Lepore2022 Article CorporateGovernanceInTheDigita

Journal of Management and Governance
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-021-09617-2
Corporate governance in the digital age: the role of social

media and board independence in CSR disclosure. Evidence
from Italian listed companies
Luigi Lepore1 · Loris Landriani2 · Sabrina Pisano1 · Gabriella D’Amore1 ·

Stefano Pozzoli2
Accepted: 10 December 2021

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature
2021
Abstract
This article aims to investigate the role of board independence on corporate
social responsibility disclosure (CSRDisc) and the moderating role of stakeholder
e-engagement by social media (SM) in the relationship between these variables. The
study uses econometric panel data dependence techniques on a sample of 347 firm-
year observations related to Italian non-financial listed companies for the period
2017–2019. The results highlight that independent directors, particularly those
appointed by minority shareholders, influence positively CSR disclosure. Addition-
ally, this relationship is strengthened by stakeholder e-engagement created by social
media (SM), since higher is the companies visibility on Facebook, Linked In, and
Twitter, and hence the institutional pressure felt by its independent directors, greater
is the CSRDisc. This article suggests a new metric to evaluate stakeholder engage-
ment by SM and a new index to measure CSRDisc based on both Directive 95/2014
and Global Reporting Initiative standard. The article contributes to academic
research on the relationship between board independence and disclosure analysing
the moderating role by institutional pressure coming from SM.
Keywords Board independence · CSR disclosure · Social media · Stakeholder

e-engagement · Institutional pressure
* Luigi Lepore
[email protected]
1
Department of Law, Parthenope University of Naples, Naples, Italy
2
Department of Business and Economics, Parthenope University of Naples, Naples, Italy
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L. Lepore et al.
1 Introduction
During the last decades, society has increasingly paid attention to sustainability
issues and consequently to the degree of commitment that companies have to Cor-
porate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Xie et al., 2019). Simultaneously, legislators
worldwide are issuing laws to regulate companies’ behaviours and CSR disclosure
(e.g., the European Directive 95/2014). As a result, companies are experiencing a
growing institutional pressure to engage in CSR reporting (Gallego-Alvarez et al.,
2017; Bhattacharyya & Cummings, 2015; Pedersen et al., 2013; Gray et al., 1995
and 1996). In this scenario, the dissemination of CSR (CSRDisc) has become a
double-edged weapon for companies to be able to improve their image and social
legitimacy, but it can also damage their corporate reputation if not used appropri-
ately. The related risk or opportunity is even higher in the digital age, since internet
and social media (SM) allow a continuous interaction among companies and stake-
holders, amplifying the institutional pressure on companies and boards of directors.
Indeed, the new digital age is also changing companies’ governance models (Fen-
wick et al., 2019; Nørreklit et al., 2019) since companies decision-making processes
are directly influenced by opinions expressed by stakeholders through SM. Notably,
in the last decade, new communication technologies have become crucial for com-
panies, representing the paradigm for the future relationship between companies and
stakeholders (Chan et al., 2020; WHO, 2020).
The spread of CSR policies and practices has significantly increased academic
research analysing CSR reporting drivers (Clarkson et al., 2008; Llena et al., 2007;
Cormier & Magnan, 2005; Wilmshurst & Frost, 2000). Several studies have exam-
ined the role of board attributes and, in particular, their independence (Brennan &
Solomon, 2008; Ducassy & Montandrau, 2015; Rao & Tilt, 2016). The results, how-
ever, have been divergent: some studies report a positive relationship, confirming
the critical governance role of board independence (e.g., Michelon & Parbonetti,
2012; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009), whereas others support a negative relationship
or find no significant relationship, showing the inefficacy of board independence as
a stimulus mechanism for CSRDisc (e.g., Amran et al., 2014; Barako et al., 2006).
These contradictory results could be due to institutional factors that can directly or
indirectly influence CSR strategies and reporting policies (Fenwick et al., 2019; Gal-
lego-Alvarez et al., 2017; García-Sánchez et al., 2014; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011).
The presence of conflicting results creates an opportunity for our study by exam-
ining stakeholder engagement’s moderating effect through Facebook, LinkedIn and
Twitter on the relationship between board independence and CSRDisc. Stakeholder
engagement through SM (e-engagement) can be interpreted as the company’s level
of social or external exposure that generates institutional pressure on the company
itself and its governing bodies (Garg, 2020; Fenwick et al., 2019; Flammer et al.,
2019; Manetti & Bellucci, 2016; Paniagua et al., 2019).
The literature review conducted reveals the existence of a gap in the existing lit-
erature. Although some scholars have analysed the role of institutional pressure in
influencing independent directors’ behaviour for adopting sustainability reporting,
particularly the roles of competition and media pressures (García-Sánchez et al.,
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Corporate governance in the digital age: the role of social…
2014; Nikolaeva & Bicho, 2011), no one has analysed the same function of SM.
Today, SM plays a crucial role in generating and amplifying institutional pressure
on companies and their boards of directors to engage in CSR reporting, essentially
replacing traditional media in this role (Fenwick et al., 2019; Flammer et al., 2019).
The board of directors’ behaviour and particularly that of independent directors, in
fact, could be influenced by their reputational concerns deriving from the level of
SM exposition of the company (García-Sánchez et al., 2014; Rupley et al., 2012).
To the best of our knowledge, no studies have critically explored SM’s role in the
relationship between board attributes and CSR disclosure.
We conducted our analysis on a sample of 347 firm-year observations related
to Italian non-financial listed companies for the period 2017–2019. We decided to
focus on the Italian context because the institutional setting’s poor quality reduces
the effectiveness of internal corporate governance (CG) mechanisms, such as board
independence, making Italy an interesting context in which to test our hypotheses. In
contexts such as this, stakeholder engagement through SM could regain the power
and effectiveness of those exact internal CG mechanisms that are weakened by the
poor quality of the institutional setting.
Our results evidence that board independence is an important stimulus mecha-
nism for CSR disclosure, especially when independent directors are appointed by
minority shareholders. Besides, the results highlight that institutional pressure due
to stakeholder engagement through SM positively influences board independence’s
effectiveness in stimulating CSR disclosure.
This study contributes to the academic literature through a pioneering analysis of
the role of stakeholder e-engagement in the relationship between board independ-
ence and CSRDisc, thereby helping to systematize the divergent empirical results
highlighted above. The findings have implications for managers, boards of directors,
shareholders, and regulators. They show that the reputational effects for independent
directors deriving from institutional pressure generated by SM strengthen the effec-
tiveness of board independence as a mechanism for good governance. These effects
are significant for contexts in which the poor quality of the institutional setting
can reduce this effectiveness. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
The following section reviews the literature and presents the hypotheses. Section 3
describes the research methodology, including sample selection, the variables and
measures, and data collection and analysis. Section 4 reports the results. Section 5
discusses the findings. Finally, Sect. 6 presents conclusions, as well as the implica-
tions and limitations of the study.
2 Literature review
2.1 The relationship between board independence and CSR disclosure
The CSR disclosure strategy plays a key role in corporate legitimacy and CG (Lim
& Greenwood, 2017; Schultz et al., 2013), and forming it is one of the board of
director’s tasks (García-Sánchez et al., 2014).
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L. Lepore et al.
According to legitimacy theory (Suchman, 1995), companies gain legitimacy

through different actions, including corporate disclosure to relevant stakeholders
(Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990), by which companies demonstrate that they are operat-
ing within their social contracts’ limits and rules (García-Sánchez et al., 2014).
Thus, companies tend to release CSRDisc to legitimize their activities, as well as
to influence the public’s perception (Cho & Patten, 2007) and obtain its support
and approval (Odriozola & Baraibar-Diez, 2017; Martìnez-Ferrero et al., 2016).
According to resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), inde-
pendent directors are compelled to release information on CSR to demonstrate
that companies complies with the rules and act responsibly, increasing their repu-
tation. Independent directors in their decision-making processes take into con-
sideration multiple stakeholders’interests, pushing companies towards sustain-
able behaviors. However, their effectiveness as a mechanism able to stimulate
CSR disclosure also depends on their real degree of independence. When board
members are also managers of the company, the probability of collusion with the
top management or controlling shareholders increases (Fama & Jensen, 1983).
To reduce these risks, boards usually include some independent members who
are professionals with no ties to either the firm’s owners or those in management
roles. According to Fama (1980), a higher proportion of independent directors
results in more efficient board oversight and limits opportunistic behaviour by
top management and dominant shareholders (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Zattoni
& Cuomo, 2010). Independent directors have reputational concerns that can lead
them to behave in all stakeholders’ best interests rather than just the sharehold-
ers (Armstrong et al., 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Lim et al., 2007). As a result,
independent directors overseeing corporate boards would encourage the company
to become more open to outside investors, also by improving the comprehensive-
ness and accuracy of disclosures, among other things (Chau & Grey, 2010; Ho &
Wong, 2001; Forker, 1992). In fact, independent directors are inherently likely to
be interested in demonstrating that the firm follows the rules and acts responsibly
(Zahra & Stanton, 1988) to increase their reputation (Fich & Shivdasani, 2007).
More generally, prestige, credibility, job opportunities and networking are the key
advantages of directorships for independent directors (Lorsch and Maciver, 1989;
Fama & Jensen, 1983).
Based on these considerations, many researchers have investigated the effect
of independent directors on the level of corporate disclosure, particularly CSR-
Disc, by referring to legitimacy theory (e.g., Ali et al., 2017), and found a pos-
itive association. For example, Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) found that the
proportion of independent directors is one of the most important factors among
the governance-related variables in explaining the amount of intellectual capi-
tal disclosure for a sample of European firms. Likewise, Donnelly and Mulcahy
(2008) confirmed that firms with more independent boards of directors engage
in greater disclosure than those with less independent boards in Ireland. Simi-
larly, Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al. (2015) highlighted solid empirical evidence in
2003–2009 for the effectiveness of board independence as a stimulus mecha-
nism for CSR disclosure for a sample of internationally listed companies. Sev-
eral other studies found similar results (e.g., Fernàndez-Gago et al., 2018; Jaggi
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et al., 2018; Pavlopoulos et al., 2017; Yunus et al., 2016; García-Sánchez et al.,
2014; Cheng & Courtnenay, 2006). Based on the considerations mentioned
above, we state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a The greater the proportion of independent directors on the board, the
higher the level of CSRDisc.
However, in a context characterized by closely held firms, such as in Italy,

