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The document appears to be from a 1978 Tactical Air Command publication that discusses aviation safety and lessons learned from accidents.

The Tactical Air Command Attack is a publication from the Tactical Air Command of the US Air Force that discusses aviation safety and lessons learned from accidents and incidents.

The publication covers topics such as aviation accidents and incidents, safety lessons, pilot profiles, letters to the editor on safety issues, and safety statistics.

tac attack

July 1978

Night owls do it in the dark ..pg 10


Letters

TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

THC HTTHCK
JULY 1978 VOL 18 NO 7

COMMANDER
GENERAL W. L. CREECH
VICE COMMANDER
LT GENERAL JAMES A. KNIGHT. JR.

CHIEF OF SAFETY
COL RICHARD K. ELY
EDITOR
CAPT PETE ABLER
ART EDITOR
STAN HARDISON
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
MARY KONOPNICKI

CONTENTS
Editor:
I am totally dismayed by Maj G. H. Felix's article,
Angle of Attack 3 "Lessons," which does a great injustice to the five 0-
The Airp lane's Pomt of Vtew 4 2A pilots involved in the three mishaps he so
Breathes There a Pilot 6 perfunctorily describes ... Tagging the cause of these
~CTI~ 8
Ntght Owls Do It In The Dark 10
three mishaps as a "lack of professionalism" is a
Atrcrew of Dtsttnctton 13 gross oversimplification which ... I find unacceptable
SPO Corner 14
Chock Talk 18 Maj J ohn L. Bradley I I I
Ftrst Thtngs Ftrst 19 Michigan ANG
Mamtenance As a Foretgn Language 20
Ten Commandments 23
Murder On The Runway Express 24
Dear Maj Bradley
Safety Awards 27 Many mishaps occur which are the result of a
Fleaglegram 28 number of interrelated circumstances, causes, etc.
F- 15 Emergency St\uation Tratntng 29 Others have resulted from willful violation of flying
TAC Tally 31 directives. The most difficult accident to investigate
is the one in which a fully qual(f/ed aircrew lost con-
trol of or flew, a properly operating aircraft into the
ground.
To discuss all the aspects of professionalism as
they relate to aviation would take more words than I

TACAP 127-1


Matertal .n thts magazme •s nondtrecttve en nature All suggestions and recom-
mendat•ons are tntended to rema•n wtthm the scope of €'.KIStmg dHect•ves. In
format•on used to bnef acctdents and rnc•dents does not tdent•fy the pers:ms.
placPs. or un•ts •nvolved and may not be construed .as mcnm•natmg under Artttle
31 of the Un•form Code of M1htarv Just•ce Wntten perm•ss•on must be obtamed
from HO TAC before materoal may be republished by other than DepartmPnt of
care to write or you would care to read. Sujji'ce it to
say that while professionals are human and subject
to error, the costs of our mistakes are dispropor-
tionate to the mistakes themselves.
We are engaged in a deadly serious (no pun
intended) business. While these individuals may not
have lacked professionalism, and the degree of other
Defense organtzatlons
Contrtbuttons of art•cles and photos from personnel m the f•eld are encouraged "causes" ol the mishap are impossible to determine,
as are comments and crthctsm We resP;rve the oght to edtt all manuscnpts for a lapse in professionalism put them in a position
clar ty and readabtltty Otrect communt atton 1S authonzed wtth The Ed1tor. TAC
ATIACK HQ TAC SEPP Langley AFB VA 23665 Autovon 432-2937 from which they couldn't recover. ED
D•stubut•on FX Controlled by SEPP
Authonty to publish 1h1s pefiOdtcal automattcdl v el(ptrPS on 26 Jan 1980 un ess
t onttnuance tS authonzed bv the approvtnq authority pr~or to that date (Cont'd on page 30)
Angle of Attack

farewell ...
As I complete my tour as Chief of Safety for The recently adopted motto of Tactical Air
Tactical Air Command, I recall the words I wrote Command, "Readiness is Our Profession," is the
for this column two years ago . In that article, I driving force behind our efforts today. Every
reviewed the challenge which lay ahead for us in program and exercise we undertake must be
TAC . The theme of my first column is as applica- committed to one end - - increased readiness.
ble now as it was then .. . Advances in weaponry made by the Soviet bloc
compared to the reduced acquisition of our own
Each TAC specialist, first line new fighter and attack aircraft caused by budget
supervisor, squadron commander, cutbacks make conservation of our personnel and
first sergeant, group / wing com- physical resources an absolute requirement to
mander, and staff member must maintain today's level of readiness.
work as a team. We have no one on We are engaged in some of the most realistic
the second team because we don't training programs in the world to increase our
have a second team. Everyone must readiness. We must continue these programs and
do his job right regardless of its improve them where possible . I know you share
scope. When we take positive steps, my concern, and we will meet this challenge in
we conserve precious resources ... the same manner in which you have met the
If you detect a problem that challenge during the past two years .
could impact on your mission ac- I thank each and every one of you for your
complishment, fix it. or advise your professiona I support . _::::....
supervisor if the solution is outside
your capability. If necessary, surface
it to your safety people . They will
assure that the problem is solved by
the proper agency . If that channel
doesn't work, bring it to the com-
mander's attention.
THE AIRPLANE'S POINT OF VIEW
as told to Pete Abler
Ya' think it's easy heing an airplane ?
Well, I'm here t() tell ya', it ain't /
It's a crime the way the mechanics and
aircrews treat ya',- like y()u're just a
dumb machine with n() feelings- -n()
heart. I've been kicked, punched,
jumped ()n, heat with ch()cks, landed
S() hard I th()ught I'd !Just a gussett,
()Vet G'd, ()Vergr()ssed, and wh() kn()WS
what else. I sure /()()k ()/der than my
1,260 h()UIS.

Everything was c lean. shiny. and bright. I was so


T he proudest moment of my life was when ecstatic. I didn't even mind it when the pilot jam-
they rolled me off the assembly line and turned med my throttles to afterburner so hard my
on my master switches. As the c urrent went zip- linkage stretched a little. I was happy! Everything
ping through my wires I knew I was destined for went well and all systems were A-OK . My land-
great things . I was taxiing out for my first flight ing gear did ache a little from the strain of those
when I caught my reflection in some plate glass fast turns when we taxied back. but I didn 't care.
windows -- I nearly flamed out on the spot. The soreness would disappear in a day or two.

