnability (the ease of accomplishing
a basic task), efficiency (how quickly this task may be performed),
memorability (remembering how to carry out a certain task),
correction of errors (how many errors are made and how they can be
recovered) and satisfaction (the pleasure of using the tool). All of
these affect the learning of digital skills.
Another characteristic of usability is the intuitiveness of a device or
application. Tablets and smartphones are relatively easy to use
instinctively by, for example, dragging horizontally or vertically
across the screen with your finger. Intuitive use can help with the
development of medium-related skills. However, ease of use also is
deceptive: it both seduces us to avoid learning more difficult content-
related skills (van Dijk and van Deursen 2014: 99–101; van Deursen
et al. 2016), and it stimulates constant following, swiping and
tapping on links, words or pictures presented on the screen rather
than encouraging input of content by users themselves.
The third technical characteristic is mobility. This offers the same
tradeoffs as usability. People who are able use the same digital media
at all times and in all places have more chances of learning the
required medium-related skills. However, users tend to avoid the
more advanced applications offered on PCs and laptops (Bao et al.
2011; Napoli and Obar 2014), meaning that they also learn fewer
content-related skills (van Deursen and van Dijk 2019). (See more
about this in chapter 6.) Broadband as compared to narrowband
connections do not show the same trade-off. Broadband is always
better for both medium- and content-related skills, as many more
visual cues of understanding are presented and many more and
diverse advanced applications are offered (Mossberger et al. 2012).
Pictures and videos can be downloaded and uploaded quickly and
response times in all interfaces are much shorter.
The final important technical characteristic is automation. More and
more applications are now offered that work on the basis of artificial
intelligence. In the context of the Internet of Things, augmented
reality and personal assistants (provided in search engines or with
smart home devices), more and more decisions are made via
algorithms. Users need to learn only a few additional operational
skills to utilize their health and sport wearables, smart watches and
glasses, self-driving cars, energy meters at home, online heating and
kitchen remote controls, search engines for assistance, and many
others. The devices and their intelligent software do all the work.
This means that information, communication and content-creation
skills would seem to be less important. Even strategic skills may no
longer be needed when smart applications take the decisions.
However, in truth they are needed more (van Deursen and
Mossberger 2018). Users need to know first whether it is actually
smart to purchase these applications and whether the decisions
made would be their own preferred decisions. Using these
technologies people are additionally confronted with systems –
transport systems, energy provision, health care and assurance
systems, and provider systems of platforms such as Google.
Understanding these systems requires more knowledge than most
people actually possess. In fact, advanced strategic skills are needed,
a type of content-related skill least performed by the average user
(see above). Again, this technical characteristic is a trade-off of a
technology that makes it both easier and more difficult for users to
learn the required digital skills.

The consequences of divides in digital skills

Having sufficient digital skills is a turning point in the whole process
of adopting technology. It is most likely that people with a high level
of digital skills will be the most frequent users of all types of media,
while those with a low level of skills will use them only for relatively
simple or attractive tasks such as personal communication, e-
shopping and entertainment. The final result is that such people will
gain fewer benefits and those with a high level of digital skills will
benefit more and suffer less harm from its negative aspects (security
and privacy problems, cybercrime, cyberbullying and other abuse;
see chapter 7).
The causal links between digital skills, frequency and diversity of use,
and positive or negative outcomes are demonstrated in nationwide
survey results from several countries (Helsper 2012; Pearce and Rice
2013; van Deursen and van Dijk 2015b; van Deursen and Helsper
2015; van Deursen et al. 2017).
Another consequence of the differences in mastering digital skills is
that the already strong position of the information elite in society,
the professional-managerial class, academics, government officials
and businessmen, will become reinforced (Michaels et al. 2014).
Conversely, the already feeble position of people with low education
in manual or unskilled jobs will become even weaker in an
information society. Such workers are at permanent risk of their jobs
being eliminated by automation and robotization; their wages tend
to stagnate or be cut. In the meantime, people with higher education
and average or advanced ICT skills earn a ‘skills premium’ (Nahuis
and de Groot 2003); these skills are substantially rewarded in the
labour market (Falck et al. 2016; O’Mahoney et al. 2008). The use of
ICT has polarized skills demand in the last twenty-five years: instead
of requiring staff with medium-level education, industries now call
for people with higher education and high digital skills (Michaels et
al. 2014).
A similar polarization occurs among those enrolling in educational
institutions. The higher the level of courses, the greater are the
digital skills needed to follow the programme of study and to succeed
in exams. Today, it is impossible to pursue higher education without
sufficient digital skills.

The evolution in the level and nature of

digital skills
In the last ten years the absolute levels of digital skills attained by the
general public have increased, as have the relative differences in
skills attained by particular groups (van Deursen and van Dijk
2015a). This means that people of every social class, age and gender,
and with all levels of education, have developed higher skills,
especially medium-related skills. However, relative gaps in
mastering digital skills between those at the higher and lower ends of
educational attainment and labour position have also grown, though
they do not seem to occur as far as gender and age are concerned:
females and seniors are now catching up with males and the young,
at least in the developing counties.
Two opposing trends will decide the future of digital skills. The first
consists of the growing requirements that our societies and advanced
technologies impose on the use of ICT: the complexity of both is
increasing. More and more difficult tasks are set for and performed
by digital media in all ways of life. These tasks require much
information processing, abstract thinking and strategic decision-
making, meaning that the necessity for content-related skills will
increase.
The other trend is composed of the affordances of new technology:
new methods of carrying out existing tasks will tend to require
simpler skills. Speech and face recognition, replacing the need to use
keyboards, and images and speaking inputs and outputs replacing
texts will reduce the demands on medium-related skills. For
example, instead of using a textual search engine, individuals can
speak to a ‘personal assistant’. New artificial intelligence software
will help users to make decisions, thus reducing the requirements of
content-related skills. However, the operations and communications
performed by digital technology will not be reduced: people,
organizations and societies want more and more complex tasks to be
carried out in this manner. For example, the advent of the Internet of
Things might lead to fewer demands on medium-related skills but
more demands on making decisions about the acceptance of the
advice given and the service of the systems offering such applications
(van Deursen and Mossberger 2018). Will I accept the advice of my
wearable smart watch to take more steps a day? Is it wise to transmit
the data provided by this device concerning my performance to my
doctor and health insurer? More strategic digital skills are needed for
this purpose than before.
The demands on content-related digital skills are also increasing on
account of the requirements of so-called twenty-first-century skills.
These substantial cognitive and behavioural skills are very similar to
content-related digital skills. The most popular frameworks have
been made by the Partnership for 21st Century Skills (2008) and
Binkley et al. (2012). Following a systematic literature review, van
Laar et al. (2017) created a list of core twenty-first-century digital
skills (see figure 5.5). These authors also found some additional skills
in the literature – self-direction, ethical and cultural awareness,
lifelong learning skills and flexibility skills – though these will not be
discussed here.

Figure 5.5. Framework of core twenty-first-century skills

Source: Adapted from van Laar et al. (2017: 583).

These seven core skills are content-related, and digital media or ICTs
are among the most important tools to realize these skills. Today
there are effective, reliable and valid search engines, online personal
assistants and other applications to find, process and evaluate online
information. Communication these days requires an appropriate and
effective use of e-mail, social-networking sites and messaging
services. Collaboration often involves content management systems,
wikis, document cooperation among groups, and chat platforms.
Creativity can be enhanced by an appropriate use of tools to devise
online content. Critical thinking, defined as observable informed
choices, is required in using search tools and evaluating any
information or disinformation on the web. Problem-solving skills can
be improved by an effective use of various online tools, from search
consoles (advanced search engines) to development apps.
It is to be expected that professional workers, e-participating citizens
and experienced e-commerce consumers with a high level of
educational attainment will be the first to develop these twenty-first-
century skills, but this is not yet supported by empirical research.
Meanwhile the need for medium-related skills at a basic level will
continue or even be reduced. We should bear in mind, however, that
the number of digital devices and programs is multiplying with the
rise of the Internet of Things and virtual or augmented reality, all of
which require a number of additional operational skills.
6
Usage Inequality

Introduction: who frequently and variously

uses digital media?
Now we have reached the last phase in the process of full adoption of
digital media. The goal is to use these media for a particular purpose
of information, communication, transaction or entertainment.
Accomplishing the three former phases is a necessary condition for
usage: without sufficient motivation and at least a minimal positive
attitude, without achieving physical access, and without developing
sufficient digital skills, any digital media use will be absent or
marginal.
However, these conditions are not sufficient for actual usage. For
example, people may have access to digital media in their household
or on other places but never use them. They might be forced to use
them without any imagination. They might have particular digital
skills but not exploit them because they prefer traditional media or
find no occasion to use digital media. Unfortunately, in statistics
about Internet and computer usage, physical access – for instance in
households – often is conflated with use. Usage has its own grounds
that will be discussed in this chapter.
Usage of digital media is affected by the occasion, the obligation, the
available time and the necessary effort expended. It depends on the
tasks people have and the contexts in which they are living. In the
last two decades the tasks have multiplied and the contexts now
embrace all spheres of daily life. Because the nature of the contexts is
different – social, economic, cultural and technological – the aspects
of digital media usage to be discussed in this chapter are different
too.
The chapter will start with the basic concepts of usage, for which
several typologies have been created. The most important are the
frequency and amount of use, use diversity and the activity of use
(creation or consumption).
The second section will list the causes of frequency, diversity and the
activity of use of digital media, including the new devices of the
Internet of Things and augmented or virtual reality. The core section
of this chapter, as in the previous chapters, follows the general model
of resources and appropriation theory (resources, positional or
personal categories, and the technical properties of the media).
I shall then examine the consequences for (in)equality of all the
divides of usage observed in the previous section. Will they disappear
when the diffusion of digital media in society is absolute and
universal access has been achieved? Or will they persist and become
a permanent characteristic of future societies?
The final section will discuss the evolution of the usage divides. This
is not only about their disappearance or persistence but also about
their nature. Will they be generational (age), cultural (gender,
ethnicity and lifestyle), social (social class and status), educational
(knowledge, intelligence and competency) or economic (employment
or own business and career)?

Basic concepts
Use typologies
How can the extreme variation in Internet use be conceptualized and
classified? There are two popular approaches: one is to derive a
typology from the core concepts of a theory and the other is a
description induced by factor or cluster analysis. Both approaches
produce suitable typologies and classifications. The usual theoretical
approach is one of the technology acceptance theories (see chapter
2). The uses and gratification theory (Katz et al. 1973; Flanagin and
Metzger 2001) lists a number of needs, motivations and
gratifications that lead to a typology of Internet or other digital
media use (see table 3.2, p. 37, where the items in the column of
specific gratifications look like a number of digital media or Internet
applications). The technology acceptance theory (Davis 1989),
however, has not yet produced a use typology. Finally, the social
cognitive theory, among others creating a media attendance model
(LaRose and Eastin 2004), offers a number of expected outcomes,
such as monetary, novelty, social and status outcomes, which look
like particular applications.
The resources and appropriation theory, used as a framework to
present digital divide research in this book, has also not produced a
user typology because this theory focuses on independent causes
rather than dependent applications of use.
In order to find a neutral typology of digital media and Internet use,
the second approach is better. Here the point of departure is
observable activities, not motivations, perceptions or expected
outcomes. Livingstone and Helsper (2007), Brandtzæg (2010), Blank
and Groselj (2014) and van Deursen and van Dijk (2014a) were
among the first to induce these typologies. However, Kalmus et al.
(2011: 392) derived the most suitable typology from a factor analysis
in a representative survey among the population of Estonia – a
country known for its high Internet access and use. This typology
inspired the list of activities shown in table 6.1. It can be extended
with activities found in other surveys.
Table 6.1. Typology of Internet use domains, activities and
applications
Source: Derived from Kalmus et al. (2011).

Use Activities Internet applications

domains
Work, study/ Work Professional applications
information Consumption E-shopping and marketplaces
use
Finance Internet banking
Citizenship E-government services
Learning/study Online courses and training
Career Personal development/independent
development learning sources
Searching for Search engines/personal assistants
and
information encyclopaedias
Searching for News services/blogs
news
Leisure/social Communicating E-mail/messaging services
use
Networking Social-networking services
Community- Community sites and forums
building
Sharing Music, video (sharing) sites
Entertainment Online broadcasting and video
Gaming Online gaming
Exploring Browsing
The most important distinction in the Kalmus typology and in table
6.1 is the dichotomy of the two main kinds of Internet domains:
work/study or information and leisure or social use or activity. This
distinction will become fairly important in the remainder of this
chapter because unequal use of these domains will be shown to
create structural divides.

Use indicators
How can we measure digital media use? There are three indicators
often used in research (see also Blank and Groselj 2014):

Frequency of use and amount of time: from a baseline of ‘non-

use’, through ‘low use’, ‘regular use’ and ‘broad use’, the
incidence and the number of hours during which people use the
Internet, etc. (Reisdorf and Groselj 2017);
Diversity of use: the number of different activities for which the
Internet, etc., is used, for example as listed in table 6.1;
Activity of use: creative (active) or consumptive (relatively
passive).

The first two indicators will figure in the following sections about the
causes and consequences of divides in digital media use.
Unfortunately, the third will have to be largely ignored, as I have not
found much data for this indicator.

Causes of divides in digital media use

Resources affecting digital media use
In discussing the inequalities observed in using digital media, I will
follow the same concepts of the framework applied in the former
chapters. The most significant causes are social and cultural
resources, backed by sufficient material resources (income) and
temporal resources (time), though mental resources are pertinent in
the form of basic motivations (needs) and attitudes or beliefs in
choosing particular applications of digital media. We will also see
that personality and intelligence (cognitive and technical ability)
affect digital media use.
The most important resources for digital media use are social; close
to half of the Internet activities listed in table 6.1 can be called social.
The social contexts in which people live may stimulate or reduce
media activities (Selwyn 2003, Selwyn et al. 2006). People are often
obliged in workplaces and schools to use particular digital media,
and the network effect takes place in communities and families. Once
there is a critical mass of users of a particular device, the rate of
adoption creates further growth. This happened with e-mail, social-
networking sites, messaging services and Internet access in general.
The social context also determines the level of support people
receive: those in dense social networks are more likely to use popular
digital media than isolated or marginal members of society.
Cultural resources in the form of lifestyle affect digital media use.
Some people work all day on a computer or smartphone, while
others are involved in playing, gaming or gambling, continually
watching YouTube videos and Netflix series, or perpetually chatting
via messaging services. The use of digital media can also be inspired
by the status acquired by sharing music and funny videos and
pictures. While once the possession of a PC, an Internet connection
or a mobile phone yielded status, today prestige is gained only by
having the latest smartphone, a brand new app or game, a state of
the art device for augmented or virtual reality, a very fast Internet
connection, or a house fully equipped with advanced equipment.
Of course, mental resources in the form of positive motivations and
attitudes continue to be relevant for frequency and type of digital
media use. However, motivations and attitudes are not resources.
The importance of such characteristics as personality, cognitive
intelligence and technical ability, physical or mental disabilities, and
literacy will be discussed below.
Material resources are needed to benefit from the incentives of the
social context and the lifestyle, habits or hobbies and status aimed
for. Companies or institutions need to invest sufficiently in the
hardware, software and connections required for jobs where
computers and the Internet would be advantageous. Similarly, if
schools do not have adequate numbers of computers for students,
and parents cannot afford to buy them for the home, the impetus will
die. A ‘digital’ lifestyle and culture, together with status markers,
might be attractive, but they are expensive to maintain.
Temporal resources are also required. Many hours are spent using
computers and the Internet in workplaces and schools, depending on
the type of job and study. Professionals may use them use them all
day long, and individuals with flexible or temporary jobs need them
more than those in permanent employment. Many people in the
developed societies, particularly those unemployed or unable to
work, spend much of their leisure time on the Internet.