where the dominant shareholder can influence independent directors’ monitor-
ing function, the board’s role and effectiveness as a suitable governance mecha-
nism able to eliminate opportunistic behaviours and stimulate CSRDisc can be
limited (Moscariello et al., 2018; Cho & Kim, 2007; Erickson et al., 2005). In
a context where the main agency problems arise between controlling and minor-
ity shareholders, independent directors lack the mandate and the incentives to
control insiders (Gutiérrez and Sáez, 2013). In Italian closely held firms, the
dominant shareholder might exercise its influence to turn independent directors
into affiliated or grey directors who are less likely to control managers from self-
satisfying behaviours (Dong-Song & Zootae, 2007; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005). In a
context such as this, independent directors appointed on the board by minority
shareholders play a more crucial role (Moscariello et al., 2018) because they can
better represent external interests and stimulate CSRDisc.
Similar interesting considerations were made by Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al.
(2015) for companies from different countries from 2003 to 2009 (Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US). They find that board independence
effectiveness is significantly reduced in stimulating such CSRDisc for family
businesses due to dominant shareholders’ influence on independent directors.
They showed that independent directors tend to make decisions according to
family interests rather than other stakeholders’ interests. These findings under-
lined that the effectiveness of board independence must be treated with due
attention in research on corporate governance in the contexts in which dominant
shareholders can influence independent directors’ behaviour. Among independ-
ent directors, the reputation of those appointed by minority shareholders is more
strictly linked to CSR disclosure, because they explicitly represent external
interests more than the class of independent directors appointed by the majority
shareholder. Thus, they could more easily lose their prestige and, consequently,
their advantages if they do not demonstrate their compliance with rules and
responsible behaviours needed to protect minority shareholder interests (Fich &
Shivdasani, 2007; Hasseldine et al., 2005; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007).
In light of the considerations mentioned above, we state the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b The greater the proportion of independent directors appointed on the

board by minority shareholders, the higher the level of CSRDisc.
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L. Lepore et al.
2.2 The moderating role of stakeholder engagement through social media
Some scholars have found a negative relationship between board independence

and CSR disclosure. Gul and Leung (2004), for example, found that an increase
in outside directors reduces voluntary disclosure in Hong Kong companies.
The same result was found by Eng and Mak (2003) in Singapore firms. Simi-
larly, Barako et al. (2006) found that the proportion of non-executive directors
on the board was significantly and negatively associated with the extent of volun-
tary disclosure of Kenyan firms. Gul and Leung (2004), similar to Eng and Mak
(2003), justify their results, suggesting that increased monitoring by independent
outside directors results in a lower level of disclosure for the presence of a sub-
stitution effect between the two mechanisms. According to Barako and colleagues
(2006), a possible explanation for their result is that outside directors may not be
truly independent. Similarly, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) documented a negative
relationship between CSR disclosure and the proportion of non-executive direc-
tors for Malaysian corporations, explaining the result as both a lack of knowledge
and an indifference of these directors towards societal concerns. More recently,
Tejedo-Romero et al. (2017) confirmed the same results for Spanish firms, show-
ing that external independent directors negatively influence intellectual capital
disclosure due to a substitution effect. Several other studies, on the other hand,
found no statistically significant relationship. Bueno et al. (2018), for example,
highlighted that board independence is not statistically related to the sustainabil-
ity disclosure of Brazilian listed firms, similar to that found by Michelon and Par-
bonetti (2012) for US and European companies and Amran et al. (2014) for firms
of 12 countries in the Asia–Pacific region. Similar findings were highlighted by
other scholars (e.g., Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Leung & Horwitz, 2004; Michelon
et al., 2015; Miras-Rodríguez et al., 2019; Prado-Lorenzo & García-Sánchez,
2010; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009; Wan-Hussin, 2009).
These empirical results may be divergent for various reasons. These include the
measure of independence used (García-Sánchez et al., 2014) or some characteris-
tics of the institutional context in which firms operate, such as institutional pressure
from competitors, stakeholders and the media (García-Sánchez et al., 2014; Rupley
et al., 2012; Brammer & Pavelin, 2008; Baughn et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2005); SM
could play a crucial role in that latter direction.
From an empirical point of view, the reporting of conflicting results suggests
that different interaction variables derived from the institutional environment might
influence the relationship’s direction and intensity. Thus, empirical studies must
consider these mediating or moderating variables in the investigated relationship to
bring order to the highlighted results and generate broader managerial and policy-
making implications, freed from the historical period’s contingencies and the con-
text under investigation (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). This paper goes further along this
line of research by investigating whether and how stakeholder engagement through
SM moderates the relationship between board independence and CSR disclosure.
Although it preliminary investigates the direct effect of board independence on CSR-
Disc, the main interest of the paper concerns the moderating role of stakeholder
engagement through SM in previous relationship.
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SM allow companies to have a continuous dialogue with their stakeholders and

to monitor their opinions. At the same time, stakeholders are informed about com-
panies’ strategies and activities through SM. This bidirectional information flows
allow companies to engage stakeholders and to involve them in their decision-mak-
ing process. In this way, stakeholders become part of the corporate governance pro-
cesses. Through SM, stakeholders could exercise a stronger influence on firm activi-
ties, influencing independent directors’ decision-making processes and stimulating
CSR disclosure. In this way, SM diffusion has raised stakeholder engagement levels,
inducing companies and their directors to consider stakeholders’ participation and
influence. Through this engagement, firms could respond to stakeholder pressure to
avoid negative publicity, but they could also adopt a proactive approach by under-
standing the business environment (Papagiannakis et al., 2019). Moreover, firms
could incorporate stakeholder engagement in their governance processes, thus creat-
ing a context of interaction, dialogue and mutual respect with stakeholders (Andriof
et al., 2017; Martinez et al., 2019). In this third generation of stakeholder engage-
ment (Krick et al., 2005), all stakeholders may serve governance functions by exert-
ing influence on management decisions (Gillan, 2006; Rupley et al., 2012; Suchman,
1995). By establishing constructive relationships with stakeholders and achieving
stakeholder engagement in governance processes, firms are better able to manage
complex social and environmental tasks (Pucheta Martinez et al., 2020; Krumay &
Geyer, 2016; Hoffmann & Lutz, 2015; De Beer & Rensburg, 2011; Bogan, 2008).
From this perspective, the analysis of social networks appears interesting due
to their influence on both reputation (Colleoni, 2013; Etter et al., 2018, 2019) and
stakeholder engagement (Song & Wen, 2020; Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; Bonson
& Ratkai, 2013; Lee et al., 2013). In fact, in the last decade, social networks have
shown their effectiveness in amplifying the external environment’s pressure on busi-
nesses and pushing firms to adopt certain measures to protect their reputation and
include stakeholders in their governance processes. As Van Laer and Van Aelst
(2010) stated, for example, SM has facilitated the mobilization of social movements,
exacerbating their power. Moreover, SM has enormously facilitated open communi-
cation and encouraged building an ongoing and constructive dialogue with all inter-
ested actors (Fenwick et al., 2019).
A similar function in amplifying institutional pressure and stimulating CSR dis-
closure was carried out in the past by traditional media. As stated in previous litera-
ture, a company’s media exposure is a proxy for social visibility, making the firm the
object of further public attention and scrutiny (Bansal 2005). Margolis and Walsh
(2003) examined the press’s role in monitoring and reporting corporate behaviour
and serving as a public watchdog for corporations using the threat of public expo-
sure. Aerts et al. (2008) and Rupley et al. (2012), more specifically, demonstrated
that media exposure is a significant determinant of corporate environmental dis-
closure. Similarly, Nikolaeva and Bicho (2011) empirically demonstrated the roles
of institutional pressures in the adoption of sustainability reporting. Other studies
also showed that more visible companies tend to disclose more social and environ-
mental information to display legitimacy (e.g., Elijido, 2011; Reverte, 2009; Gar-
cia and Larrinaga, 2003; Bewley & Li, 2000; Brown & Deegan, 1998; Patten &
Nance, 1998). García-Sánchez et al. (2014) explicitly analysed the influence of
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L. Lepore et al.
media pressure on independent director behaviour. Studying Spanish listed compa-

