Hitler and The Origins of The Second World War. Second Thoughts On The Status of Some of The Documents

Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War.
Second Thoughts on the Status of Some

of the Documents
Author(s): H. W. Koch
Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1968), pp. 125-143
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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The Historical Journal, xi, i (I968), pp. I25-I43 I25
Printed in Great Britain
VI. HITLER AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND

WORLD WAR. SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE STATUS
OF SOME OF THE DOCUMENTS'
By H. W. KOCH
University of York
ERNST NOLTE in his Die Epoche des Faschismus writes that Hitler un-
doubtedly in principle had wanted war 'but hardly that war at that time ',2
meaning the war of I939. This somewhat muddled thesis conceals two distinct
issues, namely the argument that in I939 contingencies were not entirely to
Hitler's liking and the argument that in I939 contingencies were so little to
his liking that we must conclude that Hitler took no conscious steps to risk
a general war. Few would question the first argument, it is the second which
is in need of further examination. Did Hitler in I939 set out on a premeditated
course towards war with Poland and with France and Britain as Walter Hofer
implies ;3 or was his aim confined to war with Poland exclusively? Or, last but
not least, while accepting the risk of war with Poland, were his diplomatic
manceuvres calculated to repeat Munich all over again?
Walter Hofer implicitly denies the validity of the third of these alterna-
tives and so does most of the historiography concerning the outbreak of the
Second World War. The exception, of course, is A. J. P. Taylor's Origins of the
Second World War which seems to have withstood the mauling of its critics,
a test of its quality perhaps.4 However, it does bear the hallmarks of a rapidly
executed intellectual exercise and lacks a close examination of some of the
key documents which form its basis. In addition, Taylor's thesis, that Hitler
behaved no differently from how any other statesman would have behaved
in similar circumstances, that there is little to distinguish him from
his Weimar predecessors, seems on balance untenable. But the emotionally
charged response to Taylor's book saw in this thesis a means which could
primarily be used to whitewash Hitler. It failed to see that Taylor does not
so much attempt to exonerate Hitler as endeavour to illustrate that Hitler
was as normal a German as Germans normally are: therefore beware of them.
1 I wish to express here my gratitude to my colleagues Professor G. E. Aylmer and

Dr K. G. Robbins and especially to Mr F. H. Hinsley, all of whom by their suggestions have
helped to improve the presentation of this article.
2 Ernst Nolte, Die Epoche des Faschismus (Munich, I963), p. 432 (now also available in
English as The Three Faces of Fascism, London, I965). See also footnote no. I89, p. 604 of
the German original.
3 Walter Hofer, Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Fischer Buecheri (Frankfurt,
1 960).
4 D. L. Hoggan's Der Erzwungene Krieg does not warrant inclusion here as it is more of
a historical curiosity than a work of scholarship.
I26 H. W. KOCH
The purpose of this article is not to supply a conclusive answer to the above
questions, but to review some of the key documents and examine how far
they support the present-day historical consensus on the origins of the Second
World War. If a reasonably valid alternative interpretation of these documents
can be put forward it might bring about a change in that consensus.
Of course, any discussion of documents, their relevance and authenticity,
concerning Nazi Germany could be met by the understandable objection that
nothing but a purely destructive purpose is served if all one does is to show
that some evidence is suspect without indicating what the upshot is when the
evidence is sanely considered. Documentary evidence is hardly needed where
visible evidence-mass graves, remnants of places of extermination, a divided
Europe-is around us in pitiful abundance. This would take us to the position
of the late Sir Lewis Namier who wrote: 'For who wants to read documents?
And what are they to prove? Is evidence needed to show that Hitler was a
gangster who broke his word whenever it suited him?' This objection, this
attitude is understandable but not necessarily valid, certainly not for the
historian. Any discovery which may change certain nuances of interpretation
will not undo Auschwitz. The possibility that Hitler in I939 miscalculated,
rather than premeditated general war, will not undo genocide. Nor does it
undo his responsibility for general war-which lies in the fact that by accepting
the uncertainty of being able to isolate Poland he was prepared to accept the
risk that the western powers would refuse to stand aside, and that the outcome
might thus be a general war. The area of manceuvre in I939 was incomparably
more restricted than it had been in I938, and Hitler was aware of this.
The documents to be examined are the fourteenth chapter of Hitler's
Mein Kampf-the famous 'foreign policy chapter'; the Hossbach Memo-
randum; Hitler's speech to the press on iO November 1938; his speech to
senior Wehrmacht officers on 23 May I939; and finally Hitler's speech to his
Wehrmacht commanders on 22 August I939.
Underlying this examination and especially that of Mein Kampf are two
basic questions:
(a) did Hitler deliberately plan and unleash a world war aimed at world
conquest?
(b) if such a plan did exist was it Hitler's intention to initiate it in I939?
Professor Trevor-Roper in his review of Taylor's book5 writes that between

I936 and I939 the British people came to accept that Hitler meant what he
said, 'that he was aiming-so oder so as he used to say-at world conquest'.
While the present writer finds it extremely difficult to define what Hitler
meant as no evidence exists setting forth Hitler's declared intention to conquer
the world, in Professor Trevor-Roper's view Hitler had published a blueprint
5 H. R. Trevor-Roper, 'A. J. P. Taylor, Hitler and the War', Encounter, XVII (July 196I),
88-96.
HITLER: SECOND WORLD WAR DOCUMENTS I27
of policy which he intended to carry out. This blueprint, according to Trevor-

Roper, is Hitler's Mein Kampf, written in I924.
Hitler's views on foreign policy in I924 are spread erratically over the whole of
his book. Finally, however, they are concentrated in chapter xiv, which in spite
of its title 'East Orientation or Eastern Policy?', summarizes what in Hitler's
view foreign policy ought to be like, rather than, as is the case with most of
the book, telling the reader what course German history ought to have taken.6
Two reasons, Hitler writes in this chapter, warrant a particular examination
of Germany's relations with Russia. First, because this relationship is prob-
ably the most important matter of concern to German foreign policy; and
secondly it provides the test for the ability of the young National Socialist
movement to think clearly and act accordingly.
For a state built upon the notion of the 'Volk', foreign policy has as its
major aim to secure the existence of the race by aiming at a healthy relation-
ship between the size of population and its growth potential on the one hand
and the living space available on the other. A healthy relationship can only
mean conditions under which all the necessary resources in foodstuffs and
raw materials can be obtained for a growing population. Only in that way can
a nation remain free from outside pressures.
Hitler then goes on to discuss German foreign policy before I9I4 in the
light of this dictum, and judges it as totally misguided because it did not cor-
respond with his own definition of Germany's national interest. From the
point of view of their respective national interests, the policies of Britain and
France, on the whole, gain his approval. What course, Hitler asks, are the
National Socialists to pursue? Mainly, he replies, to bring into harmony the
national territory with the size of the population, the corollary being that
territorial expansion must be the aim of Germany's foreign policy.
Having stated this, Hitler draws the following consequences. Any endeavour
to return to the territorial status quo ante bellum would be absurd. Indeed it
would amount to a crime, for Germany's borders of I914 were anything but
logical, ethnologically or militarily. Any foreign policy aiming at the revision
of the Versailles treaty, in order to return to the pre-i9I4 boundaries, would
make it impossible for potential allies of Germany to leave the company of her
present antagonists. Hitler refers here to Britain and Italy, which are to be the
pillars of Germany's future system of alliances. German demands for the return
of her colonies or for the Southern Tyrol would inevitably alienate Germany's
potential allies. Moreover, a policy aiming at the return of pre-Versailles
conditions is made nonsensical by Germany's lack of power and because
the actual result would hardly be worth the sacrifice of blood involved. No one,
Hitler insists, should have any illusions that such revision could be carried out
without bloodshed. If, contrary to expectation, the application of force to correct
6 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (227-3I Auflage, Duenndruckausgabe, Munich I937),

