Securing Real-Time Video Surveillance Data in Vehicular Cloud Computing A Survey
Securing Real-Time Video Surveillance Data in Vehicular Cloud Computing A Survey
18, 2022.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3174554
ABSTRACT Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have received a great amount of interest, especially in
wireless communications technology. In VANETs, vehicles are equipped with various intelligent sensors that
can collect real-time data from inside and from surrounding vehicles. These real-time data require powerful
computation, processing, and storage. However, VANETs cannot manage these real-time data because of the
limited storage capacity in on board unit (OBU). To address this limitation, a new concept is proposed in
which a VANET is integrated with cloud computing to form vehicular cloud computing (VCC) technology.
VCC can manage real-time services, such as real-time video surveillance data that are used for monitoring
critical events on the road. These real-time video surveillance data include highly sensitive data that should be
protected against intruders in the networks because any manipulation, alteration, or sniffing of data will affect
a driver’s life by causing improper decision-making. The security and privacy of real-time video surveillance
data are major challenges in VCC. Therefore, this study reviewed the importance of the security and privacy
of real-time video data in VCC. First, we provide an overview of VANETs and their limitations. Second, we
provide a state-of-the-art taxonomy for real-time video data in VCC. Then, the importance of real-time video
surveillance data in both fifth generation (5G), and sixth generation (6G) networks is presented. Finally, the
challenges and open issues of real-time video data in VCC are discussed.
INDEX TERMS 5G, 6G, privacy, security, vehicular ad hoc network, vehicular cloud computing, real-time
video data.
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VOLUME 10, 2022 51525
M. S. Alsayfi et al.: Securing Real-Time Video Surveillance Data in Vehicular Cloud Computing: A Survey
to provide safety for drivers, passengers, and pedestrians on can share the data by processing and storing data near the
the road. VANETs consist of three main components (see RSU to form a temporary cloud. A new concept was proposed
Fig. 1): the vehicle, road site unit (RSU) infrastructure, and in [14]. This concept focuses on integrating the VANET
traffic authority (TA) [8]. Each vehicle is equipped with an with cloud computing (CC) to form a new technology called
on board unit (OBU), which consists of various numbers vehicular cloud computing (VCC) to improve efficiency and
of intelligent sensors that collect valuable vehicle and road traffic safety in the vehicular network. VCC is defined as
status information, such as information on accidents and autonomous vehicle groups that can exchange safety and
traffic jams and from surveillance of the city at night, to pro- non-safety data, storage, resources, sensing, communication,
vide road safety for drivers, passengers, and pedestrians [9]. services, and application processing with authorized vehicles
This collection of information is shared among the VANET on the road and combine the resources of vehicles to form a
components. VANETs consist of three communication links: cloud on the road.
V2V, in which the vehicle communicates directly with other The authors in [15] proposed a new service for VCC called
vehicles; V2I or I2V, in which the vehicle communicates platform as a service (PaaS). This service (PaaS) requires
with the infrastructure or vice versa, respectively; and V2E, many resources if it is to be employed in complex real-
in which the vehicle communicates with everything on the time services and applications in VCC. Hussain et al. [16]
road [8]. proposed an approach to shift from a traditional vehicular
V2V, V2I, and V2E communicate by using the dedi- network (VANET) to VCC. The authors explored the ben-
cated short-range communication (DSRC) protocol [10], efits of using VCC and demonstrated the communication
WiMAX [11], fourth generation-long-term evolution flow between vehicles, RSUs, and cloud computing by using
(4G-LTE) [12], and 5G [13]. With the great advances in tech- 4G-LTE. In addition, by combining traditional vehicular net-
nology, sensors are now producing a mass of data, which are works with CC, several types of applications and services
sometimes difficult for the OBU to process to make decisions that are difficult to apply in pure VANETs can be applied in
in the real world. In addition, some of these data are highly VCC. One type involves using real-time video surveillance
sensitive and need to be secured from internal and external data to monitor drivers, pedestrians, and critical events in
intruders. To overcome this limitation in the OBU, the vehicle both urban and rural cities. Real-time video surveillance data
services may help governments, especially traffic authorities, when designing a new real-time video data system architec-
monitor roads where there are no surveillance cameras (such ture. The main contributions of this study are as follows:
as CCTV). • First, we provide an overview of VANETs and some
Some studies propose new surveillance services in VCC. challenges related to storing many data in OBUs.
In [17], the authors proposed a new service called picture- • We then provide an overview of VCC and its novel ser-
on-wheel (PoW). This approach aims to capture pictures or vices and applications, such as real-time video-reporting
record a video on demand by using the camera of the vehicle. services.
These videos and pictures are taken in passive mode and • Next, we explore the current research on VCC related
sent to the traffic authority in the cloud. However, some of to real-time video reporting services, determine the
these pictures or videos contain information that requires a shortcomings of the research, discuss the security- and
preliminary decision about events from the authorities and privacy-preserving aspects of video reporting in VCC,
may contain sensitive information, such as the vehicle’s iden- and discuss current solutions provided by researchers.
tity, the vehicle’s location and sensitive video data, which • We then present a new taxonomy of VCC related to real-
should be protected from adversaries during transmission time video data services.
between entities in the vehicular network. Any modification, • Next, we demonstrate the importance of 5G and
insertion, or sniffing of the information in the packet will 6G in real-time services and applications in VCC
affect decisions made by traffic authorities regarding to the environments.
event. However, this approach does not consider security and • Finally, we discuss the findings and present challenges
privacy issues. and open issues in the VCC environment.
In [18], data security and privacy among vehicles, RSUs,
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The
and clouds resulting from VCC were discussed. The authors
taxonomy of real-time video data in VCC is reviewed in
outlined VCC challenges, such as high mobility authenti-
Section II. Related work is presented in Section III. Our dis-
cation and scalability arising from the use of the DSRC
cussion and open issues are presented in Section IV, and
protocol. However, the DSRC protocol affects the transfer of
conclusions and suggestions for future work are presented
video data services between vehicles and authorities because
in Section V.
of high latency. In [19], [20], the authors outlined that some
factors will affect data transmission in the VCC environment;
II. A TAXONOMY OF REAL-TIME VIDEO DATA IN VCC
these factors include packet loss, high handover latency, and
This section provides a state-of-the-art taxonomy for real-
communication overhead. However, these factors should be
time video data services in VCCs. This taxonomy comprises
considered when designing robust VCC architectures.
ad hoc networks, mobile ad hoc networks, VANETs, CC, and
In VCC, real-time video surveillance data poses many
VCC. VCC is then expanded in detail, as shown in Fig. 2.
security and privacy issues and challenges related to the
authentication, integrity, confidentiality, availability, and pri-
A. AD HOC NETWORK
vacy of the data as well as attracting new attacks, such as man-
in-the-middle, quantum, Sybil, and artificial intelligence (AI) The following section describes two main types of ad hoc
attacks [21]. When video data are being transmitted between networks: mobile ad hoc networks and vehicular ad hoc
vehicles, infrastructure, and clouds, these types of attacks networks.