nies in the period of 2004 to 2010, they highlighted two opposing behaviours of dif-
ferent external directors when companies are more visible through the media. Their
findings showed that proprietary directors, who are external nonexecutive directors
representing dominant shareholders, tend to disclose more information about CSR
practices. In contrast, independent directors, who are external professionals who do
not have any relations with shareholders, tend to reduce CSR disclosure for their
fear that bad news is being exposed (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). This entrench-
ment strategy is developed to protect their reputation, mainly when media pressure
is applied to their companies. This was probably due to the voluntary nature of CSR
disclosure in the period investigated by García-Sánchez and colleagues. In the past,
there was no obligation to disclose CSR information, and the institutional pressure
for that disclosure was lower. Thus, independent directors could arbitrarily assume
different behaviours. With the introduction of European Directive 95/2014, CSR
disclosure became mandatory for listed companies, and the institutional pressure
firms suffer towards engaging in CSR reporting is enormously increased worldwide
(Bhattacharyya & Cummings, 2015; Gallego-Alvarez et al., 2017; Pedersen et al.,
2013). Thus, today, the fear of suffering reputation losses, fines, and sanctions for
non-compliant firms’ behaviour could prevail on the fear of disclosing bad news.
This could lead independent directors to stimulate a higher level of CSRDisc,
especially if institutional pressure through the media increases. We have conducted
similar reflections on companies’ SM exposure, considering the effect on independ-
ent directors’ behaviour. In particular, we examined whether independent directors’
effectiveness in representing external needs in governance bodies and, consequently,
their propensity to stimulate higher CSRDisc would increase as institutional pres-
sure and stakeholder e-engagement rise. The propensity to encourage CSR disclo-
sure is probably higher for independent directors appointed on the board by minority
shareholders. Being strongly connected to the external environment and stakehold-
ers, they are more exposed to reputational effects than other directors. They could be
more inclined to respect the CSR standards in their monitoring role. This will lead a
company towards higher CSRDisc (Johnson & Greening, 1999).
Previous research has found that certain board decisions can influence exter-
nal directors’ reputations (Holmstrom, 1999; Thogersen, 2006). The media have
recently been giving a large amount of attention to environmental and social issues;
thus, the impact of disclosing CSR on independent directors’ reputation could be
higher.
According to previous arguments, SM pressure may influence independent direc-
tors’ actions, positively affecting CSR disclosure. Independent directors tend to
release much more CSR information to defend their reputation and avoid harmful
exposure or gain competitive advantages, particularly when the media reports on
them. Thus, all independent directors’ propensity to stimulate a higher level of CSR-
Disc would increase as stakeholder e-engagement rises because institutional pres-
sure increases. However, the effectiveness of this stimulus effect is probably higher
for minority directors for the reason mentioned above. Based on these considera-
tions, in this study, we hypothesize that stakeholder e-engagement positively moder-
ates the relationship between board independence and CSRDisc. More specifically,
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we considered the effect of stakeholder e-engagement on the relation between board

independence and CSR disclosure using the two different measures of board inde-
pendence cited above.
Hypothesis 2a Stakeholder e-engagement positively moderates the relationship

between the proportion of independent directors on the board and CSR disclosure.
Hypothesis 2b Stakeholder e-engagement positively moderates the relationship

between the proportion of independent directors appointed on the board by minority
shareholders and CSR disclosure.
3 Method
3.1 Sample selection and data source
Our sample was composed of Italian companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange
for the period of 2017 to 2019 that were mandated to prepare a nonfinancial state-
ment containing CSR information according to Directive 95/2014. Due to their
peculiarities, financial and insurance companies were excluded from the sample.
Similarly, companies for which we did not find governance or accounting data were
excluded. The final sample consisted of 119 companies and 347 firm-year obser-
vations (unbalanced panel dataset). We chose the period of 2017 to 2019 because
these were the first three years of mandatory disclosure of CSR information for Ital-
ian listed firms according to the directive 2014/95/UE, implemented in Italy with
legislative decree 254/2016; thus, it is a period of significant change. We collected
accounting and financial data from Orbis—Bureau Van Dijk. Data on CG were gath-
ered from CG reports created by companies. Information on stakeholder e-engage-
ment was collected by Fanpage Karma, an online tool for SM analytics that pro-
vides valuable insights into SM profile performance. Finally, to collect data on the
dependent variable, CSRDisc, we content-analysed the sustainability reports created
by each company in 2017, 2018 and 2019.
3.2 The Italian context
The paper focuses on the Italian context because the ability of SM to bring stake-
holders closer to companies, through stakeholder e-engagement, could recover the
power and effectiveness of those internal CG mechanisms, such as board inde-
pendence, that are weakened by the poor quality of the institutional setting (Dal-
ton & Dalton, 2011; Zattoni et al., 2017). In Italy, in fact, the limited effectiveness
of financial markets, the low level of legal protection for stakeholders due to the
inefficiencies of the judicial system, as well as the domination of boards by a few
large shareholders who can easily undertake various forms of expropriation (Kumar
& Zattoni, 2018; Lepore et al., 2017; Moscariello et al., 2013; Maury & Pajuste,
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L. Lepore et al.
2005) significantly reduce the effectiveness of disclosure and board independence as

mechanisms for good governance. In contexts like this, therefore, SM could play a
relevant role.
More specifically, Italy is a bank-oriented system characterized by a small
number of listed companies (Moscariello et al., 2019). In this context, firms tend
to finance their activities through bank financing rather than by issuing securities.
Thus, the stock market plays a limited role. In addition, the Italian judicial system
present various inefficiencies, such as a high length of proceedings (Lepore et al.,
2017), that bring to low levels of legal protection for investors.
Furthermore, Italian firms are mainly characterized by the presence of few large
shareholders, which own the majority of the equity, bringing to type II of agency
problems between controlling and minority shareholders (Lepore et al., 2017).
According to the expropriation or entrenchment hypothesis, large shareholders
could harm minority shareholders by adopting opportunistic behaviours. In fact,
for their power, large shareholders are able to influence the management decisions
(Connelly et al., 2010) not only through their direct ownership but also using other
mechanisms, such as the creation of pyramidal groups (Moscariello et al., 2019), the
issue of non-voting shares and shareholders’ agreements (Zona & Zattoni, 2007).
Frequently, dominant shareholders exert their influence over the management by sit-
ting on the board as CEO or chairman (Connelly et al., 2010).
The presence of large shareholders in the board could limit the control exerted
by independent directors. For this reason, in the Italian corporate governance code,
whose latest version has been issued by the Italian stock exchange in July 2018, there
is an explicit suggestion to appoint directors independent from large shareholders in
firms characterized by ownership concentration (art. 3—section Comment). In addi-
tion, Italy is one of the few countries requiring firms to have at least one independent
director appointed to the board by the minority shareholders to improve the board
independence (art. 147 ter of Legislative Decree 58/1998) (Gutierrez & Saez, 2013).
For its peculiarities, the Italian corporate governance system is different from
both the German-Japanese and the Anglo-Saxon settings. It is included in the Latin
group, together with France, Spain, Belgium, Portugal and Greece (Zona & Zattoni,
2007).
For all previous considerations, Italy is an interesting context in which to test our
hypotheses.
3.3 Dependent, independent, moderating and control variables
To collect data on the dependent variable, CSRDisc, we used content analysis (Krip-
pendorff, 2013). The coding procedure was as follows. To identify the informa-
tion that companies had to disclose, we referred to Directive 95/2014 and the GRI
standards. More precisely, within the content stipulated by the Directive, we focused
on the requirement to release non-financial key performance indicators (NFKPIs)
related to the environment, social and employee matters, respect for human rights,
and anti-corruption and bribery matters. However, Directive 95/2014 does not list
the NFKPIs companies have to report. Thus, to better understand which kind of
13
NFKPI companies should provide, we referred to the GRI standards developed in

2016. Each standard contains multiple explanations and examples of NFKPIs that
companies could disclose. Then, we analysed the sustainability report of each sam-
pled company and collected data on the NFKPIs disclosed. We gave a score of 1 for
each NFKPI released by a company. If the same information was repeated, it was not
considered (Pisano et al., 2017). The level of CSRDisc for firm i was measured by
counting the number of NFKPIs released.
∑
CSRDisci = NFKPIi
In addition, we broke down our dependent variable into four sub-variables; each
one was evaluated as the number of NFKPIs released. These four sub-variables
are related to the environment (EnvDisc), social and employee matters (SocDisc),
respect for human rights (HumRighDisc), and anti-corruption and bribery matters
(AntiCorrDisc). The two coders first described a set of coding rules to ensure inter-
coder reliability. Following that, each researcher coded two companies’ sustainabil-
ity reports separately to see any discrepancies between coders. Finally, these vari-
ations were debated, and the final set of coding rules was established as a result
of this discussion. As a result, we were able to obtain more realistic and reliable
results. The degree of inter-coder reliability was measured using Krippendorff’s α,
which yielded 93 percent. The following table summarizes the dependent variables
and the independent, moderating, and control variables, providing a description and
information on their measurement and data sources (Table 1).
BoInd measures the percentage of all independent directors appointed on the
board; BoIndMin measures the percentage of independent directors appointed on
the board by minority shareholders (Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009). The moderator
variable is e-engag, which measures a firm’s stakeholder engagement through SM
(Bonson & Ratkai, 2013). It is the average number of a single SM user’s daily inter-
actions with the posts made by a company on its SM pages. It is calculated by divid-
ing the total number of reactions to (likes, love, wow, haha, etc.), comments on and
shares of the company’s posts in a year by the number of fans on Facebook, Twitter
and LinkedIn and then dividing that number by 365.
We decided to collect data from Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter because they
facilitate cooperation between actors (Fuchs & Trottier, 2015) and are useful for
stakeholder engagement. A higher value for e-engagement (specifically e-engag)
indicates that fans interact more often with posts on a company’s page in our opera-
tionalization. For this research, we consider the stakeholder e-engagement relating
to the year to which the sustainability report refers. Thus, for 2017, we consider
the average of the daily values for the whole year 2017, and the same was done for
2018 and 2019. E-engagement could also be considered a proxy for the company’s
exposure in SM or a proxy for the institutional pressure deriving from the SM (Fen-
wick et al., 2019). BoInd*e-engag and BoIndMin*e-engag are the interaction terms
used to evaluate the combined effect of board independence and e-engagement on
CSRDisc due to legitimacy considerations. To avoid biased results and in an effort to
address any potential endogeneity problems relating to omitted variables, the present
study employs a set of firm-specific factors to control for the studied associations.
13
Table 1 Description of variables and measurement
Variable Description Measurement Source
13
Dependent variable
CSRDisc CSR Disclosure Number of NFKPIs related to environmental, social and employee matters, Sustainability report
respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters released
EnvDisc Environmental Disclosure NFKPIs related to environmental matters released Sustainability report
SocDisc Social and employee matters Disclosure NFKPIs related to social and employee matters released Sustainability report
HumRightDisc Human rights matters Disclosure NFKPIs related to respect for human rights matters released Sustainability report
AntiCorrDisc Anti-corruption and bribery matters Disclosure NFKPIs related to anti-corruption and bribery matters released Sustainability report
Independent and moderating variables
BoInd Board independence The ratio between independent directors and the total number of boards CG Report
directors
BoIndMin Board independence The ratio between independent directors appointed by minority shareholders CG Report
and the total number of boards directors
e-engag Stakeholder engagement The ratio between the total amount of reactions (likes, love, wow, haha etc.), Fanpagekarma
comments and shares of the company’s posts and the number of fans on
Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn, this amount is then divided by 365
BoInd*e-engag Interaction term Two ways interaction term obtained by multiplying the BoInd and e-engag
BoIndMin*e-engag Interaction term Two ways interaction term obtained by multiplying the BoIndMin and
e-engag
Control variables
BoSize Board Size Number of directors CG Report
BoExec Board Executive Percentage of executive directors on the total number of directors CG Report
BoMeetings Board Meetings Number of board meetings during the year CG Report
RoleDual Role duality Dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman also has the role of CEO and 0 CG Report
otherwise
MultiDir Multidirectorship Number of directors having roles also in other companies CG Report
CSRComm CSR committee Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a CSR committee and 0 otherwise CG Report
L. Lepore et al.
Big4 Big4 Dummy equal to 1 if the Auditor is one of the Big4, 0 otherwise CG Report
Table 1 (continued)
Variable Description Measurement Source
Size Size Natural logarithm of total assets ORBIS

