Sensors 21 02987 v2
Sensors 21 02987 v2
Article
A Multi-Layer Classification Approach for Intrusion Detection
in IoT Networks Based on Deep Learning
Raneem Qaddoura 1 , Ala’ M. Al-Zoubi 2,3 , Hossam Faris 3,4, * and Iman Almomani 3,5
Abstract: The security of IoT networks is an important concern to researchers and business owners,
which is taken into careful consideration due to its direct impact on the availability of the services
offered by IoT devices and the privacy of the users connected with the network. An intrusion
detection system ensures the security of the network and detects malicious activities attacking the
network. In this study, a deep multi-layer classification approach for intrusion detection is proposed
combining two stages of detection of the existence of an intrusion and the type of intrusion, along
with an oversampling technique to ensure better quality of the classification results. Extensive
experiments are made for different settings of the first stage and the second stage in addition to two
different strategies for the oversampling technique. The experiments show that the best settings of the
proposed approach include oversampling by the intrusion type identification label (ITI), 150 neurons
for the Single-hidden Layer Feed-forward Neural Network (SLFN), and 2 layers and 150 neurons
Citation: Qaddoura, R.;
for LSTM. The results are compared to well-known classification techniques, which shows that
Al-Zoubi, A.M.; Faris, H.;
the proposed technique outperforms the others in terms of the G-mean having the value of 78%
Almomani, I. A Multi-Layer
Classification Approach for Intrusion
compared to 75% for KNN and less than 50% for the other techniques.
Detection in IoT Networks Based on
Deep Learning. Sensors 2021, 21, 2987. Keywords: intrusion detection; classification; neural network; deep learning; oversampling; SMOTE;
https://doi.org/10.3390/s21092987 imbalanced; IoTID20
manufactured without taking security and privacy into consideration [6]. Thus, a large
percentage of all devices, 20 billion connected IoT devices existed in 2020 according to
Gartner’s reports, lack the proper defense mechanism that protects them from security
attacks, which negatively impact the improvement and evolution of this technology [7].
The massive daily flow of the IoT connected devices introduces new threats and
vulnerabilities that became hard to deal with. An example of such an issue occurred in
October 2016, where simple IoT devices (cameras and DVRs) were exploited and converted
to attack vectors in order to hack a big DNS provider (Dyn) [8]. This process led to
a tremendous Internet outage and deactivated the availability of well-known websites,
namely Amazon, Netflix, and Twitter. Another situation happened in the same year when
Chinese researchers (a team of hackers) were able to control a car’s door locks, electronic
features, and brakes causing a traffic accident [9].
These examples of network intrusion attacks not only disturb the availability of the
device functions but also involve stealing important information and data about the device
and the users utilizing it. Hence, it becomes essential to withstand these attacks. This
creates a need for more intelligent mechanisms to connect and use IoT devices [10]. One of
these mechanisms is Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), which are a software application
or tool that monitors the network to keep it secure and detect any malicious activity that
takes place. Subsequently, the system reports and collects these violations by using event
management and security information systems. Generally, different components could be
part of any IDS, including the monitoring services that collect the data from the network,
communication models that transfer the collected data to the IDS, and the classifiers that
provide predictive models for different types of attacks. Based on the predictions’ results,
different actions such as triggering alerts, excluding nodes from the networks, and many
others might be taken. The communications among these components need to be authentic
where proper authentication approaches [11,12] can be applied.
Given the computational and fundamental resource constraints, it is difficult to apply
traditional security techniques to secure IoT devices directly. However, rule-based detection
methods showed efficient outcomes [13–15]. Thus, anomaly-based detection mechanisms
are crucial with the growth of IoT environments and technology. Generating big data
from IoT devices can be of great benefit for machine-learning algorithms, where they can
perform data analysis and deliver meaningful predictions and interpretations of the IoT
devices. Thus, applying machine learning for IoT system security is considered an optimal
opportunity to protect them from intrusion attacks, especially by detecting any outlier
activity that emerges in the system. It is worth noting that machine learning also shows
excellent performance in other areas such as [16–20].
Many popular datasets are introduced in the literature for intrusion detection, includ-
ing ISCX2012 [21], UNSWNB15 [22] and CICIDS2017 [23]. Nevertheless, these datasets did
not take into account the IoT environment when being collected. Various works started
employing the intrusion detection benchmark using IoT environments, namely DS20S [24]
and BoT-IoT [25]. However, these IoT datasets lack the novelty attack techniques that
emerged in recent years and have an insufficient number of features. Therefore, modern
datasets are presented to solve such problem like IoTID20 [26] and LITNET-2020 [27].
On one hand, the IoTID20 dataset was collected from different sources namely, laptops,
smartphones, smart home devices, tablets, and so on. On the other hand, the LITNET-2020
dataset was gathered from attack network traffic of the KTU LITNET network. The two
datasets are different in the environments they were generated from, where LITNET-2020
focuses on academic network traffic, while IoTID20 dataset focuses on home devices. Thus,
in this work, we study and examine IoT intrusion detection for home device environments.
Another recent study examined the detection of IoT for webshell by utilizing ensemble
techniques [28]. The work used several ensemble techniques in order to improve the detec-
tion criteria including random forest (RF), extremely randomized trees (ET), and voting.
The results of their approach achieved excellent performance, particularly when using RF
and ET for lightweight IoT cases and voting methods for heavyweight IoT scenarios.
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 3 of 21
Moreover, previous studies in the literature lack several points, such as considering
modern datasets for intrusion detection and combining several techniques including
different oversampling strategies, deep learning, and multi-layer approach, to produce
high quality results. Therefore, in this work we introduce a multi-layer classification
approach to detect and classify different types of intrusion by applying the following steps:
• Choosing a recent imbalanced dataset for IoT network applications called IoTID20.
This dataset was extracted through monitoring a smart home and logging both nor-
mal and malicious behaviors. The malicious behavior is represented by four main
threatening attacks, including Mirai malware, Denial of Service (DoS), Scan, and Man-
in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks.
• Oversampling the imbalanced dataset using the Synthetic Minority Oversampling
Technique (SMOTE) [29].
• Detecting intrusion activities from normal activities by applying a Single-hidden Layer
Feed-forward Neural Network (SLFN).
