G.R. Nos.

157294-95 November 30, 2006

JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated
February 7 and 12, 2003 denying petitioner Joseph Victor G. Ejercito’s Motions to Quash
Subpoenas Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum, and Resolution dated March 11, 2003 denying his
Motion for Reconsideration of the first two resolutions.

The three resolutions were issued in Criminal Case No. 26558, "People of the Philippines v.
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.," for plunder, defined and penalized in R.A. 7080, "AN ACT
DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER."

In above-stated case of People v. Estrada, et al., the Special Prosecution Panel1 filed on January
20, 2003 before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum for the
issuance of a subpoena directing the President of Export and Industry Bank (EIB, formerly
Urban Bank) or his/her authorized representative to produce the following documents during the
hearings scheduled on January 22 and 27, 2003:

I. For Trust Account No. 858;

1. Account Opening Documents;

2. Trading Order No. 020385 dated January 29, 1999;

3. Confirmation Advice TA 858;

4. Original/Microfilm copies, including the dorsal side, of the following:

a. Bank of Commerce MC # 0256254 in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00;

b. Urban bank Corp. MC # 34181 dated November 8, 1999 in the amount of

P10,875,749.43;

c. Urban Bank MC # 34182 dated November 8, 1999 in the amount of

₱42,716,554.22;

d. Urban Bank Corp. MC # 37661 dated November 23, 1999 in the amount of
₱54,161,496.52;
 5. Trust Agreement dated January 1999:

Trustee: Joseph Victor C. Ejercito

Nominee: URBAN BANK-TRUST DEPARTMENT

Special Private Account No. (SPAN) 858; and

6. Ledger of the SPAN # 858.

II. For Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9

SPAN No. 858

1. Signature Cards; and

2. Statement of Account/Ledger

III. Urban Bank Manager’s Check and their corresponding Urban Bank Manager’s Check
Application Forms, as follows:

1. MC # 039975 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of ₱70,000,000.00;

2. MC # 039976 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00;

3. MC # 039977 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00;

4. MC # 039978 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00;

The Special Prosecution Panel also filed on January 20, 2003, a Request for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to the authorized representative of
Equitable-PCI Bank to produce statements of account pertaining to certain accounts in the name
of "Jose Velarde" and to testify thereon.

The Sandiganbayan granted both requests by Resolution of January 21, 2003 and subpoenas
were accordingly issued.

The Special Prosecution Panel filed still another Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 23, 2003 for the President of EIB or his/her authorized
representative to produce the same documents subject of the Subpoena Duces Tecum dated
January 21, 2003 and to testify thereon on the hearings scheduled on January 27 and 29, 2003
and subsequent dates until completion of the testimony. The request was likewise granted by the
Sandiganbayan. A Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum was accordingly issued on January
24, 2003.
Petitioner, claiming to have learned from the media that the Special Prosecution Panel had
requested for the issuance of subpoenas for the examination of bank accounts belonging to him,
attended the hearing of the case on January 27, 2003 and filed before the Sandiganbayan a letter
of even date expressing his concerns as follows, quoted verbatim:

Your Honors:

It is with much respect that I write this court relative to the concern of subpoenaing the
undersigned’s bank account which I have learned through the media.

I am sure the prosecution is aware of our banking secrecy laws everyone supposed to observe.
But, instead of prosecuting those who may have breached such laws, it seems it is even going to
use supposed evidence which I have reason to believe could only have been illegally obtained.

The prosecution was not content with a general request. It even lists and identifies specific
documents meaning someone else in the bank illegally released confidential information.

If this can be done to me, it can happen to anyone. Not that anything can still shock our family.
Nor that I have anything to hide. Your Honors.

But, I am not a lawyer and need time to consult one on a situation that affects every bank
depositor in the country and should interest the bank itself, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and
maybe the Ombudsman himself, who may want to investigate, not exploit, the serious breach
that can only harm the economy, a consequence that may have been overlooked. There appears
to have been deplorable connivance.

xxxx

I hope and pray, Your Honors, that I will be given time to retain the services of a lawyer to help
me protect my rights and those of every banking depositor. But the one I have in mind is out of
the country right now.

