INTRODUCTION

One Belt, One Road (abbreviated as "OBOR") is a project initiated by Chinese President Xi
Jinping. It was started by China to emphasize its dominance over the world's topographical
and political structures.
OBOR is the People's Republic of China's (hereafter referred to as "PRC") foreign policy and
economic strategy. The name comes from PRC President Xi Jinping's 2013 proposals for an
overland 'Silk Road Economic Belt' and a '21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.' These are the
two major tomahawks China plans to use to economically connect Europe and China via
Eurasia and the Indian Ocean states. Ashore, it envisions the construction of a new Eurasian
land bridge and the establishment of economic gateways for China-Mongolia-Russia, China-
Central Asia-West Asia, the China-Indochina continent, China-Pakistan, and Bangladesh-
China-India-Myanmar.

On the seas, it will concentrate on establishing a seamless, secure, and productive transport
corridor connecting major ocean ports along the belt and road. 'Community of Common
Destiny' is the stage most closely associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (hereafter
referred to as "BRI"). Initially, in 2013, 152 countries were to be included in an
infrastructural development project.

However, the stage of "community of common destiny" is a utopian stage with a shaky
foundation. Up till 2017, China invested roughly $300 billion to advance and reinforce the
President's vision. By 2027, around one trillion dollars will have been contributed. 270
projects in South and Southeast Asia have been motivated by financial feasibility issues and
unrealistic advice. A significant amount of the BRI have become nothing but sinking ship.

In the same way that a freight traffic channel was opened in Africa, a freight traffic passage
was opened between two countries that experienced a major loss within a year. Mattala
International Airport, one of the world's emptiest airports, was financed by the Chinese. A
year ago, a Chinese merchant holding company was granted 99 years of rent at Hambantota
Port in exchange for the forgiveness of the majority of Sri Lanka's financial obligations
accumulated during the port's construction. This is a humiliating example of debt trap tactics.
To gain favour with the party's leadership, these businesses have been rebranded with the
BRI logo. Government requests for assistance from international partners and private funding
have been overlooked: massive state-claimed ventures and government strategy account for
more than 95 percent of BRI funding. BRI isn't a brand that investors believe in. This
wouldn't matter if BRI projects were producing ideal political outcomes, but they aren't.
Resistance to Chinese ventures and worldwide effect has grown as a result of delayed
exposure to the BRI operation. The inadequacy of BRI has been questioned by a number of
regional leaders.

We will look at how the Chinese President's brainchild has been a significant blunder and
how the money being provided isn't achieving the desired strategic and economic results in
this research paper. We'll also look at why the ostensibly perfect activity has produced
nothing but shoddy results.

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The BRI Initiative appears to be a fantastic idea and an excellent investment on the surface,
but is it actually feasible to make it a success as China intends? Is it delivering the expected
strategic and financial outcomes? Is this ostensibly flawless initiative actually perfect?

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

• To have a better understanding of the Belt and Road Initiative.

• Investigate China's concept of a new Silk Road.
• To comprehend BRI's political, strategic, and economic implications.
• To comprehend the BRI's strategic and economic error

HYPOTHESIS

China's president's brainchild has been a huge blunder, and the money invested hasn't yielded
the intended strategic and economic outcomes. The so-called flawless endeavour has only
served to highlight the flaws in the system.
 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is the Belt and Road Initiative, and what does it entail?
2. Is the One Belt, One Road initiative a strategic miscalculation?
3. What were the BRI's economic, strategic, and political objectives?
4. Is this flawless idea, in fact, flawed?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The doctrinal research approach was used in this study. The facts and numbers for this study
were framed using a variety of papers, e-pieces, reports, and books. This research was mostly
written using an analytical approach.

CHINA’S NEW SILK ROAD

In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road, infrastructural advancements and investment activities that will
span East Asia and Europe. This project, dubbed the Belt and Road Initiative in the long run
but sometimes known as the New Silk Road at times, is one of the most eagerly anticipated
framework projects ever conceived. It harkens back to the first Silk Road, which linked
Europe and Asia hundreds of years ago, facilitating trade between the Atlantic and Pacific.

