MARTHA DOHERTY ON SATCHIDANANDENDRA SARASWATI SWAMIJI A

COMMENDATION AND NOT A CONDEMNATION

A Review of Martha Doherty’s paper published in The Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005)

“Whatever teaching is presented to one (by the preceptor), he sees that as his very self. That teaching, becoming
his self, binds him from all sides and the obsession that that is the only truth, merges into him (GK 2.29)” - says
Gaudapāda in his kārikās on the Māndukyopanisad. What a pronouncement on the human psyche, even true to
this date. It requires a metal of steel to swim against the current. Where the whole clan is obsessed with a
particular idea and that too for centuries, it calls for great amount of grit to see the Truth or even to side with it.
Personal bias, natural human tendency to side with the majority, want of a discerning mind, lack of in-depth
knowledge resulting in getting carried away by others’ opinion and other external factors etc are the barriers to
determination of Truth.
Martha Doherty’s paper “A Contemporary Debate Among Advaita Vedantins on the Nature of AvidyĀ”,
published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) is taken up for a brief review. May be the same has been
already commented upon by others; some may agree with these observations, while many may disagree; some
may applaud, while many may condemn; some may react soberly, while others sharply; may be none reacts;
what more may be no one even bothers to read this in full. But still, the review is presented to the readers just to
bring to light that Martha Doherty’s (hence forth referred to as M) endeavour to condemn Satchidanandendra
Saraswati Swamiji (herein after referred to as Swamiji) has in fact resulted in unexpected commendation.
Attempt of M to portray Swamiji in poor light by all means, overt and covert, has ended up in presenting
Swamiji in a way better than any one would have desired. Those who are unable to control the curiosity and
those who have lesser patience to go through the sequence of this review may straight away read Para 70 of the
review to know how the condemnation has transformed into commendation. Para 53 also may be referred to for
the views of the custodians of the Advaitic tradition with regard to Swamiji. Others who are in no hurry to jump
to the concluding part may follow the sequence of the review.

1. Śankara’s view on avidyā and the controversy arising on account of criticisms by Swamiji of the
interpretation of avidyā by the sub-commentators on Śankara (excluding Sureśwara) herein after referred to
as traditionalists/advaitins forms the focus of the paper presented by M.

2. Admittedly, “Mūlāvidyānirāsā” (herein after referred to as MVN) authored by Swamiji, is the primary
source used in this work for his thoughts on the nature of avidyā – Note 8 on page 212. Everyone concerned
with this matter will agree that in order to properly understand this polemic MVN
a. one should be thorough with prasthānatrayabhāsyam of Śankara and Sureśwara’s vārtikam &
naiskarmyasiddhih, which form the basis for Swamiji’s views and which are profusely quoted by
him in his works to substantiate his stand;
b. one should be thorough with all the major works by Vedantins – Pañcapādikā, Bhāmatī,
Pañcapādikāvivaranam, Brahmasiddhih, Istasiddhih, Advaitasiddhih, Siddhāntaleśasangrahah
etc. which have been dealt with in detail by Swamiji in MVN;
c. one should be thorough with bhāsya of dualistic vedantins like Śrībhāsya of Rāmānuja etc which
is also dealt with by Swamiji in this work;
d. thorough study of all these mentioned above, presupposes a sound knowledge of Sanskrit, the
language in which the works are written in. This prerequisite is required so as to avoid being
misled by errors in translation unconscious or otherwise;
 e. last and the most important, one should possess a sharp discernable mind devoid of prejudice and
influence by factors external to the works directly concerned. An inward look is also essential so
as to verify certain statements with one’s own experience, wherever such verification is called for.

3. The work under review consists of 30 pages proper [page 209 to page 238 of “The Journal of Indian
Philosophy (2005)” leaving out the particulars of references]. Of these over 11 pages is devoted to
historical/sociological considerations, which in the strict sense, does not form part of the scope of the topic
admittedly, being to decide upon the fidelity of the traditionalists to Śankara, and not whether Swamiji
conforms to tradition or not etc. Leaving out 4 pages of introduction and over 2 pages devoted to Swamiji’s
understanding of mithyātva which is again in the strict sense extraneous to the admitted scope, the matter
proper spans into about 12 pages.

4. MVN, admitted to be the prime source of Swamiji’s views, spans into 238 pages. Here Swamiji proceeds in
a systematic way restricting himself to the subject of mūlāvidyā in its various aspects as projected by the
traditionalists. It does not enter into other matters of divergence between Śankara and the traditionalists. The
work is divided into four main cantos - the first details out the rival propositions and lays down the
standards of judgment to be followed in ascertainment of validity or otherwise of the conclusion arrived at;
the second (divided into 8 heads) deals with the in-depth examination of the opinions of the traditionalists
starting with “The non-ascertainment of paramārthasattā (absolute truth)” which is essential for the
ascertainment of the non-absolute nature of the states of awakening etc and proceeds to show the
unprovability & untenability of mūlāvidyā on various grounds and under all circumstances put forward by
traditionalists to maintain its tenability; the third canto presents the Swamiji’s views on the matter starting
with “capability of ascertainment of the absolute truth” on the basis of which the unreality of the states of
awakening etc can be successfully ascertained. This canto is divided into 14 heads wherein the rival views
are discussed in detail under the topics of “nature of avidyā (svarūpam)”, “the object of avidyā (visayah)”,
“the locus of avidyā (āśrayah)”, “effects of avidyā (kāryam)”, “cause of avidyā (nimittam)”, “destruction of
avidyā (nivrttih)” are discussed; the fourth canto deals with fidelity of the opposing views to Śruti, bhāsyam
etc.
Thus this polemic calls for a deep study and application of reasoning based on universal human
experience in addition to reference to and conformation from the texts of Śruti, bhāsya etc. In order to prove
Swamiji wrong the reasoning put forward have to be equally deep and strong.

5. First and foremost M’s references of MVN is taken up for review. Let us now see how many of and to what
extent, the grounds of Swamiji to substantiate the unprovability, untenability and unnecessity of mūlāvidyā
are successfully refuted by M. In the whole of the paper, 16 paragraphs of MVN (two of them twice) are
referred to from that extensive work. Let us consider each of the paragraphs quoted, in the order in which it
is quoted.
Page 216 – Note 17; here four Paras of MVN are quoted – 65, 66, 67 & 174 to substantiate the statement
“He (Swamiji) reasoned that since there is nothing outside of these states, when they are analyzed, the truth
is understood”.
This is not Swamiji’s original idea but it is an echo of an express statement of Śankara that “These very
states are ‘the knowable’ in as much as there is nothing to be known beyond them” (GKBh 4.88). Thus
Swamiji’s views about the three states in Para 65 “hereinafter is demonstrated the method adopted by Śruti
(śrauti prakriyā) as endorsed by the adepts like Gaudapāda, Bhagavatpāda (Śankara) etc.” stands vindicated.
This fact is mentioned by way of a note on page 86 of MVN. Further, while commenting on Māndukya
kārikā 4.87, Śankara introduces the method of analysis of the three states as “atha idanīm svaprakriyā
pradarśanārtha ārambhah” – Now then is the commencement of demonstration of his own (Gaudapāda’s)
method. Thus the analysis of the three states as a competent means to arrive at the knowledge of Reality is
 the Vedic method taught by Gaudapāda and Śankara, which Swamiji refers to in MVN and it is not his own
as is presented by M.
Adequacy of this method is dealt with by raising various objections and effectively meeting them in
Paras 66 & 67. Of these not a single point has been pointed out by M as being unreasonable or erroneous.
Para 174 shows how the examination of the three states is given prime importance by different Upanisads in
arriving at the knowledge of the reality. This again is not refuted by M.

6. The reference to Para 2 of MVN is probably to indicate inconsistency of Swamiji in the matter of
determination of “True method of Vedanta”. This is on account of not appreciating the scope the two works
MVN & “Vedānta Prakriyā Pratyabhijñā” (herein after referred to as VPP). The later work has a larger
scope of determining the overall system of Vedanta – adhyāropa and apavāda (deliberate superimposition &
recession) which when recognized transforms the all-seeming chaos into cosmos with regard to the sacred
text. Where as, MVN aims at pointing out the mode “inquiry of three states”, which is most competent
amongst various modes advocated by the Upanisads in the Intuition of Reality. In other words the scope of
MVN is comparatively limited in nature restricted to selection of one of the many modes as primary in
contrast to the larger scope involved in determining that one system, which operates in all the different
modes and the overall method of teaching of Vedanta. A careful study of Para 174 of MVN and the
introduction to VPP (Both English & Sanskrit, will make this clear to the reader). The determination of
adhyāropa apavāda prakriyā as the all encompassing method is again not the brainchild of Swamiji. It is an
echo of Śankara’s quote “ādhyaropāpavadābhyam nisprapañcam prapañcyate” (GitaBh 13.13) – that
(Reality) which is devoid of all details, is set forth in detail, through deliberate superimposition and
recession and Gaudapāda’s kārikā “sa esa neti netīti vyakhyātam ninhute yatah” (3.26) –since that which is
said is rescinded by the Śruti as “sa esa neti netīti”. Examination of the three states as the primary mode
amongst the various modes again is the opinion of Gaudapāda & Śankara – GK (4.87, 88).
Moreover, M has erred in stating that Swamiji’s search had resolved in adhyāropa apavāda in 1964.
Swamiji refers to this method in the introduction to “Sugamā”, his very next Sanskrit work (an original
commentary on the Adhyāsa Bhāsya of Śankara) conceived and written many years prior to 1955, the year
of its publication. Thus M’s statement “In his early works…” is also contradictory to facts, since “Sugamā”
is the work which immediately followed MVN. Thus the covert(?) suggestion of M, if any, a change in the
stance of Swamiji with regard to the determination of the method of Vedanta is unfounded. However be it,
M has not refuted Swamiji’s views in either case – analysis of three states as the primary mode (declared to
be svaprakriyā in bhāsya on GK 4.87 & as all exhaustive in bhāsya on GK 4.88) or the adhyāropa apavāda
as the principal system of teaching (declared to be the method adopted by the adepts in bhāsya on Gita
(13.13)).

7. Page 219 Note 27 refers to Paras 53 & 129 of MVN in support of the statement “the most serious is that the
concept of a mūlāvidyā makes it impossible to prove non-duality, for if mūlāvidyā is postulated as the cause
of the world, this undermines Brahman’s status as the only cause. If there is a cause other than Brahman
there is duality”.
Para 53 of MVN deals with the proposition “bhāvājñāne jñānāpanodatvam sutarām na sambhavati” –
Destruction by knowledge is all the more impossible in case of ignorance being a positive substance.
Swamiji proceeds to show the untenability of mūlāvidyā on the ground of its non-destructibility by
knowledge by advancing various propositions resulting there by, in harm to the doctrine of non-duality.
Thus, Para 53 does not at all deal with the ground of ‘mūlāvidyā as the cause of the world other than
Brahman’ as presented by M.
Para 129 deals with the negation of the traditionalists’ theory that mūlāvidyā is the cause for the birth of
illusory objects and thereby on the same analogy negates the proposition that mūlāvidyā is the cause of the
world. This Para runs into three full pages of discussion on the above subject considering various
 propositions advanced by authors of different works. The Para ends with a passing remark that mūlāvidyā
being proposed as the cause of the world will go against the Vedic proposition of Brahman as the cause.
Thus both the Paras quoted by M in the support of her statement primarily deal with matters different
from that for which the same are quoted. The Sanskrit equivalent of the sentences of M in respect of which
these two Paras are cited, are not to be found in the Paras so cited. Moreover, M has not controverted any of
the many reasoning advanced or conclusions arrived at by the Swamiji under these Paras.

8. Page 219 – Note 28 – Para 27 of MVN.

This Para is quoted in support of M’s statement, “If avidyā is present in all the three states, it is real, as
real as Brahman, and therefore a second reality.”
Para 27 deals with the subject – “On the ground of the waking person’s recollection in the form of ‘I was
ignorant’, mūlāvidyā cannot be inferred.”
In the course of the reasoning Swamiji negates the proposition of the traditionalists that ‘that the
positivity of mūlāvidyā is only to distinguish it from an absolute void like a hare’s horn, and not a positivity
in the real sense and therefore it can be destroyed by knowledge’, on the ground that – even that
differentiating positive avidyā being present in all the three states, and traces of which is present even in
jīvanmuktas (those to whom knowledge has dawned) cannot be said to be eliminated by knowledge.
However, M totally omits the part of the reasoning given by Swamiji – “Traces of mūlāvidyā being
present even in jīvanmuktas” in presenting Swamiji’s views. This part of the reasoning also forms the basis
for the conclusion that the removal of mūlāvidyā by knowledge is untenable. This amounts to partial and
incorrect representation of Swamiji’s views.
Here also no reasoning or conclusions of Swamiji is controverted by M and the primary subject matter
of the Para is quite different from that to authenticate which it is quoted. Moreover, the Sanskrit equivalent
to the sentence of M in respect of which this Para is cited is not to be found in that Para.

9. Page 224, Note 42, Paras 41 &42 of MVN.

M’s states that – “ Swamiji’s understanding of mithyā and of avidyā, as purely superimposition, is
subjective idealism (drsti - srsti) which he acknowledges and defends;” M substantiates this statement by
quoting the above to Paras from MVN.
This statement and the Paras quoted in support lays bare the depth of understanding not only of the line
of reasoning advanced in these Paras in MVN, but also about that of drsti - srsti vāda. Paras 41 & 42 fall
under the major head “jīvabrahmavibhāgasidhyartham na mūlāvidyā svīkāryā” (mūlāvidyā need not be
accepted to establish the distinction between jīva and Brahman). The heading itself of Para 41 which reads
as - suśuptāvapi jīvabrahmavibhāgah svīkaranīyah iti paksah (The view of necessity of acceptance of
distinction between jīva and Brahman even in sleep) makes it clear that what is presented here is the
pūrvapaksa (opponent’s view) which is to be refuted subsequently Para 42.
Para 41 outlines the views of traditionalists who in the present context argue for the necessity of
mūlāvidyā in sleep
a. in the case of drsti - srsti vāda,
b. so as not to be in contradiction to the Brahmasūtra bhāsya where the continuity of the world is
established in the context of refutation of the Buddhists.
Para 42 titled, “jīvabrahmavibhāgo na avidyā tantrah” (The distinction of jīva and Brahman is not on
account of mūlāvidyā) proceeds in a systematic manner to negate the propositions of pūrvapaksa made in
Para 41. Thus the statement that Swamiji acknowledges and defends is totally incorrect, since Swamiji in
Para 41 treats this vāda as a pūrvapaksa (opponent view) which is refuted by him in Para 42 onwards.
In this context, it is interesting to note that the traditionalists considers the school of drsti - srsti vāda not
only as a member of its own clan, but also places it in a high pedestal as meant for top grade aspirants –
“Those qualified aspirants who on account of performance of various upāsanas and karma have come to
 possess incomparable greatness through God’s favour nay those whose minds are extremely pure, who do
not find any distinction between the waking and dream states, aiming at such aspirants of knowledge of
Brahman the drsti - srsti vāda is advanced which is in accordance with the Śruti that teaches the creation
and dissolution of the entire world in the waking and dream states, and this school has been advocated by
the earlier Ācāryas”. (Page 476 of Jīvānanda-vyakhyā to Siddhāntaleśasangrahah of Sri Appaya Dikshita –
reprint edition, 1990 published by Chowkhamba Vidya Bhavan, Varanasi.)
Sri Madhusudana Saraswati in his advaitasiddhih defends the drsti - srsti vāda, by devoting a whole
chapter titled “atha drstisrstyupapattih” (Now then the propriety of drsti - srsti) where in he demonstrates
the validity of this school on the authority of śāstras. The statement of M that “Since this (drsti - srsti) is a
view which is refuted by Śankara (page 224)” is also not correct. The charge of drsti - srsti being opposed to
Śankara is met by Madhusudana Saraswati himself in the chapter referred to above. Moreover, bhāsya on
2.2.28 is with regard to refutation of the views of vijñānavādin (a sub-school of Buddhists).
However this may be within the tradition, Swamiji cannot be said to fall under this group of drsti-srsti
vāda because of the very basic fact that the drsti - srsti school is not antithetical to mūlāvidyā and considers
the six beginningless entities (mūlāvidyā & distinction of Jīva and Brahman being two of them) as falling
outside the ambit of srsti and accepts the permanence of the world in the form of its cause.

