CASES (LEGAL ETHICS) Sep.

15, 2023

[ G.R. No. 230642, September 10, 2019 ]

OSCAR B. PIMENTEL, ERROL B. COMAFAY, JR., RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R.

SANDOVAL, VICTORIA B. LOANZON, ELGIN MICHAEL C. PEREZ, ARNOLD E. CACHO, AL
CONRAD B. ESPALDON, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, LEIGHTON R. SIAZON, ARIANNE C.
ARTUGUE, CLARABEL ANNE R. LACSINA, KRISTINE JANE R. LIU, ALYANNA MARL C.
BUENVIAJE, IANA PATRICIA DULA T. NICOLAS, IRENE A. TOLENTINO AND AUREA I.
GRUYAL, PETITIONERS, VS. LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, AS REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRPERSON, HON. EMERSON B. AQUENDE, AND LEB MEMBER HON. ZENAIDA N.
ELEPAÑO, RESPONDENTS;

ATTYS. ANTHONY D. BENGZON, FERDINAND M. NEGRE, MICHAEL Z. UNTALAN;

JONATHAN Q. PEREZ, SAMANTHA WESLEY K. ROSALES, ERIKA M. ALFONSO, KRYS
VALEN O. MARTINEZ, RYAN CEAZAR P. ROMANO, AND KENNETH C. VARONA,
RESPONDENTS-IN-INTERVENTION;

APRIL D. CABALLERO, JEREY C. CASTARDO, MC WELLROE P. BRINGAS, RHUFFY D.

FEDERE, CONRAD THEODORE A. MATUTINO AND NUMEROUS OTHERS SIMILARLY
SITUATED, ST. THOMAS MORE SCHOOL OF LAW AND BUSINESS, INC., REPRESENTED
BY ITS PRESIDENT RODOLFO C. RAPISTA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS FOUNDER, DEAN AND
PROFESSOR, OF THE COLLEGE OF LAW, JUDY MARIE RAPISTA-TAN, LYNNART
WALFORD A. TAN, IAN M. ENTERINA, NEIL JOHN VILLARICO AS LAW PROFESSORS AND
AS CONCERNED CITIZENS, PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS;
[G.R. No. 242954]
FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L. ABAYATA,GRETCHEN M. VASQUEZ, SHEENAH S. ILUSTRISMO,
RALPH LOUIE SALAÑO, AIREEN MONICA B. GUZMAN, DELFINO ODIAS, DARYL DELA
CRUZ, CLAIRE SUICO, AIVIE S. PESCADERO, NIÑA CHRISTINE DELA PAZ, SHEMARK K.
QUENIAHAN, AL JAY T. MEJOS, ROCELLYN L. DAÑO,* MICHAEL ADOLFO, RONALD A.
ATIG, LYNNETTE C. LUMAYAG, MARY CHRIS LAGERA, TIMOTHY B. FRANCISCO, SHEILA
MARIE C. DANDAN, MADELINE C. DELA PEÑA, DARLIN R. VILLAMOR, LORENZANA L.
LLORICO, AND JAN IVAN M. SANTAMARIA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, EMERSON B. AQUENDE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
On the principal grounds of encroachment upon the rule-making power of the Court concerning
the practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom and violation of a law school
aspirant's right to education, these consolidated Petitions for Prohibition (G.R. No. 230642)
and Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 242954) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assail as
unconstitutional Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7662,1 or the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993,
which created the Legal Education Board (LEB). On the same principal grounds, these petitions
also particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional the LEB issuances establishing and
implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School
Admission Test or the PhiLSAT.
The Antecedents
Prompted by clamors for the improvement of the system of legal education on account of the
poor performance of law students and law schools in the bar examinations,2 the Congress, on
December 23, 1993, passed into law R.A. No. 7662 with the following policy statement:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the
standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling,
problem-solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to
impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and
indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice and to develop social
competence.
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system,
require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal
apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
R.A. No. 7662 identifies the general and specific objectives of legal education in this manner:
SEC. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. -
(a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
(3) to train persons for leadership;
(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the improvement of its
administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light of the historical and
contemporary development of law in the Philippines and in other countries.
(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:
(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields and of legal
institutions;
(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate and apply the
law effectively, as well as to allow them to have a holistic approach to legal problems and
Issues;
(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, [counseling], proble -solving and decision-making,
and to develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems of the present and the future;
(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful employment or
sufficient as a foundation for future training beyond the basic professional degree, and to
develop in them the desire and capacity for continuing study and sel improvement;
(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession; and
(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their profession and to fully
adhere to its ethical norms.
For these purposes, R.A. No. 7662 created the LEB, an executive agency which was made
separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but attached thereto
solely for budgetary purposes and administrative support.3 The Chairman and regular members
of the LEB are to be appointed by the President for a term of five years, without reappointment,
from a list of at least three nominees prepared, with prior authorization from the Court, by the
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).4
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7662 enumerates the powers and functions of the LEB as follows:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the
Board shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with the
provisions of this Act;
m­
f­
(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions as
herein enumerated;
(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the
size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities,
without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;
(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and
compensation to faculty members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for
admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of study
as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels of accreditation
status;
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student
shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance
group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to
exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary
guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include
the actual work of a new member of the Bar[;]
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for
the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the
Board may deem necessary; and
(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for the
attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.
On the matter of accreditation of law schools, R.A. No. 7662 further elaborates:
SEC. 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. - Educational institutions may not operate a law school
unless accredited by the Board. Accreditation of law schools may be granted only to educational
institutions recognized by the Government.
SEC. 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The [LEB] may withdraw or downgrade
the accreditation status of a law school if it fails to maintain the standards set for its
accreditation status.
SEC. 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The withdrawal or
downgrading of accreditation status shall be effective after the lapse of the semester or
trimester following the receipt by the school of the notice of withdrawal or downgrading unless,
in the meantime, the school meets and/or upgrades the standards or corrects the deficiencies
upon which the withdrawal or downgrading of the accreditation status is based.
Bar Matter No. 979-B
Re: Legal Education
In July 2001, the Court's Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM), through its
Chairperson, Justice Jose C. Vitug, noted several objectionable provisions of R.A. No. 7662
which "go beyond the ambit of education of aspiring lawyers and into the sphere of education of
persons duly licensed to practice the law profession."5
In particular, the CLEBM observed:
x x x [U]nder the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662, the State "shall x x x
require apprenticeship and continuing legal education." The concept of continuing legal
education encompasses education not only of law students but also of members of the legal
profession. [This] implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the education of persons
who have finished the law course and are already licensed to practice law[, in violation of the
Supreme Court's power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines].
x x x Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing "awareness
among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed
sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place in the law that primarily aims to
upgrade the standard of schools of ·law as they perform the task of educating aspiring lawyers.
Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also provides that the Supreme Court
shall have the power to promulgate rules on "legal assistance to the underprivileged" and
hence, implementation of [R.A. No. 7662 might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally
mandated power.
x x x [Section 7(e) giving the LEB the power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission
and Section 7(h) giving the LEB the power to adopt a system of continuing legal education and
for this purpose, the LEB may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in
such courses and for such duration as the LEB may deem necessary] encroach upon the
Supreme Court's powers under Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Aside
from its power over the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Supreme Court is constitutionally
mandated to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law.6
While the CLEBM saw the need for the LEB to oversee the system of legal education, it
cautioned that the law's objectionable provisions, for reasons above-cited, must be removed.7
Relative to the foregoing observations, the CLEBM proposed the following amendments to R.A.
No. 7662:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the
standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counseling,
problem-solving, and decisio -making; to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to
impress upon them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and
indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice; and, to develop socially-
committed lawyers with integrity and competence.
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system,
require proper selection of law students, provide for legal apprenticeship, and maintain quality
among law schools.
xxxx
SEC. 3. General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education. x x x
xxxx
2.) to increase awareness among law students of the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of society;
xxxx
SEC. 7. Power and functions. - x x x
(a) to regulate the legal education system in accordance with its powers and functions herein
enumerated;
(b) to establish standards of accreditation for law schools, consistent with academic freedom
and pursuant to the declaration of policy set forth in Section 2 hereof;
(c) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;
(d) to prescribe minimum standards for admission to law schools including a system of law
aptitude examination;
(e) to provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools;
(f) to prescribe guidelines for law practice internship which the law schools may establish as part
of the curriculum; and
(g) to perform such other administrative functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the
policies and objectives of this Act.8 (Underscoring supplied)
n­
xxxx
In a Resolution9 dated September 4, 2001, the Court approved the CLEBM's explanatory note
and draft amendments to R.A. No. 7662. The Senate and the House of Representatives were
formally furnished with a copy of said Resolution. This, notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7662
remained unaltered.
LEB Issuances
In 2003, the Court issued a resolution authorizing the JBC to commence the nomination process
for the members of the LEB. In 2009, the LEB was constituted with the appointment of Retired
Court of Appeals Justice Hilarion L. Aquino as the first Chairperson and followed by the
appointment of LEB members, namely, Dean Eulogia M. Cueva, Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Dean
Venicio S. Flores and Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Director Felizardo Y. Francisco.
Despite the passage of the enabling law in 1993, the LEB became fully operational only in June
2010.
Acting pursuant to its authority to prescribe the minimum standards for law schools, the LEB
issued Memorandum Order No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011) providing for the Policies
and Standards of Legal Education and Manual of Regulation for Law Schools.
Since then, the LEB had issued several orders, circulars, resolutions, and other issuances
which are made available through their website:
A. Orders

Number Title/Subject
LEBMO No. 2 Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law
Program
LEBMO No. 3-2016 Policies, Standards and, Guidelines for the
Accreditation of Law Schools to Offer and
Operate Refresher Courses
LEBMO No. 4-2016 Supplemental to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of
2016
LEBMO No. 5-2016 Guidelines for the [Prerequisite] Subjects in
the Basic Law Courses
LEBMO No. 6-2016 Reportorial Requirements for Law Schools
LEBMO No. 7-2016 Policies and Regulations for the
Administration of a Nationwide Uniform Law
School Admission Test for Applicants to the
Basic Law Courses in All Law Schools in the
Country
LEBMO No. 8-2016 Policies, Guidelines and Procedures
Governing Increases in Tuition and Other
School Fees, and, Introduction of New Fees
by Higher, Education Institutions for the Law
Program
LEBMO No. 9-2017 Policies and Guidelines on the Conferment of
Honorary Doctor of Laws Degrees
LEBMO No. 10-2017 Guidelines on the Adoption of Academic/
School Calendar
LEBMO No. 11-2017 Additional Transition Provisions to [LEBMO]
No. 7, Series of 2016, on PhiLSAT
LEBMO No. 12-2018 LEB Service/Transaction Fees
LEBMO No. 13-2018 Guidelines in the Conduct of Summer
Classes
LEBMO No. 14-2018 Policy and Regulations in Offering Elective
Subjects
LEBMO No. 15-2018 Validation of the Licenses of, and the Law
Curriculum/Curricula for the Basic Law
Courses in use by Law Schools and
Graduate Schools of Law
LEBMO No. 16-2018 Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the
Academic Law Libraries of Law Schools
LEBMO No. 17-2018 Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum
Academic Requirement of Master of Laws
Degree for Deans and Law Professors/
Lecturers/Instructors in Law Schools
LEBMO No. 18-2018 Guidelines on Cancellation or Suspension of
Classes in All Law Schools
LEBMO No. 19-2018 Migration of the Basic Law Course to Juris
Doctor
LEBMO No. 20-2019 Discretionary Admission in the AY 2019-2020
of Examinees Who Rated Below the Cut-off/
Passing Score but Not Less than 45% in the
Philippine Law School Admission Test
Administered on April 7, 2019
B. Memorandum Circulars

Number Title/Subject
LEBMC No. 1 New Regulatory Issuances
LEBMC No. 2 Submission of Schedule of Tuition and Other
School Fees
LEBMC No. 3 Submission of Law School Information Report
LEBMC No. 4 Reminder to Submit Duly Accomplished LSIR
Form
LEBMC No. 5 Offering of the Refresher Course for AY
2017-2018
LEBMC No. 6 Applications for LEB Certification Numbers
LEBMC No. 7 Application of Transitory Provision Under
[LEBMO] No. 7 Series of 2017 and [LEBMO]
No. 11, Series of 2017 in the Admission of
Freshmen Law Students in Basic Law
Courses in Academic Year 2017-2018
LEBMC No. 8 Guidelines for Compliance with the
Reportorial Requirements Under [LEBMO]
No. 7, Series of 2016 for Purposes of the
Academic Year 2017-2018
LEBMC No. 9 Observance of Law Day and Philippine
National Law Week
LEBMC No. 10 September 21, 2017 Suspension of Classes
LEBMC No. 11 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the
Refresher Course in the Academic Year
2016-2017
LEBMC No. 12 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the
Refresher Course in the Academic Year
2017-2018
LEBMC No. 13 Legal Research Seminar of the Philippine
Group of Law Librarians on April 4-6, 2018
LEBMC No. 14 CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, s.2016
LEBMC No. 15 Law Schools Authorized to Offer the
Refresher Course in the Academic Year
2018-2019
LEBMC No. 16 Clarification to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of
2016
LEBMC No. 17 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to
Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic
Year 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 18 PHILSAT Eligibility Requirement for
Freshmen in the Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 19 Guidelines for the Limited Conditional
Admission/Enrollment in the 1st Semester of
the Academic Year 2018-2019 Allowed for
Those Who Have Not Taken the PhiLSAT
LEBMC No. 20 Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to
Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic
Year 2018-2019
 LEBMC No. 21 Adjustments/Corrections to the Requirements
for Law Schools to be Qualified to
Conditionally Admit/Enroll Freshmen Law
Students in AY 2018-2019
LEBMC No. 22 Advisory on who should take the September
23, 2018 PhiLSAT
LEBMC No. 23 Collection of the PhiLSAT Certificate of
Eligibility/Exemption by Law Schools from
Applicants for Admission
LEBMC No. 24 Observance of the Philippine National Law
Week
LEBMC No. 25 Competition Law
LEBMC No. 26 Scholarship Opportunity for Graduate Studies
for Law Deans, Faculty Members and Law
Graduates with the 2020-2021 Philippine
Fulbright Graduate Student Program
LEBMC No. 27 Advisory on April 7, 2019 PhiLSAT and
Conditional [Enrollment] for Incoming
Freshmen/1st Year Law Students
LEBMC No. 28 April 25-26, 2019 Competition Law Training
Program
LEBMC No. 29 Detailed Guidelines for Conditional
Enrollment Permit Application
LEBMC No. 30 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher
Course in AY 2019-2020
LEBMC No. 31 Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher
Course in AY 2019-2020
LEBMC No. 40 Reminders concerning Conditionally Enrolled
Freshmen Law Students in AY 2019-2020
C. Resolutions and Other Issuances

Number Title/Subject
Resolution No. 16 Reportorial Requirement for Law Schools
with Small Students Population
Resolution No.7, Series of 2010 Declaring a 3-Year Moratorium in the
Opening of New Law Schools
Resolution No. 8, Series of 2010 Administrative Sanctions
 Resolution No. 2011-21 A Resolution Providing for Supplementary
Rules to the Provisions of LEBMO No. 1 in
regard to Curriculum and Degrees Ad
Eundem
Resolution No. 2012-02 A Resolution Eliminating the Requirement of
Special, Orders for Graduates of the Basic
Law Degrees and Graduate Law Degrees
and Replacing them with a Per Law School
Certification Approved by the Legal Education
Board
Resolution No. 2013-01 Ethical Standards of Conduct for Law
Professors
Resolution No. 2014-02 Prescribing Rules on the Ll.M. Staggered
Compliance Schedule and the Exemption
from the Ll.M. Requirement
Resolution No. 2015-08 Prescribing the Policy and Rules in the
Establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic in Law
Schools
Order Annual Law Publication Requirements
Chairman Memorandum Restorative Justice to be Added as Elective
Subject

The PhiLSAT under LEBMO No.