• Identifying the four different types of intrusion activities including Mirai, DoS, Scan,
and MITM attacks using a Deep Neural Network (DNN).
The main contributions of this paper fall into the following three points:
• Although the second step of the approach differentiates the intrusion activities from
the normal ones, the oversampling technique is applied on the intrusion type identifier
(ITI) label rather than the intrusion detector (ID) label, resulting in better oversampled
data, thus generating better quality of results for the second step of the approach and
eventually on the overall quality of the approach.
• The multi-layer construction of the approach allows better identification of the intru-
sion type, since the first and second stage of classification concentrate each on a single
objective, allowing the learning process to depend on the correlation between related
features only.
• The resulting predictive model from the proposed classification approach can then be
injected by the IDS system based on the nature of the IoT application.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related works
for intrusion detection of IoT networks. Section 3 presents the SMOTE oversampling
technique, SLFN, the sequential model of DNN, and the Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)
techniques. Section 4 discusses the proposed deep multi-layer approach. Section 5 shows
the experiments and results of the proposed approach. Finally, the last section concludes
the work.
2. Related Works
As the field of IoT improves and spreads every day, the challenges related to its
security and privacy have also evolved and increased [30–35]. Furthermore, the security
threats exposing IoT devices have different impacts according to the domain that they
operate in it, where each device may suffer from unique vulnerabilities accompanying the
characteristics, procedures, and needs of that domain, including smart grids, industrial
applications, smart homes, healthcare, and smart cities.
The security measure consists of several methods that aim to guarantee, preserve,
and restore the safety of systems from malicious attacks. These attacks could come from
several issues, including lack of compliance from the manufacturers about security stan-
dards, lack of user knowledge and awareness, problems in the update management process,
lack of physical hardening, and botnet attacks. Therefore, having these issues with the
IoT devices in the real-world environment increases the causes of exposure to intrusion
threats. These threats could be, for instance, a Black Hole (dropping traffic in networks) [36],
Storage Channel Attacks (transfer information by an unauthorized process) [37], Buffer
Overflow (overruns the buffer boundary) [38], SQL Injection (code injection technique) [39]
and so on [40].
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 4 of 21
The continuously increasing number of information leaks and attacks from IoT devices
led to the speed up and increase in security and privacy research in the literature [41–45].
Even though several preventive measures are performed, IoT devices and systems are still
exposed to malicious hackers and actors. Thus, the need for early detection of intrusion
activities to reduce the negative impact of these devices has become more urgent than ever.
Fortunately, such threats can be diminished using detection measures, which are
known as intrusion detection. One of the well-known intrusion detection methods that has
gained attention recently in the literature is using machine learning techniques [46–49]. As a
result, the standard intrusion detection techniques show improved quality by incorporating
the machine learning techniques with them [50–53]. Machine learning techniques can be
used to improve intrusion detection methods for traditional networks effectively.
Authors of [54], for example, stated that detection is an essential task to identify the
anomaly in a dataset. They specified that intrusion detection is a very important area in
the literature especially using techniques such as statistics and machine learning. Another
work also mentioned the importance of applying intelligent tools to enhance standard
intrusion detection [55]. In their work, the authors used an Optimum-Path Forest (OPF)
classifier to detect intrusion in computer networks.
Therefore, the detection of intrusion attacks using machine learning techniques has
become more effectual over the years. For example, Diro et al. [56] presented an intrusion
detection system for Denial of Service (DoS) in IoT networks using deep learning. The pro-
posed approach is compared with other traditional models using the NSL-KDD dataset
and showed superior results. Furthermore, their approach is designed by taking into ac-
count two different schemes, namely, distributed detection and centralized. Consequently,
the distributed attack detection scheme outperforms the centralized detection in terms of
Accuracy. Another machine learning model for detecting IoT attacks is proposed by [57].
The suggested signature-based model utilized the artificial immune system to detect new
attacks by self-learning and self-adaptation methods. However, due to the signature-based
detection method, the model suffers from drawbacks even though it is combined with
machine learning. Thus, without the proper combination of intrusion detection methods
and machine learning, the performance could demonstrate shortcomings in certain cases.
In addition, a gradient boosted machine (GBM) was used for the intrusion detection
problem [58]. This approach worked as a detection engine by applying the grid search to
optimize the GBM parameters. The GBM-Grid model was evaluated on three different
datasets, including UNSW-NB15, NSL-KDD, and GPRS. When compared with GAR forest,
tree-based ensembles, and fuzzy classifiers, the proposed approach achieved better results
in terms of Accuracy and specificity. Another similar work was performed by [59], where
the Random forest-based Intrusion detection systems were investigated to study their
performance in terms of false alarm rate and Accuracy. They employed GPRS, NSL-KDD,
and UNSW-NB15 datasets for their research. The proposed approach is compared against
several classifiers, namely the Multilayer perceptron, NBTree, and an ensemble of both
Random tree, and Naive Bayes. The results showed that the Random forest-based Intrusion
detection systems outperform the other classifiers.
Furthermore, the work in [60] examined the IoTID20 dataset using three various
subsets with normal traffic including, Scan attack, DoS attack, and MITM. However,
the authors did not investigate the intrusion activities of all attacks (DoS, scan, Mirai,
and MITM attacks) which are combined in our work. Another work examined the same
dataset to predict the existence of the intrusion using a multi-stage classification approach
based on clustering with oversampling. However, it does not predict the type of intrusion
but only detects the existence of the intrusion.
The work in [61] proposed an Imbalanced Generative Adversarial Network (IGAN) for
an intrusion detection model. Their approach consists of three folds, a deep neural network,
feature extraction, and IGAN. The feature vectors are constructed using a feed-forward
neural network, the IGAN is responsible for generating new samples, and the deep neural
network is applied for the detection phase. Meanwhile the work in [62] presented a contin-
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 5 of 21
uous authentication biometrics behavior system for tackling false rejects and false accepts.
The examination takes place using 16 biometric datasets. Furthermore, [63] presented
an anomaly-based method for intrusion detection in an IoT environment. The authors
detect cyber threats through an edge computing paradigm that is similar to data sources.
More details of [61–63] as well as a comparison with the proposed approach can be found
in Table 1. The table shows the methods applied by the works and the existence of the
intrusion detection process, the IoT system, and the multi attacks. It also shows if the
dataset is an imbalanced dataset and whether it is a recent dataset.
