Maimonides and Thomas Aquinas: Natural or Divine Prophecy?

®
Alexander Altmann

AJS Review, Vol. 3. (1978), pp. 1-19.

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 MAIMONIDES AND THOMAS AQUINAS:
NATURAL OR DIVINE PROPHECY?

by

ALEXANDER ALTMANN

Brandeis University

The question whether prophecy is a natural phenomenon or a divine gift

goes back to classical antiquity. A natural explanation of divination in sleep
was first attempted by Democritus whose theory operates with the notion of
'images' (eidiila) that affect the soul in dreams and foretell the future.
Whence these images emanate does not seem to be too clear from the
sources at our disposal. 1 Democritus is said to have described them as
"great and gigantic ... although not indestructible, " 1 and from this we may,
perhaps, infer that he associated the images with the statues of gods to
which the ancients ascribed an odd assortment of capacities. 1 The 'images'
may therefore signify certain emanations from those statues, especially since
Aristotle distinctly speaks of Democritus' theory as one involving 'images
and emanations' that derive from certain objects. 4 The theory thus under-
l. Sec Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Eor/y Greek Pluiosaphers (Oxford, \947), pp.
180- I, 249, n. 36; Saul Horovitz, Die Psycho/ogie bei den jwiischen Religionsphilosophen des
Mi1teialters wm Soodia bis Mai~ni {Bres[au, 1898; reprint ed., Westmead, 1970), p. 189, n.
133.
2. Sextus Empiricus Adversw physicos \. 19.
3. For references sec Arthur Stanley Pease, ed., M. Tu.iii Ciaronis ,:k divinatione (University
of l\\ino1s, 1920-23), I: 271-72.
4. Aristotle De dMnatione per somnum 2. 464al 1.
2 ALEXANDER ALTMANN

stood bear~ some resemblance to what Maimonides reports as the manner in

which the Sabians explain prophecy: statues in temples and holy trees give
prophetic revelation to people. 5 Whatever the correct interpretation of
Democritus' theory of dream visions, its intent was clearly scientific. 6 This
first effort to see divination in naturalistic terms-Cicero criticized it as far
too crude7-was to be superseded by Aristotle's more sophisticated theory
in his small treatise On Divination in Sleep which forms part of the so-called
Parva naruralia.
Aristotle posed the question: What is the cause of veridical dreams?, and
he inclined to assume that the veracity of at least some of them was due to
mere 'coincidence' (symptOmata). 1 Yet he pressed the search further. It
seemed unlikely to him that divinatory dreams were "sent by God"
(theOpempta) since it was not "the best and wisest" who enjoyed such
dreams but ordinary people and particularly those whose nature was gar-
rulous and melancholic. 9 Being a scientist, he followed this clue and he
reached the conclusion that there was a natural link between the easy
response of such people to internal stimuli during sleep and their divinatory
ability. He was able to develop this theory within the larger context of his
theory of sleep as a state in which the senses were at rest and the bond
(desmOs) of rational thinking was also relaxed, thereby allowing for the free
play of imagination. This syndrome-dormancy of senses and all controls
on the one hand and uncontrolled activity of imagination on the other-was
destined to become the archetypal pattern for practically all theories of
divination and prophecy. The natural process thus described was said by
Aristotle to be 'demonic', for "nature was demonic, not divine," 10 the term
"demonic" signifying, as in Plato, something intermediate between the
human and the divine. 11

5. Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed. 3: 45.

6. Sec: Jaeger, Theology, p. 181. The notion of 'images' is used by Ikmocritus also in con-
nection with his theory of poetic inspiration. See Pease, De diviruuio11e. l: 237-38.
7. Cicero De natura deorum l. 38-39; De divinatione 2. 67.137-39.
8. Aristotle De divinatione per somnum l. 462b28, 463b I; 2. 464a5.
9. Aristotle De divinarione I 462b 19-24, 463b l3- l8, 464a33. For Aristotle's dream theory
referred to in what follows in the text, see his De somno et wgi!ia l. 454b8- I I; De somniis 3.
460b28-46la30, 46lb27-462a32.
lO. De divinatione per somnum 2. 463bl3-15.
II. Someumes Aristotle identifies the 'demonic' with the 'divine'; see Hermann Bonitz,
Index Aristote!icw, 2d ed., p. l64, s.v. daimoniru. For nature as below the divine see the state-
ment of Themistius quoted by H. A. Wolfson, "Hallevi and Maimonides on Design, Chance
and Necesmy," Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research l \ ( 1941 ): 148-49,
[53 (republished in H. A. Wolfson, Studies in 1he History of Philosophy and Religwn, ed.
NATURAL OR DIVINE PROPHECY? 3

This scientific or naturalistic explanation of divination in sleep was a

marked departure by Aristotle from the view he had expressed in his early
work On Philosophy. "When the soul is by itself in sleep," he had said then,
"it takes on its proper nature and prophesies and predicts the future. And it
is in this state also when it is being separated from the body at the approach
of death." 11 Echoes of this earlier view, which is characteristic of Aristotle's
Platonic phase, are found also in his Eudemian Ethics, as Shlomo Pines has
pointed out. 11 According to this Platonizing doctrine, the human soul is
akin to the divine and for this reason may have intimations of things to
come whenever untrammeled by the senses. Clearly, this view contains a
theory that vindicates to the human soul a natural capacity for divination on
account of its god-like nature, not because of physiological conditions.
Th.e probably most instructive documentation of the classical and early-
Hellenistic discussion of the theme is found in Cicero's book On Divination
which, as [saac Heinemann has shown, draws in the main on Posidonius'
work of the same title. 14 The Stoics took a position radically opposed to
Aristotle's scientific approach in that they ascribed all divinatory
phenomena to divine Providence. If there are gods who care about men, so
the argument ran, there must be divination, a forewarning or cheering by
prophetic dreams or in other ways. 1~ There are two kinds of divination,
natural and artificial, the natural type comprising veridical dreams and
frenzy (mania, furor, raptu.s), the artificial signifying the interpretation of
signs based on age-old empirical observation of sequences that correlates
signs and events. The superiority of natural divination was recognized by
Posidonius and Philo of Alexandria.16 Stoicizing Peripatetics like

Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams [Cambridge, Mass., 19771, 2: 44-45, 49). For the
development of the notion of the "demonic' in the Platonic tradition, see Frank Regen, Apull!ius
phi/asophus P!aton.icus {Berlin and New York, \971).
12. Sextus Empiricus Adversus mathematicos I. 20-21, quoted by Cicero De divin.arion.e I.
30. 63 from either Cratippus or Posidonius, as suggested by Isaac Heinemann, Poseidon.las"
ml!taphysische Sch,iften {Breslau, 1928), 2: 354. Cf. Simon van den Bergh, trans., Aw>rroes·
Tahafw Al-Tahafut {London, 1954), 2: 167.
13. Shlomo Pines, ..The Arabic recension of Pal1!(l Naturalia and the philosophical doctrine
concerning veridical dreams according to a!-RisO.la al-Mandmina and other sources," ls,ae!
Otil!nta/ Stiulies 4 (1974). 141-42.
14. See Heinemann, Schrifun.. p. 328 and passim.
15. Cicero De divination.I'! I 38. 82-83, 39. 84; 2. 49. !01. The argument is reported rn the
name of Chrysippus, who wrote a treatise on divination, and others. The reverse argument: .. if
there is divinauon, there must be gods" is found m Aristotle's On. Philosophy (see Se1<-tus Adv.
phys. I 20) and in Posidonius (see Heinemann, Schrifun.. p. 346).
16 Cicero De div I 50. l \3; Philo Vita Mosis \. 277 (see Heinemann, Schriften, p. 333).
4 ALEXANDER ALTMANN

Dicaearchus and Cratippus considered natural divination alone to be

legitimate subjects of philosophic inquiry. Cratippus in particular took issue
with Aristotle's suggestion that the veracity of dreams might be purely coin-
cidental, a view that had been adopted also by CarneadesY He maintained
the Stoic notion of veridical dreams as sent by a solicitous Providence and
the Platonizing view of the divine nature of the human soul which had also
become part of the Stoic doctrine. 18 In his view, therefore, prophecy was
natural in the sense that the soul possessed a natural capacity for divination.
As has been shown in an important study by Shlomo Pines,1 9 the Arabic
philosophers had no inkling of Aristotle's treatise On Divination in Sleep in
its original and authentic form but knew it only in an Arabic version (now
lost) which can be partly reconstructed from Averroes' Epitome of it 20 and
from some quotations found in the Riso.Ia af-mantimiyya (presumably by
Aviccnna)2 1 and in Ibo Bajja's Tadbrr al-mutawaM,id. 11 According to this
Arabic version, veridical dreams are bestowed by divine Providence,
through the Active Intelligence, upon the human imagination which thereby
receives the knowledge of future evenL'l either in clear terms ("as they are go-
ing to be") or in a "hidden," i.e., figurized form. 1 i As in Cratippus, we find
in this theory the assumption of divine origin combined with a naturalistic
approach, seeing that both the activity of the Active Intelligence and the
mimetic function of the imagination are natural as distinct from the divine
initiative. It is this theory of veridical dreams which underlies the doctrines
of prophecy developed by al-Fara.bi and Avicenna. It forms the starting
point and structural nucleus of these more complex theories. Like veridical
dreams, prophecy in its various higher forms is said to be due to an emana-
tion from God mediated by the Active Intelligence, the difference being that

l7. Cicero De die 1. 13. 23; on Carneades see Heinemann, Schnften, p. 341
18. Cicero De div l. 32. 70, 2. 58. l \9. Heinemann (Schrifren. p. ]54) leaves it undecided
whether Cratippus adopted the Srnic view or whether Cicero formulated Cratippus's v[ew in
Stoic fashion. On Cratippus see Pease, De divinitalione. l: 59.
19 Referred to in n. 13.
20 See Harry Blumberg's edition of the Arabic text of Averroes' £piwme of Pana
Natura/ia ( 1972), his ediuon of the Hebrew translation of this tell! (1954); and E. L. Shields' edi-
tion (with H. Blumberg's assistance) of the Laun version (\949), all published by The
Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge, Mass.
2\. See Pines, "Arabic recension," pp. 120-1.
22. See Miguel Asin Palacios, trans., £1 nfgimen de/ solitario por A W!mpaa {Madrid and
Granada, 1946), pp. 22-24 (54-55), quoted and partly translated by Pines, pp. 137-]8.
23. See the texts quoted by Pines, pp. 114-21, l37-J8; Averroes' £piwme of ParWl
Natura/ia: Arabic 72. 7, 73. 4-7, 79. 7-12, 84. 7-9; Hebrew 47. 9-10, 48. 1-3, 5 I. 16-52. J, 55.
3-5; Latin IOI. JS-36, 102. 49-52, \09. 4-9, I \6. l7-l8.
NATURAL OR DIVINE PROPHECY? 5

in prophecy proper both imagination and intellect are involved. Averroes,

who elaborated the doctrine of veridical dreams in his Epitome of the Arabic
version of Aristotle's treatise, made the explicit point that essentially there
was no difference between veridical dreams and prophecy or for that matter
between the two and technical forms of divination (kihdna). The only dif-
ference was one of degree. For this reason it had been said that "dream was
a certain part of prophecy." Averroes alluded here to a widely quoted and
much varied badith according to which Mubammad is said to have defined a
dream as being the forty-sixth part of prophecy. 24 In his Epitome Averroes
also pointed out that veridical dreams were confined to disclosures of future
happenings and to information in the practical arts such as medicine, many
cures having been revealed in dreams, but could not convey knowledge in
the theoretical sciences. Revelations of the latter kind, particularly about
things divine, were possible only in prophecy. 15
Maimonides was not acquainted with Averroes' Epitome, as we happen
to know from the letter written by him to his disciple Yosef hen Shime'on in
I 190-9 L. 16 Yet his discussion of veridical dreams in Guide 2: 36 is strikingly
similar to Averroes'. He too makes the point that there is only a difference
in degree between dreams and prophecy, and one of the rabbinic dicta
(Berakhot 57b) quoted by him in support ("dream is the sixtieth part of
prophecy") is probably the source from which the badith cited by Averroes
ultimately derived. In other chapters (2: 37, 38), he made it clear that
prophets alone received intimations of a theoretical nature in addition to
knowledge of future events but whether or not the medical art stood to
profit from dreams is not spelled out by him. Gersonides took it for granted
that he denied such a possibility and that his psychological explanation of
misguided prophetic claims in 2: 38 was a veiled attack against Galen who
had attributed some of his cures to revelation in dreams. 11 We may safely as-