7-2016, LEBMO No. 11-2017,
LEBMC No. 18-2018, and related
issuances
As above-enumerated, among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order No. 7,
Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards
for law admission" under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.
The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal education by
requiring all those seeking admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide
uniform law school admission test, known as the PhiLSAT.10
The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications and
language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning.11 It was designed to
measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law.12 Exempted from
the PhiLSAT requirement were honor graduates who were granted professional civil service
eligibility and who are enrolling within two years from their college graduation.13
Synthesizing, the key provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 are as follows:
(1) The policy and rationale of requiring PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education.
The PhiLSAT shall be administered under the control and supervision of the LEB;14
(2) The PhiLSAT is an aptitude test that measures the academic potential of the examinee to
pursue the study of law;15
(3) A qualified examinee is either a graduate of a four year bachelor's degree; expecting to
graduate with a four-year bachelor's degree at the end of the academic year when the PhiLSAT
was administered; or a graduate from foreign higher education institutions with a degree
-­
equivalent to a four-year bachelor's degree. There is no limit as to the number of times a
qualified examinee may take the PhiLSAT;16
(4) The LEB may designate an independent third-party testing administrator;17
(5) The PhiLSAT shall be administered at least once a year, on or before April 16, in testing
centers;18
(6) The testing fee shall not exceed the amount of P1,500.00 per examination;19
(7) The cut-off or passing score shall be 55% correct answers, or such percentile score as may
be prescribed by the LEB;20
(8) Those who passed shall be issued a Certificate of Eligibility while those who failed shall be
issued a Certificate of Grade;21
(9) Passing the PhiLSAT is required for admission to any law school. No applicant shall be
admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law course leading to a degree of
either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two
years before the start of the study;22
(10) Honor graduates granted professional civil service eligibility who are enrolling within two
years from college graduation are exempted from taking and passing the PhiLSAT for purposes
of admission to the basic law course;23
(11) Law schools, in the exercise of academic freedom, can prescribe additional requirements
for admission;24
(12) Law schools shall submit to LEB reports of first year students admitted and enrolled, and
their PhiLSAT scores, as well as the subjects enrolled and the final grades received by every
first year student;25
(13) Beginning academic year 2018-2019, the general average requirement (not less than 80%
or 2.5) for admission to basic law course under Section 23 of LEBMO No. 1-2011 is removed;26
(14) In academic year 2017-2018, the PhiLSAT passing score shall not be enforced and the law
schools shall have the discretion to admit in the basic law course, applicants who scored less
than 55% in the PhiLSAT, provided that the law dean shall submit a justification for the
admission and the required report;27 and
(15) Law schools, in violation of LEBMO No. 7-2016, shall be administratively sanctioned as
prescribed in Section 3228 of LEBMO No. 2-201329 and/or fined up to P10,000.00.30
Effective for the academic year 2017 to 2018, no applicant to law school was allowed admission
without having taken and passed the PhiLSAT. The first PhiLSAT examination was held on April
16, 2017 in seven pilot sites: Baguio City, Metro Manila, Legazpi City, Cebu City, Iloilo City,
Davao City, and Cagayan de Oro. A total of 6,575 out of 8,074 examinees passed the first-ever
PhiLSAT. For the first PhiLSAT, the passing grade was adjusted by the LEB from 55% to 45% by
way of consideration.
Since the PhiLSAT was implemented for the first time and considering further that there were
applicants who failed to take the PhiLSAT because of the inclement weather last April 16, 2017,
the LEB issued Memorandum Order No. 11, Series of 2017 (LEBMO No. 11-2017).
Under LEBMO No. 11-2017, those who failed to take the first PhiLSAT were allowed to be
admitted to law schools for the first semester of academic year 2017 to 2018 for justifiable or
meritorious reasons and conditioned under the following terms:
2. Conditions - x x x
a. The student shall take the next scheduled PhiLSAT;
b. If the student fails to take the next scheduled PhiLSAT for any reason, his/her conditional
admission in the law school shall be automatically revoked and barred from enrolling in the
following semester;
c. If the student takes the next scheduled PhiLSAT but scores below the passing or cut-off
score, his/her conditional admission shall also be revoked and barred from enrolling in the
following semester, unless the law school expressly admits him/her in the exercise of the
discretion given under Section/Paragraph 14 of LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, subject to the
requirements of the same provision;
d. The student whose conditional admission and enrol[l]ment is subsequently revoked shall not
be entitled to the reversal of the school fees assessed and/or refund of the school fees paid;
and
e. The student shall execute under oath, and file with his/her application for a Permit for
Conditional Admission/Enrol[l]ment, an UNDERTAKING expressly agreeing to the foregoing
conditions.31
The conditional admission and enrollment under LEBMO No. 11-2017 and the transitory
provision provided in LEBMO No. 7-2016 were subsequently clarified by the LEB through
its Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 7-2017).
On September 24, 2017 and April 8, 2018, the second and third PhiLSATs were respectively
held.
On October 26, 2017, the LEB issued a Memorandum reminding law schools, law students, and
other interested persons that the passing of the PhiLSAT is required to be eligible for admission/
enrollment in the basic law course for academic year 2017 to 2018. It was also therein clarified
that the discretion given to law schools to admit those who failed the PhiLSAT during the initial
year of implementation is only up to the second semester of academic year 2017-2018.
Because of the confusion as to whether conditional admission for academic year 2018 to 2019
may still be allowed, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of 2018 (LEBMC No.
18-2018). Under LEBMC No. 18-2018, it was clarified that the conditional admission was
permitted only in academic year 2017 to 2018 as part of the transition adjustments in the initial
year of the PhiLSAT implementation. As such, by virtue of LEBMC No. 18-2018, the conditional
admission of students previously allowed under LEBMO No. 11-2017 was discontinued.
Nevertheless, on July 25, 2018, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of
2018 (LEBMC No. 19-2018) allowing limited conditional admission/enrollment in the first
semester of academic year 2018 to 2019 for those applicants who have never previously taken
the PhiLSAT. Those who have taken the PhiLSAT and scored below the cut-off score were
disqualified. In addition, only those law schools with a passing rate of not less than 25%, are
updated in the reportorial requirement and signified its intention to conditionally admit applicants
were allowed to do so. The limited enrollment was subject to the condition that the admitted
student shall take and pass the next PhiLSAT on September 23, 2018, otherwise the conditional
enrollment shall be nullified. Non-compliance with said circular was considered a violation of the
minimum standards for the law program for which law schools may be administratively
penalized.
The fourth PhiLSAT then pushed through on September 23, 2018.
The Petitions
Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhiLSAT on April 16, 2017, petitioners
Oscar B. Pimentel (Pimentel), Errol B. Comafay (Comafay), Rene B. Gorospe (Gorospe), Edwin
R. Sandoval (Sandoval), Victoria B. Loanzon (Loanzon), Elgin Michael C. Perez (Perez), Arnold
E. Cacho (Cacho), Al Conrad B. Espaldon (Espaldon) and Ed Vincent S. Albano (Albano) [as
citizens, lawyers, taxpayers and law professors], with their co-petitioners Leighton R. Siazon
(Siazon), Arianne C. Artugue (Artugue), Clarabel Anne R. Lacsina (Lacsina) and Kristine Jane
R. Liu (Liu) [as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers], Alyanna Mari C. Buenviaje (Buenviaje) and
Iana Patricia Dula T. Nicolas (Nicolas) [as citizens intending to take up law] and Irene A.
Tolentino (Tolentino) and Aurea I. Gruyal (Gruyal) [as citizens and taxpayers] filed their Petition
for Prohibition,32 docketed as G.R. No. 230642, principally seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be
declared unconstitutional and that the creation of the LEB be invalidated together with all its
issuances, most especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon the rule-making power of the
Court concerning admissions to the practice of law;33 They prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the LEB from conducting the PhiLSAT.
Respondents-in-intervention Attys. Anthony D. Bengzon (Bengzon), Ferdinand M. Negre
(Negre), Michael Z. Untalan (Untalan), Jonathan Q. Perez (Perez), Samantha Wesley K.
Rosales (Rosales), Erika M. Alfonso (Alfonso), Krys Valen O. Martinez (Martinez), Ryan Ceazar
P. Romano (Romano), and Kenneth C. Varona (Varona) [as citizens and lawyers] moved to
intervene and prayed for the dismissal of the Petition for Prohibition.34
On February 12, 2018, petitioners-in-intervention April D. Caballero (Caballero), Jerey C.
Castardo (Castardo), MC Wellroe P. Bringas (Bringas), Rhuffy D. Federe (Federe) and Conrad
Theodore A. Matutino (Matutino) [as graduates of four-year college course and applicants as
first year law students], St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., [as an educational
stock corporation] and Rodolfo C. Rapista (Rapista), Judy Marie Rapista-Tan (Rapista-Tan),
Lynnart Walford A. Tan (Tan), Ian M. Enterina (Enterina) and Neil John Villarico (Villarico) [as
citizens and law professors] intervened and joined the Petition for Prohibition of Pimentel, et al.,
seeking to declare R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as unconstitutional.35
Thereafter, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 242954, was filed by
petitioners Francis Jose Lean L. Abayata (Abayata), Gretchen M. Vasquez (Vasquez), Sheenah
S. Ilustrismo (Ilustrismo), Ralph Louie Salaño (Solaño), Aireen Monica B. Guzman (Guzman)
and Delfino Odias (Odias) [as law students who failed to pass the PhiLSAT], Daryl Dela Cruz
(Dela Cruz), Claire Suico (Suico), Aivie S. Pescadero (Pescadero), Niña Christine Dela Paz
(Dela Paz), Shemark K. Queniahan (Queniahan), Al Jay T. Mejos (Mejos), Rocellyn L. Daño
(Daño), Michael Adolfo (Adolfo), Ronald A. Atig (Atig), Lynette C. Lumayag (Lumayag), Mary
Chris Lagera (Lagera), Timothy B. Francisco (Francisco), Sheila Marie C. Dandan (Dandan),
Madeline C. Dela Peña (Dela Peña), Darlin R. Villamor (Villamor), Lorenzana Llorico (Llorico)
and Jan Ivan M. Santamaria (Santamaria) [as current law students who failed to take the
PhiLSAT] seeking to invalidate R.A. No. 7662 or, in the alternative, to declare as
unconstitutional the PhiLSAT. They also sought the issuance of a TRO to defer the holding of
the aptitude test.36
These Petitions were later on consolidated by the Court and oral arguments thereon were held
on March 5, 2019.
Temporary Restraining Order
On March 12, 2019, the Court issued a TRO37 enjoining the LEB from implementing LEBMC No.
18-2018 and, thus, allowing those who have not taken the PhiLSAT prior to the academic year
2018 to 2019, or who have taken the PhiLSAT, but did not pass, or who are honor graduates in
college with no PhiLSAT Exemption Certificate, or honor graduates with expired PhiLSAT
Exemption Certificates to conditionally enroll as incoming freshmen law students for the
academic year 2019 to 2020 under the same terms as LEBMO No. 11-2017.
Subsequently, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 2019 (LEBMC No.
27-2019) stating that the PhiLSAT scheduled on April 7, 2019 will proceed and reiterated the
requirements that must be complied with for the conditional enrollment for the academic year
2019 to 2020.
The Parties' Arguments
In G.R. No. 230642
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive to the
Court's power to regulate and supervise the legal profession pursuant to Section 5(5), Article
VIII38 of the Constitution and that the Congress cannot create an administrative office that
exercises the Court's power over the practice of law. They also argue that R.A. No. 7662 gives
the JBC additional functions to vet nominees for the LEB in violation of Section 8(5), Article
VIII39 of the Constitution.
In their Memorandum, petitioners also question the constitutionality of the LEB's powers under
Section 7(c)40 and 7(e)41 to prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members
and Section 7(h)42 on the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education as being
repugnant to the Court's rule-making power concerning the practice of law. They also argue that
the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education.
Petitioners-in-intervention meanwhile contend that the PhiLSAT violates the right to liberty and
pursuit of happiness of the student applicants. They posit that the PhiLSAT violates the equal
protection clause as it is an arbitrary form of classification not based on substantial distinctions.
They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the right of all citizens to quality and accessible
education, violates academic freedom, and is an unfair academic requirement. It is also their
position that the PhiLSAT violates due process as it interferes with the right of every person to
select a profession or course of study. They also argue that R.A. No. 7662 constitutes undue
delegation of legislative powers.
In G.R. No. 242954
Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 argue that certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies either
under the expanded or traditional jurisdiction of the Court. They also invoke the doctrine of
transcendental importance.
Substantively, they contend that R.A. No. 7662, specifically Section 3(a)(2)43 on the objective of
legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal profession, Section 7(e) on
law admission, 7(g)44 on law practice internship, and 7(h) on adopting a system of continuing
legal education, and the declaration of policy on continuing legal education45 infringe upon the
power of the Court to regulate admission to the practice of law. They profess that they are not
against the conduct of law school admission test per se, only that the LEB cannot impose the
PhiLSAT as the power to do so allegedly belongs to the Court.46
It is also their contention that the PhiLSAT violates academic freedom as it interferes with the
law school's exercise of freedom to choose who to admit. According to them, the LEB cannot
issue penal regulations, and the consequent forfeiture of school fees and the ban on enrollment
for those who failed to pass the PhiLSAT violate due process.
The Comments
Procedurally, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the LEB, argues
that certiorari and prohibition are not proper to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7662 either
under the traditional or expanded concept of judicial power. For the OSG, R.A. No. 7662 was
enacted pursuant to the State's power to regulate all educational institutions, and as such, there
could be no grave abuse of discretion. It also claims that the Congress is an indispensable party
to the petitions.
Substantively, the OSG contends that the Court's power to regulate admission to the practice of
law does not include regulation of legal education. It also defends Section 7(e) on the LEB's
power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission as referring to admission to law
schools; Section 7(g) on the LEB's power to establish a law practice internship as pertaining to
the law school curriculum which is within the power of the LEB to regulate; and 7(h) on the
LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education as being limited to the training of
lawyer-professors.47 Anent the argument that R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC additional functions
not assigned to it by the Court, the OSG points out that the Court had actually authorized the
JBC to process the applications for membership to the LEB making this a non-issue.
In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the argument that the PhiLSAT is
the minimum standard for entrance to law schools prescribed by the LEB pursuant to the State's
power to regulate education. The OSG urges that the PhiLSAT is no different from the National
-­
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which the Court already upheld as a valid exercise of police
power in the seminal case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez.48
It is also the position of the OSG that neither the PhiLSAT nor the provisions of R.A. No. 7662
violate academic freedom because the standards for entrance to law school, the standards for
accreditation, the prescribed qualifications of faculty members, and the prescribed basic
curricula are fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
For their part, respondents in-intervention contend that R.A. No. 7662 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality and that the study of law is different from the practice of law.
In its Comment to the Petition-in-Intervention, the OSG dismisses as speculative the argument
that the PhiLSAT is anti-poor, and adds that the Court has no competence to rule on whether
the PhiLSAT is an unfair or unreasonable requirement, it being a question of policy.
Respondents-in-intervention, for their part, argue that the right of the citizens to accessible
education means that the State shall make quality education accessible only to those qualified
enough, as determined by fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. They dispute the claimed intrusion on academic freedom as law schools are not
prevented from selecting who to admit among applicants who have passed the PhiLSAT. They
stress that the right to education is not absolute and may be regulated by the State,
citing Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas.49
By way of Reply, petitioners-in-intervention emphasize that the doctrine in Tablarin50 is
inapplicable as medical schools are not the same as law schools. They further aver that the
decline in enrollment as a result of the implementation of the PhiLSAT is not speculative.51
The Issues
After a careful consideration of the issues raised by the parties in their pleadings and refined
during the oral arguments, the issues for resolution are synthesized as follows:
I. Procedural Issues:
A. Remedies of certiorari and prohibition; and
B. Requisites of judicial review and the scope of the Court's review in the instant petitions.
II. Substantive Issues:
A. Jurisdiction over legal education;
B. Supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power;
1. Reasonable supervision and regulation
2. Institutional academic freedom
3. Right to education
C. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the Court's jurisdiction over the practice of law;
and
D. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the academic freedom of law schools and the
right to education.
The Rulings of the Court
I.
Procedural Issues
A.
Remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition
The propriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition is assailed on the ground that R.A.
No. 7662 is a legislative act and not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function. In any case,
respondents argue that the issues herein presented involve purely political questions beyond
the ambit of judicial review.
The Court finds that petitioners availed of the proper remedies.
The 193552 and 197353 Constitutions mention, but did not define, "judicial power." In contrast, the
1987 Constitution lettered what judicial power is and even "expanded" its scope.
As constitutionally defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,54 judicial power
is no longer limited to the Court's duty to' settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, or the power of adjudication, but also includes, the duty to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This innovation
under the 1987 Constitution later on became known as the Court's traditional jurisdiction and
expanded jurisdiction, respectively.55
The expanded scope of judicial review mentions "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" to harbinger the exercise of judicial review; while petitions
for certiorari56 and prohibition57 speak of "lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Petitions for certiorari and prohibition as it
is understood under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are traditionally regarded as supervisory writs
used as a means by superior or appellate courts, in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction,
to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdictions. As such, writs
of certiorari and prohibition correct only errors of jurisdiction of judicial and quasi-judicial
bodies.58
However, considering the commonality of the ground of "grave abuse of discretion," a Rule 65
petition, as a procedural vehicle to invoke the Court's expanded jurisdiction, has been
allowed.59 After all, there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out
of malice, ill will, or personal bias.60 In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,61 the Court emphasized
that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues.
That it is a legislative act which is being assailed is likewise not a ground to deny the present
petitions.
For one, the 1987 Constitution enumerates under Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII,62 the Court's
irreducible powers which expressly include the power of judicial review, or the power to pass
upon the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation.
For another, the Court's expanded jurisdiction, when invoked, permits a review of acts not only
by a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also
by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. "Any branch or instrumentality of the
Government" necessarily includes the Legislative and the Executive, even if they are not
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.63 As such, the Court may review and/or
prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, there being no plain,
speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.64
The power of judicial review over congressional action, in particular, was affirmed in Francisco,
Jr. v. The House of Representatives,65 wherein the Court held:
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review
over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled that it is well
within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. In Tañada v. Angara, where petitioners sought to nullify an act of the
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
raised a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is alleged to
have seriously infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, [this Court] declared null and void a
resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of
whether the House representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to
judicial review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the legislative
power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it
exercised its power of judicial review to determine which between the Electoral Commission and
the National Assembly had jurisdiction over an electoral dispute concerning members of the
latter. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
This was reiterated in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,66 as follows:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive
officials. (Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied)
Consistently, in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,67 the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition were regarded as proper vehicles to assail the
constitutionality of curfew ordinances, and in Agcaoili v. Fariñas,68 to question the contempt
powers of the Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation.
The consistency in the Court's rulings as to the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions,
but also to correct, undo, or restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
legislative and the executive, propels the Court to treat the instant petitions in the same manner.
B.
Requisites for Judicial Review
The power of judicial review is tritely defined as the power to review the constitutionality of the
actions of the other branches of the government.69 For a proper exercise of its power of review
in constitutional litigation, certain requisites must be satisfied: (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing"
to challenge; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.70
These requisites are effective limitations on the Court's exercise of its power of review because
judicial review in constitutional cases is quintessentially deferential, owing to the great respect
that each co-equal branch of the Government affords to the other.
Of these four requisites, the first two, being the most essential,71 deserve an extended
discussion in the instant case.
1. Actual Case or Controversy
Fundamental in the exercise of judicial power, whether under the traditional or expanded setting,
is the presence of an actual case or controversy.72 An actual case or controversy is one which
involves a conflict of legal rights and an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution. The case must not be moot or academic, or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice.
To be justiciable, the controversy must be definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations
of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be shown from the pleadings that there is an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other.
There must be an actual and substantial controversy and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. Further, the actual and substantial controversy must admit specific relief through a
conclusive decree and must not merely generate an advisory opinion based on hypothetical or
conjectural state of facts.73
Closely associated with the requirement of an actual or justiciable case or controversy is the
ripening seeds for adjudication. Ripeness for adjudication has a two-fold aspect: first, the fitness
of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by
withholding court consideration. The first aspect requires that the issue must be purely legal and
that the regulation subject of the case is a "final agency action." The second aspect requires
that the effects of the regulation must have been felt by the challenging parties in a concrete
way.74
To stress, a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the challenged governmental
act has a direct and existing adverse effect on the individual challenging it.75 While a reasonable
certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to a constitutional interest may provide basis
for a constitutional challenge, it is nevertheless still required that there are sufficient facts to
enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.76
In this regard, the Court's pronouncement in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
(PACU) v. Secretary of Education77 deserves reiteration:
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant to consider
petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid, [e]specially where, as respondents
assert, petitioners suffered no wrong - nor allege any - from the enforcement of the criticized
statute.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which
the judge, conscious of the fallibility of human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case
where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility. x x x
When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become
dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. x x x
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent
that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the
protection of the rights of the parties concerned. x x x
xxxx
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has merely a
general [interest] to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative
action he must show that he has sustained or [has an] interest common to all members of the
public. x x x
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation. x x x
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of litigants
require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference, a
hypothetical threat being insufficient. x x x
