1) The case involved a criminal estafa charge filed against Mario Fl. Crespo in 1977. Crespo filed several motions to defer arraignment pending review by the Secretary of Justice.
2) In 1978, the Secretary of Justice ordered the dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. However, the trial court judge refused to dismiss the case and threatened to proceed with arraignment.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that while prosecutors have discretion and control over criminal cases, the trial court also has discretion in granting or denying a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecutor. The determination of the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court.
1) The case involved a criminal estafa charge filed against Mario Fl. Crespo in 1977. Crespo filed several motions to defer arraignment pending review by the Secretary of Justice.
2) In 1978, the Secretary of Justice ordered the dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. However, the trial court judge refused to dismiss the case and threatened to proceed with arraignment.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that while prosecutors have discretion and control over criminal cases, the trial court also has discretion in granting or denying a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecutor. The determination of the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court.
1) The case involved a criminal estafa charge filed against Mario Fl. Crespo in 1977. Crespo filed several motions to defer arraignment pending review by the Secretary of Justice.
2) In 1978, the Secretary of Justice ordered the dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. However, the trial court judge refused to dismiss the case and threatened to proceed with arraignment.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that while prosecutors have discretion and control over criminal cases, the trial court also has discretion in granting or denying a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecutor. The determination of the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court.
1) The case involved a criminal estafa charge filed against Mario Fl. Crespo in 1977. Crespo filed several motions to defer arraignment pending review by the Secretary of Justice.
2) In 1978, the Secretary of Justice ordered the dismissal of the information filed against Crespo. However, the trial court judge refused to dismiss the case and threatened to proceed with arraignment.
3) The Supreme Court ruled that while prosecutors have discretion and control over criminal cases, the trial court also has discretion in granting or denying a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecutor. The determination of the case is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court.
MARIO FL. CRESPO vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL. GANCAYCO, J.: FACTS: On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77. When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. In an order of August 17, 1977, the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he recommended that the petition be given due course. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978, the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25,1979, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course to the petition. Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. RULING: Yes. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. And it is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
Zenaida R. Razon Section 14. Amendment or Substitution Criminal
Procedure. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
United States v. Giuseppe Pellerito, A/K/A Joseph El Italiano, United States of America v. Hector Rivera-Martinez, A/K/A El Men, 878 F.2d 1535, 1st Cir. (1989)