Quinon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.

113908 & 114819, 18 April 1997

Facts:
2 Criminal charges of “malversation of public property “was filed against Pablo B. Quiñon, the Station
Commander of Calinog Iloilo PC/INP. 2 pistols and 1 shotgun both are owned and was allegedly used in abuse
by Quiñon for private interest .
1. Criminal Case No. 16279:
- two (2) pistols and their magazines and and one (1) shotgun with a total value of P15,000.00
The proceedings of this case are summarized as follows:
i. Quiñon pleaded not guilty on arraignment
ii. proceeded with pre-trial and trial
iii. various postponements and resets of trial were made due to various reasons of Quiñon for not
appearing due to hypertension, change of counsel and withdrawal of counsel
iv. The prosecution presented its evidence before the court.
v. Quiñon and his counsel was given an opportunity to present evidence but did not appear on the date
given by Sandiganbayan.
vi. Sandiganbayan issued an order for Quiñon to be arrested, therefore he was declared that he waived
his right to present evidence. But Sandiganbayan gave him an opportunity to how cause in writing why
judgment on the bond shall not be rendered under the circumstances within 30 days.
vii. Quiñon responded 10 weeks after, through a motion for reconsideration, insisting that he was denied
of due process for his lawyer was not notified and that he was sick (hypertension)
viii. Such MR was denied by Sandiganbayan
2. Criminal Case No. 19561:
- two (2) revolvers and a shotgun with a total value of P16,000.00.
This was filed by Office of the Iloilo Provincial Prosecution, which resulted in the filing by the Office of the
Ombudsman after the preliminary investigation of the Provincial prosecution.
Quiñon filed a 2 motions to quash, both denied.

The sandiganbayan ruled in CC no. 19561 as follows:

 Both Art. 217 and Art. 220 hold persons who are not "accountable officers" as such when they are,
nonetheless, accountable for specific public property as when they have a duty to return the same or
to dispose thereof is provided by law or by lawful regulations or orders of their superiors.
  This Court does have jurisdiction of the case because the alleged conversion by the accused of the
firearms earlier issued to him as Police Sergeant constituted an office-related offense over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction (Sec. 4, PD 1606).
 This Court possesses jurisdiction over the case involving a police officer charged in connection with the
performance of his duties since it has been the view of this Court that the designation of "regular
courts" in Sec. 46 R.A. No. 6975 is in contradistinction from military courts and not against "specialized"
court such as the Sandiganbayan.
 For the last two reasons, the preliminary investigation herein was properly conducted and the
Information filed by the Office of the Ombudsman.

Issue/s:
1. Whether Sandiganbayan has Jurisdiction?
2. Whether Special Prosecutor of the Sandiganbayan, or the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor who had
authority to file the information?
3. Whether the informations in both criminal cases charge an offense?
4. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to re-open the
case and present evidence after the prosecution rested its case?

Ruling:
1. Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is included in the term regular
courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 which states "within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts; “The
term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 means civil courts.”
2. Ombudsman Act of 1989 (RA 6770) confers on the Office of the Special Prosecutor the power to "conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is thus
completely inconsequential that the complaint by which Criminal Case No. 16279 was instituted — charging a
crime cognizable by the Sandiganbayan — might have been originally filed with the Iloilo Prosecution Office, or
the preliminary investigation therein conducted.
3. Yes, all elements are present, to wit:
a. That the offender be a public officer.
b. That he had the custody of control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.
c. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.
d. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated, or consented or, through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another reason to take them.
The delivery to Quiñon, by reason of the duties of his office as PNP Station Commander, of the firearms
belonging to the Government, necessarily and inescapably entailed the implicit obligation on his part to safely
keep the firearms, use them for the purposes for which they were obviously entrusted to him, and to return
them to the proper authority at termination of his tenure as commander, or on the demand by the owner; the
duty, in other words to account for said firearms. And his act — also expressly stated in the information — of
malversing, misappropriation and converting the firearms to his own personal use and benefit, with abuse of
trust and confidence — completed the basic description of the crime of malversation attributed to him.
4. No, In Pulido v. Lazaro (158 SCRA 107 [1988]), the Court ruled that "there was no denial of due process
where petitioner had many opportunities and had afforded adequate hearing to argue his case." Far from
being tainted by error, therefore, the Sandiganbayan's challenged resolution, founded upon the undisputed
facts on record, correctly reflected the legal principles involved.