Certain observers see it as a stifling expansion of China's growing influence, and as the costs
of several of the proposed projects have risen, resistance has grown in some member
countries. Meanwhile, the US shares certain Asian concerns that the BRI might become a
virus infecting Chinese regional growth, military development, and Beijing-controlled
foundations. Under President Donald J. Trump, Washington has expressed concern about
Beijing's activities while abandoning some U.S. efforts to isolate China and strengthen ties
with regional allies.

During important travels to Kazakhstan and Indonesia in 2013, President Xi announced the
BRI. The Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road were two-dimensional
concepts. The two were once referred to as the One Belt, One Road effort, but were later
renamed the Belt and Road Initiative. [1]

1
Jin Ling, The New Silk Road Initiative: China's Marshall Plan, 50 CHINA INT'L STUD.70, 83 (2015).
In Xi's vision, a massive network of train lines, energy pipelines, motorways, and smoothing
border crossings would be built both to the west—through the mountains of former Soviet
countries—and to the south, to Pakistan, India, and the rest of Southeast Asia. According to
Xi, such an organization would increase the use of Chinese currency, while a new structure
would "remove the bottleneck in Asian connection." According to the Asian Development
Bank, the area has an annual infrastructure finance shortage of almost $800 billion. Aside
from the physical structure, China plans to build fifty unique monetary zones, modelled after
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, which was established in 1980 amid China's monetary
reforms under Deng Xiaoping.

At the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Indonesia in 2013, Xi

announced plans for the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. China would invest in port
improvements around the Indian Ocean, from Southeast Asia to East Africa, to accommodate
growing maritime trade volume.

Certainly, cross-continent rail connections in the United States are critical for China's own
global history. In any event, the infrastructure projects included in President Jinping's Belt
and Road Initiative (BRI) reflect a slew of comparable disasters. Investing is usually a
mystery. China's state-owned enterprises are fueled by heavy dies down. Projects prioritise
speed over well-being, with the goal of getting things going quickly and then dealing with
environmental and social issues later.

Chinese officials may analyses this collection of experiences and cry fake respect in response
to criticism of their current foundation attempts. Overall, as they were developing in the
nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries, industrialized countries did not need to adhere to
high ecological and social ideals. Is the international community today setting a higher
standard, or a two-tiered standard?

That sense of injustice is understandable, but it is based on a historical misunderstanding. The

United States developed despite, not because of, its rail line tragedies. If rail line growth in
the United States had been more gradual, reflecting commercial demands rather than insider
interests, the United States could have reaped more of the railways' benefits while incurring
fewer costs.
There are unquestionably major differences. China is currently a global leader in
infrastructure development. Transportation technology has progressed. In any event, China's
westward expansion appears to be more problematic. Rather than working within its borders,
China's BRI plans to connect almost 70 countries, each with its own set of challenges and
risks.

The way China's activities are suffused with patriotism is particularly noteworthy. The BRI is
critical to Xi's plan to realize the "Chinese Dream" and transform China into a global power
by 2050. The effort was lauded in the Communist Party of China's constitution last
November.

Similarly, after the United States began its westward expansion, it was hardly discussed. "The
work is now one of such national importance that the people urge on its robust prosecution as
positively as they insisted on the prosecution of the last war," Harper's magazine said in 1867.
There was no retreat or concession.
In the end, America's wealth of train routes brought the country's economy to its knees - not
once, but twice. Financial backers were forced to sell U.S. rail line bonds in 1873 due to a
stock market crisis in Europe. Several rail line companies, as well as one of the country's
largest banks, failed due to their inability to find new buyers for their bonds. In 1893, the rail
line bubble burst once more, resulting in the most significant economic downturn in history.