pp. 726-58; see also pp. 687-7I2
I28 H. W. KOCH
Versailles should be successful, the cost in blood would be so expensive as to

deprive the race of such reserves as are inevitably needed for future endeavours.
In the context of a foreign policy designed to increase Germany's living
space France appears a problem only in so far as she threatens Germany's
rear, a threat that must be eliminated. But above all stands the quest for
Lebensraum. With that Hitler turns his gaze upon the future of Germany
which, unlike Kaiser Wilhelm II, he did not seek upon the water but beyond
Germany's eastern frontier, in Russia. In Hitler's view Russia was a country
in which Jewish Bolshevism had eliminated the intelligentsia and ruling class
of Germanic stock, which so far had guaranteed the continuance of the Russian
state. 'Fate has chosen us to become witnesses of a catastrophe which will
supply the most powerful confirmation of our racial theory.'7 (One ought to
note here that Hitler speaks of 'witnesses' and not of 'initiators'.) And then
follows the fateful statement: 'Our task, the mission of the National Socialist
movement, however, is to lead our people to a degree of political insight in
which it does not see the fulfilment of its future aims in an intoxicating
Alexandrian campaign of conquest but rather in the diligent and persistent
work of the German plough, to which the sword has only to give the soil.'8
After dealing cursorily with objections to this policy, Hitler continues by
emphasizing that any positive German foreign policy also requires assistance
by powerful allies, and that those who support a Russo-German alliance
against the West ignore the realities of power. Russia was in decay and any
possible war was bound to take place not on Russian but on German soil.
Russia's lack of industry eliminates her altogether as a source of supply, on
the contrary Germany would have to play the role of a supplier nation.
Germany's state of weakness did not allow any kind of offensive action against
the West. Hence, of what value is an alliance, if one cannot face a potential
conflagration with a relative sense of security? 'Either a Russo-German
coalition would be of paper value only, in which case it is valueless, or the
letter of the treaty would be turned into reality-and thereby the entire world
warned... Inherent in an alliance is the next war. Its result would be the end of
Germany.'9 Quite apart from that, he asks with what right could one condemn
the large numbers of Germans sympathizing with Communism, if the leaders
of the state made the representatives of that 'Weltanschauung' their allies.
A future National Socialist government had only one acceptable alternative,
to turn to Britain and Italy. This carried no inherent risk of war. France would
be isolated and the law of action would reside within the new coalition;
Germany's unfavourable strategic position would be eliminated. Only under
such conditions could Germany pursue a positive and active eastern policy.10
7Adolf Hitler, op. cit. p. 743. 8 Ibid. p. 743. 9 Ibid. p. 749.
10 See also Werner Maser: Hitler's Mein Kampf, Entstehung, Aufbau Stil, Anderungen
Kommentierte Ausziige (Munich, I966), an example of systematic omission of all those
passages of chapter xiv which contradict Maser's attempt at demonstrating a clear detailed
continuity between the arguments set out in Mein Kampf, and the policy Hitler pursued.
If Mein Kampf is, as is usually maintained, a blueprint, and if by a blueprint

we mean a detailed plan guiding Hitler's actions, then we have to ask how far
Hitler's actions between 1933 and 1939 correspond with it. The purpose of
this exercise is not to prove the obvious-that Hitler was an opportunist-
nor is it intended to go to extremes in trying to prove that, since he was
merely an opportunist in circumstances which had rendered Mein Kampf
out-of-date, he had no aggressive intentions of the kind that might cause war.
The purpose of comparing Hitler's actions with Mein Karnpf is to show that
Mein Kampf does not amount to a blueprint of Hitler's foreign policy, nor
to a scheme of strategy. This does not mean that because of changed circum-
stances between I924 and I939 Hitler abandoned his social Darwinian pre-
mises and renounced (what appears to be) his primary objective, the increase
of Germany's Lebensraum. Nor does the lack of correspondence between
Mein Kampf and Hitler's policy mean that he had at any time abandoned his
belief in the primacy of force. On the contrary, Hitler's belief in the need for
territorial expansion at Russia's expense, and in the need of force, represent
the two elements which characterize his thinking throughout his adult life.
But from this it does not follow that in I939 he consciously and deliberately
engineered the Polish crisis with the intention of beginning his eastward
expansion.
On the contrary, Hitler's foreign policy between I933 and I939 represents
a strong contradiction to that outlined in Mein Kampf; that is to say to what
Hitler had written in I924 that it ought to be like. Of course, it can be argued
that steps like the renunciation of the military clauses of the Versailles treaty
in I935 and the re-militarization of the Rhineland in I936 were necessary in
order to prepare a basis for future action. If so, one is nevertheless surprised
by the methods Hitler employed to gain his objectives for, to say the least,
these methods implicitly contradicted his policy as outlined in I924. A sub-
stantial and vocal part of British public opinion acknowledged the apparent
need for a revision of the Versailles treaty. And Hitler's public claims, such
as parity of armaments and even the demand for a revision of the territorial
status quo in Eastern Europe, received a fundamentally sympathetic hearing.
Neither is there any doubt that, however much Hitler's apparent objectives
may have been justifiable within the context of national values and status then
existing in Europe, his coarse methods on the international scene (quite apart
from those employed domestically) certainly hardened those who were
suspicious and turned tentative sympathies into suspicion. The Anglo-
German naval agreement is indicative of what might have been obtained by
way of slow negotiation.
His revisionist policy did not usually proceed by slow negotiation and its
aims were extended as far as the demand for the return of Germany's colonies.
While he was pursuing it, moreover, his eastern project receded. Even the
Anschluss, Hitler's declared aim in the first paragraph of Mein Kampf, upon
9 HJ XI
I30 H. W. KOCH
close analysis has been shown to be a response to a situation only partly of