Table 1. A comparison between the proposed approach and other methods in the literature.
Applying machine learning techniques with the IoT intrusion detection methods is
gaining more attention from researchers, as shown in the previously mentioned works and
other research such as [64,65]. However, our work differs from these works by proposing
a multi-layer classification approach consisting of the detection of the existence of the
intrusion activities and the classification of several types of intrusion activities. In addition,
using the oversampling technique on the ITI label while applying the resulting oversampled
dataset on the ID label is not common. Moreover, as far as we know, the use of the very
recent IoTID20 dataset [26] for detecting the normal activities and the different types of
attacks has not yet been implemented by researchers.
3. Related Terminologies
This section presents the terminologies related to the work proposed in this study. It
includes the SMOTE, SLFN, DNN, and LSTM techniques.
holding the value generated by an activation function. The output layer holds the
predicted outputs.
• Weights: Each node in the input layer is connected to each neuron of the hidden layer
by a weight value, which is used for calculating the weighted sum of each neuron of
the hidden layer. In addition, other weights connect each neuron of the hidden layer
with each node of the output layer.
• Activation function: this function is responsible of generating the values of the neurons
for the hidden layer.
.
.
.
.
.
.
The task of training the neural network aims at giving a high quality classification
result by finding the relationships between the inputs and the outputs because the actual
relationship in most cases cannot be recognized by traditional techniques [70]. This is done
by tuning the weights and biases of the neural network to give better mapping, and thus
increasing the Accuracy of the predicted labels, which is measured by a cost function.
The training process starts by calculating the weighted sum WS j of each neuron j of
the hidden layer J by finding the sum of the product between the value xi of node i of the
input layer and each weight wij connecting the input nodes i and the neuron j. The result
is then added to the bias b J . This is observed by the following equation:
N
WS j = ∑ wij xi + b J (1)
i =1
The weighted sum WS j for each neuron j in M neurons is then passed to the activation
function to generate an input value for the next layer representing the output layer.
A weighted sum WSk is also calculated for each node k of the output layer K by
finding the sum of the product between the value h j generated by the activation function of
the neuron j and each weight w jk connecting the output node k and the value h j . The result
is then added to the bias bK . This is observed by the following equation:
M
WSk = ∑ w jk h j + bK (2)
j =1
The weighted sum WSk represents the output obtained for each node k of the out-
put layer.
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 7 of 21
P
WSq = ∑ w pq h p + bQ (3)
p =1
where WSq is the weighted sum of neuron q of the hidden layer Q, P is the number of
neurons of the previous layer, w pq is the weight connecting the neuron p of the previous
hidden layer with the neuron q of the hidden layer Q, h p is the value of the neuron p of the
previous hidden layer obtained by applying the activation function on the weighted sum
of the neuron, and the bias bQ is the bias of the hidden layer Q.
.
.
. . . .
. . .
. . .
The progress of applying deep learning approaches for several applications can be
easily recognized in the literature. In addition, different models of the deep neural network
can be found extensively [72]. The aforementioned process considering the sequential
model (Seq) of a plain stack of layer is the most simple type of DNN. Further variations
also exist including Autoencoders, Deep Belief Net, Convolutional deep Neural Networks
(CNNs), Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), Recursive Neural Networks, and Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM). The next section describes the LSTM deep neural network.
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 8 of 21
where −→
z is the input vector, zi is the elements of the input vector. ezj denotes the standard
exponential function which is applied on each element to add a small value if the input
is negative and a large value if it is big, while ∑Kj=1 ezj is responsible for ensuring that the
values remain between zero and one. Finally, K indicates the number of classes.
LSTM h1
Softmax layer
LSTM h2
LSTM h3
.
.
.
LSTM hn
The LSTM is recognized as the most used type of RNN architecture. LSTM was
introduced to solve the vanishing gradients problem of RNN by integrating non-linear
controls to the RNN cell so that the gradient of the cost function does not vanish [76]. It
is implemented to avoid the long-term dependency issue [77]. Therefore, remembering
information for a long time is considered one of the main advantages of LSTM. With the
existence of the unknown lags duration during the important events of learning, regular
RNNs can not learn higher than 5–10 discrete-time of time presence lags; nevertheless,
LSTM could learn more than 1000 timesteps using the constant error carousels [74]. Fur-
thermore, the LSTM cell performs better due to its cell memory unit, where the cell vector
can capsulize the previously-stored memory of the forgetting part, alongside adding a new
portion of the information.
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 9 of 21
Stage 1
SLFN
ANN
Intrusion
IOT
Dataset
.
.
.
Normal
Intrusion Normal
1
Scan
DoS
.
.
. . . .
. . .
.
Mirai
. .
Evaluation
LSTM
MITM
2
LSTM h1
Softmax layer
Scan
Oversampled LSTM h2
Dataset
LSTM h3
DoS
.
.
.
LSTM hn
Mirai
The first strategy, which is illustrated in Figure 5a, starts by applying the SMOTE
oversampling technique to the training instances of the dataset considering the ID label.
This generates an enlarged dataset with more instances for the minority class which is the
normal labeled instances according to the oversampling ratio specified. Figure 5a shows
that the enlarged dataset has an equal number of the normal labels and the intrusion labels
considering a ratio value of 1 for oversampling. The resulting enlarged dataset is then
considered as an input to the SLFN classifier, which will be discussed briefly. The second
strategy, which is illustrated in Figure 5b, differs from the first strategy as it applies the
SMOTE oversampling technique on the training instances of the dataset considering the ITI
label rather than the ID label. This generates an enlarged dataset with more instances for
all the classes except for the majority class which is the Mirai intrusion type. It also differs
from the first strategy in that the ITI labels are then converted to their corresponding ID
labels. The enlarged dataset along with the generated ID labels are then considered as an
input to the SLFN classifier.
Features Labels
SMOTE SLFN
Intrusion
Normal
Features Labels
SMOTE SLFN
Normal DoS
Mirai Scan Intrusion
MITM Normal
Figure 5. Adopted oversampling strategies in the first stage of the proposed approach.
The updated enlarged dataset generated from the SMOTE oversampling technique
from Figure 4 follows a two layer classification stage as follows:
• Classification of ID label by the SLFN technique.
• Classification of the ITI label by the DNN technique.