4 JULY 1978
and hung two bomb dispensers on my pylons. I
was going to fly ground attack!
Th e c rew c hi ef showed up at 0400 to do the
preflight -- and I had just fall en asleep again.
There ain't no JUSticel Two hours later the c rew
showed up . They looked like OK guys except the
front seater said something about wringing me
out -- I wondered what he meant by that -- but
not for long . Talk about a guy with "Armour
Star" st enci led on his hands. He obviou sly didn't
know th e meaning of th e word smooth. Jam th e
throttles. snap the ailerons. jerk the stick. I
thought these nurds went to school and knew
a bout temperature and stress fatigue. asym-
metrical " G" load ing . and stuff like that. The
The crew that flew me to my operational unit c lown even over-G'd th e SUU-20s and th en
weren't suc h bad fellows. but I think they were a punched off th e meter . I th ough t th ese guys
bit hung over from th ei r previous night in th e were profess1onals.
"big ci ty." The pilot was kind of shaky on the It turned o ut th at most of th em are. After I had
controls and the nav kept giggling over how been there a few weeks I got to know the good
beautiful the radar was -- sure gave my antenna fli ers and the bad. Ya' know. when a guy treats
a full workout. It would have been ni ce though if ya· right -- knows what you're capa ble of and
they had secured th e 780 gea r in the travel pGd takes good ca re of you -- you'll do anything for
a littl e better. The downlocks were loose in th ere him . I en joyed flying for th em . But tho se other
and gave me fits the way th ey kept moving turkeys -- you've never see n a c irc uit breaker
around. I flew a nice GCA for them anyway. so pop as fast as when one of th em showed up . I
they'd feel good. It's funny the ache still hadn 't really had the troubl es hooters baffled 'ca use
gone from my landing gear Oh well. I proudly they never co uld find out why it popped. If th ey
became a member of blue section with some only knew why everything c lea red up when th e
other airc raft . c rew decided t o g ro und abo rt.
Wh en I woke up the next morning. th ere was a The maintenance guys and gals were pretty
lot go in g on around me . Airplanes were taxiin g good too. They did have their excepti ons just
around. taking off and landing . It really was a like the ai rc rews . but they sure worked hard .
thrilling sightl I just co uldn 't wait to be part of it When th ey went into POMO (Production
all . About noon . a maintenance c rew drove up Oriented Mainten ance Organization}. it was th e
with a tug and began to tow me somewhere -- best thin g that eve r happened I got to see th e
said somethin g about an acceptance inspection. same crew c hiefs and th e sa me speciali st s day
All I know is th ey put me in a hanga r and st art ed afte r day -- th e "reg ul ar c rew chief" rea lly does
pulling pane ls so fast my gyros tumbled. I didn't exist: and when th ey all worked t ogeth er. we
mind it too muc h except one klutz co uldn 't use a really got a lot done .
speed handle and kept stripping th e heads of my But ya· know. the years -- th e bad aircrews --
sc rew s and another guy ju st dropped th e pan els and th e maintenance personnel who didn't ca re
when he got th em off . Wh atever happened to -- have al l taken their t oll. I wonder sometimes if
TLC? the t axpaye rs got th eir money's worth . I didn't
A few days and innumerabl e manhours lat er I do anythin g to deserve being over-G'd. dented.
was ready to go again -- with several scratches gouged. and having my engines fodded. I can't
and dents. but still in good shape. New letters stop people from hurting me . It's up t o ya'll out
were painted on my t ail so everyon e knew where the re. I'm nothin g without you and you're in th e
I be longed. I fou nd out I was go in g out on my same boat without me. so let's take care of each
f1rst mission th e next day so I vowed t o get other . I'm j ust an airplane with a heart -- my on ly
plenty of rest . But it was not t o be ... abo ut mid - wis h IS that yo u'll treat me that way. Ju st do th at
nite. four guys showed up. ran a few c hecks. and I gua rantee I'll take care of you! ~

TAC ATIACK 5
"BREATHES THERE APILOT ...
wi.tlt a 411«L 411 dead
u;/u; MJ)fA to W4 w ud,
"WiuJo I 3'm 9/ad 3 rot awfU{
u;i.t/t tftat OM".

By Maj Kenneth E. Krause


HQ TAC/SEP

The inspiration for this article has come slowly be a good. or at least acceptable and under-
but relentlessly over the past few months . Hav- standable. reason for this . Let's see what we can
ing read scores of mishap reports . it has be- put together.
come evident (and I'm not telling you anything Accidents are the result of a series of events--
new) that we aircrewmembers make the same mistakes or failures. " Big deal. " you say. " I made
mistakes over and over . TAC. SAC. MAC . Navy. some mistakes last year. but I didn 't have an ac-
civilian. and all other aircrews are out there cident ." Rog. that's the point.
·each day. every hou r. making mistakes. I've As hard as it is to accept (especially for fighter
made more than my share; you've probably pilots). we are not perfect -- close perhaps . but
made a few yourself . we haven't made it yet. As I said before. we. our
Why then. are you sitting there reading and sister services. and civilian jocks are out there
I'm sitting here writing. and others are re- flying around and making mistakes . The vast ma-
membered by overturned mugs on the mantle/ I jority of those mistakes do not result in ac -
don 't want to sound melancholy. but there must cidents . The mishap reports are replete with

6 JULY 1978
mistakes -- again. the majority of which would
not by themselves have resulted in an accident;
but when they all happen on the same flight. in
the same airplane. to the same crew. when the
sun is just right and the tree frogs are croaking --
an accident results.
The investigators then start picking up the
pieces and analyzing the mistakes or failures.
The errors made by the supervisors and crew-
members . if any. are assessed by comparing the
guys with that mythical. perfect pilot /c rew This
turkey does everything right (may he roast in
hell). He has 20-20 foresight. golden hands .
gobs of experience. keen judgement. and a
humble demeanor . This is the guy against whom
we compare our hapless mishap aviator who
just had a bad day and it all balled up on him /
her . So be it . I can't think of another way to
make comparisons. The lessons to be gleaned
from the foregoing are: We are not perfect: we
make mistakes continuously; too many mis-
takes / failures packed into a given situation will
lead to an accident.
The solution then (are you ready for this) is to
make fewer mistakes / have fewer failures. We
can't do much about the failures . The mistakes
we can do something about. It starts first with a
critical self-evaluation. Think back over the past
few sorties you 've flown. What were the mis-
takes you've made7 Write them down. Not just
the big ones. but the little ones as well . Then ask
yourself: What were the circumstances under
which you made them7 How did you correct the
mistakes? Was it obviously effective or could
you have done better? What could you do to without a clear understanding of that same di-
better prepare yourself to prevent the mistakes rective or T.O .. Do them a favor . Try to get it
or deal with them more effectively in the future7 changed.
If the answers are something like : I was tired How about throwing the wrong switch? Was it
from watching the late movie ; I threw the wrong a spring loaded toggle when it should have been
switch. then the right one; YGBSM; I need a trip a lift-lock7 Submit a Hazard Report or modifica-
to the simulator. or a review of the Dash One. tion proposal. Let's fa ce it . there's a lot we can
etc; then you have taken one step the guy next do to lessen the number of mistakes we make
to you reading PLAYBOY hasn't . on every mission. You don't make them inten-
The next step after deciding what needs to be tionally neither do I. But we make them. The
done is (give me a drum roll) ... to do it. fewer we make and the more we keep others
It may be you made a mistake because the di- from making. the less chance we have of getting
rectives or T.O .s were not clear. Another fighter "into a position from which recovery was im-
crew may be in that situation some other day possible." ____::;;-

TAC ATIACK 7
Tac tips

7,1 IS ...interest items,

to
cheat doesn't deserve to wi
Ano

WHAT GOES BOOM...BOOM ? LOW PRESSURE...LOW ALTITUDE


A bass drum? Could be. Cherry bombs? Yes, Due to stress from a heavy and complex traffic
but not in this case. An engine compressor stall? load, an ATC controller mistakenly assigned an
You're getting warmer. A couple of blown tires? unusable flight level to a TAC aircraft recently.
You win the kewpie doll! A flight of three was split up in the holding
The F-4 was on the wing during a. formation pattern and assumed altitudes of 17,000' MSL,
landing. Alignment looked good at one-half mile. FL 180 and FL 190. When the aircraft at FL 180
Touchdown was slightly after the lead aircraft, noted that the flight member below him seemed
with the right main tire only 5 feet from the right to have less than 1,000' altitude separation, he
edge of the runway -- with a slow right drift. The realized that FL 180 was unusable due to the
tire rolled onto the asphalt edge of the runway low altimeter setting. Current altimeter was
shortly after touchdown, passing over two 29.53.
runway lights before correcting back towards It was an obvious mistake by the controller
the center of the runway. The pilot perceived which probably would not have been caught by
excessive closure on the leader and applied the the aircrew had they not seen the other aircraft
brakes. Feeling no deceleration, he applied full and realized their close proximity. When you're
brakes and right nose gear steering, with no flying in low pressure areas, with a local
noticeable effect. The pilot directed the GIB to altimeter less than 29.92, FL 180 is unusable.
pull the emergency brake handle, and the air- One more item to program into your on-board
craft went boom! ...boom! The aircraft then did a computer for retrieval when it's needed.
Tasmanian Twist and stopped, pointed in the di-
rection from whence it came.
Wha' hoppen ...? The right anti-skid plug was
knocked out of the wheel assembly by a runway HOW FAR CAN YOU GO..?
light. With the circuit broken, the system sensed
a locked wheel; ergo, no brake pressure. The Every instructor pilot sooner or later comes
pilot didn't try manual braking (does the paddle face to face with the, "how far can I let this guy
switch sound familiar?), and it was proven once go?" dilemma. Unfortunately, the only way that
more that you will blow the tires if you pull the question can be conclusively answered is to let
emergency brake handle with the brake pedals someone go too far ... an obviously unaccept-
depressed. able way of finding out ... unless you're at 30,000