should be addressed by implementing efficient security pro-
tocols. Moreover, in VCC, vehicles exchange real-time video 1) MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS
surveillance data in an open access wireless environment; Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) [22]–[24] are defined as
consequently, vehicles are more vulnerable to intruders in the a group of wireless devices, such as laptops, tablets, smart-
network. In such an environment, intruders can intercept the phones, and smart watches. These devices can communicate
packet and then modify, insert or delete the real-time video with each other to operate wireless networks. In MANETs,
data that are exchanged among vehicles and infrastructures to the wireless device can be an end user or router, which is
communicate with a trusted entity in the VCC environment. called a multihop [25], [26]. Therefore, wireless local area
Moreover, the intruder can record fake real-time video data, networks (WLANs) and Bluetooth technology provide evi-
such as traffic jams, accidents and hazards, and then share dence of the use of MANETs in wireless networks.
it with trusted vehicles on the road, thereby affecting the
performance of network. Therefore, to effectively apply real- 2) VEHICULAR AD HOC NETWORK
time video surveillance data in the VCC domain, security and A VANET is a type of MANET that provides wireless com-
privacy should be handled by designing a powerful security munication between vehicles that roam in a city. The vehicle
protocol and introducing sophisticated cryptography algo- uses the DSRC protocol, 4G-LTE, or 5G to communicate
rithms to tackle all types of intruders and threats and achieve with other vehicles and RSUs. The DSRC protocol was based
network efficiency, reliability, scalability, availability, ultra- on 802.11a [27]. In addition, the vehicle could communi-
low latency, and mobility, which are the main requirements cate with other vehicles in three ways. The first method is
direct V2V communication. In the second method, the vehicle a resource-computer processor (RCP). The RCP device
communicates with other vehicles via the RSU. In the third is responsible for processing the safety and non-safety
method, the vehicle communicates with everything. In addi- messages received by vehicles. This processing infor-
tion, safety messages are shared among vehicles in one of mation is sent from one OBU to another OBU in differ-
the above ways to notify drivers of critical hazards or provide ent vehicles [28].
non-safety messages, such as weather and entertainment. The 2. An application unit (AU) is a device that is considered
main aim of VANETs is to provide traffic safety for drivers a physical unit similar to an OBU [29]. The AU uses the
and passengers to avoid accidents and traffic jams on the road. OBU to run applications through the internet. In addi-
In-Vehicle Devices. A vehicle consists of three elements: tion, an AU consists of a personal digital assistant (PDA)
an OBU, an application unit, and a tamperproof device. or any device dedicated to safety applications. The AU
1. OBU: Each vehicle is equipped with an OBU The can use wire or wireless communication with the OBU.
OBU is responsible for communication with other 3. Tamperproof Device (TPD): A device in the OBU
vehicles and RSUs. In addition, the OBU contains that protects vehicle information, the TPD stores private
and public keys for long- or short-term communication 1) VEHICULAR USING CLOUD
between vehicles and RSUs [30]. In addition, the TPD The VuC uses the OBU to collect and share safety messages,
is responsible for encrypting and decrypting data, which such as regarding street status, driver status, and traffic jams,
transfer among vehicles and RSUs through the OBU. among vehicles and clouds through the RSUs or directly
TPD can be accessed only by authorized users, such as to the cloud (see Fig. 3). First, the data that are collected
traffic authorities. According to encrypting and decrypt- by the vehicle’s sensors are first processed in the OBU; then,
ing messages in the TPD, the keys have a lifetime to the OBU sends a copy of the data to the traffic authority in the
expire, and then they are stored in the TPD after expira- central remote cloud for storing and making a decision in the
tion. However, this process causes overhead in the TPD, real world.
which cannot process the message quickly, especially In addition, the OBU collects driver and passenger data
for real-time services and applications that require a from devices, such as smart phones, smart watches, and
high-priority process. Therefore, the TPD should have tablets, that are connected to the OBU via the internet. Some
a mechanism to delete expired keys and certificates. of these data contain sensitive information that requires a
quick decision in real time; making a quick decision requires
high bandwidth and low latency between vehicles and the
B. CLOUD COMPUTING
remote cloud. As a result, there are three types of VuC:
Cloud computing (CC) [31], [32] is a new technology
vehicles using private cloud, vehicles using public clouds, and
that provides powerful computation, storage, processing,
vehicles using hybrid clouds.
resources, and application services. The main aim of CC is
1- Vehicles using a private cloud (VuPCs): A VuPC is
to provide services to the end user anytime and anywhere.
responsible for creating a private cloud on the road
In addition, organizations and enterprises have shifted to
by the traffic authority. VuPCs can be accessed only
cloud technology to upload their resources and access these
by police vehicles to download and upload data to the
resources through the internet to reduce maintenance costs.
cloud. The main aim of VuPCs is to reduce the overhead
The architecture of CC has many datacenters that are respon-
on public traffic authorities and provide information to
sible for user requests and processing these requests quickly.
police officers.
CC comprises three types of clouds [33]. The first type is the
2- Vehicles using a public cloud (VuPuCs): Each vehicle
public cloud, which is used by all users around the world;
should be registered with the traffic authority before
examples include Google Drive and Amazon. Data in the
starting to record any events on the road. Registration
public cloud should be highly protected against adversaries.
depends on the security requirements for maintaining
The second type is a private cloud, in which each user or
traffic safety on the road. After registration is com-
organization creates its own cloud. The third type is a hybrid
pleted, a new identity is assigned to the vehicle to start
cloud, consisting of public and private clouds. Moreover,
recording and sharing any events in the city with the
cloud computing has three modeling services: infrastructure
traffic authority.
as a service (IaaS), platform as a service (PaaS), and software
3- Vehicles using a hybrid cloud (VuHCs): A VuHC is a
as a service (SaaS) [34].
combination of a VuPC and a VuPuC. A VuHC can be
a police vehicle or a trusted vehicle that works with the
C. VEHICULAR CLOUD COMPUTING government.
VCC [35]–[38] is a new technology formed from a combi-
nation of a VANET and CC. VCC is defined as ‘‘a group 2) VEHICULAR AS A CLOUD
of largely autonomous vehicles whose computing, sensing, A VC is responsible for creating a cloud for a group of vehi-
communication, physical resources can be coordinated and cles on the road (see Fig. 4). In the VC scenario, the vehicle
dynamically allocated to the authorized users’’ [14]. The sends an invitation message to neighboring vehicles on the
main aim of VCC is to enable vehicles to share, process, road to join its cloud via the DSRC protocol, 4G-LTE, or 5G.