Bona fide suit. - Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The
authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the decision of such cases where
conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the
Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as necessity in the
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between litigants. x x x
xxxx
An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and positive relief. x x
x Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest therein,
however intellectually solid the problem may be. This is [e]specially true where the issues "reach
constitutional dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid
decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." x x x (Internal citations
omitted; emphases supplied)
Ultimately, whether an actual case is present or not is determinative of whether the Court's hand
should be stayed when there is no adversarial setting and when the prerogatives of the co-equal
branches of the Government should instead be respected.
As ruled in Republic v. Roque: 78
A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed
to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far removed
from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases, private respondents only assert
general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government could
prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law would remain untrammelled. As their
petition would disclose, private respondents' fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of
certain government officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed
to show how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action geared
towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words, there was no particular,
real or imminent threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by
"double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the
anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for
lack of ripeness.
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present
petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to
RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse
must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. (Internal citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)
Concededly, the Court had exercised the power of judicial review by the mere enactment of a
law or approval of a challenged action when such is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre:79
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the
challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the
administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action
in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the
proper exercise of judicial function."
This is a rather novel theory - that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them
before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real
issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not
whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v.
Angara, this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the
mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the
Court:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial
rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x, it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
xxxx
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from
or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave
abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency,
instrumentality or department of the government.
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:
x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The courts, as guardians
of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act
unconstitutional and void.
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal
of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the
present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. (Internal
citations omitted; emphases supplied)
In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa,80 the Court took cognizance of the petitions despite posing a
facial challenge against the entire law as the petitions seriously alleged that fundamental rights
have been violated by the assailed legislation:
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same
is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been
passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier,
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
xxxx
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
measure.
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of
facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only
regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily,
the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance
of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people. (Internal
citations omitted; emphases supplied)81
Likewise in Belgica v. Ochoa,82 the Court held that the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is satisfied by the antagonistic positions taken by the parties:
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of
the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these
consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization-such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund - are currently
existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as
a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
1(a). Scope of Judicial Review
To determine whether petitioners presented an actual case or controversy, or have seriously
alleged that R.A. No. 7662 suffers from constitutional infirmities to trigger the Court's power of
judicial review, resort must necessarily be had to the pleadings filed.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 allege that R.A. No. 7662 and the LEB issuances relative to the
admission and practice of law encroach upon the powers of the Court.83 It is their position that
the powers given to the LEB are directly related to the Court's powers.84 In particular, they argue
that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education under Section 7(h) of R.A.
No. 7662 falls within the authority of the Court.85 In their Memorandum, they additionally argue
that the LEB's powers to prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members
under Section 7(c) and 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, Sections 50-51 of LEBMO No. 1, and Resolution
No. 2014-02 intrude into the Court's rule-making power relative to the practice of law.86 They
also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to
education.87 It is their contention that the LEB is without power to impose sanctions.88 They also
question the authority of the LEB Chairperson and Members to act in a hold-over capacity.89
For their part, petitioners-in-intervention allege that the PhiLSAT requirement resulted to a
reduced number of law student enrollees for St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc.
and constrained said law school to admit only students who passed the PhiLSAT which is
against their policy of admitting students based on values.90 Their co-petitioners are students
who either applied for law school, failed to pass the PhiLSAT, or, were conditionally enrolled.
Thus, they argue that Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT violate the law school's
academic freedom.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 allege that they are current law students who failed to pass and/
or take the PhiLSAT, and who are therefore threatened with the revocation of their conditional
enrollment and stands to be barred from enrolling. Twelve of the 23 petitioners in G.R. No.
242954 were not allowed to enroll for failure to pass and/or take the PhiLSAT.
It is their argument that the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission, Section 7(g) to establish a law practice internship,
Section 7(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education, and Section 3(a)(2) on the stated
objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of
the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society usurp the Court's rule-making
powers concerning admission to the practice of law.91 In addition, they argue that the PhiLSAT
issuances violate academic freedom, and that the LEB is not authorized to revoke conditional
enrollment nor is it authorized to forfeit school fees and impose a ban enrollment which are
penal sanctions violative of the due process clause. They also argue that the classification of
students to those who have passed or failed the PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to law
school is repugnant to the equal protection clause.
The petitions therefore raise an actual controversy insofar as they allege that R.A. No. 7662,
specifically Section 2, paragraph 2, Section 3(a)(2), Section 7(c), (e), (g), and (h) of R.A. No.
7662 infringe upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and
upon institutional academic freedom and the right to quality education. Necessarily, a review of
the LEB issuances when pertinent to these assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662 shall also be
undertaken.
2. Legal Standing
Inextricably linked with the actual case or controversy requirement is that the party presenting
the justiciable issue must have the standing to mount a challenge to the governmental act.
By jurisprudence, standing requires a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
petitioner has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the violation of its
rights,92 thus:
Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." To possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct injury guarantees that the
party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect,
assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."93 (Emphasis supplied)
The rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth doctrine, taxpayer suits,
third-party standing and the doctrine of transcendental importance.94
Petitioners-in-intervention Caballero, Castardo, Bringas, Federe and Matutino, being graduates
of a four-year college course and applicants as first year law students, as well as petitioners
Abayata, Vasquez, Ilustrismo, Salaño, Guzman and Odias, as law students who failed to pass
the PhiLSAT and were denied admission to law school for the academic year 2018 to 2019, and
petitioners Dela Cruz, Suico, Pescadero, Dela Paz, Queniahan, Mejos, Daño, Adolfo, Atig,
Lumayag, Lagera, Francisco, Dandan, Dela Peña, Villamor, Llorico and Santamaria, being law
students who were conditionally enrolled, possess the requisite standing to challenge the
constitutionality of Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 and the implementing LEB issuances, as they
were, in fact, required to take the PhiLSAT, or to comply with the terms of the conditional
enrollment and failing which, were denied admission as regular students to law school.
Petitioner-in-intervention St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., likewise
sufficiently alleges injury that it has sustained in the form of reduced number of enrollees due to
the PhiLSAT requirement and the curtailment of its discretion on who to admit in its law school.
Under the specific and concrete facts available in this case, these petitioners have
demonstrated that they were, or tend to be directly and substantially, injured.
Meanwhile, petitioners Pimentel, Comafay, Gorospe, Sandoval, Loanzon, Perez, Cacho,
Espaldon, Albano, Siazon, Artugue, Lacsina, Liu, Buenviaje, Nicolas, Tolentino, and Gruyal; and
petitioners-in intervention Rapista, Rapista-Tan, Tan, Enterina and Villarico commonly anchor
their standing to challenge R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as citizens.
Standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able to craft
an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is involved.95
Legal standing may be extended to petitioners for having raised a "constitutional issue of critical
significance."96 Without a doubt, the delineation of the Court's rule-making power vis-a-vis the
supervision and regulation of legal education and the determination of the reach of the State's
supervisory and regulatory power in the context of the guarantees of academic freedom and the
right to education are novel issues with far reaching implications that deserve the Court's
immediate attention. In taking cognizance of the instant petitions, the Court is merely exercising
its power to promulgate rules towards the end that constitutional rights are protected and
enforced.97
Now, to the core substantive issues.
II.
Substantive Issues
A.
Jurisdiction Over Legal Education
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law necessarily includes the power to do things related to the
practice of law, including the power to prescribe the requirements for admission to the study of
law. In support, they point to Sections 698 and 16,99 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. They
contend that the Congress cannot create an administrative body, like the LEB, that exercises
this rule-making power of the Court. They emphasize that the LEB belongs to the Executive
department, and, as such, is not linked or accountable to the Court nor placed under the Court's
regulation and supervision.
For their part, petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the Court exercises authority over
the legal profession which includes the admission to the practice of law, to the continuing
requirements for and discipline of lawyers.100 According to them, the rule-making power of the
Court is plenary in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
They argue that the Court's power to admit members to the practice of law extends to admission
to legal education because the latter is a preparatory process to the application for admission to
the legal profession, which "residual power" of the Court can be inferred from Sections 5101 and
6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. They also emphasize that under Sections 1102 and 2103 of Rule
138-A, non-lawyers are allowed to have limited practice of law and are held to answer by the
Court under the same rules on privileged communication and standard of conduct pursuant to
Sections 3104 and 4105 of Rule 138-A.106
Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over legal
education. Neither the history of the Philippine legal education nor the Rules of Court invoked by
petitioners support their argument. The supervision and regulation of legal education is an
Executive function.
1 Regulation and supervision of legal education had
been historically and consistently exercised
by the political departments
Legal education in the Philippines was institutionalized in 1734, with the establishment of the
Faculty of Civil Law in the University of Santo Tomas with Spanish as the medium of instruction.
-­
Its curriculum was identical to that adopted during the time in the universities in Europe107 and
included subjects on Civil Law, Canon Law, ecclesiastical discipline and elements of Natural
Law.108
In 1901, Act No. 74 was passed centralizing the public school system, and establishing the
Department of Public Instruction headed by the General Superintendent.109 The archipelago was
then divided into school divisions and districts for effective management of the school system. It
was through Act No. 74 that a Trade School110 and a Normal School111 in Manila and a School of
Agriculture in Negros were established.112
In 1908, the legislature approved Act No. 1870 which created the University of the Philippines
(UP). However, English law courses were not offered until 1910 when the Educational
Department Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), through the efforts of
Justice George Malcolm, offered law courses in the English language. In 1911, UP adopted
these classes by formally establishing its College of Law,113 with its first graduates being
students who studied at YMCA.114 The curriculum adopted by the UP College of Law became
the model of the legal education curriculum of the other law schools in the country.115
Private schools were formally regulated in 1917 with the passage of Act No. 2706116 which made
obligatory the recognition and inspection of private schools and colleges by the Secretary of
Public Instruction, so as to maintain a standard of efficiency in all private schools and
colleges117 in the country. As such, the Secretary of Public Instruction was authorized to inspect
schools and colleges to determine efficiency of instruction and to make necessary regulations.
Likewise, under Act No. 2706, the Secretary of Public Instruction was specifically authorized to
prepare and publish, from time to time, in pamphlet form, the minimum standards required of
law schools and other schools giving instruction of a technical or professional character.118
In 1924, a survey of the Philippine education and of all educational institutions, facilities and
agencies was conducted through Act No. 3162, which created the Board of Educational Survey.
Among the factual findings of the survey was that schools at that time were allowed to operate
with almost no supervision at all. This led to the conclusion that a great majority of schools from
primary grade to the university are money-making devices of persons who organize and
administer them. Thus, it was recommended that some board of control be· organized under
legislative control to supervise their administration.119 It was further recommended that
legislation be enacted to prohibit the opening of any school without the permission of the
Secretary of Public Instruction. The grant of the permission was, in turn, predicated upon a
showing that the school is compliant with the proper standards as to the physical structure,
library and laboratory facilities, ratio of student to teacher and the qualifications of the
teachers.120
Consistent with these statutory precursors, the 1935 Constitution expressed in no uncertain
terms that "[a]ll educational institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation
by the State."121
This was followed by several other statutes such as the Commonwealth Act No. 578122 which
vests upon teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision of public or duly-
recognized private schools, colleges and universities the status of "persons in authority" and
Republic Act No. 139123 which created the Board of Textbooks, mandating all public schools to
use only the books approved by the Board and allowing all private schools to use textbooks of
their choice, provided it is not against the law or public policy or offensive to dignity.124
In 1947, the Department of Instruction was changed to the Department of Education.125 During
this period, the regulation and supervision of public and private schools belonged to the Bureau
of Public and Private Schools. The regulation of law schools in particular was undertaken by the
Bureau of Private Schools through a special consultant who acted as a supervisor of the law
schools and as a national coordinator of the law deans.126
The Department of Education, through its Bureau of Private Schools, issued a Manual of
Instructions for Private Schools which contained the rules and regulations pertaining to the
qualifications of the faculty and deans, faculty load and library holdings of private learning
institutions.127 Meantime, a Board of National Education was created128 with the task of
formulating, implementing and enforcing general educational policies and coordinating the
offerings and functions of all educational institutions. The Board of National Education was later
renamed as the National Board of Education.129 In 1972, the Department of Education became
the Department of Education and Culture,130 and was later on renamed as the Ministry of
Education and Culture in 1978.131
Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution remained consistent in mandating that all educational
institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State.132
With the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang 232133 (B.P. Blg. 232) or the Education Act of 1982,
the regulatory rules on both formal and no -formal systems in public and private schools in all
levels of the entire educational system were codified. The National Board of Education was
abolished, and instead, a Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) was organized to
supervise and regulate educational institutions. Part and parcel of the MECS' authority to
supervise and regulate educational institutions is its authority to recognize or accredit
educational institutions of all levels.134
Accordingly, the MECS was given the authority over public and private institutions of higher
education, as well as degree-granting programs, in all post-secondary public and private
educational institutions.135 In particular, a Board of Higher Education136 was established as an
advisory body to the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports with the functions of making
policy recommendations on the planning and management of the integrated system of higher
education and recommending steps to improve the governance of the higher education system.
Apart from the Board of Higher Education, a Bureau of Higher Education was also established
to formulate and evaluate programs and educational standards for higher education137 and to
assist the Board of Higher Education. Law schools were placed, under the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Higher Education.138
The MECS later became the DECS in 1987 under Executive Order No. 117139 (E.O. No. 117).
Nevertheless, the power of the MECS to supervise all educational institutions remained
unchanged.140
The Administrative Code141 also states that it shall be the State that shall protect and promote
the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make
such education accessible to all; and that the DECS shall be primarily responsible for the
formulation, planning, implementation, and coordination of the policies, plans, programs and
projects in the areas of formal and non-formal education. The Administrative Code also
empowered the Board of Higher Education to create technical panels of experts in the various
disciplines including law, to undertake curricula development.142 As will be discussed hereunder,
the 1987 Constitution crystallized the power of the State to supervise and regulate all
educational institutions.143
2 DECS Order No. 27-1989 was
the precursor of R.A. No. 7662
Pursuant to its mandate under B.P. Blg. 232, the DECS promulgated DECS Order No. 27,
Series of 1989 (DECS Order No. 27-1989),144 in close coordination with the Philippine
Association of Law Schools, the Philippine Association of Law Professors and the Bureau of
Higher Education. DECS Order No. 27-1989 specifically outlined the policies and standards for
legal education, and superseded all existing policies and standards related to legal education.
These policies were made applicable beginning school year 1989 to 1990.
"Legal education" was defined in DECS Order No. 27-1989 as an educational program including
a clinical program appropriate and essential in the understanding and application of law and the
administration of justice. It is professional education after completion of a required pre-legal
education at the college level. For state colleges and universities, the operation of their law
schools was to depend on their respective charters, and for private colleges and universities, by
n­
the rules and regulations issued by the DECS. Nevertheless, it was made clear under DECS
Order No. 27-1989 that the administration of a law school shall be governed primarily by the law
school's own policies and the provisions thereof apply only suppletorily.145
Likewise, in generally permissive terms, DECS Order No. 27-1989 prescribed the preferred
qualifications and functions of a law dean, as well as the preferred qualifications, conditions of
employment and teaching load of law faculty members. It also prescribed the general inclusions
to the law curriculum, but gave the law schools the prerogative to design its own curriculum. The
DECS also drew a model law curriculum, thus, revising the 122-unit curriculum prescribed in
1946 by the Office of Private Education, as well as the 134-unit curriculum prescribed in 1963.
The law schools were also given the option to maintain a legal aid clinic as part of its law
curriculum. It also prescribed the need for law schools to have relevant library resources.
Applicants for a law course are required to comply with the specific requirements for admission
by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Court.
Such was the state of the regulation of legal education until the enactment of R.A. No. 7662 in
1993. In 1994, R.A. No. 7722146 was passed creating the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED) tasked to supervise tertiary degree programs. Except for the regulation and supervision
of law schools which was to be undertaken by the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, the structure of
DECS as embodied in E.O. No. 117 remained practically unchanged.
Due to the fact that R.A. No. 7662 was yet to be implemented with the organization of the LEB,
the CHED, meanwhile, assumed the function of supervising and regulating law schools. For this
purpose, the CHED constituted a Technical Panel for Legal Education which came up with a
Revised Policies and Standards for Legal Education, which, however, was unpublished.
3 Legal education is a mere
composite of the educational system
As recounted, the historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the
consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels
and areas of education, including legal education.
Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps
unique because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is not reason in itself
to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the
political branches.
Notwithstanding, petitioners maintain that legal education, owing to its specialized "legal" nature
and being preparatory to the practice of law, should fall within the regulation and supervision of
the Court itself. Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 went as far as professing that they are not
against the creation of an administrative body that will supervise and regulate law schools, only
that such body should be placed under the Court's supervision and control.
Two principal reasons militate against such proposition:
First, it assumes that the Court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal
education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate the admission to the practice of
law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary to the above-recounted history of
legal education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal anchorage.
Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon
itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. For the Court to void R.A. No. 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that
regulates legal education and place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners
suggest, is to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism.
4 Court's exclusive rule-making
power covers the practice of
law and not the study of law
The Constitution lays down the powers which the Court can exercise. Among these is the power
to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law.
The rule-making power of the Supreme Court had been uniformly granted under the 1935, the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. The complexion of the rule-making power, however, changes
with the promulgation of these organic laws.
Under the 1935 Constitution, existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure were repealed
and were instead converted as the Rules of Court which the Court can alter and modify. The
Congress, on the other hand, was given the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules on
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law promulgated by the
Court.147
This power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and admission to
the practice of law is in fact zealously guarded by the Court.
Thus, in Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,148 the Court asserted its "exclusive" and
constitutional power with respect to the admission to the practice of law and when the act falls
within the term "practice of law," the Rules of Court govern.149
In In Re: Petition of A.E. Garcia,150 the Court withheld from the executive the power to modify the
laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law as the prerogative to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law belongs to the Court and the power to
repeal, alter, or supplement such rules is reserved only to the Congress.
Even then, the character of the power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law under
the 1935 Constitution was held not to be absolute and that any law passed by the Congress on
the matter is merely permissive, being that the power concerning admission to the practice of
law is primarily a judicial function.
The 1973 Constitution is no less certain in reiterating the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts and the admission to the practice of
law. As observed in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,151 the 1973 Constitution further
strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving it the additional power to promulgate
rules governing the integration of the Bar.152
The ultimate power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure, the admission to
the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar remains to be with the Court under the 1973
Constitution even when the power of the Batasang Pambansa to pass laws of permissive and
corrective character repealing, altering, or supplementing such rules was retained.
The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic laws in the sense that it
took away from the Congress the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law, and the integration
of the Bar and therefore vests exclusively and beyond doubt, the power to promulgate such
rules to the Court, thereby supporting a "stronger and more independent judiciary."153
While the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions "textualized a power-sharing scheme" between the
legislature and the Court in the enactment of judicial rules,154 the 1987 Constitution "textually
altered the power-sharing scheme" by deleting the Congress' subsidiary and corrective power.155
Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted as
vesting upon the Court the authority to define the practice of law,156 to determine who will be
admitted to the practice of law,157 to hold in contempt any person found to be engaged in
unauthorized practice of law,158 and to exercise corollary disciplinary authority over members of
the Bar.159
The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of law is a
judicial function because it requires "(1) previously established rules and principles; (2) concrete
facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) decision as to whether
these facts are governed by the rules and principles."160
Petitioners readily acknowledge that legal education or the study of law is not the practice of
law, the former being merely preparatory to the latter. In fact, the practice of law has a settled
jurisprudential meaning:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of
legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involved appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys.161 (Internal citations omitted)
The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to
cover the study of law.
5 The Court exercises judicial power only
Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he Members of the
Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions." The Court exercises judicial power only
and should not assume any duty alien to its judicial functions, the basic postulate being the
separation of powers. As early as Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co.,162 the Court
already stressed:
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in
our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme
Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic
Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any
power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the
administering of judicial functions. (Emphases supplied)
Neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise of the
Court's "residual" power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of the two co-equal
branches and which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise consistent with its functions.
Regulation and supervision of legal education is primarily exercised by the Legislative and
implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the judiciary.
It is with studied restraint that the Court abstains from exercising a power that is not strictly
judicial, or that which is not expressly granted to it by the Constitution.163 This judicial abstention
is neither avoidance nor dereliction - there is simply no basis for the Court to supervise and
regulate legal education.
Court supervision over legal education is nevertheless urged164 to the same extent as the Court
administers, supervises and controls the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA).165 The
parallelism is mislaid because the PHILJA is intended for judicial education.166 It particularly
serves as the "training school for justices, judges, court personnel, lawyers and aspirants to
judicial posts."167 Court supervision over judicial education is but consistent with the Court's
power of supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.168
Still, petitioners insist that the Court actually regulated legal education through Sections 5, 6,
and 16 of Rule 138 and Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Rule 138-A of the 1997 Rules of Court. On the
contrary, the Rules of Court do not intend nor provide for direct and actual Court regulation over
legal education. At most, the Rules of Court are reflective of the inevitable relationship between
legal education and the admissions to the bar.
6 The Rules of Court do not support
the argument that the Court directly
and actually regulates legal education
While the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law
exists under the 1935 Constitution and reiterated under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the
Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and actually regulates legal education.
Instead, the 1964 Rules of Court concerned only the practice of law, admission to the bar,
admission to the bar examination, bar examinations, and the duties, rights and conduct of
attorneys. The 1997 Rules of Court is no different as it contained only the rules on attorneys and
admission to the bar under Rule 138, the law student practice rule under Rule 138-A, the
integrated bar in Rule 139-A and disbarment and discipline of attorneys in Rule 139-B.169
In the exercise of its power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law,
the Court has prescribed the subjects covered by, as well as the qualifications of candidates to
the bar examinations. Only those bar examination candidates who are found to have obtained a
passing grade are admitted to the bar and licensed to practice law.170 The regulation of the
admission to the practice of law goes hand in hand with the commitment of the Court and the
members of the Philippine Bar to maintain a high standard for the legal profession. To ensure
that the legal profession is maintained at a high standard, only those who are known to be
honest, possess good moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the
standard set by the Court by passing the bar examinations honestly and in the regular and usual
manner are admitted to the practice of law.171
Thus, under the 1997 Rules of Court, admission to the bar requires: (1) furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral, and other qualifications; (2) passing the bar examinations;172 and (3)
taking the lawyer's oath,173 signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court a
certificate of the license to practice.174 An applicant for admission to the bar must have these
qualifications: (1) must be a citizen of the Philippines; (2) must at least be 21 years of age; (3)
must be of good moral character; (4) must be a resident of the Philippines; (5) must produce
satisfactory evidence of good moral character; and (6) no charges against the applicant,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.175 It is
beyond argument that these are the requisites and qualifications for admission to the practice of
law and not for admission to the study of law.
In turn, to be admitted to the bar examinations, an applicant must first meet the core academic
qualifications prescribed under the Rules of Court.
6(a). Sections 5, 6, and 16, Rule 138
Section 5 provides that the applicant should have studied law for four years and have
successfully completed all the prescribed courses. This section was amended by Bar Matter No.
1153,176 to require applicants to "successfully [complete] all the prescribed courses for the
degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent, in a law school or university officially recognized
by the Philippine Government, or by the proper authority in foreign jurisdiction where the degree
has been granted." Bar Matter No. 1153 further provides that a Filipino citizen who is a graduate
of a foreign law school shall be allowed to take the bar examinations only upon the submission
to the Court of the required certifications.
In addition to the core courses of civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and
private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence,
taxation, and legal ethics, Section 5 was further amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC or the
Revised Law Student Practice Rule dated June 25, 2019 to include Clinical Legal Education as
a core course that must be completed by an applicant to the bar examinations.
Notably, Section 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is not directed to law schools,
but to those who would like to take the bar examinations and enumerates the academic
competencies required of them. The Court does not impose upon law schools what courses to
teach, or the degree to grant, but prescribes only the core academic courses which it finds
essential for an applicant to be admitted to the bar. Law schools enjoy the autonomy to teach or
not to teach these courses. In fact, the Court even extends recognition to a degree of Bachelor
of Laws or its equivalent obtained abroad or that granted by a foreign law school for purposes of
qualifying to take the Philippine Bar Examinations, subject only to the submission of the required
certifications. Section 5 could not therefore be interpreted as an exercise of the Court's
regulatory or supervisory power over legal education since, for obvious reasons, its reach could
not have possibly be extended to legal education in foreign jurisdictions.
In similar fashion, Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an applicant to the bar
examinations must have completed a four-year high school course and a bachelor's degree in
arts or sciences. Again, this requirement is imposed upon the applicant to the bar examinations
and not to law schools. These requirements are merely consistent with the nature of a law
degree granted in the Philippines which is a professional, as well as a post-baccalaureate
degree.
It is a reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the qualifications in order to take the bar
examinations, had placed a considerable constraint on the courses offered by law schools.
Adjustments in the curriculum, for instance, is a compromise which law schools apparently are
willing to take in order to elevate its chances of graduating future bar examinees. It is in this
regard that the relationship between legal education and admissions to the bar becomes
unmistakable. This, however, does not mean that the Court has or exercises jurisdiction over
legal education. Compliance by law schools with the prescribed core courses is but a
recognition of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction over admissions to the practice of law - that no
person shall be allowed to take the bar examinations and thereafter, be admitted to the
Philippine Bar without having taken and completed the required core courses.
Section 16, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that those who fail the
bar examinations for three or more times must take a refresher course. Similarly, this is a
requirement imposed upon the applicant. The Court does not impose that a law school should
absolutely include in its curriculum a refresher course.
6(b). Revised Law Student Practice Rule
Neither does Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC on law
student practice manifest the Court's exercise of supervision or regulation over legal education.
The three-fold rationale of the law student practice rule is as follows:
1. [T]o ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or
inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional
competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act [as] counsels on their own;
2. [T]o provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect
itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law
students; and
3. [T]o ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a
particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by
law.177
Consistently, the Revised Law Student Practice Rule is primordially intended to ensure access
to justice of the marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student practitioner's limited
practice of law pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student practitioner, what the
Court regulates and supervises is not legal education, but the appearance and conduct of a law
student before any trial court, tribunal, board, or officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal
clinic - an activity rightfully falling under the definition of practice of law. Inasmuch as the law
student is permitted to act for the legal clinic and thereby to practice law, it is but proper that the
Court exercise regulation and supervision over the law student practitioner. Necessarily, the
Court has the power to allow their appearance and plead their case, and hereafter, to regulate
their actions.
In all, the Rules of Court do not support petitioners' argument that the Court regulates and
supervises legal education. To reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not towards legal
education or law schools, but towards applicants for admission to the bar and applicants for
admission to the bar examinations - consistent with the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning admission to the practice of law, the same being fundamentally a judicial function.
Having, thus, established that the regulation and supervision of legal education do not fall within
the competence of the Court and is, instead, a power exercised by the political departments, the
Court now proceeds to determine the extent of such police power in relation to legal education.
B.
Reasonable Supervision and Regulation of Legal
Education as an Exercise of Police Power
The term police power was first used178 in jurisprudence in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden179 where
the U.S. Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, held that the regulation of navigation
by steamboat operators for purposes of interstate commerce was a power reserved to and
exercised by the Congress, thus, negating state laws interfering with the exercise of that power.
Likewise often cited is Commonwealth v. Alger180 which defined police power as "the power
vested in legislature by the [C]onstitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the [C]onstitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
Closer to home, early Philippine jurisprudence pertain to police power as the power to promote
the general welfare and public interest;181 to enact such laws in relation to persons and property
as may promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare of each
inhabitant;182 to preserve public order and to prevent offenses against the state and to establish
for the intercourse of [citizens] those rules of good manners and good neighborhood calculated
to prevent conflict of rights.183
In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel [Operators] Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,184 the
nature and scope of police power was reaffirmed as embracing the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, or the general welfare
of the people. It is negatively defined as the authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare185 and the State's inherent
power to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society,186 and flows from
the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex.187 It is described as the most essential,
insistent and illimitable188 of the powers of the State. It is co-existent with the concept of the
State and is the very foundation and one of its cornerstones,189 and therefore even precedes the
written Constitution.
1 Enactment of education laws
is an exercise of police power
The State has a "high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens"190 and has an interest in
prescribing regulations to promote the education, and consequently, the general welfare of the
people.191 The regulation or administration of educational institutions, especially on the tertiary
level, is invested with public interest.192 Thus, the enactment of education laws, implementing
rules and regulations and issuances of government agencies is an exercise of the State's police
power.193
As a professional educational program, legal education properly falls within the supervisory and
regulatory competency of the State. The legislative history of the Philippine legal educational
system earlier recounted evinces that the State, through statutes enacted by the Congress and
administrative regulations issued by the Executive, consistently exercises police power over
legal education.
The exercise of such police power, however, is not absolute.
2 Supervisory and regulatory
exercise, not control
The 1935194 and 1973195 Constitutions plainly provide that all educational institutions shall be
under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. These reflect in express terms
the police power already inherently possessed by the State. Making express an already inherent
power is not a superfluous exercise, but is rather consequential in case of conflict between
express powers. As elucidated in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities:196
In this connection we do not share the belief that [now Article XIV, Section 4(1)] has added new
power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power. An express power is
necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For instance, if there is conflict between
an express individual right and the express power to control private education it cannot off-hand
be said that the latter must yield to the former - conflict of two express powers. But if the power
to control education is merely implied from the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express
individual right[.] x x x
The 1987 Constitution under Section 4(1), Article XIV, even when expressly recognizing the
complementary roles played by the public and private schools in education, reiterated that these
educational institutions are subject to State supervision and regulation, thus:
SEC. 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in
the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all
educational institutions. (Emphasis supplied)
As much as possible, the words of the Constitution are understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say.197
As worded, the Constitution recognizes that the role of public and private schools in education is
complementary in relation to each other, and primordial in relation to the State as the latter is
only empowered to supervise and regulate. The exercise of police power in relation to education
must be compliant with the normative content of Section 4(1), Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution.198 The exercise of police power over education must merely be supervisory and
regulatory.
The State's supervisory and regulatory power is an auxiliary power in relation to educational
institutions, be it a basic, secondary or higher education. This must necessarily be so since the
right and duty to educate, being part and parcel of youth-rearing, do not inure to the State at the
first instance. Rather, it belongs essentially and naturally to the parents,199 which right and duty
they surrender by delegation to the educational institutions. As held in Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,200 the right and duty of parents to rear their
children being a natural and primary right connotes the parents' superior right over the State in
the upbringing of their children. The responsibility to educate lies with the parents and guardians
as an inherent right,201 over which the State assumes a supportive role.202 Withholding from the
State the unqualified power to control education also serves a practical purpose - it allows for a
degree of flexibility and diversity essential to the very reason of education to rear socially
responsible and morally upright youth and to enable them, also, to come in contact with
challenging ideas.
In this sense, when the Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is understood that
what it enjoys is a supportive power, that is, the power of oversight203 over all educational
institutions. It includes the authority to check, but not to interfere.
In addition to supervision, educational institutions are likewise made subject to State regulation.
Dispensing a regulatory function means imposing requirements, setting conditions, prescribing
restrictions, and ensuring compliance. In this regard, the political departments are vested with
ample authority to set minimum standards to be met by all educational institutions.204
Starkly withheld from the State is the power to control educational institutions. Consequently, in
no way should supervision and regulation be equated to State control. It is interesting to note
that even when a suggestion had been made during the drafting of the 1935 Constitution that
educational institutions should be made "subject to the laws of the State," the proponent of the
amendment had no totalitarian intentions,205 and the proposal was not meant to curtail the liberty
of teaching,206 thus:
I think it only insures the efficient functioning of educational work and does not limit liberty of
administrators of schools. The gentleman will notice that my amendment does not tend to curtail
which he used in asking the question [sic]. I want the power of the State to be supervisory as
supervision in educational parlance should be of the constructive type in the matter of help
rather than obstruction.207 (Emphasis supplied)
3 Reasonable exercise
To be valid, the supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power
must be reasonable and not repugnant to the Constitution.208
As held in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.,209 the exercise of police power, in order to be
valid, must be compliant with substantive due process:
[T]he State, x x x may be considered as having properly exercised [its] police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require its exercise[;] and (2) the means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method. (Emphases
supplied)
In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,210 the Court held that:
Notwithstanding its. extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its
awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in
that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is, to advance the public good.
(Emphasis supplied)
Obviating any inference that the power to regulate means the power to control, the 1987
Constitution added the word "reasonable" before the phrase supervision and regulation.
The import of the word "reasonable" was elaborated in Council of Teachers,211 as follows:
x x x Section 4(1) was a provision added by the Framers to crystallize the State's recognition of
the importance of the role that the private sector plays in the quality of the Philippine education
system. Despite this recognition, the Framers added the second portion of Section 41 to
emphasize that the State, in the exercise of its police power, still possesses the power of
supervision over private schools. The Framers were explicit, however, that this supervision
refers to external governance, as opposed to internal governance which was reserved to the
respective school boards, thus:
Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the addition of the word
"reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and regulation"; two, the addition of the word
"quality" before the word "education"; three, the change of the wordings in the 1973 Constitution
referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant to the goals of national
development, to the present expression of "relevant to the needs of the people and society";
and four, the explanation of the meaning of the expression "integrated system of education" by
defining the same as the recognition and strengthening of the complementary roles of public
and private educational institutions as separate but integral parts of the total Philippine
educational system.
When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external governance of
educational institutions, particularly private educational institutions as distinguished from the
internal governance by their respective boards of directors or trustees and their administrative
officials. Even without a provision on external governance, the State would still have the
inherent right to regulate educational institutions through the exercise of its police power. We
have thought it advisable to restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State
provided in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We
found it necessary to add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our Supreme
Court in a decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. The
Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court said, and I
quote:
It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides for
control of education by the State.
The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means power to
control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to prove that State
control of private education was intended by organic law.
The addition, therefore, of the word 'reasonable' is meant to underscore the sense of the
committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State supervision and regulation, it does not in
any way mean control. We refer only to the power of the State to provide regulations and to see
to it that these regulations are duly followed and implemented. It does not include the right to
manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to
dominate. (Emphases in the original; underscoring supplied)
The addition of the word "reasonable" did not change the texture of police power that the State
exercises over education. It merely emphasized that State supervision and regulation of legal
education cannot amount to control.
4 Academic freedom
Fundamental in constitutional construction is that the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole, and that all provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and
to be so interpreted as to effectuate the purposes of the Constitution.212
Accordingly, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is not a stand-alone provision,
but must be read in conjunction with the other Constitutional provisions relating to education
which include, in particular, the clause on academic freedom.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar· provision was found in the
1973 Constitution providing that: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic
freedom."213 Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions provide for a broader scope of academic
freedom compared to the 1935 Constitution which limits the guarantee of academic freedom
only to universities of higher learning established by the State.214
In fact, academic freedom is not a novel concept. This can be traced to the freedom of
intellectual inquiry championed by Socrates, lost and replaced by thought control during the time
of Inquisition, until the movement back to intellectual liberty beginning the 16th century, most
particularly flourishing in German universities.215
Academic freedom has traditionally been associated as a narrow aspect of the broader area of
freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press. It has been identified with the individual
autonomy of educators to "investigate, pursue, [and] discuss free from internal and external
interference or pressure."216 Thus, academic freedom of faculty members, professors,
researchers, or administrators is defended based on the freedom of speech and press.217
Academic freedom is enjoyed not only by members of the faculty, but also by the students
themselves, as affirmed in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong:218
x x x. After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too
different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article
XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher
learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom
are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic
freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in
education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of
academic freedom."
More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the
sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean
that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that,
it also includes x x x" Gascon finished off the broken thought, "the faculty and the students."
Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Jurisprudence has so far understood academic freedom of the students as the latter's right to
enjoy in school the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. For instance, in Villar v. Technological
Institute of the Philippines219 and in Non v. Dames II,220 it was held that academic standards