Positional categories determining resources and digital

media use
We now turn to the factors responsible for the inequality of the
resources people have in using digital media. The overwhelming
majority of surveys in digital divide research in the world show that
the level of both education and employment, often correlated with
the level of income, are the most important background factors for
the frequency and variety of digital media use next to the positional
categories of age and gender (see Ryan and Lewis 2017; Dutton and
Reisdorf 2017; and Pew Research Center 2018 for the US; Blank and
Groselj 2014; van Deursen and van Dijk 2014a; Reisdorf and Groselj
2017; Lindblom and Räsänen 2017; and Serrano-Cinca et al. 2018 for
the UK and the EU; and Pew Research Center 2018 for the whole
world). Research published by the Pew Center shows that levels of
education make more of a difference in developing countries than in
developed countries (Poushter et al. 2018: 12).
Those who gain a good education generally acquire a good job. Using
digital media at school and then for homework extends both the
frequency and the variety of use, including into leisure time, where
more highly educated students use more information and career-
related applications than those with less education (see below).
Education level reinforces not only the social but also the cultural
resources needed for digital media use. It increases the number and
variety of social relationships for inspiration and support in the
school environment and enhances a ‘digital lifestyle’ of heavy use,
creating particular habits and status markers at home and elsewhere.
An individual’s labour position determines how frequently they use
digital media, as well as how diverse that usage is and whether it is
active or passive. Most research shows that it is managers and
professionals who make greater use of computers than people with
executive, manual and physical jobs (see Lindblom and Räsänen
2017 for the UK, Finland and Greece). Among managers and
professionals, digital media are increasingly the primary – perhaps
even the only – tools of their work; for administrative workers,
however, perhaps practising data entry all day, their frequency of use
will be very high but the diversity and creative use will be low. In
general, the employed and students use more digital media than the
retired and the unemployed (see examples in Blank and Groselj
(2014) for the UK and Serrano-Cinca et al. (2018) for Spain), except
for the unemployed in the Netherlands, who use the Internet more
often for leisure pursuits (van Deursen and van Dijk 2014a).
The third positional category affecting usage is in which country an
individual lives in the world and whether they are in an urban or
rural region. There is much inequality in the relevant infrastructure
for access, as well as in the variety of digital media available,
particularly between developed and developing countries. The
distribution of Internet or smartphone users in the world was noted
by researchers for the Pew Center in 2018 (see figure 6.1). The map
shows that, of thirty-seven countries, North America, Europe and
parts of the Asia-Pacific region have the most users and sub-Saharan
Africa, India and Indonesia the fewest. The distribution corresponds
closely with the general, economic (GDP), social inequality (Gini
coefficient) and other levels of development often used as the
positional categorization of these countries (World Bank 2016).
All nations reveal a significant internal divide in digital media use
between urban and rural regions. Here the causes are the availability
and quality of infrastructure, regional economic performance and
poverty, levels of education and skills, and the preferences of local
cultures (Salemink et al. 2017). In developing countries, even those
who have a high level of education, occupation and income show
lower use of digital media than people in developed countries in
equivalent circumstances.
Figure 6.1. Percentages of adult Internet users or owners of a
smartphone in thirty-seven countries of the world, 2017
Source: Poushter et al. (2018: 5).
A position in a social network will possibly affect digital media use
too. However, I have found no empirical evidence of people having a
central position in a large social network using digital media more
than those with a small social network or in a marginal position.
Both Tilly (2009) and Kadushin (2012) expect that the former find
and hoard more opportunities – social media, messaging services
and other online communication tools – than the latter. In earlier
chapters I argued that social-network positions influence people’s
motivation, assistance in gaining physical access, and support in
developing digital skills. Network analyses and surveys are required
to show these differences.
Household position is less important, since both frequency and
variety of digital media use are at about the same level in both single-
person and multi-person households; only the type of applications
might be different (see Blank and Grosjelj 2014 for the UK).
Personal categories determining resources and digital
media use
Almost every research project concerning the digital divide shows
that age is the most important personal cause of different use after
the level of education attained. While 48 per cent of the total world
population used the Internet in 2017, 70.6 per cent of that usage was
by people aged fifteen to twenty-four. The percentage gap between
overall usage and that of the younger population was the smallest in
Europe (79.6 versus 95.7 per cent) and the biggest in Africa (21.8
versus 40.3 per cent). The poorer the country, the wider the gap; it is
widest in the so-called least developed countries (LDCs) (ITU 2017).
Age can be categorized by number of years, by generation and by
life-stage. The most popular and questionable category is that of
generation, where a distinction is made between the Digital Natives
and Immigrants. Digital Natives were born and grew up after the
advent of the World Wide Web (1993), a generation also called the
‘post-millennials’, born from 1997 onwards. The distinction was
coined by Prensky (2001) and Tapscott (1998), who suggested that
members of this generation were not only much more frequent users
of digital media than previous generations but also better in terms of
their skills, the variety of their use and multitasking with other
activities. This proposition was later supported by research
undertaken, among others, by Zickuhr (2011) and Rosen (2012).
However, it was also sincerely criticized in the research of
Buckingham (2008), Hargittai and Hinnant (2008) and Helsper and
Eynon (2010), who attempted to show that other factors, such as
Internet experience, digital skills and types of use, were more
important than generational effects. There are enormous differences
in access, skills and usage among the so-called Digital Natives
(Hargittai and Hinnant 2008), while older generations may well
have better content-related digital skills than the young generation,
who are certainly more adept at medium-related skills (van Deursen
2010; van Deursen and van Dijk 2014a; see chapter 5).
The distinction between generation and life-stage is decisive. Chesley
and Johnson (2014) have analysed the differential use of digital
media by generation and during the life course. They argue that we
use digital media differently in childhood, adolescence, young
adulthood, older adulthood and old age, and they also show that the
generational effect is important. The age at which we are first
introduced to digital media has consequences for the way in which
we use it for the rest of our life.
This distinction is important because the generational effect in usage
will slowly be reduced as time passes. At this point the older
generations in the developed countries are catching up fast.
However, life-stage effects are here to stay. Even fifty years from now
adolescents will use digital media to help form their identity and
communicate with their peers. Adults will use them primarily for
organizing their lives, while elderly people will use them mostly for
leisure, services such as health care, and communication with family
and friends.
The second personal category affecting digital media use is gender.
In the 1980s and 1990s it was (young) males who were the first to
use digital media (van Dijk 2005). After the year 2000 the gender
gaps in frequency of use became smaller, and by 2017 it had been
reduced worldwide to 11.6 per cent (less for females). However, in
Africa it was still 25.3 per cent and in the LDCs as a whole 32.9 per
cent, though in the Americas women already used the Internet 2.6
per cent more than men (ITU 2017). The final figure shows that the
gender gap is a direct result of the unfavourable conditions for
women in several countries with respect to employment, education
and income (Hilbert 2011; ITU 2017); in all countries where women
participate in higher education, the gap in the frequency and variety
of use disappears.
This does not mean that the differences in the types of use, such as
particular Internet applications – see table 6.1, p. 82 – are declining
(see Jackson et al. 2001; Schumacher and Morahan-Martin 2001;
Zillien and Hargittai 2009; Blank and Groselj 2014; van Deursen and
van Dijk 2014a; Martínez-Cantos 2017; and Sultana and Imtiaz
2018). The common denominator is that females are more likely to
use communication and commercial applications and males
information and entertainment applications (see the leisure or social
use versus the work and information applications in table 6.1).
However, in the future, when all social and cultural distinctions in
society will be fully reflected in digital media use, these differences
may be more clearly pronounced. See the arguments below and the
following chapters.
The third important set of personal categories effecting digital media
use consists of intelligence, technical ability, literacy, and
intellectual or physical disability. Although we have insufficient
empirical evidence to back up the assertion, people of low
intelligence (superficially and perhaps arbitrarily measured as IQ),
those who have little technical ability or expertise, the functionally
illiterate and the disabled make less use of digital media and the
Internet. Surveys dealing with digital media use have no questions as
to IQ or other measures of intelligence or the ability of respondents,
and performance tests do not examine intelligence by other
measures. Correlations are established only with the level of
education attained.
Nevertheless, I want to argue that intelligence, technical ability,
literacy and disability are very important background measures of
mental, social and cultural resources causing the divides of digital
media use. The main reasons for such people finding digital media
less attractive are the design, the interface and the content of
websites, which are designed for intelligent and literate people who
are able to operate a device and its applications and have no
disabilities.
It is estimated that 2.2 per cent of the population in Western
countries have an IQ below 70; 13.6 per cent are between 70 and 85,
and two-thirds of the population are at the average quotient, between
85 and 115 (Urbina 2011; and Flanagan and Harrison 2012).
Chadwick et al. (2013) discuss the barriers and the opportunities of
the Internet for the learning disabled and those of low intelligence.
Many such individuals who have Internet access in their home do not
actually use it (see Gutiérrez and Martorell 2011 for Spain), largely
on account of the design and content of websites (Wehmeyer 2004).
The learning disabled are often ‘infantilized’ by their caregivers, who
think that the Internet is bad or dangerous for them (Chadwick et al.
2013).
In the least-developed countries, more than 50 per cent of the
population are illiterate (UNDP 2016), and as much as 20 per cent of
the population in the US (32 million adults) and the UK (8 million)
may be functionally illiterate, with comparable figures in other
Western countries (see Ullah and Ullah 2014; UNDP 2016). Such
people are only able to understand images or symbols and video or
audio content.
Another large category is the disabled, who are estimated as being
between 12 and 27 per cent of any population (Fox 2011; Anderson
and Perrin). For example, in the US, 15 per cent of the adult
population have problems in walking, 9 per cent in hearing and 7 per
cent in seeing; 11 per cent have a serious condition affecting their
ability to concentrate, remember or make decisions, and 9 per cent
are unable to go shopping or visit the doctor without assistance.
While in 2016 only 8 per cent of Americans had never used the
Internet, 23 per cent of disabled Americans had never done so. In
that year only 50 per cent of disabled Americans use the Internet on
a daily basis while the overall population reported 79 per cent daily
use (Anderson and Perrin 2017). According to a large-scale survey of
3,556 disabled individuals in Poland in 2013, only 33 per cent used
the Internet, while the figure for the whole population was 63 per
cent (Duplaga 2017). Even controlled for age, poverty and education,
disability remains as a digital divide factor (Dobransky and Hargittai
2016; Anderson and Perrin 2017).
The last personal category to be mentioned is personality. Several
studies suggest that, among the ‘Big Five’ personal characteristics,
people with particular traits show more Internet engagement than
others (Russo and Amnå 2016). The first, openness to experience
(showing intellectual curiosity for a breadth of cultural phenomena,
novel experiences and new ideas), inspires more Internet use than
the more closed-minded, pragmatic, habitual or perseverant
personality (Tuten and Bosnjak 2001; Vecchione and Caprara 2009;
Gerber et al. 2011). Second, extroversion also inspires Internet use,
especially for establishing contacts and partaking in discussions such
as in social networking and using social media in general (Ryan and
Xenos 2011). Third, the conscientious personality, who is organized,
reliable and structured, generally has a problem with the
unstructured environment of large parts of the Internet (Landers and
Lounsbury 2006), especially social-networking sites (Ryan and
Xenos 2011). Agreeable personalities, those who are cooperative and
trustful, are also found to be negative towards Internet use
(Launders and Lounsbury 2006). Such individuals prefer face-to-
face contact rather than the often antagonistic and conflictual
relations in online discussion and networking. Finally, the evidence
concerning neurotic personalities is mixed (Russo and Amnå 2016).
Some researchers see that neuroticism hampers Internet use (Cullen
and Morse 2011, observing online communities), while others note
that it supports it (Correa et al. 2010, observing social media use).
In conclusion, openness to experience and extroversion certainly
stimulate Internet use. Russo and Amnå (2016) conclude that, in the
case of political communication, these traits support online political
engagement.
We are now close to the end of the long list of causes of divides in
digital media use, which are summarized in figure 6.2. The sequence
of factors, apart from those pertaining to technical characteristics, is
estimated. The remaining causes are a number of technical
characteristics. Next to those affecting physical or material access
and digital skills, there are also technical characteristics that
influence the frequency, variety and type of digital media use.

Technical characteristics
A number of technical characteristics of contemporary digital media
influence the resources people need to use these media. What are
these characteristics? In the chapter on physical access we
mentioned diversity. Some people have several different types of
digital media while others may have only one device. In addition,
devices have different potential usages, though the divide is mainly
between smartphones or tablets on the one hand and desktops or
laptops on the other. The former are not a full substitute for the
latter. Smartphones and tablets have less memory, storage capacity
and speed (Akiyoshi and Ono 2008; Mossberger et al. 2012; Napoli
and Obar 2014) as well as a limited content availability (Napoli and
Obar 2014), but they do offer more mobility (see below) and
convenience and are cheaper in price. Smartphones, therefore, are
frequently used for communication and entertainment (social
networking and gaming) and when travelling, while desktops and
laptops are often employed for information, education, business and
work (Zillien and Hargittai 2009; Pearce and Rice 2013; Murphy et
al. 2016). Thus people who own all these devices exhibit the most
frequent and various digital media use. Van Deursen and van Dijk
(2019) found in a representative survey in the Netherlands in 2018
that owning a greater range of devices is significantly related to a
higher diversity of Internet use and a greater variety of outcomes.

Figure 6.2. Causal and sequential model of divides in digital media

use
A logical subsequent characteristic is device opportunity. Some
devices offer wider opportunities for a more satisfying and diverse
Internet experience (Donner et al. 2011). They can be combined with
all kinds of peripheral equipment (van Deursen and van Dijk (2019);
items can be printed, files can be scanned to be uploaded, large files
can be saved on a hard drive, and larger screens can be added to
multitask online and to show or present visuals. These functions are
not possible with mobile devices. In the developed countries, many
young people, some ethnic minorities, and those on low incomes
tend to use just mobiles (Hargittai and Kim 2010; Tsetsi and Rains
2017), and this is the case for a large majority of Internet users in the
developing countries. However, smartphones are not very
satisfactory for information-intensive tasks such as online education,
e-government and e-health services or for most professional
applications. As a result some authors are already talking about a
‘mobile underclass’ and ‘second class netizens’ benefiting less from
digital media (Napoli and Obar 2014, 2017; Mossberger et al. 2012).
A third technical characteristic is the availability of broadband as
compared to narrowband Internet connections. Before broadband
arrived in the 1990s, users had dial-up connections, which took a
long time and were costly. With broadband they were liberated and
motivated to spend more time on the Internet and for a growing
number of applications. Today, some people prefer mobile
connections to save the relative expense of broadband (Mossberger
et al. 2012; Horrigan and Duggan 2015). In 2018, two-thirds of
Americans had broadband at home while one in five had a
smartphone only. Racial minorities, older adults, rural residents, and
those with lower levels of education and income are less likely to
have broadband service at home (Smith and Olmstead 2018).
The final characteristic affecting digital media use is the rise of
media with primarily visual content. Social media such as YouTube,
Instagram and Pinterest are becoming more and more popular.
Television channels, video services and gaming are moving to the
Internet. This trend favours those who are illiterate or intellectually
disabled and stimulates people with low levels of education.
However, because all complex tasks such as job applications use
primarily text media, the divide between users with different levels
of education is growing (for other reasons see below).

The consequences of divides in digital media

use
Divides of digital media use and outcomes
The main consequence of the divides in digital media use is that the
outcomes are also unequally distributed. In the next chapter we will
see that this goes for both positive and negative outcomes. Those
who are frequent and active users gain many benefits in the
economic, social, cultural or political fields and in everyday living.
They are also more capable when it comes to preventing negative
outcomes such as cybercrime, bullying, insult or harassment, privacy
infringement and loss of security.
The next general consequence is that all outcomes reinforce existing
divides. Social resources will be strengthened, for example, by
frequent, various and active social-networking use. Those who
already enjoy social support will gain more, while the socially
isolated will remain marginalized. Cultural resources – a
conspicuous lifestyle, dispositions and status – are highlighted by
active participation in digital culture. Mental resources will flourish
in developing technical ability, cognitive and emotional intelligence,
or digital literacy through frequent, various and skilful digital media
use. Material resources may accumulate through good use of e-
commerce, as products and services become cheaper. Employment
can be found via online applications and professional networking.
Finally, people will gain more temporal resources by means of
efficient digital media use.

The usage gap

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the age and gender
distinctions were more pronounced in digital media use than social
class and status (van Deursen and van Dijk 2014a). However, this is
now changing rapidly, as we have seen that the older generations are
catching up in Internet use. The same goes for gender and ethnic
distinctions. In the meantime distinctions of social class or status,
articulated primarily at the level of education and income, persist
and tend to be increasingly important. This will be argued and
demonstrated in the following chapters.
The term ‘usage gap’ was first used by van Dijk ([1999] 2012, 2000,
2004). Others described the phenomenon as the ‘knowledge gap for
the Internet’ (Bonfadelli 2002), ‘differentiated use’ (DiMaggio at al.
2004), ‘status-specific types of Internet usage’ (Zillien and Hargittai
2009) or ‘engagement in different Internet activities’ (Pearce and
Rice 2013). ‘Usage gap’ refers to a systematic use of the Internet for
particular goals by people of higher social class (education, income
and property) and status (social position and cultural resources) as
compared to those of lower social class and status. The goals are
advanced information, communication and education, work,
business and capital-enhancing or career activities (higher social
class) as opposed to simple information and communication
(chatting or messaging), shopping and entertainment (lower social
class).
The usage gap concept is inspired by the term knowledge gap, which
was popular in the 1970s and 1980s. Tichenor et al. (1970: 159)
stated that, ‘as the diffusion of mass media information in a social
system increases, segments of the population with a higher socio-
economic status tend to acquire this information at a faster rate than
the lower status segments.’ However, the usage gap is broader and
more consequential for society than the knowledge gap (which
touches only on mental categories – learning – in using mass media),
as it also refers to behaviour and activities in using the Internet and
other digital media. The latter are multifunctional and are drawn on
for all activities in society and daily life. The behavioural and
systemic effects of the usage gap are much more important than the
learning effects of the knowledge gap.
Since the year 2000 a usage gap in Internet activities has been
demonstrated in a long series of studies. Van Dijk (2000: 177)
predicted that the gap of simple and advanced types of political
participation he observed among people of all classes and education
levels will grow. Educated people contributed to online political
discussion, became members of political organizations, ran as
candidates and turned out to vote more often than those with lower
levels of education, who tended only to sign online petitions and
respond to Internet polls, and who didn’t necessarily bother to vote.
Bonfadelli (2002) showed that educated people used the Internet
more actively and that their use was more information oriented,
whereas the less educated seemed to be interested particularly in the
entertainment functions of the Internet. DiMaggio et al. (2004: 39)
assumed that higherstatus users were more effective at converting
access into information and information into occupational advantage
or social influence than less privileged users. In the last ten years
these observations have been confirmed by a growing number of
studies, among them those by Hargittai and Hinnant (2008), Zillien
and Hargittai (2009), Helsper and Galácz (2009), van Deursen and
van Dijk (2014a), Pearce and Rice (2013), Buchi et al. (2016), Tsetsi
and Rains (2017), Yates et al. (2015) and Yates and Lockley (2018).

The evolution of divides in digital media use

It is likely that the usage gap in social class and status will become
wider in the future, while those of age, gender and ethnicity will
become smaller but not disappear entirely; existing cultural
preferences will most likely remain. This is because the gap is
determined not only by socio-economic inequality but also by a
cultural differentiation that is growing in postmodern society.
Another reason for the expected growth of the gap in social class and
status is the expected divide in digital and twenty-first-century skills,
as discussed in chapter 5. People of higher social class and status
have better skills in order to find advanced information and
communication online for work, education and business than those
of lower social class and status, who are more likely to explore
consumption, communication and entertainment online.
Divides in digital media use are also the result of the general
differentiation of social relationships, together with economic
divisions of labour and culture in a postmodern network society. This
increasingly individualized society consists of a large number of
communities, organizations, cultures and ethnicities with different
lifestyles and social or cultural preferences. The greater the diffusion
of digital media in society and daily life, the more their use will vary.
However, this is a general trend and not as specific as the usage gap
of class and culture.
7
Outcomes

Introduction: who benefits and is harmed by

digital media use?
After having described the causes and consequences of the phases of
appropriation of digital media, we have now arrived at the result of
this process. What are the hazards of (not) using digital media? Does
it matter if one has no access to the Internet, has insufficient digital
skills and is an infrequent user, for example? It might be that
traditional media remain adequate for many aspects of daily life,
including work and education. We cannot rule out the fact that
particular offline activities may be just as good as, or even better
than, comparable online activities.
How can we understand these questions? Are they problems as far as
economic growth, employment and innovation are concerned? Is
there a problem of people being excluded from society and
participation in all kinds of domains? Or is there a security problem
because people cannot be easily registered and controlled by
governments and businesses? These three perspectives were the
main approaches of the digital divide as discussed in chapter 1. In
this chapter I am choosing the second perspective: inclusion in or
exclusion from society. In my former book about the digital divide
(van Dijk 2005) I took the normative perspective of participation in
the labour market, the community, politics, citizenship, culture, etc.
Here I am taking a more neutral and empirical approach: which
positive and negative outcomes of digital media use have been
observed? Up until now, digital divide research has been concerned
with positive outcomes, outcomes achieved by people with digital
access, skills and use. In this chapter, negative outcomes – excessive
use, cybercrime or abuse, and loss of security or privacy – will be
discussed. The question is what outcomes are achieved by people
with an adequate level of access to digital media, together with the
skills for their use.
The causal process behind the argument in this chapter is that
following the four phases of technology appropriation will lead to
positive or negative outcomes. These outcomes then lead to the same
resources causing the four phases of appropriation. This is a
feedback loop of reinforcement, a core statement of resources and
appropriation theory as discussed in chapter 2. This particular
statement is a case of structuration theory (Giddens 1984). In
structuration theory, social structures influence actions, and actions
affect these structures, a duality of reinforcement. In resources of
appropriation theory, resources influence the process of
appropriation, and the outcomes of this process reinforce the
resources in a feedback loop. The argument is portrayed in figure 7.1.
Supporting the resources are lists of both positional and personal
categories as used previously. Via motivation/attitude, physical
access, digital skills and usage, these categories will be related in this
chapter to positive and negative outcomes.

Figure 7.1. Causes and consequences of digital media appropriation

for outcomes and the reinforcement of resources
The second section will frame the term ‘outcomes’. These may be
positive or negative, absolute or relative, concomitant or separate,
online or offline, and traditional or digital media outcomes.
The third section is about the positive outcomes of digital media use.
They are listed according to familiar domains of social and daily life:
economic, social, cultural, political and personal. The most
important potential outcomes for society and individuals will be
discussed, related to positional and personal categories and added to
a final score.
This is followed by the negative outcomes, which are clustered in
three parts: excessive use, cybercrime or abuse, and loss of security
or privacy. After this we will be able to see whether people who enjoy
positive outcomes are also able to prevent negative outcomes.
The final section of this chapter draws up a balance sheet. What is
the final situation with the digital divide? Considering all these
positive and negative outcomes, are we able to conclude that the
effects of digital inequality are increasing or decreasing? Which
categories of society benefit more and are harmed less by the use of
digital media? The answers are given in the following chapter, where
digital inequality will be related to existing social inequality.