Fallo: the petitions for certiorari and prohibition are DENIED for lack of merit
PEOPLE VS. AZARCON

WHO ELSE ASIDE BESIDES ACCOUNTABLE PUBLIC OFFICER COULD BE LIABLE FOR MALVERSATION?

Facts:

 Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated a hauling business. His services were contracted by the Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) at its concession in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur.
 Occasionally, Azarcon engaged the services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla.
 Ancla was a delinquent tax payer whose trucks were left in Azarcon’s premises.
 A Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property was issued by the Main Office of the BIR addressed to the Regional
Director or his authorized representative of Revenue Region 10, commanding the latter to distraint the goods,
chattels, or effects and other personal property of Ancla.
 The Warrant of Garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to transfer, surrender and transmit to BIR the
property in his possession owned by taxpayer Ancla.
 Azarcon, in signing the Receipt for Goods Seized Under Authority of National Internal Revenue, assumed the
undertakings specified in the receipt.
 Subsequently, Ancla took out the distrained truck from Azarcon’s custody.
 For this reason, Azarcon was charged before Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or
property under 217 of RPC.
 The sandiganbayan ruled that Azarcon was guilty of malversation and was demanded To indemnify the Bureau of
Internal Revenue the amount of P80,831.59;
 Considering that accused Jaime Ancla has not yet been brought within the jurisdiction of this Court up to this date, let
this case be archived as against him without prejudice to its revival in the event of his arrest or voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of this Court.

Issue/s:

1. Whether Alarcon was a “public officer” contemplated in Article 203 of RPC.

2. Jurisdiction of sandiganbayan

3. whether petitioner's designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct
provision of law, or by competent authority.

Ruling:

No. To be a public officer, one must be:

(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or Performing in said Government or any of its
branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class; and

(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties must be —a. by
direct provision of the law, or b. by popular election, or c. by appointment by competent authority.

 After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus found Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his co-
accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously charged before and convicted by Respondent
Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them. The Court said he obviously may not be deemed authorized
BY POPULAR ELECTION.
2. The Sandiganbayan will only have jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e. when the complaint charges the private
individual either as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime
within its jurisdiction.

- The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer
committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public officer, the
Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged.

3. NO. In signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity
constituting public functions, Azarcon obviously may not be deemed authorized by popular election.

The next logical query is whether petitioner's designation by the BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as
appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent authority. While the BIR had authority to require Petitioner
Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.

Sandiganbayan decision reversed.

PEOPLE VS. PEPITO
IS GOOD FAITH A VALID DEFENSE IN MALVERSATION

FACTS:

 PORFERIO PEPITO appeals from the Decision of the trial court convicting him of Malversation of Public
Funds through Falsification of Official Documents on five (5) counts.
 As Acting Postmaster of Iligan City, was charged with misappropriating government funds by
manipulating his records and making it appear that he paid a number of postal money orders although
no such payments were made. Appellant was found short in his cash accounts.
 An audit team from the Office of Regional Director Juan uncovered certain anomalies regarding
appellant's postal money order transactions at the Iligan City Post Office.
 However, due to lack of time, the team failed to determine the exact figure involved in the anomaly.
 Upon receipt of the PMO paid cards, the audit team cross-checked the paid cards with the record of
the PMOs allegedly paid by appellant. They discovered that some PMOs were listed as paid but were
not supported by paid cards. The audit team uncovered these discrepancies for the months of October
and December, 1975 and for the months of January, April and May, all of 1976.
 The balance of two hundred forty-four thousand six hundred thirty pesos and twenty-five centavos
(P244,630.25) was disallowed in audit for lack of supporting documents. Hence, the cash shortage in
appellant's account. 13 Appellant asked the auditors to double-check their findings but the audit team
came out with the same result.
 In a letter 14 dated February 25, 1977, the audit team informed appellant of the shortage in his cash
accounts.
 They demanded from appellant the immediate restitution of the missing funds and an explanation why
no criminal and administrative sanctions should be taken against him.
 No action was taken by appellant to restore and explain his shortage of funds. Hence, five (5) criminal
Informations for malversation of public funds through falsification of official documents were filed
against him.
 After two (2) years, or on August 13, 1982, that continuation of the trial resumed for the presentation
of the defense evidence. However, on the scheduled date of hearing, appellant, through counsel, filed
a motion to suspend the trial 16 on the ground that he has applied for and was conditionally granted an
amnesty under P.D. 1082 by the 11TH Amnesty Commission of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, for said
cases.
 Appellant prayed that pursuant to Section 6 of P.D. 1082, further proceedings in his cases be held in abeyance
pending final approval of his conditional amnesty by the President of the Philippines.
 The fiscal opposed 17 the motion on the ground that the conditional amnesty of appellant was spurious
for it was issued by a person not duly authorized for the purpose.
CONTENTIONS OF PEPITO

 Appellant denied there was shortage in his cash accounts.