May I, therefore, ask your Honors, that in the meantime, the issuance of the subpoena be held in
abeyance for at least ten (10) days to enable me to take appropriate legal steps in connection with
the prosecution’s request for the issuance of subpoena concerning my accounts. (Emphasis
supplied)

From the present petition, it is gathered that the "accounts" referred to by petitioner in his above-
quoted letter are Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9.2

In open court, the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, through Associate Justice Edilberto
Sandoval, advised petitioner that his remedy was to file a motion to quash, for which he was
given up to 12:00 noon the following day, January 28, 2003.
Petitioner, unassisted by counsel, thus filed on January 28, 2003 a Motion to Quash Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the subpoenas previously issued to the President of
the EIB dated January 21 and January 24, 2003 be quashed.3

In his Motion to Quash, petitioner claimed that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405
(The Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions stated therein.
He further claimed that the specific identification of documents in the questioned subpoenas,
including details on dates and amounts, could only have been made possible by an earlier illegal
disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) in its
capacity as receiver of the then Urban Bank.

The disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded, the prosecution in the case may not be allowed
to make use of the information.

Before the Motion to Quash was resolved by the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed another
Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 31, 2003,
again to direct the President of the EIB to produce, on the hearings scheduled on February 3 and
5, 2003, the same documents subject of the January 21 and 24, 2003 subpoenas with the
exception of the Bank of Commerce MC #0256254 in the amount of ₱2,000,000 as Bank of
Commerce MC #0256256 in the amount of ₱200,000,000 was instead requested. Moreover, the
request covered the following additional documents:

IV. For Savings Account No. 1701-00646-1:

1. Account Opening Forms;

2. Specimen Signature Card/s; and

3. Statements of Account.

The prosecution also filed a Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum bearing the same date, January 31, 2003, directed to Aurora C. Baldoz, Vice
President-CR-II of the PDIC for her to produce the following documents on the scheduled
hearings on February 3 and 5, 2003:

1. Letter of authority dated November 23, 1999 re: SPAN [Special Private Account
Number] 858;

2. Letter of authority dated January 29, 2000 re: SPAN 858;

3. Letter of authority dated April 24, 2000 re: SPAN 858;

4. Urban Bank check no. 052092 dated April 24, 2000 for the amount of P36, 572,
315.43;
 5. Urban Bank check no. 052093 dated April 24, 2000 for the amount of
P107,191,780.85; and

6. Signature Card Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9. (Underscoring supplied)

The subpoenas prayed for in both requests were issued by the Sandiganbayan on January 31,
2003.

On February 7, 2003, petitioner, this time assisted by counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash
Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the subpoena dated January 31, 2003
directed to Aurora Baldoz be quashed for the same reasons which he cited in the Motion to
Quash4 he had earlier filed.

On the same day, February 7, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s
Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 28, 2003.

Subsequently or on February 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying

petitioner’s Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated February
7, 2003.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated February 24, 2003 seeking a reconsideration of the
Resolutions of February 7 and 12, 2003 having been denied by Resolution of March 11, 2003,
petitioner filed the present petition.

Raised as issues are:

1. Whether petitioner’s Trust Account No. 858 is covered by the term "deposit" as used
in R.A. 1405;

2. Whether petitioner’s Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9
are excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405; and

3. Whether the "extremely-detailed" information contained in the Special Prosecution

Panel’s requests for subpoena was obtained through a prior illegal disclosure of
petitioner’s bank accounts, in violation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.

Respondent People posits that Trust Account No. 8585 may be inquired into, not merely because
it falls under the exceptions to the coverage of R.A. 1405, but because it is not even
contemplated therein. For, to respondent People, the law applies only to "deposits" which strictly
means the money delivered to the bank by which a creditor-debtor relationship is created
between the depositor and the bank.

The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as used in R.A. 1405,
by the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the
bank, does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term "deposits" used therein is to be
understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor
relationship between the depositor and the bank.

The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:

SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to

the people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so
that the same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic
development of the country. (Underscoring supplied)

If the money deposited under an account may be used by banks for authorized loans to third
persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship
between the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely
seeks to protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between
petitioner and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers "deposit, placement or
investment of funds" by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner.6 The money deposited under
Trust Account No. 858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be
invested by it elsewhere. To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would
encourage private hoarding of funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in other ventures,
contrary to the policy behind the law.

Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term "deposits" was intended
to be understood broadly:

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its
political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government
official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation of "deposits."
Moreover, it is clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not
only to money which is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further shows that
the law was not intended to apply only to "deposits" in the strict sense of the word. Otherwise,
there would have been no need to add the phrase "or invested."

Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.

The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being recognized exceptions
thereto, as above-quoted Section 2 provides. In the present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1)
the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject
matter of the litigation.

Petitioner contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his accounts are
not excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405. Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco7 holds
otherwise:

Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason
is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy
expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its
discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to
public scrutiny.

Undoubtedly, cases for plunder involve unexplained wealth. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 states
so.