Framing the outcomes

The ‘third level’ of digital divide research (see chapter 1), which is a
fairly recent focus, is to do with observing the outcomes. While the
term was first used in 2010, empirical research of outcomes in terms
of benefits started a few years later. Helsper and van Deursen (2015,
2017) undertook the most extensive surveys, in the UK and the
Netherlands, showing the lack of equality in achieving benefits.
Unfortunately, by that time the focus of most research was on
positive outcomes. This is not surprising given that, from the start,
all digital divide perspectives had focused on loss of economic
growth, employment or innovation, the lack of participation or
inclusion, and the failure to register or control citizens. After 2015
the general public became more aware of the negative consequences
of the Internet, particularly in relation to social media, the rise of
cybercrime and all kinds of abuse, problems of disinformation,
hacking, and excessive use.
Blank and Lutz (2018) were the first to investigate these negative
outcomes. In their survey in the UK they asked participants whether
they had experienced six specific harms: ‘In the past year have you
ever … received a virus onto your computer? … bought something
which was misrepresented on a website? … been contacted by
someone online asking you to provide bank details? … accidentally
arrived at a pornographic website when looking for something else?
… received obscene or abusive e-mails? … had your credit card
details stolen?’ While people on the right side of the digital divide
clearly amassed the benefits of Internet use, the results concerning
harms from using digital media were mixed for people on both sides
of the divide. A similar conclusion will be drawn below after
discussing a much longer list of negative outcomes.
A second type of framing is the estimation of outcomes. Are they
absolute or relative? We will see that they are relative. Everybody
who uses digital media experiences both positive and negative
outcomes, some more than others.
Thirdly, outcomes may be observed separately and in combination.
In this chapter we cluster them in linked domains of society For
example, people gaining benefits from using social-networking sites
might also discover more opportunities to find a job or a particular
product in the economic domain. We will show that the economic
and social domains and the cultural and personal domains are most
closely related.
Finally, wherever possible, outcomes online have to be compared
with similar offline outcomes. The same goes for digital and
traditional media use. What is the difference between finding a job
online and doing so through using traditional media? An example of
a question that might be asked here is: ‘Without using the Internet, I
would not have found a job. Yes/No’. In other words, a traditional
job search would not have led to this positive outcome.

Positive outcomes of digital media use

Positive outcomes of digital media use are benefits generally
endorsed by most contemporary societies. In the economic domain
they are, for example, finding a job or lower prices for products or
services. In the social domain they might be more and better contacts
or relationships and contributions to the community. In the political
and civic domain they might be voting in elections or receiving public
and social benefits. In the cultural domain examples are attending,
sharing or contributing to cultural events. In the personal domain
they might be finding an educational course or benefiting from
health information.
Table 7.1 lists the most important positive outcomes in all these
domains that were part of nationwide Dutch and British surveys
conducted by van Deursen and van Dijk (2012), Helsper et al. (2015),
van Deursen and Helsper (2018) and Van Deursen (2018). Van
Deursen and van Dijk (2012) and van Deursen (2018) posed
questions such as ‘By using the internet I obtained X: Yes/No’.
Helsper et al. (2015) and van Deursen and Helsper (2018) asked not
only for objective achievement but also for subjective satisfaction –
for example, whether finding a romantic date online was satisfying.
However, future survey questions need to become more valid and
reliable, because answers may be biased and lack sufficient detail. So,
one needs to be circumspect in accepting the data presented.

Economic domain
Positive outcomes in the economic domain for individuals are
threefold and concern work and schooling, e-commerce (buying and
selling online) and income or property. Digital media have become a
necessity in most parts of the world as far as work and education are
concerned. Both searching and applying for a job are now done
mostly online, and those who lack the access or skills to do this are
increasingly excluded from the labour market. Approximately three-
quarters of Internet users who have found employment, at least in
the UK and the Netherlands, claim that they have found a job online
they would not have found otherwise (van Deursen and van Dijk
2012; Helsper et al. 2015).
Table 7.1. The most important positive outcomes of Internet use as
achievements
Source: Information from van Deursen and van Dijk (2012); Helsper et al. (2015); van
Deursen and Helsper (2018).

Domain By using the Internet I …

Economic –found a job opportunity
– found a job
– improved my work (tasks)
– earned a higher wage
– saved money buying a product or service online
– saved money selling/sharing a product or service
online
– saved money investing in stocks or shares online
Social –found friends I subsequently met offline
–found a romantic date I subsequently met offline
–have more contact with family, friends or
acquaintances
–have better contact with family, friends or
acquaintances
–found people sharing my interests
–discovered an opinion online or added a new one
–became a member of an association or community
Political/civic –signed a petition online
–contacted a representative, party or government
department
–became a donor of a political or civic organization
Political/civic –became a member of a political or civic organization
–voted after finding political information or using a
voting aid
–received better government information online
–received a public or government service online
–found a benefit, subsidy or tax advantage online
Domain By using the Internet I …
Cultural –found a ticket online for an event or concert
–found entertainment (games, music, video) not
available offline
–became a member of a hobby, sports or cultural
club
–changed lifestyle choices after receiving information
online
–created cultural content not available offline
Personal –recognized my identity finding people with the
same interests
–found a course or study that fits me
–completed a course or study outline
–improved my health after finding health
information online
–found (more) about my disease
– found a hospital or clinic to help me more quickly
or to a greater degree
A majority affirm that they have found improvements in their job in
terms of speed or productivity, through increasing flexibility and
variety, and by receiving a greater number of courses (for using ICT)
and more contacts with colleagues (van Deursen and van Dijk 2012).
Finally, it has been confirmed from several sources that being able to
use ICTs leads to a premium in wages (see chapter 5). All these
positive employment outcomes have benefited the young (those aged
sixteen to thirty-five) and people in the higher professions more than
older (aged fifty-five plus) and nonprofessional workers (van
Deursen and van Dijk 2012; van Deursen 2018).
Also in the economic domain is the market of products and services.
For consumers – which means everybody – the advantages of e-
commerce (buying and selling products and services) are among the
most attractive benefits of Internet use. Large majorities assert that
they have saved money buying a product online rather than in a shop
and close to a majority that they have sold goods online that they
wouldn’t otherwise have sold. Again, young people and the higher
educated benefit more (van Deursen and van Dijk 2012; Helsper et
al. 2015; van Deursen 2018).
The third economic subdomain is property and income. A majority of
people in the developed countries are now using Internet banking.
The wealthy also are investing in stocks and shares. However, this
minority need to have sufficient financial knowledge and a high level
of information and strategic digital skills.
The conclusion here is that young people, particularly males, those
with higher education or income, and the employed have statistically
significant advantages of Internet use in this domain (van Deursen
and Helsper 2018; van Deursen 2018).

Social domain
The use of digital media and especially the Internet offers many
opportunities for social contact, civic engagement and sense of
community; this was realised early on (e.g. Katz and Rice 2002;
Quan-Haase et al. 2002), though some scholars doubted it (e.g. Nie
and Erbring 2002; Putnam 2000). Twenty years on, the average
American claims that helping people connect is the second best thing
about the Internet after easier access to information (Pew Research
Center 2018). Research involving nationwide surveys shows that a
majority confirm they have found new friends online (and have
subsequently met them in person) and that they also received more
contacts (van Deursen and van Dijk 2012; Helsper et al. 2015). At
least one-third of the Dutch population say that they have formed a
better relationship with friends and family (van Deursen 2018).
Online dating is popular today and is becoming a real alternative to
dating in traditional ways. More than 10 per cent of couples met
online in the Western world (van Deursen and van Dijk 2012; Smith
and Page 2016). The Internet is also helpful in finding people with
the same interests or opinions, an activity performed by a majority of
Internet users (see Helsper et al. 2015 for the UK). Finally,
individuals can become members of associations or communities
online, though this is realized by a relatively small minority of
Internet users today (van Deursen and van Dijk 2012; Helsper et al.
2015; van Deursen 2018).
It would appear that these outcomes are achieved much more by
young people than by older generations, although there is no
significant difference in terms of level of education and income (van
Deursen and Helsper 2018). This is because the use of social media is
widespread and very popular.

Political and civic domain

Generally, there is more civic participation (using government
services and engaging with local communities online) than political
participation. Though in most countries a majority of people
continue to go to the polls at election time, online political
participation is a minority affair (Boulianne 2009; Anduiza et al.
2012; van Dijk and Hacker 2018). The most frequent activities are
retrieving political and election information, discussing political
affairs, mailing or messaging a political representative, and signing
online petitions (Smith 2013). Nevertheless, a substantial minority in
the UK secured a better contact with an MP, local councillor or
political party (Helsper et al. 2015), while those in the Netherlands
decided which party to vote for by using a voting aid (van Deursen
and van Dijk 2012).
It would seem that people who are specifically interested in politics
are benefiting most in this domain. Generally, such people are highly
educated and have good incomes (Jorba and Bimber 2012; Smith
2013; van Dijk and Hacker 2018). The surprising finding is that it is
older generations more than the young who are benefiting from
online political applications (Smith 2013; Mounk 2018; van Dijk and
Hacker 2018), probably on account of different motivations.
In developed countries, where people are increasingly forced to use
online government services, there is a more widespread use of civic
applications. However, we found the same inequality of access, skills
and use as in most other domains: people with higher education or
income and the young are benefiting most from more and better
government information and services (van Dijk et al. 2008; United
Nations 2014). Most telling is that a quarter to half of Dutch and
British citizens claimed the discovery online that they were entitled
to receive a particular benefit, subsidy or tax advantage that they
would not otherwise have found (van Deursen and van Dijk 2012;
Helsper et al. 2015; van Deursen 2018).

Cultural outcomes
Cultural use of the Internet is also very popular. Even novice users
find music, video and games online that are not easily available
elsewhere. Almost everyone has on occasion made an online
reservation for an event. A much smaller majority of the Dutch and
British population confirms that they have become a member of a
hobby, sports or any other cultural club or that they changed their
lifestyle after finding cultural information online (van Deursen and
van Dijk 2012; Helsper et al. 2015; van Deursen 2018).
The number of people creating content online depends on the nature
of that content: for example, 75 per cent of the British population
have posted photos and shared them on social-networking sites,
uploaded music and video, written a blog or set up a personal
website. Creating skilled, professional-looking content was achieved
by 34 per cent but political content only by 14 per cent (Blank 2013).
By far the most personal characteristic showing statistically
significant differences in cultural outcomes is age, not level of
education or gender (van Deursen and Helsper 2018), and young
people manifest the greatest benefits in online cultural outcomes,
even where skilled content creation is concerned. Social and
entertainment content, however, is produced more by people of
lower education (Blank 2013).

Personal outcomes
There are all kinds of personal benefits to be gained from using
digital media or the Internet: two very important, even vital, benefits
are personal development (identity and education) and health. A
majority of Internet users manage to find people with the same
interests, while a minority of British and Dutch users have found or
completed a course of study online (Helsper et al. 2015). On the
other hand, a majority of these users affirmed in 2012–15 that they
had found details about their disease, improved their health after
retrieving information, and secured better or faster health care after
receiving advice online (Helsper et al. 2015).
Van Deursen and Helsper (2018) observed that people with a higher
level of education achieve such personal outcomes more than do
people with lower education. Remarkably, older generations are also
benefiting more (especially where health and adult education are
concerned) than the youngest generation.

Relations of domains and their outcomes

Helsper (2012) claims that economic, social (including the political
and civic domain), cultural and personal domains are interrelated.
For example, someone who finds information concerning a job
opportunity via a social-networking site may be able to secure the job
in the economic domain. While the economic domain was generally
found to be relatively separate, a strong link was found between
social and cultural domain achievements in Dutch and British
surveys (Helsper et al. 2015). However, the most frequent
interrelation found is between the personal and social and cultural
domains (van Deursen and Helsper 2018). The achievement of
positive outcomes is found to be higher for economic and personal
than for social and cultural outcomes (Helsper et al. 2015). The
online benefits in the economic and personal fields are higher than in
the social and cultural field, where traditional media offer face-to-
face alternatives.

Negative outcomes of digital media use

As previously mentioned, the negative outcomes of digital media use
have become widely discussed in society only recently. They are the
last focus in digital divide research (Blank and Lutz 2018). There are
so many potential negative outcomes that it is difficult to classify and
analyse them. Both a selection of experts and a representative
sample of the American population found that the benefits of digital
media for society and daily life were overwhelmingly positive (Pew
Research Center 2018; Smith and Olmstead 2018). However, a small,
albeit growing, number of experts and the general public were
concerned about the negative outcomes. The experts mentioned
mainly psychological characteristics: information and
communication overload, problems of trust regarding security and
privacy, especially in relation to the big Internet platforms, personal
identity problems such as a loss of self-confidence or self-esteem, a
negative world-view after using the Internet, and failures of
concentration. The survey of ordinary Americans, also published by
the Pew Research Center (Smith and Olmstead 2018), revealed the
answers that the Internet ‘isolates people’ (25 per cent), produces
‘fake news or misinformation’ (16 per cent), is ‘bad for children’ (14
per cent), ‘contains criminal activities’ (13 per cent) and damages
‘personal information or privacy’ (5 per cent).
Table 7.2. The most important negative outcomes of Internet use as
liabilities
Domain Problems
Excessive use –Addiction to the Internet and other digital
media
–Extreme stress in using the Internet and other
digital media
–Information overload
–Loss of concentration
–Lack of sleep
–Lack of exercise
–Lack of face-to-face communication
Cybercrime and –Financial fraud or theft
abuse –Extortion or blackmail (ransomware)
–Identity theft
–Criminal hacking of another’s computer or
connection
–Bullying
–Harassment
–Provocation in Internet discussions (e.g.
‘trolling’)
–Spam
–Creation of disinformation
Loss of security – All intrusion in a computer or smartphone
and privacy – Data theft
–Receipt of a computer virus or
spyware/malware
–No (attention to) privacy settings and
agreements
–Concerns about and inadequate use of
passwords
–No or inadequate computer protection: anti-
virus programs,
firewalls, automatic updates, spam-filters, pop-
up blockers, anti-spyware
In this section I will deal with potential negative outcomes in three
sections: excessive use, cybercrime or abuse, and loss of security or
privacy (see table 7.2). These are individual negative outcomes rather
than societal outcomes (for the latter, see, among others, van Dijk
[1999] 2012). The discussion will relate these negative outcomes to
the digital divide problem, looking at distinctions of age, gender, and
social class and status (income, income and lifestyle).
To discuss these negative outcomes in a digital divide perspective we
will look at the risks encountered by particular users and at the way
they cope with these risks. People on the right side of the digital
divide who are frequent users are more likely to encounter these
risks; however, with their experience and skills they may also be
better at coping with such risks.

Excessive use
Excessive use of digital media ranges from using a computer or the
Internet for too many hours a day to outright addiction. Addiction is
manifested in such activities as compulsive Internet shopping or
gaming, or constantly checking Facebook, and results in withdrawal
symptoms – mental and physical pain – when an individual tries to
stop (Young 1998). In addition, other daily activities – work, school,
sleep, exercise and eating – are impeded. Clearly, young people and
those frequently using computers for work, education or leisure are
liable to show excessive use. This is the flipside of being included in
the digital world.
Almost every research project concerning excessive use focuses on
adolescents and young adults, who are most likely to take advantage
of social-networking sites (SNS), messaging services and computer
games. Excessive use of SNS is more of a problem for girls, while
boys tend to play games too much (van Beuningen and Kloosterman
2018; Anderson et al. 2017). Excessive digital or social media use
leads to a lack of concentration, e.g. at school and at work, as well as
lack of sleep and face-to-face communication. In the Netherlands, 13
per cent of female Internet users consider themselves to be addicted
to social media as compared to 7 per cent of males, though
percentages among young people are generally higher (van
Beuningen and Kloosterman 2018). However, as older generations
make more use of SNS, messaging services and gaming, they too will
exhibit such problems.
Excessive use is related more to mental characteristics and disorders
such as (social) anxiety, depression and ADHD than to social
characteristics of class, age and gender (Anderson et al. 2017). While
particular users are more likely to be at risk in particular activities
(SNS, chatting, gaming, gambling, etc.), some of them might also be
better at coping with the problems. People with superior content-
related digital skills, especially information, communication and
strategic skills, and those with good social and parental relationships
are more capable of reducing excessive use.
A related negative outcome is the problem of information or
communication overload. Many people are overwhelmed by the
amount and complexity of sources and messages on the Internet. In
2016, 20 per cent of American Internet users experienced
information overload. Females, people above the age of fifty, and
those with low incomes and an educational level of high school or
less perceived significantly more information overload. They also
had more trouble in coping with this problem (Horrigan 2016).
Although there are no supporting data, it would seem most likely
that individuals with good information, communication and strategic
digital skills are better at handling these problems.

Cybercrime and abuse

It is possible for any Internet user to suffer from intrusion (hacking)
and be a victim of computer identity theft (username and password).
However, people with higher incomes and more property are also
more likely to suffer from financial fraud or theft. However, the great
majority of Internet users in the developed countries are now
adopting Internet banking. In general, those with low education and
incomes lack both the financial expertise and the digital skills (see
chapter 5) to cope with such cybercrime.
The young users of social media and messaging services are more
likely to encounter a number of other negative outcomes: bullying,
unwanted sexting, harassment and provocation such as hate speech.
While, in 2017, 41 per cent of Americans experienced some kind of
Internet harassment (e.g. offensive name-calling, physical threats,
racist comments, stalking and sexual harassment), younger people
(aged eighteen to twenty-nine) suffered more than older generations
(Duggan 2017). All kinds of harassment, with the exception of sexual
harassment (Pew Id.), are more likely to be experienced by males
than females. Neither social class nor education level were analysed
in this Pew report.
A negative outcome that is receiving more attention of late is coming
across disinformation on the Internet. This problem is encountered
most by active information seekers. According to a survey published
by the Pew Research Center, more than a third of American Internet
users are engaged information seekers. Some of them are confident
in using the Internet while others are eager to master its use better;
they have much trust in particular information sources online
(Olmstead and Smith 2017a). This section of the population is
relatively young; the confident users have a high level of education
and those eager to learn have a lower education and consist more of
females than males. Other American users, those comparatively
older – close to 50 per cent of the population – are wary about
finding information online. They do not have much trust in
information or news sources and have relatively low levels of
information skills. They therefore will not recognize, or cannot cope
with, disinformation when they come across it.
Coping with disinformation depends on trust in Internet sources and
on one’s information, communication and strategic digital skills.
Only having sufficient skills will enable users to know whether or not
to have confidence in a particular website. The same people who are
confronted with (dis) information online, usually people with high
levels of education, have more of these skills.

Loss of security and privacy

The more people use the Internet, the more they may be confronted
with a loss of security, be it from hacking, data theft, or receiving
viruses or malware. The same goes for loss of privacy through abuse
of personal data or whereabouts. The knowledge and skills needed to
prevent or repair such losses are unequally distributed. According to
another survey published by the Pew Research Center, American
Internet users were able to answer fewer than half the number of
elementary questions asked about cybersecurity. Knowledge about
such matters appeared to be much better among people with higher
education and somewhat better among younger users (Olmstead and
Smith 2017b).
The practice of preventing or repairing loss of security and privacy
varies among people of different education and age. Those with
higher education installed anti-virus programs, firewalls, automatic
updates, spam-filters, pop-up blockers and anti-spyware more often
than people with lower education. They also changed passwords
more often and looked carefully at the addresses of e-mails they
received (van Deursen and van Dijk 2012; Büchi et al. 2016).
The evidence pertaining to age and security or privacy is mixed. In
2011–12, van Deursen and van Dijk observed in Dutch surveys that
the young (those aged sixteen to thirty-five) installed such protection
less than older users. Users below the age of forty also tended to
manage their privacy settings on Facebook less well (van den Broeck
et al. 2015). However, in a Swiss survey, Büchi et al. (2016) found
that older Internet users showed lower levels of privacy protection,
mainly through a lack of ‘Internet skills’.
What are the main conclusions about these negative outcomes of
digital media use and the digital divide? Clearly, those who have
access and the most frequent and varied use encounter these risks
much more than others. However, many of them, especially the
higher educated and the young, are also more competent in coping
with them on account of having more Internet experience and better
digital skills.