The first stage considers the classification by the SLFN technique for detecting the
ID label. The oversampled dataset generated by the SMOTE technique is considered a
balanced dataset with intrusion and normal activities. The SLFN network, as discussed in
Section 3.2, consists of an input layer, single hidden layer, and an output layer. The input
layer consists of the features of the oversampled dataset and the output layer consists of
two neurons representing the intrusion and normal labels. The network is responsible for
finding the relations between the input features and the output labels by adjusting the
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 11 of 21
weights of the network to reduce the error between the predicted values and the target
values of the labels.
On the other hand, the second stage considers the classification by DNN, in which
multiple hidden layers exist, by experimenting with both the sequential and the LSTM
techniques. Both techniques classify the instances representing the intrusion activities
only, which are generated from the first stage of classification, based on the ITI label,
into different types of intrusion activities including Mirai, DoS, Scan, and MITM types.
The sequential model consists of the input features layer, multiple hidden layers, and an
output label layer of four neurons representing all the types of intrusion. In contrast,
the LSTM model consists of input features layer, LSTM cell, hidden state, attention layer,
softmax layer, and output label layer. The LSTM cell remembers the values producing the
hidden state as an output to the LSTM cell. The additive layer learns the significance of the
diversity of information and the softmax layer generalizes and normalizes the information.
This produces the predictive values of all four types of intrusion.
The output to the two stages of classification is a two-layer classification model that is
able to predict if an instance represents a normal activity or a Mirai, DoS, Scan, or MITM
intrusion activity.
Finally, an evaluation process is performed on the predicted labels including the
predicted normal activity label generated from the first stage of classification and the
predicted type of intrusion label generated from the second stage of classification.
The time complexity of the proposed approach can be analyzed by the time com-
plexity of the two stages of classification. The time complexity for the first stage of the
classification by SLFN is O( Nepochs ∗ Npatterns ∗ Nin ∗ Nout ) [78] where Nepochs , Npatterns , Nin ,
Nout represent the number of epochs, hidden neurons, input features, and output nodes,
respectively, and the time complexity for the second stage of the classification by LSTM
technique is O(W ) where W represents the number of weights [79].
The advantages of using a multi-layer approach of classification compared to single
classification approach include giving each classifier a more specialized classification task
which results in better overall classification. In addition, the results obtained from the SLFN
classifier are given to the DNN classifier where normal activities are not interfered with by
those of intrusion type, and thus allowing the DNN to give a better weighting process for
the features that are directly related to the type of intrusion rather than both the existence
of intrusion and the type of the intrusion. At another level, although the first stage of
classification considers detecting intrusion activities from normal ones, the oversampling
task considers the ITI label rather than the ID label allowing better representation of the
oversampled dataset.
Several challenges exist for applying the proposed multi-layer approach. The chal-
lenges are overcome by applying several experiments with different settings to address the
best settings’ values for the dataset studied in this paper, which is discussed in Section 5.
These challenges include the following:
• Selecting the oversampling ratio for balancing the imbalanced dataset.
• Selecting the number of neurons for the layers of the SLFN and the DNN.
• Selecting the number of layers for the DNN.
• Generating high quality results of the classification process for both4 ID label and
ITI label, which are represented by the ID label and the Mirai, DoS, Scan, and MITM
ITI labels.
5. Experiments and Results
This section discusses the experiments conducted on the IoTID20 dataset and the
results achieved from running the multi-layer approach. This section includes the environ-
mental settings, the dataset description, the evaluation measures, the effect of the SMOTE
oversampling technique on the data when classified by SLFN, the Intrusion detection
of conducting the experiments using the proposed approach, a comparison between the
proposed approach and other standard algorithms, and a summary of the discussion.
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 12 of 21
5.2. Dataset
The IoTID20 dataset [26] is a recent intrusion activity detection dataset for IoT net-
works. It was generated in a smart home environment with a Wi-Fi router connected to
victim devices which are the SKT NGU and EZVIZ camera and attacking devices which
are the laptops, tablets, and smartphones.
The dataset consists of 80 features, 625,783 instances, and three types of labels.
The dataset has a large number of features including a large number of flow-based features.
It has both intrusion and normal activities, where the intrusion activities themselves are
categorized into DoS, Mirai, MITM, and Scan attacks, which are further categorized to
different other sub categories.
In this work, we considered two types of labels for the IoTID20 dataset which are
the ID label indicating intrusion activities from normal ones and the ITI label indicating
different types of intrusion. The distribution of the instances across the labels are observed
by Table 2. It can be deduced from the table that the number of intrusion activities is
approximately 15 times as much as the normal activities. It is also observed from the table
that the Mirai type of intrusion is also a dominant type compared to the other types of
intrusion activities which reflects an imbalanced dataset.
Table 2. IoTID20 Dataset instances including the ID label and ITI label.
• Recall (REC): It represents the ability to predict the right labels of a class as a ratio
between the true prediction of the class and the correct labels of the class. The Recall
is calculated for each class of the ID label and the ITI label by Equation (7).
• G-mean: It considers the Recall of all the classes. The G-mean is calculated for the ID
label by Equation (8) and for the ITI label by Equation (9).
TPNormal + TPIntrusion
ACC ID = (5)
#instances
TPNormal + TPDOS + TPMITM + TPMirai + TPScan
ACC ITI = (6)
#instances
TPclass
RECclass = (7)
TPclass + FNclass
p
G − mean ID = RECNormal × RECIntrusion (8)
p
G − mean ITI = 5 RECNormal × RECDOS × RECMITM × RECMirai × RECScan (9)
Table 3. Performing SLFN on a different number of neurons. Bold font indicates best result.
The second part of the experiments considered the two strategies, discussed in
Section 4, for oversampling the dataset and classifying it using SLFN. The distribution of
the training instances of the dataset by applying both strategies is illustrated by Figure 6.