10. Page 225 – Note 47 – Paras 27, 53 & 44 of MVN. M states “Swamiji concludes that if avidyā were to exist
in all three states of experience, it would be real and could not be removed by knowledge. In support of this
she quotes Paras 27 & 53(which were quoted earlier also). The main subject of the discussion in Para 27 of
MVN is that the recollection of awakened person, ‘that I was ignorant’ cannot lead to inferring of mūlāvidyā
in sleep. In the course of the discussion, the view of the traditionalists that the differentiating positivity of
mūlāvidyā (bhāvavilaksana) is also refuted on the ground that even this mūlāvidyā of the nature of different
kind of positivity being present in all the three states and the traces of it being in the jīvanmukta also, its
extinction by knowledge becomes unprovable resulting in the unprovability of mūlāvidyā’s unreality.
According to Swamiji, a positive avidyā cannot be removed by knowledge not only because of its being
present in all the three states of experience but also because traces of it is held, by the traditionalists, to be
present even in Jīvanmuktas even after the dawn of knowledge.
The impossibility of removal of positive avidyā by knowledge is dealt in Para 53.
Para 44 deals with the impossibility of ‘the unreality of the beginningless distinction between Jīva and
Brahman’, if that distinction is said to exist in sleep. Other reasoning are also extended to show that positive
avidyā is not required to be accepted as existing in sleep for establishing the distinction between Jīva and
Brahman. Swamiji points out that the union of Atman and avidyā (avidyācitoryogah) which is beginningless
according to traditionalists, cannot be rightly said to be unreal (mithyā) because the tradition holds that this
avidyā leaves out none till death being present in both the bonded and the liberated.
M has not refuted any of the reasoning made in these three Paras. Thus the Paras cited do not strictly
conform to the statements in support of which they are so cited. Moreover M has left out a very important
reasoning while presenting Swamiji’s views. M makes no mention of the traditionalists’ stand that traces of
avidyā persist even after the dawn of knowledge, which is the basis for Swamiji’s conclusion of its
indestructibility by knowledge.

11. Page225, note 49; Para 40 of MVN.

This Para has been correctly referred to by M. The conclusions of M with regard to this subject are taken
up for examination later, while dealing with the subject of mithyātva.

12. Page 225, note 50; Para 125 & 126 of MVN.
 These 2 Paras are sighted in support of Swamiji’s statements – “Something that is mithyā cannot have a
material cause, it is because it is mithyā that its appearance is tenable”. However, this sentence is found in
Para 128 of MVN.

13. Page 225, note 51; Para 128 of MVN.

This Para is quoted in support of M’s statement about Swamiji’s view that “The second is that it is not
tenable that something that has cause-effect relationship is mithyā. If it does, it cannot be mithyā.”
It is probably a printing error that Note 51 is appended to this sentence instead of being appended to the
previous sentence – “Indeed, what is called falseness (mithyātva) of a thing is that it appears without
existing.” The later part of the citation of the original text under Note 51 corresponds to this previous
sentence only.

14. Page 227, Notes 57 & 58 Para 76 of MVN.

This Para is quoted to substantiate, the charge made by M that “Swamiji makes frequent of shifting from
a vyāvahārika to a pāramārthika stand point and that he is often intractable on this, creating otherwise
resolvable conflict.” In order to appreciate the appropriateness of this charge, it is necessary to be
conversant with the whole of the context. The Para is titled – “Cognition of the world is on account of
avidyā only”. A free translation of the entire Para is given herein.
Opponent: If the world be totally non-existent in sleep how is it perceived on waking? If it be said that
“It is not the same world that is perceived on every waking”, then also it requires to be explained by whom
and how the new that day’s world, an imitation of the previous day’s world is created. Isn’t it improper to
say that the world on its own comes into being accidentally?
Swamiji: By whom and how is the nacre-silver (nacre which is cognized as silver) similar to actual
silver seen earlier, created? If you opine that there is no silver at all in reality and it is misconceived due to
the erring mind possessed of an inherent nature to make one grasp unreal objects, then, be convinced that it
is the same case even in respect of the world. If on the other hand, one on the strength of the neo-vedantins,
says that there is the “ignorance” which is the material cause and from that the silver is created there, then
such a person becomes a laughing stock at the hands of those guided by experience and he has to be
corrected by referring to the reasoning put forward in earlier Paras and also in the forthcoming refutation of
creation of nacre-silver.
Opponent: How is it that the world which cannot be experienced in sleep and its existence can in no way
be imagined, all of a sudden, comes into being on awakening? In the illustration of nacre-silver, the false
appearance is attributed to an eye defect and thus there is difference between nacre-silver and the world.
While negating even mūlāvidyā in sleep you do not admit of any defect in sleep from which can issue forth
the world in waking.
Swamiji: This is not correct, since it is seen that the world in spite of being unreal as viewed by the
liberated is being experienced by the one who is bonded (this is an illustration given to gradually arrive at
the answer that the world is perceived on account of misapprehension).
Opponent: But in that case also there is a difference. The liberated has no ignorance, whereas in the
other it is there. Further, the liberated and the bonded are different persons. Experience of the world and its
absence each being in respect of different persons, there is no contradiction. Here on the other hand, both the
absence and the experience of the world, being in respect of the same person, is it not a contradiction?
Swamiji: Here also there is no difference. Here too, avidyā is not accepted in sleep, but accepted in
waking. Thus the perception of the world and its absence being with regard to different states there is no
mutual opposition.
Opponent: But then it is the same person to whom the different states pertain to.
Swamiji: True. Still there is a similarity to the illustration, where in it is to the same person that, there is
appearance of the world during the state of bondage and otherwise during the liberated state.
 Opponent: That is okay. But still, the liberated does not perceive the world on account of his knowledge
dawned on the basis of Vedanta the valid means of knowledge, whereas the bonded experiences the world
conceived by ignorance and to that extent that illustration is appropriate. But here it amounts to the very
same person being bonded as well as liberated. The proposition that being liberated in sleep, one
becomes bonded on waking sounds absurd. Therefore there is a vast difference compared when compared
with the illustration.
Swamiji: Now listen with concentrated mind. It is not our stand that, being liberated in sleep, one
becomes bonded on waking. How then? Just as, though being ever liberated, due to non-discrimination of
the real nature of the self, one conceives bondage unto the self. Similarly while the world is ever absent, on
account of misapprehension there is the non-perception of the world in sleep and the reality of it on waking.
Thus there is no defect.

Thus ends the free translation. In support of the last sentence Swamiji quotes from Śankara-bhāsya on
Chāndogyopanishad (8.6.3) – “It was already said that the fall of Atman from its true nature in the form of
entering the states of waking and dream and perception of external objects is on account of the seed that is
avidyā, kāma and karma, being not burnt up by the fire of Brahmavidyā (knowledge of Brahman)” Here it is
very clear that the perception of the world in waking and the absence of its perception in sleep is due to
nothing but misapprehension. This sufficiently answers the question and also rules out the necessity of any
mūlāvidyā to exist in sleep for the world to be perceived on waking. Moreover the statement of Śankara
quoted by Swamiji vindicates him totally.
Tracing of perception of the world in waking to misapprehension will not amount to a shift in the stand
points from vyāvahāra to pāramārtha, since the concept of misapprehension squarely falls within the sphere
of vyāvahāra only. From the pāramārthika point there is no misapprehension also. Thus the charge that
Swamiji resorts to the shift of stand points is totally baseless. It is surprising that M has not made any
reference to the quote from Śankara-bhāsya cited by Swamiji to substantiate his answer. Moreover, M also
says that “Swamiji dismisses the objection by an appeal to experience”. There is no comment made on this
also. The universal experience does not show the existence of any mūlāvidyā in sleep.

15. The outcome of the examination of the instances from MVN to the extent quoted by M is summarized
below.
a. Statements are made by M for which no Sanskrit equivalent is found in the Paras cited by M.
b. The subject matter of the Paras cited do not primarily relate to the statements in support of which
they are so cited.
c. Statements from the original are quoted only in part, resulting in incomplete presentation of
Swamiji’s reasoning.
d. Opponent’s view taken up for refutation is wrongly reported by M as the view of Swamiji.
e. Except with regard to two instances of citation from MVN, M has not dealt with the correctness or
otherwise of the grounds put forward by Swamiji in the course of proving the untenability of
mūlāvidyā.
f. Even in those two instances one is an erroneous understanding in as much as the opponent’s view
is considered as the view of Swamiji. The other instance where the M charged Swamiji with
intractable change in stance, the same has been shown to be incorrect.
g. Wherever an appeal to experience is admitted to be made by Swamiji, M is silent on the outcome
of such examination. Moreover M has not denied the appropriateness of such an appeal to the
experience.
h. Thus MVN though admitted to be the primary source of Swamiji’s views is not dealt with by M in
depth and details that it calls for even with regard to the Paras expressly cited by her, leave alone
those which are not even cited.
16. Having dealt with the instances cited by M from MVN the topic of fidelity of the Post-Śankara
commentators to Śankara in the matter of nature of avidyā is taken up for review. The discussion on the
subject proper commences from page 213 of M’s article where the “Post-Śankara advaita commentators’
interpretation of avidyā” is presented as understood by M. No comment is made with regard to this portion
except that many facets of avidyā (like locus, number, unexplainability, traces, effect etc) have been left out
by M without which a complete picture of the traditionalists’ avidyā may not be had. The readers are
requested to refer the originals authored by various traditionalists who have contributed in their own ways to
the idea of the original avidyā.

17. Two Notes are appended by M to this portion which is dealt with in short. In note 11 Mandana Miśra is said
to be the first commentator in the advaita tradition to clearly define the distinction of a concealing causal
avidyā and its projected effect also called avidyā. But the point is whether Mandana’s avidyā in its various
aspects is the same as mūlāvidyā and its aspects. Does his distinction of the two avidyās correspond to the
concealing causal avidyā and its projected effect or is it the mere lack of knowledge and misapprehension.
A reference to Note 22 on page 218 where citation from Mandana’s work is given makes it clear that he
speaks of two avidyās - agrahana (non-apprehension) and viparyayagrahana (misapprehension) which are
placed in cause and effect relationship. Therefore Mandana’s two avidyā cannot be equated with the one
avidyā (mūlāvidyā) possessed of two powers – concealing and projecting. Mandana does not speak of a
concealing avidyā.
Moreover Gaudapāda much earlier to Mandana has used the dialect of kārana & kārya for non-
apprehension and misapprehension respectively.

18. Note 13, refers to a passage from Śankara’s Brahmasūtra-bhāsya (BSBh) (1.4.3) which according to M
supports the traditional view that “in addition to māyā the words avyākrta, avyakta, prakruti, ākaśa and aks
ara are also synonyms of avidyā”. It may be noted that even Swamiji draws support from this very passage
to establish the distinction between māyā etc and avidyā. This will be dealt with later along with Note 32,
both the notes being on the same matter.

19. Letus now examine the M’s presentation of “Swami Satchidanandendra’s view on avidyā”. M says that
“Swamiji bases this (his view that avidyā according to Śankara is mutual adhyāsa) on a definition of avidyā
given by Śankara in his Introduction to the BSBh.” M further says that “relying primarily on this definition
and maintaining that it is the only definition of avidyā given by Śankara, Swamiji proposes that
superimposition (adhyāsa) is the only meaning of avidyā used by Śankara.” Comments on this follows :
a. This statement of M itself is enough to vindicate Swamiji and prove his loyalty to Śankara. Is
there any other instance where Śankara has defined avidyā so as to warrant the comment
“Swamiji maintains that it is the only definition”? Neither M nor Sri Rāmā Shāstri whom M
quotes has cited any single instance from the Bhāsyas where avidyā is defined in any other way
by Śankara. Amongst the number of statements quoted by Sri Rāmā Shāstri (which will be dealt
later) not even one amounts to a direct definition. Bhāsya sentences purportedly equating avidyā
and māyā are also quoted by him (which is also dealt later) but there is not a single direct
sentence (similar to the present one) defining avidyā or its facets as held by the
traditionalists.
b. Not only has Śankara defined avidyā in this explicit way but he also reiterates this definition of
avidyā to mean mutual adhyāsa in the same introduction – “All the talk of pramānās and their
objects whether relating to the ordinary life or vedic action and all scriptures relating to
injunctions and prohibition of actions or to moksa presuppose this mutual adhyāsa or
superimposition of the self and the non-self called avidyā, before they function.
 c. It is only reasonable to conclude that the definition of a technical term given at the start of a work
is the intended meaning of the word wherever it is used subsequently by the author. Thus it is
reasonable to conclude that avidyā as per Śankara is, according to his definition, the mutual super-
imposition (mutual adhyāsa).
d. A serious reader of Śankara will come across many such instances in prasthānatraya Bhāsyas
where the nature of avidyā is dealt by Śankara. Here the translated versions of such instances are
intentionally not given so as to allow the reader to come to his own conclusion by reading the
original passages himself. The reader may refer to Brhadāranyakopanisad Bhāsya – 4.3.20,
4.3.34; Kāthakopanisad Bhāsya 2.1.2, GitaBh 13.2, 13.21, 14.6 etc (Readers may however ensure
that the translations are faithful to the original).
e. The reader is also referred to Upadeśasahasrī the only independent work of Śankara quoted by
Sureśwara as his preceptor’s work. In the second chapter of the prose section which is in the
dialogue form contains the specific question by the student “What is avidyā?” and there is a direct
answer by the teacher which is also reiterated subsequently in that work. (Translation is
intentionally not given) In the poetry section also one may refer to ślokas 17.21, 17.46 etc.
f. Thus one may see that in the contexts where Śankara defines avidyā, he explicitly refers to mutual
adhyāsa only as avidyā. It is but appropriate to take this definitional meaning to be the view of
Śankara and consider the fidelity or otherwise of the traditionalists with regard to the nature of
avidyā by juxtaposing their meaning with that of Śankara’s.
g. Further, one should ponder over the question, how far is it justified to be critical of the one who
insists on sticking to Śankara’s definition as it is, word for word, and does not offer his own
meaning to the different words in the definition as some of the commentators have done.
h. As is well known BSBh has been commented upon by a number of persons, all of them claiming
to represent the heart of Śankara. In the context of commenting on this definition of avidyā not all
the commentators are of a unanimous opinion. Certain commentators have explained the terms in
the definition in their own ways instead of adopting the meaning as is used in common parlance.
Certain others have stuck to the literal meaning. In this situation where commentators differ
mutually, what should be done? Therefore Swamiji implores the serious reader to strictly follow
the original and stick to the definition literally which will fully serve the purpose.
i. Justification of resorting to a meaning different from that defined, on the grounds of exigency
from time to time, amounts to nothing but undermining Śankara’s ability to present a system
which stands the test of time and circumstances.