SECTION 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)
hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Seventy-five million pesos
(P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by life
imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification from holding any public office. Any
person who participated with said public officer in the commission of plunder shall likewise be
punished. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be considered by the court. The court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including
the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in
favor of the State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

An examination of the "overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)" of R.A. No. 7080
would make the similarity between plunder and bribery even more pronounced since bribery is
essentially included among these criminal acts. Thus Section 1(d) states:

d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of
any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly
through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and or business associates by any combination
or series of the following means or similar schemes.

1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or

raids on the public treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
 connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the

National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or
government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity

or any other form of interest or participation including promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other

combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or

influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, all the above-enumerated overt acts are similar to bribery such that, in each case, it may
be said that "no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule
making bank deposits confidential."8

The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed by public
officers, and in either case the noble idea that "a public office is a public trust and any person
who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to
his duty, is open to public scrutiny" applies with equal force.

Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of
bribery must also apply to cases of plunder.

Respecting petitioner’s claim that the money in his bank accounts is not the "subject matter of
the litigation," the meaning of the phrase "subject matter of the litigation" as used in R.A. 1405 is
explained in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,9 thus:

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals confuses the "cause of action" with the "subject of
the action". In Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, petitioner points out, this Court distinguished the two
concepts.

x x x "The cause of action is the legal wrong threatened or committed, while the object of the
action is to prevent or redress the wrong by obtaining some legal relief; but the subject of the
action is neither of these since it is not the wrong or the relief demanded, the subject of the action
is the matter or thing with respect to which the controversy has arisen, concerning which the
wrong has been done, and this ordinarily is the property or the contract and its subject matter, or
the thing in dispute."
The argument is well-taken. We note with approval the difference between the ‘subject of the
action’ from the ‘cause of action.’ We also find petitioner’s definition of the phrase ‘subject
matter of the action’ is consistent with the term ‘subject matter of the litigation’, as the latter is
used in the Bank Deposits Secrecy Act.

In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, where the petitioner bank inadvertently caused the transfer of
the amount of US$1,000,000.00 instead of only US$1,000.00, the Court sanctioned the
examination of the bank accounts where part of the money was subsequently caused to be
deposited:

‘x x x Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 1405] allows the disclosure of bank deposits in cases
where the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Inasmuch as Civil Case No.
26899 is aimed at recovering the amount converted by the Javiers for their own benefit,
necessarily, an inquiry into the whereabouts of the illegally acquired amount extends to
whatever is concealed by being held or recorded in the name of persons other than the one
responsible for the illegal acquisition."

Clearly, Mellon Bank involved a case where the money deposited was the subject matter of the
litigation since the money deposited was the very thing in dispute. x x x" (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The plunder case now pending with the Sandiganbayan necessarily involves an inquiry into the
whereabouts of the amount purportedly acquired illegally by former President Joseph Estrada.

In light then of this Court’s pronouncement in Union Bank, the subject matter of the litigation
cannot be limited to bank accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but must include
those accounts to which the money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion thereof was
alleged to have been transferred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9
in the name of petitioner fall under this description and must thus be part of the subject matter of
the litigation.

In a further attempt to show that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and may
not be enforced, petitioner contends, as earlier stated, that the information found therein, given
their "extremely detailed" character, could only have been obtained by the Special Prosecution
Panel through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials concerned. Petitioner thus claims that,
following the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed.

Petitioner further contends that even if, as claimed by respondent People, the "extremely-
detailed" information was obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials concerned during
a previous investigation of the charges against President Estrada, such inquiry into his bank
accounts would itself be illegal.

Petitioner relies on Marquez v. Desierto10 where the Court held:

We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before
a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection
limited to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The
bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and
such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. (Underscoring
supplied)

As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, petitioner concludes that the
information about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used
to facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts.

Petitioner’s attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails. R.A. 1405,
it bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the
evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Section 5 of R.A. 1405 only states that
"[a]ny violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not
more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion
of the court."

The case of U.S. v. Frazin,11 involving the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA) of the
United States, is instructive.

Because the statute, when properly construed, excludes a suppression remedy, it would not be
appropriate for us to provide one in the exercise of our supervisory powers over the
administration of justice. Where Congress has both established a right and provided exclusive
remedies for its violation, we would "encroach upon the prerogatives" of Congress were we to
authorize a remedy not provided for by statute. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S.Ct. 72, 54 L.Ed.2d 83 (1977).

The same principle was reiterated in U.S. v. Thompson:12

x x x When Congress specifically designates a remedy for one of its acts, courts generally
presume that it engaged in the necessary balancing of interests in determining what the
appropriate penalty should be. See Michaelian, 803 F.2d at 1049 (citing cases); Frazin, 780 F.2d
at 1466. Absent a specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to
read such a provision into the act.

Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases
involving R.A. 1405, the Court finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case.

Clearly, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine13 presupposes a violation of law. If there was
no violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant case, then there would be no "poisonous tree" to begin
with, and, thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.

How the Ombudsman conducted his inquiry into the bank accounts of petitioner is recounted by
respondent People of the Philippines, viz:
x x x [A]s early as February 8, 2001, long before the issuance of the Marquez ruling, the Office
of the Ombudsman, acting under the powers granted to it by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770,
and acting on information obtained from various sources, including impeachment (of then Pres.
Joseph Estrada) related reports, articles and investigative journals, issued a Subpoena Duces
Tecum addressed to Urban Bank. (Attachment "1-b") It should be noted that the description of
the documents sought to be produced at that time included that of numbered accounts 727, 737,
747, 757, 777 and 858 and included such names as Jose Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni
Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peachy Osorio, Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia.
The subpoena did not single out account 858.

xxxx

Thus, on February 13, 2001, PDIC, as receiver of Urban Bank, issued a certification as to the
availability of bank documents relating to A/C 858 and T/A 858 and the non-availability of bank
records as to the other accounts named in the subpoena. (Attachments "2", "2-1" and "2-b)

Based on the certification issued by PDIC, the Office of the Ombudsman on February 16, 2001
again issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum directed to Ms. Corazon dela Paz, as Interim Receiver,
directing the production of documents pertinent to account A/C 858 and T/C 858. (Attachment
"3")

In compliance with the said subpoena dated February 16, 2001, Ms. Dela Paz, as interim
receiver, furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of documents under cover
latter dated February 21, 2001:

1. Transaction registers dated 7-02-99, 8-16-99, 9-17-99, 10-18-99, 11-22-99, 1-07-00,

04-03-00 and 04-24-00;

2. Report of Unregularized TAFs & TDs for UR COIN A & B Placements of Various
Branches as of February 29, 2000 and as of December 16, 1999; and

3. Trading Orders Nos. A No. 78102 and A No. 078125.

Trading Order A No. 07125 is filed in two copies – a white copy which showed "set up"
information; and a yellow copy which showed "reversal" information. Both copies have been
reproduced and are enclosed with this letter.

We are continuing our search for other records and documents pertinent to your request and we
will forward to you on Friday, 23 February 2001, such additional records and documents as we
might find until then. (Attachment "4")

The Office of the Ombudsman then requested for the manger’s checks, detailed in the Subpoena
Duces Tecum dated March 7, 2001. (Attachment "5")
PDIC again complied with the said Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 7, 2001 and provided
copies of the manager’s checks thus requested under cover letter dated March 16, 2001.
(Attachment "6")14 (Emphasis in the original)

The Sandiganbayan credited the foregoing account of respondent People. 15 The Court finds no
reason to disturb this finding of fact by the Sandiganbayan.

The Marquez ruling notwithstanding, the above-described examination by the Ombudsman of

petitioner’s bank accounts, conducted before a case was filed with a court of competent
jurisdiction, was lawful.

For the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of petitioner about four
months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001.

While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was
originally passed, the rule is not absolute.

Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals16 teaches:

It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that
law was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court
is overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied
on the old doctrine and acted in good faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

When this Court construed the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in light of the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits Law in Marquez, that "before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a
pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction", it was, in fact, reversing an earlier
doctrine found in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima17.

Banco Filipino involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, then
known as the Tanodbayan,18 in the course of its preliminary investigation of a charge of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

While the main issue in Banco Filipino was whether R.A. 1405 precluded the Tanodbayan’s
issuance of subpoena duces tecum of bank records in the name of persons other than the one who
was charged, this Court, citing P.D. 1630, 19 Section 10, the relevant part of which states:

(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn testimony, or produce
documentary or other evidence the Tanodbayan deems relevant to a matter under his inquiry,

held that "The power of the Tanodbayan to issue subpoenae ad testificandum and
subpoenae duces tecum at the time in question is not disputed, and at any rate does not
admit of doubt."20
As the subpoenas subject of Banco Filipino were issued during a preliminary investigation, in
effect this Court upheld the power of the Tandobayan under P.D. 1630 to issue subpoenas duces
tecum for bank documents prior to the filing of a case before a court of competent jurisdiction.

Marquez, on the other hand, practically reversed this ruling in Banco Filipino despite the fact
that the subpoena power of the Ombudsman under R.A. 6770 was essentially the same as that
under P.D. 1630. Thus Section 15 of R.A. 6770 empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and
records;

A comparison of this provision with its counterpart in Sec. 10(d) of P.D. 1630 clearly shows that
it is only more explicit in stating that the power of the Ombudsman includes the power to
examine and have access to bank accounts and records which power was recognized with respect
to the Tanodbayan through Banco Filipino.

