Distributed Maritime Operations - Becoming Hard-to-Find - Center For International Maritime Security

Distributed Maritime Operations – Becoming Hard-to-Find | Center for International Maritime Security 2022/8/19 下午9:10
TACTICAL CONCEPTS
DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS –

BECOMING HARD-TO-FIND
MAY 12, 2022 | GUEST AUTHOR | LEAVE A COMMENT
By Richard Mosier
The concept for Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is based on three

bedrock tenets: the distributed force must be hard-to-find, hard-to-kill, and
lethal. For decades, the Navy has been focused on and has continuously im-
proved its fleet defense capabilities – the hard-to-kill tenet. And, with the recent
increased emphasis on the offense, the Navy is making significant progress in
becoming more lethal. In contrast, there is limited evidence of progress with re-
https://cimsec.org/distributed-maritime-operations-hard-to-find/ 第1⾴（共7⾴）
spect to the hard-to-find tenet: the very lynchpin of the DMO concept, and the
subject of this article.
The hard-to-find tenet and the DMO concept itself are in response to Russia and
China as recognized peer threats, including their advanced ISR capabilities to
detect, locate, classify, and track (all elements of “find”) and target US maritime
forces. When decomposed, the hard-to-find tenet requires consideration of a
range of complex activities to disrupt, deny, deceive, corrupt, or destroy the ad-
versary’s ISR ability to find the US force as outlined below.
Deny ISR
This is perhaps the most complex but most effective way to be hard-to-find,
track and target.
It involves five steps:
Step 1: Analyze the technical performance of enemy information systems. This

level of technical analysis applies to each type of active and passive enemy ISR
system that could be employed against distributed forces.
Step 2: Analyze and quantify the technical characteristics of US Navy force ob-
servables to include radars, line-of-sight communications, satellite uplinks, data

links, navigation aids, and acoustic observables.
Step 3: Assess enemy ISR systems probability of detection of specific fleet sys-
tems’ observables at various ranges and altitudes, under various atmospheric,
acoustic, and diurnal conditions.
The Navy Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (JPALS) offers an ex-
ample of such an assessment. JPALS is a GPS- and radio-based system to guide
tactical aircraft to the carrier and through approach and landing on
CVN/LHA/LHD ships in all weather and sea conditions.
Pilots returning to a carrier first engage with JPALS at about 200 nautical miles
(nm), where they start receiving an encrypted, low probability of detection UHF
broadcast that contains the ship’s position, allowing the aircraft to determine
range and relative bearing to the ship. At 60 nm the aircraft automatically logs
into JPALS via a two-way data link. At 10 nmthe aircraft start receiving precision
data and the pilot follows visual cues to land.
The assessment would determine the probability of detection and location of the
CVN/LHA/LHD transmitting the JPALS UHF broadcast by Chinese or Russian
ISR aircraft and electronic surveillance satellites.
Step 4: Based on the results of step (3), develop and integrate into the combat
system the aids to help the tactical commander manage force observables com-
mensurate with the ISR threat to remain hard-to-find; and, to decide if and
when it is tactically advantageous to transition from hard-to-find to hard-to-kill.
Step 5: Develop and continuously update a single, all source threat tactical ISR
threat picture with the fidelity and timeliness to support the commanders’ ability
to make better tactical decisions faster than the adversary.
DMO Force Combat Team
In addition to denying ISR, there are other methods for countering enemy ISR
and keeping the force hard-to-find.
If, under the DMO concept, the force has to be ready to operate under mission
orders, the combat team will have to be trained and ready to manage the all of
the methods that can be used to remain hard-to-find. This will include the iden-
tification of the responsible positions on the team, their training, and the plan-
ning tools and decision aids they need for the planning and management of these
methods for countering enemy ISR.
U.S. Navy Cmdr. Tadd Gorman, center, the commanding officer of the guided missile destroyer USS
Ross (DDG 71), explains the ship’s combat information center to Ukrainian navy Vice Adm. Serhiy
Hayduk, the commander in chief of the Ukrainian Naval Forces, aboard the Ross in the Black Sea
Sept. 8, 2014, during exercise Sea Breeze 2014. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist
2nd Class John Herman/Released)
As with the well-established surface warfare mission areas of ASW, ASUW, and
AAW, the tactical commander will require familiarity with and high confidence
in the person managing the deny, disrupt, destroy, deceive, and corrupt ISR
functions. This position will require an in-depth knowledge of collateral and SCI
information sources and methods as well as offboard sensor coverage, tasking,
and feedback mechanisms. The position will require in-depth knowledge of ene-
my ISR systems, their coverage, and, their performance attributes. It will require
knowledge of ship/force sensing systems, their performance against various ISR
threats, and the atmospheric and acoustic factors that affect their performance.
DMO Battlespace Awareness
Battlespace awareness1 is achieved by the continuous and rapid integration and