sense, and compute complex real-time video surveillance The vehicles that receive the invitation should reply ‘‘yes’’
data with other vehicles through the cloud. Additionally, or ‘‘no.’’ If any vehicle replies ‘‘yes,’’ then the concept of the
VCC provides new services and applications that are difficult VC is achieved. Vehicles in a VC are called vehicle members.
to implement in VANETs. The challenges that occur when These members should elect one vehicle to be a master in the
connecting vehicles to form a VCC are similar to those faced VC to receive, process, and compute the messages that are
in VANETs [39] and CC [40] because VCC is a combination received from one of the vehicle’s members and then forward
of these two technologies. Consequently, VCC and VANET the message to all vehicles in the VC. The main benefit of
can be utilized to solve issues in ITS. In [15], the authors VCs is that they create a local data center and reduce overhead
proposed three main types of VCC. These types are vehicular on the cloud. In addition, there are two scenarios of VCs:
using cloud (VuC), vehicular as a cloud (VC), and hybrid static and dynamic. A static VC is a group of vehicles in
vehicular cloud (HVC). static mode, such as parked at an airport, while the dynamic
VC is moving on the road. For example, friends who travel D. SERVICES IN VCC
on the road create a dynamic VC to exchange entrainment In this section, we provide an overview of VCC services [20]:
information. network as a service, storage as a service, computation as a
service, information as a service, entertainment as a service,
and picture on wheel as a service. In addition, a new ser-
3) HYBRID VEHICULAR CLOUD vice, called decision as a service, is presented for real-time
A HVC is a combination of a VC and a VuC; consequently, services and applications.
vehicles can join the VC as a service provider, and they
can also access the internet cloud to use cloud services via
gateways, such as RSUs/vehicles (see Fig. 5). There are two 1) NETWORK AS A SERVICE IN VCC
types of HVCs: static and dynamic. Therefore, HVC inherits As mentioned previously, RSUs and mobile vehicles can
all the advantages and disadvantages of VuCs and VCs. create a network as a service (NaaS) on the road. Some of
FIGURE 4. VC architecture.
these vehicles can access the internet via DSRC, WIMAX, 2) STORAGE AS A SERVICE IN VCC
Bluetooth, 4G-LTE, 5G, or 6G (in the future) [41] while Each vehicle is equipped with an OBU. Each OBU consists
traveling on the road. In addition, RSUs and vehicles (such as of various numbers of sensors that collect data from inside
vehicles parked at a mall) can act as a type of mobile gateway and outside the vehicle; the data are then stored in the OBU.
for other vehicles on the road to exchange safety and non- The OBU consists of two units: a processing unit and a
safety messages among vehicles that have connections with communication unit [42]. The main aims of the OBU are
the internet. Therefore, NaaS provided by vehicles or RSUs the processing, computation, and storage of data collected
can be paid or free. by the OBU sensors. Moreover, the OBUs in old vehicles
have limited storage, whereas modern vehicles are equipped make decisions during transportation on the road and by
with a high storage capacity. For example, Tesla [43] and providing storage as a service (SaaS) for other vehicles. For
Lucid [44] are self-driving electric vehicles that do not have example, if the vehicle stops in the airport parking for a long
traditional vehicular machinery; these vehicles’ companies time and has a high storage capacity, the vehicle will provide
take advantage of this feature by providing high-performance SaaS services for other vehicles around the airport, either for
computers and high-capacity storage to help other vehicles a fee or paid service.
from authorize/unauthorized vehicles. Therefore, all these of public transport will produce massive data when public
application services will generate many data that are difficult transport is roaming between cities. Thus, vehicles and RSUs
to store in OBUs because of OBUs’ limited storage. can be employed to quickly share information with relevant
authorities so that actions can be taken in real time.
a: REAL-TIME VIDEO SURVEILLANCE DATA IN VCC
Providing real-time video surveillance data in urban and rural III. RELATED WORK
cities is one of the most important services in VCC because The real-time video data collected by the vehicle’s camera
this service helps governments and law enforcement agen- on the road consist of sensitive information and the vehicle’s
cies (authorities) track people and vehicles by using CCTV identity, event type, event location, traffic authority’s identity,
or high-definition (HD) video to ensure security and safety. and traffic authority’s location; all this information should
Authorities need to respond quickly to events as the events be protected from intruders during transmission through the
occur, and as a large storage space is required for processing network. Security and privacy are both crucial aspects, par-
HD videos in real time, VCC is an ideal option. HD videos ticularly for real-time video surveillance data services and
mobility, scalability, availability, and low latency in VCC of RSUs. However, the authors’ method places a heavy load
environments. The VCC inherits the security and privacy on legitimate vehicle OBUs by sending frequent broadcasts
issues of VANET and cloud computing. In this section, through vehicular nodes.
we explore the security and privacy of real-time video surveil- In a VANET, each vehicle is equipped with an OBU
lance data services in VCC in four subsections: security device that stores the CRL and exchanges information among
and privacy in VANETs, security and privacy in VCC, and vehicles for safety and non-safety applications. However,
security and privacy for real-time video data services in VCC an OBU cannot process complex data, particularly data that
based on 5G and 6G. require real-time decisions. Therefore, researchers have con-
sidered the benefits and advantages of VANET and CC and
A. SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN VANET proposed VCC.
Vehicles communicate with each other to exchange safety and
non-safety messages to avoid accidents and traffic congestion B. SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN VCC
in modern and rural cities. These messages contain sensitive The authors of [14], [59] proposed a new concept, VCC,
information that is at risk if they are not protected from unau- by integrating CC with VANETs. This integration allows
thorized nodes (e.g., malicious vehicles). Therefore, security autonomous and intelligent vehicles to manage new services
and privacy are mandatory for protecting safety messages and and applications, especially in real time. Such vehicles collect
vehicle identities from adversaries. real-time data from the road; store the data in the vehicles’
Several studies [48]–[53] have presented comprehensive OBUs; and share the data among vehicles, RSUs and traffic
reviews on overcoming the security and privacy problems authorities in real time.
in VANETs. These studies aimed to demonstrate the impor- In [18], the authors outlined VCC security and privacy
tance of securing and protecting the data transferred between challenges, such as high-mobility authentication, which may
vehicles and of securing and protecting the identities of vehi- affect the passing of real-time video data between vehicles
cles from adversaries by designing effective security proto- and infrastructure. However, security and privacy solutions
cols. The authors of [54] proposed the following stand-alone have not yet been mentioned.
security requirements for VANETs: integrity, confidential- Similarly, the authors in [19], [20] pointed out the main
ity, authentication, user and location privacy, nonrepudia- issues of security and privacy in VCC. The authors provided
tion, and conditional anonymity. Several methods have been some parameters that may play an important role in designing
used to secure communication in VANETs; these meth- a security architecture for VCC; these parameters include
ods include pseudonyms, group signatures, and identity- high handover latency, packet loss, and communication over-
based encryption. In [55], the authors outlined the security head. However, the solutions for security and privacy issues
and privacy requirements of VANETs. These requirements are not addressed.