cannot be used to discriminate against students who exercise their rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech, in Malabanan v. Ramento,221 it was ruled that the punishment must
be commensurate with the offense, and in Guzman v. National University,222 which affirmed the
student's right to due process.
Apart from the academic freedom of teachers and students, the academic freedom of the
institution itself is recognized and constitutionally guaranteed.
The landmark case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology223 elucidates how academic freedom is enjoyed by institutions of higher learning:
[I]t is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of
this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It
decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.
That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the
University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it
"definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an institution as
distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." He cited the following from
Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France, President of the conference of
rectors and vice-chancellors of European universities: "It is a well-established fact, and yet one
which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the
collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the
individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily
connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore,
between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual
university teacher." Also: To clarify further the distinction between the freedom of the university
and that of the individual scholar, he says: The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right
of each university teacher - recognized and effectively guaranteed by society - to seek and
express the truth as he personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a
private citizen. Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in
considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and
through which they disseminate their learning. (Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Garcia also enumerated the internal conditions for institutional academic freedom, that is, the
academic staff should have de facto control over: (a) the admission and examination of
students; (b) the curricula for courses of study; (c) the appointment and tenure of office of
academic staff; and (d) the allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure.224
Reference was also made to the influential language of Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,225 describing it as the "business of the university" to provide a
conducive atmosphere for speculation, experimentation, and creation where the four essential
freedoms of the university prevail: the right of the university to determine for itself on academic
grounds (a) who may teach; (b) what may be taught; (c) how it shall be taught; and (d) who may
be admitted to study.
4(a). State's supervisory and regulatory power over
legal education in relation to academic freedom
The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who to admit, being part of their academic
freedom. The State, in the exercise of its reasonable supervision and regulation over education,
can only impose minimum regulations.
At its most elementary, the power to supervise and regulate shall not be construed as stifling
academic freedom in institutions of higher learning. This must necessarily be so since
institutions of higher learning are not mere walls within which to teach; rather, it is a place where
research, experiment, critical thinking, and exchanges are secured. Any form of State control,
even at its most benign and disguised as regulatory, cannot therefore derogate the academic
freedom guaranteed to higher educational institutions. In fact, this non-intrusive relation
between the State and higher educational institutions is maintained even when the Constitution
itself prescribes certain educational "thrusts" or directions.226
This attitude of non-interference is not lost in jurisprudence. To cite an example, due regard for
institutional academic freedom versus State interference was recognized in Lupangco v. Court
of Appeals,227 the commendable purpose of the Philippine Regulation Commission of ensuring
the integrity of the examination notwithstanding:
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the
schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review
schools and centers believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required
before becoming a full-[f]ledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction
are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and
centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,228 the Court upheld the
university's academic freedom to choose who should teach and held that the Civil Service
Commission had no authority to dictate to the university the outright dismissal of its personnel.
Nothing short of marked arbitrariness,229 or grave abuse of discretion230 on the part of the
schools, or overriding public welfare231 can therefore justify State interference with the academic
judgment of higher educational institutions. As held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge
Capulong,232 "[a]s corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently
endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by
external controls or pressure."
5. Right to education
Apart from the perspective of academic freedom, the reasonable supervision and regulation
clause is also to be viewed together with the right to education. The 1987 Constitution speaks
quite elaborately on the right to education. Section 1, Article XIV provides:
SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all
levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
The normative elements of the general right to education under Section 1, Article XIV, are (1) to
protect and promote quality education; and (2) to take appropriate steps towards making such
quality education accessible.
"Quality" education is statutorily defined as the appropriateness, relevance and excellence of
the education given to meet the needs and aspirations of the individual and society.233
In order to protect and promote quality education, the political departments are vested with the
ample authority to set minimum standards to be met by all educational institutions. This
authority should be exercised within the parameters of reasonable supervision and regulation.
As elucidated in Council of Teachers:234
While the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality education, the
determination of what constitutes quality education is best left with the political departments who
have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and resources to determine the same. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission again are very instructive:
Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education" to send
appropriate signals to the government that, in the exercise of its supervisory and regulatory
powers, it should first set satisfactory minimum requirements in all areas curriculum, faculty,
internal administration, library, laboratory class and other facilities, et cetera, and it should see
to it that satisfactory minimum requirements are met by all educational institutions, both public
and private.
When we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters, among others, as
curriculum development, development of learning resources and instructional materials,
upgrading of library and laboratory facilities, innovations in educational technology and teaching
methodologies, improvement of research quality, and others. Here and in many other provisions
on education, the principal focus of attention and concern is the students. I would like to say that
in my view there is a slogan when we speak of quality of education that I feel we should be
aware of, which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other words, even if the quality of
education is good now, we should attempt to keep on improving it. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
On the other hand, "accessible" education means equal opportunities to education regardless of
social and economic differences. The phrase "shall take appropriate steps" signifies that the
State may adopt varied approaches in the delivery of education that are relevant and responsive
to the needs of the people and the society. This is why, towards this end, the State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education
relevant to the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school
levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary education is
compulsory for all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies,
and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and private
schools, especially to the underprivileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-learning,
independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond to community
needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics, vocational
efficiency, and other skills.235 (Emphases supplied)
The deliberations of the framers in this regard are instructive:
MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize is
that education should be equally accessible to all regardless of social and economic differences.
So we go into the issue of providing opportunities to such an education, recognizing that there
are limitations imposed on those who come from the poorer social classes because of their
inability to continue education.236 x x x (Emphasis supplied)
And further, as follows:
This is why when we speak of education as a right, it means very clearly that education should
be accessible to all, regardless of social and economic differences, meaning, educational
opportunities should be provided through a system of free education, at least, up to the
secondary level. And recognizing the limits of our financial resources, tertiary education should
still be afforded and provided availability to those who are poor and deserving. That is why when
we say that education is a right, it imposes a correlative duty on the part of the State to provide
it to the citizens. Making it a right shows that education is recognized as an important function of
the State. Education is not merely a social service to be provided by the State. The proposed
provision recognizes that a right to education is a right to acquire a decent standard of living,
and that, therefore, the State cannot deprive anyone of this right in the same manner that the
right to life, the right to liberty and property cannot be taken away without due process of
law.237 (Emphasis supplied)
The element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus, pertains to both the elimination of
discrimination especially against disadvantaged groups and to the financial duty of the State for,
after all, the right to education is part and parcel of social justice. The objective is to make
quality education accessible by appropriate means.
Apart from the Constitution, the right to education is also recognized in international human
rights law under various instruments to which the Philippines is a state signatory and to which it
is concomitantly bound.
For instance, Article 13(2)238 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) recognizes the right to receive an education with the following interrelated and
essential features; (a) availability; (b) accessibility; (c) acceptability; and (d) adaptability.239
In particular, accessibility is understood as giving everyone, without discrimination, access to
educational institutions and programs. Accessibility has three overlapping dimensions:
(1) Non-discrimination - education must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable
groups, in law and fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds x x x;
(2) Physical accessibility - education has to be within safe physical reach, either by attendance
at some reasonably convenient geographic location ([e.g.] a neighborhood school) or [via]
modern technology ([e.g.] access to a "distance learning" programme); [and]
(3) Economic accessibility - education has to be affordable to all. This dimension of accessibility
is subject to the differential wording of [A]rticle 13(2) in relation to primary, secondary and higher
education: whereas primary education shall be available "free to all", States parties are required
to progressively introduce free secondary and higher education[.]240
Pertinent to higher education, the elements of quality and accessibility should also be present
as the Constitution provides that these elements should be protected and promoted in all
educational institutions.
Nevertheless, the right to receive higher education is not absolute.
5(a). Right to education is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements
Article 26(1)241 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[t]echnical and
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally
accessible to all on the basis of merit[,]" while the ICESCR provides that "[h]igher education
shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means,
and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education[.]"242 Thus, higher education is
not to be generally available, but accessible only on the basis of capacity.243 The capacity of
individuals should be assessed by reference to all their relevant expertise and experience.244
The right to receive higher education must further be read in conjunction with the right of every
citizen to select a profession or course of study guaranteed under the Constitution. In this
regard, the provisions of the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(3), Article XIV are more
exacting:
SEC. 5. x x x
xxxx
(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable,
and equitable admission and academic requirements.
There is uniformity in jurisprudence holding that the authority to set the admission and academic
requirements used to assess the merit and capacity of the individual to be admitted and retained
in higher educational institutions lie with the institutions themselves in the exercise of their
academic freedom.
In Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,245 the Court ruled:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition
that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being
a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982,
students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.
"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right x x x extends as well to parents x x x
as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to
assist and cooperate with the schools."
Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful
management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline." Going a
step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival.
Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as
collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic
freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in
Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules
laid down by the school. (Citation in the original omitted; emphases supplied)
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines,246 the Court similarly held:
xxxx
2. What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social, economic,
and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and high school grades but
also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the State maintaining "a system of
free public elementary education and, in areas where finances permit, establish and maintain a
system of free public education" up to the high school level does not per se exclude the
exercise of that right in colleges and universities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of
sufficient funds for such a duty to be obligatory in the case of students in the colleges and
universities. As far as the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such
right because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and
professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally
accessible to all on the basis of merit."
3. It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the social economic, and
cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation imposed on the State is not categorical,
the phrase used being "generally available" and higher education, while being "equally
accessible to all should be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification
for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic
deficiency.
4. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set
academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the
expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed
meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a
legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause
being disregarded. (Emphases supplied)
Likewise, in Calawag:247
Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego,
we held that the right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e), Article XIV of the Constitution
provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements." The thesis requirement and
the compliance with the procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic
requirements a person desiring to complete a course of study would have to comply
with. (Citation in the original omitted; emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the framers on the qualifications to the right to education are also
illuminating:
MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you, Madam President. Before I ask questions directed to the chairman
and members of the committee, I would like to warmly congratulate them for a job well-done.
The committee report to my mind, Madam President, is excellent and I hope it will not, in the
course of amendments, suffer from adulteration. With respect to page 1, lines 12-13: "Education
is the right of every citizen of the Philippines," I agree with this statement, but when we talk of
the right, I understand from the chairman that it is compellable and from Commissioner
Guingona, that it is enforceable in court. Suppose a student of a private school is not allowed to
enroll by reason of misconduct or that his stay in the school is considered by the administration
of that school to be undesirable, does he have a right to enforce his right to education under this
situation?
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, the right to education, like any other right, is not absolute.
As a matter of fact, Article XXVI of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, when it
acknowledges the right to education, also qualifies it when at the end of the provision, it say, "on
the basis of merit." Therefore, the student may be subject to certain reasonable requirements
regarding admission and retention and this is so provided in the draft Constitution. We admit
even of discrimination. We have accepted this in the Philippines, and I suppose in the United
States there are schools that can refuse admission to boys because they are supposed to be
exclusively for girls. And there are schools that may refuse admission to girls because they are
exclusively for boys. There may even be discrimination to accept a student who has a
contagious disease on the ground that it would affect the welfare of the other students. What I
mean is that there could be reasonable qualifications, limitations or restrictions to this right,
Madam President.
MR. GASCON: May I add, Madam President.
MR. NOLLEDO: Yes, the Commissioner may.
MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize is that
education should be equally accessible to all regardless of social and economic differences. So
we go into the issue of providing opportunities to such an education, recognizing that there are
limitations imposed on those who come from the poorer social classes because of their inability
to continue education.
However, in the same light, this right to education is subject to the right of educational
institutions to admit students upon certain conditions such as ability to pay the required entrance
examination fee and maintaining a respectable school record. When we speak of this right of
schools as far as maintaining a certain degree or quality of students, these conditions must be
reasonable and should not be used just to impose certain unfair situations on the students.
MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, may I add.
There is already established jurisprudence about this. In the United States, in the case of
[Lesser] v. Board of Education of New York City, 239, NYS 2d 776, the court held that the refusal
of a school to admit a student who had an average of less than 85 percent which is the
requirement for that school was lawful.
In the Philippines, we have the case of Padriguilan [sic] v. Manila Central University where
refusal to retain the student was because of the alleged deficiency in a major subject and this
was upheld by our Supreme Court. There is also the case of Garcia v. Loyola School of
Theology, wherein Garcia, a woman, tried to continue studying in this school of
theology.248 (Citation in the original omitted; emphases supplied)
Extant from the foregoing is that while there is a right to quality higher education, such right is
principally subject to the broad academic freedom of higher educational institutions to impose
fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. Plainly stated, the right
to receive education is not and should not be taken to mean as a right to be admitted to
educational institutions.
With the basic postulates that jurisdiction over legal education belongs primarily and directly to
the political departments, and that the exercise of such police power must be in the context of
reasonable supervision and regulation, and must be consistent with academic freedom and the
right to education, the Court now proceeds to address whether the assailed provisions of R.A.
No. 7662 and the corresponding LEB issuances fall within, the constitutionally-permissible
supervision and regulation of legal education.
C.
LEB's Powers Under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the
Court's Jurisdiction Under Article VIII, Section
5(5) of the Constitution
1 Section 3(a)(2) on increasing awareness
among members of the legal profession
One of the general objectives of legal education under Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 is to
"increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived
and oppressed sectors of society[.]" This objective is reiterated by the LEB in LEBMO No.
1-2011, Section 7, Article II, as follows:
SEC. 7. (Section 3 of the law) General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education.
a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:
xxxx
(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The plain language of Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011
are clear and need no further interpretation. This provision goes beyond the scope of R.A. No.
7662, i.e., improvement of the quality of legal education, and, instead delves into the training of
those who are already members of the bar. Likewise, this objective is a direct encroachment on
the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and legal assistance
to the underprivileged and should, thus, be voided on this ground. As aptly observed by the
CLEBM and which the Court had approved:
In the same vein Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing
"awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place in the law that primarily
aims to upgrade the standard of schools of law as they perform the task of educating aspiring
lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution also provides that the Supreme
Court shall have the power to promulgate rules on "legal assistance to the underprivileged" and
hence, implementation of [R.A. No. 7662 might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally
mandated power.249
2 Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal
apprenticeship and law practice internship
as a requirement for taking the bar
Towards the end of uplifting the standards of legal education, Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662
mandates the State to (1) undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system; (2)
require proper selection of law students; (3) maintain quality among law schools; and (4) require
legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
Pursuant to this policy, Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 grants LEB the power to establish a law
practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar examinations:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x x
xxxx
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar, which a law student
shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance
group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to
exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary
guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include
the actual work of a new member of the Bar.
This power is mirrored in Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011:
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the
objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student
shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance
group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to
exceed a total of twelve (12)months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary
guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship which shall include
the actual work of a new member of the Bar[.]
It is clear from the plain text of Section 7(g) that another requirement, i.e., completion of a law
internship program, is imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This requirement unduly
interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice
of law and admissions thereto.
The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations
belongs to the Court. In fact, under the whereas clauses of the Revised Law Student Practice
Rule, the Court now requires the completion of clinical legal education courses, which may be
undertaken either in a law clinic or through an externship, as a prerequisite to take the bar
examinations, thus:
Whereas, to produce practice-ready lawyers, the completion of clinical legal education courses
must be a prerequisite to take the bar examinations as provided in Section 5 of Rule 138.
Under Section 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal
education, but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar examinations, and
consequently, admissions to the bar. This is a direct encroachment upon the Court's exclusive
authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck
down as unconstitutional.
Further, and as will be discussed hereunder, the LEB exercised this power in a manner that
forces upon law schools the establishment of a legal apprenticeship program or a legal aid
clinic, in violation of the schools' right to determine for themselves their respective curricula.
3 Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(h) on
continuing legal education of practicing lawyers
Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the power given to the LEB to adopt a system of
continuing legal education implies that the LEB exercises jurisdiction not only over the legal
education of those seeking to become lawyers, but also over those who are already lawyers
which is a function exclusively belonging to the Court.250 Respondent, on the other hand,
maintains that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal education is different from
the mandatory continuing legal education required of all members of the bar.251 Respondent
explains that the continuing legal education under R.A. No. 7662 is limited to the training of
lawyer-professors and not to the practice of the legal profession.252
The questioned power of the LEB to adopt a system of continuing legal education appears in
Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - x x x
xxxx
Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system,
require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal
apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
xxxx
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x
xxxx
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the [LEB] may provide for
the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the
[LEB] may deem necessary; x x x (Emphases supplied)
This power is likewise reflected in Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, as follows:
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the
objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for
the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the
Board may deem necessary[.] x x x (Emphasis supplied)
By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal education" under Section 2, par. 2, and
Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the legal education of
those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to
compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as
the LEB deems, necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education of "lawyer-professors" as teaching
of law is practice of law. The mandatory continuing legal education of the members of the bar
ℒαwρhi৷