The balance sheet

We have seen that those on the right side of the digital divide of
motivation, access, skills and usage are the ones who benefit more
from the positive outcomes of digital media use in almost every
domain. These are people with higher education and income, the
young and, where particular applications are concerned, males.
However, in some domains the situation is different: older users
benefit more in political and personal domains (adult education and
health applications); people with lower education and income benefit
at least equally from SNSs in the social domain; and females benefit
somewhat more from SNSs and personal development or health
applications.
The flipside is that those on the right side of the digital divide are
also the ones who have greater chance of encountering the negative
outcomes of digital media. But, because they are generally more able
to cope with the risks on account of having better digital skills, the
result of experiencing negative outcomes is mixed.
The process of appropriation of digital media, as discussed in
chapters 3 to 6, follows the model shown in figure 7.1 (see p. 97).
Benefiting from positive outcomes feeds back to all resources. On the
other hand, encountering and not coping sufficiently with the
negative outcomes of digital media use reduces people’s resources.
For example, excessive use harms both one’s mental resources
(addiction, stress, overload, etc.) and one’s social resources (less
physical contact). People may lose money through cybercrime
(material resources), be confronted with abuse (harassment and
bullying) leading to loss of self-confidence, trust and status (mental,
social and cultural resources). Digital skills and social or parental
support are required to prevent such damage, but these are also
unequally divided in society.
8
Social and Digital Inequality

Introduction: does digital inequality reduce

or reinforce social inequality?
What is the relation between digital inequality and social inequality
in general? This is the main question to be tackled in this chapter.
When computers and the Internet arrived in the 1980s and 1990s,
historical expectations were very positive and optimistic (examples
are given in Naisbitt 1982; Rheingold 1993; Negroponte 1995; and
Dyson 1997). The Internet would distribute knowledge and
information in society easily, freely and cheaply. The educational
opportunities were thought to be tremendous. The Internet would
connect everybody far better than the telephone. People could find
and create their own media content and not depend only on the mass
media. Vertical hierarchies would be transformed into horizontal
networks. Clearly, the dominant perspective was that digital media
would reduce inequality and the scarcity of knowledge and
information.
After the Internet bubble burst after the millennium, critical
perspectives became more negative and pessimistic. One frame of
reference was the problem of the digital divide. We have already seen
that this problem is extremely complex and that it is unlikely to
disappear.
The relation between digital media use and social inequality is
suggested by the following three statements:

digital media use reduces social inequality;

digital media use makes no difference for social inequality;
digital media use increases social inequality.
Actually, the word ‘use’ in these statements should read
‘appropriation’, following the sequence in this book – motivation,
access, skills and usage – but ‘use’ sounds better. From the
perspective of the digital divide, the third statement (increasing
social inequality) seems obvious and is supported by the evidence
and arguments of the previous chapters. However, we should not
take it for granted. In chapter 7 we saw that there are both positive
and negative outcomes of digital media use. Once the positive
outcomes exceed the negative outcomes for every user, the result
could be a reduction of social inequality in absolute terms: people
formerly excluded from a particular domain could now be included.
People with disabilities who are housebound can now receive
services online.
I will now list some obvious arguments for all three statements. In
the remainder of this chapter these relatively superficial arguments
will be examined through more in-depth theoretical counter-
arguments.

Digital media use reduces social inequality

There are a number of strong arguments to support the statement
that digital media use reduces social inequality. A majority of people
in the world are currently motivated and have a positive attitude
towards digital media, which is quite a change from the situation in
the 1980s and 1990s. In the developed countries, another majority of
users now have physical access to digital media such as the Internet,
and the developing countries are following suit. The most elementary
operational and formal digital skills are being mastered by a large
majority of users, and the frequency of use and the number of
Internet applications has multiplied in the last fifteen years.
A second strong argument is that the enormous digital gaps in
gender that were observed in the 1980s and 1990s have been closed
in most parts of the world, while those in age are now reducing. The
gap of levels of education has become less pronounced, although
people of low education make different use of the Internet than
people with higher education.
Chapter 7 showed that an overwhelming proportion of people are
benefiting from the positive outcomes of Internet use in all
important domains of society: economic, political-civic, social,
cultural and personal. As a result, many would endorse the statement
that the Internet, despite all criticisms, is a good thing for individuals
and for society (as shown in the American survey by Smith and
Olmstead 2018). Simultaneously, the negative outcomes are
experienced primarily by those having best access and most frequent
use of the digital media.
Another argument in support of digital media reducing social
inequality is that, over time, all users benefit from the reduced costs
of hardware, software and (some) services. Since the 1990s, the
prices of computers, mobile phones and Internet connections have
reduced considerably. The same goes for operational systems, office
software and all kinds of smartphone apps. Internet provider
services, music subscriptions and data bundles for mobile
communication have also become cheaper, at least in terms of
capacities offered.
The final argument is that using digital media offers low-cost and
accessible information, most of which is paid for by advertising, so is
free at the point of use. It is also more accessible than traditional
sources; formerly, people had to go to a library, an agency or
somewhere similar to find information, often in laborious ways.
Today, Internet search engines are faster and much more intelligible.

Digital media use makes no difference for social

inequality
The second statement, which observes digital inequality simply as a
reflection of existing social inequality, also offers some strong
arguments. The main one is that perceived inequalities are seen in
traditional media use too. If someone has a literacy problem, it will
handicap them in dealing with print media as well as with digital
media. There are more similarities than differences between the two
(see the balance in Van Dijk and van Deursen 2014).
A second argument is that people’s basic personal and positional
characteristics are the same in the digital and the offline world.
Properties of age (stages of life) and gender are reflected everywhere.
People with disabilities have problems in both worlds. Those lacking
cognitive and emotional intelligence and technical ability meet
problems in every context. Individuals with poor or low-paid jobs
will not get a better job online and might end up with monotonous
work such as data entry. Using digital media for schoolwork will not
necessarily lead to better marks or a higher level of education. Poor
living, working and schooling conditions in a developing country will
be reproduced in the online world of that country.

Digital media use increases social inequality

The third statement argues that two types of inequality – absolute
and relative – reinforce or increase existing social inequality.
Absolute inequality means that people are excluded from or included
in particular domains of society. When they are forced to use digital
channels for which they have no access or skills, they will be
excluded in absolute terms. They will not find a job without using the
obligatory online job application; they will not be able to attend an
event when all tickets are sold online; and they might not manage to
obtain a particular social or public benefit without using online
public or government services. While such functions are not yet
universal in most countries, this is the trend. Increasingly,
governments and businesses expect that people without the relevant
access and skills can get support from others. In this way their
position as second-class citizens, consumers and workers is further
emphasized.
Relative inequality is more important for this third statement. This
means that some people are participating in and benefiting more or
earlier than others in all domains of society in the context of access,
skills and use of digital media. Existing social inequality is reinforced
because the material, mental, social, cultural and temporal resources
of these individuals are improving while the resources of those
without access and skills stay at the same level or are reduced.
A second set of arguments backing this statement claims that the
problems in the four phases of technology appropriation are not
dissipating; some are actually growing. Motivations and attitudes for
digital media use have become more positive overall, but in chapter 3
we saw that large differences in motivation and attitude among users
remain. Allegedly, physical access problems are disappearing in the
developed countries, though material access problems and unequal
possession of devices and connections remain (chapter 4). Inequality
in digital skills, especially content-related skills, is growing as
increasingly complex applications are offered (chapter 5). The
frequency and diversity of digital media use is expanding, but
diversity may lead to a structural and persistent gap between those
using primarily capital-enhancing applications and those more
interested in entertainment or less advanced communication and
commerce (chapter 6).
The last set of arguments backing this statement concern the
presumed declining costs and the level of accessibility in using digital
media. It is questionable whether the prices for hardware, software
and services are in fact declining. Adding all costs together, they
might actually be increasing, though the investment compensates for
the expense of other things now available online. For example,
subscriptions for newspapers on the Internet are often cheaper than
buying the printed versions. However, the numbers of devices,
programs and subscriptions for digital media are multiplying. It is
impossible to compile a full balance sheet of today’s digital media
household and business expenses.
Free online content is sometimes of low quality. Such content is paid
for by often intrusive advertising and sometimes leads to a loss of
privacy and security. The quality of online content is shrinking in this
age of disinformation. Traditional media at least tried to provide
news and information that was more or less reliable, while digital
media provide both quality and poor sources of information and
news. One of the risks concerning inequality is that, while some
people are happy to pay for quality newspapers and information,
others are satisfied with free news abstracts and low-quality
information.
Clearly, there is more support in this book so far for the third
statement than for the first two, despite the good arguments for
these. So, to make my case, we have to dig deeper. The numerous
demographics discussed in this book are too superficial. We need to
look for more abstract concepts of stratification and social class to
explain social and digital inequality. We should also pay attention to
the changing societal and technological context.
These theoretical concepts will be discussed in the next section. Our
societies are increasingly so-called information and network
societies. In the information society, people lacking essential
information are exposed to absolute inequality. In a network society,
people in the best positions and with the best relationships benefit
more. This means relative inequality.
We will then deal with the most important domains of social
inequality: economic, social-network, cultural and personal. What
are the trends in these domains without considering digital
inequality? Is economic inequality rising in the world? We will link
these domains of social inequality with the resources discussed in
this book – material, mental, social, cultural and temporal resources
– and then relate these domains to digital inequality.
In another section these separate domains of inequality will be
combined as they are actually found in contemporary society.
Nowadays people tend to live in separate worlds: they increasingly
live, marry and have children with people of their own social
standing. They reside in their own communities, homogeneous
neighbourhoods and ghettos. In the digital world they locate
themselves in ‘hotspots’, ‘echo chambers’ and ‘filter bubbles’. Is
segregation really happening in a network society that has the
potential to connect everybody? If so, is digital inequality
encouraging this?
I next sketch the evolution of the digital technology to come and
what it means for the digital divide. So far we have dealt with ‘simple’
digital hardware, software and networks. The future is for the
Internet of Things, artificial intelligence, big data and virtual or
augmented reality. This technological complex will bring new
challenges for digital media users. Some observers foresee a future of
extreme inequality and an even wider digital divide.
The main questions of this book will be answered in the concluding
section. Will the use of digital media reduce or reinforce social
inequality, or does it make no difference? Is the digital divide here to
stay or will it disappear?

Social inequality and digital divides

The context: the information and network society
To understand the workings of the digital divides discussed in this
book we have to consider some basic characteristics of contemporary
society. Although these abstract characteristics are very important,
they are not reflected and discussed in the theory and model of the
resources and appropriation theory framing this book. First, we are
now living in a society in which the production of information seems
to have become even more important than the production of material
goods. Data comprise the raw material of information, while
information is an interpretation of data. An information society is a
society in which the information intensity of all activities has become
extremely high (van Dijk 2005: 134).
In the information society, information is both a primary and a
positional good or asset. Primary goods are so essential for survival
and self-respect that they cannot be exchanged for other goods (Sen
1985). They are not only the means of sustaining life, or life chances,
particular rights and freedoms, but they also serve as basic
information for individuals to survive in society. Primary goods of
information are expressed by the basic knowledge of how our
complex society works: the markets of labour and exchange,
housing, transport, education and health care. In an information
society, those who are completely illiterate are not able to live
without help.
Having or lacking primary goods means absolute (in)equality. The
relationship with the digital divide here is that, when essential
information for living in a particular society moves online, primary
goods of information can be lost for those without digital access or
skills. Meanwhile, the quality and ease of use of essential information
offline may become less good. For example, it might be that a
systematic comparison of the best hospital for the treatment you
need can be found more easily on a health care site than by
consulting your doctor.
Positional goods are goods that people value because of their limited
supply and because they convey a high relative standing within
society. Thus information as a positional good means that particular
information is not readily available to all. Some people in society
and the economy have more opportunity of accessing this
information than others (Hirsch 1976). Teleworking at home has not
made a breakthrough in society partly because some crucial
information is still obtained by talking to colleagues in the
workplace, if only during a coffee break. A clear example of a
positional good is the prior knowledge of insider traders: those who
work in an investment company are in a better position to make
decisions on the stock market than outsiders. Despite the move
towards information being online, offline positions remain decisive
when scarce or unique information is required.
Lacking positional goods means relative (in)equality, and such goods
are becoming more important in the information society. They also
mark the digital divides of skills and usage. For example, there are
work roles that involve a range of tasks, from entering data in
spreadsheets and databases through designing and applying decision
support systems with artificial intelligence. The latter tasks define
the data and the information to be used and the former simply apply
it.
However, the most important reason why information as a positional
good is becoming more important is because the information society
has also become a network society (van Dijk [1991] 2001, [1999]
2012; Castells 1996; Barney 2004). The infrastructure of a modern
network society has social and media networks at every level:
individual, group/organizational and societal (van Dijk [1991] 2001,
[1999] 2012). This can be compared to a mass society (a society with
an infrastructure of ‘masses’ – organic groups, organizations and
communities in which people are living). In an individualized
network society, an individual has to be strong to acquire and keep
their position; in a mass society an individual can be taken along by
the group or community (‘mass’) to which they belong. The network
society tends to become more unequal than the mass society (van
Dijk [1999] 2012).
The network society is marked by relative inequality because the
positions and relations in its social and media networks are
distributed unequally. This is the case both for offline social
networks and for online media networks, the focus of this book.
Traditional social networks and new digital media networks are
integrated, and in this way positions of social networks are reflected
and reinforced by positions in digital media networks. When social
and media links are combined, the strength of their links will be
different, leading to a structure of power in a tripartite society (see
figure 8.1).
In the network society you have an ‘information elite’ – a minority of
units or people with strong social and media network relations. They
have the best access opportunities and skills and the most frequent
and varied digital media use, while the majority of the population,
even in the developed countries, enjoy lesser social and media
network relations. Access, skills and usage are also more limited.
Finally, the unconnected and excluded from the network society have
only traditional social network relations which, in turn, are less
frequent and dense than those of the majority.

Figure 8.1. Tripartite participation in the network society

Source: Van Dijk (2005: 179).

The positions, links and resources of the information elite tend to

become stronger than the positions, links and resources of the
majority in the network society. This is a case of the so-called
Matthew effect (Merton 1968) – the name comes from the Gospel of
St Matthew (13: 12): ‘For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and
he shall have more abundance.’ The popular adage is ‘the rich are
getting richer’. The scientific backing for this trend is the statistical
regularity of the power law, which says that a relative change in one
quantity results in a proportional relative change in another; in this
context, then, a few units of a network already having many links
acquire even more, while most units retain only a few links.

Social classes and digital divides

The positional categories of labour, education and social-networking
connections and their contexts in nations/regions and households
have already been described in the previous chapters. In fact they are
clustered in social classes. This is an important analytic distinction in
social science, part of stratification theory that attempts to explain
the social strata of society. There are many concepts and theories of
social class, but most of them come from the classical Marxian or
Weberian tradition or from modern sociology, with scholars ranging
from critical sociology (Bourdieu) to mainstream sociology
(Goldthorpe). See the summaries of class approaches in Wright
(2005). The Marxian tradition (summarized in Draper 1978) looks
mainly at the positions of production relations: capital versus labour.
Weber ([1922] 1978) focuses on market relations and the life chances
of individuals, while Bourdieu (1987) distinguished various kinds of
capital as resources: economic, social and cultural. Finally,
mainstream sociology (e.g. Goldthorpe et al. 1987) analysed
primarily labour market positions with occupations and status.
In this book I will try to merge these concepts in a general image and
analysis of social class in order to relate this broadly to the digital
divide. I have maintained the popular distinction of upper class,
middle class and working class. To differentiate this distinction
further, traditional and new middle and working classes are
introduced. The new middle class of professionals and the new
working class of flexible service workers are the fastest growing
social classes in contemporary society, while the traditional middle
classes and working classes are shrinking. Finally, an underclass, or
precariat, is added to the spectrum (Standing 2011). Members of this
class have the lowest paid and most insecure jobs; they might also be
permanently unemployed and/or have no home.
My distinction comprises six social classes merging the social class
perspectives of Marx, Weber, Bourdieu and Goldthorpe. They are the
upper class (the bourgeoisie, capitalists or the old elite), the new
middle class (the new professionals or the new elite), the traditional
middle class of shopkeepers, farmers, doctors and teachers, the
traditional working class of industrial, construction, transportation
and care workers, the new working class of flexible service workers,
more or less skilled and largely doing manual work, and, finally, the
underclass or precariat. This six-class distinction is a combination
of economic classes such as the bourgeoisie, the working class and
independent farmers or shopkeepers (Marx), status distinctions of
‘up’, ‘middle’ and ‘under’ or ‘elite’ (Weber and Bourdieu’s cultural
capital) and occupations such as industrial or service workers and
teachers (Goldthorpe).
In the developed countries roughly less than one-third of the
population is part of the upper class and the new middle class, one-
third belongs to the traditional middle and working class, and more
than one-third comprises the new working class and the underclass.
In developing countries the traditional middle class (farmers and
shopkeepers, often poor), together with the traditional working class
and the underclass, is still much larger than that in developed
countries. The characteristics of these six classes are stratified
according to high, medium and low levels (see table 8.1).
Table 8.1. Estimated levels of characteristics of social classes in
developed countries
The usual characteristics of social class (property, income, labour
position, education and forms of capital or life chances) are
compared to the characteristics of digital access and digital skills as
discussed in this book. When the estimations are justified, the
parallel of social and digital inequality is striking. The upper class
and the new middle class have the best digital access and skills. The
new working class and the underclass have low levels of access and
skills. The traditional middle class and working class show medium
levels of digital access and skills. This distribution is supported by
the survey data discussed in the earlier chapters under the
characteristics of digital media (non-)users: income, education and
labour position together with social and cultural capital.
The distribution conforms with similar social class comparisons
inspiring my scheme – the Great British Class Survey organized by
the BBC (Savage et al. 2013: 230) and a Dutch survey (Boelhouwer et
al. 2014: 292) – though their class labels are different. The result is
also similar to the comparison of social class and digital media use by
Yates et al. (2015), although these authors used the UK National
Readership Survey classification of social grade (based primarily on
occupations). Their survey also found that, as far as the Internet was
concerned, the lowest social classes (skilled, semi-skilled and
unskilled manual workers, casual and lowest grade workers, and
people living on social benefits or pensions) revealed low and limited
use, less varied use, and less information-seeking behaviour.
However, these classes were much more frequent users of social
media (see also Yates and Lockley 2018).
To lend more support to this distribution, I will now briefly
summarize the current trends of inequality in the most important
domains of society and relate these trends to digital inequality.

Economic inequality
Most economists agree that economic inequality has increased in
almost every part of the world in the last thirty to forty years.
Although fastgrowing emerging economies such as China, India and
Brazil have created a relatively wealthy middle class and the
prosperity of the whole population has increased, relative inequality
inside these economies has also grown (Milanovic 2016). The range
between the very rich and the very poor in China is now much larger
than during Mao’s time (Shambaugh 2016). Both absolute and
relative inequality have increased in the Western developed
countries, where the incomes of the lowest classes (the traditional
and new working class and the underclass), taking inflation into
account, have in fact remained at much the same level for forty years.
Recently the incomes of the middle class have also fallen; all
productivity growth has gone to the upper class (Stiglitz 2013),
mostly as a result of their steep accumulation of property or capital
(Piketty 2014).
One of the reasons why the majority of the population, at least in the
developed world, could not afford to acquire what were then
relatively expensive computers and Internet connections in the
1980s and 1990s was because the level of their income and property
had stagnated. Only once prices had gone down and digital media
had become a necessity did access and use multiply fast. However,
inequality of material access is still a problem even in the richest
countries (see chapter 4). In the developing countries, the cost of all
digital media is still so high that access and use remain a problem.
People with high levels of economic capital (income and property),
and mostly also highly educated and having a professional career or
a modern business, benefit more from the positive economic
outcomes of digital media use (see chapter 7). They are part of the
upper class of capital owners or the new middle class of professionals
who gain the advantages of cheaper consumer goods and services
(Helsper et al. 2015; van Deursen and Helsper 2018) and through
acquiring capital goods and services. Because members of the upper
class have not only capital but also the advanced financial and digital
skills – sometimes hired – necessary to buy and sell on the world’s
stock exchanges and financial markets, they manage to accumulate
capital (Piketty 2014). The upper and new middle class also profit
from employment relations online (Helsper et al. 2015): for them, a
specialized social-networking site such as LinkedIn is much more
powerful than a general one such as Facebook, so popular among the
rest of society.
Clearly, digital inequality reinforces relative inequality in the
economic domain. For the social classes at the highest end of the
spectrum, use of digital media is literally capital-enhancing.