Lev Leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets ORBIS
TobinQ Tobin’s Q Natural logarithm of the ratio between the market value the balance sheet ORBIS
value of assets
SustSensitInd Sustainability sensitive industry Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company operates in a sustainability sensi- ORBIS
tive industry, 0 otherwise
13
L. Lepore et al.
In particular, we inserted BoSize and expected to find a positive association with

disclosure, considering that more directors can play their monitoring role better
(Cheng & Courtenay, 2006). We included BoExec and predicted that it is negatively
related to disclosure, assuming that executive directors’ power reduces the monitor-
ing role potentially played by the independent members (Cheng & Courtenay, 2006).
We inserted BoMeetings and expected to find a positive association with disclo-
sure, hypothesizing that directors play their monitoring role better if they meet each
other frequently (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). We included RoleDual and predicted a
negative relation with disclosure, assuming that this power concentration reduces
the board of directors’ monitoring role (Pisano et al., 2015). We considered Muldir
and expected a positive relationship with disclosure, hypothesizing that the directors
play their monitoring role better if they sit on more than one board, thanks to their
experience and skills (Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). We also include CSRComm and
expect to find a positive association because a CSR committee is commonly viewed
as an effective, valuable mechanism for improving CSR disclosure (Garcia-Sánchez
et al., 2014). We included Big 4 and predicted a positive relationship with disclo-
sure, assuming that a Big 4 audit company can stimulate a company toward more
accountable behaviour (Barako et al., 2006). Moreover, we included size, which was
predicted to have a positive association with CSRDisc. Larger firms are expected
to provide more information to satisfy investor demand for information, consid-
ering that they support lower average costs of collecting and disseminating infor-
mation than smaller firms (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007). We inserted Lev, which
was predicted to be positively associated with CSR disclosure because, according
to Jensen and Meckling (1976), firms with higher leverage have more incentive to
disclose information to reduce agency costs with long-term and short-term credi-
tors. We included TobinQ, which was predicted to have a positive relationship with
our dependent variable because companies characterized by high performance could
be incentivized to make more corporate disclosures (Raffournier, 1995) to under-
score their good performance to investors. Finally, we included SustSensInd, which
was predicted to have a positive relationship with CSRDisc because firms belonging
to certain sectors are usually more sensitive to CSR issues, probably because their
production processes have a more substantial negative influence on the environment
and society (Reverte, 2009).
3.4 Regression analysis
To test our hypotheses, we developed the following regression models based on panel
data dependence techniques:
CSRDisc = 𝜶 + 𝜷 1 BoInd + 𝜷 2 e − engag + 𝜷 3 BoInd ∗ e − engag
+ 𝜷 4 BoSize + 𝜷 5 BoExec + 𝜷 6 BoMeetings
(1)
+ 𝜷 7 RoleDual + 𝜷 8 Multidir + 𝜷 9 CSRComm + 𝜷 10 Big4
+ 𝜷 11 Size + 𝜷 12 Lev + 𝜷 13 TobinQ + 𝜷 14 SustSensitInd + 𝜺
13
CSRDisc = 𝜶 + 𝜷 1 BoIndMin + 𝜷 2 e − engag + 𝜷 3 BoIndMin ∗ e − engag

+ 𝜷 4 BoSize + 𝜷 5 BoExec + 𝜷 6 BoMeetings
+ 𝜷 7 RoleDual + 𝜷 8 Multidir + 𝜷 9 CSRComm
+ 𝜷 10 Big4 + 𝜷 11 Size + 𝜷 12 Lev + 𝜷 13 TobinQ + 𝜷 14 SustSensitInd + 𝜺
(2)
We tested our hypotheses considering both the overall level of CSR disclosure and
the specific levels of disclosure related to environmental, social, human rights and anti-
corruption-related aspects (EnvDisc, SocDisc, HumRightDisc and AntiCorrDisc) as
dependent variables.
Even though CSRDisc by the firms varied only slightly over the years, the use of
panel data improves econometric specifications. It favours the assessment of companies’
behaviour over time, allowing the capture of unobserved heterogeneity and undetected
differences among firms’ behaviours and characteristics potentially correlated with
the explanatory variables (Fuente et al., 2017; Martínez-Ferrero et al., 2016; Petersen,
2009). The research used panel data methodology to doubly censored variables: a Tobit
regression that allows for specific consideration of both ends of the rating scale.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the variables.

The CSR disclosure data we used are quite normal, with acceptable skewness
and kurtosis. Skew and kurtosis values does not exceed 2.1 and 3, respectively.
We confirmed the assumption of normality through visual inspection.
The average value of CSRDisc is 31.01, with minimum and maximum values
of 2 and 105, respectively. That is, on average, sampled companies revealed 31
indicators. The broad disparity between the minimum and maximum values and
the standard deviation of 15.26 suggests that companies engage in several CSR-
Disc-related behaviours. Firms that communicate only two metrics indicate that
CSR disclosure is probably still regarded only as a legal necessity by some firms.
CSR transparency does not play a strategic role in these companies’ CG and
stakeholder relationships. After analysing the various types of CSR data released,
it becomes apparent that companies provide more information on EnvDisc and
SocDisc and less information on HumRightDisc and AntiCorrDisc.
The independent variable BoInd varies considerably among companies, from
14 to 89%; the average is 49.7%. Similarly, BoIndMin varies substantially among
companies, from 0% to 57.1%; the average is 9.45%. This relatively low value indi-
cates the limited average presence of independent directors appointed by minority
shareholders. The average value of e-engag is 0.00402, and the minimum and maxi-
mum values are 0 and 0.0547, respectively. The high variability means that, in the
sample, there are companies without followers and without SM interactions (reac-
tions, comments and shares) and companies that have many followers who generate
many interactions. The average value means that in the period considered, each fan
13
L. Lepore et al.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics

Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Dependent variables
CSRDisc 347 31.01 15.26 2 105
EnvDisc 347 12.66 7.510 1 42
SocDisc 347 15.86 7.329 0 51
HumRightDisc 347 1.576 3.273 0 28
AntiCorrDisc 347 0.919 1.569 0 14
Independent and moderat-
ing variables
BoInd 347 0.497 0.497 0.142 0.89
BoIndMin 347 0.094 0.122 0 0.57
e-engag 347 0.0040218 0.0066667 0 0.0547098
Tot_followers 347 305,076 690,676 0 4,268,414
Interaction 347 232,181 1,016,749 0 8,675,038
BoInd*e-engag 0.0020964 0.0041924 0.0425521
BoIndMin*e-engag 347 0.0006137 0.0024163 0 0.0303943
Control variables
BoSize 347 9.963 2.442 5 17
BoExec 347 0.257 0.143 0 0.714
BoMeetings 347 9.896 4.501 2 29
RoleDual 347 0.259 0.439 0 1
MultiDir 347 5.683 3.120 0 15
CSRComm 347 0.222 0.416 0 1
Big4 347 0.919 0.273 0 1
Size 347 13.98 1.622 11.02 18.96
Lev 347 0.351 1.841 0 29.87
TobinQ 347 0.705 0.815 0 6.071
SustSensitInd 347 0.190 0.393 0 1
interacted 0.00402 times with posts every day. Multiplying this value for 365 days
and the average number of followers (305,076), we see that the company with the
average engagement value has 447,638.01 interactions per year. The company with
the highest engagement value had 85,221,019.7 interactions in a year.
Concerning the control variables, BoSize is 9.96 on average, and the minimum
and maximum values are 5 and 17, respectively. The average value assumed by
BoExec is 25.7%. On average, for 25.9% of companies, the board’s CEO and chair-
man are the same person. The average BoMeetings amounts to 9.896 a year. Multidir
has an average value of 5.7, and the value ranges between 0 and 15. Considering that
BoSize is approximately 10 members, Multidir indicates a discrete level of direc-
tors’ engagement in other companies. Twenty-two percent of companies have a CSR
committee. Ninety-two percent of companies had one of the Big 4 as their auditor.
The average size is 13.98, the average Lev is 0.351, and the average TobinQ is 0.705.
Before performing a regression analysis, we investigated the correlations
between model variables (see Table 3). BoInd is positively correlated with both
13
Table 3 Correlation matrix
CSRDisc EnvDisc SocDisc HumRightDisc AntiCorrDisc BoInd BoIndMin e-engag BoInd*e-engag BoIndMin*e-engag
CSRDisc 1.00
EnvDisc 0.82*** 1.00
SocDisc 0.82*** 0.41*** 1.00
HumRightDisc 0.72*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 1.00
AntiCorrDisc 0.47*** 0.24*** 0.35*** 0.39*** 1.00
BoInd 0.20*** 0.31*** 0.01 0.16*** 0.09 1.00
BoIndMin 0.45*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.49*** 0.30*** 0.38* 1.00
e-engag 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.20*** 0.52*** 0.18*** 0.09 0.29*** 1.00
BoInd*e-engag 0.56*** 0.43*** 0.31*** 0.78*** 0.28*** 0.21* 0.55*** 0.73*** 1.00
BoIndMin*e-engag 0.55*** 0.42*** 0.31*** 0.77*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.55*** 0.73*** 0.84*** 1.00
BoSize 0.14* 0.12* 0.17** 0.04 − 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.03 − 0.00 − 0.01
BoExec − 0.21*** − 0.24*** − 0.11* − 0.12* − 0.16** − 0.46* − 0.24*** − 0.09 − 0.13* − 0.13**
BoMeetings 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.03* 0.31* 0.17** 0.16** 0.08 0.07
RoleDual − 0.19*** − 0.07 − 0.21*** − 0.13* − 0.23*** − 0.16* − 0.19*** − 0.06 − 0.11* − 0.11**
MultiDir 0.01 − 0.03 0.07 − 0.03 − 0.03 0.07 − 0.05 − 0.10 − 0.09 − 0.08*
CSRComm 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.19** 0.28*** 0.19*** 0.34* 0.31*** 0.13* 0.26*** 0.25***
Big4 0.13* 0.16** 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.15* 0.06 0.06
Size 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.11* 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.55* 0.40*** 0.09 0.23*** 0.23***
Lev 0.05 0.08 0.00 − 0.00 0.07 0.11* 0.15** − 0.00 0.03 0.03
TobinQ − 0.17** − 0.24*** − 0.07 0.02 − 0.10 − 0.07 − 0.03 − 0.04 − 0.05 − 0.05
SustSensitInd 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.08 0.16** 0.30*** 0.30* 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.29***
13
Table 3 (continued)
BoSize BoExec BoMeetings RoleDual MultiDir CSRComm Big4 Size Lev TobinQ SustSensitInd
13
CSRDisc
EnvDisc
SocDisc
HumRightDisc
AntiCorrDisc
BoInd
BoIndMin
e-engag
BoInd*e-engag
BoIndMin*e-engag
BoSize 1.00
BoExec − 0.22*** 1.00
BoMeetings − 0.02 − 0.24*** 1.00
RoleDual − 0.23*** 0.20*** − 0.12* 1.00
MultiDir 0.63*** − 0.34*** 0.02 − 0.20** 1.00
CSRComm 0.11* − 0.24*** 0.11* − 0.19*** 0.13* 1.00
Big4 0.17** − 0.17** − 0.10 − 0.07 0.13* − 0.01 1.00
Size 0.33*** − 0.39*** 0.17** − 0.26*** 0.25** 0.44*** 0.13* 1.00
Lev 0.01 − 0.08 0.06 − 0.07 0.06 0.12* 0.03 − 0.01 1.00
TobinQ 0.14** 0.15** − 0.22*** 0.08 0.21**** 0.04 0.08 0.00 − 0.04 1.00
SustSensitInd − 0.06 − 0.22*** 0.17** − 0.12* − 0.04 0.18*** 0.06 0.25*** 0.10 − 0.03 1.00
* p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