 After he was informed of the missing funds, he asked the audit team to re-examine the records for his cash on
hand has always tallied with his cashbook. His office had been subjected to various regular audit examinations
by different offices, namely: the Bureau of Treasury, the District Postal Inspector, the Postal Audit Examiners and
the Iligan City Auditor's Office.
  None of these offices found any irregularity in his accountabilities.
 He urged that there must have been some error or inaccuracy in the conduct of the audit.
 He further charged that the malversation cases were filed against him for political reasons for the late Governor
Arsenio Quibranza had a grudge against his son-in-law.

Appellant admitted that when he was found short in his cash accounts, he applied for amnesty under P.D. 1082.
He was informed by then Presiding Judge Dalisay and Prosecutor Lagcao that he would have to admit his guilt in his
application for amnesty since amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, he still proceeded with his application
for his friends in Lanao del Sur assured him that his amnesty would be immediately processed and approved.

His conditional amnesty has been granted but it is still pending final approval by the President for allegedly there
is someone in Manila who is blocking the grant of his amnesty.

 The RTC found him guilty of Article(s) 217, 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, on all the
five (5) counts he is charged (with).

ISSUES: WON THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES OF
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS THRU FALSIFICATION OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS (complex crime)

RULING:

 It is settled that in cases of malversation of public funds, the mere failure of a public officer to have
duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such funds or property to personal
use.
 to justify conviction for malversation of public funds, the prosecution has only to prove that the
accused received public funds or property and that he could not account for them or did not have
them in his possession and could not give a reasonable excuse for the disappearance of the same.

ELEMENTS OF MALVERSATION- In the case at bar, all the elements of malversation of public funds are present, viz:
(a) the offender is a public officer,
(b) he had custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office,
(c) these funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable, and
(d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence permitted
another person to take them.

 Appellant, as Acting Postmaster of Iligan City has custody of the funds of his Office. A portion of these
funds was used in the payment of postal money orders (PMOs) presented to him. As evidence of these
payments, the Postmaster accomplishes the PMO paid cards and makes a list of the PMOs he paid for a
given period. These lists and paid cards are then sent to the Central Office of the Bureau of Post for
safekeeping. An audit of the PMO transactions of appellant, however, disclosed that some of his PMO
payments were not supported by PMO paid cards.
 Appellant's assertion that the audit made by the Office of Iligan City Auditor was inaccurate remains an
unsubstantiated allegation.
 Although appellant insisted on this alleged inaccuracy during the trial, he cannot point to the specific
procedure where the auditors erred in examining his accountabilities.
  Noticeably, appellant did not present any document to show that the audit of other government
agencies covered also the PMO transactions of the post office for the same period covered by the audit
of the City Auditor.
FALLO: The Decision of the trial court convicting appellant PORFERIO M. PEPITO for five (5) counts of Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification of Official Documents is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant
LUMAUIG V. PEOPLE

FACTS:

 In 1994, then Mayor Aloysius Dait Lumauig of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao obtained a cash adavance on the amount
of P101, 736 intended for the payment of freight and insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to be
donated by the City of Manila.
 However, instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure 2 buses and five patrol cars. It never came to his mind
to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles were already turned over to the municipality.
 He claimed that he was neither informed nor did he receive any demand from COA to liquidate his cash
advances. It was only 2001 while he was claiming for separation pay when he came to know he still has
unliquidated cash advances.
 And so as not to prolong the issue, he paid the amount of P101. 736 to the municipal treasurer for which
reason the incumbent Mayor Prudenciano executed an Affidavit of Desistance.
 He was charged for violation of Article 218 of the RPC and from the same facts, an information for violation of
Section 3 of RA 3019 was also filed against him as he utilized the cash advance for a purpose other than for
which it was obtained.
 The Sandiganbayan ACQUITTED him in the criminal case for violation of RA 3019 but CONVICTED him in
criminal case for Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under Article 218 of the RPC.
 His motion for reconsideration being denied, he thus filed a petition.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not prior demand to liquidate is a requisite for conviction under Article 218 of the RPC

HELD:

 The Supreme Court held no.