include confidentiality, nonrepudiation, privacy protection, In [59], the authors presented a new mechanism by
and control access. Raya et al. [56] identified the following integrating VCC with a cyber physical system. The main
threats faced by VANETs: impersonation, forgery, replay, objective of this integration was to monitor drivers while
and jamming. The threats facing VANETs can be divided moving in the city. The study methodology is based on using a
into three main categories: authentication, availability, and driver body sensor (DBS) that reads vital body reactions and
confidentiality [57]. sends the data to the OBU of the vehicle through wireless
In VANETs, a certificate authority (CA) is used for vehicle communication. Nevertheless, the main security and privacy
authentication. If any vehicle is compromised by adversaries, challenges and issues have not yet been addressed
the certificate of the compromised vehicle is revoked and sent The author of [60] presented a new architecture for VCC.
to the certificate revocation list (CRL), which is distributed to This architecture consists of three-tiers: the vehicular cloud,
all legitimate vehicles, to prevent the exchange of any safety the RSU, and CC. Additionally, the author mentioned the
or non-safety messages with the revoked vehicle. The distri- security requirements and threats of the proposed architec-
bution of the CRL to all nodes (vehicles) without distortion tures. However, this study does not provide any security or
is vital to securing communication in VANETs. The RSU privacy solutions and does not show how data are transferred
handles the distribution of the CRL to all vehicles and tracks among tiers. In [61], the authors presented a new hierarchical
misbehaving vehicles. Legitimate vehicles cannot obtain a architecture for VCC. This study shows how communication
CRL if they move out of the RSU range. Therefore, RSUs is performed among entities in their proposed architecture,
should be deployed appropriately along the road; however, but security and privacy were not considered.
this deployment may incur a high cost. Wan et al. [62] presented a new approach called VCMIA,
The authors of [58] proposed an efficient method to over- in which a vehicular cyber physical system (VCPS) is inte-
come the use of a limited number of RSUs on the road. The grated with mobile cloud computing (MCC) to support a
authors aimed to use vehicular nodes to distribute the CRL cloud provider and an ITS. The main objective of this
when there was no RSU at the legitimate vehicle’s location. approach is to enable users to access the central cloud and
The proposed simulation demonstrated that the distribution share information between the cloud provider and the vehicle.
of a CRL through vehicular nodes can outperform the use Similarly, a new approach is presented by the authors in [63].
This approach is VCPS, which integrated a VCPS with the The authors of [70] provided a new vehicle architecture
communication between the mobile user and cloud provider. based on fog computing techniques. This architecture con-
Although the authors in [62] and [63] mentioned security sists of three layers: the vehicle, fog, and CC layers. The
challenges, they did not present any solutions. vehicle layer handles the transmission of data to the fog layer.
The researchers in [64] presented a new security mecha- The fog layer consists of RSUs, base stations, computing
nism in which location-based encryption is used to protect resources, resource storage, and a local authority (LA). The
the confidentiality of location from external intruders. In this LA is responsible for generating pseudonymous certificates
study, the vehicle changes its key when roaming among zones for vehicles. Moreover, the authors assumed that the fog layer
on the road. To exchange the information, the source vehicle could be trusted. The CC layer is responsible for storing the
and receiver of the vehicle should be located in the same zone. data that are uploaded by the fog layer; however, the security
Nevertheless, a limitation of this approach is that communi- and privacy of communication channels between the fog and
cation is lost when both sender and receiver are located in cloud layers are not considered.
different zones. Garai et al. [71] proposed a new mechanism for distributing
Mershad and Artail [65] proposed a new system called keys and manage the mechanism between vehicles, RSUs,
CROWN, which uses RSUs as cloud interfaces and directo- and the central cloud according to the VCC concept that
ries. In the CROWN system, vehicles can access data covered is presented in [16]. This mechanism is a certificate-based
by the RSUs; however, these vehicles cannot access data privacy and authentication protection protocol. The main
outside the RSU range. objective of this study was to prevent Sybil and tracking
Park et al. [66] proposed a privacy-preserving scheme for attacks. In addition, the architecture proposed in this study
protecting vehicles and infrastructure in a vehicular-based consists of three layers: a central cloud, RSU cloudlet, and
cloud. The authors presented a new architecture that consists vehicle cloudlet. The RSU cloudlet and vehicle cloudlet com-
of a master authority, transportation manager, and server man- municate with each other since the vehicle cloudlet receives
ager. The vehicle’s OBU generates the vehicle’s pseudony- messages from its members and forwards the messages to the
mous certificate and sends the certificate, along with vehicle’s RSU cloudlet. Additionally, the vehicles need to change their
real identity, to the master authority. However, the proposed certificates when roaming between different RSUs to sup-
architecture does not work well if no RSU is located in the port intra- and inter-RSU cloudlets. However, the intruders
vehicle location. can modify and intercept vehicle information when roaming
Hussain et al. [67] proposed a new security protocol for among RSU cloudlets.
securing traffic information. This study made two assump- The authors of [72] proposed a new mechanism for select-
tions: the first assumption is that each zone is covered by three ing cluster heads in VANETs by using fuzzy logic based
RSUs, while the second assumption is that the vehicles are on cognitive radio (CR). The authors used two types of
authenticated to obtain a symmetric key zone (i.e., a Kzone), fuzzy logic: fuzzy input for CR VANET and fuzzy to noise.
which is distributed by the RSU when a vehicle joins a new Moreover, the authors explore the three main parameters for
zone. However, this approach suffers from overhead on the creating a cluster on the road: cluster head (CH), cluster mem-
vehicle’s OBU. ber (CM), and cluster gateway (CG). This work is extended
Nkenyereye and Rhee [68] proposed a new security pro- in [73]. Although this study presents an important technique
tocol for securing traffic management in VuC [16]. The in VANET, which is a cluster, this study did not mention the
objective of the security protocol is to secure data traffic trans- security and privacy of real-time data in VCC.
mission between transportation centers and vehicles through The author in [74] proposed a comprehensive survey of
RSUs by using an identity-based digital signature (IDS) VANET clouds. In this survey, the authors started by intro-
scheme. However, the packets that are transmitted between ducing a new architecture and new applications and the main
RSUs and the transportation center through the network is challenges and open issues. However, the authors did not
easily intercepted and modified by an intruder. mention the security and privacy solutions of real-time ser-
Kang et al. [69] presented a new approach that is a service- vices in VANET clouds.
