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Living With Television: The Violence Profile

Article in Journal of Communication · June 1976

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Joirrna! of Communication, Spring 1976

172
Living With Television:
The Violence Profile

by George Gerbner and Larry Gross

Does TV entertainment incite or pacify (or both)?

New approach to research uses Cultural Zndicators
as a framework for a progress report on a long-range
study of trends in television content and egects.

T h e environment that sustains the most distinctive aspects of human existence is

the environment of symbols. We learn, share, a n d act upon meanings derived
from that environment. The first and longest lasting organization of the sym-
bolic world was what we now call religion. Within its sacred scope, in earlier
times, were the most essential processes of culture: art, science, technology,
statecraft, and public story-telling.
Common rituals and mythologies are agencies of symbolic socialization and
control. They demonstrate how society works by dramatizing its norms and
values. They are essential parts of the general system of messages that cultivates
prevailing outlooks (which is why we call it culture) and regulates social rela-
tionships. This system of messages, with its story-telling functions, makes
people perceive as real and normal and right that which fits the established
social order.
T h e institutional processes producing these message systems have become
increasingly professionalized, industrialized, centralized, and specialized. Their
principal locus shifted from handicraft to mass production and from traditional
religion and formal education to the mass media of communications-partic-
ularly television. New technologies on the horizon may enrich the choices of the
choosy but cannot replace the simultaneous public experience of a common
symbolic environment that now binds diverse communities, including large
George Gerbner is Professor and Dean and Larry Gross is Associate Professor at The
Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. They are also co-
editors (with William H. Melody) of Communicutions Technology and Social Policy: (hider-
standing the New "Cultural Reoolution" (Wiley, 1973). For collaboration and assistance in the
continuing study from which the findings reported here are based, the authors wish to give
acknowledgment and thanks to Michael F. Eleey, Suzanne K . Fox, Marilyn Jackson-Beeck, Stephen
D. Rappaport, Thomas M. Wick, and Dr. Nancy Signorielli.

173
Journal of Communication, Spring 1976

groups of young and old and isolated people who have never before joined any
mass public. Television is likely to remain for a long time the chief source of
repetitive and ritualized symbol systems cultivating the common consciousness
of the most far-flung and heterogenous mass publics in history.

Our long-range study of this n e w symbolic environment

developed from, and still includes, the annual Violence
lndex and Profile of TV content and its correlates in
viewers’ conceptions of relevant aspects of social reality.

The research began with the investigation of violence in network television

drama in 1967-68 for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of
Violence (4) and continued through 1972 under the sponsorship of the Surgeon
General’s Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior (5).
The study was broadly conceived from the beginning and both reports showed
the role and symbolic functions, as well as the extent, of violence in the world of
television drama. A conference of research consultants to the National Institute
of Mental Health in the spring of 1972 recommended that the Violence Index
developed for the report to the Surgeon General be further broadened to take
into account social relationships and viewer conceptions. Implementing that
recommendation, we issued the Violence Profile (fifth in our series of reports),
including violence-victim ratios and eventually viewer responses. The then
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Caspar W. Weinberger reported to
Senator John 0. Pastore in the fall of 1973 that our research was “broadened to
encompass a number of additional dimensions and linked with viewers’ per-
ceptions of violence and its effects, as recommended by NIMH consultants and
as incorporated by Dr. Gerbner in his renewal research” (16).
The “renewal research” to which Secretary Weinberger referred is our
present project, Cultural Indicators. Conducted under a grant from the Na-
tional Institute of Mental Health, it consists of periodic study of television
programming and of the conceptions of social reality that viewing cultivates in
child and adult audiences. Although the study of violence is a continuing aspect
of the research,’ the project is also developing indicators of other themes, roles,
and relationships significant for social science and policy.
The pattern of findings that is beginning to emerge confirms our belief that
television is essentially different from other media and that research on tele-
vision requires a new approach. In this article we shall sketch the outlines of a
critique of modes of research derived from experience with other media and
advance an approach we find more appropriate to the special characteristics,
features, and functions of television. We shall illustrate the design and some
‘Several additional events influenced the further fate and development of the Violence Profile.
Senator Pastore and Chairman Torbert Macdonald of the House Communications Subcommittee
continued to take an active interest in it. The research director of the studies for the Surgeon
General. Eli A. Rubinstein, continued to press for follow-up research (14). Douglass Cater and
Stephen Strickland wrote a book on the report and argued for “ongoing research capable of
undergirding large public policy investigations” (1,p.133).And, finally, a committee of the Social
Science Research Council especially formed and funded by N l M H to study the Violence Profile
recommended continued use and further development (15).

174
 Lioing With Teleoision: The Violcwrc, Prtijlu

contributions of the approach taken in the Cultural Indicators project by

presenting the latest Violence Profile (No. 7 in the series), including indicators
of some conceptions television cultivates in its viewers.’

The confusing state of television research is

largely due to inappropriate conceptions of the problem.
The automobile that burst upon the dusty highways of the turn of the
century was seen by most people as just a horseless carriage rather than as a
prime mover of a new way of life. Similarly, those who grew up before television
tended to think of it as just another in the long series of technological in-
novations in mass communications. consequently, modes of thinking and re-
search rooted in experience with other media have been applied to television.
These earlier modes of study were based on selectively used media and focused
on attitude or behavior change. Both assumptions are largely inadequate to the
task of conceptualizing and investigating the effects of television.
We begin with the assertion that television is the central cultural arm of
American society. I t is an agency of the established order and as such serves
primarily to extend and maintain rather than to alter, threaten, or weaken
conventional conceptions, beliefs, and behaviors. Its chief cultural function is to
spread and stabilize social patterns, to cultivate not change but resistance to
change. Television is a medium of the socialization of most people into stand-
ardized roles and behaviors. Its function is, in a word, enculturation.
The substance of the consciousness cultivated by TV is not so much specific
attitudes and opinions as more basic assumptions about the “facts” of life and
standards of judgment on which conclusions are based. The purpose of the
Cultural Indicators project is to identify and track these premises and the
conclusions they might cultivate across TV’s diverse publics.
We shall make a case for studying television as a force for enculturation
rather than as a selectively used medium of separate “entertainment” and
“information” functions. First, we shall suggest that the essential differences
between television and other media are more crucial than the similarities.
Second, we will show why traditional research designs are inadequate for the
study of television effects and suggest more appropriate methods. Third, we will
sketch the pattern of evidence emerging from our studies indicating that
“living” in the world of television cultivates conceptions of its own convention-
alized “reality.”

The reach, scope, ritualization, organic connectetlness,

and non-selective use of mainstream television makes
it di$erent from other media of mass commtinicutions.
TV penetrates every home in the land. Its seasonal, cyclical, and perpetual
patterns of organically related fact and fiction (all woven into an entertainment
fabric producing publics of consumers for sale to advertisers) again encompass

2A summary of the cultivation studies also appears in our article in the April 1976 Psychology
Todrry (10).