8 JULY 1978
.
mishaps with morals, for the TAC a1rcrewman

ft in -totally sterile airspace. and even that craft's design limit load factor. symmetrical or
doesn't guarantee success. asymmetrical. can cause permanent structural
An F-4 on a normal RTU syllabus mission was deformation Operation between the design limit
over-G·d by the student in an attempt to stay load factor and the ultimate strength load factor
above the 10.000 ft AGL BFM altitude restric- (nominally 1 50% of the design limit load factor)
tion . The mission was normal until a "slice back" is expected to cause permanent damage .
was attempted during advanced handling . The Nobody likes to write up an aircraft for over-G.
student failed to apply the proper amount of "G" yet allowing undetected structural damage to
loading . With the sharp end pointed down and progress long enough will result in catastrophic
the power up. the airspeed went up as fast as airframe failure. Fly your aircraft within design
the airplane went down . In an attempt to keep limits to the best of your ability. If you exceed
above 10.000 ft . the student pulled ap- the design parameters. write it up . Who knows?
proximately 10 Gs . The aircraft sustained minor You may be the next guy to fly it.
structural damage.
The student bent the airplane. but the IP bit
the bullet for failure to adequately monitor the
maneuver and terminate it when it should have
been apparent that the aircraft was going to
descend below the minimum recovery altitude.
As an IP. you have to make innumerable. split-
second decisions on when to take the aircraft.
and when to let the student go and recover on
his own . As always. the credit for being right
doesn't co me close to the penalties for being
wrong. It's your decision -- be prepared to make
it when the time comes. Anticipation of what the
student will do next should go a long way in
keeping you out of the penalty box!

OOPS ...
In 1977. the Air Force experienced 17
fighter / trainer mishaps involving aircraft over-G.
While over-G mishaps are costly in terms of
dollars and inspection manhours. the potential
for catastrophic failure that they create is far
more serious.
Even a momentary excursion above an air-

TAC ATIACK 9
Night owls do it in the dark

Both opinions are obviously overstated. Flying


By Capt Pete Abler at night is not dangerous, nor is it as easy as fly-'
ing during daylight. Night flying requires more
attention to instruments and slightly different
procedures to compensate for the lack of visual
cues. Consider the following condensed from
the FAA publication, GENERAL AVIATION NEWS,
Fly at night?? You gotta be kidding me -- bird
April 1978 issue. Keep in mind that the material
don't even fly at night, and they oughta know a: is applicable to all aircrews -- not just the
whole lot more about the subject than do!! 11 I
general aviation fliers. Following that, we'll talk a
fly my 6 hours each half. After that, forget it.
bit more about some night flying considerations.
The huge L -101 1 jetliner with 163 passengers
on board was in the landing pattern at Miami
International Airport when the flight crew ob-
As a firm believer in flying after dark, I fin I served that. one green light (indicating the
attitudes of those who -do it while it's light ""
nosewheel was down and locked) had not come
bit disconcerting. After all, since there are fewe
on. The aircraft was vectored away from the air-
aircraft airborne at night, there must be more lif
port to the northwest at an assigned altitude of
available to those that are. Right? Ergo -- it mus
be inherently safer to fly at night.
2,000 feet while the crew attempted to de-
termine whether they had a wheel mechanism
failure or simply a light bulb failure. The next 4
10 JULY 1978
m1nutes has become a classic "horror tale" in
av1ation circles. via newspaper headlines and
the art of the novelist and television dramatist
While the crew was grappling with the problem.
the aircraft. after initially being placed on
autopilot. somehow was deflected from 1ts
intended flight path and slid imperceptibly
toward the ground. A last-second effort by the
captain to pull up failed. and the aircraft
crashed with a devastating impact into a
northern corner of the Florida Everglades .
N1nety-four passengers and four crewmembers
died. The date was December 29. 1972. The
time was 18 minutes before midnight
In the 6 years that have elapsed since this ac-
cident. Important improvements have been made
m ground and cockpit instrumentation for alert-
Ing pilots when an aircraft of this type is dan-
gerously close to the ground . However. the
lessons that could be learned from this
catastrophe -- which was well documented.
thanks to surviving cockpit voice and flight
recorder tapes and a painstaking investigation
by the National Transportation Safety Board --
are still applicable to the general aviation pilot.
who usually flies without the protection of so-
phisticated ground/proximity warning devices.
and who often flies alone. (Not to mention TAC
f1ghter aircrews .)
In n1ght flying. there is no direct connection
between the visibility range and visual reference curate calibration . In a very real sense. night fly-
to the ground. On moonless nights. the only ob- ing IS always a form of mstrument flight
jects that may be seen from the cockpit are The Importance of the light factor can be seen
those which are illuminated sufficiently to stand in that the great majority of night accidents take
out from the background. If any of the flight place under conditions described as "dark
crew of the ill-fated L-1 011 had glanced out of n1ght" (moonless) . In 1975. for example . NTSB
his windows. he would have seen nothing below reported 419 nighttime accidents; of which. 64
to warn him that the aircraft was dangerously occurred under a bright moon. and 355 took
low. place in dark night conditions .
Many pilots are unaware of how much we Ordinarily, such factors as the amount of
depend on visual references to the ground -- moonlight are not considered by pilots in flight
even in highly sophisticated aircraft Through planning . In fact. many flights that culminate in
long ingrained· habit. we have learned to make a night landing so happen only because of a
mstant approximate calculations of our elevation delay enroute . The prospect of amving at the
above ground by the size of a tree. a building. a destination a1rport an hour or so after sundown
person. etc. When the terrain becomes shadowy may not seem to present any inherent difficulties
or indist1nct. visual reference is reduced to as long as weather and visibility remain good
guesswork -- which makes for risky navigation -- But for the Inexperienced. non-IFR rated pilot.
or dependence upon instruments which must be the abrupt loss of v1sual clues in flight can lead
monitored continuously and maintained in ac- to d1sor1entat1on .and loss of control . The