is, in fact, covered by B.M. No. 850 or the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) dated August 22, 2000 which requires members of the bar, not otherwise exempt, from
completing, every three years, at least 36 hours of continuing legal education activities
approved by the MCLE Committee directly supervised by the Court.
As noted by the CLEBM:
Thus, under the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662, the State "shall undertake
appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require the proper selection of law students,
maintain quality among law schools and require apprenticeship and continuing legal
education["]. The concept of continuing legal education encompasses education not only of law
students but also of members of the legal profession. Its inclusion in the declaration of policies
implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the education of persons who have finished
the law course and are already licensed to practice law. Viewed in the light of Section 5,
paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution that vests the Supreme Court with powers over the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, said portion of Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662 risks a declaration
of constitutional infirmity.253 (Underscoring supplied)
4 Section 7(e) on minimum
standards for law admission
and the PhiLSAT issuances
Of the several powers of the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, its power to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission under Section 7(e) received the strongest objection from the
petitioners. Section 7(e), provides:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x
xxxx
(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and
compensation of faculty members; (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners argue that the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission belongs
to the Court pursuant to its rule-making power concerning the admission to the practice of law;
Thus, Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 which gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission is allegedly unconstitutional as it violates the doctrine of separation
of powers. Necessarily, according to the petitioners, the PhiLSAT which was imposed by the
LEB pursuant to Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 is likewise void.
The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-making power and the power of the
LEB to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.
Consequently, the PhiLSAT, which intends to regulate admission to law schools, cannot be
voided on this ground.
4(a). LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards
for "law admission" pertain to admission to
legal education and not to the practice of law
Much of the protestation against the LEB's exercise of the power to prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission stems from the interpretation extended to the phrase "law
admission." For petitioners, "law admission" pertains to the practice of law, the power over
which belongs exclusively to the Court.
The statutory context and the intent of the legislators do not permit such interpretation.
Basic is the rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, that is, every part must be read together with the other parts, to the
end that the general intent of the law is given primacy.254 As such, a law's clauses and phrases
cannot be interpreted as isolated expressions nor read in truncated parts, but must be
considered to form a harmonious whole.255
Accordingly, the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission should be read with the State policy behind the enactment of R.A.
No. 7662 which is fundamentally to uplift the standards of legal education and the law's thrust to
undertake reforms in the legal education system. Construing the LEH's power to prescribe the
standards for law admission together with the LEB's other powers to administer, supervise, and
accredit law schools, leads to the logical interpretation that the law circumscribes the LEB's
power to prescribe admission requirements only to those seeking enrollment to a school or
college of law and not to the practice of law.
Reference may also be made to DECS Order No. 27-1989, as the immediate precursor of R.A.
No. 7662, as to what is sought to be regulated when the law speaks of "law admission"
requirements.
Section 1, Article VIII of DECS Order No. 27-1989 is clear that the admission requirement
pertains to enrollment in a law course, or law school, or legal education, thus:
Article VIII
Admission, Residence and Other Requirements
SEC. 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law course unless he complies with specific
requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Supreme Court of the
Philippines, for which purpose he must present to the registrar the necessary credentials before
the end of the enrollment period. (Emphases supplied)
This contemporary interpretation suffice in itself to hold that the phrase "law admission" pertains
to admission to the study of law or to legal education, and not to the practice of law. Further
support is nevertheless offered by the exchanges during the Senate interpellations, wherein it
was assumed that the phrase "minimum standards for law admission" refers to the requirements
that the student must fulfill before being admitted to law school. This assumption was not
corrected by the bill's sponsor.256
4(b). Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 is reasonable supervision and regulation
Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, insofar as it gives the LEB the power to prescribe the minimum
standards for law admission is faithful to the reasonable supervision and regulation clause. It
merely authorizes the LEB to prescribe minimum requirements not amounting to control.
Emphatically, the law allows the LEB to prescribe only the minimum standards and it did not, in
any way, impose that the minimum standard for law admission should be by way of an
exclusionary and qualifying exam nor did it prevent law schools from imposing their respective
admission requirements.
Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, the minimum standards for admission to law schools as
implemented by the LEB are: (1) completion of a four-year high school course; and (2)
completion of a course for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.257 Again, these requirements
are but consistent with the nature of the law course in the Philippines as being both a
professional and post-baccalaureate education.
As the facts disclose, however, the LEB later on introduced the PhiLSAT as an additional
prerequisite for admission to law school.
4(c). Pursuant to Section 7(e), LEB is authorized to administer
an aptitude test as a minimum standard for law admission
Evident from the Senate deliberations that, in prescribing the minimum standards for law
admission, an aptitude test may be administered by the LEB although such is not made
mandatory under the law. Thus:
Senator Tolentino: x x x
I will proceed to another point, Mr. President. I have taught law for more than 25 years in private
schools and in the University of the Philippines as well. There is one thing I have noticed in all
these years of teaching and that is, many students in the law school are not prepared or apt by
inclination or by ability to become lawyers. I see that the objectives of the legal education that
are provided for in this bill do not provide for some mechanism of choosing people who should
take up the law course.
As it is now, because of our democratic principles, anybody who wants to become a lawyer, who
can afford the tuition fee, or who has the required preparatory course, can be admitted into the
law school. And yet, while studying law, many of these students - I would say there are about 30
or 40 percent of students in private schools - should not be taking up law but some other course
because, simply, they do not have the inclination, they do not have the aptitude or the ability to
become lawyers.
Can that be provided for in this bill, Madam Sponsor? Would it contravene really our principles
of democracy where everybody should be free to take the course that he wants to take? Or
should the State be able to determine who should be able or who should be allowed to take a
particular course, in this case of law?
Senator Shahani: Mr. President, there are those aptitude tests which are being taken when the
student is in high school to somehow guide the guidance councilors [sic] into the aptitude of the
students. But the talent or the penchant for the legal profession is not one of those subjects
specifically measured. I think what is measured really is who is, more or less, talented for an
academic education as against a vocational education. But maybe, a new test will have to be
designed to really test the aptitude of those who would like to enter the law school. x x x
Senator Tolentino: x x x
Many parents want to see their children become lawyers. But they do not consider the aptitude
of these children, and they waste money and time in making these children take up law when
they really are not suited to the law course. My real concern is whether by legislation, we can
provide for selection of those who should be allowed to take up law, and not everybody would
be allowed to take up law. x x x
xxxx
Senator Shahani: Mr. President, of course, the right to education is a constitutional right, and I
think one cannot just categorically deny a student - especially if he is bright - entrance to a law
school. I think I would stand by what I had previously said that an aptitude examination will have
to be specially designed. It is not in existence yet. x x x258 (Emphases supplied)
This matter was amplified in second reading:
Senator Angara: x x x
Senator Tolentino asked why there is an omission on the requirements for admission to law
school. I think [Senator Shahani] has already answered that, that the [LEB] may prescribe an
aptitude test for that purpose. Just as in other jurisdictions, they prescribe a law admission test
for prospective students of law. I think the board may very well decide to prescribe such a test,
although it is not mandatory under this bill.259 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The lawmakers, therefore, recognized and intended that the LEB be vested with authority to
administer an aptitude test as a minimum standard for law admission. The presumption is that
the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and one which operates no
further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.260 This presumption
has not been successfully challenged by petitioners.
It also bears to note that the introduction of a law aptitude examination was actually supported
by the Court when it approved the CLEBM's proposed amendment to Section 7(e), as follows:
SEC. 6. Section 7 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 7. Power and Functions. - x x x
xxxx
d). to prescribe minimum standards for ADMISSION TO LAW SCHOOLS INCLUDING A
SYSTEM OF LAW APTITUDE EXAMINATION x x x[.]" (Underscoring supplied)
And further in Bar Matter No. 1161261 when the Court referred to the LEB the conduct of a
proposed law entrance examination.
4(d). PhiLSAT, as an aptitude exam,
is reasonably related to the improvement
of legal education
Having settled that the LEB has the power to administer an aptitude test, the next issue to be
resolved is whether the exercise of such power, through the PhiLSAT, was reasonable.
Indeed, an administrative regulation is susceptible to attack for unreasonableness. In Lupangco
v. Court of Appeals,262 the Court held:
It is an [axiom] in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations
must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must
be held to be invalid. (Emphasis supplied)
To determine whether the PhiLSAT constitutes a valid exercise of police power, the same test of
reasonableness, i.e., the concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful means, is employed.
Petitioners argue that the PhiLSAT is unreasonable because: it is not a conclusive proof of the
student's aptitude;263 it entails unreasonable examination and travel expenses and burdensome
documentary requirements;264 applying for PhiLSAT exemption is inconvenient;265 it is redundant
to existing law school entrance exams;266 and it is not supported by scientific study.267
Unfortunately, these grounds are not only conclusions of fact which beg the presentation of
competent evidence, but also necessarily go into the wisdom of the PhiLSAT which the Court
cannot inquire into. The Court's pronouncement as to the reasonableness of the PhiLSAT based
on the grounds propounded by petitioners would be an excursion into the policy behind the
examinations - a function which is administrative rather than judicial.
Petitioners also argue that there is no reasonable relation between improving the quality of legal
education and regulating access thereto. The Court does not agree.
The subject of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. It is indubitable that the
State has an interest in prescribing regulations promoting education and thereby protecting the
common good. Improvement of the quality of legal education, thus, falls squarely within the
scope of police power. The PhiLSAT, as an aptitude test, was the means to protect this interest.
4(e). Tablarin sustained the conduct of an
admission test as a legitimate exercise
of the State's regulatory power
Moreover, by case law, the Court already upheld the validity of administering an aptitude test as
a reasonable police power measure in the context of admission standards into institutions of
higher learning.
In Tablarin, the Court upheld not only the constitutionality of Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 2382, or
the Medical Act of 1959, which gave the Board of Medical Education (BME) the power to
prescribe requirements for admission to medical schools, but also MECS Order No. 52, Series
of 1985 (MECS Order No. 52-1985) issued by the BME which prescribed NMAT.
Using the rational basis test, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as follows:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical
school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on
the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that
the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of
those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements - i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school - for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the
state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related; the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of
the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission,
selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the
required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need
to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in
general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education, in the country." Given the
widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United
States of America the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other
countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account
the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to
hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat
our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.268 (Emphases supplied)
The Court reached its conclusion that NMAT is a valid exercise of police power because the
method employed, i.e., regulation of admissions to medical education is reasonably related to
the subject, i.e., the protection of the public by ensuring that only those qualified are eventually
allowed to practice medicine.
The necessity of State intervention to ensure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
those unqualified to take care of the life and health of patients was likewise the reason why the
Court in Department of Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego269 upheld the "three-flunk"
rule in NMAT:
We see no reason why the rationale in the [TabIarin] case cannot apply to the case at bar. The
issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at
least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The
latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the former in the regulation of the medical
profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the
power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful
subject and a lawful method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the
right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law
nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools
and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be
doctors. (Emphases supplied)
Tablarin recognized that State intervention was necessary, and therefore was allowed, because
of the need to meet the goal of promoting public health and safety.
In similar vein, the avowed purpose of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education
by evaluating and screening applicants to law school. As elucidated, the State has an interest in
improving the quality of legal education for the protection of the community at-large, and
requiring an entrance test is reasonably related to that interest. In other words, the State has the
power and the prerogative to impose a standardized test prior to entering law school, in the
same manner and extent that the State can do so in medical school when it prescribed the
NMAT.
In all, the Court finds no constitutional conflict between the Court's rule-making power
concerning admissions to the practice of law and on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.
Further, pursuant to its power under Section 7(e), the Court affirms the LEB's authority to initiate
and administer an aptitude test, such as the PhiLSAT, as a minimum standard for law
admission. Thus, the PhiLSAT, insofar as it functions as an aptitude exam that measures the
academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law to the end that the quality of legal
education is improved is not per se unconstitutional.
However, there are certain provisions of the PhiLSAT that render its operation exclusionary,
restrictive, and qualifying which is contrary to its design as an aptitude exam meant to be used
as a tool that should only help and guide law schools in gauging the aptness of its applicants for
the study of law. These provisions effectively and absolutely exclude applicants who failed to
pass the PhiLSAT from taking up a course in legal education, thereby restricting and qualifying
admissions to law schools. As will be demonstrated, these provisions of the PhiLSAT are
unconstitutional for being manifestly violative of the law schools' exercise of academic freedom,
specifically the autonomy to determine for itself who it shall allow to be admitted to its law
program.
D.
LEB's Powers vis-a-vis Institutional Academic
Freedom and the Right to Education
1 PhiLSAT
Paragraphs 7, 9, 11, and 15 of LEBMO No. 7-2016, provide:
xxxx
7. Passing Score - The cut-off or passing score for the PhiLSAT shall be FIFTY-FIVE PERCENT
(55%) correct answers, or such percentile score as may be prescribed by the LEB.
xxxx
9. Admission Requirement - All college graduates or graduating students applying for admission
to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to
any law school in the Philippines. Upon the effectivity of this memorandum order, no applicant
shall be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a
degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken
within 2 years before the start of studies for the basic law course and presents a valid
[Certificate of Eligibility] as proof thereof.
xxxx
11. Institutional Admission Requirements - The PhiLSAT shall be without prejudice to the right of
a law school in the exercise of its academic freedom to prescribe or impose additional
requirements for admission, such as but not limited to:
a. A score in the PhiLSAT higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the LEB;
b. Additional or supplemental admission tests to measure the competencies and/or personality
of the applicant; and
c. Personal interview of the applicant.
xxxx
15. Sanctions - Law schools violating this Memorandum Order shall [be] imposed
the administrative sanctions prescribed in Section 32 of LEBMO No. 2, Series of 2013 and/or
fine of up to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for each infraction. (Emphases supplied)
Without doubt, the above provisions exclude and disqualify those examinees who fail to reach
the prescribed passing score from being admitted to any law school in the Philippines. In
mandating that only applicants who scored at least 55% correct answers shall be admitted to
any law school, the PhiLSAT actually usurps the right and duty of the law school to determine
for itself the criteria for the admission of students and thereafter, to apply such criteria on a
case-by-case basis. It also mandates law schools to absolutely reject applicants with a grade
lower than the prescribed cut-off score and those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility. The token
regard for institutional academic freedom comes into play, if at all, only after the applicants had
been "pre-selected" without the school's participation. The right of the institutions then are
constricted only in providing "additional" admission requirements, admitting of the interpretation
that the preference of the school itself is merely secondary or supplemental to that of the State
which is antithetical to the very principle of reasonable supervision and regulation.
The law schools are left with absolutely no discretion to choose its students at the first instance
and in accordance with its own policies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of
a State-determined pool of applicants, under pain of administrative sanctions and/or payment of
fines. Mandating law schools to reject applicants who failed to reach the prescribed PhiLSAT
passing score or those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility transfers complete control over
admission policies from the law schools to the LEB. As Garcia tritely emphasized: "[c]olleges
and universities should [not] be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to
whom to admit or reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different, and
certainly higher category."270
1(a). Comparison of PhiLSAT with NMAT and LSAT
Respondent urges the Court to treat the PhiLSAT in the same manner that the Court treated the
NMAT in Tablarin. Petitioners oppose on the ground that the PhiLSAT and the NMAT are
different because there is a Constitutional body, i.e., the Court, tasked to regulate the practice of
law while there is none with respect to the practice of medicine.
The Court treats the PhiLSAT differently from the NMAT for the fundamental reason that these
aptitude exams operate differently.
For one, how these exams allow the schools to treat the scores therein obtained is different.
While both exams seem to prescribe a "cut-off" score, the NMAT score is evaluated by the
medical schools in relation to their own cut-off scores. Unlike the PhiLSAT score, the NMAT
score is not the sole determining factor on whether or not an examinee may be admitted to
medical school. The NMAT score is only meant to be one of the bases for evaluating applicants
for admission to a college of medicine.
Medical schools further enjoy the discretion to determine how much weight should be assigned
to an NMAT score relative to the schools' own admissions policy. Different medical schools may
therefore set varying acceptable NMAT scores. Different medical schools may likewise assign
different values to the NMAT score. This allows medical schools to consider the NMAT
score along with the other credentials of the applicant. The NMAT score does not constrain
medical schools to accept pre-selected applicants; it merely provides for a tool to evaluate all
applicants.
Obtaining a low NMAT percentile score will not immediately and absolutely disqualify an
applicant from being admitted to medical school. Obtaining a high NMAT percentile score only
increases an applicant's options for medical schools. Taking the NMAT, thus, expands the
applicant's options for medical schools; it does not limit them.
For another, medical schools are not subjected to sanctions in case they decide to admit an
applicant pursuant to their own admissions policy. In fact, at some point,271 there was even no
prescribed cut-off percentile score for the NMAT, and instead it was stressed that a student may
enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting the latter's specific requirements and
reasonable regulations.272 Also, the issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission to a
college of medicine had been transferred to. the medical schools, thus, rightfully giving the
responsibility for and accountability of determining eligibility of students for admission to the
medical program to the schools concerned.273
Similar to the NMAT, the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is only one of the several criteria for
evaluation for law school admission. It is just one of the methods that law schools may use to
differentiate applicants for law school. The American Bar Association actually allows a law
school to use an admission test other than the LSAT and it does not dictate the particular weight
that a law school should give to the results of the LSAT in deciding whether to admit an
applicant.274
In contrast, the PhiLSAT score itself determines whether an applicant may be admitted to law
school or not, the PhiLSAT being strictly a pass or fail exam. It excludes those who failed to
reach the prescribed cut-off score from being admitted to any law school. It qualifies admission
to law school not otherwise imposed by the schools themselves. The PhiLSAT, as presently
crafted, employs a totalitarian scheme in terms of student admissions. This leaves the
consequent actions of the applicant-student and the school solely dependent upon the results of
the PhiLSAT.
1(b). Balancing State interest with
institutional academic freedom ℒαwρhi৷