20. M states that “this avidyā/adhyāsa, Satchidanandendra maintains it is uncaused”; “he provisionally accepts
that adhyāsa is due to lack of discrimination”. But these again are Śankara’s own statements (which M
admits later) and not promoted newly by Swamiji. It is no guess work that Śankara does not demand a cause
for avidyā for at the close of his introduction to BSBh he states that the mutual adhyāsa is beginningless.
Moreover, since causal relationship is inconceivable without the presupposition of time and the concept of
time itself being a product subsequent to the mutual adhyāsa, it is not possible to attribute a beginning to the
mutual adhyāsa. That is, the mutual adhyāsa, desiderates no cause and thus it is not an effect of any other
external cause.
In the introduction to BSBh itself Śankara says that adhyāsa derives its breath from non-discrimination
(aviveka), but it goes without saying that no temporal relation between the two is intended. The point driven
in is, the moment the discriminative knowledge dawns mutual adhyāsa disappears.

21. M proceeds “In discussing this absence of knowledge or viveka, Śankara, he (Swamiji) maintains, never
uses the word avidyā, but rather a number of synonyms that imply want of knowledge”.
 Here “Śankara never uses the word avidyā” attributed by M to Swamiji needs to be substantiated by M.
Where has Swamiji maintained thus? In his work VPP there appears a discussion on this lack of
discrimination on page 32 where it is said “so'yam vivekābhāvah ajñānam, āgrahanam, anavabodhah,
anavagamah, apratibodhah ityādiparyāyaśabdairapi jñānābhāvabodhakairvyapadiśyate bhāsye”- meaning,
in the bhāsya this lack of discrimination is referred to also by the synonyms indicative of absence of
knowledge like ajñānām etc. No words indicating “Śankara never uses the word avidyā” attributed to
Swamiji is found in the Sanskrit original.

22. The next statement of M taken up for consideration is “Swami Satchidanandendra therefore considers
avidyā purely in its manifest form as error which he also calls mithyājñāna” – page 216.
This again is not a figment of imagination of Swamiji. It is based on Śankara’s own statements in his
bhāsyas. A long list of citations containing the word mithyājñāna or its synonym exclusively in the sense of
misapprehension is given as an appendix to his works like Śankara’s Sūtrabhāsya (Self-explained),
Pañcapādikā Prasthānam (A critical appreciation) etc which the reader may refer to.

23. M says “He does not accept a concealing power (āvaranaśakti) as its (avidyā’s) cause even in an
epistemological sense.”
This again is in line with Śankara, who nowhere states that avidyā (mutual adhyāsa) has for its cause a
concealing power (āvaranaśakti).

24. M says “He (Swamiji) accepts māyā, prakrti, avyakta as causal at the level of known experience
(vyavahāra) but does not accept avidyā. It follows that he rejects the equating of avidyā with māyā, prakrti,
avyakta.”
This again is based on express statements by Śankara. The seed form of the universe called māyā, prakr
ti, avyakta etc is inferential in nature based upon the misapprehension of duality (BSBh 2-1-9). Evolution of
the not-self – the body conglomerate etc which is the object of mutual superimposition is traced to this seed
form called māyā etc. It is the mutual superimposition which is called avidyā while the inferred seed of all
of phenomenal universe is called as māyā, literally meaning false-appearance on account of ignorance.
Explicit statements to this effect are found in large numbers in bhāsyas list of which is appended to works
like Śankara’s Sutrabhāsya (Self-explained), Pañcapādikā Prasthānam (A critical appreciation) etc,
authored by Swamiji. Just one sentence is quoted here as an example – “Name and form which constitute
the seed of the world of mundane life conjured up by avidyā as though they were identical in the
omniscient lord, but which are indefinable as reality or other than that are called māyā, śakti (Potential
energy) & prakrti (primordial matter), in the Śruti and Smrtis (BSBh 2-1-14).” Thus Śankara himself
differentiates avidyā and māyā by terming the later as conjured up by avidyā and as inferential in nature.

25. The next point taken up for consideration by M is avidyā in sleep where M states - “Central to
Satchidanandendra’s position is that there is no avidyā in the state of sleep; only the reality, Brahman exist
there. Consequently, the self is considered available in the state of sleep in its true form…”
This again is not a personal opinion of Swamiji but the direct dictum of the Śruti itself. Further Śankara
also states in unambiguous and explicit statements the absence of avidyā in sleep not just once but
repeatedly. The citations are not given intentionally and the reader may refer the Bhāsya on the third and the
fourth brāhmana of fourth chapter in Brhadāranyakopanisad which is popularly known as the
svayañjyotibrahmanam. The Ajātaśatru – Gārgi conversation in the second chapter of the same Upanisad
may also be referred to. In these places one finds that absence of avidyā in sleep is being repeatedly stressed
in statement after statement. Even in the other bhāsyas where the nature of the self during sleep is discussed,
Śankara on the authority of scriptures, expressly states the pure nature of the self during sleep and equates it
to Brahman, Pure Consciousness.
 In the bhāsya there are statements to the effect that,
a. By negating of fear in sleep, the Śruti in fact negates avidyā, the cause of fear in sleep.
b. The self is devoid of all characteristics of Samsāra in sleep.
c. In sleep due to the absence of avidyā which is the cause of duality, the self is ātmakāma.
d. The pranā does not depart in respect of the desireless person, who intuits the self as the
attributeless, non-dual, of the nature of unbroken light of consciousness as is in the state of deep
sleep.

With regard to the express bhāsya statements declaring the absence of avidyā in sleep, one cannot assign
a secondary meaning to the word “avidyā” by stating that only projectional aspect of avidyā is meant to be
absent in sleep but the concealing aspect is present in the sleep. Such an argument will be in contradiction to
the use adjectives – devoid of all characteristics of Samsāra, of nature of Pure Consciousness alone, being
the ever pure, ever knowing and ever liberated nature (nitya-mukta-buddha-śuddha-svabhavatā) etc in sleep.
Moreover Śankara has not described avidyā as having two distinct powers.
With regard to sleep, the traditionalists postulate another point which is also in direct opposition to Śruti
and Śankara. The point is the reason for the ignorance in the form of “I knew nothing in sleep”. The
traditionalists trace the ignorance to the presence of mūlāvidyā in its concealment aspect in sleep. But the
Śruti and Śankara declare “oneness” as the cause of such ignorance. During sleep everything becoming one
with the Atman, the jīva being embraced by the true Self the Ultimate reality, becoming one devoid of any
interval, being the all-self (sarvātma) knows nothing within or without. Oneness as the cause for non-
apprehension in sleep is also expressly stated in Chāndogyopanishad and its bhāsya. In the Taittirīyopanis
ad bhāsya an opponent raises an objection – “Let the non-apprehension in sleep be on account of avidyā.”
Śankara negates this objection and answers that it is because being in its own true intrinsic nature,
independent of any external factor. Since the topic of sleep deserves an independent research paper, nothing
further is said.
Thus we find that, whatever has been said by M as ‘according to Satchidanandendra’s view’ “with
regard to avidyā, adhyāsa negation of equation of māyā and avidyā and absence of avidyā in sleep are based
totally on Śruti, and express statements of Śankara which are incontrovertible and they are not in the least an
original idea of Swamiji as is stated by M.

26. The next topic is with regard to matters stated under the head “Source of divergent views” – page 217. M
says “Swamiji traces the introduction of the concept of avidyā as existent and as the material cause for the
world to Padmapāda”. But on reading of the English introduction to VPP and Pañcapādikā Prasthānam one
finds that Swamiji is of the opinion that school advocating avidyā as the primordial material cause of the
universe was prevalent during the time of Mandana, who makes a casual mention of that school.
Though the authorship of Pañcapādikā is popularly ascribed to Padmapāda, the direct disciple of Śan
kara, no trustworthy internal or external evidence has so far been adduced to by any scholar to substantiate
this belief. Moreover, Swamiji finds that Pañcapādikā really represents altogether a different school of
Vedanta while it covertly poses to be a sub-commentary on a work propounding Vedantic absolutism. It
contains many a doctrine which is actually opposed and contradictory to that of Śankara of which avidyā is
just one among them.

27. M states that the crux of the problem is Padmapāda’s reading of the compound mithyājñānanimittah in the
section of introduction to the Brahmasūtra bhāsya where Satchidanandendra determined that Śankara has
defined avidyā as adhyāsa.
It is to be noted that not only Swamiji but Bhāmatī also while dealing with this definitional part has
determined avidyā as mutual adhyāsa.
28. M states that “Swami Satchidanandendra finds several difficulties in this passage from the Pañcapādikā.
The most important one is the Padmapāda’s resolution of the Śankara’s compound mithyājñānanimittam as
mithyā–ajñāna, it is ignorance and it is false.”
It is to be noted that the words mithyā-ajñāna does not according to Pañcapādikā mean “It is
ignorance and it is false” as M translates it. Padmapāda himself states his interpretation of the two words
– mithyā means indeterminable and ajñāna means the insentient potentiality of avidyā as opposed to jñāna
(sentiency). Probably M has inadvertently translated the two words as is commonly understood as against
the definitional meaning given to them by Padmapāda.
Swamiji’s understanding of mithyājñāna as false knowledge or error is supported by a number of
statements from bhāsya which are listed on pages 20, 125 to 131 in his Pañcapādikā Prasthānam.
Moreover, nowhere in the bhāsya has the word mithyā used in the sense of “indeterminable”.

29. M states “Other problems that he has are the various characterizations of avidyā as indeterminable
(Anirvacanīyā), inert (jada), a power (śakti) and the opposite of knowledge (jñānaparyudāsa).
Satchidanandendra particularly rejects the assertion that the power of avidyā (avidyā-śakti) is the material
(upādāna) cause of superimposition (adhyāsa).”
These are not the only “Other problems” in this context. One may go thorough VPP and Pañcapādikā
Prasthānam by Swamiji to know the various other inconsistencies with regard to mithyā-ajñāna. Śankara in
clear terms has said that mutual adhyāsa which is known as avidyā is fundamental to all human procedure
empirical and Vedic which will evidently include within its sphere even concept of time which in turn is
apriori to the concept of causation. Thus the ajñāna as postulated by Pañcapādikā as the material cause of
adhyāsa is opposed to Śankara. Moreover, the meaning of the term adhyāsa itself is different for
Pañcapādikā and Śankara. In Śankara’s introduction to BSBh, adhyāsa means false knowledge/error and
this is reiterated later as “adhyāso nāma atasmin tadbudhih – adhyāsa means mistaking something to be
what it is not.” However in Pañcapādikā this meaning of error is accepted only in the secondary sense, the
primary being the thing which is superimposed in distinction to the mental process of superimposition. Thus
according to Pañcapādikā explanation Śankara is not primarily thinking of an inherent error that assails the
human mind but only of something objective falsely appearing in place of another.

30. On page 218 M mentions that “The concept of avidyā as a two fold power, one concealing and one
projecting, existing in a cause effect relationship, Swami Satchidanandendra traces to Mandana Miśra.
Presenting it as the view of an opponent, which he subsequently accepts, Mandana characterizes avidyā as a
failure to apprehend (agrahana), resulting in an erroneous apprehension (viparyaya).”
The first sentence is factually incorrect. Swamiji does not trace “The concept of avidyā as a two fold
power, one concealing and the other projecting” to Mandana, but states that according to Mandana avidyā
is of 2 varieties, non-apprehension (agrahana) and misapprehension (viparyaya-grahana) and that Mand
ana adopted the nomenclature accepted by Gaudapāda who divides it into Kārana-avidyā and Kārya-avidyā.
Mandana does not speak of concealing power at all. Agrahana of Mandana is only non-apprehension
which is altogether different from the concealing power. The citation quoted by M under note 22
substantiates this. It does not speak of any concealing power.
As far as the second sentence is concerned the first part is correct, but the part “which he subsequently
accepts” is incorrect. Mandana’s acceptance of the concealing aspect needs to be substantiated by M.
Moreover, Mandana maintains that avidyā in Jīva belong to a beginningless series like that of seeds and
sprouts and that the avidyā of the each preceding jīva is responsible for the succeeding false imagination
which presents the next jīva in the series. Thus M has confounded the two different concepts of avidyā.

31. The Para “Implications” on page 219 is next taken up for consideration.
 M states that “For Swami Satchidanandendra… the mūlāvidyā is a misrepresentation of Advaita with far
reaching consequences.”
Here this statement needs a small correction – For Swami Satchidanandendra… The mūlāvidyā is a
misrepresentation of Śankara’s system of Advaita.
M enumerates certain of the consequences and in support of them cites Paras from MVN. All these
citations have already been examined earlier and therefore they are not dealt with here. The implications are
far more than what has been stated by M. K. A. Krishnaswamy Iyer in his introduction to MVN lists out
some of the serious consequences to postulation of mūlāvidyā –
a. The oneness of Reality which from the time of the Upanisads down to the time of Śankara &
Sureśwara was not a matter of faith but one of intuitive experience, not a doctrine accepted on
authority, but a Truth realized in life, has become a cardinal article of belief based on vedic
assertion admittedly unprovable.
b. In the hands of the present day vedantins the transcendental (pāramārthik) has passed into a pure
assumption, since all experience has to be included in the empirical. Vedantic truth has thus
become an unsupported dogma resting on the sanctity of the ancient writings, but neither
attainable nor demonstrable.
c. A great deal of importance is attached to Samadhi or trance and only the gifted are supposed to
enjoy the bliss of mystic union.
d. Their system cast an impenetrable veil over Brahman which has lapsed into a holy fetish
unconnected and unconnectible with life.