175
Joumul of C~omtntrtiication,Spring J9i6

essential elements of art, science, technology, statecraft, and public (as well as
most family) story-telling. T h e information-poor (children and less educated
adults) are again the entertainment-rich held in thrall by the myths and legends
of a new electronic priesthood.
If you were born before, say, 1950, television came into your life after the
formative years as just another medium. Even if you are now an “addict,” it will
be difficult for you to comprehend the transformations it has wrought. Could
you, as a twelve-year old, have contemplated spending an average of six hours a
day at the local movie house? Not only would most parents not have permitted
such behavior but most children would not have imagined the possibility. Yet,
in our sample of children, nearly half the twelve-year-olds watch at least six
hours of television every day.
Unlike print, television does not require literacy. Unlike the movies, tele-
vision is “free” (supported by a privately imposed tax on all goods), and it is
always running. Unlike radio, television can show as well as tell. Unlike the
theater, concerts, movies, and even churches, television does not require mobil-
ity. It comes into the home and reaches individuals directly. With its virtually
unlimited access from cradle to grave, television both precedes reading and,
increasingly, preempts it.
Television is the first centralized cultural influence to permeate both the
initial and the final years of life-as well as the years between. Most infants are
exposed to television long before reading. By the time a child reaches school,
television will have occupied more time than would be spent in a college
classroom. At the other end of the lifelong curriculum, television is there to keep
the elderly company when all else fails.
A11 societies have evolved ways of explaining the world to themselves and to
their children. Socially constructed “reality” gives a coherent picture of what
exists, what is important, what is related to what, and what is right. T h e
constant cultivation of such “realities” is the task of mainstream rituals a n d
mythologies. They legitimize action along socially functional and convention-
ally acceptable lines.
T h e social, political, and economic integration of modern industrial society
has created a system in which few communities, if any, can maintain an
independent integrity. W e are parts of a Leviathan and its nervous system is
telecommunications. Publicly shared knowledge of the “wide world” is what
this nervous system transmits to us.
Television is the chief common ground among the different groups that
make up a large and heterogeneous national community. No national achieve-
ment, celebration, or mourning seems real until it is confirmed and shared on
television.
Never before have all classes and groups (as well as ages) shared so much of
the same culture and t h e same perspectives while having so little to d o with
their creation. Representation in the world of television gives an idea, a cause, a
group its sense of public identity, importance, and relevance. No movement can
get going without some visibility in that world or long withstand television’s
power to discredit, insulate, or undercut. Other media, used selectively and by

176
 Lining W t h Telecision: Thr Violencr Projle

special interests or cultural elites, cultivate partial and parochial outlooks.

Television spreads the same images and messages to all from penthouse to
tenement. T V is the new (and only) culture of those who expose themselves to
information only when it comes as “entertainment.” Entertainment is the most
broadly effective educational fare in any culture.
All major networks serving the same social system depend on the same
markets and programming formulas. That may be one reason why, unlike other
media, television is used non-selectively; it just doesn’t matter that much. With
the exception of national events a n d some “specials,” the total viewing au-
dience is fairly stable regardless of what is on. Individual tastes and program
preferences are less important in determining viewing patterns than is the time
a program is on. The nearly universal, non-selective, and habitual use of
television fits the ritualistic pattern of its programming. You watch television as
you might attend a church service, except that most people watch television
more religiously.
Constitutional guarantees shield the prerogatives of ownership. Tech-
nological imperatives of electronics have changed modern governance more
than Constitutional amendments and court decisions. Television, the flagship of
industrial mass culture, now rivals ancient religions as a purveyor of organic
patterns of symbols-news and other entertainment-that animate national and
even global communities’ senses of reality a n d value.

These considerations led us to question

many of the more common arguments raised
in discussions of television’s egects.

An important example is the concern over the consequences of violence on

television. T h e invention and development of technologies which permit the
production a n d dissemination of mass mediated fictional images across class
lines seems invariably to raise in the minds of the established classes the specter
of subversion, corruption and unrest being encouraged among the various lower
orders-poor people, ethnic a n d racial minorities, children and women. The
specter arises when it seems that the lower orders may presume to imitate-if
not to replace-their betters. Whether the suspect and controversial media are
newspapers, novels, and theater, as in the nineteenth century, or movies, radio,
comic books, a n d television as in the twentieth, concern tends to focus on the
possibilities of disruption that threaten the established norms of belief, behav-
ior, and morality.
In our view, however, that concern has become anachronistic. Once the
industrial order has legitimized its rule, the primary function of its cultural arm
becomes the reiteration of that legitimacy and the maintenance of established
power and authority. The rules of the games and the morality of its goals can
best be demonstrated by dramatic stories of their symbolic violations. The
intended lessons are generally effective and the social order is only rarely and
peripherally threatened. The system is the message and, as our politicians like to
say, the system works. O u r question is, in fact, whether it may not work too well

177
Journal of Communication, Spring 1976

in cultivating uniform assumptions, exploitable fears, acquiescence to power,

and resistance to meaningful change.
Therefore, in contrast to the more usual statement of the problem, we d o not
believe that the only critical correlate of television violence is to be found in the
stimulation of occasional individual aggression. The consequences of living in a
symbolic world ruled largely by violence may be much more far-reaching.
Preparation for large-scale organized violence requires the cultivation of fear
and acquiescence to power. TV violence is a dramatic demonstration of power
which communicates much about social norms and relationships, about goals
and means, about winners and losers, about the risks of life and the price for
transgressions of society’s rules. Violence laden drama shows who gets away
with what, when, why, how a n d against whom. “Real world” victims as well
as violents may have to learn their roles. Fear-that historic instrument of social
control-may be an even more critical residue of a show of violence than
aggression. Expectation of violence or passivity in the face of injustice may be
consequences of even greater social concern. We shall return to this theme with
data from our studies.

The realism of TV fiction hides its synthetic

and functionally selective nature.

T h e dominant stylistic convention of Western narrative art-novels, plays,

films, TV dramas-is that of representational realism. However contrived tele-
vision plots are, viewers assume that they take place against a backdrop of the
real world. Nothing impeaches the basic “reality” of the world of television
drama. It is also highly informative. That is, it offers to the unsuspecting viewer
a continuous stream of “facts” and impressions about the way of the world,
about the constancies and vagaries of human nature, and about the con-
sequences of actions. T h e premise of realism is a Trojan horse which carries
within it a highly selective, synthetic, and purposeful image of the facts of life.
A normal adult viewer is not unaware of the fictiveness of television drama.
No one calls the police or an ambulance when a character in a television
program is shot. “War of the Worlds’’-type scares are rare, if they occur at all.
Granting this basic awareness on the part of the viewers, o n e may still wonder
how often and to what degree all viewers suspend their disbelief in the reality of
the symbolic world.
Surely we all know that Robert Young is not a doctor and that Marcus Welby
is an M.D. by only poetic license. Yet according to the Philadelphia Bulletin
(July 10, 1974) in the first five years of the program “Dr. Welby” received over a
quarter of a million letters from viewers, most containing requests for medical
advice.
Doctor shows are not the only targets of such claims. A former New York
City police official has complained that jury members have formed images and
expectations of trial procedures and outcomes from television which often
prejudice them in actual trials. In a courtroom incident related to us by a
lawyer, the counsel for the defense leapt to his feet, objecting, “Your Honor, the

178
Prosecutor is badgering the witness!” The judge replied that he, too, had seen
that objection raised on the Perry Mason show but, unfortunately, it was not
included in the California code.

Anecdotes and examples should not trivialize the real point,

which i s that even the most sophisticated can find many
important components of their knowledge of the real world
deriued wholly or in part from fictional representation.