L. Lepore et al.
EnvDisc and HumRigthDisc. Instead, BoIndMin is positively correlated with dif-

ferent kinds of disclosure. E-engagement is also positively correlated with each of
the different CSR disclosure types, similar to the interaction term.
This study used Tobit regressions to test the hypotheses. However, at first, we
estimated a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to check for mul-
ticollinearity based on the assumption that much of the diagnostic information for
multicollinearity can be obtained by calculating an OLS regression that uses the
same variables (dependent and independent) (Menard, 2002). The variance infla-
tion factor (VIF) figures for all independent variables were less than or equal to 3,
thus indicating that no multicollinearity exists in the multiple regression models
(Hair et al., 1998). These analyses are not presented here but are available from the
authors upon request.
4.2 Regression results
Tables 4 and 5 show the results of regressions obtained using Stata software. In par-
ticular, Table 4 shows the results for the tests of H 1a and H
2a, whereas Table 5 shows
results for the tests of H1b and H2b.
The rho value indicates that the estimated models’ explanatory capacity is
between 70.9% and 92,3%. The Wald chi2 probability associated with the tests’ val-
ues is below 0.01: the final models are accepted as relevant from an econometric
point of view. The models’ p values are statistically significant at the 99% and 95%
confidence levels, and thus, the fitness of the equations to explain the effects of inde-
pendent variables on CSRDisc is accepted (Hair et al., 1998).
In models 1 and 2 reported in both Tables 4 and 5, the dependent variable is CSR-
Disc, while in Models 3–10, the dependent variables are the different components
of CSRDisc: EnvDisc (Models 3 and 4), SocDisc (Models 5 and 6), HumRighDisc
(Models 7 and 8) and AntiCorrDisc (Models 9 and 10). The models labelled with
the number 1 in both Tables 4 and 5 test the hypotheses H 1a and H1b respectively,
i.e. the direct effects of board independence (measured with BoInd and BoIndMin)
on CSRDisc. The models labelled with the number 2 in both Tables 4 and 5, on the
other hand, test the hypotheses H 2a and H2b, i.e., the moderating effects of e-engag
on the relationship between board independence (measured with BoInd and BoInd-
Min) and CSRDisc.
Concerning the overall CSRDisc level, the results in Model 1 in Table 4 con-
firm H1a, showing a positive association between board independence and CSRDisc.
More specifically, the coefficient of BoInd is statistically significant at better than the
5 percent level for explaining variations in CSRDisc (β = 10.57, p < 0.05). Concern-
ing the specific components of CSRDisc, the tests of H1a show varying results: Mod-
els 3, 7 and 9 confirm H 1a regarding EnvDisc, HumRigthDisc and AntiCorrDisc and
mean that board independence is positively and significantly associated with envi-
ronmental, anti-corruption and human rights disclosure. Instead, regression Model 5
does not show a significant result regarding SocDisc. The descriptive statistics show
that the disclosure on human capital is the one that, in the CSR disclosure, receives
the most attention from companies; the amount of disclosure of this type is, in fact,
13
Table 4 Tobit regressions (with BoInd)
VARIABLES CSRDisc EnvDisc SocDisc HumRightDisc AntiCorrDisc
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
13
Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction effect Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction
effect effect effect effect
BoInd 10.57** 6.969 5.691*** 5.705*** − 0.180 − 2.150 2.918*** 2.260** 0.856* 0.469
(4.581) (4.836) (1.680) (1.761) (2.912) (3.092) (0.850) (0.895) (0.449) (0.464)
e-engag 322.3*** − 190.4 47.15 49.36 135.4** − 139.2 67.76*** − 27.97 25.38*** − 35.01
(90.94) (243.6) (32.96) (87.64) (56.29) (158.6) (17.27) (44.64) (8.593) (23.23)
BoInd*e- 907.9** − 3.951 481.1* 170.9** 106.3***
engag
(402.1) (144.9) (260.0) (74.02) (38.11)
BoSize 0.892** 0.957** 0.328** 0.327** 0.547** 0.579** − 0.0270 − 0.0136 − 0.0183 − 0.00877
(0.406) (0.404) (0.159) (0.160) (0.240) (0.240) (0.0784) (0.0781) (0.0409) (0.0406)
BoExec − 4.002 − 3.680 − 1.019 − 1.021 − 1.680 − 1.555 − 0.855 − 0.771 0.142 0.220
(5.613) (5.580) (2.129) (2.130) (3.422) (3.407) (1.060) (1.055) (0.557) (0.550)
BoMeetings -0.256* − 0.234* − 0.0392 − 0.0392 − 0.0751 − 0.0613 − 0.0829*** − 0.0789*** − 0.0200 − 0.0173
(0.138) (0.138) (0.0508) (0.0509) (0.0873) (0.0872) (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0135) (0.0133)
RoleDual − 0.283 0.108 0.107 0.105 − 0.886 − 0.716 − 0.180 − 0.0951 − 0.0605 0.00399
(1.646) (1.645) (0.620) (0.626) (1.011) (1.013) (0.311) (0.311) (0.164) (0.164)
Big4dum 3.957** 3.989** 0.589 0.588 1.696 1.742 0.605* 0.605* 0.279 0.279
(1.852) (1.843) (0.674) (0.674) (1.201) (1.194) (0.341) (0.340) (0.179) (0.176)
MultiDir − 0.240 − 0.246 − 0.0304 − 0.0304 − 0.129 − 0.134 − 0.00114 − 0.00187 − 0.0112 − 0.0111
(0.277) (0.276) (0.103) (0.103) (0.171) (0.171) (0.0520) (0.0518) (0.0271) (0.0267)
Size 0.481 0.461 0.0924 0.0923 0.0993 0.0762 0.0647 0.0633 0.0359 0.0332
(0.467) (0.464) (0.174) (0.174) (0.294) (0.293) (0.0870) (0.0866) (0.0456) (0.0449)
Lev 0.221 0.214 0.0887 0.0887 0.0721 0.0675 0.00379 0.00293 0.00455 0.00370
(0.209) (0.208) (0.0740) (0.0740) (0.140) (0.139) (0.0379) (0.0378) (0.0200) (0.0196)
Tobin Q -1.807* − 1.830* − 1.050** − 1.049** − 0.516 − 0.512 0.159 0.155 − 0.0831 − 0.0818
L. Lepore et al.
Table 4 (continued)
Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction effect Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction
effect effect effect effect
(1.070) (1.060) (0.431) (0.432) (0.612) (0.610) (0.209) (0.207) (0.108) (0.106)
SustSensitInd 3.736 3.251 2.082 2.085 0.563 0.334 0.634 0.538 0.923*** 0.871***
(3.067) (3.027) (1.558) (1.561) (1.537) (1.536) (0.678) (0.666) (0.335) (0.338)
CSRComm 1.462 1.757 0.809 0.808 0.460 0.560 0.125 0.189 − 0.0109 0.0170
(1.477) (1.474) (0.535) (0.538) (0.936) (0.931) (0.273) (0.274) (0.142) (0.140)
Constant 10.27 11.49 5.394* 5.392* 9.242** 10.11** − 0.514 − 0.345 − 0.0665 0.0287
(7.729) (7.690) (3.033) (3.034) (4.668) (4.678) (1.486) (1.477) (0.773) (0.765)
sigma_u 12.26*** 12.05*** 6.458*** 6.459*** 5.856*** 5.838*** 2.772*** 2.715*** 1.362*** 1.376***
(0.890) (0.881) (0.451) (0.454) (0.447) (0.446) (0.197) (0.196) (0.095) (0.096)
sigma_e 5.446*** 5.432*** 1.877*** 1.877*** 3.749*** 3.728*** 0.973*** 0.972*** 0.516*** 0.506***
(0.261) (0.261) (0.090) (0.090) (0.178) (0.177) (0.046) (0.047) (0.024) (0.024)
Rho .835 .831 .922 .922 .709 .710 .890 .886 .874 .880
Log likeli- − 1244.369 − 1241.819 − 922.975 − 922.975 − 1075.282 − 1073.578 − 673.282 − 670.604 − 444.741 − 440.934
hood
Wald chi2 (13) 44.08*** (14) 49.84*** (13) 35.46*** (14) 35.47*** (13) 20.57** (14) 24.17** (13) 44.25*** (14) 49.92*** (13) 30.90*** (14)
39.04***
347 firm-year observations and 119 firms. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1—Standard errors in parentheses
13
Table 5 Tobit regressions (with BoIndMin)
13
Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction
effect effect effect effect effect
BoIndMin 37.05*** 30.61*** 5.771*** 6.181*** 20.61*** 17.86*** 6.638*** 4.200*** 3.391*** 2.709***
(4.598) (5.124) (1.810) (2.010) (3.027) (3.370) (0.876) (0.967) (0.443) (0.482)
e-engag 188.3** 14.54 25.23 36.00 68.24 − 11.77 46.08*** − 17.15 14.35* − 4.733
(84.47) (103.9) (33.33) (40.60) (53.59) (68.92) (16.48) (19.54) (7.964) (9.754)
BoIndMin*e- 1,086*** − 71.25 446.0* 451.7*** 117.3***
engag
(385.8) (153.6) (243.4) (80.80) (36.06)
BoSize 0.932** 0.950** 0.362** 0.360** 0.552** 0.562** − 0.0130 − 0.000585 − 0.00967 − 0.00634
(0.376) (0.371) (0.159) (0.159) (0.227) (0.226) (0.0736) (0.0702) (0.0380) (0.0373)
BoExec − 3.257 − 3.769 − 2.436 − 2.393 0.711 0.571 − 1.129 − 1.256 0.295 0.273
(4.965) (4.922) (2.050) (2.048) (3.085) (3.071) (0.958) (0.927) (0.492) (0.483)
BoMeetings − 0.171 − 0.155 − 0.000906 − 0.00140 − 0.0714 − 0.0606 − 0.0612** − 0.0555** − 0.0119 − 0.0101
(0.125) (0.124) (0.0499) (0.0498) (0.0803) (0.0801) (0.0238) (0.0234) (0.0121) (0.0119)
RoleDual 0.402 0.531 0.196 0.179 − 0.419 − 0.366 − 0.0797 − 0.0286 0.0205 0.0504
(1.519) (1.507) (0.622) (0.622) (0.954) (0.950) (0.293) (0.284) (0.151) (0.149)
Big4dum 3.076* 3.185* 0.406 0.394 1.399 1.438 0.429 0.449 0.187 0.193
(1.702) (1.698) (0.676) (0.675) (1.122) (1.117) (0.322) (0.319) (0.164) (0.161)
MultiDir − 0.150 − 0.150 − 0.0488 − 0.0483 − 0.0343 − 0.0321 0.00374 − 0.000333 − 0.00496 − 0.00456
(0.254) (0.252) (0.103) (0.103) (0.161) (0.160) (0.0487) (0.0476) (0.0248) (0.0243)
Size 0.266 0.226 0.122 0.122 − 0.180 − 0.203 0.0497 0.0349 0.0161 0.0112
(0.424) (0.422) (0.173) (0.173) (0.273) (0.272) (0.0813) (0.0795) (0.0415) (0.0407)
Lev 0.149 0.159 0.0910 0.0897 − 0.00347 0.000881 − 0.00396 − 0.000845 − 0.00175 − 0.000679
L. Lepore et al.
Table 5 (continued)
Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction Direct effect Interaction
effect effect effect effect effect
(0.191) (0.191) (0.0741) (0.0739) (0.130) (0.130) (0.0357) (0.0359) (0.0182) (0.0178)
Tobin Q -2.166** − 2.103** − 1.180*** − 1.182*** − 0.676 − 0.629 0.0610 0.0861 − 0.122 − 0.109
(0.994) (0.978) (0.431) (0.431) (0.582) (0.579) (0.196) (0.185) (0.100) (0.0991)
SustSensitInd 2.429 1.833 2.146 2.191 − 0.494 − 0.679 0.438 0.129 0.793** 0.736**
(2.921) (2.821) (1.563) (1.573) (1.479) (1.471) (0.633) (0.541) (0.331) (0.331)
CSRComm 1.072 0.965 0.741 0.745 0.136 0.0245 0.0919 0.110 − 0.0400 − 0.0627
(1.353) (1.345) (0.536) (0.535) (0.872) (0.870) (0.258) (0.255) (0.129) (0.127)
Constant 14.84** 15.79** 7.331** 7.305** 10.69** 11.11** 0.541 0.839 0.242 0.326
(7.072) (7.002) (2.990) (2.987) (4.399) (4.382) (1.379) (1.323) (0.707) (0.696)
sigma_u 11.75*** 11.26*** 6.482*** 6.515*** 5.681*** 5.631*** 2.588*** 2.155*** 1.356*** 1.361***
(0.841) (0.822) (0.452) (0.460) (0.426) (0.423) (0.186) (0.176) (0.0933) (0.0934)
sigma_e 4.958*** 4.974*** 1.879*** 1.873*** 3.474*** 3.464*** 0.919*** 0.934*** 0.466*** 0.455***
(0.237) (0.239) (0.0900) (0.0903) (0.164) (0.164) (0.044) (0.047) (0.022) (0.021)
Rho .848 .836 .922 .923 .727 .725 .888 .841 .894 .899
Log likeli- − 1217.485 − 1213.512 − 923.619 − 923.511 − 1053.634 − 1051.963 − 652.064 − 635.353 − 420.350 − 415.184
hood
Wald chi2 (13) (14) (13) (14) (13) (14) (13) (14) (13) (14)
106.91*** 117.17*** 34.17*** 34.40*** 69.18*** 73.21*** 91.10*** 123.09*** 88.32*** 102.00***
347 firm-year observations and 119 firms. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1—Standard errors in parentheses
13
L. Lepore et al.
the highest among those analysed. However, the test of Hypothesis H1a highlights
that this disclosure is not linked to the board’s independence. Apart from the pecu-
liar result obtained for SocDisc, our results on H 1a are consistent with the results of
several other studies (i.e., Amran et al., 2014; Chen & Jaggi, 2000; Cheng & Cour-
tenay, 2006; Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2009), according
to which board independence is a suitable CG mechanism that stimulates CSRDisc.
Model 2 in Table 4 supports H2a, showing that e-engag positively moderates
the relationship between board independence and CSRDisc. The coefficient of
BoInd*e-engag is positive and statistically significant (β = 907.9, p < 0.05). The
results of Models 6, 8 and 10 confirm H 2a regarding SocDisc, HumRigthDisc and
AntiCorrDisc, while regression Model 4 does not show a significant result concern-
ing EnvDisc. These results mean that e-engag positively moderates the relationships
between board independence and SocDisc, HumRightDisc and AntiCorrDisc, while
its effect is insignificant for environmental disclosure.
Concerning the control variables, in Model 1, the coefficients of BoSize and Big-
4dum are statistically significant and positive. These results can be read in light of
the better consulting and control roles played by a big board and a big four auditing
company, respectively, in stimulating CSR practices, making firms more willing to
provide a higher disclosure level. Instead, the coefficient of TobinQ is statistically
significant and negative, meaning that companies with higher performance (TobinQ)
are less inclined or interested in disclosing CSR information. Finally, the coefficient
of BoMeetings is statistically significant and negative, meaning that a high number
of board meetings during the year negatively influence CSR disclosure.
To test Hypotheses H 1b and H
2b and better understand the role of board independ-
ence in stimulating CSRDisc, we also perform the same regression analysis shown
above considering the proportion of independent directors appointed by minority
shareholders (BoIndMin).
This analysis could help one understand why both the relationship between board
independence and SocDisc and the moderating effect of e-engag on the relationship
between BoInd and EnvDisc are not significant using BoInd. The following table
shows the results of the regression analyses.
The results in Table 5 confirm our hypotheses, with higher levels of statistical
significance compared to that in table than those in Table 4. Model 1 confirms H1b
with reference to the overall level of CSRDisc, whereas models 3, 5, 7 and 9 confirm
H1b regarding all the specific levels of disclosure related to environmental, social,
human rights and anti-corruption related aspects, differently from the results shown
in Table 4.
Regarding H2b, the results shown in Table 5 are the same as those shown in
Table 4. Again, in this case, the significance levels are higher. However, even by
measuring the board’s independence by BoIndMin, it is not possible to highlight the
significance of the moderation effect of e-engag on the relationship between inde-
pendence and environmental disclosure. This finding may depend on the fact that
environmental disclosure represents the component of CSR disclosure that public
opinion has paid the greatest attention to in recent years. Hence, companies offer an
adequate level of communication on this issue, regardless of the independent direc-
tors’ stimulus action.
13
The results shown in Table 5 reveal the more effective role of independent minor-
ity directors in stimulating disclosure (Gisbert & Navallas, 2013; Patelli & Prencipe,
2007) in the Italian context. These independent directors better represent external
small investors’ interests, contrary to the other independent directors, which are
nonexecutive directors representing majority shareholders (Moscariello et al., 2018;
Gisbert & Navallas, 2013; Dong-Song & Zootae, 2007; Yeh & Woidtke, 2005).
To add robustness to the results, we constructed OLS regression models. The
OLS choice as a robustness test depends on its simplicity and, consequently, reli-
ability. The OLS model results are similar to those presented above regarding the
main and interaction effects regarding both the overall CSR disclosure level and
the different specific levels of EnvDisc, SocDisc, HumRightDisc and AntiCorrDisc.
Moreover, the OLS regressions show the statistical significance of e-engagement as
a moderating variable in the relationship between board independence and environ-
mental disclosure.
Regarding the endogeneity problem that could arise from the simultaneous
relationships among board characteristics and disclosure practices, we execute an
instrumental-variable analysis as a robustness check. This approach alleviates the
endogeneity bias arising both from reverse causality as well as from unobserved
heterogeneity. To find a suitable instrumental variable, we exploit the insight in
Knyazeva et al. (2013) and Chintrakarn et al. (2021). They highlighted that local
director labour markets have significant effects on board independence: in an area
with more firms, the local supply of directors is larger, and hence, there is a larger
number of potential independent directors. Our instrumental variable is the number
of listed firms located in the same city. The supply of potential directors at the city
level is beyond any one firm’s control and is plausibly exogenous. Thus, ideally, the
two crucial criteria for instrumental variables, strong relevance to the endogenous
variable and orthogonality with the error term, are met. Regression results of these
analysis are similar to that of our main regression models and confirm our hypoth-
eses. Thus, our instrumental-variable analysis confirms the conclusions that inde-
pendent directors rise CSRDisc significantly, in particular for more exposed firms.
The details of our robustness analysis are not presented here, but are available from
the authors upon request.
5 Discussion
Our findings show that independent directors play an essential role in improving
CSRDisc, particularly those appointed by minority shareholders. These independent
directors can bring a broader vision to the company and can connect the company
better to the external environment, allowing it greater access to relational capital that
insiders, executives, and independent directors tied to the dominant shareholders
cannot guarantee (Burt, 1980; Connelly et al., 2010). Minority independent direc-
tors know stakeholders’ expectations better and are usually more efficient in control-
ling external contingencies. By establishing many external links with stakeholders
and minority shareholders, they increase board objectivity and its ability to repre-
sent multiple points of view regarding the role of the company in society. Therefore,
13
L. Lepore et al.
boards of directors characterized by higher levels of this kind of independence are