24. Averroes' Epitome. Arabtc67. 4-ll, 84. l l, Hebrew 44. 3-9; 55. 6-7; Lauo l l6. 23.On
the hadith and its many variations see M. J. Kister, "'The interpretation of dreams ... ," Israel
Onenral Studies 4 (1974): 7l To the list should be added. Franz Rosenthal, trans., lbn Kluildli.n
The Muqaddimah (Bollingen Senes 43, 1958), 1. 208-9.
25. Averroes' Epitome: Arabic 67. 8-lO, 73. 4, 88. 9-91. 3, Hebrew 44. 6-9, 47. 16-48. l,
57. 14-59. 9; Latin 102. 48-49, 120. 7-123. 41. The attribution of medical prognosis to dream
revelatwn ls a well-known topos in ancient philosophy. For references, see Pease, De
divinatione, 2: 572. Helnemann, Schnfien, p. 332 quotes a reference concerning the discovery, in
a dream, of tile efficacy of arisl()/achia against snake poisoning.
26. See Solomon Munk, "Notice sur Joseph ben-lehouda. . ," Journal Asiatique 3d ser.
l4 (1842)· 22, 24-25, 31; D. H. Baneth, ed., Mous Ben Maimon Episwlae (Hebrew), vol
(Jerusalem, 1946), p. 70. Baneth (p. 22) confirmed Munk's dating o( the letter.
27. Sefer milhamot ha-shem (Riva dl Trento, 1560), 2: 4, fols. l7c-l8b.
6 ALEXANDER ALTMANN

sume that Maimonides' accord with Averroes was due to the fact that both
of them used the Arabic version of the Aristotelian treatise, and that both
followed in the al-Fara.bi and Avicenna tradition that had grown out of it. It
is this intellectual background that accounts in large measure for
Maimonides' theory of prophecy.
Thomas Aquinas' philosophical background was in many respects dif-
ferent. He shared with Maimonides a knowledge, at least to some extent, of
the Arabic philosophers, particularly of Avicenna. 18 He was not acquainted,
however, with the Arabic version of Aristotle's On Divination in Sleep, even
assuming that he knew the Latin version of Averroes' Epitome of the Parva
naturalia which was, in part, based on that version. 19 This is evident from
the fact that both he and his teacher Albertus Magnus quote the authentic
Aristotelian view that veridical dreams cannot be sent by God, seeing that
they do not occur to the wisest and best. 30 Both Albert and he believed
Aristotle to hold a purely naturalistic notion of veridical dreams, and this
suited both of them very well. It enabled them to assign the phenomenon of
prophecy as attested in pagan literature to purely natural agencies in con-
trast to biblical prophecy which they attributed to the agency of God and
designated as divine prophecy. 31 There were more differences in the intellec-
tual heritage of Maimonides and St. Thomas. Maimonides' knowledge of
the philosophical tradition concerning theories of prophecy was limited to
the works of the Arabic and a few Jewish philosophers, whereas Thomas,
like Albert, had at his disposal a large array of Latin sources as well. 31
Moreover, Thomas could draw on an extensive body of patristic writings,
especially St. Augustine's Twelfth Book in De Gene.si ad litteram that dealt
with prophecy. 11 Finally, both he and Albert were quite at home with

28. For bibliographical details (translations, etc.) and texts quoted by S1. Th.omas, see C.
Vansteenkiste, "Alltori Arabie G1udei nell' opera di S. Tommaso," Angelirnm 32 (1960).
29. The Versio Vulgata is variously attributed to Gerard of Cremona {d. 1187) and Michael
Scot (d. c 1235). See Shields' edltion, p. xiii.
JO. Albertus Magnus, Opua Omma, vol. 9 (Paris, 1891), Lib. rn, Oesomn.o et eigi/ia. Tract
I, C. 2, p. ]79; Thomas Aqu\nas, Quaestion.esdi.!putaiae (QD), I, De veritaie. ed. Raimondo
Spiaui (Turin and Rome, 1953), 12 5 (4), 246a; idem, Summa theo/ogiae. 45, ed. R Potter
(Manchester, 1970), 2: 2 (ST), 172. 4 (4)
31. Cf. Albertus Magnus, Opera. 3. I I, p. 178: "hoc quod <licit Aristoteles plus accedit
ventati, quam aliqu1d quad ante vd post scnpsit aliquis Philosophorum, cujus scripta ad nos
devenerunt."
32. Of the range of literature available to Albertus Magnus one catches a glimpse from the
quotatrons found in his De somn.o et Si/gi/io.
33. St. Augustine, De Genesi ad li11eram. 12. 1-37, in J. P. Migne, Patrofogiae cursus com-
p/etum. Series latin.a, 34: 454-86.
NATURAL OR DIVINE PROPHECY? 7

Maimonides' treatment of the subject in the Guide and made ample use of it,
as has been shown in a number of studies tracing his borrowings. H
It is remarkable that Thomas Aquinas could adopt a great many points
from Maimonides' theory of prophecy, notwithstanding the radical dif-
ference in their fundamental outlook which may be summed up in the an-
tithesis between 'natural' and 'divine' prophecy that forms the subject of this
paper. The ultimate reason for this difference must be sought in the dis-
similarity of ontological assumptions that divide them. Maimonides sub-
scribes to the Avicennian type of ontology 15 which sees the total reality, in-
cluding God, as a continuum in which the flow of emanations from God
through the hierarchy of Intelligences reaches down to the Active Intel-
ligence as the immediate fountainhead of the activity of forms in the sub-
lunar world. This entire universe is a system of free-flowing grace as it
were, 16 and does not require special acts of divine grace for special purposes.
Here grace is abounding at all times, and its reception and efficacy depend
solely on the receptivity or disposition of the recipient. "Envy is banished
from the celestial choir," Plato had said, 37 and this statement is echoed in
Avicenna's declaration, "Yonder there is no veiling (ibtijO.b) nor avarice
(bukhl)," 38 a formulation that reappears somewhat abbreviated in Judah
34. See Jacob GL1ttmann. Das Verhiiltnisdes Thomas von Aqumo zum Judemlmm und zur JU-
dischen L111eratur (GOttingen, 1891), pp. 73-79; Ernst Salomon Koplowitz, Die Abhiing1gkei1
Thomas von Aquins van R. Mose Ben Maimon (Mir, 1935), pp. 89-93; and the excellent
monograph by JosC Mada Casciaro, El did/ogo teo/6gico de Santo Tomds con musu/manes y
judios. el tema de la profeda y la reve/aciOn (Madrid, 1969). On some early polemics concerning
the degree of Thomas• "dependence" on Ma1mo111des, see the valL1able essay by Joseph
MaL1sbach, "'Die Stellllng des hL Thomas von Aqllin zu Maimonides in der Lehre von der
Prophetie," Theo/ogische Quanalsuh,ift 81 (1899): 553-79.
35. He does so with some reservations, as is evident from his remarks in Guide, I. 71 mjine.
A searching analysis of the Avicennian ontology is found in Herbert Davidson's study,
"Alfarab1 and Avicenna on the Active Intellect," Viawr Mediel!lll and Renaissance S1ud1es 3
(1971)· 109-78.
36. I borrow th\S term from H. A. Wolfson's translation of Maimonides' definition of
prophecy (2: 36) as "a free grace Oowmg from God throllgh the medium of the Active Intellect
to man's rational faculty first and then to his imaginative faclllty." As Wolfson explains, the
term fai(l. which is L1sually translated as "emanation," actually denotes the "clement of
liberality and generosity in the act of emanation" and is correctly rendered by la,gilas in the old
Latin translation (Paris, 1520). See Wolfson, "Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy,'' JQR.
n.s. 33 (1943): 71 (repubhshed m Wolfson, Studies in the Hiswry of Philosophy and Religion, 2
[1977]: 60-119; cf. p. 108).
37. Phaedrus 147A; see also Timaeus 29E; Aristotle Me1aphysics I 2. 12 938a1· "It is im•
possible for the Deity to be jealous."
38. See Fazlur Rahman, ed., Avicenna's De Anima (London, 1959), p. 178; S. van Riel, ed.,
Avicenna Latinus. Ube, De Anima seu Sextus de Na1t,,a/ibus (Louvam and Leiden, 1968), p. 29:
ct non est illic occultatio aliqua nee avaritia.
8 ALEXANDER ALTMANN