21ST CENTURY MARITIME SILK ROAD

China could benefit from America's errors. That begins with a realisation that infrastructure
development is not a goal in and of itself. Transparency can help to decrease corruption and
inefficiency. Quality is just as important as quantity. Infrastructure that is badly constructed
has the potential to destroy more value than it provides.2

The Silk Road of the Twenty-First Century The Road's geographical breadth has been
steadily spreading into new territory. Its recent strategic evolution has been marked by a
stronger emphasis on collaboration on common marine security and sustainable development.
The Road is meant to cover a massive connectivity gap, particularly when coupled to the
2
Liu Cigui, Reflections on Maritime Partnership: Building the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,
47 CHINA INT'L STUD. 5, 17 (2014).
Belt, and there is no alternative that comes close to its magnitude, speed, and devotion. While
there will undoubtedly be beneficial repercussions in terms of development, connectivity, and
cooperation, some countries are concerned about the security implications. One of these
concerns is that China's acquisition of strategic seaports could serve as logistics hubs for its
growing blue-water fleet. Indeed, the Belt and Road Initiative is destined to serve a number
of China's core interests, including the development of its $1.2 trillion blue economy,
improving food and energy security, diversifying and securing sea lines of communication
(SLOC), preserving territorial sovereignty, and enhancing its international discourse power.

The Belt and Road Initiative has the potential to expand China's maritime strategic area far
beyond its enclosed surrounding waters, allowing it and other Belt and Road participants to
shape the evolving global maritime order together. Within this framework, China, like former
and current powers, is attempting to mitigate the impact of disruptive forces on major supply
chains—the Road is not an outlier in this regard. China will be able to create resilience in the
face of economic or diplomatic isolation, which might have a severe impact on its economy
and, as a result, domestic stability. At the same time, by investing in weak regimes, China is
incurring significant risks that could have a negative impact on its own economy. China's
maritime renaissance, aided by the Belt and Road Initiative, adds to the security complexity
of the SCS and IOR. These are security zones that are more heavily contested by regional and
extra-regional actors than the Belt's most vital regions.3

Given the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN) significant interest in increased
connectivity, economic prospects, and good ties with China, the Road is appealing to most
states in the SCS. The Road, however, is influenced by and has an impact on pre-existing
maritime and jurisdictional problems. This has an impact on the territorial claimant
governments of Southeast Asia, two of which, Viet Nam and the Philippines, are wary of
Chinese investment. Furthermore, the Belt and Road occasionally rekindles existing tensions
and strains between China and other countries in the region. This dynamic alternates between
moderation in the pursuit of common marine economic development and the abolition of
territorial disputes, and the exacerbation of fears among some regional governments about
China's rising footprint and a regional armaments build-up.4

3
Dragana Mitrovic, The Belt and Road: China's Ambitious Initiative, 59 CHINA INT'LSTUD. 76, 95 (2016).
4
Gregory T. Chin, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Governance Innovation and Prospects, 22 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 11, 26 (2016).
This is accompanied by governments' scepticism about the US's involvement, as well as a
general absence of an effective, regionally led security architecture and ASEAN cohesion. As
a result, countries are concerned about what China's security strategy for the area may be, as
well as how regional power struggles may affect their own security. In the IOR, the Road
aims to build a production and commercial network that connects the maritime domain with
the Eurasian interior and Western China, alongside the Belt. This would be a historic first that
might help open up Central Asia's landlocked regions, strengthen connectivity in South Asia,
and boost Eurasian economic integration and security cooperation. As a result, the Belt and
the Road might alter the IOR into a more integrated global common, potentially opening up a
slew of new economic prospects.

