PILONEO - 18 - G.R. No. L-53373

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G.R. No. L-53373.

June 30, 1987


MARIO FL. CRESPO
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT
CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR
GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL.
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the
approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against
Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77. When the
case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer
arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review
filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August
1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied
the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the
order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18,
1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate
court. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of
Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. In an order of
August 17, 1977, the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from
proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of
the Court. In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he
recommended that the petition be given due course. On May 15, 1978
a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and
perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel
the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of
Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review.
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition for review reversed the resolution
of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for
immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A
motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence was filed by the
Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial court, attaching
thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order
of August 2, 1978, the private prosecutor was given time to file an
opposition thereto. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of
preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in
the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. On
January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals
against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further
orders from the Court. In a decision of October 25,1979, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of
January 23, 1979. A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed by
the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. Hence this
petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby
petitioner prays that said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent
judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his threat to proceed with
the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring
the information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering
respondent Judge to dismiss the said case, and declaring the obligation
of petitioner as purely civil. In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second
Division of this Court without giving due course to the petition required
the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to
dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the
Solicitor General he recommends that the petition be given due course,
it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply
to the comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the
petition be dismissed. In the resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second
Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the Court En Banc.
In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to
give due course to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be reversed and that
respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a
criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may
refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on
the merits.
RULING:
Yes. It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the fiscal. And it is through the conduct of
a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a
prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The
Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the
criminal prosecution. Whether the accused had been arraigned or not
and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by
the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to
the Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the
motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the
proper determination of the case.

Zenaida R. Razon Section 14. Amendment or Substitution Criminal


Procedure.
The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see that justice is
done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused
before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the
duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the
prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own
independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted
or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of
appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such
circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case
leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire
proceedings will be null and void. The least that the fiscal should do is
to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the
presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his
direction and control. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once
a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case
as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction
and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is
already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The
Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and
competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It
does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.

FRANCESS A. PILONEO
JD-1A

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