oriented security method for VCC. This approach provides Whaiduzzaman et al. [20] presented novel services, such as
two new services: payment and accident management. The storage as a service, traffic information as a service, computa-
main aim of the accident management service is to moni- tion as a service, network as a service, and entertainment as a
tor the driver by using human body detection, such as by service, by combining VANETs with CC. VCC is consider as
using a camera inside the vehicle, whereas the payment ser- a suitable environment for generating new real-time services
vice aims to purchase goods online through the dashboard for monitoring road events and can draw a clear picture for
console of the vehicle. This study outlined various security local authorities to understand. Nevertheless, these real-time
requirements, such as integrity, availability, confidentiality, services generate many data that must be rapidly transmitted
and privacy protection. However, vehicle communication is among network entities with low latency.
disconnected from the central cloud if the vehicle is outside The 4G-LTE and DSRC protocols are insufficient for trans-
the RSU coverage. mitting real-time data in VCC because these protocols suffer
from delays and lack of scalability, respectively. Thus, 5G of MobEyes to assist in opportunistic diffusion. MobEyes
technology is considered promising for transmitting real-time is based on vehicle sensors that collect data from inside the
video reporting data in VCC. These services may contain vehicle and from the surrounding vehicle environment; the
sensitive information that should be protected against attacks. sensors then forward the data to other vehicles through one
hop or multiple hops. The paper shows the two most common
C. SECURITY AND PRIVACY FOR REAL-TIME VIDEO DATA types of urban monitoring: infrastructure communication and
SERVICES IN VCC BASED ON 5G static sensor deployment. Therefore, a further investigation of
Security and privacy are one of the issues and challenges security and privacy aspects is required, although this study
in 5G networks because the data rate transmission among provides a simple security mechanism by using a simple
entities is faster in 5G networks than in 4G-LTE tech- one-way hash function and asymmetric cryptography without
nology. 5G networks can facilitate the adoption of tech- details.
nologies, such as device-to-device (D2D) communication, A new approach for monitoring truck drivers by using mul-
software-defined networks (SDNs), and network function tiple cameras inside a vehicle is presented by Kutila in [91].
virtualization (NFV). Each of these technologies has unique Similarly, the authors of [92] proposed a new mechanism
security and privacy challenges and issues. Several studies for monitoring drivers in vehicles. The proposed mechanism
have explained the importance of security and privacy in used a new technique called a spatiotemporal technique.
5G environments [75]–[78]. Mantas et al. [79] outlined the A spatiotemporal technique is used for two purposes: first,
possible threats and attackers against the main entities of 5G to make momentary decisions about various events, and sec-
networks. These attacks and threats were derived from 3G, ond, to classify the driver distribution level. Nevertheless,
4G, and 4G-LTE networks to identify the security challenges neither [91] nor [92] addressed security and privacy issues.
and issues in 5G networks. In addition, the 5G architecture Weng [93] presented two types of surveillance services.
consists of user equipment, external internet protocols (IPs), The first service is called the forensic picture service,
access networks, and the core network of the mobile oper- in which a vehicle can provide an offline picture by mak-
ator. However, the main security and privacy issues in D2D ing the picture available before requesting it from the cus-
communication have not been mentioned. tomer; the second type is called the photo-shooting service,
Alam et al. [80] proposed a new protocol for securing D2D which allows users to provide a landscape photo. Similarly,
communications in LTE-A networks. The authors presented Habtie [94] proposed a surveillance service for traffic mon-
three network scenarios for analyzing possible threats in itoring and management by integrating cellular networks
D2D communication: D2D in public safety, D2D without with CC. The proposed service was based on two methods,
user applications, and D2D with user applications. Therefore, namely, conventional road monitoring and traffic accident
this study did not mention threats to real-time services and statistics. However, the security and privacy issues are not
applications, although the authors identified threats in such considered by the above studies [93] and [94].
applications. The authors in [95] proposed a new POW service. This
The author of [81] presented a comprehensive survey service aims to monitor cities by using the vehicle’s camera
of D2D communication. The authors begin by giving an sensor. The vehicle’s camera captures a photo or records
overview of the D2D communication concept in three differ- video for events that occur on the road and forwards the photo
ent respects: communication scenarios, status, and the advan- or video to the nearest traffic authorities for decision-making;
tages of D2D communication in public safety applications. however, this study did not consider the security and privacy
However, solutions for security and privacy issues were not issues of the proposed service.
addressed. Hussain et al. [96] proposed a new service that is called
A new protocol for providing a group authentication in vehicle witnesses as a service in VCC. The WaaS enables
D2D communication is presented by the authors in [82]. This vehicles to capture pictures and to forward the pictures to
study is based on the works in [83] and 3GPP 23.023 [84] law enforcement via the cloud by using the vehicle’s camera.
and used hybrid techniques, such as Diffie–Hellman (DH) This study focuses only on a passive service that takes only
key exchange [85], an authentication encryption standard an offline picture of the event after the event occurs on the
(AES-128 bit) [86], aggregated signatures [87], and elliptic road. To secure the picture, this proposal uses two security
curve cryptography (ECC) [88], to achieve the following techniques, namely, ElGamal encryption [97] and ECC. Nev-
security requirements: integrity, confidentiality, and authenti- ertheless, the intruders can easily obtain the pseudonyms of
cation against intruders. The main objective of this study is to vehicles because the communication channels between the
implement a group device leader for reducing the communi- vehicles and trusted vehicles are not secure.
cation overhead. Nevertheless, the protocol proposed in this Eiza et al. [98] proposed the system architecture for a
study has not been applied to an HVC environment. new surveillance service for monitoring traffic accidents in
The authors of [89] extended the work in [90]. The authors the city. This system architecture is based on a 5G network
used a new VANET-based mechanism is called MobEyes and CC. The proposed service aims to protect video data
for urban monitoring. This study is considered a pioneering that are sent from participating vehicles to the central cloud.
paper on urban monitoring, as this study describes the use The authors used several techniques, including pseudonym
authentication, a threshold scheme based on a secret key, exchange data in real time. The world’s first 6G flagship
public keys with keyword search (PK-KS), and cipher policy program was launched by Oulu University, Finland, with a
attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). The proposed service complete adoption planned by the beginning of 2030 [103].
suffers from high latency when sending video data to the Compared to its 5G counterpart, 6G technology will offer
central cloud and download the data from the central cloud more interesting features, such as ultra-high ‘‘seven-nines’’
because of the long distance between the participating vehicle reliability, ultra-low latency, and ultra-high mobility for
and the central cloud. autonomous driving. The main motivations for focusing on
Nkenyereye et al. [99] proposed a new protocol for 6G technology involve latency, data security, and privacy
overcoming the weaknesses of the service proposed by issues with 5G, especially for real-time services, thereby
Eiza et al. [98]. To deal with video data when transmit- limiting the support for 5G technology.
ting among participating vehicles and the central cloud, Several studies have focused on 6G technology.