The Road has sparked further competition in the region for development assistance and
connectivity. While this is a favourable development, it also leads to increased militarization
and maritime rivalry in an already complicated multi-stakeholder region, particularly between
China and the resurgent quadrilateral of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia (the
'Quad'). By combining Eurasian terrestrial and marine security domains through the BRI,
China will be pushed to play a larger role in IOR security matters, as Myanmar, the Maldives,
and Pakistan have already done. This dynamic contributes to unprecedented security
cooperation between China and India. Furthermore, the Road may make it easier for China to
establish itself as a resident military power in the IOR, reducing the role of the United States
as the principal security provider and jeopardising some of India's long-term security goals.
However, it is unclear whether this would result in a long-term US-Indian-Chinese security
condominium or if an alternative that includes the EU or some of its individual member states
in the IOR would be preferable. The building of the Road is anticipated to contribute to an
increase in geostrategic overtures and military posturing by regional and extra-regional
entities in the process. What impact do these security implications have on EU interests, and
what security and economic cooperation opportunities exist with China and regional
stakeholders? While the goals of the Belt and Road Initiative support China's basic interests,
they are not totally acquisitive, and several of them overlap with the EU's Maritime Security
Strategy and Global Strategy. These include promoting maritime security and stability at
large, as well as stimulating sustainable global growth of the blue economy, improving local
and regional connectivity, facilitating international cooperation on 'green' development in the
blue economy, and stimulating sustainable global growth of the blue economy. Indeed, China
will become increasingly preoccupied with stabilising states and regions as part of the Belt
and Road Initiative in order to protect its interests.5

After all, the Belt and Road Initiative is likely to remain a thorn in China's foreign policy. In
certain areas, this will undoubtedly provide great benefits, but such cross-pollination may not
always be consistent with EU norms and ideals in terms of governance models, development
initiatives, corporate standards, and human security. As a result, in the medium and long
term, the Road in its current form may provide more security difficulties than answers for the
EU. This has less to do with the Road's declared objectives and more to do with pre-existing
maritime difficulties and tensions, the multi-stakeholder character of the SCS and IOR, and
some of the Road's practical security implications to date.

Both Chinese tactics and (extra-)regional stakeholder receptivity to the Road have resulted in
these ramifications. The EU, along with other interested parties, should look at ways to
mitigate these problems. The EU and China should ideally seek more chances for maritime
security partnership, while the recommendations below suggest that they may be constrained
in the context of the Belt and Road, or at the very least require more communication and
innovative thinking. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, like the Belt, are an
exception, as they provide abundant opportunity for collaboration. The Road, like the Belt,
advances by trial and error, and if a combination of incentives and disincentives is used,
China may be willing to revise, if not the aims, then at least some existing techniques.

5
Livemint. “Opinion: The Many Problems with China Belt and Road Initiative.” Https://Www.livemint.com,
Livemint, 5 Aug. 2018, https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/Aqj4qxXvt3x7yCDkkyL58M/The-many-problems-
with-China-Belt-and-Road-Initiative.html.
 ICE SILK ROAD

With all of this in mind, it's no surprise that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is highly
involved in Arctic issues. Beijing has sought membership in a number of international Arctic-
related organisations (such as the Polar Navigation and Equipment Committee), as well as
free trade agreements, mining and infrastructure investment programmes, and improved
diplomatic relations with all Arctic states.

China is not an Arctic country in the traditional sense: its coasts do not border the Arctic Sea,
and it does not claim sovereignty over Arctic under-continental shelves or water. The
People's Republic of China describes itself as a "Near-Arctic State," with greater interests in
the region. President Xi Jinping announced his government's intention to make China a
"Polar Power" in 2014. China is unable to conduct resource extraction operations or
commercial fishing within foreign territorial waters or international waters, as defined by the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, because it lacks jurisdiction over the
Arctic (UNCLOS). The commitment of Beijing to this pact dates back to 1925, when the
Republic of China signed the "Spitsbergen Treaty" (also known as the Svalbard Treaty,
which was created in 1920).6

However, as the region within the polar circle continues to rise in importance, priorities have
shifted. Nonetheless, as indicated in the PRC's White Paper released in January, the potential
in the Arctic are numerous in the new context of rapidly changing climate and environment.
Indeed, the region is of clear interest to many stakeholders, including the Chinese
government, in terms of economic potential, scientific insights (establishing weather patterns
in light of global climate change), biodiversity, sea routes, untapped natural resources, and
strategic footholds it could provide. China is at the forefront of Arctic development because
to the potential benefit of connecting its shipping lines to the North Atlantic through the
region.7