32. Comments with regard to the Para “Advaitins’ arguments against Satchidanandendra”.
Here and in the subsequent Para titled “avidyā and māyā/prakrti”, M presents the response of the
advatins to Swamiji particularly that of Polagam Rāmā Shāstri. However it is very strange, rather unfair that
M has not made even a single reference to the review made by Swamiji with regard to the comments of
Rāmā Shāstri. The views of Swamiji on the refutal are found in the very same “Vedāntavidvadgosthī”
quoted by M herself. The response of Swamiji to the refutal by Rāmā Shāstri if had been presented to the
reader, it would have enabled him to judge for himself the appropriateness or otherwise of the refutation and
whether the same has succeeded in proving Swamiji wrong or has only strengthened the views of Swamiji.
A mention at least, of the fact that Swamiji has reviewed the refutal would have served the cause of fairness.

33. While referring to the charge of plagiarism leveled on Swamiji by Rāmā Shāstri, M appends the Note 30.
The very first sentence in the Note is made on the basis of baseless surmises and is contrary to facts. M’s
tracing of the charge of plagiarism to “Some historical basis” is merely fictional. This is in spite of the fact
that Swamiji has denied his knowledge of Nāgeśa Bhatta’s allusion to mūlāvidyā, when he wrote the works
refuting it. It is true that Swamiji deeply revered Mahābhāgavata of Kurtukoti and studied under him. But
M’s bold statement that Mahābhāgavata of Kurtukoti was known in his time as an exponent of Nāgeśa Bhatt
a is unsubstantiated. No source work is indicated by M in this regard. Unless this statement is substantiated
by proper evidence, the surmise of historical fact falls flat. What has Swamiji himself to say in the matter of
the source for the knowledge of mūlāvidyā? In his preface to MVN, Swamiji expresses his indebtedness to
Krishnaswamy Iyer. There is no mention of Mahābhāgavata of Kurtukoti in this regard. Sri S Vittala
Shastry, the author of mūlāvidyā bhāsya-vārtika-viruddha (which M quotes under note 26) pays his
obeisance to Krishnaswamy Iyer as the one who brought to light “avidyā means adhyāsa”. Swamiji in his
autobiography in Kannada explicitly tells that it was K. A. Krishnaswamy Iyer who first brought to his
attention the variance between Śankara’s school and that of the traditionalists. Swamiji further tells that
Krishnaswamy Iyer took him to Virūpāksa Śastrī to prove his stand. Thus the history is nothing but her-story
in the absence of evidence.
34. M states under Note 30 that Satchidanandendra’s views on avidyā in Śankara has several features in
common with those of Nāgeśa Bhatta. This again is totally incorrect. Except for the common opinion that
mūlāvidyā is ultra-vires the Śankara-bhāsya, there is no commonality whatsoever between the two. A brief
reference to what avidyā means to both is enough to establish the difference between the two methods of
approach (of Swamiji and that of Nāgeśa) to the subject. Nāgeśa Bhatta’s avidyā is summarized by him as –
“Therefore misapprehension is the gross avidyā and its impressions (vāsanārūpa) termed as avyakta is the
subtle-avidyā. The subtle-avidyā being the cause of gross avidyā at the time of vyavahāra, it is called as the
cause (kārana).” – Page 282 of Vayyākarana-siddhanta-laghumanjuśā of Nāgeśa Bhatta published by
Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1989. Nāgeśa further says “Thus it is settled that avidyā is
of the nature of misapprehension and its impressions and this avidyā has an origin (janya)” – Page 296
ibid.
As against this view of Nāgeśa on avidyā, Swamiji sticks strictly to Śankara’s definition – “avidyā is the
mutual superimposition of self and the not-self.” Moreover according to Śankara the mutual adhyāsa
otherwise known as avidyā, is beginningless which Swamiji strictly advocates in contra distinction to
Nāgeśa Bhatta who holds that avidyā has an origin. Nāgeśa Bhatta on page 305 of his above mentioned
work reiterates the necessity of origination of avidyā. Even a casual reading of the views of Nāgeśa Bhatta
on avidyā will reveal that he follows the Bhāmatī School rather, renders a sort of commentary on Bhāmatī’s
statements. He pitches himself on Bhāmatī’s side and criticizes the mūlāvidyā citing statements from
Bhāmatī in support.

35. M says under note 30 that “Nāgeśa Bhatta rejects the interpretation of avidyā as indeterminable
(Anirvacanīyā).” This is incorrect. Following the foot steps of Bhāmatī, he expressly states that adhyāsa is
anirvacanīyā. Page 279 ibid.
After portraying avidyā as per Nāgeśa Bhatta as has been understood by her, M makes the statement
“This is consistent with Satchidanandendra’s representation of avidyā purely as an effect and his rejection of
a causal avidyā.”
The first part of the sentence that Swamiji’s representation of avidyā purely as an effect is totally
incorrect. Avidyā being beginningless according to Swamiji, it can never be an effect. The very objection of
Swamiji against the traditionalists is the treatment of avidyā / mutual adhyāsa as an effect of mūlāvidyā.
Swamiji basing himself on the express statements of Śankara that adhyāsa / avidyā is beginningless and that
“All the talk of Pramānās and their objects whether relating to ordinary life or to vedic action and all
scriptures relating to injunctions and prohibitions of action or to moksa presuppose this mutual
superimposition of the self and the not-self before they function (Introduction to BSBh).”, holds that
adhyāsa / avidyā is the root of even the concept of time which in turn is apriori to the concept of cause and
effect. Thus it is wrong to hold that Swamiji views avidyā purely as an effect as does Nāgeśa Bhatta.
Even though both Nāgeśa Bhatta and Swamiji reject the mūlāvidyā which is held by the traditionalists to
be the material cause of the universe, both of them differ totally with regard to the manner of rejection, the
grounds put forward, the citation of supporting authorities etc. Therefore M’s statement that the seed for his
understanding of avidyā only as Superimposition (adhyāsa) can be seen here” is incorrect and totally
fictional. The seed of Swamiji’s views is the words of bhāsya alone as M admits on Page 215.

36. M repeatedly lays stress on Mahābhāgavata’s adherence to Nāgeśa Bhatta which in turn according to her,
influenced Swamiji. Without prejudice to the ground that no evidence is cited either for Mahābhāgavata’s
adherence to Nāgeśa Bhatta or its surreptitious influence on Swamiji and thus the whole theory is a figment
of M’s imagination, it is submitted that even if it were true that if Swamiji was influenced by Nāgeśa Bhatta
through Mahābhāgavata, it will in no way acquit the traditionalists from the charge of infidelity of
mūlāvidyā theory to the definition of avidyā by Śankara. To whomsoever the finding that mūlāvidyā is
opposed to Śankara may be traced to, how does it affect the actual finding as far as seekers of truth are
 concerned. Not even a single statement in the Prasthānatraya Bhāsya can be shown where adhyāsa is
said to have mūlāvidyā as its material cause or for that matter, adhyāsa itself requires a material
cause. Moreover, Nāgeśa Bhatta’s work is primarily a treatise on Vyākarana and not on Vedanta.

37. M on page 219 states “The response of the Advaita tradition to Swami Satchidanandendra has been
thorough and sustained.”
One of the scholars (Sri Rāmā Shāstri) who is an advocate of the traditionalists equates Swamiji with
Nāgeśa Bhatta whose period is shown by M to be 1650-1750. Is it not strange for the tradition to keep mum
so long in the face of an open attack upon their pet-doctrine? The tradition had to wait for centuries for the
arrival of Rāmā Shāstri in 1958 to refute the charges made by Nāgeśa Bhatta.

38. Now the citations of Śankara given in support of the tradition are taken up for consideration. M first picks
up the BSBh on 1.4.3 and gives a translation of a part of that. However, the translation is not faithful to
the original when she says “Then Śankara make the argument that without the acceptance of avidyā,
liberation is untenable. Liberation is due to the destruction of causal potency (bījaśakti of avidyā) by
knowledge.”
The original is thus – “nahi tayā vinā parameśvarasya sraśtrtvam siddhyati śaktirahitasya tasya pravr
ttyanupapatteh muktānām ca punaranutpattih| kutah| vidyayā tasyā bijaśakterdāhāt|”
This translates as “Without that (the prāgavasthā i.e. the primordial state) the creatorhood does not get
bestowed upon parameśvara, since bereft of śakti, he cannot proceed with creation. Also (if prāgavasthā is
accepted) the liberated are not liable to rebirth. Why? Because that bījaśakti (Potential seed) is burnt up by
vidyā.” Thus as per the original so far, what is required to be accepted for absence of rebirth of the liberated
is the prāgavasthā i.e. the prior/primordial state and not the acceptance of avidyā as translated by M.
Further, in the following sentence what is stated to be burnt up by vidyā is that bījaśakti (Potential seed)
and not avidyā as M translates. M introduces the next sentence in the bhāsya as “The statement most
germane to our discussion then follows” and translates that as “Śankara reiterates that this causal potency
(bījaśakti) is in the form of avidyā, has its basis in Parameśvara (parameśvarāśraya) and is called Avyakta;
in it are sleeping the individuals (samsārinah) who have no knowledge of their nature.” Here the statement
of M that ‘Śankara reiterates’ is incorrect since Śankara has not at all used the word avidyā so far. Let us
now see the original – avidyātmikā hi sā bījaśaktiravyaktaśabdanirdeśyā parameśvaraśrayā māyāmayī
mahāsuptih yasyām svarūpapratibodharahitah śerate samsārino jīvāh. This translates as “Because this
bījaśakti (potential seed) called as Avyakta (the Unmanifest) being made up of avidyā (avidyātmikā) is the
grand sleep composed of māyā having parameśvara as its locus. In this the samsāri jīvas who are devoid of
the knowledge of their true nature sleep. The next sentence is “That this avyakta (the unmanifest) in some
places is referred to by the word ākāśa… in some places by the word aksara… in some places by the word
māyā…” based on this passage M arrives at the following conclusions.
a. It is not difficult to see why this is such a popular bhāsya for the proponents of mūlāvidyā.
b. The prior condition or causal form of the world is in this form of avidyā.
c. This avidyā has a number of synonyms – Avyakta, ākāśa, aksara and māyā.
d. From this is derived the equivalence of the words avidyā and māyā.
e. Through the Śvetāśvatara quotation, these two avidyā & māyā are further equated to Prakrti.
f. Further this cause is a power (śakti) that belongs to parameśvara.

Now the comments on these conclusions follow.

a. The BSBh 1-4-3 is equally popular for the opponents of mūlāvidyā. Swamiji quotes this very
passage to prove that Śankara treats avidyā as distinct from māyā/prakrti/Avyakta etc – Page 50 of
Pañcapādikā Prasthāna; Point 5 on page 3 and point 6 on page 15 of Vedāntavidvadgosthī.
b. The second conclusion of M is based on the original “avidyātmikā hi sā bījaśaktih”, which translates
as “Since that potential seed is made up of avidyā”. Here the potential seed is said to be made up of
avidyā and not said to be avidyā itself. This clearly brings out the distinction between the potential
seed and avidyā. Even as per M’s translation of the word avidyātmikā as ‘the form of avidyā’, it
results in the potential seed being different from avidyā since ‘form of avidyā’ is not the same as
‘avidyā’. Moreover the usage “form of avidyā” does not settle the issue because a further question
arises “What then is that avidyā?” Hunting for an answer to this, one finds no other definition for
avidyā except that which is given in the introduction to BSBh which goes against the traditionalists.
In this context it is pertinent to pay attention to Śankara’s statement referring to the seed form of
the world – sarvajñasya īśvarasya ātmabhūte iva avidyākalpite nāmarūpe tatvānyatvābhyām
anirvacanīye samsāraprapañcabījabhūte sarvajñasya īśvarasya māyā śaktih prakrtih iti ca Śrutismr
tyorabhilapyete – meaning – Name and Form fancied by avidyā, as though identical with the
omniscient īśvara but which are indefinable as identical with or other than īśvara, constituting the
seed of the phenomenal world of mundane life, have been called the māyā, śaktih, Prakrti of the
Omniscient Lord, in both the Śruti and smrti - BSBh 2-1-14. Similarly in BSBh 2-1-27 Śankara
refers to the manifested and the unmanifested name and form as avidyā-kalpita (figment of
avidyā). Thus according to Śankara and Swamiji, the potential seed/māyā etc is not the same as
avidyā but the figment of avidyā, in contrast to the identity of both as per the traditionalists.
c. The third conclusion of M that, avidyā has a number of synonyms avyakta, aksara etc is also
incorrect. The original bhāsya reads as “tadetadavyaktam kvacid ākāśaśabdanirdistam” – That this
avyakta in some places is called by the word ākāśa. Here the synonym ākāśa is with regard to
avyakta and not to avidyā. In the earlier sentence avidyā is used as a compound word avidyātmika
qualifying the word Avyakta. Now since ākāśa, aksara and māyā are said to be synonyms of Avyakta,
the word avidyātmika will qualify these words also and therefore they are also to be treated as made
up of avidyā or figment of avidyā. While introducing each synonym Śankara uses the words ākāśa-
śabda-nirdistam (called by the word ākāśa), aksara-śabdoditam (called by the word aksara) and
māyā iti sūcitam (referred to as māyā). However no such usage is made with regard to the word
avidyātmika so as to consider that also as a synonym.
d. The next conclusion that “the equivalence of māyā and avidyā is derived” is again incorrect. What is
derived is the equivalence of māyā and Avyakta and not māyā and avidyā. If avidyā were to be
considered a synonym then there should have been a sentence “avidyā-śabda-nirdistam” etc. But it is
not so.
e. It is wrong to say that avidyā and māyā are equated to prakrti through the Śvetāśvatara quotation.
māyā and prakrti are equated by that quotation.
f. Śakti is a synonym of māyā and prakrti as per BSBh on 2-1-14 and not avidyā-śakti as is considered
by the traditionalists. The word avidyā-śakti being used as a synonym for māyā etc is not at all found
in the entire prasthānatraya bhāsya.
g. In the BSBh 1-4-3 Śankara considers two alternatives to the meaning of the word avyakta,
depending upon the two different meanings of the word mahān. If mahān is taken to meant hiran
yagarbha’s intellect, then the word avyakta will mean the primordial seed, which is made up of
avidyā and is otherwise called as māyā etc. Alternatively, if the word mahān is taken to mean jīva,
then the word avyakta will mean avidyā. Thus by giving two different meanings to the word avyakta,
Śankara explicitly brings out the distinction between avidyā on the one hand (when jīva is mahān)
and the primordial seed called māyā etc on the other (when the hiranyagarbha’s intellect is mahān)
and he specifically states the later to be avidyātmika i.e made up of avidyā. If according to Śankara
avidyā and māyā are synonyms then the proposal of two alternatives would not arise. In BSBh 1-4-3
Śankara uses the words yadā tu jīvo mahān (on the contrary when jīva is mahān) to clearly show the
alternative meaning. The word tu which is an adversative particle need not have been used, if
 according to Śankara avidyā and māyā were synonyms. Since the first meaning itself would have
been sufficient.
It would have been fair if only in her Note 30 M had included the above mentioned original
sentence which is just one sentence later to the passage quoted by her.
h. If avidyā should be treated as synonym for māyā etc, then the phrase avidyātmika māyā would result
in the meaning avidyātmika avidyā, which is absurd.