presentation of relevant information, keeping the commander continuously up-
dated so that he or she can make better and faster tactical decisions. The key fac-
tors in this process are relevance and timeliness. The current shipboard system
architectures will require modifications to optimize the process for automated
integration and presentation of relevant collateral and SCI information. Time is
the key factor. An end-to- end analysis of the flow of information from receipt on
ship to presentation to the commander would serve to identify and eliminate
delays.
DMO force commanders should not only be cleared for access to compartmented
information, as they are now, but they should also be educated on and comfort-
able with these off-board systems, their sources and methods, their strengths
and weaknesses, and their tasking and mission plans. They also have to under-
stand how own-ship and off board collateral and SCI information are integrated
on the ship, in what space; managed by whom, and, in what form.
In summary, the hard-to-find tenet presents significant challenges that will have
to be addressed, both in fleet operations and in Navy-wide efforts to man, train
and equip the fleet with the capabilities for its’ successful execution. Two chal-
lenges stand out. The first is the determination of the OPNAV resources and re-
quirement sponsor for the manning, training, and equipping the fleet for coun-
tering enemy ISR and managing the hard-to-find functions. The second will be
adjustments in onboard architectures to assure each commander has the rele-
vant information, in a consumable form and in time to make better decisions
faster than the adversary. (A history of the Deny ISR task can be found in the de-
tailed description of the US Navy’s Cold War efforts to be Hard-to-Find provided
in Robert Angevine’s paper subject: “Hiding in Plain Sight—The U.S. Navy and
Dispersed Operations under EMCON, 1956–1972.“)
The success of the Navy concept of Distributed Maritime Operations depends on

being hard to find. This runs counter the JADC2 concept in which all DoD plat-
forms, sensors, and weapons are networked, e.g. continuously transmitting and
receiving information via line-of-sight, HF and satellite RF communications that
unfortunately present the enemy with electronic surveillance observables that
can be exploited to find and attack the transmitting ships. The Distributed forces
can receive information via broadcast without compromising their presence.

However, the decision regarding if and when to engage in RF communications
for active participation in networks will depend on the commander’s assessment
of the risk of enemy exploitation of those emissions to locate the force.
Richard Mosier is a retired defense contractor systems engineer; Naval Flight

Officer; OPNAV N2 civilian analyst; OSD SES 4 responsible for oversight of
tactical intelligence systems and leadership of major defense analyses on UAVs,
Signals Intelligence, and C4ISR.
1. Battlespace awareness is: “Knowledge and understanding of the operational area’s environment, factors, and condi-
tions, to include the status of friendly and adversary forces, neutrals and noncombatants, weather and terrain, that en-
ables timely, relevant, comprehensive, and accurate assessments, in order to successfully apply combat power, protect
the force, and/ or complete the mission.” (JP 2-01)
Featured Image: JOINT BASE PEARL HARBOR-HICKAM (Feb. 21, 2022) Zumwalt-class guided-missile destroyer
USS Michael Monsoor (DDG 1001) gets underway in Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Feb. 21, 2022. (U.S. Navy pho-
to by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Isaak Martinez)
DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS U.S. NAVY
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Distributed Maritime Operations – Becoming Hard-to-Find | Center for International Maritime Security 2022/8/19 下午9:10

DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS –

The concept for Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is based on three

It involves five steps:

Step 1: Analyze the technical performance of enemy information systems. This

servables to include radars, line-of-sight communications, satellite uplinks, data

DMO Force Combat Team

DMO Battlespace Awareness

Battlespace awareness1 is achieved by the continuous and rapid integration and

The success of the Navy concept of Distributed Maritime Operations depends on

can receive information via broadcast without compromising their presence.

Richard Mosier is a retired defense contractor systems engineer; Naval Flight

DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS U.S. NAVY

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