Figure 6a,b show the effect of strategy 1 on the training instances of the dataset before
applying the oversampling technique and after applying it, respectively. The imbalanced
training instances in the first figure show that the number of the instances labeled as intru-
sion has a larger value than the number of instances labeled as normal, but after applying
the oversampling technique with an oversampling ratio of 1, the number of instances of the
normal label increases and becomes equal to the number of instances for the intrusion label,
causing an enlarged training dataset. In contrast, Figure 6c,d show the effect of strategy 2
on the training instances of the dataset before applying the oversampling technique and
after applying it, respectively. In this strategy, the number of instances of the ITI label is
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 14 of 21
the one considered, which includes those for the normal label. It is observed from the first
figure that the number of instances for the Mirai intrusion type has a larger value than the
number of instances for the other types. After applying the oversampling technique on
the ITI label, the number of instances for all the labels increases and becomes equal to the
number of instances for the Mirai intrusion label, causing an enlarged training dataset.
100 100
80 80 Intrusion
392,441
60 60
Intrusion
392,441
40 40
Normal
20 20 392,441
Normal
0 26,833 0
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
100 100
Normal Scan
MITM 26,833 50,245 Scan
80 23,902 80 MITM 278,724
278,724
60 60
Normal
278,724
40 Mirai 40
DOS 278,724
39,570 DOS
20 20 278,724 Mirai
278,724
0 0
0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100
Figure 6. The distribution of the training instances by applying Strategy 1 and 2 of the SMOTE oversampling technique.
Both strategies were tested on the IoTID20 dataset to find the best strategy for the
approach proposed. The first strategy was tested using different values of the oversampling
ratio values which are 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1. Figure 7 shows the results of applying the first
strategy with the different values of the oversampling ratio for Accuracy, Recall, and G-
mean measures. It is observed from the figure that the oversampling ratio of one is the best
for G-mean and the Recall of the intrusion label, which is our main focus for IoT networks.
Thus, we consider it for comparison with strategy 2.
Table 4 shows the results of applying both strategies. Strategy 2 was tested using
the auto value for the oversampling ratio as we did not consider enlarging the number
of instances for one label, which is the normal in the case of strategy 1, but rather we
considered enlarging the number of instances of several labels which include the normal,
MITM, DOS, and Scan labels excluding the instances of the majority label which is the
Mirai label. Thus, the auto ratio, which oversamples all classes except the majority class,
is considered for oversampling the multi-label instances by equalizing the number of
instances for all the labels. It is observed from the table that the second strategy recogniz-
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 15 of 21
ably outperforms the first one for all the evaluation measures. The values of Accuracy,
Recall, and G-mean are approximately touching the optimal value of one for strategy 2,
which indicates an outstanding performance for the proposed strategy. The reason behind
this outstanding behavior is that the oversampling technique recognizes more detailed
information about the training instances by considering the ITI label for oversampling the
training instances, and thus giving more representative training instances for the SLFN
classification technique, which results in a better detection of the intrusion activities by the
SLFN classification technique.
1.000
0.975
0.950
0.925 Accuracy
G-mean
0.900 REC (Intrusion)
REC (Normal)
0.875
0.850
0.825
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Oversampling Ratio
Figure 7. Evaluation of different oversampling ratio values for strategy 1.
Table 4. Oversampling by SMOTE for SLFN of 150 neurons on different values of sampling strategy.
Bold font indicates best result.
best value for Accuracy and G-mean, which indicates a competitive classification results
for such an imbalanced dataset.
Table 5. Intrusion type detection using a deep learning sequential model and LSTM with a different number of layers
and neurons. Bold font indicates best result.
Table 6. Comparative experiments of the proposed approach with other well-known classification techniques. Bold font
indicates best result.
For future work, the work can be extended to provide a more detailed prediction for
the sub categories of the intrusion by applying another layer to the proposed approach.
In addition, evolutionary computation techniques can be added to the proposed multi-
layer approach to explore more enhanced prediction of the type of the intrusion activities.
Moreover, different machine learning-based intrusion systems can be deeply analyzed and
compared to study (a) the impact of delaying the detection and exclusion of different types
of attacks on the services provided by IoT networks (b) the complexity of their prediction
systems and the corresponding resource consumption, especially in case of IoT devices
with limited resources. Finally, the proposed classifier could detect the attacks considered
to generate the dataset, including flooding, spoofing, and scanning attacks. However, other
attacks could be considered in future research, such as impersonation, Sybil, and other
DoS attacks.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, H.F. and R.Q.; methodology, H.F. and R.Q.; validation,
R.Q. and A.M.A.-Z.; data curation, R.Q.; writing—original draft preparation, R.Q., A.M.A.-Z. and I.A.;
writing—review and editing, R.Q., A.M.A.-Z., H.F. and I.A.; supervision H.F.; project administration,
I.A. and H.F. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding. The APC is funded by Prince Sultan University.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Data available in a publicly accessible repository at https://sites.
google.com/view/iot-network-intrusion-dataset/home (accessed on 21 April 2021). The data
presented in this study are openly available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-47358-7_52
(accessed on 21 April 2021) [26].
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to acknowledge the support of Prince Sultan University
for paying the Article Processing Charges (APC) of this publication.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Nauman, A.; Qadri, Y.A.; Amjad, M.; Zikria, Y.B.; Afzal, M.K.; Kim, S.W. Multimedia Internet of Things: A comprehensive survey.
IEEE Access 2020, 8, 8202–8250. [CrossRef]
2. Qaddoura, R.; Manaseer, S. Comparative Study for the Effect of CPU Speed in Fog Networks. In Proceedings of the 2018 Fifth
International Symposium on Innovation in Information and Communication Technology (ISIICT), Amman, Jordan, 31 October–
1 November 2018; pp. 1–5.
3. Alam, T. Internet of Things: A Secure Cloud-based MANET Mobility Model. Int. J. Netw. Secur. 2020, 22, 514–520. [CrossRef]
4. Savaglio, C.; Ganzha, M.; Paprzycki, M.; Bădică, C.; Ivanović, M.; Fortino, G. Agent-based Internet of Things: State-of-the-art and
research challenges. Future Gener. Comput. Syst. 2020, 102, 1038–1053. [CrossRef]
5. Angelova, N.; Kiryakova, G.; Yordanova, L. The great impact of internet of things on business. Trakia J. Sci. 2017, 15, 406–412.
[CrossRef]
6. Thamilarasu, G.; Chawla, S. Towards deep-learning-driven intrusion detection for the internet of things. Sensors 2019, 19, 1977.
[CrossRef]
7. Williams, R.; McMahon, E.; Samtani, S.; Patton, M.; Chen, H. Identifying vulnerabilities of consumer Internet of Things (IoT)
devices: A scalable approach. In Proceedings of the 2017 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics
(ISI), Beijing, China, 22–24 July 2017; pp. 179–181.