Thus avyakta, ākāśa, aksara, māyā, prakrti and śakti are synonyms and all of them are figment of
avidyā as shown above in BSBh 1-4-3, 2-1-14 and 2-1-27.

39. Mthen states that “Some of the most striking equations of avidyā and māyā / prakrti occur in Śankara’s
comments on Bhagavadgītā” and cites six instances under note 34.
a. The first citation is from GitaBh 15.16 it refers to one of the two purusas as aksara and considers it
as māyā, śakti of Bhagavān which is the birth seed of the purusa called ksara and is the locus of
impressions of desires and action of the many samsārīs i.e. it refers to the avyakta, māyā etc
mentioned in BSBh 1.4.3, 2.1.14 etc. There is however, no mention of avidyā at all in this quotation.
It is not known how this sentence supports the equation of avidyā and māyā / prakrti.
b. The second citation from the GitaBh 18.41 is again a reference to the Lord’s prakrti which is māyā
made up of the three gunas. Here again there is no mention of avidyā so as to indicate an equation
between māyā / prakrti and avidyā.
c. The next two sentences quoted from 8.20 and 9.10 are considered together. The avyakta, māyā and
prakrti are termed as avidyā-laksana i.e. that which indicates avidyā. It is clear that avyakta etc are
termed as avidyā-laksana and not avidyā. By juxtaposing these sentences with those of BSBh 2.1.14,
2.1.27 etc where avyakta etc are termed explicitly as avidyā-kalpita (figment of avidyā), the word
avidyā-laksana would rightly mean avidyā kalpita only. Moreover the term laksana in the compound
word is derived as laksyate anayā iti laksana. This is based on Śankara-bhāsya on Gaudapāda
Kārikā 4.67 and the Śābara-bhāsya on Jaiminī Sūtra 1-1-2. Since avidyā is indicated by Prakrti the
later is called avidyā-laksana.
Further the GitaBh 18.48 specifically states that the gunas are figment of avidyā. Therefore
māyā which is made up of the three gunas also becomes a figment of avidyā. The meaning of the
compound avidyālaksana used for prakrti etc will be further clear when the last citation is dealt
with.
d. In the fifth citation from the introduction to the 13 th chapter prakrti is termed as trigunātmika i.e.
made up of the three gunas. The three gunas being fancied by avidyā prakrti also becomes a figment
of avidyā and not avidyā itself. In this citation also there is not even a mention of the word avidyā.
Moreover, this prakrti otherwise termed as avyakta, māyā etc is called ksetra (GitaBh 13.5 & 13.6)
and Jīva is called the ksetrajña i.e. the knower of the ksetra (GitaBh 13.1). The cause of samsāra
which is avidyā is here determined as ksetra-ksetrajña-samyogah – the union of the ksetra and ks
etrajña (GitaBh 13.26). Thus avyakta / prakrti which is ksetra is different from avidyā the cause of
samsāra.
e. The last of the sentences is cited from the GitaBh 13.21. It is really surprising that M chose to cite
this, since it is a clincher for Swamiji. In this bhāsya the prime word is prakrtisthah (the one
stationed in Prakrti). Śankara derives the word prakrtisthah as prakrtau avidyālaksanāyām
kāryakāranarūpena parinatāyām sthitah prakrtisthah| prakrtim ātmatvena gatah ityetat – Prakr
tisthah is the one who abides in the Prakrti which indicates avidyā (avidyālaksana) and which is
transformed as the body and senses. In other words prakrtisthah is the one who identifies the prakrti
as his self. Probably the compound avidyālaksana which qualifies the word prakrti is relied upon by
M to establish the identity of avidyā and prakrti. But towards the end of that bhāsya is the sentence
 quoted by M under note 34 – “etad uktam bhavati - prakrtisthatvākhyā avidyā, gunesu ca sangah
kāmah, samsārasya kāranamiti” meaning – this is the conclusion, avidyā called as prakrtisthatva
(identification of Prakrti as self) and attachment unto the gunas i.e. desire, is the cause of samsāra.
Here there are two distinct words prakrtih and prakrtisthatva. Śankara calls Prakrti as avidyālaksan
a and prakrtisthatva as avidyā and states that avidyā called as prakrtisthatva is the cause of
samsāra. On the basis of this statement of Śankara where he has clearly distinguished avidyā-laksan
ā-prakrtih from avidyā, the compound avidyālaksana qualifying the words māyā, avyakta etc can at
no cost equate avidyā with māyā etc.
Moreover in this context one may refer to a few more statement from GitaBh
a. GitaBh 14.6, the act of superimposition of an object of cognition unto the self which is the subject is
clearly stated as avidyā.
b. The GitaBh 13.26 which is an echo of introduction to BSBh almost verbatim, where identity of
adhyāsa and mithyājñāna is spelt out clearly.
c. The mental notion in the form of non-discriminative knowledge of the self and the not-self is
referred to as avidyā and the mental notion in the form of discriminative knowledge of the self and
the not-self is referred to as vidyā in GitaBh 2.21. Therefore, avidyā is a mental concept according to
Śankara, whereas it is a substance according to the traditionalists. Thus the sentences purportedly
equating avidyā and māyā / prakrti cited from GitaBh do not actually equate the two but clearly
bring out their mutual distinction. This is in line with Śankara’s dictum in BSBh 2.1.14, 2.1.27 etc
that māyā / prakrti is figment of avidyā.

40. M quotes under note 35 citations from Upanisad-bhāsyas as quoted by Sri Rāmā Shāstri. However the same
is not dealt herewith since they are almost on the same lines as those already considered herein above. The
discussion on the citations comes to a close with the following observations.
a. The mutual adhyāsa is specifically declared to be avidyā and the same is reiterated by Śankara.
b. māyā / avyakta / prakrti etc as per Śankara are avidyā-kalpita and not avidyā.
c. No single instance is shown where Śankara defines avidyā in the sense of mūlāvidyā in terms of the
various characteristics attributed to it by the traditionalists.
d. Not a single statement to show that avidyā is Anirvacanīyā.
e. Nowhere in the bhāsyas, adhyāsa is either said to have a beginning or desiderates a cause.
f. If avidyā and māyā are identical how come Śankara uniformly uses the terms avidyā-kalpita
(figment of avidyā), avidyā-krta (made of avidyā) etc and not even once by the word avidyā directly.
In the sentences cited by M in defence with respect to māyā etc, use of a compound word avidyālaks
ana and avidyātmika is seen and the same is not referred to as avidyā plain and simple. On the other
hand wherever superimposition is referred to, Śankara uses the word avidyā in its plain form.
g. It is very strange that M has not brought to the attention of the readers the fact that the bhāsya
statements cited by Rāmā Shāstri have been reviewed by Swamiji in his work Vedāntavidvadgosthī.
It would have been fair only if M had considered the review and then decided upon the strength of
the defence and the correctness or the otherwise of the views of Swamiji.
h. None of the citation given by Swamiji in support of his views is challenged or shown as incorrect.
i. Thus M’s conclusion that “There is ample evidence that Śankara considers avidyā as causal
component in the creation of the world” is grossly incorrect in as much as Śankara considers māyā /
Avyakta / Prakrti etc as the causal component and the māyā etc are in turn considered as figment of
avidyā.

41. Inthis context it is pertinent to note what Swamiji says on page 32 of the introduction to Vedāntavidvadgost
hī. “Incidentally it may be remarked that Śankara always styles this primordial matter Prakrti by the
significant name māyā but never by the name of avidyā or any other synonym of ignorance. And conversely,
 he invariably calls the mutual superimposition of the self and the not-self by the name of avidyā or some
equivalent of it, but we do not meet with any instance where it is called māyā. Coming down to the
commentaries, we see that this rule is observed more in the breach than in practice. In the school of
mūlāvidyā theory, where the law of causation takes precedence of the principle of truth and error, this usage
is of course justifiable. But can we use the terms māyā and avidyā indiscriminately even while strictly
adhering to Śankara’s adhyāsa-vāda? This question has been neither posed nor critically considered in any
Vedantic discussion so far as I am aware. I shall therefore venture my own opinion in the matter, and leave
the readers to judge for themselves. In so far as māyā or prakrti is a figment of avidyā proper, I think that
one is perfectly justified in calling it avidyā in a secondary sense, just as one may say ‘This is all his foolery’
meaning thereby the result of that person’s foolish pranks. And conversely, in so far as avidyā is regarded as
a function of the mind and is included in the world of names and forms, it may be also called māyā meaning
thereby an illusory appearance. But keeping in mind the fact that avidyā primarily denote a species of
knowledge and māyā an illusory object, we cannot but exclusively follow Śankara’s practice in using the
terms, if we do not wish to confuse the minds of our readers.”

42. Now the points under the head “Philosophical considerations” on page 223 are taken up. M states that
“Satchidanandendra’s primary difficulty with Advaita tradition’s representation of avidyā is that it is
bhāvarūpa.”
This is incorrect. The most primary difficulty is that it is inconsistent with Śankara’s definition which is
reiterated in his bhāsyas at several places. Avidyā being bhāvarūpa is just one of the many important
inconsistencies. In the works like MVN, Pañcapādikā Prasthānam etc, scores and scores of pages have
been used to put forward the various grounds. Not a single scholar has so far come out with a point by point
refutation of the points raised by Swamiji in his works. M refers to a debate having taken place. Since the
details of the debate are not presented by M no comments are made in this regard.

43. M under note 38 questions “If avidyā is purely adhyāsa how do we understand Śankara’s compounds like
avidyādhyāropita, avidyādhyasta, avidyādhyāropana?” This question has been satisfactorily answered by
Swamiji on page 19 of the introduction to the Vedāntavidvadgosthī. It is surprising that M has not made any
comment with regard to Swamiji’s answer to this question. But the usage of such words in no way
undermines the clear-cut definition by Śankara himself for whom avidyā is the mutual superimposition of
the Self and the not-self. The fact remains that no other definition of avidyā is given by Śankara and the
statements quoted by traditionalists are not definitional in nature and their stand that there are citations
which equate avidyā and māyā etc was also shown to be incorrect. Swamiji says “These words
(avidyādhyāropita etc) have to be understood in the sense of mithyāpratyayadarśitah (shown by erroneous
notion) similar to the usage karikalabah etc. The words adhyastha etc refer to the qualified words which are
the objects of cognition. Therefore merely on this account, it is not necessary to postulate any avidyā distinct
from adhyāsa since such an avidyā is not accepted in the Bhāsyas.” In the above example kari means an
elephant and kalabah means an elephant calf, but still in Sanskrit literature such usages are not uncommon.

44. M says in page 223 that “Though avidyā is existent (bhāvarūpa) it is not real (avāstava) and therefore there
is no untenability in it being removed by knowledge of truth.”
The following points arise in this regard.
a. Is the word “existent” the right substitute for the word bhāvarūpa? An “existing thing” will be more
appropriate to denote bhāvarūpa.
b. Is it logical to accept that a thing exists, but it is not real? The very meaning of the word existence
underlines reality. Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary gives this meaning to the word “exist” –
“To have a real being whether material or spiritual; to have being in a specified place or with respect
to understood limitations or condition.” The word existence is said to mean “reality as opposed to
 appearance; reality as presented in experience.” Śankara in his GitaBh 2.16 says – “What exists,
exists always.”
c. Moreover, knowledge neither directly dispels nor creates a thing or it characteristics but only
removes nescience. Therefore if avidyā be an existent thing then its destruction by knowledge is
ruled out. Also knowledge being a mental notion can only remove another mental notion. Avidyā as
per the traditionalists is not a mental notion and therefore it cannot be removed by knowledge. Vidyā
and avidyā are both held to be mental notions by Śankara at various places. Thus removal of
mūlāvidyā by knowledge will remain only in theory, more so because traces of it remain till death
even after the dawn of knowledge.

45. M states on page 224 that “The problem of reifying avidyā resulting in the untenability of non-duality was
not unknown to Śankara, who resolves it by establishing that avidyā is mithyā.” In support of this BSBh
4.1.3 is quoted.
a. First and foremost M has not shown even a single instance where Śankara has reified avidyā
i.e. where avidyā is considered as a material thing. On the other hand a number of statements are
there where Śankara refers to avidyā as a species of knowledge – a mental notion (GitaBh. 2.21,
13.21, 13.26, 14.6, BSBh Introduction, 1.3.2, in Taittirīyopanisad bhāsya 2.8 both vidyā and
avidyā are said to rest in the antahkarana (mind), GitaBh 13.2 avidyā is referred to as a tāmassic
mental notion and is said to pertain to the mind).
b. To hold that knowledge removes reified avidyā will go contrary to Śankara’s express statement
elsewhere that knowledge neither dispels nor creates the nature of things.
c. The most important objection is that there is no statement in the bhāsya (BSBh 4.1.3) cited above
which says “avidyā is Mithyā”. M deduces this on the basis of two sets of statements quoted by
her under Note 40 & 41. A reading of the whole of that bhāsya will make it clear as to how M has
confounded the issue. Śankara poses different objections and clears them one by one. After
answering the objection cited under Note 40 Śankara proceeds to deal with a fresh objection and
says that perception of senses is accepted prior to the dawn of knowledge and the absence of
perception is after dawn of knowledge. As a sequel to this, the discussion runs like this –
Q: “To whom then does this ignorance pertain to?”
A: “We say it is to you who is questioning.”
Q: “But I’m declared to be the Lord by the Śruti.”
A: “If you know it that way then ignorance pertains to none.”
That is, duality, ignorance etc are there only so long as knowledge is not dawned and they cease to
be the moment knowledge dawns. Immediately following this sentence is the one cited under note
41. Therefore the word “etena” (by this discussion) found in that sentence refers to the immediately
preceding discussion and not which is farther in sequence. The later sentence disposes of the
objection that “non-duality is hampered by the presence of avidyā which imputes duality to self” by
referring to the immediately preceding discussion i.e. “duality of the self is accepted so long there is
ignorance and when knowledge dawns there is neither ignorance nor duality.” This being the case
one can judge for oneself the correctness of M’s statement “Reified avidyā is Mithyā, is established
by Śankara).”
d. Moreover, here M has not made it clear as for what she means by the word Mithyā in the present
context. Does it mean false/unreal as is the common usage or does it mean
Anirvacanīyā(indefinable) as the Pañcapādikā holds or does it mean adhistāna-ananyatva (non-
distinction from the cause), as M says later on page 226. If it is held to be false, then there is the
contradiction that a thing exists but it is false. If it is anirvacanīyā, then it is foreign to Śankara
since Śankara has never called avidyā as anirvacanīyā. If it is non-distinction from the cause then
 it becomes an effect. Then it is a contradiction to avidyā being beginningless and its being the root
cause of all. Thus the problem of reifying avidyā does not get solved.