his own making and 'achieved almost against his own will'."1
The Sudetenland and the question of Czechoslovakia appear at first glance
as a departure from his revisionist policy but if one takes into account Hitler's
Austrian background and heritage they become its corollary. Moreover, like
Danzig, they were not problems created by Hitler. But be that as it may, it is
difficult to see the relevance of Mein Kampf as a blueprint for the particular
actions in these questions.
Hitler's foreign policy between I933 and I939 amounts to the pursuit of
that which he had disavowed in I924, namely the restoration of Germany's
pre-I9I4 frontiers, while the means he used were the direct antithesis of thos
laid down in Mein Kampf, particularly so in respect to Britain, in return for
whose support he had once stipulated that nothing must be considered too
difficult and no self-denial too great. Naturally, it may be said that what Hitler
had written in I924 could hardly be applicable in the changed environment of
the mid and late I930S when Hitler apparently could get all he wanted without
bloodshed. But this precisely confirms the argument put forward here, that
Mein Kampf as a supposed blueprint of Hitler's plans is at most remotely
relevant to the actual policy pursued.
Living space in Russia had always been Hitler's aim and yet, although the
war of I939 was supposedly 'premeditated' and to be the initiation of the
quest for Lebensraum, there existed no plan for a military campaign in Russia.
When such planning began in I940, even then it was under the reservation
'that clarification with Russia by diplomatic ways and means' would not
succeed.12 The Hitler-Molotov conversations of November I940 crystallized
the issues, and, as far as Hitler was concerned, caused political expediency
to coincide with his anti-Marxist bias and with the direction in which living
space could be acquired.
But irrespective of whether the campaign against Russia was irrevocably
decided upon in July or in November 1940 or not, Hitler had failed in what
he had set out to be the National Socialist movement's primary task, 'to lead
our people to a degree of political insight in which it does not see the fulfil-
ment of its future aims in an intoxicating Alexandrian campaign ... '13
Finally, the manner of planning 'Barbarossa' shows again the absence of
a relationship between blueprint and execution. Between July I940 and March
I94I planning was entirely military. Economic planning did not really begin
until I94I, civilian administration not before April, while it was only towards
the end of August I94I that the form and character of the civil government
11 See Jiirgen Gehl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss 1931-1938 (Oxford, I964).
12 General Warlimont's evidence, I[nternational] M[ilitary] T[ribunal], xv, 562 ff. See also
Hitlers Weisungen fJur die Kriegsfiihrung (ed. Walter Hubatch), dtv-Taschenbuchausgabe,
Weisung no. i8, iz November 1940, p. 77, which makes reference to Russo-German talks
the aim of which it was to clarify Russia's attitude 'for the immediate future'.
13 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 743.
HITLER: SECOND WORLD WAR DOCUMENTS I3I
was decided. 'Far from acting on the basis of a long-term plan for coloniza-
tion, Hitler approached the subject empirically, seeing present alternatives
clearly but rarely perceiving anything beyond the successful achievement of
the immediate objective.'14
Relating the content of Mein Kamnpf to the events of I939, it is virtually
impossible to conclude that Hitler in I939 set out deliberately to conquer
Europe or the world in accordance with his postulates of I924. His aim as set
out in Mein Kampf was with Britain's aid to make Germany a world power by
expansion into Russia.
The Polish problem had little relation to Hitler's fundamental aim, yet out
of it came the Second World War. Of course he could not expand into Russia
without dealing with Poland but again this could be accomplished in ways
other than war, as the example of Slovakia shows. A satellite relationship with
Germany, such as Poland has had since I945 with Russia could have solved
Hitler's problem-if that was the problem-of finding a broad base for attack
on Russia. The British guarantee meant hardly that the alternatives con-
fronting Hitler were either to give up his claim for Danzig or face general war.
There was still, on the surface at least, room for diplomatic manceuvre and
for the exercise of all pressure short of war, as the Russo-German Pact
demonstrates.
Hitler's initial stupendous military successes increased his appetite and the
ramblings of his 'secret conversations' are much more a reflexion of that than
a continuation and elaboration of what he had written in I924: except, of
course, that they continued to illustrate Hitler's basic premise of political
action, the primacy of force.
The policy in Mein Kampf therefore has little connection with the actual
policy followed by Hitler in the I930S. It is a character statement, indicative
of the primitive passions of its author, a creed of violence; it is public oratory
having become 'literature'. It reflects the essential coarseness and crudity of
Hitler's mind, but it is only a guidebook to Hitler's diplomacy in I933 to I93
by way of a very long stretch of imagination and then only in the widest sense
and not in the detail associated with a blueprint.
Konrad Heiden's verdict of some twenty years ago seems to hold true still:
'Far too much has been read into the so-called foreign policy chapters. No
statesman is in a position to indicate ten years in advance what he is going to
do twenty years later.'15 Is there then anything in Mein Kampf which could
give us a clue to Hitler's actions? Perhaps. 'Considerations of foreign policy',
Hitler wrote, 'can only be made from one point of view: is it of benefit to our
people now and in the future, or will it be harmful? '16
From that perspective, in the way in which he from time to time inter-
14 Gerald Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand (London, I960), p. io.

15 Konrad Heiden, Der Fuhrer (London, 1944), p. 226.
16 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 687.
9-2
132 H. W. KOCH
preted the 'benefit' of his people, Hitler's actions in the realm of foreign
policy can be rationally assessed, rather than when they are forced with great
industry and artifice into a scheme of strategy planned ten to fifteen years
ahead. In place of following a long-term scheme, Hitler up to I939 pursued
a policy of national restitution on Greater German lines which seemed to
contain little coherent planning but evolved from case to case. But this raises
a genuine problem which it will be difficult to solve. This is the discrepancy
between Hitler's beliefs, his principles, such as the need for Lebensraum, and
the extremely haphazard nature of his planning and preparations, military,
economic and political, to turn these principles into reality. This is not the
place to solve this problem, but, perhaps, one may suggest tentatively that in
spite of his prominence on the political stage, Hitler himself was as much
surprised by the speed with which events unfolded, by the quickness of his
success, as was the rest of the world. Hence it is only with the beginning of
the war and particularly with its extension into Russia that we notice the
gradual establishment of a direct relationship between theory and practice.
One of the major documents used hitherto as providing-in the words of

the editors of the Documents on German Foreign Policy-' a convenient
summary of German Foreign Policy in I937-I938',17 has been the Hossbach
Memorandum of io November I937. It is not the purpose of this article to
give a detailed analysis of its contents or to relate it to the actual course of
events. This has already been done elsewhere.18 All that is intended is to ask
some salient questions on the nature of the document and to throw light on
what is generally still its very obscure history.
The first striking feature of the Hossbach Memorandum when compared
with Mein Kampf is the almost complete lack of connexion between the two
documents, save the insistence on the primacy of force and the desire to
annex Austria. This lack, however, should not be interpreted as meaning that,
as there is little practical connexion in detail between the postulates of Mein
Kampf and Hitler's actual foreign policy, his words on 5 November I937 in
the Reichskanzlei represent, for once, the true policy he intended to follow.
Perhaps, perhaps not. But what is significant is that the main theme of foreign
policy in Mein Kampf, the obtaining of living space in Russia, is not mentioned
at all in the memorandum. And yet Hitler in his introductory remarks asked
for his views expressed at the meeting to be considered as his testament in
case of death. This, in Professor Trevor-Roper's opinion, 'suggests that he
was not talking irresponsibly'.19 It is doubtful whether Hitler on an occasion
17 DGFP, Series D, I, 29, note 25a.