Nkenyereye et al.’s approach consists of three layers: the Yastrebova et al. [104] proposed that the main challenges per-
remote cloud layer, the RSU infrastructure layer, and the taining to such applications can be resolved by implementing
vehicle layer. Compared with [98], this approach reduced 6G networks. Huang et al. [41] conducted a comprehensive
the communication cost by 50%. Nevertheless, this approach survey of 6G technology and demonstrated the advantages
suffers from an increasing communication overhead. of using 6G technology when compared to 5G. However,
Almusaylim et al. [100] presented a new 5G network– the security and privacy of 6G networks have not yet been
based protocol for protecting data privacy in VCC. The addressed.
main objective of this study is to improve the security Aazhang et al. [105] presented a survey to identify the
of [99]. However, the security and privacy solutions were not challenges posed by 6G networks. The authors’ study focused
considered. on several potential 6G technology applications, such as
Yoo [101] proposed a new protocol for securing video unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), satellites and terahertz-
reporting services in a vehicular network by using D2D com- enabled wireless communications. However, the authors did
munications. The main objective of this approach is to over- not consider the security and privacy issues of real-time ser-
come the limitations in [98] by extending the functionality of vices in vehicular networks.
the remote cloud, the law enforcement agency (LEA), the TA, A comprehensive survey of 6G technology was presented
and DMV. This study used hybrid techniques, such as public by Strinati et al. [106]. The authors began by providing an
key encryption with keywords, CP-ABE, and pseudonymous overview of 5G technology and the reasons for the require-
authentication, to secure the proposed protocol. However, the ments of 6G networks. The authors presented the main chal-
communication channels among the participating vehicles lenges of using 6G technology. Nevertheless, the authors
and TA are not secure. did not consider the security and privacy issues and
Similarly, the authors of [102] presented a new mecha- challenges.
nism for securing a video reporting service in a VANET Zhang et al. [107] presented key technological challenges
based on a 5G network. The objective of this study is to for 6G technology applications. They explained how 6G can
overcome the limitations of [98]; these limitations include support the super Internet of Things (IOTs) and AI systems.
replay, fabrication, and denial of service attacks. In addition, Nevertheless, data security and privacy, which are the pri-
the methodology of this proposed mechanism is to generate mary concerns associated with the design and use of any
730 pseudonymous certificates for each participating vehicle new technology, were not mentioned. In [108], the authors
to use the pseudonymous certificates when recording any presented a comprehensive survey on the use of AI in 6G
event on the road. Nevertheless, the intruders can easily technology. The authors explored the importance of using AI
intercept, modify, and insert false information in the packet in 6G and how 6G can be implemented in different ranges
among the TA and participating vehicles. Table 1 compares of applications, such as surveillance applications and ITS.
the advantages and weaknesses of the existing proposed solu- This paper shows the differences among 1G, 2G, 4G, 5G, and
tions to ensure the security and privacy of video data in VCC. 6G technologies and outlines why 6G technology is better.
Table 2 presents the security techniques that are used in the A new heterogeneous architecture is presented that consists
literature to secure video data while data are being transmitted of a physical layer, a data link layer, a network layer, and an
among entities in the network. application layer. However, this study does not provide solu-
tions for protecting surveillance data service from adversaries
D. SECURITY AND PRIVACY FOR REAL-TIME VIDEO while transmitting data among entities.
DATA SERVICES IN VCC BASED ON 6G In contrast, Loven et al. [109] proposed a new 5G model
Although some countries have started implementing 5G net- that could be applied to 6G technology. This model comprises
works that will revolutionize the world of wireless communi- two parts: AI for edge computing and edge computing for AI.
cation, researchers have begun to consider the specifications Edge AI can support novel applications, such as smart cities,
and features of sixth generation (6G) networks. Undoubt- urban computing, smart buildings, and self-driving. However,
edly, this generation will entail considerable changes in net- security and privacy issues and the corresponding solutions
works involving AI communication among smart devices to are not considered.
Wang et al. [110] published the results of a comprehensive These concerns include authentication, access control,
survey on the privacy and security of 6G networks. The encryption, malicious behavior, and communication. More-
authors discussed four main aspects: AI-based edge com- over, real-time intelligent edge computing (e.g., in the case
puting, real-time intelligent fog computing, 3D interfaces, of UAV and autonomous vehicle applications) cannot be
and intelligent radio. The authors showed that 6G tech- implemented in 5G because such computing requires ultra-
nology is faster than 5G and offers space-ground-undersea low latency networks, which can be achieved only with 6G
(SGU) coverage. The authors also outlined security and pri- technology. In addition, the authors outlined the challenges
vacy issues for autonomous driving, blockchains, multisen- in deploying 6G in AI applications, physical layers, and net-
sory applications, and wireless brain–computer interactions. work layers. Although the authors’ study provided valuable
TABLE 2. A comparison table of security techniques based on video data service in VCC.
information about the security and privacy challenges because the vehicles can send the same video or picture more
entailed in 6G network usage, the study failed to provide than once.
solutions to these issues. Security and privacy are the main concerns of real-time
Tang et al. [111] proposed a heterogeneous architecture by service in VCC. Table 2 shows the security and privacy tech-
integrating machine learning (ML) approaches in vehicular niques that are used to secure video data service when data
networks using 6G. The authors offered an overview of the are transmitted among vehicles and infrastructures. These
VANET, Internet of Vehicles (IoVs), UAVs, and air-to-ground techniques are vulnerable to quantum attack [112]. To apply
(AG) communication. Moreover, this study outlined the main real-time video surveillance service in a VCC environment,
challenges in vehicular applications; these challenges include certain requirements should be achieved when designing a
radio configuration, multi-radio access, beamforming, net- robust system architecture model; these requirements include
work allocation, network traffic control, high mobility, pri- low latency, mobility, scalability, security, and privacy.
vacy requirements, and real-time application requirements. Moreover, a design for an architecture for real-time video
Real-time requirements are highly sensitive in vehicular net- surveillance service should support four factors: real-time
works, which require immediate decision-making regarding data collection, real-time processing, real-time decision-
specific events in real time and attack detection mecha- making, and real-time notification messages. Therefore,
nisms. However, security and privacy solutions have not been we can argue that real-time video surveillance data service
discussed yet. will play an important role in ITS for monitoring the critical
The two upcoming networks, 5G and 6G, will change the event in the rural and modern cities.
communication methods among devices, especially for self-
driving. Table 3 shows the comparison between 5G and 6G IV. DISCUSSION AND OPEN ISSUES
based on several important features, such as mobility, latency, This section will discuss the importance of real-time video
data rate, seif-driving, real-time services, AI integration, surveillance data in two sections. The first section discusses
VCC, reliability, maximum bandwidth, and key technologies. the usefulness of using real-time video surveillance data in
According to the above literature, some of studies focus VCC, while the second section is a literature discussion.