46. M states that Swamiji’s understanding of mithyā and of avidyā as purely superimposition is subjective
idealism (drsti - srsti) which he acknowledges and defends. This statement is already refuted in Para 9
above.
It was repeatedly shown that avidyā as purely superimposition is based on Śankara’s only definition of
avidyā in bhāsya. In that Para it was shown that the advocates of drsti - srsti conform to mūlāvidyā which
itself distinguishes Swamiji from drsti-srsti-vādins. According to the drsti-srsti-vādin, the creation issues
forth from the jīva who wakes up from sleep. They hold that there are six beginningless entities (mūlāvidyā
and the distinction of jīva & Brahman being two of them) which are outside this creation. They also hold
that mūlāvidyā and the distinction jīva & Brahman are present in Sleep. No where Swamiji is found to
conform to any of these views. Swamiji rejects the theory of presence of mūlāvidyā and the distinction of
jīva & Brahman in sleep. According to Swamiji, the mutual adhyāsa on waking is a sufficient cause for the
perception of the word. Therefore, it is not correct to hold that Swamiji conforms to drsti-srsti-vāda

47. M states that Swamiji’s understanding of mithyā is based on a definition of satya and anrta in
Taittirīyopanisad-bhāsya, Kāthakopanisad bhāsya, Brahmasūtra bhāsya and Upadeśasahasrī (page 224).
She says “On the basis of these statements, Swami Satchidanandendra concludes that, if avidyā were to exist
in all the three states of experience it would be real and could not be removed by knowledge, it therefore
becomes imperative for him to establish that avidyā does not exist in sleep in order to establish that avidyā
is not real.” In support of these M cites certain Paras of MVN. Since the same have already been dealt with,
they are not dealt with now.
With regard to the meaning of mithyā what objection could there be if Swamiji bases his views on the
definitions given by Śankara himself. Rather should not those who claim to be the followers of Śankara,
follow Śankara to the last letter?
It is a misrepresentation of facts when M says that Swamiji concludes that if avidyā were to exist in all
the three states it would be real and could not be removed by knowledge. Swamiji’s contention is that
mūlāvidyā being an existing thing (bhāvarūpa) it cannot be removed by knowledge. Moreover, mūlāvidyā is
said not only to exist in all the three states but also in those who are liberated (jīvanmuktas). If this be so,
then removal of mūlāvidyā by knowledge is only a myth and theory and therefore a practical impossibility.
Absence of avidyā in sleep (a topic requiring a separate detailed examination) is not without the support
of Śruti, Śankara and the actual experience. This was also dealt with earlier.

48. Subsequent statements of M in that Para on page 225 have already been dealt with. The observations of M
with regard to satya and anrta in Taittirīyopanisad bhāsya is absurd, incorrect and baseless as any serious
reader would himself come to know even on a prima-facie reading. Even the traditionalists will disagree
with M that the definition of satya etc provides for distinguishing subjective from empirical reality.
Therefore no comment is offered in this regard, except that the purpose of definition of satya which
qualifies Brahman is to distinguish Brahman from all the modifications which are unreal.

49. M states in page 225 “In the Upanisad and Śankara’s commentary here and elsewhere, mithyā is presented
as that which has no independent existence (adhisthāna ananyatva) while satya depends on nothing else for
its existence.” Citation from bhāsya is also given. Here again there is a gross misunderstanding of the bhās
ya and a misrepresentation of the bhāsya as would be seen hereinafter.
a. In the Chāndogyopanisad bhāsya on 6.1.4, the word mithyā is not at all to be found. So also is the
word adhisthāna. The essence of that bhāsya is – by knowing the cause the whole lot of its effects
becomes known since effect is not another thing distinct from the cause. The effect is just a name
 sake and in reality there is no another thing called an effect. The material cause such as clay,
alone is real while its effect is unreal, its name being mere play of words. Thus what is proved is
the sole reality of the cause as the substance of its effects and the unreality of the so called effect
as distinct from the cause.
b. Under Note 53, BSBh 2.1.15 is cited. Here also neither the word mithyā nor the word adhisthāna
is found. What is said here in short is, the effect is not distinct from the cause even on the account
that only when the cause exists the effect is cognized and not otherwise. Alternatively, not only on
the strength of Śruti but also on the basis of direct perception we know that the effect is not
distinct from the cause, for e.g. in respect of the cloth formed of the thread, the cloth which is an
effect is not at all perceived apart from the thread. What is directly perceived is only the thread
interlaced.
Thus, what exists is the cause alone, is what is stressed here.
c. Vide Note 54, passage from BSBh 2.1.14 is cited in support of “Mithyā is presented as that which
has no independent existence, while satya depends on nothing else for its existence”. This
definition of satya and mithyā is not at all to be found in the passage quoted. Here again, the word
mithyā or adhisthāna is not found. What is said is – “It is seen that in reality, there is no
distinction between cause and effect. The multifarious world, space etc is what is the effect; the
cause means Para-Brahman. The effect really is non-distinct i.e. does not exist separately from
that cause. In these sentences no where it is said that mithyā means adhisthāna-ananyatva as M
wants it. In fact, the effect is said to have no existence at all as an effect and what exists is only the
cause. If cause is the only thing that exists and the so called effect is only a figment of words
where from comes the cause-effect relationship between the two? It is not the case that there is a
cause and there is its effect and that the effect is not distinct from the cause and therefore, it is
Mithyā. On the other hand, what is there is just the cause which is actually perceived and the
perception of the so called effect is a misapprehension and therefore the effect is mithyā (unreal).

50. M states in page 226 that, “(According to Advaita opponents of Swamiji) mithyā is defined as that which
has a requirement for a material cause (adhisthāna-ananya). Further, what is mithyā is an effect, and is
established as having a cause-effect relationship”.
Letting the Advaita opponents of Swamiji to judge for themselves, the correctness or otherwise of the
definition of Mithyā attributed to them by M, the following observations are made in this regard.
a. In the bhāsyas the word mithyā is compounded with knowledge where reference to an error is
intended. It is also used to indicate the characteristic of changing nature of knowable objects in
opposition to the word satya. Also the words asatya(untruth) and anrta (false) is used as synonym of
mithyā.
b. In the entire prasthānatraya the phrase adhisthāna-ananyatva cannot be found. The word adhist
hāna wherever mentioned in the Bhāsyas refer to the body and not to any causal matter.
c. Effect, according to the bhāsya, has no existence at all divorced from the cause i.e. what exists is the
cause only and the cognition of the effect as such is a misapprehension and therefore the effect is
unreal. It follows that there cannot be a relationship of whatsoever nature between the real and the
unreal.
d. In Pañcapādikā the word mithyā is said to have two meanings – apanhavavachana (denial) and
anirvacanīyatāvacana (unexplainable). Here also the definition as stated by M is not found.
Moreover in the bhāsyas mithyā is never used as a synonym for unexplainable.
e. M states on page 224 that avidyā is mithyā. Applying her definition of mithyā to avidyā, it results in
avidyā becoming non-distinct from its cause. This means that avidyā has a cause which is not
acceptable since it is defined as beginningless. Moreover, since everything other than Brahman is the
 effect of avidyā, the only other thing capable of being the cause of avidyā is Brahman, in which case
Brahman and avidyā become non-distinct. This again is absurd.

51. M states that “The subjective idealism does have validity in the Advaita tradition from the absolute
standpoint and that other Ācāryas advance it on the occasion when the context is purely pāramārthika. This
is incorrect. The very word drsti - srsti falls within the empirical sphere. Moreover, the drsti-srsti approve of
mūlāvidyā which again falls within the empirical sphere. This subject is already dealt under Para 9 and 46.
In this regard M cites two bhāsyas, Vide Notes 43 & 55. What the citation GKBh 4.3.28 refers to is not
known. The other i.e. BSBh 2.2.28 is in fact refutation of the school of vijñānavādins of the Buddhists and
not that of the drsti - srsti-vādins.

52. The points made by M under the head “shifting stand-points” is already commented upon in Para 14 in
detail and shown that conclusions of M are incorrect.
Thus the various points raised by M have been dealt with in detail.

53. Before closing the discussion on the subject matter proper, attention of the readers are drawn to the opinions
of the pontiffs of the Kāñcī, Śrngerī and Dwāraka Śankarācārya Mutts with regard to Swamiji.
The late Sri Chandraśekharendra Saraswati Swamiji of the Kāñcī Kāmakoti Pītha who had invited
Swamiji in 1961 to Karaikudi in Tamilnadu had described Swamiji as a living example of a sage who had
lived all his life steeped in contemplation on the Paramārtha. Later on, in 1979 the Kāñcī Pīthādīśa
persuaded and prompted the close devotees of Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswati Swamiji to celebrate his
centenary the next year (Gangoli D.B – Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswati Swamiji Page 2). His Holiness
concurred to the views of Swamiji and expressed it openly in an interview to Sri Devaraya Kulkarni
(Recorded in the Souvenir – Birth Centenary of Sri Satchidanandendra Saraswati Swamiji). In spite of being
the head of a great institution, the Kāñcī Pīthādīśa sent his successor designate Sri Jayendra Saraswati
Swamiji to Holenarsipur to pay respects to Swamiji (This information is given by HH Sri Jayendra
Saraswati Swamiji Himself). Moreover financial assistance was rendered by the Kāñcī Kāmakoti Pītha
towards publication of Swamiji’s works.
Acceptance of Swamiji’s views with regard to mutual adhyāsa as avidyā by the Kāñcī pontiff is
confirmed from the recorded speech in Sanskrit rendered by His Holiness (The audio cassette of the
same is available with many of His devotees. The recorded speech is transcribed by Dr. K. Prashanth, Dept
of Sanskrit Vivekananda College, Chennai – 4, titled Janmarāhityam katham sambhavisyati (Meaning: How
birthlessness will take place?). In that discourse His Holiness states that “The cause of appearance of duality
is mithyājñānam i.e. anyathājñānam (to know a thing as what it is not) and by the destruction of this
anyathājñānam alone birthlessness is attained.” Here it is seen that His Holiness refers to misapprehension
(adhyāsa) as the cause of duality and not to any mūlāvidyā, the destruction of which ensures birthlessness as
held by the traditionalists.
The then pontiff of Śrngerī Śārada Pītha late Sri Abhinavavidyātīrtha Swamiji had paid a visit to
Holenarsipur to meet Swamiji. His Holiness had offered financial aid for the publication of Swamiji’s
magnum opus the VPP at that time. His Holiness said on that occasion, “By my personal visit many of my
doubts have been solved. Having dedicated your whole life for the propagation of Śankara-siddhānta you
are a true devotee indeed.” (Gangoli D.B 1997 ibid Page 30 and The Publisher’s Note to VPP).
The pontiff of Dwāraka Śārada Pītha had offered financial assistance towards the publication of
Swamiji’s book, Māndukya Rahasya Vivrtih (Acknowledgements Māndukya Rahasya Vivrtih by
Satchidanandendra Saraswati Swamiji).
Moreover, almost all of the contributors to the Vedāntavidvadgosthī speaking against mūlāvidyā were
groomed under the traditionalists’ school of Vedanta only, who on finding the Truth in the Swamiji’s stand
shifted their allegiance to Śankara alone devoid of the sub-commentators.
54. Straying away from the main focus of the topic admitted by M to be “The fidelity of the post-Śankara
commentators to Śankara on avidyā” M imputes unto Swamiji Historical/Social considerations, traditional
and modern influences etc. Under this head M makes baseless surmises and false allegations & statements.
Mutually contradicting statements are not in wanting. Here also M exhibits lack of knowledge not only of
Swamiji’s views but also that of others like Bhāskarācārya, Nāgeśa Bhatta etc. M also resorts to selective
presentation of facts and thus exhibits her crusader’s zeal to portray Swamiji in as poor light as possible.
Every of this above made remarks are substantiated herein below.

55. M states in page 229 that “Swamiji’s exposure to traditional instruction was limited. Virūpāksa Śastrī did not
go into great detail with his student, because he felt that his knowledge of Sanskrit was limited and that he
lacked expertise in grammar, logic and other disciplines… His study was thus confined to a very simple
reading of Upanisad-bhāsyas with no study of Brahmasūtra bhāsya or the explanatory texts that would
normally be part of the traditional study.”
a. This is a baseless surmise. Swamiji studied Bhagavadgītā Bhāsya under K. A. Krishnaswamy Iyer
(Page 9 of D. B. Gangoli) and also under Sri Mahābhāgavata of Kurtukoti. Not only Brahma Sutra
bhāsya but also Pañcapādikā Vivarana was studied under Virūpāksa Śastrī. It was at the time of
study of Pañcapādikā Vivarana that MVN was being compiled. Swamiji availed of additional
benefit of learning higher vedantic lessons from Virūpāksa Śastrī (D. B. Gangoli page 16)
Swamiji’s correct presentation of the views of the sub-commentators, whenever they are taken up
for refutation in his works is sufficient to prove M wrong.
b. M states that “Mahābhāgavata arranged for Swamiji’s initiation at the hands of Sri Śivābhinava
Narasimha Bharati and for his subsequent study of bhāsya with Virūpāksa Śastrī.”
This is incorrect. It was Bettagery Krishna Śastrī, who arranged for the initiation (page 13 & 15
D.B Gangoli). Swamiji and his friend Chidambaraiah went themselves to Virūpāksa Śastrī to learn
bhāsya (Page 13, D.B Gangoli).
c. The statement that “Swamiji’s knowledge of Sanskrit was limited and that he lacked expertise in
Grammar, logic and other disciplines” is totally incorrect. The very works of Swamiji in Sanskrit
are enough to prove M otherwise. MVN a great polemic which was written while Swamiji was
studying the Pañcapādikā Vivarana under Virūpāksa Śastrī is itself a sufficient proof of Swamiji’s
knowledge of Sanskrit and his familiarity with logic etc. Even the comment on MVN by Virūpāks
a Śastrī that “The style of writing of the treatise is good” (Page 21 of D.B Gangoli) sufficiently
proves Swamiji’s command over Sanskrit.
d. M states that “Grammar, logic and other disciplines are considered as prerequisite to the study of
bhāsya.” This is grossly incorrect. Śankara does not treat these as the prerequisites for the study of
his Bhāsyas. In fact he expressly prohibits an aspirant’s endeavor in Tarka Śāstra (logic), calling it
as anti-vedic and as not being adopted in any respect by the adepts of in the tradition. (BSBh
2.2.17 & 18). Śankara also negates the prerequisite of expertise in other disciplines like
pūrvamīmāmsā etc (BSBh 1.1.1). Since the Bhāsyas are in Sanskrit it goes without saying that a
person has to have knowledge of that language. The only prerequisite for learning bhāsya
according to Śankara is the sādhana catustaya (Four-fold means) (BSBh 1.1.1).
e. Intention of M in quoting a purported personal communication in this regard which is contrary to
facts is not known.