As a result, China has coined the phrase "near-arctic state" to describe its relationship with
the Arctic. Beijing's use of vocabulary indicates the position it intends to play and the
legitimacy it wants to assert in the region. However, neither this self-proclaimed status nor
6
Liu Jianchao, Fostering a Security Concept for a New Asia, 46 CHINA INT'LSTUD. 5, 17 (2014).
7
Xiangqian Gong, 'Understanding China's Arctic Policy: Three Dimensions' (2018) 477.
the claims promoted by internal Chinese legislation have formal acceptance in the
international rule-based system. The declaration of interest is more significant because it
draws on Chinese foreign policy in terms of diplomatic, trade, and environmental approaches,
all of which are part of the BRI's bigger concept. The northern sea routes, also known as the
Northern Sea Routes, have formed part of the new maritime Silk Road and are being planned
in China. The Arctic's critical significance is becoming obvious; the question of its
governance, safeguards, and stability is determined by a variety of treaties, one of which is
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Chinese approach, as outlined in
the Arctic White Paper, is intended to allay concerns about Beijing's intentions. This method
depicts China as a Zhilaohu ((纸老虎).

OBOR IS AN INITIATIVE HAS BEEN A STRATEGIC BLUNDER.

The disagreement between America and China that prevented the forum from issuing a
common communiqué dominated the headlines from this year's APEC meeting in Papua New
Guinea. Two short memorandums issued on the sidelines of the summit by the island nations
of Vanuatu and Tonga went unnoticed. Both agreed to become the newest members in
Chinese President Xi Jinping's main foreign-policy effort, the Belt and Road Initiative, in
exchange for renegotiating existing debt. They join other Pacific states including Papua New
Guinea and Fiji (BRI).8

Concern has intensified as Xi's trillion-dollar development ambition has spread beyond the
Eurasian core to the South Pacific, western Africa, and Latin America. Many Americans
believe the Belt and Road Initiative is a continuation of the Chinese Communist Party's
(CCP) efforts to undermine the world order's security and economic infrastructure. They are
concerned that China's expanding generosity is coming at the expense of international
institutions and American influence.

Another announcement made at last month's APEC meeting reflects this angst: Australia,
Japan, and the United States announced the formation of their own trilateral investment
project to assist fulfil Indo-Pacific infrastructure demands. This is insufficient for some: The
bipartisan US-China Economic and Security Review Commission proposed that Congress
8
Hillman, Jonathan. “Is China Making a Trillion-Dollar Mistake?” The Washington Post, WP Company, 9 Apr.
2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/04/09/one-belt-one-road/.
create an additional fund "to offer further bilateral assistance for nations that are a target of or
vulnerable to Chinese economic or diplomatic pressure" in its most recent report to Congress.

The response to the Belt and Road Initiative should not be like this. Ignore the hype: this
attempt was a strategic disaster for the Chinese.

China has made a huge mistake by subscribing into the mistaken notion that barrels of money
are all that is required to address complicated geopolitical challenges. Because of Xi's
tyranny, the government is nearly unable to recognise its error or quit his pet project. Making
China's blunders their own benefits neither the US nor its friends.
"Community of shared destiny" is the slogan most frequently connected with the Belt and
Road Initiative in Xi's talks. Xi's usage of this term is supposed to connect the BRI to the
CCP's deeper goal throughout the last three decades, which has been defined by party leaders.

Xi claims (like Hu and Jiang did before him) that the Chinese have adapted socialism to
current conditions, resulting in a unique Chinese response to "the problems facing mankind."
Xi is adamant that the time has come for "Chinese thinking and a Chinese methodology" to
assist others outside of China, despite the fact that this response originated in China. That is
precisely what the Belt and Road Initiative aims to achieve. The project supports Xi's lofty
statements about the party's historic mission on the international stage by employing the
Chinese model of socialism to develop the world's impoverished regions.