on video recording, taking pictures of critical events in pas- Finally, the open issues of real-time video surveillance data
sive mode, and then uploading the pictures to the central in VCC are discussed.
cloud computing; see Table 1. These videos and pictures
have sensitive information and should be protected against A. DISCUSSION OF THE USEFULNESS OF USING
intruders. However, these approaches suffer from both of high REAL-TIME VIDEO SURVEILLANCE DATA IN VCC
latency because of the long distance from the vehicle to the The authors believe that real-time video surveillance data ser-
central cloud and an increasing overhead on traffic authorities vice will play a prominent and vital role in the development
and improvement of ITSs in the near future. This service aims services in VCC. Similarly, in [115], the authors show the
to monitor the critical and normal events in both rural and importance of broadband technology in enhancing the trans-
metropolitan cities by monitoring vehicles and pedestrians by portation system. Broadband technology is highly important
capturing a real-time video of the event and sending the video for achieving communication between vehicles and humans.
to the traffic authority for processing and decision-making in Moreover, the engineers need to develop a powerful trans-
real-time. portation system and road infrastructure to support real-time
Moreover, unlike traditional vehicular networks (VANETs), services and applications.
VCC systems provide a suitable environment to implement Tariq in [116] proposed a real option analysis (ROA)
real-time video surveillance data. In VCC, the group of framework to overcome the limitations in road infrastructure.
autonomous vehicles (AVs) can share, communicate process, One of the main objectives of this dissertation is to propose
compute, and exchange real-time video surveillance data in transportation agency guidelines in the context of AVs. More-
the dynamic and static mode of VCC. By using AI systems, over, the researcher gave important recommendations regard-
the AVs should be able to record any abnormal event that ing the importance of road infrastructure and the cooperation
is faced on the road. In addition, the integration between of self-driving car manufacturers before starting to actually
AVs and real-time video surveillance data in VCC will bring operate AVs on the roads to avoid any potential human or
advantages in ITS environments and security and privacy environmental disasters. Therefore, there is an urgent need
challenges and issues. One of the advantages of integration in to build a robust and efficient model for implementing real-
VCC is that VCC can give a clear picture for traffic authorities time video surveillance services, especially in areas that lack
to enhance and improve the traffic flow on the road and to infrastructure.
make decisions about events according to traffic authority in In [117], the authors explore the preferences of prospective
the real world. This scenario will reduce both communication future AVs consumers according to four choices of AVs.
overhead and latency on traffic authority by making the These four choices of AVs are self-owned AVs, private AVs,
processing and decision-making of real-time video data in vehicle-sharing AVs and ride-hailing AVs. This study aims
the edge of the network. For instance, the VCC and surveil- to determine the trend and measure the relative impact of
lance services will automate minor accident procedures by different characteristics related to travel behavior and aware-
photographing vehicular accidents and signing documents ness of the importance of technology in autonomous vehicles
electronically by using the identity of the AV or the identity among people. Moreover, this study reviewed AV patterns
of the driver (if the vehicle is not fully autonomous) without that can be developed and become a reality in the future by
needing the presence of a police officer or the insurance taking the opinions of the public and vehicle drivers on the
company. development of road infrastructure. The findings show that
One of the most prominent obstacles that real-time video consumers prefer to use traditional vehicles rather than AVs
monitoring systems in VCC will face is that the current because consumers are unaware of the importance of self-
road infrastructure is unsuitable for this type of real-time driving vehicles in reducing accidents and complying with
service, so the road infrastructure should be developed with traffic safety laws. Therefore, the authors completely agree
the latest network technologies, such as 5G networks and with the recommendation and vision in [114]–[117] because
future 6G networks, which fully support AVs. Undoubtedly, the recommendation will enhance the quality of safety and
these developments and improvements require high revenues traffic flow on the road and protect the life of drivers and
from transport institutions and authorities to create a powerful passengers.
road infrastructure that keeps pace with the rapid technologi- In terms of security and privacy, protecting real-time video
cal changes in the world and supports self-driving vehicles surveillance data, modern vehicles, and AVs are manda-
(or autonomous vehicles). Self-driving vehicles need to be tory because most modern cars and AVs are connected to
continuously connected to the internet, so any interruption in the internet, thus making them vulnerable to adversaries
communication will lead to traffic disasters and many casual- who can manipulate, alter, insert, or generate fake real-time
ties, so designing a communication method is very important video surveillance data during data transmission through the
to ensure the smooth movement of self-driving vehicles to network. Therefore, the security and privacy requirements
record real-time video data on the roads. should be achieved when designing a system model for real-
The authors in [114] presented a technical note for ongoing time service in VCC by designing effective security and pri-
research on connected vehicles. This technical note starts vacy algorithms to protect both real-time video surveillance
by discussing roadway infrastructure classification which data, modern vehicles and AVs on the road.
consist of four classes. The authors show the importance
of improving the road infrastructure to support automation B. DISCUSSION LITERATURE
vehicles. Then, the authors discuss the main challenges and In this review, we cover different video data and POW ser-
the importance of appropriate infrastructure provisions to vices in VCCs. The authors proposed a POW service that
support CAV operations. Although this study gives important enables a vehicle’s camera to record videos and take a picture
information on the importance of enhancing and developing in the passive mode. These videos and pictures were uploaded
road infrastructure, this study does not mention real-time to traffic authorities in remote clouds by using DSRC and
4G communication. These two types of communication suf- of the authors are unacceptable for real-time video reporting
fer from scalability, mobility, and latency because of the long and surveillance data services, owing to the time sensitivity
distance between the vehicles and the central cloud. These of the process of recording events and sending the recordings
approaches aim to monitor the driver and events on the road. to the traffic authority for decision-making. To design a new
Moreover, there is no benefit to just recording video or taking architecture for real-time services in VCC, ultralow latency,
pictures without taking a decision except work in [94]. The mobility, location-awareness scalability, availability, security,
authors mentioned that the video recordings and pictures are and privacy requirements should be considered.
processed by the traffic authority for decision-making; then, Finally, researchers expect 5G technology to be fully
the police vehicle is notified to attend the events location. deployed by the beginning of 2023. However, this tech-
However, the security and privacy issues have not yet been nology can partially support real-time video surveillance
fully addressed. data services and applications, especially those concerning
The approaches in [98]–[102] proposed a new surveillance AVs, which require quick decision-making and processing
service called video reporting for monitoring drivers and of events (such as accidents) in real time with ultra-low
events in vehicular network environments. In the proposed latency.