Halevi, Joseph ibn Saddiq and Abraham ibn Da'Ud. 39 For Maimonides the
flow of emanations that results in the bestowal of forms upon matter in the
physical world is identical with the flow of emanations that constitutes the
exercise of Providence and the gift of prophecy. 40 The interposition of
mediating agencies like the Active Intelligence does not detract from the
divine character of the various bestowals. At the same time, the natural en-
dowments of matter and of the material intellect of man, if properly con-
ditioned, render the bestowal of the divine overflow a natural process.
Maimonides says distinctly (2: 32) that '"it is a natural thing for everyone
who according to his natural disposition is fit for prophecy ... to become a
prophet." True, he makes the actualization of the prophetic potentiality
dependent upon the Divine Will that may or may not miraculously prevent
it, but the "Divine Will"-designated here as mashi'a. not irdda-has to be
understood as the primordial Will of God that is identical with God's
Wisdom. 41 Hence the gift of prophecy is not due to an ad hoc dispensation
but is grounded in the ultimate mystery of the Divine essence in which Will
and Wisdom are intertwined. Maimonides' stipulation that links prophecy
to the Divine Will is not meant to annul its natural character; it only cor-
roborates it. For the natural happening is thereby legitimized, as it were, as
divinely preordained and as of an order above mechanical and blind neces-
sity. Maimonides' insistence upon the operation of Will in the flow of
emanations comes close to the way in which some modern interpreters have
understood Plotinus' notion of emanation as a blend of necessity and wiJl. 4 l
[t would therefore seem that even if Maimonides' stipulation meant to dis-
guise his view-as some commentators assume it does 43 -his stress on the
Divine Will does represent his true opinion and it allows, at the same time,
for a naturalistic theory of prophecy.
Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, breaks with the Avicennian on-
tological scheme which had dominated the neoplatonic phase of Latin

39. fodah Halevi, Kuzari, 5: 10; Joseph ibn Saddiq, Microcosm. ed. Saul Horovitz, p. 38;
Abraham ibn Da'Ud, 'Emunah ,amah. ed. S. Weil, 74. 9-10; 36. 37-41. ki "ein sham ki/!1.1.
40. Cf. Guide, 2: 12 (Munk 26a); 3: 18 (Munk 37b).
41 See Avraham Nuriel, "Ha-ra~on ha-'elohi be-moreh nevukhim," in Tarbiz 39 (1970):
39-61
42. See Paul Henry, "Le problCme de la libertC chez Plotin," in Revue n,fo-scol,wique. 2d
ser., 8 (1931); J. M. Rist, Plotinw;: The Road to Rea/ily (Cambridge, 1967); Klaus Kremer,
·•□ as 'Warum' der Sch6pfung: •quia bonus' vel/et •quia voluit'? Ein Beitrag zum Verhiiltnis
von Neuplatonismus und Christentum an Hand des Prmz1ps 'bonum est diffusivum sui'," in
Kurt Flasch, ed., Pa,ousia. Festgabe JUI' Johannes Hirschberger (Frankfurt, 1965), pp. 241-64.
43. See Joseph Kaspi, Moses Narboni and Shemtov ben Joseph ad loc. (2: 32).
NATURAL OR DIVINE PROPHECY? 9

scholasticism, although he retains some of its Augustinian features. 44 The

most radical step in this direction was the relocation of the Aristotelian ac-
tive intellect from the semi-divine and transcendent position that had been
assigned to in in the Alexander of Aphrodisias tradition down to Averroes.
Thomas interpreted the active intellect as a part of the human intellect. 45 He
adhered to the concept of Intelligences correlated to the celestial bodies but
cancelled the emanationist theory and thereby did away with the notion of a
divine continuum in which grace is a matter of free-flowing divine activity.
In the Augustinian-Avicennian tradition the boundaries of grace and nature
had been blurred. All cognition had been described as a seeing in the divine
light. St. Thomas sharply differentiated between nature and grace. Gratia
perficit naturam, which means that the two are not a single activity any
more. Whereas in the al-Fara.bi-Avicenna type of epistemology the highest
stage of human knowledge amounts to an act of mystical union with the Ac-
tive Intelligence, and prophecy is this very act, termed variously the 'angelic
intellect' or 'holy intellect' or 'holy spirit' or 'divine power', 46 Thomas frees
the cognitive act from any link with the transcendent. Hence for him
prophecy cannot be a mere perfect act of the natural order of intellection. It
becomes a pure 'gift of God' (donum Dei or donum Spiri1us sancti). 41 It is no
longer the result of natural dispositions as in Maimonides. Nor can it ever
be a habitus, since it is a transient gift, like light in the air. 4~ At best, it may

44. Sec Gallus M. Manser, Da5 Wesen des Thomismus. 3d ed. (Freibllrg, Switzerland,
1949), pp. 140-52, 166-79; Etienne Gilson, "'Les sources grCCo-arabes de l'augustmisme
av1cenn1sant," Archives d'hisioire doc1rinale et lilliraire du Moyen Age, 1929-30, pp. 5-107
45. Cf. Martin Grabmann, Mmelalterliche Deutung und Umblidung der anstorelischen
Lehre vom nous poie1ikos (Mllnich, 1936), pp. 47ff.
46. Angelic intellect: Avicenna, Tis' ras,i'il (Cairo, 1326 A.H.), 122. 12 (al-·aql al-malak();
holy intellect: Avicenna, De anima (ed. Rahman), 248. 18 ('aql quds(); holy spim: Tis· rasd ·11.
64 2: holy spirit: De onimo, 249 ! (a!-rUh al-qudsiyya); divine power· Dt an/ma, 150. 4 (qu,nm
qudsiyya). The notion of "angelic intellect' is implied in al-F:i.nibf's statement that one who has
achieved contact with the Active Intelligence was considered an 'angel' (malak) by the ancients;
see Al-s1vtisd1 al-madimyyab (Hyderabad, !346 A.H }, p. 49. The Hebrew version (Se/er ha-
hatha/01, ed. F1lipowski, p. 40, bottom line) reads melekh (king), and the reading malik (king) in
the Arabic text 1s followed by Fazlur Rahman, Prophecy in Islam (London, 1958), p JO and
Ralph Lerner and Muhsm Mahdi, eds., Medieval Political Philosophy- A Sourcebr,r,k (Chicago,
l 963), p. 36. Paul Brcinnle, ed., Die Staats/euung von Alfarabi, Deutsche Bearbtiwng (Leiden,
1904), p. 61 translates 'Engel', and this reading corresponds to the statement in Averroes'
Epirome of Parva Naturalia "These men, if they exist, are men onl~ in an eqmvocal sense, and
the~ are more nearly angels than men" (Arabic 90. 2-3; Hebrew 58. 12; Latin 122. 23-24).
47. QD. 12 4, p. 245a; 12. 5, p. 246a-b; 12. 8, p. 253a; ST. 2. 2. 172. I, 172. 2 and passim.
48. QD. 12. I, p. 236a; ST, 171 2.
10 ALEXANDER ALTMANN