TAC ATIACK 11
night owls do it in the dark

"expenenced" aircrew IS not 1mmune to these the solut1ons? Unfortunately. the solut1ons are
problems e1ther. not always easy to come by since we are all hu-
Human be1ngs are not blessed with instant vi- mans with different capabilities. The followmg
sual adaptation to the dark. Almost everyone has are some general rules that ought to be helpful .
had th e experience of walking into a darkened
mov1e house and having difficulty identifying e Be cons1s tent. Don 't change your flymg sig-
people 1n nearby seats for the first few minutes. nifi can tly for n1ghtt1me. Do everything basically
Human eyes requ1re at least 8 to 10 minutes to the same way you do it in the daytime. only
ach1eve a Significant degree of dark adaptation. slowly and carefully. Don 't trust outside
(As much as 30 m1nutes to an hour to achieve references as readily -- use your instruments to
full adaptat10n) At dusk. a rapid descent from c ross check what you see outside-- frequently .
altitude where the sun IS still visible down to an
airport already in shadow can reduce the light e Plan more thoroughly. You can't see as
level faster than some individual's eyes can ac- much at night. so you have to know your posi-
commodate to the change. The pilot may have tion in relat io n to obstacles at all times . Have a
difficulty 1n reading h1s panel instruments as plan for al l emergencies -- you may not be able
well as m p1ck1ng out terrain features . to nav1gate VFR to your destination or alternate .
Exposure to bright sun glare can reduce night
vision (temporarily), especially in conjunction e Fly smoothly and precisely. If you tend to be
with fatigue . Do not expect good night vision sloppy during the day. you're going to be much
after a day on sunny sk1 slopes or beaches -- worse off at night and you'll be giving yourself
unless your eyes have been carefully protected f1ts trymg to fly the aircraft . Smooth · con tro l
w1th effect1ve glasses. techn iques will also lessen your c han ces of
Drows1ness and fatigue are two threats to vert1go -- you know how hard it is to contro l the
flight safety which lie in wait for the careless a1rcraft when your mind keeps saying you're In -
pilot at all t imes . but at night they are particu- verted . Take the easy way out-- be precise .
larly dangerous. The absence of visual stimu-
lants. th e drone of the engine. the warmth of the e Make sure all internal and external lights are
heated cock pit. and the natural tendency to seek work1ng properly. La ck of good instrument llght-
rest at n1ght are all highly conducive to dozing mg makes your job harder. increasmg fatigu e. A
at the co ntrols -- especially when the pilot is fly- clean windscreen and canopy are mandatory.
mg alone. and for long hours; such as pilots
who fly ca rgo runs at n1ght. e Be alert. Get th e proper amount of c rew rest
The quest1on -- is one more likely to have an and then some! Most of us don't fly at night on
accident when flying at night? -- cannot be a regular basis. so you 're upsetting your normal
answered on the basis of statistical evidence be- cyc le . If you're too tired to fly -- don 't be
cause the ev1dence is incomplete . We know that ashamed to admit 1t -- and above all , don't flyl
about one- tenth of all general aviation accidents
take place at n1ght and common observation For my part. n1ght flying is much more enjoy-
suggests that less than 10 per ce nt of the flying able than many daytime missions . It's quieter. and
IS done after dark. But 1t would be erroneous to all the people who don't like n1ght flying are on
mfer that night flying IS dangerous. Still. it is Im- th e g round out of your way. However. 1t also
portant to realize that the conditions of night 1n creases the penalty for carelessness . If you ap-
fl1ght are different from dayt1me fly1ng. and to proach n1ght flying w1th the respect 1t deserves .
prepare yourself to cope w1th them before set- you will have, a safe. enjoyable flight. If you
ting out after dark . aren 't prepared. you're gambling; and the odds
OK. we've defined the problems -- how about are always w1th the house .. . ~

12 JU LY 1978
AIRCRE
OF
DISTINCTION
Captain Matthew W. Earl, Jr
Instructor Pilot.

Captain Norman C. McCasfiri


Pilot
On 24 February 1978, Captain Earl and crew Captain Kenneth L. Stroud
were performing a full functional check flight of a
DC-130A. At 17,000' during the check of the Navigator
pressurization safety valve, the crew heard a loud MSgt Carl D. Graham
"boom.'" MSgt Roberts scanned the cargo com- Flight Engineer
partment and realized that the internal fuel tank
had imploded and was leaking fuel into the cargo
MSgt Richard A, Roberts
compartment. The crew immediately went on
Airborne Radar Technician
oxygen and performed appropriate emergency
procedures. SSgt John L. Christopher
Realizing the danger of having the fuel run for-
ward in the cargo compartment where the Prop Specialist
electrical racks and transformer rectifier unit are
located, Captain Earl established a nose high at-
titude to allow fuel to flow towards the back of
the aircraft. MSgt Graham and MSgt Roberts
opened the escape hatches to allow flow-through sparks. The aircraft was safely recovered and the
air to remove explosive fumes from the aircraft. crewmembers successfully egressed from the air-
Sound proofing insulation was wrapped around craft.
the leaking tank to slow the fuel flow. Radio and The calm, professional reaction demonstrated
interphone communications were cut to an by Captain Earl and his crew during this critical
absolute minimum and other electrical switches emergency is exemplary and qualifies them as
were left untouched to prevent any electrical the TAC Aircrew of Distinction for July 1978
13
TAC ATTACK
SPO
CORNER

PHYSIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS pilot noted a degradation of aircraft control. At


FL 270. the aircraft stalled. recovered . then went
By Maj G. H. Felix into a series of climbs. stalls. and dives . The
HQ TAC/SEF hypoxi c pilot did not respond to chase pilot
transmissions; the chase kept urging idle power
Th ey don't happen often; but w hen they do. and appropriate turns . Luckily. at 12.000 feet.
darned if they don't get you r atten ti on . W e've the hypoxic pilot regained full consciousness
recently had three physiological incidents that and co mplete aircraft control.
deserve your attention. Two hose disconnects contributed to this
Two involve A-7s and g reen app le s. In the near-disaster . The pilot discovered his oxygen
first. the pilot encounte red strong oil fumes in mask hose dis.connected from his CRU/60-P
th e cockpit causing dizziness and a burning co nn ector; postflight inspection revealed a dis-
sensation in his eyes . Not being ce rtain of the co nnected canopy seal hose . preventing normal
source of the fumes. he turned the oxyge n regu- ca bin pressurization . Sucking cockpit air when
lator off and pulled his trusty green app le. The the coc kpit is at FL 250 doesn't get it
recovery was uneventful. The engine was sub- The lesson. one that's harped on at each
se~uen tl y reJected during ground run for fume s physiological training session. is : As soon as you
and excessive oil consumption . recognize hypoxia symptoms. do something.
The second pilot became hypoxic at FL 250. Che ck the regulator. connections. pull the apple.
Cabin pressurization failed. and the regulator descend. Do what you have to do to regain full
showed a negative flow and ze ro pressure. The co nsciousness . If you find yourself floundering
pilot pulled the app le. made an immediate around the sky like the A-1 0 driver. brother.
descent to 1 0.000 feet. and the hypoxia you've waited too long . He was lucky.
symp toms disappeared . Investigation revea led NOTE Several units have initiated co rrecti ve
an improperly seated LOX con nector that had vi- action by lea ving the CRU /6 0-P connected to
brated loose. disconnecting the LO X supply th e oxygen hose in the aircraft . Hopefully, this
Th e third wasn't as routine as the first two . will cut down problems with alignment and se-
Th e A-1 0 pilot was in a climb to FL 350 on an c urity of the connection. Your unit might
acceptan ce flight Passing FL 220. the c hase co nsider trying the same "c ure ."