18 A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London, I96I); Gehl, Austria,
Germany and the Anschluss, also BBC transcript of the Taylor-Trevor-Roper debate, 9 July
I96I; T. W. Mason in Past and Present, no. 29 (December, I964).
19 H. R. Trevor-Roper, 'A. J. P. Taylor, Hitler and the War', also see letter by Margaret
Lambert to The Times Literary Supplement, 2 June i96I.
like this would talk 'irresponsibly' but a motive can equally well be found in
the realm of German domestic politics. Juergen Gehl, for instance, maintains
that Hitler wanted to convince his generals that the armaments programme
had to be expanded and therefore exaggerated the possibilities of an armed
conflict.20 But, be that as it may, if Hitler meant what he said, if his discourse
at the Reichskanzlei was a full exposition of his policy intentions, if he meant
it to be his testament, Hitler's refusal on two separate occasions to read the
memorandum and approve it when asked to do so by his adjutant requires an
adequate explanation.21 Whatever the explanation, it is bound to be so highly
speculative as to make the document inadmissible in any other court except
the Nuremberg Tribunal.
This impression is reinforced when we bear in mind the actual history of
the document. On i8 June I 946 Hossbach, upon the request of Dr Laternser,
the defence counsel of the General Staff and the OKW, submitted an affidavit
in connexion with his testimony concerning the meeting at the Reich
Chancellery on 5 November I937. On oath Hossbach declared that h
made no protocol of the conference, instead a few days later (five to be exact)
he wrote minutes based on his memory and written according to the best of
his knowledge and conscience.22 In I948 Hossbach published a book in which,
in contradiction to his affidavit of I946, he writes that the memorandum was
based on notes made at the conference as well as on his own memory.23
The problem is further complicated by the subsequent history of the
document.24 Hossbach had made no copy besides the original which he
handed over to Blomberg.25 From Blomberg the original apparently went to
the OKH files at Liegnitz in Silesia where, towards the end of I943, it was
discovered by a general staff officer, Colonel Count von Kirchbach. Kirchbach,
while leaving the original in its place of deposition, did make a copy which
he handed to one of his relations, by whom the document was forwarded to the
prosecution team of the first Nuremberg trials. It finally reached the floor at
Nuremberg as Document PS-386. The considerable objections to Hitler's
plans which Neurath, Blomberg and Fritsche put up are not recorded in it,
and in consequence the document does not agree with Kirchbach's own
copy.26 Hence, the original plus Kirchbach's own copy are missing.
It is therefore surprising that the relevant volume of the Documents on
German Foreign Policy contains no reference to the somewhat chequered
career of the 'memorandum' and to the fact that it is a copy of a copy, the
20 Gehl, op. cit. p. i62, see also Taylor, op. cit. pp. 13I-4 and Gerhard Meinck, Hitler und
die deutsche Aufrustung 1933-37 (Wiesbaden, 1957).
21 Friedrich Hossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler (Hannover, 1949), p. 219.
22 IMT, XLII, 228 ff.
23 Friedrich Hossbach, Von der militdrischen Verantwortlichkeit in der Zeit vor dem Zweiten
Weltkrieg (Gottingen, 1948), p. 28.
24 Meinck, op. cit. pp. 236-7.
25 IMT, XLII, 2i8.
26 Ibid. 236.
134 H. W. KOCH
original as well as the first copy of which are missing.27 While there is little
doubt that the document such as it is does reflect Hitler's mentality and
attitude in a general sense, its value as Hitler's 'testament' and as an indicator
of his future policy can be seriously disputed.28
Another argument which has been raised is that once it had overcome all
resistance to the assumption of full power inside Germany, the inherent
dynamic of National Socialist policy would end inevitably in an aggressive
foreign policy. This may be so, but it appears doubtful whether an aggressive
foreign policy is a specifically National Socialist characteristic. After all,
revisionism, meaning the revision of the Versailles treaty, was accepted and
endorsed by the majority of Germans and was thus bound to be aggressive in
terms of policy, which does not necessarily mean aggressive to the point of
war. This determinist thesis has now been extended to mean that by I936 the
German economy had arrived at the crossroads at which Schacht's policy of
expedients had to be abandoned, the alternative facing Hitler being a return
to the ordered channels of the international economy. Since the basic premise
of Hitler's policy was the extension of Lebensraum, such a return would tend
to frustrate any rapid mobilization of Germany's economic and military
resources necessary for such a course. Consequently, Hitler had not only to
continue the course of expedients but indeed to endeavour to extend it on a
scale far wider than practised hitherto, with the result that, metaphorically
speaking, cheques were drawn on non-existent capital, or more correctly the
proceeds of living space were used before this space had actually been obtained.29
This seems plausible enough, but the theory is as good or as bad as any
other. Its inherent major problem is the unsatisfactory state of the evidence
cited, mostly polemical in nature, and the almost complete lack of figures. The
one (but certainly not definitive) survey whose conclusions are backed up by
relatively reliable figures, shows no evidence of an economic crisis between
I936 and I939; moreover it reduces to its true proportions the myth, purpose-
fully and apparently very successfully put about by Hitler, of the extent of
German rearmament.30
27 T. W. Mason in his article in Past and Present, no. 29 (December, I964), contends that
the Hossbach memorandum, i.e. the Nuremberg version, corresponds with the notes taken
at the time by General Beck. This is substantially true but for one significant omission. Beck
in his notes makes no reference whatsoever to Hitler's plan to drive out large parts of the
populations of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the kind of plan which because of its inherent
inhumanity one would have expected a man of Beck's character to take exception to and to
comment upon. See also Wolfgang Forster, Ein General kdmpft gegen den Krieg (Munich,
'949).
28 See Nolte, op. cit. pp. 602-3, note 177, for a pertinent assessment of the value of the
Hossbach memorandum in a general sense.
29 K. D. Bracher, W. Sauer, G. Schulz, Die nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung (Cologne,.
i962), pp. 745 ff.; Meinck, op. cit.; H. Buchheim, Das Dritte Reich (Munich, 1958), pp. 27 ff.;
Rene Erbe, Die nationalsozialistische Wirtschaftspolitik im Lichte moderner Theorie (Zurich,
1958).
30 Burton H. Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for War (Harvard Economic Studies.
Harvard, 1959). See n. 68, below.
HITLER: SECOND WORLD WAR DOCUMENTS 135
The propounders of the thesis of inevitability of war for economic reasons

interpret the Hossbach notes as being the military and political equivalent of
Hitler's Four-Year Plan of I936 in the economic field. This equation is
juxtaposed with excerpts from Hitler's Table Talk of I942-3. Apart from
demonstrating that the method of juxtaposition is no satisfactory substitute
for reliable and unequivocal evidence, since the Hossbach notes deal only with
Austria and Czechoslovakia, they are irrelevant to Hitler's concept of Lebens-
raum as such. Secondly, these territories hardly add-and this was clear to
see in I937-8-sufficient resources to cope with a long-term economic crisis.
This, of course, is provided such a serious crisis did exist, which is itself more
than doubtful.
Hitler's address to representatives of the German press on io November