8. Darrell Etherington, K.C. Large DDoS Attacks Cause Outages at Twitter, Spotify, and Other Sites. 2016. Available online:
https://techcrunch.com/2016/10/21/many-sites-including-twitter-and-spotify-suffering-outage/ (accessed on 21 April 2021).
9. Solon, O. Team of Hackers Take Remote Control of Tesla Model S from 12 Miles Away; The Guardian: London, UK, 2016. Available online:
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/20/tesla-model-s-chinese-hack-remote-control-brakes (accessed on
21 April 2021).
10. Kumar, C.S. Correlating Internet of Things. Int. J. Manag. (IJM) 2017, 8, 68–76.
11. Qiu, S.; Wang, D.; Xu, G.; Kumari, S. Practical and Provably Secure Three-Factor Authentication Protocol Based on Extended
Chaotic-Maps for Mobile Lightweight Devices. IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2020, 1. [CrossRef]
12. Li, Z.; Wang, D.; Morais, E. Quantum-Safe Round-Optimal Password Authentication for Mobile Devices. IEEE Trans. Dependable
Secur. Comput. 2020, 1. [CrossRef]
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 19 of 21
13. Kasinathan, P.; Costamagna, G.; Khaleel, H.; Pastrone, C.; Spirito, M.A. An IDS framework for internet of things empowered by
6LoWPAN. In Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer & Communications Security, Berlin, Germany,
4–8 November 2013; pp. 1337–1340.
14. Krimmling, J.; Peter, S. Integration and evaluation of intrusion detection for CoAP in smart city applications. In Proceedings of
the 2014 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, San Francisco, CA, USA, 29–31 October 2014; pp. 73–78.
15. Le, A.; Loo, J.; Lasebae, A.; Aiash, M.; Luo, Y. 6LoWPAN: A study on QoS security threats and countermeasures using intrusion
detection system approach. Int. J. Commun. Syst. 2012, 25, 1189–1212. [CrossRef]
16. Ala’M, A.Z.; Hassonah, M.A.; Heidari, A.A.; Faris, H.; Mafarja, M.; Aljarah, I. Evolutionary competitive swarm exploring optimal
support vector machines and feature weighting. Soft Comput. 2021, 25, 3335–3352.
17. Abbasi, J.S.; Bashir, F.; Qureshi, K.N.; ul Islam, M.N.; Jeon, G. Deep learning-based feature extraction and optimizing pattern
matching for intrusion detection using finite state machine. Comput. Electr. Eng. 2021, 92, 107094. [CrossRef]
18. Qaddoura, R.; Manaseer, W.A.; Abushariah, M.A.; Alshraideh, M.A. Dental radiography segmentation using expectation-
maximization clustering and grasshopper optimizer. Multimed. Tools Appl. 2020, 79, 22027–22045. [CrossRef]
19. Ala’M, A.Z.; Heidari, A.A.; Habib, M.; Faris, H.; Aljarah, I.; Hassonah, M.A. Salp chain-based optimization of support vector
machines and feature weighting for medical diagnostic information systems. In Evolutionary Machine Learning Techniques; Springer:
Singapore, 2020; pp. 11–34
20. Sheta, A.; Faris, H.; Rodan, A.; Kovač-Andrić, E.; Ala’M, A. Cycle reservoir with regular jumps for forecasting ozone concentra-
tions: two real cases from the east of Croatia. Air Qual. Atmos. Health. 2018, 11, 559–569. [CrossRef]
21. Shiravi, A.; Shiravi, H.; Tavallaee, M.; Ghorbani, A.A. Toward developing a systematic approach to generate benchmark datasets
for intrusion detection. Comput. Secur. 2012, 31, 357–374. [CrossRef]
22. Moustafa, N.; Slay, J. UNSW-NB15: A comprehensive data set for network intrusion detection systems (UNSW-NB15 network
data set). In Proceedings of the 2015 Military Communications and Information Systems Conference (MilCIS), Canberra, ACT,
Australia, 10–12 November 2015; pp. 1–6.
23. Sharafaldin, I.; Lashkari, A.H.; Ghorbani, A.A. Toward generating a new intrusion detection dataset and intrusion traffic
characterization. In Proceedings of the ICISSp, Funchal, Madeira, Portugal, 22–24 January 2018; pp. 108–116.
24. Pahl, M.O.; Aubet, F.X. All eyes on you: Distributed Multi-Dimensional IoT microservice anomaly detection. In Proceedings
of the 2018 14th International Conference on Network and Service Management (CNSM), Rome, Italy, 5–9 November 2018;
pp. 72–80.
25. Koroniotis, N.; Moustafa, N.; Sitnikova, E.; Turnbull, B. Towards the development of realistic botnet dataset in the internet of
things for network forensic analytics: Bot-iot dataset. Future Gener. Comput. Syst. 2019, 100, 779–796. [CrossRef]
26. Ullah, I.; Mahmoud, Q.H. A Scheme for Generating a Dataset for Anomalous Activity Detection in IoT Networks. In Canadian
Conference on Artificial Intelligence; Springer: Cham, Switzerland, 2020; pp. 508–520.
27. Damasevicius, R.; Venckauskas, A.; Grigaliunas, S.; Toldinas, J.; Morkevicius, N.; Aleliunas, T.; Smuikys, P. LITNET-2020:
An annotated real-world network flow dataset for network intrusion detection. Electronics 2020, 9, 800. [CrossRef]
28. Yong, B.; Wei, W.; Li, K.C.; Shen, J.; Zhou, Q.; Wozniak, M.; Połap, D.; Damaševičius, R. Ensemble machine learning approaches
for webshell detection in Internet of things environments. Trans. Emerg. Telecommun. Technol. 2020, e4085. [CrossRef]
29. Chawla, N.V.; Bowyer, K.W.; Hall, L.O.; Kegelmeyer, W.P. SMOTE: Synthetic minority over-sampling technique. J. Artif. Intell.
Res. 2002, 16, 321–357. [CrossRef]
30. Sadiq, A.S.; Faris, H.; Ala’M, A.Z.; Mirjalili, S.; Ghafoor, K.Z. Fraud detection model based on multi-verse features extraction
approach for smart city applications. In Smart Cities Cybersecurity and Privacy; Elsevier: Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2019;
pp. 241–251.