14 JU LY 1978
dug into the mud and flipped the aircraft in-
ALONE, UNARMED AND IFR verted . Damage to the aircraft was minor;
damage to the field was negligible . Embarrass-
ment to the pilot was substantiai. FAA action
By Capt Garry S. Mueller could be considerable .
TAC / SEF

Did you hear the one about the guy who


rented an Aero Club airplane for a cross-coun-
try? Well. he made it to his dest ~nation base
but had a few problems getting home.
His story starts one foggy (IMC) morning. Take-
off was normal. but preparation lacked a few
essentials. He neglected to file a flight plan.
failed to get a weather brief. and took off in IMC
weather without a valid instrument rating.
Anyhow. he managed to es tablish radio
contact with Tamsville municipal tower. They
politely informed the pilot that Tamsville. (close
to Val rid a) weather was 300 foot overcast. 1-
mile visibility. winds calm. with fog and haze . He
pressed on . After another 20 to 30 miles. he
found the proverbial "sucker hole." so down he
went. hoping to establish his actual position. As
expected. he wasn't where he wanted to be.
which is usually the case.
After wandering around trying to find Valrida.
and being low on gas. he found a plowed
field. With gear down and welded. he landed in
the field. During "landing rollout." the nose gear

• Keep a good lookout for other boats and ob-


jects .
BOATING SAFETY IS NO ACCIDENT • Operate at safe an·d legal speeds -- watch
your wake.
• Know and respect the weathe r -- heed
By TSgt James 0 . Bunkley, Jr. weather warnings.
ATC SAFETY KIT • Take sufficient fuel -- in proper containers --
know your cruising radius.
Many Air Force members and their de- • Keep your boat in shape -- check safety
pendents are killed or seriously injured in boat- equipment .
ing mishaps every year The majority of ac- • Take necessary equipment -- fire extin-
cidents would not have happened if the victims guishers. personal flotation devices .
had taken time to learn proper small boat • Secure the boat properly -- stow loose ob-
operating procedures . jects .
If smal l boat enthusiasts observe the following • Learn boating laws and obey them .
rules. they will be nautical miles ahead in per- • Never operate a boat while intoxicated.
sonal fun and safety. All "boaters" are encouraged to take part 1n
• Know your boat-- what it can and can't do. formal small boat training programs offered by
• Don 't overload -- check the boat manufac- the U.S. Coast Guard. Coast Guard Auxiliary.
turer's capacity plate U.S. Power Squadrons . and the Red Cross .

TAC ATIACK 15
TAC &TAC GAINED LOSSES
JAN-MAY '78
JET BlAST
A security police flightline guard recently
spent several days in the hospital due to eye
injury caused by aircraft jet blast. Fortunately.
no permanent damage was incurred.
The airman was on duty at his entry control
point which was close to the aircraft taxi route.
An aircraft was taxiing back to its assigned spot;
and as it turned to proceed up the row of air-
c raft. the exhaust reached the SP who was look-
ing directly at the aircraft The SP was relatively
new at his post and wasn't prepared for the
blast
The exhaust blast from each aircraft is dif-
ferent due to engine size. placement. etc. Power
settings also cause large variations in exhaust
chock talk force . Experienced crew chiefs and maintenance
personnel have seen ladders . Dash 60s. and

...Uuidutu ad iluiduuaU other heavy maintenance equipment blown over


by jet blast New people may not be aware of

IIJitl£ a ~ duu. this hazard .


Jet exhaust is hot and extremely uncomfort-
able at the least. and h·ighly dangerous at its
worst All personnel should be made aware of
the hazards of jet blast . Also. if you see a pilot
using too much power in the parking area. men-
EENY -MEENY -MINE£ -MOE, tion it to him (nicely. of course) when he
returns . He may not realize the hazards he is
IN WHICH HOlE c reating.
DOES THE GASOliNE GO ?
An MJ-1 hydrauli c mule was discovered
recently with gasoline in the hydraulic reservoir .
Luckily. the discovery was made before the
whole unit came apart at the seams; not to men-
tion what might have happened to an aircraft
had things gone a little farther .
For reasons unknown. the access door to the
gasoline filler was labeled "Fill reservoir with Mil
Spec 5606" (hydraulic fluid) The individual who
serviced the unit may have assumed that the
gasoline went elsewhere and put it into the hy-
draulic reservoir which has a gasoline type filler
neck.
Further investigation re vea led other MJ-1
units with th e identical improper markings. but
none had been improperly se rviced . Other types
of ground equipment have identi ca l filler necks
for gas and hydraulic fluid next to one another.
Poor des1gnl You bet. Until a fix ca n be imple~
mented. the potential for disaster exists. When
you're servicing AGE. take a second look to
make sure the proper re ce ptacle is being used .

18 JULY 1978
comp lete the perfect joinup off the range to
show these guys some more of your stuff ....
What's that? Master Caution Lightl Let's see --
telelight panel -- check hydraulic gauges. Damn ,
why did they put those gauges down therel PC-
1 is less than 1 .000 psi . Better tell lead.
Those were the last thoughts that passed
through his mind before the midair Factual
situation? No. but easily probable
Between Jan '77 and Feb '78. distraction
First things first
and / or channelized attention were factors in 16
Class A or B mishaps The results were 9
fatalities and 1 2 destroyed aircraft. Ten of the
sixteen mishaps occurred during the last 6
months . The trend is up
Under normal conditions. no task a pilot is re-
quired to perform has a higher priority than
maintaining aircraft control. All too often .
however . other tasks. real or imagined. are in-
flated in importance and priorities are drastically
rearranged. This can occur when a pilot's task
saturation point is reached during a particularly
demanding phase of a mission. Task saturation
can induce intense concentration on the task
perceived to be most important at the time
(channelized attention). For example, two mis-
haps involved pilots trying to visually score their
own toss bomb impacts. Both failed to realize
they had waited until it was to late to initiate
recovery from the escape maneuver. Two other
lost control while looking for obscure ground
targets.
Priorities can also be rearranged when a
pilot's task load suddenly increases unex-
pectedly due to an aircraft problem or malfunc-
tion. An unexpected task load increase can
cause attention to be totally diverted to identify-
Portions ing / coping with the cause of the unwanted load
increase (distraction) . Four pilots flew into the
taken from ground and two others lost control while devot-
TIG BRIEF ing their attention to an aircraft malfunction .
#10 12 May 78 As new tactics often dictate unfamiliar or
more difficult tasks. it may well be time to reflect
on the basics. No mission-related task is so im-
portant that it makes forgetting about the
The mission has gone well. The low level to ground at low altitude tolerable . Nor is any air-
the range was perfect and the " splash" call craft malfunction so time-critical that it makes
came right on your TOT. Your CEA was 30'. losing control desirable . Especially in the heat of
strafe percentage was 65. and you can hear the battle. we must remember "F IRST THINGS
quarters jingling in your pocket. Now to just FIRSTI" ~

TAC ATIACK 19
MAI.NTENANCE as a
By Capt Duane C. Tway
4502 CAMS / Quality Control
Bergstrom AFB , TX

You know the old cliche that goes. "Last yer I


cudn't spel Mantenance Ocifer. and now I are
one"? Well. after many years of stick and rudder
t1me. now I are one. And just about the first
thing I found out was that "Maintenance" is a
foreign language. If you don't believe it. pick up
a set of aircraft forms and turn to the 781A.
"So what if maintenance is a foreign lan-
guage." you say. "I fly for a living. Amen and the
Klang don 't rise. I won't have to worry about the
Rated Supplement m maintenance ." "Aha." say I.
"Gotcha!" Because you fly for a living. you need
to be able to speak "conversational
maintenance." There are quite a number of ab-
breviations used in the maintenance language
that will help you understand the care and feed-
ing of your trusty steed.
As anyone who hasn't been PCS to the South
Pole for the last few years can tell. the Air Force
1s changing. Our young airmen in maintenance
are the finest products we have ever received
from Tech School. But there's also a challenge
-- there are so many of them. We are critically
short in some areas in the staff sergeant and
tech sergeant ranks. and they are our first-line
supervisors. responsible for training our new
troops. Also. under Project Able Chief. because
of l1mited training funds. our young troops are
taught only the basics in Tech School; and get
their "hands-on" training right here at River City
airpatch. Now. don't get me wrong. these new
personnel are good maintenance folks; and they
do safe work. But our experience level is going

20 JULY 1978
foreign language Murphy is still al1ve and well ... .
So 1f you are anythmg l1ke me. you've seen
some things written 1n the 7 81 A that you didn't
understand -- like "ARN-52 ETR to shop due
NCW TCTO." And. agam like me. you probably
were embarrassed to ask what it meant. Well.
guys. these days 1t could be very important to
know what that stuff means. Don 't misunder-
stand. our mamtenance is better than 1t's ever
down. Beca use of t his. th e chances for docu- been: but the potential for errors -- especially
me ntation fou l-ups on our 78 1s are obviously documentation errors. is increasing. So another
greater. We in maintenance realize this. and knowledgeable pa1r of eyes on our forms 1s even
we' re working to keep 1t from happening. But more Important.