1938, has only come to light in recent years.31 It has been interpreted as
Hitler's order for the psychological preparation for war,32 as well as an
expression of his bitterness at the silent opposition of the German population
against his warlike policy,33 of his disappointment at Germany's defeatist
mood, for which Hitler saw himself as partly responsible.
In actual fact, far from expressing despondency over the reaction of public
opinion, his attitude from the outset of his address is congratulatory at the
achievement of the German press. It had influenced the public to the extent
of helping to maintain its nerves, while the nerves of Czechoslovakia in
particular had failed. The frequently quoted passage in which Hitler says that
only circumstances forced him to speak of peace for decades, and that this
contained the inherent danger of giving the impression that he wished to
maintain peace at all costs-this passage is meant retrospectively. Underlying
it are Hitler's social Darwinian premises, according to which excessive love
of peace will make a nation unfit for the 'struggle for survival'. But, Hitler
says, with the help of the press he had succeeded in avoiding this dangerous
pitfall. It would now be their task to continue along that line 'and to reinforce
step by step the self-confidence of the German people. . .', a task which could
not be carried out in a year or two, and whose objective was not immediate, not
'for the spring or summer of 1939, but ... for the coming decades' and years.34
The last third of Hitler's address contains his customary diatribe against
intellectuals and then finally an admonition to the press, amounting to a
demand that Germany's leadership be treated by the press as infallible.
In essence Hitler demanded psychological war preparation, though the
31 Wilhelm Treue, 'Rede Hitlers vor der deutschen Presse (io November 1938)', Viertel-
jahrsheft fur Zeitgeschichte, vi (1958), 175-91.
32 Bracher, Sauer, Schultz, op. cit. p. 759; B. Gisevius, Adolf Hitler (Munich, I963),
p. 440; Damerus, Hitlers Reden (Wtirzburg, I962), I, 973.
33 Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, op. cit. p. 758.
34 See also DGFP, Series D, iv, Doc. 400, recording a conversation between Ribbentrop
and Ciano, 28 October I938, in which a conflict with the western democracies is regarded
' within the bounds of possibility in 4 to 5 years time'.
I36 H. W. KOCH
view of the speech as an emphatic and expressive directive to prepare public

opinion for an imminent war cannot be substantiated. To support this point
by quoting Hitler as saying that the press ought to throw certain events into
a perspective as a result of which the inner voice of the people would slowly
'begin' to scream for the use of force,35 is a subtle distortion. The quotation
taken in its actual context shows Hitler reviewing the events leading up to
Munich. He is speaking in the past tense; he says that there are matters which,
if they could not be solved peacefully, 'had to be solved by way of force. For
that purpose it has been necessary not to propagate the use of force as such
but to represent to the German people certain foreign events in such a manner
that the inner voice of the people slowly began to scream for the use of force.'36
Hitler expressed his great appreciation of the efforts of the German press and
asked for its continuation. There is nothing to suggest, as does Erich Kordt,
that Hitler ordered the press within two years to arouse in the people the will
to war.37 The great significance with which the speech has been invested since
its discovery was apparently lost to some of the major personalities present,
particularly to Dr Otto Dietrich, the government press chief.38 A more recent
study by Ernest K. Bramsted interprets Hitler's speech as giving praise 'for
the performance of the press ,39 an interpretation shared by Oron J. Hale.40
On 22 August I939 Hitler entertained his senior commanders to one of his

most ferocious displays yet. The accounts of that display vary, and for the
historian three separate records exist.41 The first version comprises two docu-
ments of a total of 63 pages in the Documents of German Foreign Policy.42 It
purports to record two speeches Hitler made on that day, but according to
Halder's diary there seems to have been only one speech.43 The second
35 Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, op. cit. p. 759.

36 Wilhelm Treue, op. cit. p. i82. The mutation of a distortion of this nature is amply
demonstrated in Hitler and Nazi Germany (ed. R. G. L. Waite, European Problem Studies,
New York, I966), p. 9I. The editor, who has translated the work of Bracher, Sauer, and
Schultz, quotes Hitler in direct speech that it was necessary 'to explain certain events to the
German people in such a way that the inner voice of the people will itself cry out for force'.
R. G. L. Waite is not only taking great liberty with the original of Hitler's speech but also
with the text of the work he has translated. At least, Wolfgang Sauer does not put the present
tense begin under quotation marks, but the immediate part which follows. Waite, who has
obviously never looked at the original, not only mistranslates that but his secondary source
as well. 37 Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart, 1948), p. .I35.
38 Otto Dietrich, 12 J7ahre mit Hitler (Cologne, 1955), pp. 250 ff.; 0. Meissner, Staatsse-
kretdr unter Ebert, Hindenburg, Hitler (Hamburg, 1950), p. 470.
39 Ernest K. Bramsted, Goebbels and National Socialist Propaganda 1925-1945 (London,
I965), pp. I0I-2, 176-7.
40 Oron J. Hale, The Captive Press in the Third Reich (New Jersey
41 (a) Nuremberg Documents 798-PS and 1014-PS.
(b) N.D. L-3.
(c) Admiral Boehm's version, Raeder Defence Document Book no. 2, Doc. 27.
42 DGFP, Series D, vii, Docs. 192, 193.
43 Ibid. pp. 557 ff. Generaloberst Halder, Kriegstagebuch, Stuttgart (I964) I, entry for
22 August 1939; Gerhard Ritter, Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung, dtv-
Taschenbuch (Munich, I964), p. 498 n. 54.
version, reproduced in the British Documents44 is of a highly sensational