31. Khan, R.; Khan, S.U.; Zaheer, R.; Khan, S. Future internet: The internet of things architecture, possible applications and key
challenges. In Proceedings of the 2012 10th International Conference on Frontiers of Information Technology, Islamabad, Pakistan,
17–19 December 2012; pp. 257–260.
32. Almomani, I.; Alromi, A. Integrating Software Engineering Processes in the Development of Efficient Intrusion Detection Systems
in Wireless Sensor Networks. Sensors 2020, 20, 1375. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
33. Xu, T.; Wendt, J.B.; Potkonjak, M. Security of IoT systems: Design challenges and opportunities. In Proceedings of the 2014
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design (ICCAD), San Jose, CA, USA, 2–6 November 2014; pp. 417–423.
34. Heer, T.; Garcia-Morchon, O.; Hummen, R.; Keoh, S.L.; Kumar, S.S.; Wehrle, K. Security Challenges in the IP-based Internet of
Things. Wirel. Pers. Commun. 2011, 61, 527–542. [CrossRef]
35. Sfar, A.R.; Natalizio, E.; Challal, Y.; Chtourou, Z. A roadmap for security challenges in the Internet of Things. Digit. Commun.
Netw. 2018, 4, 118–137. [CrossRef]
36. Inayat, Z.; Gani, A.; Anuar, N.B.; Khan, M.K.; Anwar, S. Intrusion response systems: Foundations, design, and challenges. J. Netw.
Comput. Appl. 2016, 62, 53–74. [CrossRef]
37. Wu, Z.; Xu, Z.; Wang, H. Whispers in the Hyper-space: High-speed Covert Channel Attacks in the Cloud. In 21st USENIX
Security Symposium (USENIX Security 12); USENIX Association: Bellevue, WA, USA, 2012; pp. 159–173.
38. Neela, K.; Kavitha, V. A survey on security Issues and vulnerabilities on cloud computing. Int. J. Comput. Sci. Eng. Technol. 2013,
4, 855–860.
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 20 of 21
39. Halfond, W.G.; Viegas, J.; Orso, A. A classification of SQL-injection attacks and countermeasures. In Proceedings of the IEEE
International Symposium on Secure Software Engineering, Hong Kong, China, 18 December 2006; Volume 1, pp. 13–15.
40. Anwar, S.; Mohamad Zain, J.; Zolkipli, M.F.; Inayat, Z.; Khan, S.; Anthony, B.; Chang, V. From intrusion detection to an intrusion
response system: fundamentals, requirements, and future directions. Algorithms 2017, 10, 39. [CrossRef]
41. Khan, A. Overview of Security in Internet of Things. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Recent Trends in
Engineering Science and Management, Bundi, Rajasthan, India, 10 April 2016; Volume 10.
42. Zhang, Z.K.; Cho, M.C.Y.; Shieh, S. Emerging security threats and countermeasures in IoT. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM
Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, Singapore, 14–17 April 2015; pp. 1–6.
43. Almomani, I.; Al-alakhra, M.; Al-Kasasbeh, B. WSN-DS: A Dataset for Intrusion Detection Systems in Wireless Sensor Networks.
J. Sens. 2016, 2016, 1–16. [CrossRef]
44. Zhou, W.; Jia, Y.; Peng, A.; Zhang, Y.; Liu, P. The effect of iot new features on security and privacy: New threats, existing solutions,
and challenges yet to be solved. IEEE Internet Things J. 2018, 6, 1606–1616. [CrossRef]
45. Zhao, K.; Ge, L. A survey on the internet of things security. In Proceedings of the 2013 Ninth International Conference on
Computational Intelligence and Security, Emeishan, China, 14–15 December 2013; pp. 663–667.
46. Verma, A.; Ranga, V. Machine learning based intrusion detection systems for IoT applications. Wirel. Pers. Commun. 2020,
111, 2287–2310. [CrossRef]
47. Hindy, H.; Bayne, E.; Bures, M.; Atkinson, R.; Tachtatzis, C.; Bellekens, X. Machine Learning Based IoT Intrusion Detection
System: An MQTT Case Study. arXiv 2020, arXiv:2006.15340.
48. Almomani, I.; Alenezi, M. Efficient Denial of Service Attacks Detection in Wireless Sensor Networks. J. Inf. Sci. Eng. 2018,
34, 977–1000.
49. Singh, T.; Kumar, N. Machine learning models for intrusion detection in IoT environment: A comprehensive review. Comput.
Commun. 2020. [CrossRef]
50. Li, W.; Meng, W.; Au, M.H. Enhancing collaborative intrusion detection via disagreement-based semi-supervised learning in IoT
environments. J. Netw. Comput. Appl. 2020, 161, 102631. [CrossRef]
51. Rahman, M.A.; Asyharia, A.T.; Leong, L.; Satrya, G.; Tao, M.H.; Zolkipli, M. Scalable Machine Learning-Based Intrusion Detection
System for IoT-Enabled Smart Cities. Sustain. Cities Soc. 2020, 61, 102324. [CrossRef]
52. Amouri, A.; Alaparthy, V.T.; Morgera, S.D. A Machine Learning Based Intrusion Detection System for Mobile Internet of Things.
Sensors 2020, 20, 461. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
53. Qaddoura, R.; Aljarah, I.; Faris, H.; Almomani, I. A Classification Approach Based on Evolutionary Clustering and Its Application
for Ransomware Detection. Evol. Data Clust. Algorithms Appl. 2021, 237–248.
54. Ahmed, M.; Mahmood, A.N.; Hu, J. A survey of network anomaly detection techniques. J. Netw. Comput. Appl. 2016, 60, 19–31.
[CrossRef]
55. Costa, K.A.; Pereira, L.A.; Nakamura, R.Y.; Pereira, C.R.; Papa, J.P.; Falcão, A.X. A nature-inspired approach to speed up
optimum-path forest clustering and its application to intrusion detection in computer networks. Inf. Sci. 2015, 294, 95–108.