The ·fo llowing is a list of some common abbreviations used m our aircraft forms: kind of avo-
cab ul ary of th e main t ena nce language. You are not expected to speak it fluent ly -- and there
w i II not be a test.

AGE - Aerospace Ground Equipment -- equipment to support the aircraft, powered AGE are
power carts, bomb lifts, etc.; nonpowered AGE are maintenance stands, jacks, etc.
AME - Alternate Mission Equipment -- munitions items like MERS, TERS, launcher rails ,
camera equipment, etc .
AWl- Awaiting Installation -- a part that is fixed but not installed .
AWM - Awaiting Maintenance - the status of the aircraft or component when waiting for
maintenance and during maintenance.
AWP- Awaiting Parts .
BPO - Basic Postflight Inspection -- a thorough inspection performed after the last flight of the
day.
CAL - Calendar or calibrate .
CF - Carried Forward -- when a 781 A write-up or inspection is transcribed to new set of forms
rather than cleared by fixing the problem .
CND - Cannot Duplicate -- a write - up in the 781 that could not be duplicated by ma intenance
troubleshooting. A production inspection is required to sign off a CND .
CR CH - Crew Chief.
CW- Complied With .
ON - Document Number -- the supply document number for a part .
EOR - End of Runway Check.
ETIC - Estimated Time in Commission -- maintenance 's best guess when the aircraft will be
operationally ready .
ETR - Equipment Temporarily Removed .
FOM - To Facilitate Other Maintenance .
HPO - Hourly Postflight Inspection -- a major inspection normally performed at intervals based
on operating time.
I&C - Installation and Checkout .
JCN - Job Control Number -- a number assigned to each write - up in the 781 A by maintenance
control.
JEIM - Jet Engine Intermediate Maintenance -- the base engine shop if authorized to change
major engine components .

TAC ATIACK 21
"MAINTENANCE"
as a foreign language

LM - Local Manufacture.
LRU - Line Replaceable Unit -- a black box that can be removed and replaced on the aircraft.
MDS - Mission , Design and Series -- the series designation , as F-4E, CH-53C.
NCW - Not Complied With .
NDI - Non-Destructive Inspection -- X-ray, ultrasonic, magnetic flux and die penetrant inspec-
tion for internal cracks, FOD, etc.
NFE Not Fully Equipped .
J

NFG - No Frappin' Good -- not an authorized abbreviation.


NSN - National Stock Number -- replaces most FSNs in supply system .
OD - Overdue .
OP CK - Operational Check.
PCW - Previously Complied With .
PE - Periodic Inspection -- a major inspection due after a set number of operating hours.
PH - Phased Inspection - a major inspection conducted in segments at specified intervals.
PR- Preflight Inspection. ·
QC - Quality Control - the Stan Eval of Maintenance .
R&R or R2 - Remove and Replace.
R, R&R. or R3 -- Remove, Repair, and Replace .
SOAP - Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program -- a system to sample oil for metal content to
predict failures .
SRU - Shop Replaceable Unit -- normally something inside a black box that can only be re -
placed in the shop .
TCI - Time Change Item -- a part with a specified operating life .
TCTO - Time Compliance Technical Order -- a technical order (normally to change, modify, or
inspect) that has a required completion date after which the aircraft is grounded .
TH - Through Flight Inspection -- an inspection required between flights during the same flying
period .

In addi t ion to the above symbols . TO 00-20-1 00-20-5 contain more than you ever wanted to
sta tes. ··any readily iden t ifiable abbreviation may know about the aircraft forms . The next time the
be used for any word or term frequen t ly used in weathe r is down or the ai rcraft is broken . stop
making entries on documents .· · So ask if you by your friendly maintenance OC section and
aren 't sure what something means . leaf through the books . The better look we all
Now for the commercial. TOs 00-20-1 and take at the 781. the safer our aircraft will be . ___:::-

22 JULY1978
10 commandments of safety for supervisors

MANDMENTS OF SAFETY
for supervisors By SSgt Alan R . Koester
1965 CIG/ 01
Norton AFB, CA

As a supervistu, are y()u aware (){ y()ur resp()nsibilities {()r the safety (){ y()ur
W()r/(ers ? Y()ur j()b in management places y()u in tt unittue p()sititm. N()t ()nly d()es
y()ur unit rely ()n y()u tts the direct representative (){ management t() apply its
p()licies wisely and fttirly, but y()u are als() ()bligated t() safeguard the well-being
(){ the W()r/(ers in y()ur charge. By {()//()wing the ten c()mmandments (){ safety {()r
supervis()rs, y()u will take a giant step t()wttrd assuring the safety ttnd well-being
(){ y()ur W()r/(ers.
VI Follow up your instructions cons istently.
I You are a supervisor; and thus. in a sense.
have two famil ies. Care for your people at work
See to it that workers make use of the safe-
guards provided them . If necessary. enforce the
as you would care for your people at home . Be safety rules with disciplinary action . Do not fail
sure all your personell understand and accept the unit which has sanctioned these rules -- or
their personal responsibility. your workers who need you.

II Know the rules of safety that apply to the


VII Set a good example. Demonstrate safety in
your own work habits and personal conduct. Do
work you supervise. Never let it be said that one
not appear as a hyprocrite in the eyes of your
of your persnnel was injured because you were
personnel.
not aware of the precautions required for the
job . VIII Investigate and analyze every accident --
however slight. Where minor injuries go
Ill Antic1pate the risks that may arise from
change in equipment or methods. Make use of
unheeded. c rippling accidents may later strike .

the expert safety advice that is available to help


guard against each new hazard .
IX Cooperate fully with those in the organiza-
tion who are actively concerned with member 'S
safety. Their dedicated purpose is to keep your
IV Encourage discussion of work hazards. No personnel fully able and on the job. and to cut
job should proceed where a question of safety down the heavy personal toll of accidents.
remains unanswered. When you are receptive to
the ideas of your workers. you tap a source of
firsthand knowledge that will help you prevent
X Remember. not only does accident pre-
vention reduce suffering and loss. but from a
needless loss and suffering . pra ctica l viewpoint. it is good business . Safety.
therefore. is one of your prime obligations -- to
V Instruct your personnel to work safely as the Air Force. your fellow supervisors. and to the
workers in your charge.
you would guide and counsel your family at
home -- with persistence and patience . Re- Leading your personnel into "thinking safety"
member. during peacetime there is no opera - as well as working safely will win their loyal sup-
tional requ ireme nt so important that we must port and cooperation . More than that. you wil l
com promise safety. gain in personal stature. _..>.