Social network inequality

The total volume of social capital (the number of social contacts) in
contemporary society is expanding overall. This is a consequence of a
network society with growing individualization and mobility and
where people live, work and spend leisure time separately (van Dijk
[1999] 2012). The Internet, and especially social media, has given a
boost to new and existing relationships (Ellison et al. 2011; Wang
and Wellman 2010; Rainie and Wellman 2012; Poushter et al. 2018).
The quality of such relationships with friends, colleagues and
acquaintances is another matter, however, as some of them have
become less intensive or complex and more diluted or superficial
(Mesch and Talmud 2011).
However, the distribution of this growing social capital has also
become more relatively unequal. People with high incomes or
education and a higher profession – in general, the upper and new
middle class – have a much larger network than people with low
income or education and lower occupations – in general, the
traditional and new working class and the underclass (see Poushter
et al. 2018 for the US, Savage et al. 2013 in the UK, and Boelhouwer
et al. 2014 for the Netherlands). See also the assumptions of table 8.1
and figure 8.1. The disparity is not so much among core or strong ties
(family and friends) as among significant weak ties (colleagues,
acquaintances, customers and contacts online whom one never
meets in person).
Significant weak ties matter in a network society, as Granovetter
(1983) explained in his article ‘The strength of weak ties’. They offer
valuable resources which are not found by people with fewer weak
ties. In general, social networks provide access to valuable resources
(Tilly 1998; DiMaggio and Garip 2012). Networks show network
effects that exacerbate inequality in the adoption of beneficial
practices (the positive outcomes of chapter 7). Network effects are of
three kinds: network externalities, social learning and normative
influence (DiMaggio and Garip 2012). With network externalities,
the early members of a network profit both first and the most when
others join in; with social learning, the larger your network, the more
support you can obtain and the more you can learn from others; and,
with normative influence, the larger your network, the more contacts
you have available to ask for advice before taking decisions.
These network effects can also be related to social class. Tilly (1998:
10) has explained that powerful, connected people command
resources from which they draw significant returns by exploiting
outsiders who have been excluded from the full value of the network.
These powerful connected people are hoarding opportunities in the
network because they have greater access to resources that are
valuable, renewable and a subject of monopoly and social support.
The rise of digital media has reinforced the unequal distribution of
social capital and all these network effects. The results are the
unequal social resources discussed as causes for all four phases of the
digital divide: motivation, physical access, digital skills and usage.

Cultural inequality
Just as in the economic domain growth occurs worldwide and in the
social domain the number of contacts increases, in the cultural
domain cultural production and consumption are rising. This is a
side effect of the growing diversity in postmodern society (see
chapter 6). Inequality exists in the cultural domain, though it is less
visible, since diversity, rather than exclusion, has become the
principle of cultural distinction today (Ferrant 2018). In the past,
those in the higher social classes distinguished themselves through
‘high-brow’ culture, in comparison to the masses, with their popular,
‘lowbrow’ culture (Bourdieu [1979] 2010).
Today, all social classes have become omnivorous in creating and
consuming culture (Peterson 1992), so that ‘even the snobbiest of
snobs’ (Coulangeon 2015) among the upper and middle classes enjoy
popular culture (Ferrant 2018). However, the distinction is not that
some classes are more omnivorous than others (Warde et al. 2007)
but that some types of culture are peculiar to specific classes. While
the upper and middle classes frequently enjoy classical music, art
and literature, a large proportion of the working and underclasses
show little interest in such matters but prefer popular music or
literature, videos, TV programmes and games or watching sports.
Surveys in the UK (Bennett et al. 2009; Savage et al. 2013) have
shown that the higher classes appreciate both classical and popular
culture, while the lower classes focus more on popular culture (see
also table 8.1). This is reflected in digital media use, where the higher
classes benefit from all kinds of online culture, while the lower
classes limit themselves to video, television, film, pictures, music,
sports and games. Witte and Mannon (2010: 114) conclude, in
analysing American surveys, that ‘the intensive and extensive nature
of Internet use among the well-off and well-educated suggests an
elite lifestyle from which the poor and uneducated are marginalized.’

Inequality of personal development

The personal domain has become the principal domain of life for
individuals in a late-modern or postmodern society. According to
Giddens (1991), this importance is revealed in the rise of self-identity
as a ‘reflective project’. Whereas, before modernity, certain decisions
were made largely by the community and the family, individuals are
now constantly confronted with lifestyle choices, whether in the field
of food, health, education, work, leisure, social and family
relationships, children or their own personal well-being.
Digital media are very powerful tools to support these areas.
Increasingly, people are looking on the Internet to find lifestyle and
leisure choices or options, to discover what disease they think they
have and its treatment, and to search out food choices and recipes.
They are also looking for support to realize their potential, for life
coaching and even to overcome loneliness. And they may search for
training courses or other kinds of adult education.
The story here is much the same: the personal domain is growing,
but so is the inequality in benefits. The opportunities for personal
development via the Internet are being taken mostly by people with
higher education and incomes and, for some activities, also young
people (working on self-identity and spending leisure time) and
females (health and food information). See a number of benefits
combined in Helsper et al. (2015) and Helsper and van Deursen
(2017). Those who are in greatest need of the key benefit, health
information and care, are the elderly or disabled and people with low
education, who on average have more health problems; but they are
using these applications less (see van Deursen and van Dijk 2012;
Hale 2013; Robinson et al. 2015). According to a Pew health online
report (Fox and Duggan 2013), at that time Americans with college
grades used them roughly double more than Americans with high
school grades, and young people (age 18–29) more than the elderly
(65+), although the information retrieved spurred them equally often
to go to a doctor.

A balance sheet
Taking into account these four domains, the conclusion is evident:
today digital inequality not only reflects but also tends to reinforce
social inequality. Digital media are powerful tools that support
people who already have an advantage in a particular domain, while
those who are already disadvantaged in certain respects benefit less.
The parallel between the social and the digital media characteristics
of social class summarized in table 8.1 is striking. In the future, the
use and the benefits of digital media may become more equally
divided in absolute terms. The question is whether relative
inequality will also be reduced.

Separate worlds: the trend of segmentation

So far we have looked at domains of society or life and people’s
individual resources, combining them only in the general concept of
social class. In fact these domains and resources are related in many
ways. Helsper (2012) talks about corresponding fields, and van
Deursen et al. (2017) discuss compounded inequality. People are
divided not only by social class but also by ethnic, cultural, health
(ability), age and gender distinctions; these may be conceived as
stratification (high and low) in terms of hierarchy and as
segmentation in terms of distance (separation). Social segmentation
of society is a strong term, but in fact we can see social categories
drifting apart in all domains of society (Bruch and Mare 2008).
While there has been much investigation of residential, ethnic,
school and occupational segmentation, all domains of life and society
are affected, often by the even stronger process of segregation
(structurally living and working apart). Figure 8.2 depicts the links
between these domains and shows cycles in which people move from
segregation in one domain to similar segregation in another domain.
This figure was designed to describe what this means for the digital
divide.

Figure 8.2. A cycle of segregation in various life domains

While in earlier societies segmentation was derived by birth or
descent, in modern society it is achieved by property, work,
education and lifestyle. Late-modern or postmodern society created
even more distinctions of a cultural kind (Turner 1990; Giddens
1991). Today, the network society links all sorts of abstract social
segments or concrete small worlds with strong ties to the rest of
society via weak ties (Milgram 1967; van Dijk [1999] 2012). All these
distinctions are marked by particular differential resources and types
of inequality.
The most important of these distinctions and inequalities today are
the divides of social class, especially the level of education, as they
characterize all domains of society and life. Starting with the domain
of ‘living’ in figure 8.2, we find, on the one hand, people with low
education in neighbourhoods that are predominantly poor and, on
the other, those who are more highly educated in well-off areas.
Today there is a trend of residential segregation in large parts of the
world, as the social mix between people is declining (Ostendorf et al.
2001). This applies especially to the poor, who tend to congregate in
neighbourhoods with others of similar background (Volker et al.
2014; Hofstra et al. 2017). Moving anticlockwise in figure 8.2, most
people start a family and raise children from within their own
communities. These children then go to schools in their own
neighbourhoods with other children of the same class or ethnic
composition, a process of school segregation.
When leaving school and applying for a job, these children of mostly
working-class and underclass families are more likely to find
employment at a similar level to that of their parents than a job at
another, perhaps higher level (occupational segmentation). Later,
these children find a home in the same or a similar neighbourhood.
In all these domains they will reproduce the same, sometimes
unhealthy lifestyle, with such problems as obesity and heart disease,
and a low level of lifelong learning in adult education.
This is an extreme picture of segregation with no upward social
mobility. At the other extreme we find high or persisting social
mobility among upper-class and middle-class people, starting with
the domain of work. It is here, and in their friendship network,
rather than in the neighbourhood, that such people meet their
contacts (Volker et al. 2014). Most likely they will find a partner of
the same social class and level of education. They will reproduce
their culture in bringing up their children, who will attend good
schools (not necessarily in the neighbourhood) with the same kind of
children. These children will most likely secure employment away
from home, probably in an urban environment, at a level similar to
that of their parents. They will move wherever is necessary in order
to support their career. They are more likely to have a relatively
healthy lifestyle and all kinds of choices and lifelong learning
options.
The majority of people worldwide fall between these two extremes,
as segmentation never reaches 100 per cent. However, many
present-day sociologists are concerned about the rise of social
segmentation and the creation of separate lives accompanying these
societal divisions (Coleman 1990; Wrzus et al. 2013; Musterd et al.
2017). They also argue that upward social mobility, so clearly
observed since the mid-twentieth century with the rise of higher
education, is now stagnating or even declining. Some see
polarization between the extremes highlighted above (Gaschet and
Gallo 2005; Vuyk 2017).
This has been a long introduction to the main proposition of this
section, which is that the use of digital media reflects and reinforces
these segmentation processes more than it reduces them. To
understand this, one needs to appreciate two main opposing
characteristics of digital media networks: they are able to connect
everybody in society and they are able to select favoured others (van
Dijk [1991] 2001, [1999] 2012) – heterogeneity versus homogeneity.
However, in practice, the temptations of selection and homogeneity
are dominant because people want to have their views confirmed
(against cognitive dissonance; Festinger 1954) and tend to move
towards the familiar and to stay in their own group (homogeneity
and groupthink; see Sunstein 2008).
In digital media use, selection is the main mechanism supporting the
social segregation tendencies discussed in at least four network
activities: 1) contacting, 2) producing, consuming and sharing
resources, 3) choosing places to live, work and go to school and 4)
exchanging opinions. One aspect of contacting is online dating. In
most countries today there are popular online dating sites aimed
only at people with higher education (Skopek et al. 2010). Clearly,
this supports social segregation where relationships and
familybuilding are concerned. Having good connections in social-
networking sites (a social resource) might lead to new job
opportunities (an economic resource). There are also many Internet
applications for fine-tuning job selection, finding a course of study,
and selecting a place to live. Finally it is easy on the Internet to
exchange opinions with people of the same interests and views, a
process that is often described pejoratively as visiting ‘echo
chambers’ and being stuck in ‘filter bubbles’ (Sunstein 2001; Pariser
2011).
However, just as segregation is never total, people do not only search
for and exchange views similar to their own (van Dijk and Hacker
2018). They also browse through unexpected sites and are
accidentally exposed to new sources, people they do not know, and
opposing views (Brundidge 2010; Lee et al. 2014; Barberá 2015).
Deliberately seeking reinforcement of one’s views is the action of a
minority (Karlsen et al. 2017).
Intentionally looking for quality information and news online, and
paying for the privilege, is an activity undertaken primarily by a
minority of people with higher education and income. The majority
is tempted to use free news and information sources, often of lower
quality. This will be one of the most important manifestations of the
digital divide in the future (van Dijk and Hacker 2018).

The evolution of digital technology and

inequality
Basic changes are taking place in digital media technology, all of
which are capable of increasing or reducing social inequality. Four
major directions will change the relations between humans and
digital media.
The first direction is the multiplication of digital media. Alongside a
growing number of computer types, most traditional media –
televisions, cameras and audio equipment – are being manufactured
in digital form. There are new types of digital media: wearables, all
kinds of meters, virtual and augmented reality devices, and many
others. These devices are cheaper than traditional media, and the
skills needed to operate them are similar (the same kind of menu
operations), thus offering the potential to reduce the digital divide.
However, the disadvantages are that all these devices together
probably cost more than all the former traditional media combined
and that people may have to learn several different operating
systems. The multiplication of digital media also means that the
process of appropriation recurs several times.
The second direction is the most basic. Up to now, digital divide
research has dealt with the ‘simple’ dual interface of humans and
devices or connections driven by software – human–computer or
human–media interaction. We are now in an era where people work
not only with interfaces of hardware and software but also with
interfaces of systems. The digital media of the Internet of Things, for
instance, are coordinated by systems. Examples are the system for
advanced home energy meters and the system of health providers
offering patients meters for heart conditions and diabetes or for
coaching healthy people with wearables for exercise or sport.
Another example is the transport system for safety cars steered by
sensors and for self-driving cars.
Users need to know how these systems work and for whom they are
providing their data. This is a big problem. Most users – perhaps
only 1 or 2 per cent of the entire population on earth – do not even
know how the Internet as a system works, and the complicated
systems just mentioned are even more difficult to understand and be
controlled by the average user. A high level of content-related digital
skills, which most people do not have, is required to use the
applications of the Internet of Things, where ‘more emphasis [will
be] on information skills (selection, interpretation, and quality
assessment), communication skills (understanding how devices
communicate with other devices and humans and vice versa, and
how users communicate with other users in the IoT system), and
strategic skills (deciding what data should be collected and how it
should be used to gain optimal outcomes)’ (van Deursen and
Mossberger 2018: 131).
These new digital media are directed by artificial intelligence and
continually produce big data. Decisions are made not only by users
but also automatically by algorithms, so users need to have the
strategic skills to follow or overrule these decisions. However, most
often people are not informed about the working of these algorithms;
nor is it clear who possesses the data and the algorithms processing
them – the user, the IoT provider or the system and organizations
concerned. If these conditions prevail, the Internet of Things and any
other digital media directed by AI and big data will considerably
enhance digital and social inequality.
Those individuals who were the first to adopt and use the older
digital media, computers and the Internet have also been the first to
adopt these new digital media. In a survey in the Netherlands in
2018, people with higher education used the applications of the
Internet of Things roughly twice as much as people with lower
education. Similarly, young people were far more frequent users than
older people (van Deursen et al. 2018).
The third technical direction in the evolution of digital media is
miniaturization, which encompasses both external hardware, such
as wearables, and implanted devices or chips, where individuals
become cyborgs. Here technology becomes quite intimate and may
make people more powerful. Smart devices can also boost our
intelligence.
The popular historian Y. N. Harari (2016, 2018) has a vision of the
future in which super humans are created alongside normal humans.
The super humans are the information elite, with not only the best
digital skills but also the power to afford, to deal with and to control
advanced data worn on or as implants in the body. Normal humans
would become superfluous or irrelevant once most jobs are fully or
largely automated and robotized. Harari envisages a future of
extreme inequality. His pitch-black dystopian vision unfortunately is
not some kind of science fiction, and according to my analysis a
milder version may become reality. An ever more powerful
information elite, consisting of upper-class people and the
professional new middle class, with full possession of digital
technology and high information and strategic twenty-first-century
skills, distancing itself from the rest of the population is not an
impossible future.
The fourth direction is the integration or merger of computers and
the online world with physical reality and the offline world. This is
being realized by the applications of virtual, augmented and mixed
reality (mixed reality: an example is a holograph projected on a
physical scene). Today these are used in the entertainment, health
care and educational sectors. The equipment is rather expensive at
present. Moreover, the interfaces are complex, so people need special
operational and cognitive skills, as well as high information,
communication and strategic skills, to understand and cope with
these new applications. As ever, it is people with higher education
and incomes and the young who have been the early adopters of this
technology.
These four directions are new challenges for society, and all tend to
intensify the digital divide and social inequality.

Conclusions
The major conclusion of this chapter is that digital inequality, or the
digital divide, tends to reflect and reinforce existing social inequality.
This is first of all a matter of relative inequality. Some people and
some social classes benefit more and earlier from the outcomes of
digital media use than others. Relative inequality matters in a
network society where some are able to take greater advantage of
resources via relationships than others. In terms of absolute
inequality, digital media use may reflect and reinforce existing social
inequality when the positive outcomes are reached only by some in
society. Absolute inequality matters too in an information society
when some cannot find vital information necessary to live and work.
When the use of digital media becomes absolutely essential, those
without access or elementary digital skills will be excluded.
We have seen that use of digital media makes a difference as far as
existing social inequality is concerned. There is a wide spectrum
between those who do not use digital media at all and have no skills
and those who use it frequently and have superior skills; this range is
now wider and more diverse than was that between the unlettered
and intellectuals in the past. Similarly, the illiterates did not possess
and were not able to use traditional press media while the
intellectuals used them frequently and with high skill. Nowadays it is
not only a matter of literacy, it is also to do with taking action online
(see chapter 6).
Furthermore, today digital media are everywhere, in all spheres of
life. Traditional media were concentrated in particular in schools and
some workplaces and were important for leisure pursuits. Thus I
have argued that the gap in digital media use is more important than
the knowledge gap in traditional media. People draw on digital
media for much more than just deriving knowledge.
The reflection and reinforcement of digital inequality in existing
social inequality is intensified when we look at the background of
social class (see table 8.1). The characteristics of digital media are
able to reflect and reinforce the characteristics of social class. If these
characteristics accumulate in all domains of living, these social
classes are going to live in separate worlds.
Regarding the evolution of new digital technologies such as the
Internet of Things, decision apps based on artificial intelligence, and
virtual or augmented reality, we have seen that there is a greater
chance that digital divides and social inequality will increase. This
new technology might be easier to operate because more and more
decisions are made automatically, but satisfactory use and real
benefit might be more difficult to achieve than is the case with older
digital technology. Advanced content-related and twenty-first-
century digital skills, and at least some knowledge of artificial
intelligence and data processing, are required.
The digital divide is here to stay. We have seen that motivation or
attitude and physical access have improved, but that the gaps in
digital skills and usage are only increasing. At the same time,
motivation/attitude and physical access divides have not been closed
completely, and certainly not in the developing countries.
Perhaps the most important and evident conclusion of this book is
that it is impossible to close the digital divide without reducing other
social inequalities. Focusing merely on the problem of the digital
divide will lead only to its mitigation. However, the best solution
would be to reduce existing social inequality and digital inequality
simultaneously. We will now turn to this idea in the final chapter.
9
Solutions to Mitigate the Digital Divide