Chinese academics and policy experts at famous party think tanks have outlined more
practical goals for the programme to meet these lofty ambitions. They claim that the BRI will
connect China's internal markets with those of its neighbours. As a result, China's neighbours
will be closer to China geopolitically, bringing stability to the area. The Belt and Road
Initiative will reduce the appeal of separatist ideology to populations in China's border
regions, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, by expanding economic activity. Another anticipated
benefit is the energy security that will be provided by BRI-funded transportation routes.
Finally, China will gain an advantage over other large countries (read: Japan and the United
States) who view the globe as a black-and-white fight for hegemony by formulating and then
implementing a plan that prioritises common development over power politics. According to
these scholars, the community of shared destiny is a community that will greatly benefit
China.
Because the Belt and Road Initiative is only five years old (and many of its key participants
have been participating for significantly less time), it is impossible to assess its full impact.
However, for BRI projects in South and Southeast Asia, the region defined by Chinese
authorities as the "primary axis" of the Belt and Road Initiative, a preliminary assessment can
be made. BRI investment is strongest and has been around the longest here. The situation
does not appear to be promising. Hundreds of billions of dollars have been invested in these
countries with no returns for investors or electoral gains for the party. It has long been
debatable if Chinese policymakers want a financial return from the Belt and Road Initiative—
The three major rating agencies classify 27 BRI countries' sovereign debt as "junk," while
another 14 have no grade at all.
Investment decisions frequently appear to be influenced by geopolitical considerations rather
than strong financial judgement.

INVESTMENT DECISIONS OFTEN SEEM TO BE DRIVEN BY GEOPOLITICAL NEEDS INSTEAD

OF SOUND FINANCIAL SENSE.

Expensive port development in South and Southeast Asia is a good case study. According to
a 2016 CSIS analysis, none of the Indian Ocean port projects supported via the BRI have a
good chance of succeeding financially. They were probably given first priority because of
their geopolitical significance. Projects that are less clearly linked to China's security needs
have a harder time getting off the ground: according to RWR Advisory Group, 270 BRI
infrastructure projects in the region have been put on hold due to practicality or financial
viability issues (or 32 percent of the total value of the entire). Between what the Chinese have
said they will spend and what they have really spent, there is a huge disparity. There's also a
disconnect between how BRI projects are intended to be picked and how they've been chosen
in the past. BRI investment in Eurasia has been described by Xi and other party leaders as
following designated "economic corridors" that would connect China to markets and people
in other regions of the continent. The party expects that by doing so, it will be able to direct
resources to regions where it will have the greatest long-term impact and make cumulative
infrastructure upgrades conceivable.9

9
Pan Zhiping, Silk Road Economic Belt: A Dynamic New Concept for Geopolitics in Central Asia,
47 CHINA INT'L STUD. 33, 43 (2014).
Although China's $1 trillion infrastructure push across Asia draws romantic analogies to the
old Silk Road, there is a more recent chapter of history that cautions. More than a century and
a half ago, the United States was a rising force racing westward, building transcontinental
railways with limited benefits and a huge societal cost.
China has assumed that responsibility today. The similarities are startling — and alarming.
America's transcontinental railways became an obvious national imperative, combining
economic and strategic goals. However, their real design favoured elite interests over
collective well-being. Due to dubious finance, hefty subsidies, and a heavy dose of
nationalism, political favours outweighed economic fundamentals.

The railway expansion was made feasible by friendly relations between the US government
and multinational enterprises. President Abraham Lincoln signed the Pacific Railway Act in
1862, which was the first-time land allocations were made directly to corporations. The
government also awarded a series of land concessions that, if added together now, would
equal the area of the third-largest state.

Corruption was widespread. The construction company Credit Mobilizer, in possibly the
most famous case, exaggerated its fees and bribed American politicians with cash and
discounted shares. The secretary of the Treasury, the vice president, and four senators were
among those who received compensation. Kickbacks also won the favour of state politicians
and judges, who threatened to stymie projects if they didn't get their cut.

Speed was valued more than safety. Land grants and loans in the United States mandated
project completion, which encouraged the use of temporary wooden structures and other
short-term alternatives. Railway executives made a public challenge to see who could build
the fastest. The president of the Central Pacific Railroad won a bet in 1869 by ordering his
men to install 10 miles of track in a single day.