nature and was rejected by the Nuremberg Tribunal-a fact which did not
prevent it from becoming a standard document in many publications on the
period. The third version is the record made by one of the attendants at the
conference, Admiral Boehm, and is considerably more substantial than the
first version and much less sensational than the second.
The principal difference between the first and second version on the one
hand and the third on the other is that the authorship of the latter is clear.
Admiral Boehm recorded Hitler's speech on the evening of 22 August 1939,
at the hotel 'Vier Jahreszeiten' in Munich.45 The authorship of the other two
versions of Hitler's speech cannot be clearly ascertained.
There is no need here to recapitulate the text of Hitler's speech. Those who
attended had the impression that Hitler was trying to impress his commanders
with the necessity of the course which he was taking,46 an attempt for which
there appeared to have been great need, for, as Hitler said, 'A great deal of
harm was done by many Germans, who were not in agreement with me, saying
and writing to English people after the solution of the Czech question: The
Fiihrer succeeded because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too
soon.'47 But of greater immediate importance was Hitler's emphatic expression
of his opinion to his generals that, in view of the Russo-German pact about
to be concluded, there was no fear of British intervention, and that for this
reason Poland might not drive the situation to the extreme.48 In other words,
Hitler was aware of the strong opposition to his course and that this opposition
was in contact with Britain.49
Does this suggest that Hitler hoped in that way to deter some generals from
encouraging the British to intervene and oppose him? Clearly no, otherwise
Hitler would hardly have chosen a full assembly of Wehrmacht commanders
and instead would have followed his usual method of informing only a highly
select group of which each individual would know no more and no less than
was absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of a specific task. What is
meant is precisely the opposite. Assuring the generals that he had little fear of
British intervention, he displayed on the other hand a firmness of intent and
purpose and he may have hoped that if relayed by the elements of opposition
D[ocumentson]B[ritish] F[oreign]P[olicy], 1919-1939, 3rd Series, vii, Doc. 3I4 (Enclosure).

4 Alan Bullock, Hitler, a Study in Tyranny (Odhams Edition 1954), p. 482; IMT, XLI,
i6 ff.; Wheeler Bennett, The Nemesis of Power (London, I954), p. 447 n.
46 Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der Wehrmacht 1939-1945 (Frankfurt, I964), p. 40.
47 DGFP, Series D, vii, Doc. I92. This passage also corresponds with Boehm's account.
See also Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Offiziere gegen Hitler (Frankfurt, I959), pp. 49 ff.
48 Ibid.; also Warlimont, p. 40 and Manstein, Verlorene Siege (Bonn, I958), p. i9. For the
view that as late as 29 August I939 Hitler still considered a negotiated settlement possible,
see D.G.F.P., Series D, vii, Appendix i, p. 567.
49 See for instance Winston Churchill's B.B.C. Broadcast on I7 October I938, in which he,
in the words of Hans Rothfels, 'divulged in a manner hardly justifiable confidential information
which in this case was primarily based on that provided by Ewald von Kleist' (Hans Rothfels,
Die deutsche Opposition gegen Hitler, Frankfurt, I958, pp. I37-8).
138 H. W. KOCH
with the intent of strengthening Britain's resolve, this would in effect have
the opposite result upon the frayed nerves of Chamberlain's government.
Taylor's suggestion, therefore, that Hitler was talking for effect seems
extremely plausible.50 Within 48 hours the British Embassy in Berlin had in
its hands the second version of the address, later to become known as docu-
ment L-3. It was communicated to the British Embassy by the American
A.P. correspondent in Berlin, Louis P. Lochner.51 This most sensational of all
versions has Hitler express himself with a degree of callousness, vulgarity and
brutality which even for Hitler is rare.52 Referring to Chamberlain he ex-
presses fear that some 'Saukerl' would intervene and mediate. According to
this version the meeting closed with Goering jumping on the table, thanking
Hitler bloodthirstily and dancing like a wild man. The first version does not
mention this incident at all and according to it 'Goering thanked the Fiihrer
and assured him that the Wehrmacht would do their duty'. The reference to
fear of mediation is also there,53 only it appears that the expression Hitler used
has changed to Schweinehund.54
Admiral Boehm's account, which it ought to be emphasized again is the
most substantial and detailed of the three, confirms the tenor of the first
version but does not contain Hitler's expression of such fears or his use of
either Saukerl or Schweinehund; nor does it contain a record of Goering's war
dance or Hitler's call to deal mercilessly with the Poles. Boehm is supported
by three other persons attendant at the meeting who otherwise had little
reason to rally to Hitler's defence, the late Grand Admiral Raeder, Field-
Marshal von Manstein and Hitler's own chief of staff, General Halder.55
Against this we have firstly Lochner's document and secondly a document
consisting of two pages of typescript without heading, filing indication or any
of the other bureaugraphic paraphernalia which would allow us to ascertain
its precise origin.56
Hoggan all too readily views document L-3 as Lochner's own fabrication.57
The fact that similarities exist between all three documents would suggest
50 Taylor, Origins, p. 264. 51 DBFP, loc. cit.