How often d o we make a sharp distinction between the action which we

know is not “real” a n d the accumulation of background information (which is,
after all, “realistic”)? Are we keenly aware that in the total population of the
television world men outnumber women four to one? O r that, with all the
violence, the leading causes of real life injury and death-industrial and traffic
accidents-are hardly ever depicted?
How many of us have ever been in an operating room, a criminal courtroom,
a police station or jail, a corporate board room, or a movie studio? How much of
what we know about such diverse spheres of activity, about how various kinds of
people work and what they do-how much of our real world has been learned
from fictional worlds? T o the extent that viewers see television drama-the
foreground of plot or the background of the television world-as naturalistic,
they may derive a wealth of incidental “knowledge.” This incidental learning
may be effected by bald “facts” and by the subtle interplay of occurrence,
co-occurrence, and non-occurrence of actors and actions.
In addition to the subtle patterns against whose influence we may all be
somewhat defenseless, television provides another seductively persuasive sort of
imagery. In real life much is hidden from our eyes. Often, motives are obscure,
outcomes ambiguous, personalities complex, people unpredictable. T h e truth is
never pure and rarely simple. The world of television, in contrast, offers us
cogency, clarity, and resolution. Unlike life, television is an open book. Prob-
lems are never left hanging, rewards and punishments are present and ac-
counted for. The rules of the game are known and rarely change. Not only does
television “show” us the normally hidden workings of many important a n d
fascinating institutions-medicine, law enforcement and justice, big business,
the glamorous world of entertainment, etc.-but we “see” the people who fill
important and exciting roles. We see who they are in terms of sex, age, race, and
class and we also see them as personalities-dedicated and selfless, ruthless and
ambitious, good-hearted but ineffectual, lazy and shiftless, corrupt and corrupt-
ing Television provides the broadest common background of assumptions not
only about what things are but also about how they work, or should work, and
why
T h e world of television drama is a mixture of truth and falsehood, of
accuracy and distortion. I t is not the true world but an extension of the
standardized images which we have been taught since childhood. The audience
for which the message of television is primarily intended (recall that an au-

179
lourno1 of Communicafion, Spring 1976

dience of about 20 million viewers is necessary for a program’s survival) is the

great majority of middle-class citizens for whom America is a democracy (our
leaders act in accordance with the desires of the people), for whom our economy
is free, and for whom God is alive, white, and male.

The implications for research are far-reaching and

call into question essential aspects of the
research paradigm stemming from historic pressures
for behavior manipulation and marketing efficacy.

They suggest a model based on the concept of broad enculturation rather

than of narrow changes in opinion or behavior. Instead of asking what commu-
nication “variables” might propagate what kinds of individual behavior
changes, we want to know what types of common consciousness whole systems
of messages might cultivate. This is less like asking about preconceived fears
and hopes and more like asking about the “effects” of Christianity on one’s view
of the world or-as the Chinese had asked-of Confucianism on public moral-
ity. To answer such questions, we must review and revise some conventional
articles of faith about research strategy.
First, we cannot presume consequences without the prior investigation of
content, as the conventional research paradigm tends to do. Nor can the content
be limited to isolated elements (e.g., news, commercials, specific programs),
taken out of the total context, or to individual viewer selections. The “world” of
television is an organic system of stories and images. Only system-wide analysis
of messages can reveal the symbolic world which structures common assump-
tions and definitions for the generations born into it and provides bases for
interaction (though not necessarily of agreement) among large and hetero-
geneous communities. The system as a whole plays a major role in setting the
agenda of issues to agree or disagree about; it shapes the most pervasive norms
and cultivates the dominant perspectives of society.
Another conventional research assumption is that the experiment is the most
powerful method, and that change (in attitudes, opinions, likes-dislikes, etc.,
toward or conveyed by “variable X”) is the most significant outcome to meas-
ure. In the ideal experiment, you expose a group to X and assess salient aspects
of the state of the receivers before and after exposure, comparing the change, if
any, to data obtained from a control group (identical in all relevant ways to the
experimental group) who have not received X. No change or no difference
means no effect.
When X is television, however, we must turn this paradigm around: stability
may be the significant outcome of the sum total of the play of many variables. If
nearly everyone “lives” to some extent in the world of television, clearly we
cannot find unexposed groups who would be identical in all important respects
to the viewers. We cannot isolate television from the mainstream of modern
culture because it i s the mainstream. We cannot look for change as the most
significant accomplishment of the chief arm of established culture if its main
social function is to maintain, reinforce, and exploit rather than to undermine or

180
 Living With Television: The Violence Projile

alter conventional conceptions, beliefs, and behaviors. O n the contrary, t h e

relative ineffectiveness of isolated campaigns may itself be testimony to the
power of mainstream communications.
Neither can we assume that TV cultivates conceptions easily distinguishable
from those of other major entertainment media. (But we cannot emphasize too
strongly the historically novel role of television in standardizing and sharing
with all as the common norm what had before been more parochial, local, and
selective cultural patterns. ) W e assume, therefore, that TV’s standardizing and
legitimizing influence comes largely from its ability to streamline, amplify,
ritualize, and spread into hitherto isolated or protected subcultures, homes,
nooks, and crannies of the land the conventional capsules of mass produced
information and entertainment.

Another popular research technique which i s inappropriate

is the experimental or quasi-experimental test of the consequences
of exposure to one particular type of television programming.

Much of the research on media violence, for example, has focused on the
observation and measurement of behavior which occurs after a viewer has seen a
particular program or even isolated scenes from programs. All such studies, no
matter how clean the design and clear the results, are of limited value because
they ignore a fundamental fact: the world of TV drama consists of a complex
and integrated system of characters, events, actions, and relationships whose
effects cannot be measured with regard to any single element or program seen in
isolation.

How should, then, the ejTects of television

be conceptualized and studied?

We believe that the key to the answer rests in a search for those assumptions
about the “facts” of life and society that television cultivates in its more faithful
viewers. That search requires two different methods of research. T h e relation-
ship between t h e two is one of the special characteristics of t h e Cultural
Indicators approach.’
T h e first method of research is the periodic analysis of large and representa-
tive aggregates of television output (rather than individual segments) as the
system of messages to which total communities are exposed. The purpose of
message system analysis is to establish to composition and structure of the
symbolic world. W e have begun that analysis with the most ubiquitous, trans-
lucent, and instructive part of television (or any cultural) fare, the dramatic
programs (series, cartoons, movies on television) that populate and animate for
most viewers t h e heartland of the symbolic world. Instead of guessing or
assuming the contours a n d dynamics of that world, message system analysis
maps its geography, demography, thematic and action structure, time and space
3 F ~ ar more detailed description of the conceptual framework for this research see “Cultural
Indicators, The Third Voice” (8)

181
Jortmol of Conirnrrnication, Spring 1976

dimensions, personality profiles, occupations, and fates. Message system analy-

sis yields the gross but clear terms of location, action, and characterization
discharged into the mainstream of community consciousness. Aggregate viewer
interpretation and response starts with these common terms of basic exposure.
The second step of the research is to determine what, if anything, viewers
absorb from living in the world of television. Cultivation analysis, as we call that
method, inquires into the assumptions television cultivates about the facts,
norms, and values of society. Here we turn t h e findings of message system
analysis about the fantasy land of television into questions about social reality.
T o each of these questions there is a “television answer,” which is like the way
things appear in the world of television, and another and different answer which
is biased in the opposite direction, closer to the way things are in the observable
world. We ask these questions of samples of adults and children. All responses
are related to television exposure, other media habits, and demographic charac-
teristics. W e then compare the response of light and heavy viewers controlling
for sex, age, education, and other characteristics. The margin of heavy viewers
over light viewers giving the “television answers” within and across groups is
the “cultivation differential” indicating conceptions about social reality that
viewing tends to cultivate.
Our analysis looks at the contribution of TV drama to viewer conceptions in
conjunction with such other sources of knowledge as education and news. The
analysis is intended to illuminate the complementary as well as the divergent
roles of these sources of facts, images, beliefs, a n d values in the cultivation of
assumptions about reality.

W e shall now sketch some general features of the

world of network television drama, and then report
the latest findings about violence in that world.
As any mythical world, television presents a selective and functional system
of messages. Its time, space, and motion-even its “accidents”-follow laws of
dramatic convention and social utility. Its people are not born but are created to
depict social types, causes, powers, a n d fates. T h e economics of the assembly
line and the requirement of wide acceptability assure general adherence to
common notions of justice and fair play, clear-cut characterizations, tested plot
lines, and proven formulas for resolving all issues.
Representation in the fictional world signifies social existence; absence
means symbolic annihilation. Being buffeted by events and victimized by
people denotes social impotence; ability to wrest events about, to act freely,
boldly, and effectively is a mark of dramatic importance and social power.
Values and forces come into play through characterizations; good is a certain
type of attractiveness, evil is a personality defect, and right is the might that
wins. Plots weave a thread of causality into the fabric of dramatic ritual, as stock
characters act out familiar parts and confirm preferred notions of what’s what,
who’s who, a n d who counts for what. The issue is rarely in doubt; the action is
typically a game of social typing, group identification, skill, and power.