But it didn't take long for the emphasis on quantity to overshadow quality. Bridges collapsed,
boilers blew out, and trains derailed. Train collisions occurred as a result of mismanaged
scheduling and single-tracked lines. According to one estimate from 1880, there were almost
8,000 incidents involving passenger trains in the United States alone.
It was a uniquely American approach to build first and troubleshoot later. During the same
time period, railway engineers in the United Kingdom meticulously ensured that tracks were
as level as possible. In the short run, the process was slower and more expensive. However,
these projects lasted longer, and several of the bridges and tunnels completed in Britain at the
time are still in use today.

The rail competition in America took on a life of its own. Main lines split into trunk lines,
which in turn split into local lines. The United States built 22,000 miles of new track in the
1860s alone, a record that was nearly doubled the following decade. Construction has started
on the project. Few, if any, people understood how everything fit together.

As more track became available than the market required, practically everything transported
by the trains got distorted. Wheat, cattle, coal, and silver production soared as new territory
was avidly exploited. As towns like Dodge City, Kansas, became connected to markets in the
east, they flourished quickly. Many of these boom towns went bankrupt when the railways
moved further west, closer to sources of cattle and other commodities.

As Stanford University historian Richard White demonstrates in "Railroaded," a book that

should be mandatory reading for Chinese policymakers, the Dakotas became a natural
experiment in state support. To meet demand, railways took longer to materialise in South
Dakota, and farmers avoided marginal terrain. Land grants and subsidies, on the other hand,
stimulated rapid development in North Dakota, driving up territory values and settling barren
land.
Economic blunders resulted in environmental devastation. The land had been over-grazed and
over-farmed. Rivers were dammed, mountains were dynamited, and the soil and water were
poisoned by mining firms. Buffalo were hunted for their hides, flesh, and just for enjoyment,
pushing them to extinction. William Cody, a Kansas Pacific Railway contractor, killed 4,280
buffaloes over the course of 18 months to feed labourers, earning the name “Buffalo Bill”.
The people who lived in their route, as well as those who built them, were not treated well by
America's transcontinental railroads. The railways, which carried troops and settlers, hastened
the disintegration and deaths of western Native communities. For minimal pay, railway
workers put through long hours and worked in hazardous conditions. Thousands of Chinese
workers were among them, and they were discriminated against and forced to pay for their
own lodging, food, and tools.
 CONCLUSION

The 'community for shared destiny' phase is a utopian phase with a shaky foundation. Up till
2017, China invested roughly $300 billion to develop and reinforce the president's vision. By
2027, a trillion dollars will have been invested. 270 projects in South and Southeast Asia
have been cancelled due to financial viability issues and unrealistic proposals. Many of the
BRI's initiatives have proven to be a flop.

In the same way that a freight traffic route was opened in Africa, a cargo traffic route was
opened between two countries that suffered a significant loss within a year. Mattala
International Airport, which was built with Chinese funds, has been labelled one of the
world's most deserted airports. Last year, a Chinese merchant holdings business obtained a
99-year lease on the Hambantota Port by forgiving most of Sri Lanka's debts incurred in the
construction of the port; this is a humiliating example of debt trap diplomacy.

To court favour with the party leadership, many initiatives have merely been rebranded with
the BRI moniker. Large state-owned firms and government policies supply more than 95
percent of BRI funding, despite government appeals for participation from international
partners and private investment. BRI is not a brand that investors believe in. This might not
be a problem if BRI projects result in positive political outcomes. They're not. Long-term
exposure to the BRI has fuelled regional hostility to Chinese investment and geopolitical
involvement. Many regional leaders have condemned the BRI's failings.

We investigated how China's president's brainchild has been a major blunder, and how the
money invested is not yielding the intended strategic and economic outcomes. We'll also
learn why the so-called "ideal" programme has accomplished nothing more than being
flawed.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Jstor.com
 Indian Express
 Mapsofindia.com
 Business Standards
 Economic Times