[CrossRef]
56. Diro, A.A.; Chilamkurti, N. Distributed attack detection scheme using deep learning approach for Internet of Things. Future
Gener. Comput. Syst. 2018, 82, 761–768. [CrossRef]
57. Liu, C.; Yang, J.; Chen, R.; Zhang, Y.; Zeng, J. Research on immunity-based intrusion detection technology for the internet of
things. In Proceedings of the 2011 Seventh International Conference on Natural Computation, Shanghai, China, 26–28 July 2011;
Volume 1, pp. 212–216.
58. Tama, B.A.; Rhee, K.H. An in-depth experimental study of anomaly detection using gradient boosted machine. Neural Comput.
Appl. 2019, 31, 955–965. [CrossRef]
59. Primartha, R.; Tama, B.A. Anomaly detection using random forest: A performance revisited. In Proceedings of the 2017
International Conference on Data and Software Engineering (ICoDSE), Palembang, Indonesia, 1–2 November 2017; pp. 1–6.
60. Maniriho, P.; Niyigaba, E.; Bizimana, Z.; Twiringiyimana, V.; Mahoro, L.J.; Ahmad, T. Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection
Approach for IoT Networks Using Machine Learning. In Proceedings of the 2020 International Conference on Computer
Engineering, Network, and Intelligent Multimedia (CENIM), Surabaya, Indonesia, 17–18 November 2020; pp. 303–308.
61. Huang, S.; Lei, K. IGAN-IDS: An imbalanced generative adversarial network towards intrusion detection system in ad-hoc
networks. Ad Hoc Netw. 2020, 105, 102177. [CrossRef]
62. Eberz, S.; Rasmussen, K.B.; Lenders, V.; Martinovic, I. Evaluating behavioral biometrics for continuous authentication: Challenges
and metrics. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Abu Dhabi,
United Arab Emirates, 2–6 April 2017; pp. 386–399.
63. Eskandari, M.; Janjua, Z.H.; Vecchio, M.; Antonelli, F. Passban IDS: An intelligent anomaly-based intrusion detection system for
IoT edge devices. IEEE Internet Things J. 2020, 7, 6882–6897. [CrossRef]
64. Arrington, B.; Barnett, L.; Rufus, R.; Esterline, A. Behavioral modeling intrusion detection system (BMIDS) using internet of
things (IoT) behavior-based anomaly detection via immunity-inspired algorithms. In Proceedings of the 2016 25th International
Conference on Computer Communication and Networks (ICCCN), Waikoloa, HI, USA, 1–4 August 2016; pp. 1–6.
65. Liu, L.; Xu, B.; Zhang, X.; Wu, X. An intrusion detection method for internet of things based on suppressed fuzzy clustering.
EURASIP J. Wirel. Commun. Netw. 2018, 2018, 113. [CrossRef]
Sensors 2021, 21, 2987 21 of 21
66. Fernández, A.; Garcia, S.; Herrera, F.; Chawla, N.V. SMOTE for learning from imbalanced data: Progress and challenges, marking
the 15-year anniversary. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 2018, 61, 863–905. [CrossRef]
67. Qaddoura, R.; Al-Zoubi, A.; Almomani, I.; Faris, H. A Multi-Stage Classification Approach for IoT Intrusion Detection Based on
Clustering with Oversampling. Appl. Sci. 2021, 11, 3022. [CrossRef]
68. Chawla, N.V. Data mining for imbalanced datasets: An overview. In Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery Handbook; Springer:
Boston, MA, USA 2009; pp. 875–886.
69. Demirbay, B.; Kara, D.B.; Uğur, Ş. A Bayesian regularized feed-forward neural network model for conductivity prediction of
PS/MWCNT nanocomposite film coatings. Appl. Soft Comput. 2020, 96, 106632. [CrossRef]
70. Yang, J.; Ma, J. Feed-forward neural network training using sparse representation. Expert Syst. Appl. 2019, 116, 255–264.
[CrossRef]
71. LeCun, Y.; Bengio, Y.; Hinton, G. Deep learning. Nature 2015, 521, 436–444. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
72. Schmidhuber, J. Deep learning in neural networks: An overview. Neural Netw. 2015, 61, 85–117. [CrossRef]
73. Hochreiter, S.; Schmidhuber, J. Long short-term memory. Neural Comput. 1997, 9, 1735–1780. [CrossRef]
74. Gers, F.A.; Schmidhuber, J.; Cummins, F. Learning to forget: Continual prediction with LSTM. In Proceedings of the 9th
International Conference on Artificial Neural Networks: ICANN ’99, Edinburgh, UK, 7–10 September 1999; pp. 850–855.
75. Gers, F.A.; Schmidhuber, J.; Cummins, F. Learning to Forget: Continual Prediction with LSTM. Neural Comput. 2000, 12, 2451–2471.
[CrossRef]
76. Sherstinsky, A. Fundamentals of recurrent neural network (rnn) and long short-term memory (lstm) network. Phys. D Nonlinear
Phenom. 2020, 404, 132306. [CrossRef]
77. Greff, K.; Srivastava, R.K.; Koutník, J.; Steunebrink, B.R.; Schmidhuber, J. LSTM: A search space odyssey. IEEE Trans. Neural Netw.
Learn. Syst. 2016, 28, 2222–2232. [CrossRef]
78. Parekh, R.; Yang, J.; Honavar, V. Comparison of performance of Variants of Single-layer Perceptron Algorithms on Non-separable
Datasets. Neural Parallel Sci. Comput. 2000, 8, 415–438 .
79. Tsironi, E.; Barros, P.; Weber, C.; Wermter, S. An analysis of convolutional long short-term memory recurrent neural networks for
gesture recognition. Neurocomputing 2017, 268, 76–86. [CrossRef]
80. Lemaître, G.; Nogueira, F.; Aridas, C.K. Imbalanced-learn: A Python Toolbox to Tackle the Curse of Imbalanced Datasets in
Machine Learning. J. Mach. Learn. Res. 2017, 18, 1–5.
81. Pedregosa, F.; Varoquaux, G.; Gramfort, A.; Michel, V.; Thirion, B.; Grisel, O.; Blondel, M.; Prettenhofer, P.; Weiss, R.;
Dubourg, V.; et al. Scikit-learn: Machine Learning in Python. J. Mach. Learn. Res. 2011, 12, 2825–2830.
82. Chollet, F. Keras. 2015. Available online: https://keras.io (accessed on 21 April 2021).