I82
 Many times a day, seven days a week, the dramatic pattern defines situations
and cultivates premises about society, people, and issues. Casting the symbolic
world thus has a meaning of its own: the lion’s share of representation goes to
the types that dominate the social order. About three-quarters of all leading
characters are male, American, middle- and upper-class, and in the prime of
life. Symbolic independence requires freedom relatively uninhabited by real-
life constraints. Less fully represented are those lower in the domestic and
global power hierarchy and characters involved in familiar social contexts,
human dependencies, and other situations that impose the real-life burdens of
human relationships and obligations upon freewheeling activity.
Women typically represent romantic or family interest, close human con-
tact, love. Males can act in nearly any role, but rare is the female part that does
not involve at least the suggestion of sex. While only one in three male leads is
shown as intending to or ever having been married, two of every three females
are married or expect to marry in the story. Female “specialties” limit the
proportion of TV’s women to about one-fourth of the total population.
Nearly half of all females are concentrated in the most sexually eligible
young adult population, to which only one-fifth of males are assigned; women
are also disproportionately represented among the very young and old. Chil-
dren, adolescents, and old people together account for less than 15 percent of
the total fictional population
Approximately five in ten characters can be unambiguously identified as
gainfully employed. Of these, three are proprietors, managers, and profes-
sionals. The fourth comes from the ranks of labor-including all those employed
in factories, farms, offices, shops, stores, mining, transportation, service stations,
restaurants, and households, and working in unskilled, skilled, clerical, sales,
and domestic service capacities. The fifth serves to enforce the law or preserve
the peace on behalf of public or private clients.
Types of activity-paid and unpaid-also reflect dramatic and social pur-
poses. Six in ten characters are engaged in discernible occupational activity and
can be roughly divided into three groups of two each. The first group represents
the world of legitimate private business, industry, agriculture, finance, etc. The
second group is engaged in activity related to art, science, religion, health,
education, and welfare, as professionals, amateurs, patients, students, or clients.
The third makes up the forces of official or semiofficialauthority and the army of
criminals, outlaws, spies, and other enemies arrayed against them. One in every
four leading characters acts out a drama of some sort of transgression and its
suppression at home and abroad.
Violence plays a key role in such a world. It is the simplest and cheapest
dramatic means available to demonstrate the rules of the game of power. In real
life much violence is subtle, slow, circumstantial, invisible, even impersonal.
Encounters with physical violence in real life are rare, more sickening than
thrilling. But in the symbolic world, overt physical motion makes dramatically
visible that which in the real world is usually hidden. Symbolic violence, as any
show of force, typically does the job of real violence more cheaply and, of
course, entertainingly.

183
Journal of Communication, Spring I976

Geared for independent action in loosely-knit and often remote social con-
texts, half of all characters are free to engage in violence. One-fifth “specialize”
in violence as law breakers or law enforcers. Violence on television, unlike in
real-life, rarely stems from close personal relationships. Most of it is between
strangers, set u p to drive home lessons of social typing. Violence is often just a
specialty-a skill, a craft, an efficient means to test the norms of and settle any
challenge to the existing structure of power.

The Violence Profile is a set of indicators

tracing aspects of the television world and
of conceptions of social reality they tend
to cultivate in the minds of viewers.

Four specific types of indicators have been developed. Three come from
message system analysis: (1) the context of programming trends against which
any aspect of the world of television can be seen; (2)several specific measures of
violence given separately and also combined in the Violence Index; and (3)
structural characteristics of the dramatic world indicating social relationships
depicted in it, (in the present report, “risk ratios”). The fourth type of indicator
comes from cultivation analysis and will be shown in this report as the “cultiva-
tion differential.” Although the Violence Profile is the most developed, the
Cultural Indicators project is constructing similar profiles of other aspects and
relationships of the media world.
Before we present the indicators, let us briefly note the definitions, terms,
and some procedures employed in generating t h e TV violence measures.‘
Message system analysis has been performed on annual sample-weeks of
prime time and weekend daytime network dramatic programming since 1967 by
trained analysts who observe and code many aspects of TV content T h e
definition of violence employed in this analysis is “ t h e overt expression of
physical force against self or other, compelling action against one’s will on pain
of being hurt or killed, or actually hurting or killing.” T h e research focuses on a
clear-cut and commonly understood definition of violence, and yields indicators
of trends in the programming context in which violence occurs; in the preva-
lence, rate, and characterizations involved in violence; a n d in the power rela-
tionships expressed by the differential risks found in the world of television
drama.
All observations are recorded in three types of unite: the program (play) as a
whole, each specific violent action (if any) in the program, a n d each dramatic
character appearing in the program.
“Program” means a single fictional story presented in dramatic form. This
may be a play produced for televisjon, a feature film telecast during the period

‘For a more detailed methodological description and all tabulations not included here, see
“Violence Profile: A Technical Report” (3). available for $12.00 (checks to be made out to the
Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania) from The Annenberg School of Communications.
University of Pennsylvania, Philadclphia, PA 19174.

184
of the study, or a cartoon story (of which there may be one or more in a single
program).
Violent action means a scene of some violence confined to the same parties.
If a scene is interrupted (by flashback or shift to another scene) but continues in
“real time,” it is still the same act. However, if a new agent of violence enters
the scene, that begins another act. These units are also called violent episodes.
Characters analyzed in all programs (whether violent or not) are of two
types. Major characters ark the principal roles essential to the story. Minor
characters (subjected to a less detailed analysis) are all other speaking roles.
(The findings summarized in this report include the analysis of major characters
only. )
Samples of programming. Network dramatic programs transmitted in eve-
ning prime time (8 p.m. to 11 p.m. each day), and network children’s dramatic
programs transmitted weekend mornings (Saturday and Sunday between 8 a.m.
and 2 p.m.) comprise the analytical source material.5 With respect to four basic
sample dimensions (network, program format, type and tone), the solid week
sample is at least as generalizable to a year‘s programming as larger randomly
drawn samples (2).
Coder training and reliability. For the analysis of each program sample, a
staff of 12 to 18 coders is recruited. After about three weeks of training and
testing, coders analyze the season’s videotaped program sample.
During both the training and data-collection phases, coders work in inde-
pendent pairs and monitor their assigned videotaped programs as often as
necessary. All programs in the sample are coded by two separate coder-pairs to
provide double-coded data for reliability comparisons. Final measures, com-
puted on the study’s entire corpus of double-coded data, determine the accept-
ability of information for analysis and provide guidelines to its interpretation
(11, 12).
Three sets of violence measures have been computed from the direct obser-
vational data of the message system analysis. They show the percent of pro-
grams with any violence at all, the frequency and rate of violent episodes, and
the number of roles calling for characterizations as violents, victims, or both.
These measures are called prevalence, rate, and role, respectively. Each is given
separately in all the tabulations that follow.
For ease of illustration and comparison, the three types of measures are also
combined to form the Violence Index. The Index itself is not a statistical finding
but serves as a convenient illustrator of trends and facilitates gross comparisons.
The Index is obtained by adding measures of prevalence, rates (doubled to raise
their relatively low numerical value) and roles. The formula can be seen on
Tables 1 through 4.
‘In 1967 and 1968, the hours included were 7 : 3 0to 10 p . m . Monday through Saturday, 7 to 10
p.m. Sunday. and children’s programs 8 a.m. to noon Saturday. Beginning in 1969, these hours were
expanded until 11 p.m. each evening and from 7 a.m. to 2:30 p . m . Saturday and Sunday. As of 1971
however, network evening programming has been reduced by the FCC‘s prime-time access rule.
T h e effective evening parameters since 1971 are therefore 8 to 11 p.m. Monday through Saturday
and 7:30 to 10:30 p.m. Sunday.