Introduction: can the digital divide problem

be solved or only mitigated?
One of the most important conclusions of this book is that the digital
divide cannot be closed without reducing existing social inequalities.
I have argued here that it is the unequal material, mental, social,
cultural and temporal resources of people that are its causes. While
digital media use can show positive outcomes and potentially lead to
less inequality, currently the regular use of these media actually
reflects and reinforces existing inequalities. This is not the fault of
the digital media themselves. At a time when social inequality was
decreasing, as was the case in many countries for about thirty years
after the Second World War, digital media might have contributed to
the reduction of social inequality.
Unfortunately today, most existing economic, social and cultural
inequalities are rising in large parts of the world (see chapter 8). This
would seem to lead towards a grim future in which pushing against
the digital divide will be an uphill struggle. As the chances for solving
both social and digital inequality are very small, we have to conclude
that the digital divide cannot be closed but only mitigated. This is the
vision behind the solutions proposed in this chapter, which are
intended to reduce social and digital inequality simultaneously.
The second challenge is to deal with both absolute and relative
inequality in this context. Absolute inequality is when people are
excluded from using digital media. Relative inequality is when some
people are benefiting more than others through the use of digital
media. The question is whether ‘the rich’ are getting richer or more
powerful by using and benefiting from digital media while ‘the poor’
are increasingly left behind. Solutions to both absolute and relative
inequality will be discussed.
This chapter addresses the problem of the digital divide from the
perspectives of both scholars and policy-makers. The first
observation to be made here is that the discourses of these two
constituencies are quite different and separate. Policy documents
virtually ignore the numerous scientific publications mentioned in
this book and refer primarily to other policy documents and official
statistics. However, it is true that policy research has followed the
same focus during the last ten years – the shift of attention from
physical access problems to problems of digital skills and usage.
Simultaneously, digital divide scholars rarely refer to the work of
policy-makers, as policy perspectives are not their prime objective.
The causes of this separation are twofold. First, scholars describe the
divide problem mainly with their own data and are only just
beginning to formulate a theory explaining the phenomenon (see
chapter 2). Thus they are not yet in a position to offer concrete policy
directions. Most of their proposals are of a very general kind, such as
the suggestions that more attention should be paid to digital skills or
that more meaningful applications are the solution to non-use.
Second, scholars and policy-makers use different frameworks when
dealing with the problem. While the former use general frameworks
of empirical description and theoretical explanation, the latter work
with the specific frameworks in which they are interested. These
interests might be lack of economic growth or innovativeness, labour
market deficiencies, or educational policies. There are only a few
general government departments or national task groups in
particular countries that are dealing with the whole picture of the
digital divide problem (see below). While scholars prefer an
empirical approach, policy-makers and researchers clearly use a
normative approach following the current strategies of government,
business and NGOs.
The scientific disciplines of digital divide scholars were described in
chapter 2. But who are the policy-makers and researchers? First,
there are national and local governments, whose departments
contain policy researchers and advisors. Second, there are
international bodies, such as the UN, UNESCO and the European
Union, sector institutions such as the ITU (telecommunication), the
OECD (economy) and the World Bank (finance), and informal
forums such as the World Economic Forum. Allied to these forums
are think tanks or policy journals such as The Economist. Third,
there are national and international NGOs and pressure groups
promoting particular goals and issues: social, cultural and public
norms and directions, consumer interests, and educational
innovation or public awareness about digital media problems.
Fourth, there are stakeholders in the digital media sector itself, the
IT and Telecom companies which focus on the technical issues of
access and connectivity for all and new directions in technical
infrastructure, hardware, software and providers. Related to these
are the business producers in the ICT or digital media sector,
responsible for the product design of digital technology. Finally we
have the users themselves, both businesses as users of ICTs and the
individual workers, consumers and citizens with their
representatives in trade unions and consumer or citizens’
organizations. They also have a responsibility to solve the digital
divide by developing awareness about the positive and negative
outcomes of digital media use and by organizing or following courses
and training to improve their skills. Organizational users and their
representatives have their own staff of policy researchers.
In this final chapter I will first discuss the different goals of the
policies to bridge the digital divide, analysed in five perspectives,
following which I will deal with the means to realize these
perspectives. A number of concrete solutions will be classified
according to our four phases of technology appropriation:
motivation/attitude, physical access, digital skills and usage. I will
then propose my own list of strategic undertakings to fight both
digital and social inequality.

Goals: policy perspectives for the digital

divide
There are five main policy perspectives to solve or mitigate the digital
divide problem related to the different frameworks discussed in
chapter 1. I will argue that all these perspectives are necessary and
valid; the digital divide problem is much too complicated to be
approached with a single or limited strategy. A comparison scheme
for the five perspectives is summarized in table 9.1.
The technological perspective
The first international perspective to deal with the digital divide
problem is technological, which has the goal of distributing digital
technology in society. This means supporting infrastructure,
primarily computer networks but also devices linked by these
networks, in order to connect the unconnected. Two decades ago the
unconnected were a majority in both developed and developing
countries, though today they are a minority in the developed
countries.
Table 9.1. Policy perspectives to solve the digital divide and the
characteristics of their goals

This perspective dominated during the first level of digital divide

research, when the focus was physical access, as described in chapter
4. It is no surprise that physical access should have been the most
popular goal at a time when a promising new technology had arrived.
The thinking was that everybody should have the opportunities and
benefits of this technology. The technological perspective is created,
promoted and fed mainly by data from (inter)national IT and
telecom companies, technological research institutes and the R&D
departments of business and government departments. The most
important of these is the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), which continually provides data about the state of connections
and the stock of devices available.
General technology diffusion has the goal of universal access to the
Internet with a particular access device or terminal, in the same way
that the telephone and broadcasting became ubiquitous. Focused
technology diffusion, on the other hand, connects particular parts of
the population who have the greatest access problems. Two
possibilities here are providing public access (e.g. in libraries and
community technology centres) and distributing computers and
tablets primarily in schools (examples are One Laptop per Child
projects and so-called iPad schools). The technology in question is
continually changing with the targets of universal and public access.
Having begun with PCs and dial-up Internet connections in the
1990s, it shifted to mobile telephones and laptop computers after the
year 2000, and since 2010 it has focused on broadband connections
(fixed and mobile). Objectives and standards of mobile connections
are continually being upgraded, from 2G via 3G and 4G to 5G.
Obviously, creating and distributing digital technology and
supporting physical access are necessary goals to bridge the digital
divide. However, many others are needed to solve this problem.
Moreover, the phase of physical access never ends, partly because of
continual technology change, but also on account of wider
conceptions of access: material or conditional access and a different
quality of technology (see chapter 4; Hilbert 2011a; van Deursen and
van Dijk 2019). According to these wider conceptions, the physical
access divide is here to stay, even in the rich and technologically
advanced countries.
Two critical observations are made in the literature. The first is the
technological determinism behind most arguments about this
perspective. Creating and distributing digital technology might
increase rather than decrease social and digital inequality, both
inside and between countries (Fuchs 2009; Pick and Sarkar 2015;
Skaletsky et al. 2017; see also the analysis in this book). The second
is that the published linear trend projections showing upward curves
are unfounded (James 2008). As this and other books have shown,
there are too many factors at work to make exact predictions about
the future of access.

The economic perspective

The economic perspective often accompanies the technical
perspective in the policies of government and business. It assumes
that the problem will be solved through a better supply of digital
technology, and so the main goal is to boost investment in the ICT
sector, thus advancing growth and development and enhancing
innovation. An assumed side effect is to lower the prices of hardware,
software and services. This can be supported by policies to enhance
competition in the sector.
This perspective is promoted mainly by government departments,
international economic and financial institutions such as the OECD,
the World Trade Organization and the World Bank, and forums or
think thanks such as the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the
Economist Intelligence Unit. These organizations are used to making
indexes and lists of countries showing their performance and
development in access to digital technology. Examples are the annual
Inclusive Internet Index published by The Economist and the
Inclusive Development Index of the WEF. While these indices are
rather superficial and arbitrary, they do use appropriate labels, such
as availability, affordability, readiness and relevance.
The main ways in this perspective of bridging the digital divide are
more investment in digital technology, stimulating innovation, and
supporting competition in the ICT sector. Historically, the choice for
investment has always been whether it should be undertaken by the
public or the private sector. After the public telecommunication and
broadcasting monopolies were dismantled in the 1980s, private firms
took over in almost every country. This does not mean that
governments no longer invest. In fact the Internet was first set up by
the US Defense Department. Today, East Asian governments remain
among the main investors in ICT infrastructure.
Innovation is led by small start-up companies and large R&D
departments in corporations. Governments stimulate innovation by
funding academic research. Competition policy was first enacted to
oppose the retreating public monopolies; currently it has to deal with
the growing power of the new monopolies on the Internet such as the
Big Five American Internet companies. Next to innovation,
competition has succeeded in reducing the prices of hardware,
software and services. In this way it supported the collective usage of
digital media by businesses and consumers and contributed towards
closing the digital divide of physical access.
Nevertheless, many assumptions behind the economic perspective
are questionable, principal among which is whether ICTs actually
boost economic growth (see below; Gordon 2016). Another
assumption is that supporting business, innovation and competition
in digital technology not only enhances economic growth and
development in a country as a whole but also reduces digital divides
both inside and between countries. However, almost all research
shows that the rate of ICT access and the development of a country is
closely related to its GDP and its urbanization (examples are Fuchs
2009; Cruz-Jesus et al. 2018). These indicators are not easy to
change through policy.
Research also shows that (un)equal access is related to a great extent
to the so-called Gini coefficient of (in)equality and the general level
of education (Fuchs 2009; Bauer 2018; Cruz-Jesus et al. 2018).
Supporting digital technology through investment, innovation and
competition might reduce absolute inequality once every country
and all its inhabitants have some kind of access. However, it might
lead simultaneously to more relative inequality between and inside
countries (see references just mentioned).
This is a case of uneven and combined development observed in
development theory (Hilferding 1981; Milanovic 2016). Combined
development in this context is the global accessibility and
affordability of digital media. Uneven development is a trend of
persistent differences in levels and rates of economic development
between various sectors of the economy. The most advanced
countries are progressing faster with digital technology than the
disadvantaged countries, which, though they may be in a better
position than previously, are lagging further and further behind –
another case of relative inequality.

The educational perspective

The preceding two perspectives are supply-side policies, while the
following perspectives are demand-side led, focusing on users.
During the years of second- and third-level digital divide research,
the importance of digital literacy and skills for real access was
highlighted. The assumption was that, without such skills, people
would be unable to take advantage of digital media. Since about 2010
digital literacy and skills have also figured in policy documents.
Supporters of the educational perspective naturally expect the digital
divide to be bridged through education and training in both formal
and adult education. There are four ways of achieving this. The first
is to integrate digital literacy or skills into formal education at all
levels – not only of students but also of teachers, who often need
remedial training. The second is to promote adult education in
libraries, community centres and other public places, aimed
specifically at people over the age of forty who have not learned
digital skills at school. The third is training on the job, and the fourth
is stimulating Internet users to learn skills on their own.
While this perspective is emphasized primarily by educational
authorities and institutions, community service workers, and social
or educational scientists, in the last ten years it also figures
increasingly in the general national strategies of government
departments and taskforces.
As I have argued in this book, the phase of acquiring digital skills is
the most crucial in the process of technology appropriation.
However, there are a number of basic problems that the educational
perspective cannot solve. First, all unequal resources and structural
inequalities will remain (Mariën and Prodnik 2014; Davies and
Eynon 2018). At best, their levels can be mitigated by improving
digital skills. Second, there has been a stagnation and even a
decrease in social mobility in the labour market, the educational
system and society at large in many countries of the world, as has
been observed in many recent scientific studies and reports of
international policy forums such as the OECD, the WEF and the
World Bank, which fear the rise of populism. Labour markets are
polarizing; educational systems are divided by levels and quality of
schooling; and societies are segmented in many domains (see
chapter 8). The popular objective of equal opportunities or chances
for all is the ideal of meritocracy: ‘whatever your social position at
birth, society ought to offer enough opportunity and mobility for
“talent” to combine with “effort” in order to “rise to the top”’ (Littler
2018: 1). However, meritocracy is in crisis; the ideal is becoming a
liberal or conservative ideology in contrast to social, economic and
educational reality (McNamee and Miller 2009; Littler 2018).
After the Second World War in the developed countries, a whole
generation of children were able to overtake their parents in social
mobility. It is questionable whether the next generation will enjoy
the same achievement; it is more likely that things will go in the
opposite direction. The rungs of the ladder of mobility are broken
(McNamee and Miller 2009; Economist Intelligence Unit 2019;
Hayes 2016; Vuyk 2017; Littler 2018). So the question remains
whether improving (different) digital skills will support jobs and
schools at the bottom or at the top of the ladder.

The social perspective

The core concept of the social perspective is inclusion. It is
understood as a human right that everyone should be able to
participate in the information and network society. Universal access
to digital technology is the main goal, and particular attention should
be paid to the most deprived groups: seniors, children and
adolescents, women, (ethnic) minorities, disabled people and the so-
called poor. While inclusion is the assumed result of the first three
perspectives, the social perspective (presuming that the
technological, economic and educational perspectives will not extend
to all groups) focuses on participation in society itself.
In order to bridge the digital divide, the social perspective suggests,
first, that the government should provide full access to social and
public services and tools of engagement for every citizen, both online
and offline. These services will need to be accessed by traditional
means for some time yet. Government and other public
organizations need to follow the web guidelines for disabled Internet
users. Second, concerted action needs to be taken in communities,
public places, schools and homes where one finds the most deprived
groups. It could be organized by civil servants, social and community
workers or public librarians in cooperation with representatives of
the deprived groups concerned. This requires special strategies and
tactics based on a knowledge of the needs of each particular group.
To reach the goals of this perspective, affordability is to be
supported by (more or less) free provision of basic equipment and
software, readiness organized via customized courses, for instance in
public libraries or community centres, and relevance accomplished
by creating appropriate content and apps for groups.
This perspective is advocated by social and political scientists, civil
servants, community, social and cultural workers, and members of
charity organizations. Indeed, charities are often the ones who
coordinate arrangements in the field. Social and political scientists
investigate opportunities for participation in several domains
(Mossberger et al. 2014; Helsper 2012). The social perspective tends
to focus on the technology and its opportunities or uses and not on
social, economic, political and cultural conditions (Mariën and
Prodnik 2014), which are often so serious and permanent that the
result of any participatory action is bound to be marginal. But it is
difficult to solve the basic problems of deprived groups with
technology when in fact the solutions are social.

The persuasive perspective

The last perspective to be discussed here focuses on motivation and
attitudes. I have emphasized in this book that these are driving every
phase of appropriation. Most reasons given by non-users of digital
media are motivational – ‘I do not want it’ or ‘I do not need it’ –
while others are attitudinal – ‘I reject the medium’ for its assumed
bad features (cybercrime, excessive use and poor communication)
(see table 3.1, p. 36). In other words, such individuals are
anticipating the negative outcomes of digital media use.
In order to bridge the digital divide, the persuasive perspective
concentrates on showing the relevance of digital media applications
and on creating awareness about both positive and negative
outcomes. The first way of doing this is to show the usefulness of
digital media and the relevance of the content offered, which often
means encouraging customized applications and local content for
non-users and infrequent users. The second way is to provide
information in order to change attitudes. The goal is to create
awareness about and trust in positive outcomes of digital media use
as well as providing information about how to deal with security and
privacy problems and to prevent the excessive and abusive use of
digital media. The target groups for such interventions are people
with few digital skills and children or young people exhibiting
insecure online behaviour.
This perspective is often advocated by scholars of development
theory or of social and cultural science. It is practised by NGOs and
government departments dealing with social, cultural and
development affairs. There are also pressure groups advocating more
care in solving security and privacy problems. However, these actors
also appeal to those who produce hardware and software and offer
services to provide safer, privacy-friendly and useable products for
all. Finally, awareness campaigns emphasize the responsibility of
users to change their online behaviour.
A major criticism of the persuasive perspective is that it is trying to
remedy the characteristics of a technology that is evolving in the
wrong direction. Prevention is better than cure: what is needed are
designs, products and rules or regulations for useable, secure,
privacy-friendly and non-addictive digital media. In awareness
campaigns it is mainly the end users who are (morally) addressed
rather than the producers, and the social, economic and cultural
contexts causing a particular behaviour are not confronted. Most
scholars and policy-makers know that mass campaigns usually have
small effect on individual behaviour unless the environment
concerned is changed at the same time.
The five perspectives discussed are moving forward. At the start of
the digital divide problem around the millennium, only the first two
perspectives were promulgated, and in fact they remain dominant.
However, now even economists, telecom technicians and IT
producers make reference in their research and policy documents to
the skills, literacy, product relevance and readiness needed to
achieve access for all.

International comparison of digital divide

policies
The technological and economic perspectives are dominant in all
countries, but in recent years there has been a shift towards the
social and persuasive perspectives. Global policies are offered by
several UN institutions, the ITU, the OECD, the World Bank and the
World Economic Forum. National policies can be proposed by
separate government departments or taskforces combining
departments, by national commissions or by institutions supporting
employment and innovation.
Hilbert does not believe in national strategies: he argues that their
investments and achievements are unknown and suggests another
approach: ‘it is not the existence or non-existence of a national
strategy per se that explains success of failure in digital development,
but rather sector-specific projects and tailor-made policies that
address specific areas of interest’ (Hilbert 2011b: 731). Such projects
and policies can best be undertaken at a regional and local level with
a multi-stakeholder strategy (World Bank 2016). However, national
strategies do reflect the various approaches in the world to the digital
divide. I will now give a very brief summary of these strategies in the
main regions of the developed countries and the economically
emerging and developing countries. For more detailed descriptions,
see Peña-López (2009), Hilbert (2011b) and World Bank (2016).

North America
The concept of the digital divide arose in the United States and was
already part of the Clinton–Gore government agenda in the 1990s.
Since that time, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) have undertaken research, given policy advice and developed
regulations. They also inspired or organized annual budgets of
billions of dollars for national programmes, though by far the most
investment came from federal departments and agencies (Hilbert
2011b). For the last twenty years there have been federal
programmes such as the Universal Service Fund connecting schools,
libraries and community technology and technology opportunities
programmes serving local innovation projects. Similar programmes
have been available at the state level.
After the installation of the Bush administration in 2001, the budgets
of all these technology diffusion programmes were severely reduced.
At that time the assumption was that the digital divide was beginning
to close and that the market would solve the problem completely. In
2009 the Obama administration set up the Broadband Technology
Opportunities Program (NTIA 2009), which focused on a nationwide
deployment of broadband access. The most important digital divide
in the US today is the growing gap between broadband and narrow
access and between people using PCs and laptops at home and those
who have only smartphones with limited data (Mossberger et al.
2012, 2014; Skaletsky et al. 2017; Levine and Taylor 2018). Current
American policy to bridge the digital divide is to provide public
access across the board. Home access is not an official objective.
In diffusion and innovation, the US demonstrates a clear
technological perspective (supply orientation) and economic
perspective (a market approach of both supply and demand). The
social, educational and persuasive perspectives are left to the
educational sector, public access provision and local community
development. No further public investment in the distribution of
computers and staffing (training), except for the educational sector,
is considered appropriate. A very specific trait of the American
situation is the important role of philanthropists such as Bill and
Melinda Gates in donating computers and Internet connections to
schools, libraries, computer technology centres and teacher training
institutions.
A final characteristic feature of the situation in the US is the small
part played by public enterprise in model projects, awareness
programmes and special content and application development to
stimulate underserved users, minorities, the disabled and the
illiterate. Most private initiatives are undertaken by hardware and
software producers and public–private associations, sometimes in
cooperation with community organizations.
There is much greater government initiative in dealing with the
digital divide in Canada, where there is a large urban–rural digital
divide, even wider than that in the US (Mallett et al. 2017). The
Canadian government strategy in the 1990s was called Connecting
Canadians and was very broad; it contained six pillars (Steinour
2001), which were policies not only to extend universal access via
infrastructure but also to support local communities in establishing
pilot demonstration projects, to increase Canadian content online, to
organize the country’s school networks, and to promote e-commerce
and e-government.