56. M states on page 229 that “When Satchidanandendra submitted the manuscript of MVN to Virūpāksa Śastrī,
he wrote on the manuscript ‘It should not be respected by those who are desirous of liberation’ He observed
that ‘Satchidanandendra did not know sampradāya’, placing him outside of the advaita tradition”. Except
for the last part i.e. Virūpāksa Śastrī’s comment with regard to tradition, M’s statement is contrary to facts. It
 was Maharaja of Mysore who forwarded the manuscript of MVN to Virūpāksa Śastrī and not Swamiji.
Virūpāksa Śastrī opined on that manuscript “The style of the writing of the treatise is good, but the
exposition of the subject matter is against the tradition” (Page 21 of D.B Gangoli). The statement of M that
“Virūpāksa Śastrī wrote on the manuscript ‘It should not be respected by those who are desirous of
liberation’.” is baseless.

57. In
page 230 M equates avidyā as per Swamiji’s with that of Mandana, Bhāskarācārya and Nāgeśa Bhatta.
The whole Para is replete with incorrect and contradictory statements.
a. M says “Satchidanandendra’s interpretation of avidyā is similar to Bhāskara’s view that avidyā is
the misapprehension of the self as the non-self and its cause, is not knowing Brahman.” This is
incorrect. The place where Bhāskara has defined avidyā in such a way is not cited. According to
Bhāskara in his bhāsya on the sutra 1.1.4, avidyā is defined as – “The wrong knowledge in respect
of the not-self like body etc and the lack of knowledge of the nature of Brahman, both these, the
knowing and the not knowing constitute the avidyā of the jīva, who is real.” This is different from
the avidyā of Swamiji who strictly follows the definition of avidyā given by Śankara in his
introduction to BSBh. Śankara’s avidyā is mutual adhyāsa of the nature of the mixing up of the
Satya (real) and anrta(unreal). Moreover, according to Śankara, the jīvahood is just a deceptive
appearance. Thus not only avidyā of Swamiji and Bhāskara are different, but also M’s
presentation Bhāskara’s avidyā incorrect.
b. M says “Like Mandana, Satchidanandendra finds that avidyā is not a material cause (upādāna
kāranā) or a power (śakti).” Here also there are two defects – self contradiction and incorrect
understanding.
Under note 11 on page 214 where Mandana is attributed with defining the distinction of a
concealing causal avidyā and its projected effect, also called avidyā. On page 218 M states that “The
concept of avidyā as a two-fold power, one concealing and one projecting, existing in a cause-effect
relationship is accepted by Mandana.” In contrast to these two statements, here M says “Like Mand
ana Satchidanandendra finds that avidyā is not a material cause (upādāna kāranā) or a power
(śakti).” Moreover, according to Mandana there are two avidyās non-apprehension and
misapprehension which are placed in a cause-effect relationship.
c. M says “Nāgeśa Bhatta wrote a treatise on Vedanta in his Vayyākarana-siddhanta-laghumanjuśā”.
This is incorrect. The work is a treatise on Vyākarana and not Vedanta. While discussing the
subject of “wordy expression of mental objects”, Nāgeśa considers the topic of illusory objects
and as a corollary criticizes the mūlāvidyā by substantiating his stand on the authority of
Bhāmatī’s views.
d. M is again wrong in stating that Nāgeśa like Satchidanandendra rejects Pañcapādikā’s
characterization of avidyā as existent (bhāvarūpa), indeterminable (anirvacanīya) and
beginningless (anādi). Nāgeśa does not reject the characterization – interterminable. He clearly
says adhyāsa is anirvacanīya (page 279 of his work). Swamiji on the other hand is against the
characterizing of avidyā as existent and indeterminable, since Śankara does not characterize so.
Swamiji’s avidyā is beginningless as Śankara describes it and Nāgeśa’s avidyā has an origin.
e. M once again is wrong in stating that “This is consistent with Satchidanandendra’s representation
of avidyā purely as an effect.” Swamiji’s avidyā based on Śankara’s definition, is beginningless
and therefore not an effect.
f. M states “… the seed for his (Swamiji’s) understanding avidyā only as superimposition can be
seen here (in Nāgeśa).” This is too farfetched and baseless. The seed of Swamiji’s understanding
is Śankara’s definition itself given in the Introduction to BSBh, Upadeśasahasrī (2nd chapter of
prose). Brhadāranyaka bhāsya (4.3.34), GitaBh (13.26) etc.
 g. Thus in page 239 M has equated the views of Swamiji, Mandana, Bhāskarācārya and Nāgeśa Bhat
ta. M states in page 215 that Swamiji relies on Śankara’s definition. This amounts to equating Śan
kara’s avidyā with that of Mandana, Bhāskarācārya and Nāgeśa.

58. Satchidanandendra’s emphasis on the method of analysis of the three states of experience as the best (M on
page 231), as was shown earlier, is based on the express statement of Śankara in his bhāsya on Gaudapāda
kārikā (4.87), while introducing the topic of examination of the three states as “Now then, commences the
exposition of his own (Gaudapāda’s) method.”

59. M states in page 231 “The principal features of Satchidanandendra’s thought, which can be traced to the
works of these authors, are a focus on the avasthātraya-prakriyā with the presentation of sleep as a state
through which one can gain insight into reality, the absence of potentiality or ignorance in that state, and a
subjective idealism in the waking state.” The comments on this are as follows.
a. Presentation of sleep as a state through which one can gain insight to reality is not the opinion of
only Swamiji but also that of Śankara. Śankara says (in Brhadāranyakopanisad bhāsya 4-4-
6)“The prāna does not depart in respect of the desireless person, who intuits the self as the
attributeless, non-dual, of the nature of unbroken light of consciousness as is in the state of deep
sleep.” Verse 10.13 of Upadeśasahasrī may also be referred to in this regard.
b. The absence of ignorance in that state is again based on the express statement of Śankara and
Śruti and is a matter of universal experience. This was already dealt in Para 25.
c. M’s imputation of the school of subjective idealism to Swamiji is incorrect as shown already in
Para 9 and 46.

60. M states on page 231 that “In addition, there is the emphasis on intuition and rational inquiry, and the
subordination of the authority of scripture (Śruti) to these modes of inquiry” and in page 233 that
“he(Swamiji) also ruled out Śruti as the only pramāna, subordinating it to reason and one’s own
experience.” In this regard it is pertinent to look at what Śankara says.
a. Śruti and the other holy works are not the sole means of right knowledge in the inquiry into the
nature of Brahman, as they are in the case of inquiry into the nature of dharma; but Śruti etc and
intuition and accessories also are the means here according to the context. For the knowledge of
Brahman has to culminate in intuition and relates to an existing entity, (BSBh1.1.2).
b. A text is not going to change a fact but only to make it known as it is. (praśnopaniśad bhāsya 6.3)
c. Even a hundred texts declaring that fire is cold or that it emits no light would not be a valid source
of knowledge. (GitaBh. 18.66)

From the above, what is gathered is, according to Śankara “scriptural authority alone, cannot decide the
nature of Brahman. It depends not merely on the verbal authority, but also on whether or not the knowledge
arising out of the Vedic teaching leads to the direct intuition of the Brahman. Swamiji strictly follows Śan
kara in this regard. Therefore if M accuses Swamiji of subordinating Śruti to reason and experience, it
amounts to Śankara being accused. Moreover, the Śruti itself advocates the use of reasoning and
contemplation as direct means for realization.
It is not that, Śruti is relegated in terms of being a valid means of knowledge, as M suggests, the
emphasis being, Śruti is not the valid means of knowledge just because it is the Śruti. Moreover, one may
refer to the chapter titled “Śāstra - the one means of self-knowledge” in the book “Salient features of Śan
kara’s Vedanta (1990)” authored by Swamiji, to understand Swamiji’s views on how the Śruti operates as a
pramāna.
61. Inpage 232 M comes out with another of her ingenious surmises. M sees Swami Vivekananda’s influence in
Swamiji’s mission to discover the “real” Śankara in order to restore the Vedanta to its authentic form. This is
based on the information that Swamiji was commissioned to translate Vivekananda’s Rājayoga into
Kannada. Probably this is the height of M’s farfetched and baseless surmises. M says “Swamiji took
Vivekananda’s call for a retrieval of the ‘real’ Śankara, delving deeply into textual studies to recover the
authentic Śankara.” Even if accepting this for a while was it wrong for Swamiji to delve deeply into textual
studies? How does this affect the result of such an in depth study by which the contrast between Śankara and
the Sub-commentators proclaiming to represent Śankara was laid bare before the masses?
Thus the influences galore on Swamiji according to M is – Nāgeśa Bhatta through Mahābhāgavata (Page
230 and note 30), the socio-political influences of Swamiji’s time (page 229), V Subramanya Iyer(Page 231
& 232), K.A. Krishnaswamy Iyer (Note 14, page 231& 232 and Swami Vivekananda (page 232) – all of
them have significantly influenced Swamiji – all these influences within his 40 years of age.
If only some one reads aloud this influences galore in the precincts of Swamiji’s Samadhi (place where
his mortal remains are buried), he would give out a sigh in relief for not being burdened with two more of
such unconscious influences – Rāmānuja, whose Śrībhāsya and some other works were translated by
Swamiji and Buddha whose Dhammapada was also translated by him.

62. Inpage 233, M states “(Satchidanandendra held -) Śankara does not postulate any theory like that of
mūlāvidyā, or require the acceptance of pramānas. Rather, he begins with a discussion of adhyāsa and
appeals to universal Intuition.” This is quoted from Swamiji’s work – “Misconceptions about Śankara”.
While quoting, M mixes up the original sequence of the sentences, which is likely to mislead the reader and
the intended emphasis is lost in the process. In the original, the second part of the first sentence given above
– “or require the acceptance of pramānas” does not follow the first part. The original is thus “Śankara
begins his bhāsya, with an introduction dealing with adhyāsa – otherwise called avidyā without postulating
any theory or acceptance pramānas (the valid sources of right knowledge) and appeals to universal intuition
through out.” The sentence “It is not right to say that Śankara postulates a hypothetical avidyā” appears
subsequently as a new para. The emphasis is that avidyā of Śankara is not a hypothetical postulate but a
matter of Universal experience and it does not require to be proved by pramānas in contrast to the
traditionalists’ theory of mūlāvidyā which they attempt to prove by various pramānas.

63. On page 233, M states that according to Swamiji “Śankara could be legitimated in western terms” in so far
as “he (Śankara) is not theological because Śruti is not the final pramāna that being oneself.” This is not at
all correct. No where it is stated that Śruti is not the final pramāna. What is stated is Śruti is not the only
means of knowledge as in theology but Śruti etc and intuition and other accessories also are the means here
according to the context. In fact śāstra is the ultimate means of knowledge(antyapramāna) which removes
the knowing nature itself superimposed on Atman and simultaneously with that removal, it ceases to be a
means of knowing just as the means of dream knowledge ceases to be such on waking (GitaBh 2.69).

64. Inpage 233, M says “With this commitment to independent rational inquiry, as opposed to an exegesis of
scripture along traditional lines…” This is incorrect. Swamiji does not suggest any rational inquiry
independent of the scriptures as M imputes. Non-vedic reasoning is in fact discarded as means of knowledge
of self. Śāstraic reasoning on the other hand, based on universal intuition is held to be subservient to self
realization even by the Śruti itself. Swamiji explicitly states in page 23 of his “Salient Features of Śankara’s
Vedanta” that - “That is why the reason proposed by the Śruti, claims superiority over any other ordinary
speculative reason. It is based upon universal experience, while the other speculations are barren since they
have no such support. Therefore no dry reasoning can be admitted here under the pretext that there is a text
recommending reason.” This is an echo of BSBh 2.1.6. Thus Swamiji’s appeal to rational inquiry is not an
 appeal to dry speculation but to inquiry on the lines suggested by the Śruti. Therefore there is no opposition
to the explanations of scripture as alleged by M.

65. M states in page 236 “Post-Śankara commentators, both critics and defenders of Śankara engage with ideas
whose origin can be traced to Śankara…” This is factually incorrect. Not all ideas dealt by the critics and
defenders can be traced to Śankara. The most important being the mūlāvidyā and its various aspects of
nature, number, locus, object, cessation etc. The substantiation of avidyā by Śruti statements and other
pramānas is also not traceable to Śankara.

66. M says in page 236 “His (Swamiji’s) standard for determining authenticity in advaita is Śankara, which the
tradition would not contest, but the focus on a single person as representative of tradition is foreign to
Advaita tradition of paramparā.” The proponents of the traditionalists will themselves not agree with the
later part of the sentence “But the focus on…” Swamiji would have had no objection if the proponents of
the traditionalists had admitted this. But which at no cost, they would, for it is Śankara that they would want
to represent through their views.
In this regard, it is pertinent to look at Śankara himself. In his bhāsyas, one comes across his criticisms
of other schools of Vedanta, all of them being non-dualistic. Śankara even labels them as not conforming to
the vedantic tradition. In this case, will M include such schools condemned by Śankara within the vedantic
tradition? If she does, will the traditionalists approve of it?

67. M says in page 236 “Tradition on the other hand, works to reconcile divergent views while subordinating
the views of any given person to the vision of non-duality.”
Why can’t the same standard be adopted with respect to Swamiji also? Swamiji does not compromise on
the non-duality. Rather even according to M, he follows Śankara strictly to the exclusion of others. So,
instead of levelling charges of being opposed to tradition, why is he not absorbed into it as another
proponent of Śankara?