52 Also Halder, who was present, denies emphatically Hitler's display of brutality; Ritter,
loc. cit.
53 DBFP, loc. cit. 54 Ibid.
55 Erich Raeder, Mein Leben (Tilbingen, I957), pp. i65 ff.; Manstein, loc. cit.; Ritter,
op. cit., p. 498.
56 Gerald Reitlinger, The SS-Alibi of a Nation (London, 1956), and Bullock, op. cit.
p. 482, state in accordance with statements of the Nuremberg prosecutors that these sheets
of typescript (N.D. 798-PS and 1014-PS) were taken from OKW files captured in the Tyrol.
Reitlinger goes on to say that these were based on shorthand notes taken surreptitiously by
Admiral Canaris. As his source he quotes H. Greiner, Die Oberste Wehrmachtsfiihrung 1939-
1943 (Wiesbaden, 1951), p. 38. What Greiner states, however, is that he himself made these
notes on the evening of 22 August I939 and based them on the account which General
Warlimont supplied, who had just returned from Berchtesgaden. These notes, so Greiner goes
on, were supplemented the next day by those which Canaris had made 'surreptitiously'.
Incidentally, Greiner's own account does not mention the words Saukerl or Schweinehund.
57 Hoggan, op. cit. p. 624.
that this is not so, moreover it has since become clear that the material if not
the documents were supplied to Lochner via Beck.58 Hoggan's own kind of
history tends to yield too quickly to conspiratorial notions-though as an
afterthought Goering's war dance sounds very much like a journalistic
embellishment.
One may therefore ask why in one particular detail which is directly relevant
to any assessment of Hitler's attitude prior to the immediate outbreak of war,
the two records of the meeting which are of uncertain origin should so strongly
diverge from that of an actual participant and from the testimony of other
participants.
Perhaps the Lochner version provides the clue, in that it turned up shortly
afterwards at the British Embassy. If Hitler had spoken for effect, his estimate
of what would occur was certainly right. The amount of 'resistance' literature
is too prolific, at least in quantity, to be examined here, but it emerges fairly
clearly that the opposition to Hitler did as much as it could to re-invigorate
the moral fibre of Chamberlain's government against Hitler. The fear which
dominated the opposition's activities in the last month or so before the war
was that of a repetition of Munich. Not that they resented Munich or its
repetition in principle, but that it should have been concluded with Hitler !59
The document makes it clear that it originated from one of the generals
present opposed to Hitler. Facing the possibility of another British and
French acquiescence in another bloodless victory for Hitler, a reference such
as the first two versions contain was just the kind of phrase with which the
originators of the document would hope to prevent this. True, this inter-
pretation still leaves open the question of how a similar phrase came to be
recorded in the first version, but in the last analysis the historian is faced with
the choice between two documents of extremely uncertain and even doubtful
origin and a third document which in contrast to the other two is the most
substantial and detailed; its origins are clear and its testimony supported by
verifiable witnesses.60
But one ought to emphasize again that Hitler's actions in the summer of
1939 were part and parcel of a complex war of nerves. Hitler was decided upon
a fairly early solution of the Polish question, a solution which was to his
58 According to Lochner the document originated from an unnamed officer who handed it
to Beck, who in turn through Hermann Maass, a former youth movement official, forwarded
it to Lochner. Ritter, op. cit. p. 498.
59 Schlabrendorff, loc. cit.
60 A good example of the manipulation of sources examined here is provided by Alan
Clark's recent book, Barbarossa (London, i 965). On page 2zo Hitler's conference of z:z August
1939 is reported in the light of document L-3, i.e. Doc. 314, DBFP, 3rd Series, vii, without
reference being made to differing and less sensational versions. Goering's alleged war dance
is mentioned, and supplemented by a footnote which reproduces Manstein's acid remark on
Goering's extravagant attire. To the unsuspecting reader this juxtaposition appears very much
as confirmation by Manstein of Goering's extraordinary behaviour. What he does not know,
without actually referring to Manstein, is that the latter categorically denies this performance
having taken place.
I40 IH W. KOCH
liking. One of the effects of the Russo-German pact could well have been
Polish acquiescence over Danzig, another Britain's realization of the practical
impossibility of assisting the Poles. To gain his objective Hitler was prepared
to risk war with Poland-but this diplomacy appears to have been aimed at a
repetition of Munich.
A short resume of the Polish crisis may perhaps serve as a test of some of
the key documents, in particular of Mein Kampf, as well as throwing light on
the last document in question, the minutes of a conference on 23 May I939,
with senior officers of the Wehrmacht.61
Shortly after the Munich agreement Hitler initiated his attempts to come to
an arrangement with Poland over Danzig and the Polish corridor. All of these
attempts proved to be abortive and, in conjunction with the German occupa-
tion of the Czech rump state, they precipitated the British guarantee to
Poland. If Hitler now pursued the return of Danzig to the Reich, he risked
the greater probability, though not the certainty, of Western intervention.
The first German move therefore was to endeavour to extend the existing
treaties with Japan into a full military alliance directed against the British
position in the Far East, thus diverting British military resources away from
Europe, an endeavour which really goes back into the autumn of 1938.
Ribbentrop pressed the matter early in 1939 but without much success.62
Japan was interested in a military alliance directed against Russia,63 a measure
hardly conducive to relieving pressure on Germany, let alone allowing her to
exert it on Poland.
Obviously this reduced the number of alternatives available to Hitler. After
3' March 1939, he could drop his claims to Danzig and, in view of the signi-
ficance of the British guarantee, suffer a major diplomatic defeat, a course
which, as the May crisis of I938 had clearly shown, was simply unacceptable
to a man of Hitler's character. A different alternative was to continue wooing
Poland and try to get his friendship pact, with Danzig thrown into the bargain.
But the British guarantee had reduced the chances of success of this policy
to zero. Consequently, the last alternative short of using direct force was the
coercion of Poland by means of a Russo-German rapprochement. At the end
of March Hitler had already asked Brauchitsch what he thought of the
Reichschancellor visiting Moscow.64 The upshot was the Russo-German Pact
of August 1939.
In the light of Hitler's intention of coming to terms with Russia, his speech
made on 23 May 1939, to senior Wehrmacht officers is of particular signi-
61 DGFP, Series D, VI, Doc. 433.

62 DGFP, Series D, iv, Docs. 400, 42I, 426, 542, 543, 547, 549.
63 DGFP, Series D, VI, Doc. 70.
64 Professor Harold C. Deutsch, 'Strange Interlude: The Soviet-Nazi liaison of I
in Historian, Ix, 1946-47 (Brauchitsch's testimony to Professor Deutsch in his capacity as
chief of the State Department Special Interrogation Mission).
HITLER: SECOND WORLD WAR DOCUMENTS I4I
ficance. In it Hitler said 'Danzig is not the objective, it is a question of ex-

panding our living space in the east... of securing our food supplies as well
as solving the problem of the Baltic states '.65 At first sight the meaning seems
clear enough: war so oder so as Hitler used to express himself. The quest for
Lebensraum seems confirmed. But is it? To begin with, Hitler's living space,
the area where it could be obtained, had always been the Ukraine: Russia, not
Poland. But with Russia negotiations were already in progress, with the ulti-
mate end of making her his partner in the coercion of Poland. In other words
far from solving the problem of Lebensraum or that of the Baltic states, by his
very action Hitler was in the process of shutting off-possibly only for the
short term-the source of his potential living space.
On the basis of the available evidence it seems reasonable to assume that
Hitler viewed the pact as a mere expedient, in the long run to be jettisoned
whenever convenient. Nevertheless, within the immediate context of the
diplomatic prelude to the Second World War, Hitler's invocation of the need
to secure food supplies by territorial expansion and the settling of the problem
of the Baltic states was a reference to aims which could hardly be secured in
the desired form if a Russo-German Pact were concluded.
What then remains of Hitler's actual objectives are Danzig and the Corridor,
in fact nothing but Germany's pre-Ig94 frontiers which, even if one includes
the western hulk of Poland, in the terms in which Hitler saw the problem of
living space were neither here nor there. Seen in this perspective the intention
underlying Hitler's speech may well have been different from that which has
been accepted hitherto.
Seeckt had succeeded in making the Reichswehr a state within a state, a
circumstance which still existed in I939. Admittedly, through conscription,
nazification of the army had set in in its lower levels, but though many sup-
ported Hitler as head of state, the majority of commanders and staff officers
kept their distance and resented the permeation of their profession by National
Socialist party doctrine. This, it appears, Hitler intuitively felt; as yet it was
doubtful whether the army was an instrument instantly ready to follow the
dictator's every whim. It might; but there was not yet that absolute certainty
which existed after the successful campaigns in Poland, Scandinavia and the
West. Hitler, as we have seen, was not unaware of the existence of a body of
opposition to him.
Having laid down in Mein Kampf the principle that Germany's pre-I9I4
frontiers were not worth the sacrifice of German blood, Hitler stuck to it in
the face of contrary evidence before his generals, simply by denying that
Danzig was his objective. Instead he invoked what he had described as being
Germany's fundamental problem. But at the back of his mind he must have
had the thought that in I939, as in I938, war might yet be avoided, Poland
might give in, and Hitler would have another bloodless conquest over which
65 DGFP, Series D, vi, Doc. 433.
I42 H. W. KOCH
his generals would forget the original objectives he had said were at stake.
Hitler's choice of words in this speech, it is suggested, was a product of
expediency as muchas the Russo-German Pact was to be a few months later.
As the crisis wore on, particularly in August 1939, this was no idle specula-
tion. Especially after the conclusion of the Russo-German Pact Hitler could
legitimately hope that it nullified any hopes the Poles might entertain of
Anglo-French military intervention on their behalf. And even if the Poles
persisted in not giving way to Hitler's claims without the use of force, Hitler,
who could not know the secret stipulation of the Anglo-Polish treaty, ac-
cording to which the British guarantee was limited to the sole contingency of
German aggression, had to assume that it applied also to Russian intervention
in Poland. Since this meant war between the Russo-German alliance and the
Anglo-French-Polish combination, a war in which neither French nor British
could do anything effective to aid their Polish ally, there was good reason to
suppose that Britain and France would not aid their ally. In Hitler's view if
the Poles had any sense of realities they would see it the same way. The extent
to which Hitler discounted Anglo-French intervention is best seen when one
looks at the troop dispositions on Germany's western frontier between
September and October I939. Moreover Hitler and Ribbentrop tried very
hard to get Russian military demonstrations on Poland's eastern frontier prior
to i September I939 (which Stalin and Molotov judicially avoided).66 This is
surely inconsistent with the thesis underlying Walter Hofer's book War Pre-
meditated: the thesis that in I939, Hitler's objective was war (a war of which
Chamberlain in I938 had deprived him), for this kind of demonstration would
have been the likeliest thing to make Poland more amenable to German
demands, and thus kill Hitler's chance of having his own little war. One can
hardly exclude the possibility that in spite of all Hitler was aware that another
diplomatic victory might not be granted to him. But weighing the possibilities
it seems likely that Hitler gambled in the conviction that the odds, or pro-
vidence, as he would have put it, favoured this.
This examination of evidence already known puts forward no dogmatic