East Asia
East Asia has become one of the most important strongholds of ICT
production and diffusion in the world and now surpasses North
America and Europe in broadband capacity (Broadband Commission
2018). It specializes in the manufacture of hardware and has become
the main exporter of computer equipment and network technology.
South Korea has the widest broadband coverage in the world.
However, there is a clear divide between more advanced countries in
the region (South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan)
and less developed countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines.
The emerging economy of China is catching up rapidly, with
astonishing growth figures of more than 50 per cent Internet
coverage in 2018.
East Asian countries reveal a strong emphasis on government
initiative in order to stimulate the private-sector manufacture of ICT.
These states make strategic and selective interventions in the
economy to promote and sustain development but leave most of its
execution to private enterprise. This is the situation in China, where
the government’s Five-Year Plans are realized mainly by large
companies financed by the Chinese Bank and ministries. Even before
2000, influential ministries in most East Asian countries launched
and coordinated nationwide plans to promote digital media in
society. Examples in the first decade of the twenty-first century are
the Technopolis programme in Japan, the Singapore One Project, the
Malaysian Super Corridor Project and the Cyber Korea 21 initiative.
The ultimate aim of these plans, which adhered strongly to the
technological and economic perspectives, was to accomplish
universal service, not by funds and subsidies as in the US or by
regulation as in the EU, but by galvanizing the national telecom
companies and electronics manufacturers to roll out infrastructure
and to produce equipment that will eventually extend to every
household.
The assumption was that this diffusion of general technology,
accompanied by nationwide awareness campaigns, would lead to
wide-scale adoption of the Internet. In a third phase, digital skills
and useful applications for the economy and society would be
promoted. Unfortunately, this staged approach can lead to
stagnation after a time because digital skills, user experience and
local development have to be organized in parallel. This warning was
expressed early on by critical observers such as Wong (2002) and
Shin (2007). After an incredible uptake of broadband access
throughout South Korea lasting about twenty years, these observers
have been shown to be right. The gap in physical access between
parts of the population (social class) have largely disappeared, but
the gaps in digital skills and usage remain substantial (Park and Kim
2014).
In the last fifteen years, the national policies of East Asian countries
have paid greater attention to the social, educational and persuasive
perspectives. South Korea was the first, with the launch of their plan
Bridging the Digital Divide (KADO 2003). This had more focus on
digital skills, usage inequalities and disadvantaged groups than for
example the US and Europe had at that time. However, awareness is
not the same thing as achievement. The Chinese government also
wants to reduce the enormous gap in Internet access and use
between the urban and rural population and between the poor and
the rich (Ben et al. 2017). In fact, the (relative) gaps in access, skills
and usage between city and region and between poor and rich are
persistent and even growing (Ben et al. 2017; ITU 2017).
The technological and economic perspectives remain dominant in
East Asia, as is testified by the latest plans such as the Digital
Economy Framework for Action in Singapore (IMDA 2018) and the
13th Five-Year Plan for National Informatization in China (2016–20)
(Ben et al. 2017).

Europe
North-Western Europe is ahead in physical access as compared to
the United States and most East Asian countries (ITU 2017; Ben et
al. 2017; WEF 2018; Broadband Commission 2018). However, the
Southern and Eastern European countries are lagging far behind,
with access figures at only about half the rate of their neighbours
(Digital Economy and Society Index 2018; ITU 2017; Ben et al. 2017;
WEF 2018).
The European Union (twenty-eight member states in 2018) is very
much engaged with an all-inclusive information society, having
produced documents between 1995 and 2010 with titles such as An
Information Society for All. However, it is the economic perspective,
stimulating technological innovation and diffusion, that is dominant
in the EU. The main goal is to create a common market and to reduce
the gap between North-Western and South-Eastern countries using
such plans as Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market
(European Commission 2016a).
The major strategic route taken by the EU is to liberalize
telecommunications and the whole media sector. Building and
distributing the new infrastructure is left to the market. It is
questionable whether the policy of stimulating innovation and then
correcting the market through regulation is successful (see ETNO
annual reports 2016 and 2017). European Internet companies have
been left standing by American and Chinese companies, and the EU
today has more problems regulating the big American Internet
platforms than in liberalizing their own media companies.
As the (Western) European countries purport to be welfare states, in
theory they should redistribute resources, be they hardware,
software, services or training opportunities, to people who have little
or no access. However, this has not happened. The EU’s information
society policy has shifted to a technological and market focus, and
the European Structural and Investment Funds for innovation and
R&D have to be directed towards new business opportunities. Public
national and local government investment is organized by the
member states themselves in the field of education and to support
particular problem areas or groups. It focuses on educational
resources, public access, community-building, and some assistance
to the unemployed, people living on social benefits, and low-income
families with school-age children.
Taking all spending into account, it seems that articulated
government investment in closing the digital divide is considerably
more generous in the EU than in the US, but lower than in East Asia
(see the balance of European public investment in Rubio et al. 2016).
However, it is impossible to measure the precise overall public
investment in ICTs in all these countries.
One of the most important differences in digital divide policy
between the EU, the US and East Asia is the much bigger role in
Europe for public awareness-building programmes and the
promotion of the information society (Servaes and Burgelman
2000). A major proportion of EU funding goes to model and
awareness projects. Besides, more regulation is proposed to
transform the Internet into a safer environment for users. In this way
Europe pays comparatively more attention to a persuasive
perspective. More recently, there has also been an educational
perspective with the publication of A New Skills Agenda for Europe
(European Commission 2016b; see also Helsper and van Deursen
2015; Cruz-Jesus et al. 2016). The European Commission has
discovered that a lack of digital skills in the workplace has caused a
fall in productivity and in consumption in the digital market. A
majority of European employers take no action to improve the digital
skills of their employees (Ecorys and DTI 2016).

The developing world

In the developing countries, by 2017 Internet access was reached by
an average of 40 per cent of the population, though in the least
developed countries (LDCs) the figure was less than 20 per cent (ITU
2017). This was achieved mainly by an amazing upsurge in mobile
telephony: 80 per cent of people in developing countries have a
mobile phone, about half of whom have a mobile Internet
connection. However, most people use a feature phone with very few
Internet options; only a minority own a smartphone (3G), and fewer
still have a 4G mobile phone that can actually be called broadband
(ITU 2017).
The spectacular success of mobile telephony in the developing world
inspired policy-makers and scholars with the idea that these
countries could ‘leapfrog’ the construction of an expensive fixed
infrastructure of cable, copper and fibre lines realized in the
developed world and immediately transfer to a mobile network
(James 2003). This idea is contested (see below), but the most
important conclusion is that it testifies to a technological solution to
bridging the digital divide. A second perspective makes the
assumption that deploying ICT infrastructure enhances the
economic, social and cultural development of developing countries as
a whole. This too is challenged. The counter-arguments are 1) that
deploying infrastructure is not a cause but an effect of economic
development and 2) that such effects lead to combined and unequal
development: the rich and most parts of the developing countries can
be linked to the world market and advanced technology, while the
poor, most often rural parts of these countries are lagging behind
more and more. The rural and urban divide is the most important
problem both in emerging economies such as China and in the LDCs.
These doubts raise the basic question as to which strategy of
development bridging the digital divide is best for the developing
countries (Mutsvairo and Ragnedda 2019). Four strategies are
available (van Dijk 2005). The first is to adopt some kind of staged
approach, such as the one conducted in East Asia, first rolling out the
technical infrastructure such as mobile broadband and promoting a
local industry of ICT production and/or software development. The
second stage is to invest in medium-related digital skills, first for
those who need it most, then for the whole population, and the final
stage is to develop usage applications for everybody and teach
content-related skills in schools.
A second strategy is a strong version of a staged approach: leapfrog
the development phases and go directly to the deployment of
infrastructure and the manufacture and servicing of ICT in industrial
regions directly linked to the world market. This is what India and
some East Asian countries have done.
The third strategy is the opposite of the staged approach. It is argued
that Third World countries can evolve only gradually from their
present state. A large-scale distribution of information and
communication technology is not at present the most important goal.
In its place, all energy should be devoted to basic material and
human resources – working electricity, transport, health, basic
education and media such as the press, broadcasting and telephony.
Surprisingly, this strategy was also suggested in a speech by the
founder of Microsoft, Bill Gates: ‘I am suggesting that if somebody is
interested in equity that you wouldn’t spend more than twenty per
cent of your time talking about access to computers, that you’d get
back to literacy and health and things like that. So the balance that
makes sense is that more money should be spent on malaria’ (Gates
2000).
The final strategy is a rejection of all stage approaches and proposes
that investment in technical infrastructure, education and usage
applications should be made in parallel (Mansell and When 1998).
Clearly, this strategy fits best with the core argument of this book.
However, the four successive phases of technology appropriation by
individuals are not stages of diffusion in the development of
countries. The only conclusion derived from the theory and model of
phases of technology appropriation is that technical, social,
economic, cultural and educational resources have to be deployed
equally for development to take place.
All five policy perspectives discussed here are needed to mitigate the
digital divides in developing countries. From the technological
perspective, the most popular strategy is to go mobile. Indeed, the
explosive growth of mobile telephony and the Internet has provided
a taste of the opportunities inherent in media networking for the
peoples of Africa, Asia and South America: better communication,
services and basic information for everyday life. Messaging is
cheaper than calling. Health information is in close reach and
hospitals can be contacted. Government and other public services are
available online. The latest information about food prices and
diseases, agricultural technique and irrigation can be retrieved. All of
this is very important to boost the motivation for and relevance of
digital media use.
However, the developing countries cannot ‘leapfrog’ the diffusion of
digital technology simply by going mobile and would in fact remain
stuck in their current stage of development. Mobile phones are
powerful tools for existing production, circulation, consumption and
communication; they support current agriculture, trade and the
formal economy in these countries, but they do not create a new
mode of production to compete in the world market. To reach a
higher stage of development, what is needed is the construction of a
fixed infrastructure of huge computer centres and fibre or copper
cable networks, with mobile only at the so-called local loop for
reaching users, all of which requires enormous investment. China
has understood this and is currently preparing the relevant
infrastructure (Shenglin et al. 2017). In the meantime, what is called
for is general broadband access in public buildings, community
centres and Internet cafés.
From the economic perspective, ICTs offer a good means of entry for
small and medium-sized business start-ups in mobile phone rental
and repair, computer training and data entry or software, telephony
services for international companies, and Internet cafés. A
reasonable level of access to the Internet and the global information
infrastructure is required to be able to participate in the trend of
outsourcing of production from the high-tech economies to the
newly industrializing economies.
The most important conditions necessary to achieve this are a
working infrastructure (reliable electricity and connections),
educational resources (literacy, school attendance, participation of
girls) and political institutions (regulation and a working system of
law to fight corruption). Without these conditions the digital divide
will certainly not be mitigated.
From the educational perspective, just providing schools with
computers and Internet connections is not enough (see the criticism
of the One Laptop per Child strategy below). More basic investment
has to be made, such as building more schools, training teachers (not
only in digital skills), enabling children – especially girls – to go to (a
higher level of) school, developing better curricula and providing the
old medium of textbooks.
From the social perspective, public access is crucial. Next to
adequate mobile connections, the availability of public access points
with broadband capacity is needed to reach at least a basic measure
of social inclusion.
Perhaps the best strategy is offered by the persuasive perspective. We
have seen what a boost to mobile connections and opportunities has
achieved. Showing the relevance of digital media for people in the
developing world is the best incentive (Mwim and Kritzinger 2016),
which means producing applications and content in the national or
regional language which fit their needs (see some examples provided
above). The worst strategy is to impose provisions, programmes,
approaches and content from the developed, most often Western,
countries.

Means: solutions to bridge the digital divide

All five perspectives are required in order to find the specific
solutions to bridge or mitigate the digital divide. This section will
propose about twenty solutions for solving the digital divide problem
organized along the four phases of general access. In an earlier book
(van Dijk 2005) I portrayed them as the spokes of a wheel; figure 9.1
is an updated version, though, surprisingly, not much has changed
during the last fifteen years.

Figure 9.1. A wheel of policy instruments to bridge the digital divide

Motivation and attitude
The primary drivers of motivation and attitude are temporal and
material resources (chapter 3). Thus having children in school or
adults in a job where they have to use computers and the Internet is
the best solution to create positive motivations and attitudes. Mental
resources driven by a particular intelligence, literacy, technical
ability and personality are also relevant, but these cannot always be
changed.
Another influence comes from social and cultural resources. In a
context where large numbers of people are using digital media and
offering support, others will be motivated too. Social and
communication needs are the initial way of bringing people to the
Internet, as is shown today by the very fast adoption of mobile
telephony and social media in the developing countries. Cultural
resources – in particular the content manifested on the Internet and
other digital media – are the last important driver of digital media
use.
So, a first solution to bridge the digital divide where motivation is
concerned is to increase the surplus value of digital media as
compared to traditional media. This means creating relevant
applications and attractive content for every group of users. In the
1980s and 1990s, the Internet clearly belonged to young, highly
educated, male, rich, able-bodied Western users speaking English.
Today, while many other people are using the Internet, there still are
many minorities – cultural, ethnic, social and personal (people with
various handicaps) – who could be offered more motivation.
Examples are providing apps for migrants in their own language,
web access and assistance for the homeless, housing and job-finding
apps focused on the poor or on people with insecure jobs, and aids
for disabled people for easier access to and use of the web.
The second solution evidently is increasing the usability and user-
friendliness of digital media for all – a task for the companies and
the organizations offering websites, software and other apps aimed
at the general public. Both usability and the user-friendliness of
digital media have dramatically improved in the last thirty years, but
they remain a challenge because applications have become ever more
complicated and because there are increasing numbers of users with
low abilities.
A third solution is to provide information to promote relevant
applications. This might involve public campaigns for healthy living,
education, finding a job or community participation. However, it
might also mean creating more awareness about the positive
outcomes of Internet use. Recent research shows that most people
have only a general idea about the positive (and negative) outcomes
of Internet use (chapter 7). If they became more conscious of the
specific benefits of e-commerce, e-government and e-health or
finding jobs and educational opportunities online, they night be
more motivated to use the Internet.
This brings us to the attitudes which inspire people to want to use
digital media. The first solution to bridge the digital divide is to
promote the positive outcomes and to create awareness of and
ways of reducing the negative outcomes of digital media use. This
may be a task for government, educational and NGO actors, who
need to show clear positive outcomes in the domains of the labour
market, education, health and community. They might also show
ways of preventing or mitigating negative outcomes of excessive use,
abuse and the lack of secure and privacy-friendly online behaviour.
The main goal here is to support trust in digital media.
Promotion and creation of awareness will have no effect if
governments and public institutions make no new rules and
regulations to promote positive outcomes and to prevent negative
outcomes, particularly in the domains of economic competition,
security and privacy. The most urgent task today is to regulate the
social media platforms and their use, since these present the greatest
problems in terms of monopolization, cyber abuse, disinformation,
manipulation and loss of privacy.

Physical access
According to chapter 4, lack of material resources is the cause of the
huge gap in physical access between the developed and developing
countries, as well as inside many countries. This situation continues
because income inequality is rising in most parts of the world
(chapter 8), and neither governments nor employers are able or
willing to take action to improve matters. Other causes, such as
social and cultural resources, arise from people’s choices. However,
governments have the duty to organize universal and public access.
Universal access can be defined as ‘access to a defined minimum
service of specified quality to all users independent of their
geographical locations and, in the light of specific national
conditions, at an affordable price’ (European Commission 1996).
Public access is the provision of information and communication
connections, information sources and places where hardware,
software and connections required are freely available, for instance
in libraries, community centres, municipal halls and schools, and
perhaps free public wifi for people to use their own devices. Public
access is a substitute where a country cannot afford universal access,
which is often the case in developing countries.
Organizing physical access for all requires enormous investment,
which is one of the reasons why, in the last thirty years, most
governments have left this task to private companies. Only in East
Asia is there a sizeable amount of public or government investment
(see below). Elsewhere, governments tend to subsidize R&D and
academic research and try to realize universal access by regulation
and through market competition. For instance, private suppliers are
required to connect not only urban areas, with several subscribers,
but also remote, more sparsely populated regions at the same price;
this applies equally to broadband connections. Public regulatory
institutions also stimulate a better interconnectivity between
different channels or carriers such as the original telephone, satellite
and cable television channels. Governments do still invest in public
access, particularly in the developing countries, where at least
mobile access to the Internet is required.
Today, broadband access is the main priority in both developed and
developing countries. In the US this is the only remaining
governmental infrastructure policy. In developing countries
broadband access for all is needed to prevent a situation where the
majority have only 2G connections and only members of the elite
have 3G smartphones (Schoemaker 2014; Reed et al. 2014; Skaletsky
et al. 2017; Broadband Commission 2018). The difference between
narrow- and broadband connections is the most important divide in
physical access today (Napoli and Obar 2014; Schoemaker 2014;
Reed et al. 2014; Levine and Taylor 2018).
A highly contested subject of debate is whether governments should
directly subsidize physical access for disadvantaged groups.
According to my analysis, undirected provision of computers or
connections is not an effective strategy (van Dijk 2005), though
strictly conditional subsidies in particular situations might make
sense. Target groups might be the long-term unemployed, the
homeless, people below the poverty line, migrants trying to find a
job, and disabled people needing aids or peripherals to use
computers, with individuals required to take certain courses and use
jobsearch or job-training sites.

Digital skills
Provided that sufficient temporal and material resources are
available, mental resources are the most important causes of divides
in obtaining digital skills (see chapter 5). In this context, intelligence
aside, mental resources are technical proficiency or know-how,
knowledge of technological and societal affairs, and analytic
capabilities all of which can be developed through social contacts and
education.
However, education is actually the final step in solving the problem
of a lack of skills. In Digital Skills, van Dijk and van Deursen (2014)
dedicated a full chapter to digital skills policies, starting with
awareness and improving the design of digital technology and
moving on to the provision of technology, such as connecting schools
and providing public access. Also important is content development:
educational software, curriculum change and certification of
modules in skills programmes. Only then does the teaching of digital
skills in formal and adult education take place.
Organizing awareness programmes as to the importance of digital
skills can be done by labour, educational and government
representatives. This issue is not given priority in many labour
organizations and even in schools. Individuals often overestimate
their own skills (see chapter 5), which means that institutional and
self-assessments have to be undertaken and monitored.
Learning digital skills is much easier if there is a good design of
applications and content. Another aspect is to adapt hardware and
software for particular groups: seniors, the illiterate, disabled people,
especially the visually impaired, and those of very low intelligence.
Examples are extra aids for reading screens and following the
accessibility standards for websites.
Many policy-makers believe that connecting and equipping schools
and public access points with computers and the Internet is also the
starting point for learning digital skills. In poor countries and
regions this is indeed a necessity. However, several social and
educational scientists are critical about One Laptop per Child
projects and establishing so-called iPad schools (Warschauer and
Ames 2010; Selwyn 2013; van Dijk and van Deursen 2014). Simply
providing hardware and software without sufficient guidance and
educational innovation and without taking into account the local
culture is bound to fail. Instead of an approach of ‘simply handing
computers to children and walking away, there needs to be large-
scale integrated educational improvement.’ The poor countries
‘would be better off building schools, training teachers, developing
curricula, providing books and subsidizing attendance’ (Warschauer
and Ames 2010: 34).
Content development links more directly to the practice of learning
digital skills. First of all the meaning of digital skills, including
twenty-first-century skills, has to be established (see van Dijk and
van Deursen 2014; van Laar et al. 2017). Currently, only very general
frameworks are offered (see chapter 5); concrete standardization and
certifications are only available for the more technical medium-
related skills, such as those of ICDL (International Computer Driving
Licence) training centres. Content-related skills standards and
twenty-first-century skills definitions are still in the making. One of
the latest challenges is learning to cope with the growing
disinformation and manipulation on the web. There are no generally
accepted educational programmes available in schools and adult
education to deal with this problem.
Another task is to create more and better educational software
appropriate not only for average learners but also for particular
target groups (juniors, seniors, cultural minorities, illiterates and
teachers themselves).
Finally, it is necessary to support formal education at all levels, adult
education, both online and in specific institutions, and on-the-job
training or special ICT courses. For formal education, appropriate
curriculum change has to be made. The best option is not to create
special classes but substantially to integrate digital and twenty-first-
century skills into every school subject. Policy-makers could also
benefit from people’s personal experience: for the young, the digital
world they know best is quite different from the world of books and
chalkboards at school. These experiences should be integrated in all
regular computer or Internet courses (see suggestions in Davies and
Eynon 2018).
Many teachers in the developed countries have not learned digital
skills themselves in school, and so they expect that their young
students will have better medium-related skills. However, these
young people do not have the necessary content-related skills, so
teacher training is required to facilitate this (van Dijk and van
Deursen 2014).
Learning digital skills has to be integrated into daily life, and in
workplaces this means on-the-job training. In some countries, such
as Canada and Scotland, conditional funds for every citizen after
school life are considered. Today, government should invest not only
in formal education but also in lifelong learning by adults. Courses in
libraries, community centres, hospitals and other public buildings
should be adapted to the local culture and the specific needs of
participants.