Thus far, it is settled that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, is reasonably
related to the State's unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of legal education. This
aptitude test, however, should not be exclusionary, restrictive, or qualifying as to encroach upon
institutional academic freedom. Moreover, in the exercise of their academic freedom to choose
who to admit, the law schools should be left with the discretion to determine for themselves how
much weight should the results of the PhiLSAT carry in relation to their individual admission
policies. At all times, it is understood that the school's exercise of such academic discretion
should not be gravely abused, arbitrary, whimsical, or discriminatory.
With the conclusion that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, passes the test of
reasonableness, there is no reason to strike down the PhiLSAT in its entirety. Instead, the Court
takes a calibrated approach and partially nullifies LEBMO No. 7-2016 insofar as it absolutely
prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking thereof within two years as a prerequisite
for admission to any law school which, on its face, run directly counter to institutional academic
freedom. The rest of LEBMO No. 7-2016, being free from any taint of unconstitutionality, should
remain in force and effect, especially in view of the separability clause275 therein contained.
1(c). PhiLSAT and the right to education
Anent the argument that the PhiLSAT transgresses petitioners' right to education and their right
to select a profession or course of study, suffice to state that the PhiLSAT is a minimum
admission standard that is rationally related to the interest of the State to improve the quality of
legal education and, accordingly, to protect the general community. The constitutionality of the
PhiLSAT, therefore, cannot be voided on the ground that it violates the right to education as
stated under Section 1, Article XIV of the Constitution. The Court's pronouncement
in Tablarin276 again resonates with significance:
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more, petitioners
have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that
provision. On the contrary, we may note - x x x - that the statute and the regulation which
petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional
schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5(3) of Article XIV, as one must, one
cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The
State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to
all" who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school, but rather
merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements."
2 Other LEB issuances on law admission
Apart from the PhiLSAT, the LEB also imposed additional requirements for admission to law
schools under LEBMO No. 1-2011, specifically:
Article III
Prerequisites and Program Specification
SEC. 15. Prerequisites to admission to Law School. - x x x
xxxx
Where the applicant for admission into a law school is a graduate of a foreign institution or
school following a different course and progression of studies, the matter shall be referred to the
Board that shall determine the eligibility of the candidate for admission to law school.
SEC. 16. Board Prerequisites for Admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. Program. - The Board shall
apply Section 6 of Rule 138 in the following wise: An applicant for admission to the Ll.B. or J.D.
program of studies must be a graduate of a bachelor's degree and must have earned at least
eighteen (18) units in English, six (6) units in Mathematics, and eighteen (18) units of social
science subjects.
SEC. 17. Board Prerequisites for Admission to Graduate Programs in Law. - Without prejudice
to other requirements that graduate schools may lay down, no applicant shall be admitted for
the Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent master's degree in law or juridical science, without an
Ll.B. or a J.D. degree. Admission of non-Members of the Philippine Bar to the master's degree
shall be a matter of academic freedom vested in the graduate school of law. The candidate for
the doctorate degree in juridical science, or doctorate in civil law or equivalent doctorate degree
must have completed a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent degree.
Graduate degree programs in law shall have no bearing on membership or non-membership in
the Philippine Bar.277 (Emphases supplied)
Further, LEBMO No. 1-2011, Article V, provides:
xxxx
SEC. 23. No student who has obtained a general average below 2.5 or 80 in the college course
required for admission to legal studies may be admitted to law school. Exceptions may be made
by the Dean in exceptionally meritorious cases, after having informed the Board.278
These provisions similarly encroach upon the law school's freedom to determine for itself its
admission policies. With regard to foreign students, a law school is completely bereft of the right
to determine for itself whether to accept such foreign student or not, as the determination
thereof now belongs to the LEB.
Similarly, the requirement that an applicant obtain a specific number of units in English,
Mathematics, and Social Science subjects affects a law school's admission policies leaving the
latter totally without discretion to admit applicants who are deficient in these subjects or to allow
such applicant to complete these requirements at a later time. This requirement also effectively
extends the jurisdiction of the LEB to the courses and units to be taken by the applicant in his or
her pre-law course. Moreover, such requirement is not to be found under Section 6, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court as this section simply requires only the following from an applicant to the bar
exams:
SEC. 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless
he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began
the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with
any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english,
spanish, history and economics.
Likewise, in imposing that only those with a basic degree in law may be admitted to graduate
programs in law encroaches upon the law school's right to determine who may be admitted. For
instance, this requirement effectively nullifies the option of admitting non-law graduates on the
basis of relevant professional experience that a law school, pursuant to its own admissions
policy, may otherwise have considered.
The required general weighted average in the college course suffers the same infirmity and
would have been struck down had ·it not been expressly repealed by the LEB because of the
PhiLSAT.279
3 Section 7(c) and 7(e) on the minimum
qualifications of faculty members
The LEB is also empowered under Section 7(c) to set the standards of accreditation taking into
account, among others, the "qualifications of the members of the faculty" and under Section 7(e)
of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe "minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members[.]"
Relative to the power to prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty members, LEB
prescribes under LEBMO No. 1-2011 the following:
[PART I]
Article V
Instructional Standards
SEC. 20. The law school shall be headed by a properly qualified dean, maintain a corps of
professors drawn from the ranks of leading and acknowledged practitioners as well as
academics and legal scholars or experts in juridical science[.] x x x
xxxx
PART III
QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUM
Article I
Faculty Qualifications
SEC. 50. The members of the faculty of a law school should, at the very least, possess a L1.B.
or a J.D. degree and should be members of the Philippine Bar. In the exercise of academic
freedom, the law school may also ask specialists in various fields of law with other
qualifications, provided that they possess relevant doctoral degrees, to teach specific subjects.
Within a period of five (5) years of the promulgation of the present order, members of the faculty
of schools of law shall commence their studies in graduate schools of law.
Where a law school offers the J.D. curriculum, a qualified Ll.B. graduate who is a member of the
Philippine Bar may be admitted to teach in the J.D. course and may wish to consider the
privilege granted under Section 56 hereof.
SEC. 51. The dean should have, aside from complying with the requirements above, at least a
Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or a master's degree in a related field, and should have been a
Member of the Bar for at least 5 years prior to his appointment as dean.
SEC. 52. The dean of a graduate school of law should possess at least a doctorate degree in
law and should be an acknowledged authority in law, as evidenced by publications and
membership in learned societies and organizations; members of the faculty of a graduate school
of law should possess at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or the relevant master's or
doctor's degrees in related fields.
Aside from the foregoing, retired justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals may serve as deans of schools of law, provided
that they have had teaching experience as professors of law and provided further that, with the
approval of the Legal Education Board, a graduate school of law may accredit their experience
in the collegiate appellate courts and the judgments they have penned towards the degree [ad
eundem] of Master of Laws.280 (Emphases supplied)
Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, a law faculty member must have an Ll.B or J.D. degree and
must, within a period of five years from the promulgation of LEBMO No. 1-2011, or from June
14, 2011 to June 14, 2016, commence studies in graduate school of law.
The mandatory character of the requirement of a master's degree is underscored by the LEB in
its Resolution No. 2014-02, a "sequel rule" to Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1-2011, which provides
that:
xxxx
1. Members of the law faculty are required to be holders of the degree of Master of Laws. It is
the responsibility of the law deans to observe and implement this rule.
2. The law faculty of all law schools shall have the following percentage of holders of the master
of laws degree:
2.1. School Year- 2017-2018-20%
2.2. School Year- 2018-2019 - 40%
2.3. School Year- 2019-2020-60%
2.4. School Year- 2020-2021-80%
In computing the percentage, those who are exempted from the rule shall be included.
3. Exempted from this requirement of a master's degree in law are the following:
The Incumbent or Retired Members of the:
3.1. Supreme Court;
3.2. Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals;
3.3. Secretary of Justice and Under-Secretaries of Justice, Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsmen,
Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitors General
3.4. Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission who teach Labor Laws;
3.5. Regional Trial Court Judges;
3.6. DOJ State and Regional State Prosecutors and Senior Ombudsman Prosecutors who teach
Criminal Law and/or Criminal Procedure;
3.7. Members of Congress who are lawyers who teach Political Law, Administrative Law,
Election Law, Law on Public Officers and other related subjects;
3.8. Members of Constitutional Commissions who are Lawyers;
3.9. Heads of bureaus who are lawyers who teach the law subjects which their respective
bureaus are implementing;
3.10. Ambassadors, Ministers and other [D]iplomatic Officers who are lawyers who teach
International Law or related subjects;
3.11. Those who have been teaching their subjects for 10 years or more upon recommendation
of their deans; and
3.12. Other lawyers who are considered by the Board to be experts in any field of law provided
they teach the subjects of their expertise.
4. The following are the sanctions for non-compliance with the foregoing rules:
4.1. If a law school is non-compliant with these rules for the first time beginning School Year
2017-2018, the Board shall downgrade its Recognition status to Permit status;
4.2. If a law school under a Permit status should remain no -compliant with these rules in
succeeding school years, the Board shall downgrade the Permit status to Phase-Out status;
4.3. If a law school which is under Phase-Out status remains no -compliant with these rules in
succeeding school years, the Board shall order its closure to take effect at the end of the school
year.
5. If a law school under sanction shall become compliant, its Recognition status shall be
restored. (Emphases supplied)
xxxx
And under LEBMO No. 2:
SEC. 31. Unfitness to Continue Operating a Law Program. A law school which is
operated below quality standards of a law school is unfit to continue operating a law program.
xxxx
2) A law school is substandard if the result of the inspection and evaluation of the law school
and its facilities by members of the Board or its staff shows that the law school has serious
deficiencies including a weak faculty as indicated, among others, by the fact that most of the
members are neophytes in the teaching of law[.] x x x
xxxx
SEC. 32. The imposable administrative sanctions are the following:
a) Termination of the law program (closing the law school);
b) Phase-out of the law program;
c) Provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law program of the
substandard law school under Permit Status.
This master of laws degree requirement is reiterated in LEBMO No. 17, Series of
2018 (Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic Requirement of Master of Laws
Degree for Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law Schools), as follows:
xxxx
B) For Members of the Law Faculty
SEC. 6. For purposes of determining compliance with the minimum academic requirement of a
Ll.M. degree for the members of the law faculty in law schools required under Section 50 of
LEBMO No. 1, Series of 2011 and Resolution No. 2014-02, the required percentage of holders
of Ll.M. shall be computed based on the aggregate units of all courses/subjects offered during
the semester by the law school.
SEC. 7. Within thirty (30) days upon completion the effectivity this of this memorandum [sic], the
President of the HEI and the Dean of each law school shall jointly submit to the LEB separate
certification of the total teaching assignments/load for the 1st Semester and 2nd Semester of
the Academic Year 2017-2018 in the prescribed matrix form containing the names of every
faculty member, his/her highest academic law degree, qualification for , exemption from the
n­
n­
Ll.M. requirement, if applicable, courses/subjects assigned to teach, and academic weight of
each course/subject, and a disclosure whether or not the law school is compliant with the
prescribed percentage of Ll.M. holders for faculty members. Thereafter, the same certification
shall be submitted for every regular semester not later than 45 days from the start of the
semester.
xxxx
SEC. 12. Law schools failing to meet the prescribed percentage of its faculty members required
to have Ll.M. degrees shall be imposed the appropriate administrative sanction specified under
Resolution No. 2014-02. (Emphases supplied)
To be sure, under its supervisory and regulatory power, the LEB can prescribe the minimum
qualifications of faculty members. This much was affirmed by the Court when it approved the
CLEBM's proposal to revise the powers of LEB under R.A. No. 7662, but nevertheless retaining
the LEB's power to "provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools." As
worded, the assailed clauses of Section 7(c) and 7(e) insofar as they give LEB the power to
prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty members are in tune with the reasonable
supervision and regulation clause and do not infringe upon the academic freedom of law
schools.
Moreover, this minimum qualification can be a master of laws degree. In University of the East v.
Pepanio,281 the Court held that the requirement of a masteral degree, albeit for tertiary education
teachers, is not unreasonable. Thus:
The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The
operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to
ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching
skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human
activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from il -prepared
teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be
required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to
employment. (Emphasis supplied)
This was reiterated in Son v. University of Santo Tomas,282 as follows:
As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate program
professor's field of instruction has been in place, through DECS Order 92 (series of 1992,
August 10, 1992) or the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Article IX, Section
44, paragraph [1(a)] thereof provides that college faculty members must have a master's degree
in their field of instruction as a minimum qualification for teaching in a private educational
institution and acquiring regular status therein.
DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of its [rule]-
making power as provided for under Section 70 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, otherwise known
as the Education Act of 1982. As such, it has the force and effect of law. In University of the East
v. Pepanio, the requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers was held to be
not unreasonable but rather in accord with the public interest.
xxxx
From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents, for
maintaining professors without the mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to
be employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary qualifications. Petitioners cannot
therefore insist to be employed by UST since they still do not possess the required master's
degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and maintain professors without the necessary
master's degrees is not a ground for claiming illegal dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as
the law is concerned, respondents are in violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the
practice of hiring unqualified teaching personnel; but the law cannot come to the aid of
petitioners on this sole ground. As between the parties herein, they are in pari delicto.
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The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the undergraduate teacher's field of
instruction has been cemented in DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and
respondents have been violating it. The fact that government has not cracked down on violators,
or that it chose not to strictly implement the provision, does not erase the violations committed
by erring educational institutions, including the parties herein; it simply means that government
will not punish these violations for the meantime. The parties cannot escape its concomitant
effects, nonetheless. And if respondents knew the overwhelming importance of the said
provision and the public interest involved - as they now fiercely advocate to their favor - they
should have complied with the same as soon as it was promulgated.