methods, vehicles record abnormal events on the road and The 5G and 6G technologies will become mandatory for
send the associated data to traffic authorities in the central all intelligent networks in the future because both 5G and 6G
cloud, after which an official vehicle accesses the cloud to technologies will cause a major revolution in VCC, as modern
explore the video. These video recording data are uploaded vehicles and AVs will not only exchange or store information
using D2D communication and mmWave technology, which but also process the data and make decisions in real time with-
are used in 5G networks to overcome the limitations of DSRC out relying on CC. Moreover, the integration of 5G and 6G
and 4G. Compared to previous studies, the authors improved will bring new significant security and privacy challenges for
the scalability and latency, but the latency is still high because real-time services in VCCs. Therefore, the most open issues
of the long distance between vehicles and the central cloud. in the security and privacy of real-time video surveillance data
Moreover, the authors did not show how the official vehicles in VCC are as follows.
knew there was an event to access the cloud, download the • Real-Time High-Mobility Authentication: Authentica-
video, and then go to the event’s location. tion is an important security requirement in VCC, espe-
This scenario may affect traffic flow and the lives of cially for high-mobility authentication. In VCC, the
drivers, passengers and pedestrians. As a result, existing modern vehicle, AV, RSU, and the central cloud should
approaches are based on centralized traffic authorities to gen- be authenticated before sending any safety or non-safety
erate security policies that lead to security issues. Maintaining messages among its and other entities. Vehicles on the
security policies in centralized traffic authorities has weak- road can be static, semi-dynamic, or highly dynamic.
nesses, such as a single point of failure. Moreover, availability First, a static vehicle is a vehicle in static mode, such as
is one of the main requirements of real-time video services when the vehicle is parked at a shopping mall for a long
to make participating and official vehicles upload real-time time. Second, a semi-dynamic vehicle is a vehicle that
critical event video data anywhere and anytime. moves at 40 km/h in the city. Third, a highly dynamic
Fortunately, the authors did not consider the importance vehicle is a vehicle that moves at a very high speed (such
of using video reporting data in real time. The approaches as 150 km/h) inside a city or highway. High-dynamic
TABLE 4. A comparison table of video data and POW services in VCC. 3: Fully achieved, ∗ partially achieved, 8: Not achieved.
vehicle authentication is a challenge faced by VCCs data sent by the vehicle or RSU to traffic authorities
because the vehicle roams between different locations should be protected from internal and external attackers
in a few seconds and the vehicle’s identity needs to be using symmetric or asymmetric algorithms. Lightweight
authenticated in every movement. Thus, a novel mech- cryptography is required to avoid computation overhead
anism is required to authenticate the high mobility of on the OBU or RSU.
vehicles in VCCs. • Real-Time Vehicle Location: Securing the real-time
• Real-Time Video Data Integrity: Integrity is one of the vehicle location is another challenge in the VCC envi-
security requirements responsible for protecting the data ronment. The vehicle sends the location for each event,
from any new information that may be added by intrud- either a normal event or urgent event, to the traffic
ers during transmission on the network. For instance, authority; this information is combined with the vehi-
the vehicle records a video of an event from the road cle’s identity, vehicle’s location, type of event, time
and sends two messages. The first message consists of of recording (if the event is recorded by the vehicle’s
an event video as a plain message, while the second camera), and the traffic authority identity. For sensitive
message is a hashed event video by using a hashing events that require decision-making, a notification that
algorithm in the RSUs or traffic authority. The receiver the message was received should be sent by the traffic
should compare the two messages received from the authority to the current vehicle location. However, a new
sender by hashing the plain message and comparing the technique is required to protect the location of vehicles
message with the original event video hash. Using a from intruders.
robust key in the hashing algorithm is required; however, Finally, Table 4 compares the approaches that used video
the computation of the key should not take a long time data and POW services in VCC. The approaches were com-
to hash the event data. pared based on security, data privacy, identity privacy, vehic-
• Real-time Video Data Confidentiality: Vehicles or RSUs ular network types, communication type, latency, scalability,
can record and exchange sensitive data regarding any and high mobility requirements. However, these requirements
event (such as accidents or traffic jams) with other are important for delivering real-time video data from vehi-
vehicles on the road. These events contain either nor- cles and infrastructure in VCCs.
mal or sensitive data. More clearly, normal data do not
need decision-making from the traffic authority, whereas V. CONCLUSION
sensitive data require urgent decision-making from the VCC will play an important role in ITS in the near future.
traffic authority in real time. In addition, the sensitive Moreover, real-time video surveillance will change the
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SEIF HARIDI is currently the Chair Professor
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of computer systems specialized in parallel and
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Art. no. 120130, doi: 10.1016/j.techfore.2020.120130. tributed Computing Group at the KTH Royal Insti-
tute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden. He is
also the Chief Scientific Advisor of RISE SICS,
until December 2019. He led a European research
program on cloud computing and big data at EIT-
MAJED S. ALSAYFI received the B.Sc. degree in Digital, from 2010 to 2013. He is a co-founder
computer science from Taibah University, Med- of a number of start-ups in the area of distributed
ina, Saudi Arabia, in 2005, and the M.Sc. degree and cloud computing, including Hive Streaming and logical clocks, and a
in network security from the University of Sains co-designer of SICStus Prolog, the most well-known logic programming
Malaysia (USM), Penang, Malaysia, in 2010. He is system and the Mozart Programming System, a high-quality open-source
currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree with the Fac- development platform based on the Oz multi-paradigm programming lan-
ulty of Computing and Information Technology guage. His research interests include in the combination of systems research
(FCIT), King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Saudi and theory in the areas of programming systems and distributed computing.
Arabia. His research interests include computer
security, information security, network security,
security and privacy in vehicular cloud computing, vehicular fog computing,
vehicular edge computing, the Internet of Vehicles, the Internet of Things,
mobile IPv6 security, and cryptography.
ABDULLAH S. AL-GHAMDI received the B.Sc.
degree in computer science from The University
of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, MS, USA,
MOHAMED Y. DAHAB has been an Asso- in 1990, the M.Sc. degree in management infor-
ciate Professor at the Department of Computer mation systems from the University of Illinois at
Science, Faculty of Computing and Information Springfield, Springfield, IL, USA, in 1992, and
Technology, King Abdulaziz University (KAU), the Ph.D. degree in computer science from George
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, since 2010. He served as Washington University, Washington, DC, USA,
the Chairperson of the Agricultural Expert Sys- in 2003. He is currently a Full Professor with the
tems Development Department, Central Labora- Department of Information Systems, Faculty of
tory for Agricultural Expert Systems (CLAES), Computing and Information Technology, King Abdulaziz University, Saudi
Ministry of Agriculture, Egypt, for two years. His Arabia. His research interests include collaborative software, distributed sys-
main research interests include algorithms, seman- tems, conflict measurements, workflow, information systems, and artificial
tic web, pattern recognition, natural language processing, expert systems, intelligence.
knowledge bases, information extraction, and information retrieval.