be a habilitas, a certain readiness or state of being attuned after previous ex-

periences of that gift. 49
At the same time, Thomas admits the naturalness of veridical dreams
and of pagan prophecy. He offers two definitions of natural prophecy. The
first of these is based on Aristotle's notion of the 'natural' as "that which
has the principle of motion within itself," e.g., it being natural for fire to rise
upward. 50 Those who hold the soul to be naturally gifted to foresee the
future take the term 'natural' in this sense of 'natural power'.'i 1 Yet this
theory must be rejected, he says, for various reasons, chiefly because the
human mind cannot naturally arrive at a cognition to which no way leads
from self-evident principles of knowledge. 51 The second definition of natural
prophecy starts from the concept of 'natural' as a principle of dispositions
or aptitudes insofar as these are the necessary preconditions for the attain-
ment of certain perfections, e.g., the suitable disposition of the human body
for the infusion of the rational soul.~ 3 Natural prophecy in this sense of the
term would seem to be identical with the al-Firibi-Avicenna-Maimonides
sponsored view that makes prophecy dependent on natural dispositions for
the reception of the divine overflow. St. Thomas adopts this kind of theory,
wi~hout its emanationist implications, as an adequate explanation of
veridical dreams and natural prophecy. He rules it out of court as far as true
prophecy-the one ·'about which we talk''-is concerned. 54 He believes that
in the case of veridical dreams the natural aptitude or disposition enables
the dreamer to receive certain 'impressions' from the celestial bodies in
which the 'preparations' of future events reside. The soul, by virtue of its
subtlety, is able to previsualize those events from certain 'similitudes' left in
the imagination as a result of those impressions.'' This theory goes back to
Avicenna who attributes to the celestial bodies an influence upon the
imagination of suitably disposed people, without, however, attaching too
much significance to dreams produced in this manner. 56 St. Thomas ob-

49. QD. 12. I, p. 236b; ST, l71. 2 (2).

50. QD. 12. 3, p. 241a. See Aristotle Physics 1. I 192b-\93al.
Sr. Thomas reports th,s view (which we discussed above, pp 3-4) in the name of St.
Augustme who refutes it. See De Gen.es1 ad /iueram, 12:13.
52. QD. l2. 3, p. 241a.
53. QD, 12. 3, p. 241a-b. Cf. Aristotle De genera1ione animalium 2. 3 736b28. Thomas
Aquinas offers two different sets of definitions of the "natural' in QD. De veritate. 14. lO, p.
454a and 25. 6, p. 479a.
54. QD. l2. 3, p 24lb: prophetia de qua nunc loquitur; prophetia de qua loquimur.
55. QD. 12. J (ad I and 5), pp. 242b and 243a.
56. Avicenna, De anima (ed. Rahman), ISO. 4-7; (ed. van Riel), 31. 29-33.
NATURAL OR DIVINE PROPHECY? 11

viously assigns a far greater importance to the impact of the celestial bodies
upon the human imagination. There is a great deal of evidence to show that
in his view the celestial bodies are responsible for sublunar happenings that
are not reducible to the elemental powers, including such occult
phenomena as magnetism. 51 As far as natural prophecy is concerned, St.
Thomas believes it to consist in the reception of certain information from
the Intelligences which, unlike Maimonides, he does not equate with the
angels. 58 He makes the point, however, that even information conveyed by
the angels is still within the confines of natural prophecy. 59 This theory of
natural prophecy clearly follows the Maimonidean pattern but relegates it
to a lower level. Defined in the most concise formulation offered by
Thomas, natural prophecy is one "ex virtute creata." 60 This includes both
intelligences and angels.
It is obvious that divine prophecy, according to St. Thomas, can do
without the dispositions which Maimonides laid down as conditional for the
coming~into-being ofprophecy. 61 If prophecy is but a gift of God, it will be
unnecessary for the prophet to be endowed with a high degree of imagina-
tion and intellectual capacity, to have developed his mental powers through
training, and to be possessed of moral perfection. All these preconditions
were required by Maimonides under the assumption that only the most
favorable preparation of·matter' rendered an individual fit for the reception
of the divine emanation, i.e., for union with the Active Intelligence. More
specifically, only at the stage of the acquired intellect could the divine influx
assume such proportions as to set in motion the rational faculty as well as
the imagination in adequate measure. On the one hand, Thomas adopts the
phenomenology of the prophetic process described by Maimonides also for
divine prophecy. He actually quotes Maimonides when referring to this
process: "Prophecy begins in the intellect and is completed in the
imagination." 61 For "from the fullness of the intellectual light a redundancy
arises that spills over into imagination there to form an imaginative vision." 6 l

57. See Thomas Litt, Les corps ci!estes dans /'univers de Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Paris, I963),
pp. I Uff., 117, 122-23, 129. Litt analyzes Th.omas's treatise ··oe occultis operationibus
naturae" and shows th.at in h.is view of th.e celestial bodies h.e followed Albertus Magnus. For
Avicenna's doctrine, sec S. van den Bergh, Tahafui, 2: 166-67.
58. QD. 12. J (ad I), p. 242b; (ad 5), p. 243a; 12. 4, p. 245; 12. 8 (J), p. 253a; ST. 172. I (2).
59. QD. 12. 8 (ad 3), p. 253b.
60. QD. 12. J, p. 241b; 12. 4, p. 245a; 12. 8, p. 253a.
61 QD. 12. 4-5; ST, 172. J-4.
62. QD, 12. 12 (6), p. 261a.
63 QD, 12. 12 (2), p. 260b.
12 ALEXANDER ALTMANN