xxxx
In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaoisi v. St. Scholastica's College that -
Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois still cannot legally acquire a
permanent status of employment. Private educational institutions must still supplementarily refer
to the prevailing standards, qualifications, and conditions set by the appropriate government
agencies (presently the Department of Education, the Commission on Higher Education, and
the Teclmical Education and Skills Development Authority). This limitation on the right of private
schools, colleges, and universities to select and determine the employment status of their
academic personnel has been imposed by the state in view of the public interest nature of
educational institutions, so as to ensure the quality and competency of our schools and
educators. (Internal citations omitted)
Thus, the masteral degree required of law faculty members and dean, and the doctoral degree
required of a dean of a graduate school of law are, in fact, minimum reasonable requirements.
However, it is the manner by which the LEB had exercised this power through its various
issuances that prove to be unreasonable.
On this point, the amicus curiae, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, while admitting that the masteral
degree requirement is a "laudable aim" of the LEB, nevertheless adds that the LEB-imposed
period of compliance is unreasonable given the logistical and financial obstacles:
The masteral degree requirement is a laudable aim of LEB, but the possibility of meeting the
LEB period of compliance is unreasonable and unrealistic in the light of logistical and financial
considerations confronting the deans and professors, including the few law schools offering
graduate degrees in law.
To illustrate, to the best of my knowledge there are no more than six (6) graduate schools of law
around the country to service potential applicants. Those who have opted for graduate studies
in law find it very costly to fly to the venue. While one or two programs may have been delivered
outside the provider's home school venue to reach out to graduate students outside the urban
centers, pedagogical standards are often compromised in the conduct of the modules. This is
even aggravated by the fact that very few applicants can afford to go into full-time graduate
studies considering that most deans and professors of law are in law practice. Perhaps, LEB
should work in consultation with PALS in designing a cost-effective but efficient delivery system
of any graduate program in law, [especially] for deans and law professors.283
Further, the mandatory character of the master of laws degree requirement, under pain of
downgrading, phase-out and closure of the law school, is in sharp contrast with the previous
requirement under DECS Order No. 27-1989 which merely prefer faculty members who are
holders of a graduate law degree, or its equivalent. The LEB's authority to review the strength or
weakness of the faculty on the basis of experience or length of time devoted to teaching violates
an institution's right to set its own faculty standards. The LEB also imposed strict reportorial
requirements that infringe on the institution's right to select its teachers which, for instance, may
be based on expertise even with little teaching experience. Moreover, in case a faculty member
seeks to be exempted, he or she must prove to the LEB, and not to the concerned institution,
that he or she is an expert in the field, thus, usurping the freedom of the institution to evaluate
the qualifications of its own teachers on an individual basis.
Also, while the LEB requires of faculty members and deans to obtain a master of laws degree
before they are allowed to teach and administer a law school, respectively, it is ironic that the
LEB, under Resolution No. 2019-406, in fact considers the basic law degrees of Ll.B. or J.D. as
already equivalent to a doctorate degree in other non-law academic disciplines for purposes of
"appointment/promotion, ranking, and compensation."
In this connection, the LEB also prescribes who may or may not be considered as full-time
faculty, the classification of the members of their faculty, as well as the faculty load, including the
regulation of work hours, all in violation of the academic freedom of law schools. LEBMO No. 2
provides:
SEC. 33. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. There are two general kinds of faculty members, the
full-time and part-time faculty members.
a) A full-time faculty member is one:
1) Who possesses the minimum qualification of a member of the faculty as prescribed in
Sections 50 and 51 of LEBMO No. 1;
2) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work for the law school;
3) Who has no other occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work, except when
permitted by the higher education institution of which the law school is a part; and
4) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher education institution.
b) A part-time faculty member is one who does not meet the qualifications of a full-time
professor as enumerated in the preceding number.
SEC. 34. Faculty Classification and Ranking. Members of the faculty may be classified, in the
discretion of the higher education institution of which the law school is a part, according to
academic proceeding, training and scholarship into Professor, Associate Professor, Assistant
Professor, and Instructor.
Part-time members of the faculty may be classified as Lecturers, Assistant Professorial
Lecturers, Associate Professorial Lecturers and Professorial Lecturers. The law schools shall
devise their scheme of classification and promotion not inconsistent with these rules.
SEC. 35. Faculty Load. Generally, no member of the faculty should teach more than 3
consecutive hours in any subject nor should he or she be loaded with subjects requiring more
than three preparations or three different subjects (no matter the number of units per subject) in
a day.
However, under exceptionally meritorious circumstances, the law deans may allow members of
the faculty to teach 4 hours a day provided that there is a break of 30 minutes between the first
2 and the last 2 hours. (Emphases supplied)
The LEB is also allowed to revoke permits or recognitions given to law schools when the LEB
deems that there is gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or
instructors under Section 41.2(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, thus:
SEC. 41.2. Permits or recognitions may be revoked, or recognitions reverted to permit status for
just causes including but not limited to:
a) fraud or deceit committed by the institution in connection with its application to the Board;
b) the unauthorized operation of a school of law or a branch or an extension of a law school;
c) mismanagement or gross inefficiency in the operation of a law school;
d) gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or instructors;
e) violation of approved standards governing institutional operations, announcements and
advertisements;
f) transfer of the school of law to a site or location detrimental to the interests of the students
and inimical to the fruitful and promising study of law;
g) repeated failure of discipline on the part of the student body; and
h) other grounds for the closure of schools and academic institutions as provided for in the rules
and regulations of the Commission on Higher Education.284 (Emphasis supplied)
In this regard, the LEB is actually assessing the teaching performance of faculty members and
when such is determined by the LEB as constituting gross incompetence, the LEB may mete
out penalties, thus, usurping the law school's right to determine for itself the competence of its
faculty members.
4 Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g)
on legal apprenticeship and legal internship
While the clause "legal apprenticeship" under Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal
internship, as plainly worded, cannot immediately be interpreted as encroaching upon
institutional academic freedom, the manner by which LEB exercised this power through several
of its issuances undoubtedly show that the LEB controls and dictates upon law schools how
such apprenticeship and internship programs should be undertaken.
Pursuant to its power under Section 7(g), the LEB passed Resolution No. 2015-08 (Prescribing
the Policy and Rules in the Establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic in Law Schools) wherein it
classified legal aid clinics into three types: (1) a legal aid clinic which is an outreach project of a
law school; (2) a legal aid clinic which entitles the participating student to curricular credits; and
(3) a legal aid clinic that entitles the participating student to avail of the privileges under Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court.
Pertinent to the third type, the LEB requires the law schools to comply with the following rules:
xxxx
b) Implementing Rules
(1) A LAC should be established by the law school.
(2) The law school should formulate its Clinical Legal Education Program and submit it to the
Legal Education board for its assessment and evaluation.
(3) If Legal Education Board finds the Clinical Legal Education Program to be proper and in
order it shall endorse it to the Supreme Court for its approval.
(4) Once approved by the Supreme Court, fourth (4th) year law students in that law school
enrolled in it shall be allowed to practice law on a limited manner pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, Section 24(c), Article IV of LEBMO No. 2 prescribes the activities that should be
included in the law school's apprenticeship program, as follows:
Article IV
Law School: Administrative Matters and Opening of Branches or Extension Classes
SEC. 24. Administrative Matters.
xxxx
c) Apprenticeship Program. The apprenticeship program should be closely supervised by the
Dean or a member of the faculty assigned by the Dean to do the task. The apprenticeship
program should at least include any of the following activities:
1) Preparation of legal documents
2) Interviewing clients
3) Courtroom observation and participation
4) Observation and assistance in police investigations, inquests and preliminary investigations
 5) Legal counseling
6) Legal assistance to detention prisoners
7) For working students, participation in the legal work of the legal section or office of the
employer-entity x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Relatedly, Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, provides:
Article IV
Grading System
SEC. 59. Grading System. - The law school, in the exercise of academic freedom, shall devise
its own grading system provided that on the first day of classes, the students are apprised of the
grading system and provided further that the following are observed:
xxxx
(d) When apprenticeship is required and the student does not complete the mandated number
of apprenticeship hours, or the person supervising the apprenticeship program deems the
performance of the student unsatisfactory, the dean shall require of the student such number of
hours more in apprenticeship as will fulfill the purposes of the apprenticeship
program.285 (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions unduly interfere with the discretion of a law school regarding its curriculum,
particularly its apprenticeship program. Plainly, these issuances are beyond mere supervision
and regulation.
III.
Conclusion
In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality of legal education, does not
encroach upon the Court's jurisdiction to promulgate rules under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution. It is well-within the jurisdiction of the State, as an exercise of its inherent police
power, to lay down laws relative to legal education, the same being imbued with public interest.
While the Court is undoubtedly an interested stakeholder in legal education, it cannot assume
jurisdiction where it has none. Instead, in judicial humility, the Court affirms that the supervision
and regulation of legal education is a political exercise, where judges are nevertheless still
allowed to participate not as an independent branch of government, but as part of the sovereign
people.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged
is settled as belonging exclusively to the Court, certain provisions and clauses of R.A. No. 7662
which, by its plain language and meaning, go beyond legal education and intrude upon the
Court's exclusive jurisdiction suffer from patent unconstitutionality and should therefore be
struck down.
Moreover, the exercise of the power to supervise and regulate legal education is circumscribed
by the normative contents of the Constitution itself, that is, it must be reasonably exercised.
Reasonable exercise means that it should not amount to control and that it respects the
Constitutionall guaranteed institutional academic freedom and the citizen's right to quality and
accessible education. Transgression of these limitations renders the power and the exercise
thereof unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission. The PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law
schools in measuring the applicants' aptness for legal education along with such other
admissions policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard.
However, the PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant's aptitude for
law school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the
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examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the PhiLSAT is used to exclude,
qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT
goes beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom,
becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional. In striking down these objectionable
clauses in the PhiLSAT, the State's inherent power to protect public interest by improving legal
education is neither emasculated nor compromised. Rather, the institutional academic freedom
of law schools to determine for itself who to admit pursuant to their respective admissions
policies is merely protected. In turn, the recognition of academic discretion comes with the
inherent limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical, arbitrary, or gravely abused.
In similar vein, certain LEB issuances which exceed the powers granted under its charter should
be nullified for being ultra vires.
As in all levels and areas of education, the improvement of legal education indeed deserves
serious attention. The parties are at a consensus that legal education should be made relevant
and progressive. Reforms for a more responsive legal education are constantly introduced and
are evolving. The PhiLSAT, for instance, is not a perfect initiative. Through time and a better
cooperation between the LEB and the law schools in the Philippines, a standardized and
acceptable law admission examination may be configured. The flaws which the Court assessed
to be unconstitutional are meanwhile removed, thereby still allowing the PhiLSAT to develop into
maturity. It is, thus, strongly urged that recommendations on how to improve legal education,
including tools for screening entrants to law school, reached possibly through consultative
summits, be taken in careful consideration in further issuances or legislations.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.
The Court further declares:
As CONSTITUTIONAL:
1. Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to set
the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the
qualifications of the members of the faculty without encroaching upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning; and
2. Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the power to
prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal education and minimum
qualifications of faculty members without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:
1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal education" as
an aspect of legal education which is made subject to Executive supervision and control;
2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the objective of
legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of
the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the
Legal Education Board the power to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for
taking the Bar; and
4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the
Legal Education Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory continuing legal education
and to provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such
duration as it may deem necessary.
As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:
1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and qualifying
admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to admit,
particularly:
a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college graduates or graduating
students applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT
as a requirement for admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall
be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of
either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two
years before the start of studies for the basic law course;
b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for
admission to law schools; Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12,
2019 enjoining the Legal Education Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is
made PERMANENT. The regular admission of students who were conditionally admitted and
enrolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in the exercise of their academic freedom; and
c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;
2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications and
classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law in violation of
institutional academic freedom on who may teach, particularly:
a. Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;
b. Resolution No. 2014-02;
c. Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;
d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and
3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the
establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation of institutional
academic freedom on what to teach, particularly:
a. Resolution No. 2015-08;
b. Section 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and
c. Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.
SO ORDERED.
Bersamin, C. J., I join the separate dissenting and concurring opinion of J. Leonen.
Carpio, Carandang, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Peralta, J., no part.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see separate concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., See separate dissenting and concurring opinion.
Jardeleza, J., Please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Caguioa, J., Please see separate concurring.
A. Reyes, Jr., J., Please see my concurring opinion.
Gesmundo, J., Please separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Hernando, J., on official business.
Lazaro-Javier, J., Please see concurring and dissenting opinion.