more likely to ensure that their companies behave in a socially responsible way
(García-Sánchez et al., 2014).
Our findings also show that the mixed empirical results highlighted on the rela-
tion between board independence and CSRDisc could be due, among other things,
to the level of stakeholder e-engagement, which generates institutional pressure
on the firm and its directors, conditioning their behaviour (Fenwick et al., 2019).
Our results, in fact, show that e-engag positively moderates the relationship
between board independence and CSRDisc, confirming that engagement through
SM could play a watchdog role (Bednar, 2012), strengthening board independ-
ence as an effective mechanism for stimulating CSRDisc. These results are in line
with studies showing that more exposed companies tend to disclose more CSR
information to better respond to societal expectations and to political and pub-
lic pressures and to gain legitimacy (Elijido-Ten, 2011; Reverte, 2009; Garcia-
Ayuso & Larrinaga, 2003; Bewley & Li, 2000; Brown & Deegan, 1998; Patten
& Nance, 1998; Grey et al., 1995; Guthrie & Parker, 1989; Dowling & Pfeffer,
1975). Independent directors are particularly interested in demonstrating their
socially responsible behaviour to gain legitimacy and avoid penalties and harm-
ful media exposure. Hence, they could be more inclined to respect CSR standards
and stimulate a high level of CSRDisc when companies are more visible through
SM. The fear of bad news being exposed could make independent external direc-
tors unfavourable to information disclosure, as García-Sánchez et al. (2014)
found. However, the effect of a low level of transparency could be more danger-
ous for directors. Bad news damages directors’ professional reputations, but a low
level of transparency could be worse (Fich & Shivdasani, 2007), particularly in
periods in which society is giving great attention to CSR issues. This statement
is particularly true for independent directors appointed by minority shareholders,
who have no relationship with large dominant shareholders, and thus, need to pre-
serve their reputation and prestige in society to maintain their seat on the board,
their advantages and their network in the market for corporate control. In light of
legitimacy theory, our results indicate that independent directors of companies
with a greater number of fans’ interactions on SM are strongly encouraged to per-
form better their role of stimulating CSRDisc, much more so than the directors
of companies who are less exposed to followers’ interactions and judgements.
They are more exposed to external stakeholders’ assessments; hence, their risk of
reputation losses is higher. If the socially irresponsible behaviour of a company
with a greater degree of stakeholder e-engagement became public knowledge
through SM, the independent directors of that company, particularly independent
minority directors, would suffer more in terms of legitimacy than the directors
of a company with a lesser degree of e-engagement. Thus, to avoid such harmful
external exposure and loss of reputation (Johnson & Greening, 1999), independ-
ent directors of companies with higher e-engagement have an incentive to ensure
that those companies disclose CSR information. However, the propensity of inde-
pendent directors to favour CSRDisc might derive not only from a defensive atti-
tude but also from a proactive stance aimed at gaining legitimacy and prestige in
society. In this way, CSR disclosure reduces the information risk, benefitting both
13
directors and firms in areas such as credibility, job opportunities and networking
for the former and reduction in capital and debt costs or an increase in the market
value for the companies (García‐Sánchez & Martínez‐Ferrero, 2017).
6 Conclusion, implications and limitations
Social media have determined an incredible growth of companies’ stakeholders,

who increasingly demand not only information about their CSR behavior, but the
real participation in decision-making processes. This “new digital governance”,
characterized by the active involvement of stakeholders, can reduce information
asymmetries that characterize Italian context (Manita et al, 2020), transforming the
role of independent directors, from a mere law obligation to guardians of the stake-
holders’ social needs. In the digital age, companies are closer to their stakeholders,
increasing their ability to dialogue with them and satisfy their needs (Ivaninskiy,
2019; Moşneanu, 2020). This could lead to the emergence of a digital democracy
within the companies (Jagadeesha & Srinivasrao, 2020).
In this scenario, the dissemination of CSR information has become a double-
edged sword for companies and their governing bodies, as it is equally able to
improve their image and legitimacy or worsen their reputation. The risk highlighted
and the strategic opportunity are increased by SM, which, having become tools for
universal stakeholder engagement, enormously amplify the diffusion of information
and, consequently, their effects.
Independent directors have prime responsibility for CSR communication, and
their effectiveness as a mechanism able to encourage CSR disclosure depends,
among other things, on their true degree of independence.
This study shows that independent directors, particularly those appointed by
minority shareholders, positively influence CSR disclosure and that institutional
pressure through SM plays an essential role in their preferences and functions regard-
ing CSR. In the digital age, companies’ legitimacies and images are increasingly
created and supported by information passing through SM channels (Di Domenico
et al., 2021; Dunn & Harness, 2018; Fatma et al., 2020; Foltean et al., 2019; Lee
et al., 2018; Lodhia et al., 2020). Consequently, stakeholder engagement through
SM has important implications for external directors’ legitimacy, pushing them to
increasingly consider external stakeholders’ interests and stimulating the company’s
CSR disclosure (Fasan & Mio, 2017). This is relevant for contexts in which some
internal and external CG mechanisms fail to guarantee stakeholder rights, such as
Italy. In these contexts, institutional pressure from stakeholder engagement through
SM can generate a virtuous circle in which high levels of stakeholder engagement
positively influence the effectiveness of board independence, which in turn improves
CSRDisc and CG, allowing the company to obtain greater consensus from lenders,
shareholders and stakeholders.
13
L. Lepore et al.
6.1 Theoretical implications
This study provides theoretical contributions to the studies on the determinants of