Yet in discussing the question "Whether any natural disposition is re-

quired for prophecy," 64 Thomas points out that as a divine gift prophecy
cannot be due to any natural cause (ex virtute alicuius causae creatae). At
times God confers this gift precisely upon the seemingly most unfit in order
thereby to indicate the operation of divine power. 65 Hence prophecy cannot
be something merited by certain perfections. It is all a matter of unmerited
grace. 66
ln thus divorcing the gift of prophecy from all natural dispositions,
Thomas Aquinas subscribes to the very view which Maimonides (2: 32) had
listed as the opinion of the ignorant multitude among pagans and Jews, i.e.,
the one that held prophecy to be independent of natural capacities and that
considered it purely a matter of Divine Will. At the same time Thomas does
not deny that dispositional qualities are indeed needed to make the divine
gift of prophecy operational. He therefore assumes that God, who is the
creator of both form and matter, supplies not only the lumen propheticum
but also the necessary disposition in case it is lacking. Thus, in the absence
of a sufficiently strong power of imagination God will ameliorate the com-
plexion of the organ that is responsible for the imaginative faculty. 61 This is
an interesting case of combining Maimonides' phenomenology of the
prophetic act with the exigencies of a supernaturalistic view of prophecy.
The naturalistic point of view remains intact but it is integrated into a super-
naturalistic framework. Divine grace creates the natural conditions for the
effective reception of the charisma.
What is meant by this kind of divine intervention becomes clear from
Thomas' discussion of the role of angels in prophecy, another LOpos that
bears some resemblance to Maimonides' doctrine. Before entering into this
area of discussion, let us first present Thomas' important and fundamental
distinction between two aspects of the prophetic act which he calls acceptio
(or receptio) and iudidu.m. 68 As Benoit Garceau has shown in his
monograph on the subject, 69 these two terms signify, in this context at least,
the imaginative vision on the one hand and its intellectual interpretation or
meaning on the other. ln a sense, acceptio and iudidum correspond to the

64. QD. 12. 4, p. 245a.

65. Ibid. (ad 6), p. 245b.
66. Ibid. (ad 4).
67. lb,d. (2), p. 244b.
68. QD. 12. 7, p. 25la-b (see also 12 3 [ad I], p. 242b); cf. ST. 174. 2-3.
69. Benmt Garceau, Judie/um. Vacabulaire, Sauras, Dactrine de Salm Thomas d'Aquit1
(Montreal and Pans, 1968), pp. 38-39.
NATURAL OR DIVINE PROPHECY! 13

terms ta$awwur and la$diq, concept and affirmation, which form the two
main divisions in the logical systems of the Arabic philosophers, 70 and go
back to Aristotle's distinction between the What and the That in the begin-
ning of the Posterior Analytics (I. I). Thomas Aquinas points out that the
mere reception of an image in dream or vision does not make one a prophet.
Pharaoh's dream vision did not amount to prophecy. Joseph, who received
a iudicium, an intellectual understanding, of Pharaoh's dream, did thereby
show himself to be a prophet. A fortiori, one who has both the receptio of a
species or similitude and the intellectual iudicium concerning it is a prophet.
He is the most superior prophet whose very receptio consists of an intellec-
tual vision (unalloyed by imaginative components) as well as a divinely im-
parted iudicium. 11 It is not difficult to recognize in this tripartite division the
contours of Maimonides' three levels of prophecy, the lowest being purely
imaginative (as in veridical dreams); the intermediate combining
imaginative and intellectual cognition; and the highest involving the intellect
alone (as in Moses' prophecy). 12

70. See H. A. Wolfson, ·'The Terms Tasawwur and Tasdiqin Arabic Philosophy and Their
Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents," Moslem Wor/d33 (1943)· 1-15 (republished in Studies.
[· 478-92; cf. 2: 564-65),
71. QD, 12. 7 and 12. 12; ST. 174. 2-3.
72. Thomas's view derives, in the first place, from Augustine's. See De genesi. 12. 9
(Prophet/am ad mentem pertinere). As for the lowest level of prophecy, there is an echo of
Maimonides' description of veridical dreams (2: 36) as novele1 ne\lU'ah. a term quoted from
Genesis Rabba, 17: 5, 44: l 7. Thomas (ST. 173. 2) refers undoubtedly to this term when he says
that mere imaginative apparitions are "called by some casus prophe1iae" (this being the correct
reading in place of extasis prophetiae, which makes no sense). The reference becomes perfectly
dear from a passage in Albertus Magnus, De somno et vigil/a, 3. I. 3, p. 181· ··propter quod
trad1derunt Phtlosophi, quod somnium ahquod futurum praenuntians est casus a prophetta
factus. Casus enim vocatur immaturus fructus deddens, qui tamen figuram et saporem fructus
etiam aliquo modo praetendit." Manuel Joel, Verhiiltnis Alben des Grossen zu Mous
Maimonides (Breslau, 1863; 2d ed. 1876, here quoted), p. 25, first drew attention to the use in
this passage (in the name of the 'philosophers'} of Maimonides' quotation and interpretation of
the midrashic phrase, casus being obviously the rendition of novelet (i.e., the fruit •falling'
prematurely off the tree) in the Latin version by Augustinus iustinianus which was based on
Judah al-l;{arizi's Hebrew translation (see W. Kluxen, "Literargcschichtliches zum lateinischen
Moses Maimonides," in Rechuches de thiiologie ancienne et miidihale 21 ( I954): 2]-50). Joel did
not verify his assumption but the Paris 1520 edition of the old Latin version (reprint ed.,
Frankfurt, 1964), fol. 63b does indec:d contain this term: Dixit etiam in eadem ratione quod
casus prophetiae somnium est. Johannes Buxtorf jun. (Doctor Perplexorum. [Basie, 1629], p.
293) renders the midrashic statement: .. Deciduum Prophetiae est Somnium." Cf. Jacob Gutt-
mann, Die Scholastik des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts (Breslau, 1902), pp. ll3-14. The
dependence of the Thomas Aquinas passage on Maimonides was definitively established by
Joseph Mausbach (seen 34), p. 563, n. 1 by suggesting the reading 'casus' (following the note in
the Bar-le-Due edition). JosC M. Casciaro (seen. 34), pp. 165-66 adopts Mausbach's reading
14 ALEXANDER ALTMANN

Thomas Aquinas describes the acceptio supernaturalis, i.e., the divinely

caused reception of some vision, as nova formatio speciero.m, i.e., as a new
formation of images or similitudes, it being new either as signifying
something not previously contained in the imagination, or as a novel com-
bination of previously held images.n The formation of images he attributes
to the activity of the angels in the sense that it is the angels' job to move the
imagination. This assumption, he explains, follows from St. Augustine's and
Dionysius' doctrine that all created corporeal nature is administered by
created spiritual natures. 74 In light of this statement we may assume that the
furnishing by God of the requisite quality of the imagination whenever
necessary is to be understood as part of the angelic function. As for the
iudicium supernaturale, he characterizes it as an 'infused light' (lumen in-
fusum) or as an 'illumination of the mind' (mentis illustratio), a terminology
somewhat reminiscent of the Maimonidean definition of prophecy as an
'overflow' (fai(I.) from God through the Active Intelligence upon intellect
and imagination. Thomas Aquinas must, however, not be understood as
reverting to an emanationist position. He certainly does not consider the in-
fused light to flow from God by way of the Active Intelligence; yet there re-
main certain ambiguities. On the one hand, he describes the lumen infusu.m
in terms of its function, which is the 'strengthening' or 'preparation' of the
human mind for the reception of the lumen propheticum. 1 ' On the other
hand, he defines it as a process by which the lumen divinum, something utter-
ly simple and universal, is communicated to the human mind. The lumen in-
fusum is the filtering as it were of the incomprehensible divine light by way
of the angelic intellect. By passing through the angelic intellect the divine
light is somehow ·contracted' and 'specified' and thereby accommodated to
the prophetic intellect. 16 One is reminded of the kabbalistic doctrine of
'contraction' ($im$um) which serves a somewhat similar purpose.
It follows that in the doctrine of St. Thomas the supernatural act of
prophetic illumination is not as direct and immediate as one might have as-
sumed from its definition as donum Dei. It turns out to be an act mediated
by angelic activity, not entirely unlike the view held by Maimonides. The
revelation of prophecy, St. Thomas says, "descends from God to an angel,
and from the angel to man." 77 Maimonides, too, describes all prophecy,

7J. QD. 12. 8, p. 253a.