Usage
In chapter 6 it was found that divides in digital media use arose from
social and cultural resources as well as material resources (income)
and temporal resources (time). Having a particular job, attending a
particular school, enjoying a relationship network and belonging to a
particular family influence the frequency and type of use.
These conclusions show that potential solutions should always be
relevant and adapted to the particular needs, social relationships,
lifestyles and cultures of potential users. At workplaces they should
support learning on the job and in homes they should fit the chosen
lifestyle. The first solution is special hardware and software
designed for particular groups such as the elderly, children (with
special attention to girls), the disabled and those who are
functionally illiterate. A second solution is to create special content
relevant for cultural minorities and socially deprived groups, which
most often means local content adapted to the needs of these groups
in their own language. This is the main way of providing relevance, a
goal that is becoming a part of current policy documents, even those
of technical and economic policy-makers.
A third solution, also focused on relevant content, is to stimulate
open access to all public and scientific information on the Internet.
This means not only free government, community and health
information or public broadcasting and news media but also greater
provision of freeware and shareware for applications that are
currently unaffordable for people on low incomes. This also means
supporting competition in software and services and breaking up
old (public) monopolies and new (platform) monopolies. There has
to be a way of preventing people with low incomes and education
from having to obtain news from cheap and unreliable sources such
as Facebook while quality newspapers online remain available only
to those with high income and education.
The last solution is the most important general strategy advocated
here. This is the full integration of digital media into social user
environments. So far, digital divide policy, from creating physical
access through to digital skills training, has had a mainly technical
orientation. Digital technology was presented as something different.
Providing the necessary hardware, developing digital skills and
installing digital projects in local communities were alien strategies.
To be effective, the local needs, languages and existing approaches
towards daily activities have to be integrated in every digital strategy.
Only this will motivate potential users (see figure 9.1).
These policy instruments to reduce the digital divide are quite
general. More specific solutions can be found in national policy
documents adapted to local needs. One of the best and complete
documents of this nature is Digital New Zealanders (Digital
Inclusion Research Group 2017), which makes use of the same
phases of access as this book (motivation, physical access, skills and
usage). It was inspired by a similar document, the UK Digital
Strategy 2017 (www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-digital-
strategy/uk-digital-strategy).

Leverage in the fight against both social and digital

inequality
In order to find solutions that not only mitigate the digital divide but
also touch both digital and social inequality systematically, I propose
the following five undertakings:

maintain or revitalize social mobility

increase the number of long-term social programmes adapted to
disadvantaged groups in their own communities
provide cheaper digital technology
design digital technology that is easier to use
draw up rules and regulations to manage the beneficial use of
digital media.

The first and most important of these is to maintain or revitalize

social mobility, which we have seen stagnating or decreasing in
many countries. In addition to governments establishing income
policies, public and private corporations should create jobs and
organize rotation schemes and continual learning with special
computer courses at all levels. This does not mean arranging a
flexible labour market. This flexibility in practice means a hold on
any lifelong learning because employers have no interest in schooling
employees who are likely to leave in a year or so. Nevertheless,
employers have to be stimulated to contribute to lifelong learning,
for instance through government direction and support. To reduce
the usage gap, employees should be allowed to learn more advanced
applications than are needed for their specific jobs. Developed
welfare states have to maintain or reinstall safety nets for workers
and unemployed people that allow them to find better jobs and
undertake lifelong learning, including digital skills (Mounk 2018). In
primary and secondary education, digital learning should focus at all
levels not only on medium-related skills but also on content-related
skills.
The second undertaking is to increase the number of long-term
social programmes for disadvantaged groups in their own
communities. Here social programmes can be integrated with digital
skills programmes involving the most relevant applications focusing
on housing, job search, health assistance and local culture. This local
orientation is also valid for developing countries. See the full
integration of digital media into user environments solutions
discussed above.
Evidently, providing cheaper digital technology will improve
physical access for all. Despite today’s lower prices, the proliferation
of devices, software, subscriptions, services and costs of training
consume an increasing proportion of the household budget in both
developing and developed countries. The cost of a smartphone in a
developing country can equate to several months or even a year of
income. Supporting competition in the marketplace is not the only
solution here. Hardware, software, content and services should be
provided in locations accessible to the public and all vital
information should be(come) free on the web.
The next undertaking is to design digital technology that is easier to
use. Accessible and user-friendly applications provide the most
important solution for people with low intelligence, the functionally
illiterate and people with particular disabilities. However, while all
the new digital applications based on artificial intelligence mean that
they are easier to use, the autonomous and automatic decisions
made on behalf of the user have to be understood and accepted. This
demands the most complex digital skills: strategic skills backed by
information skills.
The last undertaking is to draw up rules and regulations to manage
the beneficial use of digital and social media. In the last ten years,
social media platforms have produced serious problems – excessive
use, abuse of all kinds, disinformation or manipulation and privacy
or security problems – that have caused harm, in particular, to
people on the wrong side of the digital divide. These platforms are
private companies that evolved into monopolies, and they need to
create effective rules for the behaviour of their users. Governments
and other public bodies also have the duty to regulate the operation
of these platforms, otherwise the difference between knowledgeable,
wise, and experienced users, on the one hand, and those who lack the
requisite knowledge and experience, on the other, will become one of
the most important manifestations of the digital divide.

Future directions
National strategies have done a good job in creating awareness about
the coming digital era and problems such as the digital divide.
Today, access to digital technology is no longer a great issue. Tailor-
made policies addressing specific problems of, for instance, the
labour market, innovation, competition, education and community
development are now on the agenda. Increasingly, actions to bridge
the digital divide will be a task not for (inter) national government
and industrial-sector policy institutions but for government,
business and educational actors in the field, as well as, ultimately, for
users themselves.
We have seen that, in national policies, a shift has occurred from
mere technological and economic perspectives to social, educational
and persuasive perspectives. However, because digital technology is
evolving rapidly and economic growth, productivity and innovation
are continuing priorities, the technological and economic
perspectives remain dominant.
In the technological domain we see recurring cycles of appropriation
when new digital media arrive: the Internet of Things, virtual and
augmented reality, and hardware, programs and systems controlled
by data and artificial intelligence. Again and again, the first to
embrace these developments are the people with high education and
income and young people. The digital divide problem seems to be the
same but also different with all these media. Increasingly the
importance of content-related skills and strategic usage will become
the most important issue.
In the economic domain, changes in the economy will be
interweaved with changes in digital technology. This also means that
the digital divide problem will be less a marginal problem for
disadvantaged groups in society than one for the whole workforce,
citizenry, the market and its consumers. Robert Gordon (2016) has
shown that, so far, the productivity of information and
communication technology in America has been disappointing, less
than former technologies. We are still waiting for a substantial
contribution of digital technology to economic growth. One of the
reasons is the digital divide, especially the lack of digital and twenty-
first-century skills and omnipresent digital media use that also
improves production and not only distribution and consumption.
The final direction of development is the full integration of all digital
and social policies. In all domains and perspectives, technical and
educational or social approaches have to be combined. This book has
shown that social and digital inequality have in fact become the same
thing.
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Index

A
acceptance of technology theory 24–6, 30
access (physical)
conditional 49, 50, 57, 60
material 48–9, 60, 90–1,113, 121
access phases 2, 113, 134
motivation/attitude 39–44
physical 47–60
skills 61–75, 135
usage 80–92, 154–5
accessibility 43, 74–5, 112–13, 137, 153
adult education 54, 64, 69, 70, 71, 104, 124, 126, 134, 138, 152, 153
Africa 54, 85, 87, 147
Americans 8, 42, 55, 89, 92, 104, 107, 124
age 42, 53–4, 72, 77, 86–7, 103, 106–8
artificial intelligence 114, 128–9, 130
attitudes to digital media 34–9, 113, 149–50
augmented reality 49, 78, 114, 128–9, 130, 157
automation 74, 75–6, 128–9, 130, 156
awareness programmes 140–1, 145, 150, 152

B
Bonfadelli, Heinz 94,
Bourdieu, Pierre 27, 28, 118, 123
Brazil 55
broadband 48–9, 50, 53, 55–6, 75, 92, 135, 142–3, 146–8, 151–2
Broadband Technology Opportunities Program 142
Bush administration 8–9, 142

C
Canada 142, 145
capacity of digital media 49, 55
China 11, 143–4
Clinton administration 9, 141
combined and uneven development 135, 137, 146
community access centre (CAT) 135
community technology centre (CTC) 135, 142
competency of digital media use 62–4
competition (market) 136–7, 149, 151, 154, 156
computer anxiety 35, 38, 40, 43
computer driving licence 64, 153
costs of digital media 15, 27, 111, 113, 156
cultural capital 27–8, 40, 118–19, 120, 123
cultural differentiation 28, 94–5, 123
cultural inequality 6, 16, 28, 123
cultural opportunities 100, 103
curriculum change 153
cyberabuse/cybercrime 105, 107–8

D
design of technology 55, 133, 152–3
developed countries 3, 6, 9–10, 29, 52–3, 59–60, 85, 119, 135, 138,
141
developing countries 6, 9–10, 29, 52–3, 59–60, 85, 135, 141, 145–8
developing strategy 146–7
diffusion of innovation theory 7–8, 15, 18, 25–6, 58
digital divide
critics 8–9
definition 1–2, 7
evolution 16, 46, 58–60, 62, 94–5, 127–9, 130, 157
history 2, 7–14
level of research (first, second, third) 7–14, 18, 47, 98
metaphor 2–3
perspectives 4–5, 134–41
research 11, 17–23
research disciplines 20–1
research publications 22–3
research questions 17–19
research strategies 21–2
research themes 19–21
theory 23–33
digital literacy 5, 11, 62–5, 69, 93, 137–8
see also digital skills; literacy
Digital New Zealanders 155
digital skills 12, 57, 61–79, 80, 87, 90, 106, 108, 111, 113, 128, 129,
133–4, 138–9, 143–4, 145, 149, 152–4, 155, 156
communication 67–8, 76, 78
content-creating 67–8, 76
definition 63
formal 67–8, 70, 111
frameworks 61, 63–6, 68
information 67–8, 70, 72, 76, 78
operational 66–7, 70, 111
research strategies 65–6
strategic 67–8, 70, 72
ways to acquire 69–70
disabled people 32, 43, 55, 73, 88–9, 92, 139, 142, 150, 152, 154
disinformation (‘fake news’) 40, 67, 79, 104, 105, 107–8, 113, 151,
153, 156
domestication theory 26, 28

E
e-commerce 1, 10, 76, 79–80
e-government 10, 20
e-health 20, 124
East Asia 53, 136, 143–4
economic capital 27, 120–1
economic opportunities 99–101, 121–2, 136–7
economic theory 27, 136
Economist Intelligence Unit 13, 71, 136
educational level of attainment 12, 27, 51–2, 71, 77, 85, 103, 106, 125,
138
educational perspective on the digital divide 137–9, 157
educational software 153
elderly 12, 29, 54, 87, 124, 154
see also seniors
ethnic minorities 54–5, 92, 139, 154
ethnicity 8, 17, 32, 33, 42, 44, 54–5, 57, 94
Europe 1, 23, 82, 85, 97, 143, 144–5
European Commission 17, 22
European Union (EU) 69, 70, 144–5
excessive use of digital media 105, 106–7
exclusion/inclusion 5, 6, 9, 116–17, 139–40
expectations of digital media use 36, 38
exploitation 122

F
Facebook 121
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 141

G
Gates, Bill 142, 147
gender 29, 31, 33, 42, 44, 54, 57, 73, 74, 77, 84, 88, 91, 93, 106–8,
111–12, 125
generation (effect) 12, 53–4, 72, 87
see also age
Giddens, Anthony 27, 31, 123
Goldthorpe, John Henry, 118
Gordon, Robert 157
government policy 3, 7, 10, 134–8
gratifications from digital media use 36–8

H
Harari, Yuval N. 129
Hargittai, Eszter, 9, 18, 23, 61
haves and have-nots 7, 14
health 124
health information 13, 99, 100, 124, 147, 154
Helsper, Ellen 13, 104
Hilbert, Martin 2, 48, 55, 141
Hoffman, Donna 23
households 41, 53, 71, 86

I
illiterates 40, 42,73–4, 88, 89, 92, 115, 130, 142, 154, 156
full 73–4, 89
functional 73–4, 89
Inclusive Development Index 136
income 2, 8, 17, 21, 27, 32, 39, 50–1, 55, 58, 59, 83, 84, 85, 92–3,
120–1, 151, 154–6
India 85, 120
Indonesia 85, 143
inequality
absolute 3, 112, 115–16, 124, 130, 132
categorical 19–30, 31
cultural 123
economic 120–1
information 1
old and new 13–15
personal 31–2, 42–3, 123–4, 125
positional 32, 41
relational view of 29–30
relative 3, 113, 115–17, 121, 124, 130, 132
social 15, 110–15, 121–2, 130, 132, 155
structural 3, 93–4, 113
information and communication technology (ICT) 1, 4, 5, 41, 42, 54,
157
information elite 1, 3, 4, 41, 42, 53, 76, 116–17, 129
information overload 105, 106
information society 1, 76, 114, 115–16, 130, 144
innovation 4, 5, 6, 136, 141
intelligence 71–2, 42, 71, 88–9
intentions to use digital media 26, 38–9
interfaces 128–9
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 6, 17, 22, 23, 135
Internet cafés 48, 56, 147, 148
Internet dropouts 45
Internet experience 73, 87
Internet (non-)use 45–6
Internet of Things 49, 56, 75–6, 78, 114, 128–9, 130, 157

J
Japan 143
job training 154

K
knowledge gap 1, 15, 93–4, 130
knowledge society 115

L
labour market position 51, 71, 85, 138
Latin/South America 11, 23, 53, 147
‘leapfrog’ strategy 146–7
life chances 5, 28
lifelong learning 78, 154
lifestyle (digital) 28, 70, 103, 123–4, 154
LinkedIn 121
literacy 42, 62–3, 65, 88
traditional 62
see also digital literacy

M
Malaysian Super Corridor Project 143
Marx, Karl 118
Matthew effect 117
meritocracy 138
mobile telephony 10, 86, 90–2, 135, 146–7
mobility 75, 121
motivation for digital media use 1, 34–40, 113, 149–50

N
National Telecommunications and Information Administration
(NTIA) 1, 8–9, 59, 141
nations 52, 71 145–7
needs for digital media use 38–9
Netherlands 10, 12, 32, 68, 85, 91
network approach/relational perspective 29
network effects 122, 126–7
network society 6, 16, 30, 114, 115–17, 121–2, 125, 130, 139
network theory 29, 126–7
non-users of digital media/Internet 130, 140
Norris, Pippa 7, 18, 23, 58
North America 85, 141–2

O
Obama administration 10, 142
occupations 119–21, 122, 125
OECD 6, 133, 136, 138, 141
One Laptop per Child projects 135, 148, 153
open access 154
opportunity hoarding 122
outcomes 18–19, 57, 92–3, 86–109, 121, 141
negative 19, 98, 104–8, 110, 111, 150
positive 18, 46, 98–104, 110, 150
Oxford Internet Institute 59

P
participation 1, 4, 5, 20, 30, 31, 33, 93, 74, 95, 96, 102, 117, 139
personal categories 42–3, 53–4, 86–90
personal opportunities 103–4
personality 32, 33, 42–4, 53, 83–4, 89–91, 149
Pew Research Center 8, 59, 104, 107
Poland 89
policy perspectives on the digital divide 134–41
political and civic opportunities 102–3
positional categories 41, 51–3, 70–1, 84–6
positional good 115
power law 117
primary good 115
privacy protection 105, 108
productivity 12, 137, 145, 157
public access 12, 137, 145, 157

Q
quality of information 111, 113–14, 127

R
race 42, 53, 55
see also ethnicity
Ragnedda, Massimo 13, 28, 70
region(al) gaps 52, 71, 85, 142, 145–7
resources 5, 27–8, 32, 39–41, 50–1, 69, 83–4, 122
cultural 32, 40–1, 50, 70, 83–4
material 32, 39, 50, 68, 84
mental 32, 39–40, 50–1, 68, 84
social 32, 39–40, 50, 68, 83
temporal 32, 39, 68, 84
resources and appropriation theory 30–2, 44, 57, 74, 81, 96–7, 109,
110
Rogers, Everett 7–8, 58

S
s-curve of adoption 8, 18, 58
Scotland 154
search engine use 1, 5, 66, 67, 68, 77, 79, 82, 112
security protection 105, 108
segregation/segmentation 114, 124–7
Sen, Amartya 4–5
seniors 8, 10, 42, 54, 54, 70, 72, 139
Singapore 11, 12, 144
Singapore One Project 143
skill premium 77, 100
skills 5, 61, 77
see also digital skills
social capital 27, 121–2, 172
social class 8, 77, 93, 94, 114, 117–20, 121, 123–5, 130
social mobility 125–7, 138–9, 155–6
social media/social-networking sites 1, 4, 6, 10, 103, 120, 121–2,
126–7, 156
social network position 41, 53, 71, 86, 93
social opportunities 101–2
solutions to the digital divide 132–4, 149–57
South Korea 11, 143–4
Spain 12, 23, 85
stratification 18, 58, 114, 125
structuration theory 27, 31
subsidies 152

T
teacher skills 138, 142, 148, 149, 154
technical ability 40, 71–2, 88, 91, 93, 112
technical acceptance model 25, 26, 81
technical characteristics of digital media 20, 49, 55–6, 74–6, 90–2,
127–9
technical determinism 9, 135–6
technological diffusion policy 135–6, 142, 146
technology maintenance 56, 60
technophobia/technophilia 40
Technopolis program 143
theory of planned behaviour 24–5, 26
Tilly, Charles 29, 122
trickle-down principle 8, 18, 27, 58
twenty-first-century skills 61, 78–9, 94, 157

U
unemployed 34, 39, 41, 51, 89, 85, 118, 119, 145, 156
uneven development 137
see also combined and uneven development
unified theory of acceptance and use of technology 25, 26
United Kingdom 11, 23, 32, 45, 74, 84, 85, 89, 98–9, 101, 102, 120,
122, 123
United Nations 6, 17, 22, 23, 59, 141,
United States 1, 8, 42, 55, 144
universal access 59–60, 112, 135, 142, 151
universal service 151
usability 75, 150, 156
usage gap 11, 93–5, 113, 156
usage of digital media 57, 76–7, 80–3, 110–15
creative or passive 80–1, 83
diversity 18, 76, 80–2, 83, 113
frequency/amount 18, 45, 46, 80–1, 83, 113
use typologies 81–2
user-friendliness 150
uses and gratification theory 25–6, 81–2

V
van Deursen, Alexander 12, 13
van Dijk, Jan 12, 23, 94
virtual reality 49, 128–9, 157

W
Warschauer, Mark 23
Weber, Max 28, 118
World Bank 6, 13, 17, 22, 71, 136, 138, 141
World Economic Forum (WEF) 136, 138, 141
World Internet Project 22
World Trade Organization (WTO) 136

Y
young people 15, 28, 40, 42, 53, 54, 72, 91, 101–2, 106, 124, 129, 140,
154, 157
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