185
Journal of Communication, Spring 1976

30t

t 1 I I I I I I 1
1967 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75
Figure 1: “Action“ (crime, western, adventure) programs as percent of cartoon and of other
(general) programs analyzed

Before presenting the trends indicated by the measures just discussed, let us
glance at the first indicator, that of program mix. “Action” programs contribute
most violence to the world of television drama. Figure 1 shows that such
programs comprise more than half of all prime-time and weekend daytime
programming, and their proportion of the total has not changed much in recent
years. In fact, while general (non-cartoon) crime and adventure plays dropped
from their 1974 high of 62 percent to 54 percent in 1975, cartoon crime and
adventure rose in the same period from 47 percent to 66 percent of all cartoons.
These programming trends foreshadow the violence findings that follow. We
can summarize them by noting that there has been no significant reduction in
the overall Violence Index despite some fluctuations in the specific measures
and a definite drop in “family hour” violence, especially on CBS, in the current
season. The “family hour” decline has been matched by a sharp increase in
violence during children’s (weekend daytime) programming in the current
season and by an even larger two-year rise in violence after 9 p.m. EST.
Figure 2 shows these trends in greater detail. Figure 3 provides similar infor-
mation for each network separately, showing that late evening violence shot
up on all three networks in the past two or three years (with minor dips on CBS
and ABC in 1975), and that children’s (weekend daytime) programs became
more violent on ABC and NBC in the past season. Figure 4 is a direct com-
parison of the Violence Index for each network, showing remarkable long-term
stability and similarity among them. Figure 5 is a direct comparison of the
“family hour” Violence Index for each network, showing little change over a
two-year period for ABC and NBC, substantial reduction for the second year
in a row for CBS.

186
 Lioing With Teleaixbn: The Violencv Projili.

Tables 1 through 4 (found at the end of the article) present all measures
for the different hours of programming. They show how the specific measures
of prevalence, rate, and role fluctuate and combine each year to make up the
composite Violence Index. More complete tabulations, including network and
format breakdowns, can be found in the Technical Report (3).
The indicators reflected in the Violence Index are clear manifestations of
what network programmers actually do as compared to what they say or intend
to do. Network executives and their censorship (“Standards and Practices”)
offices maintain close control over the assembly line production process that
results in the particular program mix of a season (6). While our data permit
many specific qualifications to any generalization that might be made, it is safe
to say that network policy seems to have responded in narrow terms, when at all,
to very specific pressure, and only while the heat was on. After nine years of
investigations, hearings, and commissions (or since we have been tracking
violence on television), eight out of every ten programs (nine out of every ten
weekend children’s hour programs) still contain some violence. The overall rate
of violent episodes, 8 per hour, is, if anything, higher than at any time since
1969. (The violence saturation of weekend children’s programs declined from
the 1969 high but increased from its 1974 low to 16 per hour, double that of
overall programming, as can be seen on Table 4 . ) Between six and seven out of
every ten leading characters (eight and nine for children) are still involved in

-
some violence. Between one and two out of every ten are still involved in killing.

--
-- All hours an sample

260
- ”Family hour’’ (before 9 p.m. EST1
Late evening (9-11 p.m. EST)
Weekend daytime (children’s) hours

220

I80

I40

\
\
\
100
1
I I I I I I I I I
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Figure 2: Violence Index for different hours of dramatic programming

187
Journal of Communication, Spring 1976

All hourr in sample

"Family hour" (before 9 p.m EST)
Late evening (9-11 p.m. EST)
Weekend daytime (children's) hours

220-

I80 ~

ABC
140 -

100-

260 -

220 -

I80 -
CBS
140 -

100-

6ok , I
\

260 -

220 ~

NBC 180-

II00
4Ol
J
I I I I I 1 I
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975

Figure 3: Violence Index for different hours by network

188
 Lioing With Television: The Violence Projilc,

I I I I I I I I I
I967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Figure 4: Violence Index for each network, all programs in sample

Reductions have been achieved in the portrayal of on-screen killers (especially

during weekend children’s hours) and in “family hour” violence (especially by
CBS), but, as we have noted, a sharp rise in late evening and general children’s
violence has canceled out any overall gains from the latter.
It is clear, at least to us, that deeply rooted sociocultural forces, rather than
just obstinacy or profit-seeking, are at work. W e have suggested earlier in this
article, and have also developed elsewhere (9, lo), that symbolic violence is a
demonstration of power and an instrument of social control serving, on the
whole, to reinforce and preserve the existing social order, even if a t a n ever
increasing price in terms of pervasive fear and mistrust and of selective aggres-
siveness. That maintenance mechanism seems to work through cultivating a
sense of danger, a differential calculus of the risks of life in different groups
in the population. T h e Violence Profile is beginning to yield indicators of such
a mechanism, and thereby also of basic structural and cultivation characteristics
of television programming.
T h e structural characteristics of television drama are not easily controlled.
They reflect basic cultural assumptions that make a show “entertaining”-i.e.,
smoothly and pleasingly fitting dominant notions (and prejudices) about social
relations and thus demonstrating conventional notions of morality and power.
T h e most elementary-and telling-relationship involved in violent action is
that of violent and victim. T h e pattern of those who inflict and those who suffer
violence (or both) provides a differential calculus of hazards and opportunities
for different groups of people in the “world” of television drama. Table 56
presents a summary of the scores of involvement and what we call risk ratios.
The character score is the roles component (CS) of the Violence Index; it is the
percent of all characters involved in any violence plus the percent involved in
All tables appear at the end of the article.
Jorrrnal of Communication, Spring 1976

220

I80

I40

100

\<SS
\
60 \

I I I I I I I I I
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Figure 5: Violence Index for each network, family hour only

any killing. T h e violent-victim and killer-killed (risk) ratio are obtained by

dividing violents and victims, or killers and killed within each group. The plus
sign means more violents or killers in the group; the minus sign means more
victims (hurt) or killed.
W e see that the 1967-75 totals show 1.19 male a n d 1.32 female victims for
every violent male a n d female. Even more striking are the differential risks or
fatal victimization. There were nearly two male killers for every male killed;
however, for every female killer one woman was killed.
Table 5 also shows the differential risks of involvement and victimization
attributed to other groups, projecting assumptions about social and power
relations. Old men, married men, lower class, foreign, and nonwhite males were
most likely to get killed rather than to inflict lethal injury. “Good guys” were of
course most likely to be the killers.
Among females, more vulnerable than men in most categories, both young
and old women as well as unmarried, lower class, foreign, and nonwhite women
bore especially heavy burdens of relative victimization. Old, poor, and black
women were shown only as killed and never as killers. Interestingly, “good”
women, unlike “good” men, had no lethal power, but “bad” women were even
more lethal than “bad” men. The victimization of the “good” woman is often
the curtain-raiser that provokes the hero to righteous “action.”

290
 Living With Television: The Violence Projile

The pattern of relative victimization is remarkably stable from year to year.

I t demonstrates an invidious (but socially functional) sense of risk and power.
We do not yet know whether it also cultivates a corresponding hierarchy of fear
and aggression. But we do have evidence to suggest that television viewing
cultivates a general sense of danger and mistrust. That evidence comes from the
fourth and final element of the Violence Profile, the component we call the
cultivation differential.