74. QD. 12. 8, p. 253a-b.
15. QD. 12. 8, p. 253a.
16. QD. 12. 8, p. 253a-b.
17 QD. 12. 13, p. 265b.
NATURAL OR DIVINE PROPHECY? 15

with the exception of Moses', as mediated by angels but this parallel holds
good only insofar as the role of the Intelligences as transmitters of the
emanation is concerned. In all other respects the analogy breaks down. In
Maimonides' doctrine the angels that are said to mediate prophecy are, as a
rule, the imaginative faculty of each prophet, the term 'cherub' being used to
denote the intellect. H Thomas Aquinas does not accept Maimonides'
designation of natural faculties or propensities as 'angels'. 19 Nor does he
agree that the angels seen in prophetic dreams and visions are mere projec-
tions of the imagination. According to Maimonides, the 'created forms'
which the prophet visualizes are but forms 'created' by the imagination, 80
and they include the forms of angels and men. In St. Thomas' view, the role
of angels in prophecy is of a metaphysical, not merely psychological, order.
Their role is confined, however, to a subsidiary function, while the initiative
and the content of the prophetic gift remain the preserve of God. Were
angels to communicate to men any knowledge they possess on their own,
without divine revelation as its source, the prophecy thus constituted would
come under the rubric of natural, not divine, prophecy. 81
Maimonides emphatically differentiates between Moses' prophecy and
that of all other prophets. He goes so far as to say that the term 'prophet' as
used with reference to Moses and to the others is 'amphibolous' (bi-
tashkik).81 We take the term 'amphibolous' to be used here in the sense of
'analogical'.u This implies a relationship between exemplar and copy, and
allows for both distance and proximity between Moses and the rest of the
prophets. Moses is the "master of the prophets" and, at the same time, he
shares with them the general characteristics of all prophecy, Le., the
naturalness of the prophetic act within the metaphysical continuum of a uni-
verse in which divine grace abounds and is freely available to all according

78. See Guide. 2: 45 in fine; 1: 6 (Munk l7b-18a). The 'separate intellects' that are said to
appear to the prophets (ibid., Munk l6b) are figurized in corporeal form by the imagination (I
49, 2: 41-42), which is the mediating agency par excellence in all prophecies, except Moses·
79. See Jacob Guttmann, Das Verhii.lmis . .. , pp. 73- 75.
80. Guide. l 46 (Munk 52b). Zvi Diesendruck, ··Maimonides' Leh re von der Prophetic," m
Jewish Studies in Memory of Israel Abrahams (New York, 1927), pp. 124ff., interpreted this pas-
sage m the sense of prophecy being a divine creation. This view cannot be upheld.
81. Seen. 59.
82. Guide, 2: 35. On the vanous shades of meaning of this term see H. A. Wolfson, "The
Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic Philosophy and Maimonides," Harwird Theo/og1cal
Re~iew 31 (1938)· 151-73; idem, .. Maimonides and Gersonides on Divine Attributes as Am-
biguous Terms," Mordecai M. Kap/an Jubilee Volume (New York, 1953), pp. 515-30
(repllblished in Studies, I: 455-77, 2: 23l-46).
83. For this meaning of the term see Wolfson's two essays referred to in the preceding note.
 16 ALEXANDER ALTMANN

to degrees of receptivity. It has been suggested that, according to

Maimonides, Moses' prophecy involved a direct bestowal of the prophetic
gift by God, without mediation by secondary causes such as the Active
Intelligence.u This view cannot be upheld. Even Moses, it would seem,
received his prophecy through the Active Intelligence. That this is
Maimonides' view can be substantiated from a close reading of the way in
which he interprets the biblical passages describing the uniqueness of
Moses' prophecy. God spoke to him "mouth to mouth" (Numbers 12:8) is
paraphrased: "The mighty divine overflow reached him" (2: 24), i.e., he
received an abundant measure of the divine emanation that passes through
the Active Intelligence. "Whom the Lord knew face to face" (Deuteronomy
34: 10): "His apprehension was different from that of all who came after
him" (2: 35). "And the Lord spoke unto Moses face to face" (Exodus 33: 11)
is said to mean: .. as a presence to another presence, without an in-
termediary"; for .. the hearing of a speech without the intermediacy of an
angel is described as 'face to face'" ( l: 37). In plain words: "The imaginative
faculty did not enter into his prophecy, since the intellect overflowed toward
him without the farmer's intermediation; for ... he did not, like the other
prophets, prophesy by means of parables" (2: 37). It is the purely intellec-
tual nature of Moses' prophecy that alone is held to justify the striking
figures of speech used to characterize his supreme rank.
St. Thomas clearly reflects Maimonides' view when he describes Moses'
purely intellectual vision as an infusion of the divine light without angelic
help.~' He makes the point, however, that even at this level of prophecy
imagination is used, if only for the benefit of the multitude, while the
prophet himself has no need for the figurization of the truth apprehended by
him.~ 6 Al-Firabi had expressed the same view when he said that the
figurative language used by the Lawgiver-Prophet is invented "not in order
to understand [for] himself the higher realities ... but as symbols and
images for others." 81 Maimonides could not have held otherwise since he
was acutely aware of the need to interpret the figurative language of the
Torah. His reference to Moses' faculty of imagination (2: 36) makes sense
from this point of view. 88 The essential difference between Maimonides and

84. H. A. Wolfson, "Hallevi and Maimonides on Prophecy" (seen. 36), p. 71.

85. QD. 12. 14, p. 266b.
86. QD, 12. l2 (ad 2), pp. 262b-263a.
87. See Rahman, Prophecy in Islam. pp. 76-77 (n. 37), quoting al-FaJ:3.bi, Tab$11 a/-sa'dda.
p. 44.
88. Gwde, 2: 36 (Munk 80a). For a different interpretation see Kasp1. ad loc.
NATURAL OR DIVINE PROPHECY? 17