TAC ATIACK 23
-soLVE THE MURDER

The suspects filed into the deputy commander SOF and the squadron commander sat on the
for operations (DO) office . Everyone appeared right . The wing safety officer had AFR 127-3 in
cheerful while tension filled the air. Was it the hand . Flight members were scattered here and
supervisor of flying (SOF)? He had told the pilots there .
to land by 2000 hours so they wouldn't cut into The SOF was the first to speak He had talked
their crew rest. Was it the tower operator? He to the tower o 'p erator . a grizzled and
had cleared an aircraft for an intersection experienced master sergeant who had admitted
takeoff while another aircraft was taking off . that it was his fault. However. he had been told
Was it Red 747 He swerved to avoid another air- by Base Ops to turn the runway lights to full
craft on his takeoff roll . Was it Blue 11? He intensity. Did these lights blanket out the small
knew another aircraft had been cleared for lights of the aircraft? And who else was at fault.?
takeoff. And what about the RSU officer. was he The crew of Red 74 was the next to talk. Due
in this plot? to aircraft maintenance cancels. all aircraft had
Perhaps the Wing was at fault . They had an extra pilot on board and each one wanted a
scheduled two squadrons to night fly in the night landing for sortie requirements . Thus. all
local IFR pattern . But why had everyone decided aircraft were doing full stops and taxiing back
to do full stops and taxi back. overloading Ap- for second takeoffs. Red 7 4 had held off the
proach Control and Tower? Could the DO solve main taxiway while getting his clearance from
the mystery? And what about the tapes -- what tower . This was to prevent their engines from
secrets would they reveal? burning the asphalt taxiway and the nearest
Everyone was seated . The wise DO scanned concrete was 600 feet from the end .
the room to make sure everyone was there. The Since everyone had decided to land about the

24 JULY 1978
on the runway express By Capt Robert M . Cockey
706 TFS / 926 TFG
NAS , New Orleans, LA

same time. the radar pattern was full and there control. Within a couple of minutes. he had
was much confusion Red 7 4 requested takeoff. recorded a takeoff. a full-stop landing. a low ap-
holding number 1. Red 7 4 was told by tower to proach. heard three aircraft request takeoff
hold short. then asked . " Do you have a clearance. plus heard ground control tell Blue
clearance?" 1 2 that he did not have a clearance . The RSO
Red 74 was told to change to departure fre- was writing the takeoff and landing times on his
quency; they ran up their engines. The left RSU sheet and phoning the information to the
engine didn't look right. so they ran up the SOF.
engines again. and a third time just to make The RSU is situated between taxiway 1 and 2.
sure . They looked down the runway to see that it so he cannot see both taxiways at once. He was
was clear. listening to four conversations going on at once.
In the glare of bright lights. a truck appeared but he heard Blue 11 cleared on to hold. He
to be near the runway by taxiway 2; but the also heard Captain B say that he was taxiing
runway looked clear. They released the brakes. back. The RSO thought that Captain B was Blue
Suddenly, they realized that another aircraft was 11 because that was what was on his flying
on the runway by taxiway 2 trying to take off. schedule.
They used all their pilot skills and successfully
avoided it . But wow! --what happened?
The crew of Blue 1 1 was next to ta I k. They
had decided to use taxiway 2 . There was already
congestion in the panel check area for taxiway
1 . The pilots of Blue 11 had thought they had
heard someone cleared for takeoff; but while
checking their switches. they heard an aircraft
fly down the runway . Actually. it was a transient
aircraft doing a low approach. but it appeared to
have satisfied the tower operator and Blue 11
that someone had just taken off. Blue 11 was
told by tower that they were cleared on to hold.
As they took the runway. they looked down the
approach end . but because of the strobe lights
and full bright runway lights. they couldn't see
any aircraft. They were then cleared to take off.
The Base Operations Officer then stated he had
requested the runway lights be turned to full
bright because he had hoped that the lights
would help melt the 3 feet of snowdrifts from
the night before .
Finally, it is the Runway Superv1sory Officer's
chance to talk . He explained that the RSU is
barely the size of a closet room for only one
chair and radios that were always being
repaired . He had been listening to the final con-
troller so he could know if the aircraft would
land or low-approach .
He was also listening to tower and to ground

TAC ATIACK 25
Solve the murder on the runway express

What the RSO didn't know was that Captain B The RSU had already been found to be grossly
had been changed to Blue 1 2. He was looking at madequate. A larger. modern unit had been
taxiway 2 because that IS where Blue 11 was. requested that would be bui lt on a t ruck so it
He never saw Red 7 4 which had just now com- could be located in a better position. Concern
pleted taxiing 600 ft to the runway. When Red over the expenditure of funds had delayed the
74's takeoff came into view. he grabbed the project
m1ke; but he saw that Red was swerving to avoid Like the murder on the Orient Express.
Blue 11. who was now accelerating. An abort everyone was involved. Given enough of a
call might have caused a worse situation if they chance. fate can make a combination of many
had both tried to abort It all happened m a events add up to one big accident Even if
flash. everyone 1s doing his job. there are many little
The RSO stopped talking and sat down . The areas that are often overlooked or considered
pilots agreed that an abort call would have been un1mportant which become maJor factors in the
worse. and the tower operator later explained right circumstances.
that th1s was the same reason why he hadn't Cons1der how each of the events in this story
made a call. In the investigation. it would be became an important factor and how the cor-
found that the phone number to the tower recting of JUSt a few of them could have
hadn't been changed 1n 3 years They were get- prevented th1s acc1dent
ting as many as 50 calls a night asking anything Cons1der. the evidence at your base. Is there a
from "what t1me IS 1t /" to "when does the BX murder mystery waiting for you/ Start looking
close?" It would also be found that there was a for the clues and remember. "The accidents of
truck on taxiway 2 that was a SOF truck. and it tomorrow are the results of the cnmes of today."
had a red rotat1ng beacon just like the a1rcraft -~

26 JULY 1978
TAC
SAFETY AWARDS
Individual Safety Award

L BAFITY AWARD

Mr. George J C&shman, Base Fire Chief, 366


Ctvif Engineertnt Sqt.~adron, 366 Tactical Fighter
Wmg, Mot.~ntain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, has
been select4td to receive the Tactical Air Com-
mand lndividu,.t S.fety Award for July 1978. Mr.
Ceshman wiU receive an engraved desk set and
a letter of appreciation from the Vice Com-
mander, Tactical Air Command.

CREW CBIIF SAFETY AWARD


Atrman First Class Jan W. Noppen, 834th Or-
ganizational Maintenance Squadron. 1st Special
Operations Wing, Eglin Air Force Auxiliary Field
No· 9, Florida, hae t;Mten aetected to receive the
Tactical Air Corntttaf\d Crew Chief Safety Award
for July 1978. Airman Noppen Wtl receive an en-
graved desk set and a letter of appreciation from
the Vice Commander, Tactical Air Command.

A1C Jan W. Noppen

TAC ATIACK 27
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
3FFICIAL BUSINESS DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
.ENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300 DoD 318

FLEAGLEGRAM

FOLD- - -

HE WHO HESITATES...
2. It for some reason there is insufficient fuel to
divert, the pilot should hold and plan to land when
the runway opens or when he approaches
"emergency fuel."
3. The term "minimum fuel" means essentially the
same to both AF and FAA facilities. In this state,
Afew days ago, we had NO traffic priority is required or assured.
a few things that you might want to pass along. It "Emergency Fuel" is not part of FAA standard
happened during recovery of a two-ship flight of A- terminology. If you are, or will be "emergency fuel"
7s at Des Moines MAP. The weather was M9V11 by USAF definition, declare an emergency for low
OVC5 R -- with a 15-knot direct crosswind. The fuel. This will insure understanding and assure
wingman was first in on the ILS and made a normal priority handling.
landing; however, braking was not normal due to
either hydroplaning or braking technique. As the end
of the runway approached, turnoff appeared ques- Maj James M. Fredregill
tionable, so the hook went down; and the BAK-12 132 TFW/SE (Iowa ANG)
stopped the bird. Lead was on a short final; and Des Moines, IA
when advised of the situation, went around. Expect-
ing the runway to be opened soon, he did not im-
FOLD- mediately divert to the alternate. Problems were en-
countered in extricating the arrested SLUF; and
after 10 minutes, lead advised that he was
"emergency fuel" and would divert. Five minutes
later, the runway was reopened; and when advised,
lead decided to land at home which was closer than
the alternate. A fairly expeditious recovery was ac-
complished requiring another 12 minutes. At touch-
down, about 10 minutes of fuel remained.
The lessons learned are as follows:
I. An immediate divert is the best course of ac-
tion. It reduces traffic at home and insures arrival at
the divert base in the best fuel state.