The cultivation differential comes, of course,

from the cultivation analyeis part of the
Cultural lndicators research approach.

It highlights differences in conception of relevant aspects of social reality

that television viewing tends to cultivate in heavy viewers compared to light
viewers. The strategy is obviously most appropriate to those propositions in
which television might cultivate conceptions that measurably deviate from
those coming from other sources. Furthermore, the independent contributions
of television are likely to be most powerful in cultivating assumptions about
which there is little opportunity to learn first-hand, and which are not strongly
anchored in other established beliefs and ideologies.
The obvious objection arises that light and heavy viewers are different prior
to-and aside from-television. Factors other than television may account for
the difference.
The point is well taken. We have found, as have others, that heavy viewing
is part and parcel of a complex syndrome which also includes lower education,
lower mobility, lower aspirations, higher anxieties, and other class, age, and sex
related characteristics. We assume, indeed, that viewing helps to hold together
and cultivate elements of that syndrome. But it does more than that. Television
viewing also makes a separate and independent contribution to the “biasing” of
conceptions of social reality within most age, sex, educational, and other grou-
pings, including those presumably most “immune” to its effects.
Our study of TV’s contribution to notions of social reality proceeds by
various methods, each comparing responses of heavy and light viewers, with
other characteristics held constant. Of the different methods used in cultivation
analysis, only adult survey results are included in this report; the others are still
in the process of development and summarization. These surveys were executed
by commercial survey research organizations. For details of sampling, etc., the
reader is referred to the Technical Report (3).
To probe in the direction of the pattern suggested by our message analysis,
we obtained responses to questions about facts of life that relate to law enforce-
ment, trust, and a sense of danger. Figure 6 presents the results of the first
question asking what proportion of people are employed in law enforcement.
The “television answer” (slanted in the direction of the world of television) was
five percent. The alternative answer (more in the direction of reality) was one
percent.
As Figure 6 shows, the heavy viewers (those viewing an average of four
hours a day or more) were always more likely to give the television answer than
 TV TV

CallOQO No R~QYIOI NO! Over Under Nola Fomol.

rl/l Advll COIlegl R ~ Q u I ~ v 30 30

R e s p o n denls Educofton N e w s ReodTng Age Gender

Figure 6: Percent giving the “television answer” to a question about the proportion of
people employed in law enforcement

the light viewers (those viewing an average of two hours a day or less). Figure 7
shows similar results for the question “ C a n most people be trusted?” and Figure
8 for the question “During any given week, what are your chances of being
involved in some type of violence?” One in ten (the “television answer”) or one
in a hundred?”
Let us take education as probably the best index of a complex of social
circumstances that provide alternative informational and cultural opportunities.
Those of our respondents who have had some college education are less likely to
choose the “television answer” than those who have had none. But within each
group, television viewing “biases” conceptions in the direction of the “facts” it
presents. When we compared light and heavy viewers within the “college” and
the “ n o college” groups, we got a typical step-wise pattern of the percentage of
“television answers.” Regular reading of newspapers makes a similar difference.
Both college education and regular newspaper reading seem to reduce the
percentage of “television answers,” but heavy viewing boosts it within both
groups. This appears to be the general pattern of TV’s ability to cultivate its own
“reality.”
An exaggerated impression of the actual number of law enforcement work-
ers seems t o be a consequence of viewing television. Of greater concern,
however, would be the cultivation of a concomitantly exaggerated demand for
their services. The world of television drama is, above all, a violent one in which
more than half of all characters are involved in some violence, at least one-tenth

65 %

Colli~e No R.~ulor Not Moll Fernole

A11 Collepa R ~ Q U I O ~

Respondenfz Educofion News Reading Gender

Figure 7: Percent responding “Can’t be too careful” to the question “Can most people be
trusted?”

192
in some killing, and in which over three-fourths of prime-time hours contain
some violence. As we have suggested, the cultivation of fear and a sense of
danger may well be a prime residue of the show of violence.
Questions about feelings of trust and safety may be used to test that
suggestion. T h e National Opinion Research Corporation’s 1975 General Social
Survey asked “Can most people be trusted?” Living in the world of television
seems to strengthen the conclusion that they cannot. Heavy viewers chose the
answer “Can’t be too careful” in significantly greater proportions than did light
viewers in the same groups, as shown in Figure 7. Those who d o not read
newspapers regularly have a high level of mistrust regardless of TV viewing.
But, not surprisingly, women are the most likely to absorb t h e message of
distrust.
Focusing directly on violence, we asked a national sample of adults about
people’s chances of being involved in violence in any given week. Figure 8
shows the patterns of overestimations in line with television’s view of the world.
It may explain why in recent surveys, such as the Detroit study conducted by
the Institute of Social Research (13), respondents’ estimates of danger in their
neighborhoods had little to do with crime statistics or even with their own
personal experience. T h e pattern of our findings suggests that television and
other media exposure may be as important as demographic and other ex-
periential factors in explaining why people view the world as they do.
Television certainly appears to condition the view of the generation that
knew no world without it. All the figures show that the “under 30” respondents
exhibit consistently higher levels of “television responses,” despite the fact that
they tend to be better educated than the “over 30” respondents. We may all live
in a dangerous world, hut young people (including children tested hut not
reported on here), the less educated, women, and heavy viewers within all these
groups sense greater danger than light viewers in the same groups. College
education (and its social correlates) may counter the television view, but heavy
exposure to TV will counteract that too.

Fear is a universal emotion and easy to exploit. Symbolic violence may be

the cheapest way to cultivate it effectively. Raw violence is, in comparison, risky
and costly, resorted to when symbolic means fail. Ritualized displays of any
violence (such as in crime and disaster news, as well as in mass-produced drama)

;iflflfiflflflfi
TV TV L H L H L H L H L H L H L H L H
C0ll.p. NO R4q~lOl Nap O“., UDd., HOI. Fernol.
A I/ C O I I II. Rigulor 30 30
Respondent 5 Education News Read,nv A ve Gender

Figure 8: Percent giving the “television answer” (exaggerating) their own chances of being
involved in violence
Journal of Communication, Spring 1976

may cultivate exaggerated assumptions about the extent of threat and danger in
the world and lead to demands for protection.
What is the net result? A heightened sense of risk and insecurity (different
for groups of varying power) is more likely to increase acquiescence to and
dependence upon established authority, and to legitimize its use of force, than it
is to threaten the social order through occasional non-legitimized imitations.
Risky for their perpetrators and costly for their victims, media-incited criminal
violence may be a price industrial cultures extract from some citizens for the
general pacification of most others.
As with violence, so with other aspects of social reality we are investigating,
TV appears to cultivate assumptions that fit its socially functional myths. Our
chief instrument of enculturation and social control, television may function as
the established religion of the industrial order, relating to governance as the
church did to the state in earlier times.