68. M in page 236 states that “His (Swamiji’s) minimizing the status of Śruti as a pramāna, giving primacy to
reason, circumventing the need for a teacher, and oral transmission, finding the text an adequate source of
knowledge, and his generally philological/historical approach, along with problematizing the contradictions
in the works of the post-Śankara advaita commentators are all aspects of his work that deny his validation
by the advaita tradition.”
Here M enumerates the grounds for throwing Swamiji out of Advaita tradition, which are considered
hereafter
a. First and foremost it should be ascertained whether at all there is a set of standards prescribed, on
the basis of which one can be said to conform to the advaita tradition or otherwise. Is there a set of
rules which particularize the tenets of advaita, confirmation or deviation with respect to which
makes one fall into the tradition or out of it? Do the points mentioned above by M for throwing
Swamiji out of advaita tradition find place in such a set of standards prescribed? What is the
source of yardstick adopted by M in this regard? These are some of the basic questions that have
to be answered. Above all should Swamiji be considered as an outcast just because M says so? We
have seen the favourable disposition of the proclaimed custodians of Advaita tradition i.e. the
pontiffs of various Śankarācārya Mutts towards Swamiji (Para 53). Even if we take for
granted that M has succeeded in showing that Swamiji is outside the Advaita tradition, it is
pertinent to note that M has not been able to show even remotely that Swamiji is outside of Śan
kara’s tradition of Advaita.
b. The repeated acquisition of minimizing the status of Śruti as a pramāna and giving primacy to
reason has already been dealt with earlier and it was shown that this acquisition will equally apply
 to Śankara, whom Swamiji follows strictly. Śankara’s statement with regard to reason and
intuition are already cited. Śruti itself proposes reasoning as an immediate means to dawn of
knowledge. Moreover, Swamiji does not undermine the status of Śruti as a pramāna. In fact, he
advocates that even the reasoning to be followed is not any dry speculation but that put forward by
Śruti. In his “Salient features of Śankara’s Vedanta” (page 25), he quotes Śankara’s statement in
BSBh on 2.1.6 with regard to the kinds of reasoning, the first of which is the examination of the
three states. In the VPP, 3 full pages commencing from page 49, Swamiji details out how the
āgama i.e. the method of teaching adopted by the Śruti and the reasoning are subservient to the
intuition of reality. Here he clearly says that the reasoning as shown by Śruti is to be adopted and
that speculative reasoning on the basis of pure intellection by human beings has no place in
Vedanta. Page 75 of introduction to VPP, may also be seen for Swamiji’s views in this regard
where Swamiji says that “Śruti itself lays down that Atman is to be thought over, besides being
heard only. Only dry speculation not based upon experience has no place here.” This view of
Swamiji is also found on page 95 of introduction to Māndukya Rahasya Vivrtih. Moreover the
whole of the fourth canto of MVN is devoted to Śruti pramāna where he extensively quotes from
the Śruti to substantiate his stand. Even while introducing the methodology of examination of the
three states in the third canto of MVN he uses the word śrauti i.e. the method advocated by the
Śruti (Page 85 of MVN).
c. M’s another baseless allegation is that Swamiji circumvents the need for a teacher and oral
transmission. In this regard attention of the readers is drawn to the following statements of
Swamiji in his works.
i. He (the ignorant man) reverts to a more discriminating and considerate mode of life and
acting upon the advice of Vedanta and a wise teacher gets enlightenment. (Vedāntavidvadgos
thī. Intro - page 41)
ii. When one intuits his own true nature by discarding avidyā by means of the teachings of Śruti
and Ācārya… The knowledge dawns solely on account of Vedanta and Ācārya.(VPP page
47 - translated)
iii. Therefore knowing of Brahman is dependent upon the teaching of Ācārya, knowing the
Vedanta tradition.(VPP page 96 - translated)
iv. Thus the means of knowledge like faith, perseverance, serving the Guru etc practiced
cumulatively or alternatively depending upon the qualification of the aspirant become a tool
for being qualified to hearing of Śruti etc and dawn of knowledge.(VPP page 99 - translated)
v. … For both of these facts are quite understandable in so far as Brahman is reality, to be
known only through the guidance of a Guru and there is need for Śāstra to treat of this
paramātman (the supreme self) and the recommendation to the seeker to approach a teacher
(page 115 - Śuddha Śankara Prakriyā Bhāskarā, English edition 2001).

All the above citations, except for the last, are found in the very works of Swamiji referred to by
M in her paper.
Probably this allegation is based on page 109 of “Misconceptions of Śankara” where Swamiji
advices the earnest student of Śankara’s teachings to carefully observe certain rules during the course
of the study. There, the second rule reads as “Read the original for yourself as far as possible.” This
statement, if read out of context will mislead the reader. This statement should be seen in the light of
the previous rule and also to whom the work “Misconceptions of Śankara” is addressed to as stated
in the preface of that book. This work is for the earnest students who become bewildered in their
attempt to ascertain the exact teaching of Śankara in the wake of mutually conflicting sub-
commentaries, each of them claiming to present Śankara’s thought, being taught to them. Therefore
the advice “read the original” is to those who have already been taught by their respective
 Gurus and on the basis of which they find themselves confused by the mutually conflicting
views, all imputed to Śankara. The second set of readers to whom this book is addressed to is the
professors and scholars who undertake to write on the subject in English. Here again, since they have
already entered the field of Vedanta, most of whose interest in Vedanta being only academic, a direct
reading of the originals will enable them to make a comparative study and there by sift the non-Śan
kara tenets from that of Śankara’s.
Moreover, in the present days, in the paucity of teachers who teach the original Bhāsyas, what is
the way out for those sincere seekers of truth, who with unflinching faith in Śankara, have
surrendered to him totally, to help them cross the cycle of birth and death? For persons having
such faith, Śankara himself becomes their Guru incognito and the Bhāsyas start making sense to
those readers. Further, there is no fear of going astray since at every step they have the tool of
verification by appeal to experience. Thus it is not the case that Swamiji circumvents the need for a
teacher.
d. M finds fault in Swamiji’s “Finding the text an adequate source of knowledge.” By the word text,
it is presumed that M means the original Bhāsyas of Śankara. If the original text is not found
adequate and is found to be wanting in any respect, then it amounts to undermining Śankara’s
ability to present his views in a candid and comprehensive manner so as to serve the purpose for
which he composed his works. In this regard let us consider the time when the various mutually
conflicting commentaries had not yet been written on the Bhāsyas. At that time, all the followers
of Śankara then had no option but to follow only his bhāsyas without the aid of any commentaries.
Applying M’s yard stick, all of such followers should be considered as outside of Advaita tradition
for following the bhāsya alone. If it be said that at no point of time there was an absence of
commentary since Pañcapādikā authored by Padmapāda the direct disciple of Śankara was very
much there. The objection cannot be sustained since it is still not established with evidence
internally or externally that Pañcapādikā is from the pen of a direct disciple of Śankara.
For a while let us take it for granted that Pañcapādikā is a direct disciple of Śankara. In such
a case what was the need for all other commentaries? Did the other commentators not have the faith
that Pañcapādikā correctly represents the view of Śankara? If they themselves being closer in time
doubted the loyalty of Pañcapādikā to Śankara, what is wrong in others who have come centuries
later to doubt its loyalty? Another pertinent question that arises is what was the need for writing
Pañcapādikā itself? Does it not amount to undermining Śankara’s ability to present his views to
those qualified seekers in such a way that they understand it correctly? If Pañcapādikā has come to
elucidate Śankara in more detail then did the author do justice to the job taken up, since
Pañcapādikā itself had to be further explained by Vivarana? Author of Vivarana is not said to be a
direct disciple of the author of Pañcapādikā and we find the Vivarana also to differ from the views
of Pañcapādikā in certain aspects. Therefore, is it not sane to follow the original text only, to
overcome this chaos?
e. Swamiji’s problematizing the contradictions in the works of post-Śankara advaita commentators,
according to M, places him out of the advaita tradition.
Here M admits the contradictions in the works of post-Śankara commentators, but finds fault
with “the problematizing of such contradictions”. Is it not the presence of contradictions itself a
problem, which does not call for any further problematizing. Why at all so many commentaries on
the same work and that too mutually conflicting? Wouldn’t it have been wiser for the tradition not to
have presented the conflicting commentaries in the first place rather than presenting them and then
trying to reconcile the contradictions? Wouldn’t it have been better, if only the commentators
presented their views independently without claiming to represent Śankara? These are the pertinent
questions that arise in the minds of an earnest student.
 Now let us look at Śankara, he also condemns many of his advaitic predecessors. Among the
advaitins themselves, there were schools that supposed that the jīva nature of Brahman is also real
and that the soul’s union with Brahman has to be attained only after death by means of certain
practices enjoined in the Śrutis. They likewise differed among themselves in their attitude with
regard to the relation of the world and Brahman and with regard to final release and its means. Śan
kara’s school itself, while agreeing with others being advaitic, differed from them all in adopting a
particular method of its own in presenting the vedantic truth. Śankara however, was by no means the
originator of this method for it had been handed down by the line of teachers belonging to a holy
tradition.
In BSBh 1.4.22 while dealing with three different views on the meaning of a particular Śruti,
Śankara upholds one of them (Kāśakrtsna’s) as conforming to the Śruti, Not only he rejects the other
two views but also says that those who insist on distinction in Atman, they annul the purport of the
Vedantas and verily obstruct the right knowledge which is the door for liberation, according to them
liberation becomes attainable by actions and ephemeral, also they do not conform to reason. Now,
applying the norms of M, Śankara should also be considered outside the advaita tradition for instead
of reconciling the opposing views he has criticized two of them and sided with the third view (of
Kāśakrtsna) finding it in conformity with Śruti and the other views as opposed to reason.
Even within the tradition, let us take an example. Anubhūtisvarūpācārya, otherwise known as
Prakatārthakāra, believed to be the Vidyā Guru of the famous Ānandagiri, in his independent
commentary on Śankara’s BSBh makes a ‘courteous’ remark about Vācaspati Miśra the author of
Bhāmatī – “Vācaspati is but a follower of Mandana’s posterior and is ignorant of the meaning of
Sutrabhāsya… hates the very sannyāsa āśrama (3.4.47)” The author of Kalpataru reasons out the
issue and says that Vācaspati Miśra is NOT ignorant of the meaning of Sutrabhāsya. Is this
mutually contradicting view not problematic for a sincere student, who having staked his all for the
sake of liberation has come to the feet of Śankara full of hope? Should not he in these circumstances
look at what Śankara himself says in this regard? It would not do to circumvent the situation by
saying that both are right in their own ways since the issue does not affect the non-duality. Prakat
ārthakāra says Bhāmatīkara is ignorant of meaning of Sutra Bhāsya i.e. the ignorance imputed is not
in respect of any insignificant issue but to the whole of the Bhāsya. Moreover, how to follow the
Bhāmatī, who hates the sannyāsa āśrama (as per Prakatārthakāra), which is the basic qualification
for the study of Vedanta as per Śankara. Moreover, since both of them claim to explain Śankara both
cannot be correct at the same time. One of the two has to differ from Śankara and that one will have
to be regarded as outside of Śankara’s advaitic tradition. This is just one example.

69. Coming towards the end of the discussion on the traditionality of Swamiji M gives her verdict on page 237
“His (Swamiji’s) concept of tradition as static rather than dynamic is anathema to both traditions.” What a
courteous remark full of kindness about the person who is regarded by the Sage of Kāñcī, HH Sri
Chandraśekharendra Saraswati Swamiji, the 68th Pontiff of Kāñcī Kāmakoti Pītha as the very
personification of the phrase “āsupterāmrteh kālam nayet vedantacintayā (right upto bed and right
upto death one should spend the time in vedantic thoughts)” and who was praised by HH Sri
Abhinavavidyātīrtha Swamiji, the then pontiff of Śrngerī Mutt as “being a true devotee indeed of Śan
kara”. Curses are not new to Swamiji. Even during his lifetime one of the adversaries, a staunch advaitic
traditionalist even cursed Swamiji that his tongue be torn to a thousand pieces. Swamiji’s comparative study
of Śankara-bhāsya and the commentaries and his single devotion to Śankara, by strictly adhering to him
word for word, are solely to be blamed for inviting disparaging remarks from his adversaries.

70. Lothas been said so far; false allegations and baseless surmises were brought to light; statements factually
incorrect were exposed; citations substantiating certain statements were shown to be out of context and in
 some cases self-defeating; statements attributed to Swamiji, but not found in the originals were discovered;
incomplete and incorrect understanding of not only Śankara and Swamiji but also the views of traditionalists
were enumerated; quotations made partially and out context were pointed out; issues raised, even though
extraneous to the admitted scope were reviewed; withholding of complete facts and resort to partial
reporting were singled out; how finding fault in Swamiji amounts to finding fault in Śankara was shown;
translations not faithful to the original were pointed out; self-contradictory statements were laid bare; most
important of all, how not a single ground of Swamiji against the tenability of Mūlāvidyā is
controverted, was shown;
However what is yet to be shown is the final outcome of the question – fidelity to Śankara, admitted to
be the main focus of M’s paper. In this regard attention of readers is drawn to the following statements of M.
a. He (Swamiji) bases this (avidyā means mutual adhyāsa of the self and the not-self) on a definition
of avidyā given by Śankara in his introduction to BSBh. (Page 215)
b. It (Swamiji’s understanding of mithyā) is based on satya and anrta in the Taittirīyopanisad Bhāsya
(2.1) BSBh (2.1.11), Kāthakopanisad Bhāsya(1.2.14) and Upadeśasahasrī – prose (2.81) (page
224)
c. For Satchidanandendra, on the other hand the focus is entirely on Śankara.
d. The question that informed his entire life’s work can be formulated as “What did Śankara say?”
(Page 236).
e. He deals with possible points of contentions in the wake of other commentaries by measuring
them against Śankara. (Page 236)
f. The difference between Satchidanandendra and the tradition on this point (measurement with
reference to Śankara) is a radical one. (Page 236)
g. Satchidanandendra effectively places Śankara above the tradition and is willing to separate Śan
kara from tradition on a point of conflict. (Page 236)
The verdict is clear. M has vindicated Swamiji, though inadvertently, by stating that Swamiji follows
Śankara out and out. No qualms on account of Swamiji being treated as an outcast from the ‘Advatic
tradition’ so long as he is admitted to follow Śankara. What more can the earnest seekers want, than the
confirmation of unflinching loyalty of Swamiji to Śankara and Śankara alone?

71. The review concludes here with the answer to an important question – What should be the ideal standard to
be followed to determine the conformity of a school of thought to the Advaitic tradition?
A system of thought can be rightly said to conform to Advaitic tradition, not just because it has come
down from ages; not because a vast majority of people believe it to be advaitic; not because the authorship
is attributed to revered names; not because it gives room for accommodating totally conflicting views; not
because it logically refutes the Dvaita systems; but because it enables a true seeker, who in contrast to a
mere academician, has forsaken his everything worldly, for the sake of realization of the Ultimate Truth and
who is possessed of the required mental disciplines and discerning ability, to intuit the truth of Advaita in
entirety in his this very lifetime, by providing him the necessary methodology of approach. If such a true
seeker following such methodology intuits the truth for himself wherein no traces of nescience is left over
even while living and revels in the eternal bliss, then that school of thought and that alone can be rightly
considered to conform to the Advaitic tradition. Swamiji’s school in following Śankara strictly has been
proved to be so fruitful. Living still, amongst us, are those gifted few who have reaped the benefits of
Swamiji’s teachings of Śankara “as Śankara says” and having intuited the unity of self find themselves to be
the abode of eternal wisdom, happiness and equipoise. Many more are there who having renounced
everything worldly, are engaged full time in the exclusive study of Śankara alone and in the contemplation
of self on the lines suggested by Śankara and Swamiji. In light of this, the readers of this review may take
the hint from Śankara’s words and rest in peace in Śankara alone– “The knower of Vedic teaching, leaves
the cause of disagreement exclusive to the disputants themselves and rests in perfect peace being
safeguarded from them all, on account of knowing of Reality (Praśnopaniśad Bhāsya 6.3)”.
śam nah karotu śankarah
Om tat sat