The purpose of the Fleaglegram Is to aid in accident prevention. Although It is intended for use by TAC personnel, anyone with a gr
war story or Idea that could prove helpful in preventing unsafe or hazardous situations is encouraged to participate. If you choose to rer
anonymous, the form need not be signed. Simply fold the form so that the address is on the outside and staple or tape and mail at
military installation. The Fleaglegram Is not designed to replace or augment the Hazard Report Form (AF Form 457) in any way
submissions will be considered for publication in TAC ATTACK magazine.
F-15
Emergency Situation Training

~
BY Capt Ray L. Marcum. Option B. As you turn your aircraft towards the
555 TFTS nearest suitable emergency airfield, you should
Luke AFB, AZ analyze your fuel situation . If fuel is critical, you
are going to shut down the engine.
SITUATION: Entering your assigned area and In this situation, the difference in aircraft fuel
altitude block for a DACT mission, lead informs remaining and the higher fuel flow on the right
you that you appear to be dumping / venting fuel. engine indicate that the culprit is the right
Closer visual inspection confirms that fuel is engine . Option C is partially c9rrect in that the
leaking from the panel 96R area. You then notice engine can be shut down with the throttle.
that your right engine fuel flow is higher than the However, fuel will continue to leak unless you
left engine at normal power settings. Also your also close the airframe mounted fuel valve, Op-
total fuel state is 2,000 pounds lower than the tion D. If your fuel quantity continues decreasing
leader's . (#1-9,6000; #2-7,500) What ya' gonna due to the leak, you'll want to "expedite" your
do? recovery . It is not the time to zoom to high
altitude for a minimum fuel descent unless the
leak is stopped .
OPTIONS: If you cannot determine which engine fuel
system is leaking, both engine fire buttons should
A. Perform a fuel gauge BIT check. be used to shut the engines down AFTER LAND-
B. Land ASAP at the nearest suitable field. ING. Moving the throttles to cutoff 5-10 seconds
C. Place right throttle in cut-off . after depressing the fire buttons will insure that
D. Shut down the right engine using the fire the engine driven fuel pump doesn't cavitate.
button. Option A, of course, will do nothing except waste
time. Remember, if you can confirm which
DISCUSSION: engine is the culprit, shut down the affected
engine using the engine fire button and then the

~
Fuel leakage problems caused by failure of the throttle . In any event, if both engines are left run -
CIVV controller and the afterburner fuel pump ning, after landing, shut down both engines us-
would indicate your most immediate concern is mg the fire buttons and then the throttles . ~

~~~..,.~~...:
29
ain't (whatever).' And the first thing I hear out at my
operational squadron is 'Rotate the command selec-
tor valve.' You mean that I am considered capable
and responsible enough to have the option of eject-
ing my pilot? Wow . I was impressionable. And,
when I have a briefing, people listened, even pilots.
Surprisingly somewhere along the line I discovered
that pilots were human beings , picked their noses
and passed wind just like normal people.
"It's funn y what pride will do for you. I changed
suddenly into a cocksure, aggressive, knowledgeable
someone. There were those who called me a fighter
pilot, others called me a fighter-gator , and others
still called me a navigator. None of those names
really fit. But I still knew who I was, what I could
do, and knew I did it better than anyone else ...
Letters to the editor "But you know, I have a sneaking suspicion that
the old feeling about me is still there. People still
look at my name tag to see what type of wings I
wear before they read my name . I rea d an interesting
article in the May 78 issue of T AC ATTACK on
WSOs doing nothing and leading an aircraft to ac-
cidents. The colonel suggests that WSOs get lulled
into complacency in the aircraft by 'old habit pat-
ED NOTE: The following was taken ji·om a feller terns (i.e., specialization), a varying reliance on
inspired hy Colonel Jones' article. "The Dangerous WSOs by pilots, and / or an unknown quality called
Art of Doing Nothing." ll'hich appeared in the May stress testing.' Colonel Jones is very correct and very
'78 TA C A/lack. The words speak for themselves. observant ...
"Look gang, it is a two-way street. Yes , the WSO
" ... I remember after putting in 8+ months of train- has a harder road to follow and needs to be superb
ing at Mather and pinning on my very own set of to be considered just good. But, to operate in the F-
wings. I showed up a t my R TU base and met my 4 to its maximum yo u need both crewmembers func-
contemporary pilots. I got this peculiar feeling at the tioning as a team. A superior-than-thou attitude of a
time that something wasn't right. Like , pilots pilot is felt, and even that simple feeling, inhibits.
received, on the average. 100 hours in RTU, From putting his helmet bag on the top ladder step
backseaters 50; or when everyone called, what I had to ignoring a G I B in a debrief to making scathing re-
worked so hard for, 'Funny Wings,' or that out of an marks in the bar all facilitate that bigotism , and that
entire squadron of instructors there were some 20-30 inhibits crew coordination. You don't 'use' your
pilot s and one WSO. It 's weird how a young second backseater - - yo u ma y 'use' a tool or even a dog,
lieutenant will pick up negati ve vibes like that. So but not a man. You function as a team, act as a
what if I had one I P tell me he'd ra ther have I ,000 crew. You wouldn't do to yo ur wingee what you do
pounds of gas rather than me in the airplane. Or the to your backseater because you need your wingman
one who'd rather have a Oight surgeon or his crew as part of the team. The crew concept is the best
chief. Or the one who said. Turn on the radar and thing going toda y, but it won't .be here long. Enjoy
INS and go cold mike. ' it now and see if'the aircraft doesn't perform better,
"Well, RTU was a rude awakening and definitely the missions go smoother. See if you, the Aircraft
an ego bruiser. Oh yes. I did have an ego. I was Oy- Commander, can prevent forcing someone to write
ing in what I thought to be the most impressive air- an article that never should have been written to be-
plane around. I grew to be proud of myse lf a nd love gin with ."
that 15 ton monster. And I read and believed little
cliches like 'I'd rather be a fighter-gator than an or- Capt Jim Hazen
dinary pilot,' and ' If yo u ain't a fighter-gator, you 43 TFS ; Elmendorf AFB, AK

30 JULY1978
Tac tally

TAC ANG AFR


thru May thru May thru May
May May May
1978 1917 1978 1977 1978 1171
I
CLASS A MISHAPS ~ 0 12 11 3 7 4 0 1 1
AIRCREW FATALITIES ~ 0 9 4 3 4 0 0 0 0
TOTAL EJECTIONS ~ 0 13 10 3 5 3 0 1 1
SUCCESSFUL EJECTIONS ~ 0 11 10 2 4 3 0 1 1

TAC'S TOP ~~5" thru MAY


TAC FTR/RECCE TAC GAINED FTR/RECCE lAC/GAINED Other Units
class A 11ishp free 11onths class A mishap free months class A 11isbap free •••t~s
25 474 TFW 40 156 TFG (ANG) 130 182 TASG (ANG)
23 56 TFW 29 434 TFW (AFR) 99 193 TEWG (ANG)
17 347 TFW 21 184 TFTG (ANG) 91 110 TASG (ANG)
15 1 TFW 20 123 TRW (ANG) 86 USAFTAWC (TAC)
15 388 TFW 13 132 TFW (ANG) 82 919 SOG (AFR)

25
RPV CLASS AMISHAP RATE
20

RATE/ 15
100 LAUNCHES 1973 [8.6]
10
5
--~-
- ---- 1976 (1.0]
-----------------------------
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JU N JUL AUG SEP OCT NOY DEC
CUM RATE 0.0 2.6 1.8 3.0 2.1
NO OF ACDTS 0 1 0 1 0

* U.S. Government Printing Office: 1978 735-074/ 2

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