CSR. It contributes to the existing literature, proposing the inclusion of stakehold-
ers’ e-engagement through SM, as a moderating variable, in studies analysing the
relationship between BoInd and CSRDisc, thereby helping to systematize the diver-
gent empirical results highlighted by scholars (Dalton & Dalton, 2011). Besides, this
article contributes to the literature on company disclosure, suggesting a new index
to measure the level of CSRDisc based on Directive 95/2014 and the GRI reporting
principle standards, which can be used in future studies, as well as a better met-
ric of stakeholder engagement through SM than those proposed in earlier literature,
such as the measurement of corporate legitimacy or reputation by sentiment analysis
(Colleoni, 2013) or the number of fans’ reactions and interactions with firms’ posts
(Ihm, 2015; Bonson & Ratkai, 2013). The stakeholder e-engagement variable com-
bines measures of popularity, commitment and virality from the firm’s fan pages,
offering a more comprehensive view of reactivity, dialogues, stakeholder engage-
ment and social legitimacy generated by SM. In this sense, e-engagement becomes a
critical institutional factor whose pressure should not be overlooked in CG research
(Lounsbury & Zhao, 2013; Tolmie et al., 2020; Zattoni et al., 2017). Moreover, this
indicator could be used effectively to measure the so-called relational capital, on
which research has been questioning for some time (Martìni et al., 2016).
6.2 Managerial implications
The results of this study have also significant practical implications. First, this article
evidences that stakeholders pressure through SM can strengthen board independence
as an effective mechanism for stimulating CSRDisc. This study suggest to managers
that SM, by opening a critical dialogic channel for stakeholders, boards, managers
and companies (Colleoni, 2013), plays a crucial role in enabling stakeholder engage-
ment in CG digital processes (Bellucci & Manetti, 2017; Bogan, 2008; Hoffmann
& Lutz, 2015; Krumay & Geyer, 2016). Firms and managers can use SM as a stra-
tegic mechanism to respond to societal expectations (Lee et al., 2013), creating a
context of dialogic communication and mutual respect with stakeholders (Andriof
et al., 2017) to rebalance the power distribution between companies and stakehold-
ers. Second, stakeholder e-engagement reduces stakeholders’ scepticism regarding
traditional reporting (Romero et al., 2018; De Beelde & Tuybens, 2015; Unerman
& Bennett, 2004) and improves the ability of companies to identify their stakehold-
ers. However, as stated in the previous literature, although SM may offer a possible
avenue for dialogic exchanges, they must evolve; for example, they should encour-
age offline and face-to-face interactions for dialogue around social issues between
companies and stakeholders. In this way, SM may be able to become the dialogic
spaces that communication scholars envisioned to contribute to real social change in
which the use of SM stimulates online stakeholder engagement, and which in turn
encourages offline participation in firms’ governance processes (Hoffmann & Lutz,
2015; Kent & Taylor, 2021). Third, this article suggests to regulators the necessity to
13
reconsider the role of factual board independence from dominant shareholders when
concentrated ownership structures render independent firms an inefficient moni-
toring device for companies. They should include in the code of best practice the
recommendation for the inclusion of enough minority independent directors in the
board composition, also strengthening the opportunity to use SM as official commu-
nication channels in determining policy for sustainability reporting standards. This
implication supports the SEC’s intention to introduce sanctions for administrators in
cases of noncompliance with CSR disclosure rules and standards for strengthening
the responsibility of independent directors regarding the materiality and relevance of
CSRDisc (SEC, 2020).
6.3 Limitations and future researches
For years, traditional research on CG has focused on how to create engagement, on

how to involve stakeholders, considering them as a passive subject of communica-
tion. This study opens up new spaces for future research, about new ways to involve
external stakeholder to allow their active participation to companies’ strategies for-
mulation and decision-making processes. SM can thus become a further tool for gov-
ernance, also opening research in this direction (Chaher & Spellman, 2012; Roohani
& Attaran, 2014). However, this study has some limitations, so further research is
necessary. First, the sample includes only Italian companies; therefore, future stud-
ies could adopt our approach and apply it elsewhere to extend the present results. It
would also be interesting to map SM’s use for stakeholder engagement by Eurozone
companies and compare stakeholder engagement through SM with that obtained
using other channels (i.e., traditional media) to identify and understand the reasons
behind possible differences or similarities and understand the reasons. Moreover,
this study investigates the key CSR performance indicators released by firms but
does not consider other CSR information that companies should provide according
to Directive 95/2014. Therefore, future studies could investigate whether companies
are disclosing all CSR information required by Directive 95/2014. Finally, this study
investigates the quantity of CSR information. Future studies could analyse the attrib-
utes of disclosure, such as the time orientation (forward-looking, present or past),
the nature (quantitative or qualitative) and the type (financial or non-financial) of
disclosure, to examine the quality of CSR information released.
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Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.
Luigi Lepore, PhD is an Associate Professor of Business Administration at Parthenope University of

Naples (Italy). He is Head of Studies of Administration and Organization Science and Public Manage-
ment. He has been a Visiting Researcher at IE Business School (Madrid) and at Institute for Court Man-
agement (Williamsburg - USA). His research interests focus on corporate governance, financial distress,
accounting and financial reporting, public accounting and public management. He teaches business
administration, accounting and public management. He has participated as speaker in several interna-
tional conferences, including annual congress of European Accounting Association, European Group of
Public Administration, Italian Chapter of Information System, European Institute for Advanced Studies
in Management and the European Academy of Management. He has published numerous articles in jour-
nals, including Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, Business Strategy
and the Environment, Journal of Management and Governance, Utilities Policy, BMC Health Services
Research, Journal of Intellectual Capital, Information System Management, Management Control and
Financial Reporting
Loris Landriani, PhD is an Associate Professor of Business Business Administration at Parthenope Uni-
versity of Naples (Italy). He is currently a professor of Business Administration and External Auditing. In
the past he has taught, always at the Faculty of Economics: Accounting and Budget, Corporate Strategy,
Company Evaluation, Governance and Control of local public service companies, Economic and finan-
cial communication. His research interests mainly concern public utilities, viewed from the perspective
of government, control and evaluation. In particular, he has dealt with transport, water services, kinder-
gartens and cultural heritage. He is the author of numerous national and international researches and
publications on these topics. He has been a Visiting Researcher at the Department of Organization and
Leadership of Columbia University, New York.
Sabrina Pisano, PhD is an Associate Professor of Business Administration at the “Parthenope” University
of Naples, Italy. She has been a Visiting Researcher at Leonard Stern School of Business of the New York
University. She teaches “Accounting and annual report” and “Human resources administration and eco-
nomics”. She is interested in the following topics: annual report, voluntary disclosure, corporate social
13
responsibility, corporate governance. She has participated as a Speaker in several international confer-
ences, including the annual congresses of European Accounting Association (EAA), the European Insti-
tute for Advanced Studies in Management (EIASM) and the workshop on Accounting and Regulation.
She published numerous articles in journals, including Journal of Intellectual Capital, Corporate Govern-
ance: The International Journal of Business in Society, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences.
Gabriella D’Amore, PhD is an Associate Professor of Business Administration at the University of Naples
Parthenope, Italy. She has been visiting scholar at the Department of Community, City, and Regional
Planning of Cornell University – Ithaca – USA. Her research topics include the governance and perfor-
mance measurement of public services, especially water utilities; environmental disclosure and Sustain-
able Development Goals; ownership structure, financial performance and reporting. She serves Environ-
ment, Development and Sustainability Journal edited by Springer as associate editor and reviewer. She
serves as reviewer Journal of Intellectual Capital, British Food Journal, Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence
- in AI Business, Sustainability, Asia Pacific Journal of Business Administration. Her research has been
published in several books and international journals (e.g. Utilities Policy, KMI International Journal of
Maritime Affairs and Fisheries).
Stefano Pozzoli is full professor of Business Administration at the University of Naples Parthenope,
Italy. He teaches accounting. He is member of the Observatory for the finance and the accounting of
the local governments, for the Ministry of the Interior. Member of the joint commission of the national
council of the chartered accountants and the council of accountants. Italian Member of IPSAS board. His
research interests concern the following subjects: Public services, Local Governments.
13

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Journal of Management and Governance

Corporate governance in the digital age: the role of social

Luigi Lepore1 · Loris Landriani2 · Sabrina Pisano1 · Gabriella D’Amore1 ·

Accepted: 10 December 2021

Keywords Board independence · CSR disclosure · Social media · Stakeholder

2.1 The relationship between board independence and CSR disclosure

According to legitimacy theory (Suchman, 1995), companies gain legitimacy

However, in a context characterized by closely held firms, such as in Italy,

Hypothesis 1b The greater the proportion of independent directors appointed on the

2.2 The moderating role of stakeholder engagement through social media

Some scholars have found a negative relationship between board independence

SM allow companies to have a continuous dialogue with their stakeholders and

media pressure on independent director behaviour. Studying Spanish listed compa-

we considered the effect of stakeholder e-engagement on the relation between board

Hypothesis 2a Stakeholder e-engagement positively moderates the relationship

Hypothesis 2b Stakeholder e-engagement positively moderates the relationship

3.1 Sample selection and data source

3.2 The Italian context

2005) significantly reduce the effectiveness of disclosure and board independence as

3.3 Dependent, independent, moderating and control variables

NFKPI companies should provide, we referred to the GRI standards developed in

Size Size Natural logarithm of total assets ORBIS

In particular, we inserted BoSize and expected to find a positive association with

CSRDisc = 𝜶 + 𝜷 1 BoIndMin + 𝜷 2 e − engag + 𝜷 3 BoIndMin ∗ e − engag

Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the variables.

Table 2 Descriptive statistics

* p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

EnvDisc and HumRigthDisc. Instead, BoIndMin is positively correlated with dif-

boards of directors characterized by higher levels of this kind of independence are

6 Conclusion, implications and limitations

Social media have determined an incredible growth of companies’ stakeholders,

This study provides theoretical contributions to the studies on the determinants of

6.3 Limitations and future researches

For years, traditional research on CG has focused on how to create engagement, on

Luigi Lepore, PhD is an Associate Professor of Business Administration at Parthenope University of

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2.1 The relationship between board independence and CSR disclosure

2.2 The moderating role of stakeholder engagement through social media

3.1 Sample selection and data source

3.2 The Italian context

3.3 Dependent, independent, moderating and control variables

* p < 0.10; p < 0.05; *p < 0.01

6 Conclusion, implications and limitations

6.3 Limitations and future researches