The Marquez ruling that there must be a pending case in order for the Ombudsman to validly
inspect bank records in camera thus reversed a prevailing doctrine. 21 Hence, it may not be
retroactively applied.

The Ombudsman’s inquiry into the subject bank accounts prior to the filing of any case before a
court of competent jurisdiction was therefore valid at the time it was conducted.

Likewise, the Marquez ruling that "the account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection" may not be applied retroactively to the inquiry of the Ombudsman subject of this
case. This ruling is not a judicial interpretation either of R.A. 6770 or R.A. 1405, but a "judge-
made" law which, as People v. Luvendino22 instructs, can only be given prospective application:

x x x The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given
legal effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in
Morales v. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People v. Galit. x x x

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987
Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and
restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach
waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales. (Emphasis supplied)

In fine, the subpoenas issued by the Ombudsman in this case were legal, hence, invocation of the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is misplaced.

At all events, even if the challenged subpoenas are quashed, the Ombudsman is not barred from
requiring the production of the same documents based solely on information obtained by it from
sources independent of its previous inquiry.
In particular, the Ombudsman, even before its inquiry, had already possessed information giving
him grounds to believe that (1) there are bank accounts bearing the number "858," (2) that such
accounts are in the custody of Urban Bank, and (3) that the same are linked with the bank
accounts of former President Joseph Estrada who was then under investigation for plunder.

Only with such prior independent information could it have been possible for the Ombudsman to
issue the February 8, 2001 subpoena duces tecum addressed to the President and/or Chief
Executive Officer of Urban Bank, which described the documents subject thereof as follows:

(a) bank records and all documents relative thereto pertaining to all bank accounts (Savings,
Current, Time Deposit, Trust, Foreign Currency Deposits, etc…) under the account names of
Jose Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peach Osorio,
Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, 777 and 858. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The information on the existence of Bank Accounts bearing number "858" was, according to
respondent People of the Philippines, obtained from various sources including the proceedings
during the impeachment of President Estrada, related reports, articles and investigative
journals.23 In the absence of proof to the contrary, this explanation proffered by respondent must
be upheld. To presume that the information was obtained in violation of R.A. 1405 would
infringe the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.

Thus, with the filing of the plunder case against former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, using the above independent information, may now proceed to
conduct the same investigation it earlier conducted, through which it can eventually obtain the
same information previously disclosed to it by the PDIC, for it is an inescapable fact that the
bank records of petitioner are no longer protected by R.A. 1405 for the reasons already explained
above.1âwphi1

Since conducting such an inquiry would, however, only result in the disclosure of the same
documents to the Ombudsman, this Court, in avoidance of what would be a time-wasteful and
circuitous way of administering justice,24 upholds the challenged subpoenas.

Respecting petitioner’s claim that the Sandiganbayan violated his right to due process as he was
neither notified of the requests for the issuance of the subpoenas nor of the grant thereof, suffice
it to state that the defects were cured when petitioner ventilated his arguments against the
issuance thereof through his earlier quoted letter addressed to the Sandiganbayan and when he
filed his motions to quash before the Sandiganbayan.

IN SUM, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the challenged subpoenas for documents pertaining to petitioner’s Trust Account No. 858
and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 for the following reasons:

1. These accounts are no longer protected by the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law, there
being two exceptions to the said law applicable in this case, namely: (1) the examination
of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of
 duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation. Exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against former
President Estrada is analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while exception (2)
applies because the money deposited in petitioner’s bank accounts is said to form part of
the subject matter of the same plunder case.

2. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" principle, which states that once the primary source
(the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In
the first place, R.A. 1405 does not provide for the application of this rule. Moreover,
there is no basis for applying the same in this case since the primary source for the
detailed information regarding petitioner’s bank accounts – the investigation previously
conducted by the Ombudsman – was lawful.

3. At all events, even if the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan were quashed, the
Ombudsman may conduct on its own the same inquiry into the subject bank accounts that
it earlier conducted last February-March 2001, there being a plunder case already
pending against former President Estrada. To quash the challenged subpoenas would,
therefore, be pointless since the Ombudsman may obtain the same documents by another
route. Upholding the subpoenas avoids an unnecessary delay in the administration of
justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated February 7

and 12, 2003 and March 11, 2003 are upheld.

The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed, consistent with this Court’s ruling in Marquez v.
Desierto, to notify petitioner as to the date the subject bank documents shall be presented in
court by the persons subpoenaed.

SO ORDERED.