REFERENCES
1. Cater, Douglass, and Stephen Strickland. TV Violence and the Child; The Evolution and Fate of
the Surgeon General’s Report. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975.
2. Eleey, Michael F. “Variations in Generalizability Resulting from Sampling Characteristics of
Content Analysis Data: A Case Study.” Unpublished manuscript, Annenberg School of
Communications, University of Pennsylvania, 1969.
3. Gerbner, George, and Larry Gross, with the assistance of Michael F. Eleey, Suzanne K. Fox,
Marilyn Jackson-Beeck, and Nancy Signorielli. “Violence Profile No. 7: A Technical Report.”
Annenberg School of Communications, 1976.
4. Gerbner, George. “Dimensions of Violence in Television Drama.” Chapter 15 in Violence and
the Media edited by Robert K. Baker and Sandra J. Ball, a staff report to the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, U.S. Government Printing Office,
1969.
5. Gerbner, George. “Violence in Television Drama: Trends and Symbolic Functions.” In G. A .
Comstock and E. A. Rubinstein (Eds.) Television and Social Behaoior, Vol. 1. Washington
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
6. Gerbner, George, Larry Gross, and William H. Melody. Communications Technology and
Social Policy. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973.
7. Gerbner, George. “The Structure and Process of Television Program Content Regulation in the
U . S . ” In G. A. Comstock and E. A. Rubinstein (Eds.) Television and Social Behaoior, Vol. 1.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972.
8. Gerbner, George. “Cultural Indicators: The Third Voice.” In Communications Technology and
Social Policy. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973.
9. Gerbner, George. “Scenario for Violence.” Human Behavior, October 1975.
10. Gerbner, George, and Larry Gross. “The Scary World of Television,” Psychology Today,
April 1976.
11. Krippendofi, Klaus. “Bivariate Agreement Coefficients for the Reliability of Data.” In E. F.
Borgatta and G. W. Bohrnstedt (Eds.), Sociological Methodology. San Francisco: Jossey Bass,
1970.
12. Krippendorf, Klaus. “ A Computer Program for Agreement Analysis of Reliability Data, Version
4.” Mimeographed. Annenberg School of Communications, July 1973.
13. “Personal Safety a Major Concern: Public Perceptions of Quality of Life in Metropolitan
Detroit Examined in ISR Study.” ZSR Newsletter, Winter 1976, p. 4.
14. Rubinstein, Eli A. “The TV Violerke Report: What’s Next?” Journal of Communication,
Winter 1974, pp. 80-88.
15. Social Science Research Council. “ A Profile of Television Violence.” Report submitted by the
Committee on Television and Social Behavior of the SSRC, July 1975.
16. Weinberger, Caspar W. Letter to Senator John 0. Pastore dated November 13, 1973.

194
 Table 1: Violence measures for all programs in sample

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 TOTAL

SAMPLES (100%) N N N N N N N N N N

P r o c r a m s (plays1 analyzed 96 87 121 111 103 100 99 96 1 1 1 924

Proqraln Hours Analyzed 62.0 58.5 71 .8 67.2 70.3 72.0 75.2 76.0 77.3 630.2
Leading characters analyzed 240 215 377 196 252 300 359 346 364 2049

PREVALENCE x % 9. % % % x % % %

(%P) ~
Proqranls c u n t a ~ n i r .vlolcnce 81.3 81.6 83.5 77.5 80.6 79.0 72.7 83.3 78.4 79.8
Prosram t.ours containlng violence 83.2 87.0 83.2 78.3 87.2 84.2 79.7 86.8 83.0 83.6
RATE N N N N N N N N N N

Number of violent episodes 478 394 630 498 483 539 524 522 626 4694
lR/P) Rate per all programs Iplays1 5.0 4.5 5.2 4.5 4.7 5.4 5.3 5.4 5.6 5.1
IR/Hl Rate per all h w r s 7.7 6.7 8.8 7.4 6.9 7.5 7.0 6.9 a. 1 7.4
Ouratlcn of Violent Eoisodes ihrs) .. .. ~. -_ .. .. 3.2 3.8 3.6 10.6

90LtS I%OF LEADING LHARACTERSI x % % % x x % % 9; %

VIolents Iconirn~tttngv ~ ole n cei 55.8 49.3 16.5 52.0 46.0 39.3 34.5 40.8 43.1 44.6
Victims (suojected to violence1 64.6 55 8 58.9 56.6 50.8 49.7 48.2 51.2 53.8 56.0
i%V) Any involvement 1 1 1 violence 73.3 65.1 66.3 62.8 61.5 58.3 55.7 60.7 64.8 62.9
Killers (committing fatal ;iolenceJ 12.5 10 7 3.7 6.6 8.7 7.7 5.8 9.8 6.3 7.7
Killed l v i c t i r s o f lethal violence1 7.1 3.7 2.1 4.6 3.2 4.7 3.3 5.8 3.8 4.2
(%Y) hny involvement in hilling 18.7 1l.G 5.6 8.7 9.9 9.7 7.5 13.6 9 .I 10.2

INDICATORSor VIOLENCE
Program Score: PS=[XP1+21R/P)+2(R/HI 106.6 104.1 111.4 101.3 103.7 104.8 97.3 107.9 105.6 104.8
Character V-Score: C s = ( X V J + IXKi 92.1 76.7 71 .9 71 .4 71.4 68.0 63.2 74.3 73.9 73.0
Violence Index: V1 E PS + CS 198.7 180.9 183.3 172.7 175.1 172.8 160.5 182.2 179.7 177.8
 Table 2: Violence measures for family hour only

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 TOTAL

SAMPLES 1100%) N N N N N N N N N N

Programs ( l a y s 1 a n a l y ? d 38 36 38 35 28 27 32 29 31 294
Program Hours A n a l y z e d 30.0 27.0 27.3 26.0 25.0 23.5 29.0 27.0 21.5 236.3
Leadlng characters analyzed 103 102 130 76 78 98 110 109 105 91 1

PREVALENCE % % % % % % % x % Y

(%P) Piyograms c o n t a i n i n g v i o l e n c e 78.9 75.0 63.2 57.1 75.0 74.1 56.3 69.0 51.6 66.7
Program h o u r s c o n t a i n i n g v l o l e n c e 86.7 83.3 74.3 67.3 86.0 85.1 70.7 77.8 60.5 77.1
RATE N N N N N N N N N N

Number o f v l o l e n t e p t s o a e s 240 123 122 86 110 122 147 108 77 1135

(R/P) Rate p e r a l l programs ( p l a y s ) 6.3 3.4 3.2 2.5 3.9 4.5 4.6 3.7 2.5 3.9
(R/H) Rate p e r a l l h o u r s 8.0 4.6 4.5 3.3 4.4 5.2 5.1 4.0 3.6 4.8
Ouratlon o f Violent Episodes I h r s l __ -. __ __ .. -_ 0.9 1 .o 0.5 2.4

ROLES 1 % OF LEADING CHARACTER51 46 x x % % % 7. % 91 I

V i o l e n t s ( c o n n n r t t ~ n g\ l o l e n c e l 58.3 39.2 36.2 32.9 37.2 37.8 29.1 29.4 16.2 35.0
Victims (subjected t o violence1 68.9 46. 1 40.8 39.5 38.5 40.8 33.6 36.7 27.6 41 .4
(%V) Any I n v o l v e m e n t i n v i o l e n c e 75.7 56.9 49.2 40.8 50.0 50.0 40.9 45.0 36.2 49.5

Killers (corrnitt;ng fatal vlolence) 22.3 10.8 6.2 3.9 9.0 4.1 6.4 12.8 1 .o 8.6
K i l l e d Ivictims of lethal violence) 7.8 4.9 3.1 1.3 2.6 3.1 4.5 7.3 0.0 4.0
I%K) Any l n v o l v e m e n t i n h i l l i n g 28.2 12.7 9.2 3.9 10.3 5.1 10.0 16.5 1 .o 11 .o

I N D I C A T O R S OF V I O L E N C E

Program Score: PS=(%P)+2lR/P)+2(R/H) 107.6 90.9 78.5 68.7 91.7 93.5 75.6 84.4 63.7 84 .O
Character V-Score' CS = (%\/I + (XKI 103.9 69.6 58.5 44.7 60.3 55.1 50.9 61.5 37.1 60.5

V\olence Index: V1 = P5 + CS 211.5 160.6 137.0 113.4 151.9 148.6 126.5 145.9 100.9 144.5
 Table 3: Violence measures for late evening (9-11 p.m. EST)

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 TOTAL

SAMPLES 1100%) N N N N N N N E, N
N.