Thomas is here, as elsewhere, the difference between natural and divine

prophecy. In Maimonides' view even Moses' prophecy was the natural
result of a specific disposition which, though unique, was still natural. The
highest possible degree of perfection that is natural to the human species, he
says, must necessarily be realized in at least one particular individual (2: 32).
Moses was that individual. Hence, Moses is no exception to the general rule
that prophecy is a natural phenomenon within a divinely controlled uni-
verse. Maimonides' portrayal of Moses' spirituality in Guide 3: 51 makes it
evident that he considered the attainment of his exceptional rank to have
been the natural result of his dispositions and mode of life. We might say
that his union with the Active Intelligence was held to have been consequent
upon his decorporealization as it were, a stage reminiscent of ibn 83.jja's
ultimate stage that arises from an existential break with matter. 39 We may
also call it the achievement of merited grace. St. Thomas, on the other hand,
sees Moses' prophecy as the ultimate degree of divine prophecy in the sense
of unmerited grace.9°
One final point. Avicenna had suggested that Providence which took
such care of the comforts of the human race as to provide men with
eyelashes and concave soles could not have left him without making provi-
sion for politically gifted men that would take care of law and order, thereby
securing the survival of the species. For, as Aristotle had said, 91 man was
·political by nature', i.e., in dire need of political organization. 91 In taking
up this theme Maimonides pointed out that the striking social divisiveness
due to differences in character between men required the authority of rulers
and lawgivers in order to neutralize the 'natural diversity' by the imposition
of 'conventional accord'. In this way, "the law, although it is not nature,
enters into what is natural" (2: 40). In other words, convention is designed

89. See Alexander Altmann, "lbn Bijja on Man's Ultimate Fel1c1ty," Harry Aus1ryn
Wolfson Jubilee Volume (Jerusalem, 1965), I 74 and passim {repubhsh.ed in Alex.ander Alt-
mann, SrudJes m Religious Philosophy and Mysticism [Ithaca, N.Y. and London, 1969], p. 96
and passim).
90. QD. 12. 14; ST. 174. 4.
91 Politics I I. 9 1253a2; 3. 4. 2 1278bl9; Ethica Nichornadiea I. 7. 6 1097bll; 9. 9. 3
l 169bl8. It can be shown that the manner in which the Arabic philosophers and Maimonides
elaborate the statement presupposes some knowledge of its use in the Politics. not merely in the
Ethics. This corroborates S. Prnes's suggestion that some recension, paraphrase or summary of
Aristotle's Politics was known to the Arabs. See his article '"Aristotle's Politics in Arabic
Philosophy," Israel Oriental Studies 5 (1975): 157.
92. Avicenna, AI-Shif,i". Af.fliihiyyiit (2), ed. Ibrahim Madkm1r (Cairo, 1960), 10: 2, pp.
441-42.
18 ALEXANDER ALTMANN

to help nature against nature. It is tacitly assumed that only the prophet, not
the philosopher, is capable of effectively imposing a unifying law upon a na-
tion or group of people. The prophet is thus seen as a necessity of nature, a
view that inevitably implies that prophecy is a natural phenomenon. This is,
at any rate, St. Thomas' reading of the Avicennian thesis according to which
prophets are indispensable for the preservation of humanity. Thomas lists
this viewpoint as one of the nineteen arguments adduced by him in favor of
the naturalistic approach to prophecy. 9 i He quotes as a scriptural prooftext
Proverbs 29: l8: "Where there is no vision, the people cast off restraint," in-
terpreting 'vision' as the exercise of the prophetic office. He may have hit
upon this particular verse by his own intuition, and it is interesting to note
that Gersonides, in his Commentary on Proverbs, explains it in the very
same way. Thomas rejects Avicenna's argument. The sociopolitical order,
he says, will be taken care of with or without prophets. Nature will be
responsible for the satisfaction of man's need. The prophet is not a necessity
of nature. He is required to give direction toward life eternal, not to secure
justice in the political order. The supernatural goal is attainable through the
'justice of faith' of which prophecy is the principle. 94 Thomas has nothing
further to say, in this context at least, on the political function of prophecy,
a theme of tremendous significance to Maimonides who sees in the Law of
the Torah the perfect constitution of the ideal city. 9 i
St. Thomas' silence on the political function of prophecy-to be more
precise: his denial of such a function-set him apart from the entire school
of thought, Islamic and Jewish, that ranged itself with the Platonic search
for the 'ideal city' on earth. In developing that tradition, the faliisifa and
their Jewish partisans, including Maimonides, had good reason for stressing
the role of imagination in prophecy. It was the political function of the
prophet that necessitated the veiling of metaphysical notions by figuriza-
tion. By radically ignoring the political aspect, St. Thomas deprived himself
of the means of suggesting a cogent rationale for the significance of the
imaginative element in prophecy. On the one hand, he fully subscribed to
the interpretation of the prophetic act as one involving the imagination. On
the other,. he had little to offer in explanation of this theory beyond the
general observation that truth was hard of access to the multitude.% Yet the

93. QD, 12. 3 (II), p. 240a, ST. 172. l (4).

94. {bid. (ad l!), p. 243a-b (ad4).
95. Guide. 1: 39-40, J: 29-34.
96. QD, 12. 12 passim.
NATURAL OR DIVINE PROPHECY? 19

problem could not easily be ignored. Albertus Magnus had quoted the
Greek poet Simonides who suggested that it was the envy of the gods that
caused their revelations to be veiled in figurative language.97 A decisive step
toward a more appreciative evaluation was taken when the mimetic function
of imagination in the service of the intellect was discovered, probably in
Middle Platonism. 98 In the Arabic version of Aristotle's On Divination in
S/eep 99 this new insight already plays some part, if only a minor one. Final-
ly, at-Fara.bi put it into the service of the political interpretation of
prophecy, and Maimonides took it from there. Yet how sensitive an area
this was may be gauged from the fact not hitherto observed, that when
listing the required dispositions of prophecy in his popular writings,
Maimonides mentioned only intellectual and moral perfection but omitted
imagination. He obviously considered it imprudent to disclose this par-
ticular requirement to the very audience that was to benefit from the veiling
of the truth. To what extent Maimonides adopted the political view of
prophecy and in what manner he modified it to suit his own purposes is
another matter. There is, however, enough evidence to show that the adop-
tion of this viewpoint reinforced his naturalistic concept of prophecy, while
the rejection of it in St. Thomas was part and parcel of his supernaturalistic
doctrine.

97. Albert us Magnus, De somno et vigilia. 3. I 2., p. 179: ut d1cit Simonides, ··Deus invidet
hanc scientiam homini, et ideo velat cam sub mctaphora et deceptione." On S,monides see
Pease, De divinatione, L: L94.
98. See Richard Walzer, "AJ-Fariibi's Theory of Prophecy and Divination," in Jour,w/ of
Hellenic Studies I ( 1957): 144ff. (republished in Walzer, Greek into Arabic (Cambridge, Mass.,
1962], pp. 21Iff.).
99. See above, p. 4.