 The elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code are:
o (1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated therefrom;
o (2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
o (3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a provincial auditor;
and,
o (4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after such account should be rendered
 The Article 218 of the RPC does not require the COA or the provincial auditor to first make a demand before
the public officer should render an account.
 It is sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring him to render an account.
 Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an accountable officer is held
liable for a violation of the crime.
 The law is very clear. Where none is provided, the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither
may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must
be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.
There is no room for interpretation, but only application.
MANZANARIS V. PEOPLE

FACTS:

 Selso M. Manzanaris is the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Basilan since 1963.
 He is the custodian of all the records of the said court.
 Criminal case was filed against Geronimo Borja for malversation of public funds and Certificate Title No.
877 of the Register of Deeds of Basilan was among the property bond filed by Borja.
 When Manzanaris discovered that the original Title was not existing in the Register of Deeds, he
ordered a subordinate to give a copy of the title for the administrative reconstitution of such.
 Borja signed a receipt,” Received from the Clerk of Court Selso M. Manzanaris OCT No. 877 to be
reconstituted in the Register of Deeds. After reconstitution to be returned to the court.”
 Release and delivery was done without any court order. Trinidad Borja, wife of Geronimo Borja was
able to Reconstitute the Original Certificate of Title No. 877 in Nov. 1974 but the Certificate was not
turned over to the court.
 It was also known that on June 11, 1975 building of the Court of First Instance of Basilan, with all the
records and documents of the court, were burned.
 1981, when Atty. Filoteo Jo filed a petition to borrow the original title. This was denied as issued in
the Certificate given by Manzanaris that the Title was among those burned in fire.
 The lawyer later informed Manzanaris that Mrs. Borja was able to reconstitute the said Title, it was
only then that Manzanaris remembered that he had the Title delivered to Geronimo.
 Since then, She repeatedly asked for the return of the said title, but Mrs. Borja could no longer find it
in the files of her deceased mother, the registered owner.
 Sandiganbayan found Manzanaris guilty in Violation of Art. 226.

In his petition, admitted the removal of the said Title for reconstitution saying that he was actuated with a
lawful and commendable motive, that is, To protect the interest of the state, since the unreconstituted
certificate of title, given as property bond, was absolutely inefficacious for such purpose.

Issue:

 Whether or not Selso M. Manzanaris has a criminal intent or illicit purpose in Violation of Infidelity in
the custody of documents Art. 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of documents
Held:

 No. Guilt of the crime of Infidelity in the custody of documents, the act of removal, as in this case,
should be with a criminal intent or illicit purpose.
 “ActuS non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea”, The act does not make a man criminal if his mind is not
criminal.
 There are offenses that mere commission is already a crime with intent but that presumption is made
only on acts that are criminal.
 In this case, it is not criminal nor malum prohibitum, which makes the doer liable by mere commission
even without evil intent.
 Manzanaris was motivated with a sincere desire to protect the interest of the Government.
 He did not benefit from the said act.
 The SC ruled in a previous case, “The act of removal, destruction or concealment of public documents is
punished by law only when any of such acts would constitute infidelity in the custody thereof.”
Sandiganbayan ruling was reversed and petitioner acquitted.

PECHO V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:

 Odon Pecho, then Custom Guards of the Bureau of Customs went to the office of Constantino Calica, a
certified public accountant and a customs broker.
 They introduced themselves as the duly authorized representatives of Eversun Commercial Tradings and then
engaged him for an amount equal to fifty (50%) percent of the authorized brokerage fee, to prepare and file
with the Bureau of Customs the necessary Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration covering Eversun’s
shipment.
 Upon conducting a spot check on the questioned shipment by Customs Senior Agent, Ruperto Santiago, it was
discovered that it was automotive diesel engines instead of agricultural disc blades and irrigation pumps as
declared in the import entry and revenue declaration.
 Petitioner was charged for the violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019 –
 Sandiganbayan Second Division found the petitioner guilty as charged.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the following grounds:
o Invalidity of the information as a consequence of non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112, Rules of Court and of Sections 6 and 7, Rules of procedure of the office of the
Ombudsman
o Failure of the prosecution to overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt the presumption of
innocence in favor of accused Odon Pecho
o Failure of the prosecution to establish the attendance of the concurring essential elements of the crime
charged; and
o There is no such crime as attempted violation of Section 3(e) RA 3019
 Sandiganbayan rejected all the grounds filed by the petitioner, with the reasons that as to the first ground, it
was the waiver, and as to the second and third grounds, it ruled that the decision is supported with proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and as to the fourth ground, it held that the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
attempted or frustrated felonies do not apply to offenses penalized by Special laws.
Issue:

 Whether or not the attempted or frustrated stage of the crime defined in Section 3e of RA No. 3019 is
punishable.
Ruling:

 The Supreme Court held no. The High Court explained that there are 2 reasons why Section 3(e) of RA 3019
penalizes only consummated offenses.
 First is regarding the penalty imposed as to the violation of the said section. The imposable imprisonment
penalty does not have the nomenclature and duration of any specific penalty in the RPC, hence no valid basis
for application of penalty to principal of a frustrated and attempted felony.
 Secondly, the third requisite of Section 3(e), viz., "causing undue injury to any party, including the
government," could only mean actual injury or damage which must be established by evidence. This simply
means that proof of actual injury or damage is required
 The Government incurred no undue injury or damage. At most then, the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 reached only the attempted stage because the perpetrators had commenced the commission of the
offense directly by overt acts but failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced the
felony as a consequence by reason or some cause other than their own spontaneous desistance, namely the
timely intervention of alert customs officials before the release of the cargoes
 Accordingly he should be acquitted of the violation of Section 3e of R.A. No. 3019.
Fortunately, for the state, the offense charged in the information in Criminal Case No. 14844 necessarily includes the
complex crime of estafa under Article 315 through falsification of public documents.

The evidence established by the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of estafa was only at its
attempted stage and that it was sought to be consummated through the falsification of the documents.

RODILLAS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:

 Accused Alfredo Rodillas is a patrolman of the Integrated National Police Force of Caloocan City and assigned
with the jail section thereof
 He was then directed to escort Zenaida, a detention prisoner before the sala of Judge Pardo in Caloocan City
as the policewoman supposed to escort him was sick
 While waiting for the arrival of the judge, the relative of the husband of Zenaida approached the accused and
requested if Zenaida could be allowed to talk to her husband
 After the adjournment of the court, the husband of Zenaida requested the accused to allow them to have
lunch as they were hungry, which was accepted
 While eating the husband asked the accused if he could accompany his wife to the comfort room as she was
not feeling well.
 The accused accompanied Zenaida and her lady companion to the comfort room
 The lady went out and said she’ll buy sanitary napkins for Zenaida
 After several minutes without the lady companion coming back, the accused became suspicious, entered the
room and found that Zenaida was no longer inside, and saw that it had no window grills
 The accused search for her but to no avail. He then reported the matter to his superior officer
 He admitted that he did not inspect the comfort room first before allowing Zenaida to enter
 He was charged and found guilty of the crime of Evasion through negligence

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the acts of petitioner qualifies as a definite laxity amounting to deliberate non-performance
of duty to sustain his conviction
RULING:

 The Supreme Court held in the affirmative.

 The elements of the Crime of Evasion through negligence are:
o Offender is a public officer
o He is charged with the conveyance or custody of a prisoner, either a detainee or a convict
o And the prisoner escapes through his negligence
 It is evident from the records that the petitioner acted negligently and beyond the scope of his authority
when he permitted his charge to create the situation which led to her escape.
 The petitioner contends that human considerations compelled him to grant Zenaida Andres requests to take
lunch and to go to the comfort room to relieve herself.
 As a police officer who was charged with the duty to return the prisoner directly to jail, the deviation from his
duty was clearly a violation of the regulations.
 In the first place, it was improper for the petitioner to take lunch with the prisoner and her family when he
was supposed to bring his charge to the jail. He even allowed the prisoner and her husband to talk to each
other at the request of a co-officer.
 It is the duty of any police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions to assure the
absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will make his act one of definite
laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-performance of duty. His tolerance of arrangements
whereby the prisoner and her companions could plan and make good her escape should have aroused the
suspicion of a person of ordinary prudence.