Programs ( p l a y s ) a n a l y z e d 26 21 26 26 34 33 30 29 35 260
Program H o u r s A n a l y z e d 25.0 24.0 30.5 28.0 30.3 33.0 27.5 33.0 39.5 270.7
Leading characters analyzed 75 60 88 56 91 119 104 I15 133 841

PREVALENCE x % % % % % % x x x

l%P) Programs c o n t a i n i n g v i o l e n c e 69.2 76.2 80.8 69.2 76.5 69.7 63.3 86.2 85.7 75.4
Program h o u r s c o n t a i n i n g v i o l e n c e 76.0 89.6 84.4 80.4 87.6 79.8 79.1 92.4 92.4 85.1

RATE N N N N N N N N N N

Number o f v 4 o l e n t e p i s o d e s 87 99 110 116 129 172 130 220 284 1347

(R/P) Rate p er a l l programs I p l a y s ) 3.3 4.7 4.2 4.5 3.8 5.2 4.3 7.6 8.1 5.2
IR/H) Rate p e r a l l h o u r s 3.5 4.1 3.6 4.1 4.3 5.2 4.7 6.7 7.2 5.0

Duration of Violent Episodes I h r s ) __ __ -_ -_ ._ __ 1.3 1 .B 1.9 5.0

R O L E S ( % O F L E A D I h G CHARACTER5I % % % % % % % x % x

Violents Icomnitting violence) 38.7 55.0 34.1 46.4 44.0 37.8 32.7 56.5 51.1 44.0
V i c t i m s (sub;ectcd t o v + o l e n c e ) 42.7 55.0 44.3 50.0 48.4 45.4 36.5 61.7 59.4 49.7
1°C) Any i n v o l v e m e n t i n v i o l e n c e 56.0 68.3 52.3 57.1 59.3 55.5 41 . 3 71.3 68.4 59.1
K i l l e r s (committing f a t a l violencel 5.3 16.7 5.7 14.3 15.4 16.0 12.5 16.5 16.5 13.6 cF.
K i l l e d (vlctirns of lethal violencel 4.0 5.0 2.3 12.5 5.5 8.4 6.7 10.4 9.8 7.4
(%K) Any i n v o l v e m e n t i n k i l l i n g 9.3 16.7 6.8 21.4 17.6 19.3 14.4 24.3 23.3 17.6 TQ

f
INDlCATORS O r VIOLENCE >
Program S c o r e : P S = ( % P ) + Z I R / P 1 + 2 ( R / H ) 82.9 93.9 96.4 86.4 92.6 90.5 81.5 114.7 116.3 95.7

Character V-Score: C S = ( % V ) + (%KJ 65.3 85.0 59.1 78.6 76.9 74.8 55.8 95.7 91.7 76.7

Vlolence Index: V I = PS + CS 148.2 178.9 155.5 165.0 169.5 165.3 137.2 210.4 208.1 172.4
 Table 4: Violence measures for weekend daytime (children's) hours

1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 TOTAL
(0

SAMPLES (100%) N N N N N N N N N N
.;
h

Programs lplaysl analyzed 32 30 57 50 41 40 37 38 45 3 70

Program Hours Analyzed 7.0 7.5 14.0 13.2 15.0 15.5 18.7 16.0 16.3 123.2
Leading characters analyzed 62 53 159 64 83 83 145 122 126 697

PREVALENCE % % % % % % % x % x

(%PI Programs contalnrng violence 93.8 93.3 98.2 96.0 87.8 90.0 94.6 92.1 91.1 93.2
Program hours containing violence 94.0 92.2 97.6 95.6 88.5 92.3 94.6 90.6 89.8 92.7
RATE N N N N N N N N N N

Number o f violent epis~cies 151 172 398 296 244 245 247 194 265 2212
(R/P) Rate per all programs (plays) 4.7 5.7 7.0 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.7 5.1 5.9 6.0
IR/Hl Rate per all hours 21 . 6 22.9 28.4 22.5 16.2 15.8 13.2 12.1 16.2 18.0

Duration o f Violent Episodes ( h r s ) -_ .. __ __ -. __ 1 .o 0.9 1 2 3.2

ROLES ( % OF LEAOIhG CHARACTERS1 x % % % % x % % I x

Violents f c o m i t t I rig violence) 72.6 62.3 66.7 79.7 50.6 43.4 40.0 36.1 57.1 54.8
Victims (subjected t o violence) 03.9 75.5 81.8 82.8 65.1 66.3 67.6 54.1 69.8 70.9
f%Vl Any involvement ~n v7olence 90.3 77.4 88.1 93.8 74.7 72.3 77.2 64.8 84.9 79.9

Killers (committing fatal vlolencel 4.8 3.8 0.6 3.1 1.2 0.0 0.7 0.8 0.0 1'.2
Killed (victims o f lethal violencel 9.7 0.0 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 1'.3
l%Kl Any involvement in hilling 14.5 3.8 1.9 3.1 1.2 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.8 2.3

INOICATORS O F VIOLENCE

Program Score: PS=l%P1+2lR/PI+2(R/HI 146.3 150.7 169.1 152.8 132.2 133.9 134.4 126.6 135.3 141 .1

character V-Score: cs = ( X V I+ ( % K I 104.8 81.1 89.9 96.9 75.9 73.5 77.9 65.5 85.7 87.3

Violence Index: v1 i Ps + CS 251 .2 231 .8 259.0 249.7 208.1 205.4 212.3 192.1 221.1 223.4
 Table 5: Risk ratios for all programs studied 1967-75

Male Characters Female Characters

Character Violent-victim Killer-killed Character Violent-victim Killer-killed

Groups N score ratio ratio N score ratio ratio
All characters 2010 80.0 -1.19 +1.97 605 48.9 -1.32 1.oo
Social age
Children-adolescents 188 64.9 -1.83 +o.oo 77 46.8 -1.39 o.oo*
Young adults 431 81.2 -1.21 +3.07 209 59.8 -1.67 +1.29
Settled adults 1068 80.8 -1.15 + 1.98 267 37.8 1.oo 1.oo
Old 81 58.0 + 1.03 -2.00 22 50.0 -2.25 -0.00'
Marital status
Not married 1133 83.6 -1.16 +2.24 306 57.2 -1.51 - 1.43
Married 462 66.9 -1.33 +1.57 252 39.3 -1.11 +1.40
Class
Clearly upper 196 87.2 -1.28 +1.15 70 52.9 -1.64 +1.33
Mixed; indeterminate 1744 78.7 -1.19 +2.36 517 48.2 -1.26 1.oo
Clearly lower 70 91.4 -1.11 -1.33 18 55.6 -2.67 - O.OO*

Nationality
U.S. 1505 75.0 -1.19 +2.39 503 46.1 -1.39 - 1.08
Other 276 96.7 -1.22 +1.13 66 60.6 -1.55 +3.00
Race r
8.
White 1533 77.6 -1.20 f2.12 541 49.9 -1.29 +1.07
CS
Other 264 83.3 -1.27 +1.33 50 38.0 -2.43 -0.00'
Character type**
E
s
"Good" (heroes) 928 69.3 -1.26 f3.47 314 43.3 -1.56 -6.00
Mixed type 432 71.1 -1.31 +1.09 156 43.6 -1.37 1.oo
g
"Bad" (v iIla ins) 291 114.1 - 1.03 +1.80 41 s.
82.9 +1.14 +2.00 $.
?
violents nor victims. If 0.00 i s preceded by a sign, group has either no violents or no victims; +O.OO means only violent(s1
* Group has neither
but no victims(s); -0.00 means only victim(s) but no violent(s).
2
** This classification was introduced in 1969. s
Note: Character score is the percent of characters involved in any violence plus the percent involved in any killing. V-v ration is of violents (+) and
victims (-). K-k ration is of killers (+) and killed (-).
s
300
?
5
rc

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