claims; the intention simply is to supply and substantiate an approach to a
reasonable alternative interpretation, consistent with the evidence and one
that is in keeping with Hitler's character.
Far from having been a farsighted planner of genius, Hitler was more of a
superb tactician, a Rommel in politics, who very often because of his lack of
a detailed strategic long-term conception defeated his own ends (e.g. his
declaration of war on the United States of America in I941 !). One of Hitler's
major character traits, as Nolte rightly points out, was his monomania, his
concentration upon one objective to the exclusion of anything else. In foreign
policy, as for instance in the Czech and Polish crises, this meant following
66 DGFP, Series D, vii, Docs. 360, 383, 387, 388, 4I3, 4I4, 424, 446.
courses of action which surprised people through the impatience and violence
with which the case was put and later the action pursued, once obstacles or
provocations were put in the way. Once Czech mobilization had taken place
or Poland had become demonstrably active in the Danzig question, there was
no holding Hitler back from solving the particular problem in hand.
Policy in that way dependent on the play of individual temper played havoc
with military planning, as E. M. Robertson's study has shown.67 Although
Hitler's long-term political objective as set out in Mein Kampf seems to have
been Lebensraum in Russia, his streak of monomania when provoked led him
into a pact with his potential victim. But even if we accept that this pact was
a temporary expedient as far as Hitler was concerned, until September I940
there had never been a military plan to this effect and even then Hitler, until
Molotov's visit to Berlin, envisaged the possibility of an amicable settlement
with Russia. The discrepancy between Hitler's principles as expounded in
Mein Kampf and the policy actually pursued, is still apparent. Up to
Hitler had waited and taken those pickings which conveniently offered them-
selves. If there was a plan, it was not in Mein Kampf nor in the Hossbach
Memorandum: it evolved from picking to picking as it were.
That Poland was one picking too many became evident on 3 September
1939. To Hitler at the time it was not. His belief in the spinelessness of Britain
and France apart-and this in itself came very near to being justified-Hitler
always prided himself on being an ice-cold Verstandsmensch and a realist,which
was the quality he believed British politicians were supremely endowed with,
and which he so much admired. To him the Polish guarantee was no more
than an unfulfillable gesture, even more so after the conclusion of the Russo-
German Pact. Britain after all, could provide no effective help for her ally
while taking the risk not only of becoming involved in war with Germany but
also with Russia. His mistake was not to believe that Britain could take a
seemingly unrealistic attitude. This lesson was lost on Hitler, in whom the
Verstandsmensch was unable to see why on earth Britain should continue the
war after the defeat of Poland, or again after the fall of France.
Finally, this persistent belief in the rationality of the Anglo-Saxons may
have been responsible for Hitler's faith that ultimately they would not allow
the domination of Europe by Russia, and that consequently every step which
in early I945 brought Russians and Western allies closer together would bring
nearer the moment of rupture. All that was wrong with this calculation was
that Hitler was three years ahead of his time.68
67 E. M. Robertson, Hitler's Pre-war Policy and Military Plans 1933-1939 (London, I963).
68 Since completing this article my attention has been drawn to a document recently
covered in the Hungarian National Archives which bears on p. I34 above. If this document
is genuine in all respects it seems that the 'appeasers' were more realistic and accurate about
the pace of German rearmament than Churchill before I939 or others since I945. See Eva
Haraszti, 'Two Secret Reports from the Hungarian Archives', The New Hungarian Quarterly,
vol. viii, No. 27, pp. I07-34.

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Hitler and the Origins of the Second World War.

Second Thoughts on the Status of Some

VI. HITLER AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND

1 I wish to express here my gratitude to my colleagues Professor G. E. Aylmer and

Professor Trevor-Roper in his review of Taylor's book5 writes that between

of policy which he intended to carry out. This blueprint, according to Trevor-

6 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (227-3I Auflage, Duenndruckausgabe, Munich I937),

Versailles should be successful, the cost in blood would be so expensive as to

If Mein Kampf is, as is usually maintained, a blueprint, and if by a blueprint

close analysis has been shown to be a response to a situation only partly of

14 Gerald Reitlinger, The House Built on Sand (London, I960), p. io.

One of the major documents used hitherto as providing-in the words of

17 DGFP, Series D, I, 29, note 25a.

The propounders of the thesis of inevitability of war for economic reasons

Hitler's address to representatives of the German press on io November

view of the speech as an emphatic and expressive directive to prepare public

On 22 August I939 Hitler entertained his senior commanders to one of his

35 Bracher, Sauer, Schulz, op. cit. p. 759.

version, reproduced in the British Documents44 is of a highly sensational

D[ocumentson]B[ritish] F[oreign]P[olicy], 1919-1939, 3rd Series, vii, Doc. 3I4 (Enclosure).

50 Taylor, Origins, p. 264. 51 DBFP, loc. cit.

61 DGFP, Series D, VI, Doc. 433.

ficance. In it Hitler said 'Danzig is not the objective, it is a question of ex-

65 DGFP, Series D, vi, Doc. 433.

This examination of evidence already known puts forward no dogmatic

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