Why Leave Nara
Why Leave Nara
Why Leave Nara
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Monumenta Nipponica
by RONALD P. TOBY
THE AUTHOR is Associate Professor of history at this time, and it may be fallacious to
and East Asian studies, University of Illinois, speak of a 'Japan' at all until the eighth cen-
Urbana-Champaign. He wishes to thank the tury. Cornelius J. Kiley, 'State and Dynasty
two anonymous readers of the present article in Archaic Yamato', in JAS, 33:1 (1973), pp.
for their valuable suggestions. 25-49.
1 For simplicity I use the fiction that from 2 J. Edward Kidder, Early Buddhist Japan,
the time of Keitai Ad;, r. 507-531, the Yamato Praeger, New York, 1972, p. 60.
kings, to use the terminology of Cornelius J. 3 Kiley proposes this distinction in 'State
Kiley, were kings of 'Japan', although there and Dynasty'.
were probably still competing regional 'kings'
The best estimate of the population of the capital and its immediate surround-
ings in the late eighth century is 200,000 people.4
The abandonment of the Heijo capital at Nara has yet to be fully explained.
The most common explanation for the move is the desire of the imperial house
(Kammu) and the bureaucracy (nobility) to escape the baneful influence of the
Nara-centered Buddhist church, which had accrued so much economic and
political power 'that . .. the authority of the Imperial House was, or seemed to
be, endangered.'5 The function of Buddhism as 'protector of the state', some
scholars argue, inevitably drew the clergy into politics, and '. . . the monks' im-
mense political success more than anything else contributed to the declining
prestige of Buddhism and forced the Nara bureaucrats to transfer the capital
site.'6 Others also see this reason as the principal motivation to abandon Nara,
but adduce as well the rationale offered by Kammu himself in 788, that the
new capital district was 'convenient by water and by land',7 an important con-
sideration in both the prosecution of the frontier wars in the northeast, and
the pursuit of communications with the southwest and with the continent.
It may be satisfying to suppose that the growing power of the Buddhist in-
stitution, infringing on the imperial prerogative in the Dokyo L60 incident in
the 760s, motivated Kammu to abandon the old capital, and Ross Bender
leaves little doubt that the Dokyo affair represented serious conflicts between
Shinto legitimating principles and Buddhist principles.8 But the new capital
was not much less Buddhist oriented, although perhaps somewhat more world-
ly, and Kammu's own relations with younger clerics, especially Saicho ?,& 9
do not suggest strong hostility to Buddhism on the emperor's part. The revul-
sion against Dokyo, and the reaction against Nara Buddhist institutions may
be part of the reason for the move of the capital. But surely there are other
reasons to explain the uprooting of an urban complex approximating 200,000
souls in population-about 3Wo to 4Wo of the total population at the time -
and to justify the vast expense of replacing the hundreds of official buildings
and thousands of official domiciles that were to be abandoned. Even Yazaki
Takeo's restatement of Kammu's point, that communications with the rest of
the Japan and with continental Asia were superior from the Yodo River
watershed than from the Nara Plain, seems insufficient. Relations with the
continent and with western Japan had been more troubled in the late seventh
and the early eighth centuries than they were in Kammu's own day.
The establishment of a permanent royal city in the early eighth century,
however, was not a random occurrence, nor the result of royal whim. Rather,
the founding of such a city was the culmination of more than a century of
evolution in both the Yamato kingship and its governmental trappings, and in
the physical embodiment of government, that is, the buildings that housed
king and court. This gradual transition from 'court to capital' was a manifesta-
tion of transformations in the polity at large, in Japanese society, and in the
structure of the competing elements of the Yamato lineage group.1" If the foun-
ding of the 'first permanent capital' in 710 was an expression of such basic
forces in Japanese society, then perhaps there are equally basic elements of
social and political dynamics that may help to explain the more momentous
decision to abandon Nara after three-quarters of a century. If Nara was to be a
permanent capital, then why did it prove to be temporary? Or, to phrase the
question in different terms, was Heijo the 'first permanent capital', or merely
the penultimate 'court'?
These conclusions must be regarded as tentative, but however much the
founding of Heijo in 710 may have been based on the expectation that it was to
be a permanent capital, its abandonment in 784 seems to partake of the
dynamics of the movement from one court, Heijo, to another at Nagaoka, and
only thence, in 794, to what was to be a truly permanent capital.
The conduct of the quintessential Nara-period monarch, Shomu Tf , r. 724-
748, reinforces the vision of Heijo as an elaborate court rather than a settled
capital. Shomu often absented himself from Heijo, and spent the years from
740 to 745 elsewhere, while a debate raged among the nobility as to where the
'court' and 'capital' should be located. The emerging Yamato imperium was
beset by frequent rebellions in the 730s; in 737 a smallpox epidemic wracked
the home provinces, taking the lives of many leading nobles, including the
heads of all four branches of the Fujiwara clan. 12 Shortly thereafter, in the fall
of 740, Fujiwara no Hirotsugu -W gMP, the Assistant Vice-Governor of
Dazaifu (Dazai Shoni J rose in rebellion in northern Kyushu, forcing
the court to mobilize 17,000 troops from the provinces of the Tokai, Tosan,
San'yo, San'in, and Nankai regions.13 In the midst of this civil unrest, Shomu
ordered the court moved from Heijo because he 'wished to change the hearts'
of the people.14 On Tempyo 12(740).11.30, after notifying his general in the
field that he was leaving Heijo and telling him 'not to be alarmed', Shomu left
the city.15 By month's end the monarch had arrived at a 'temporary court'
(tongu A1I9) at a place called Seki-no-miya in Iga province. On Tempyo
12.12.6, Shomu commanded his Minister of the Right, Tachibana no Moroe 4A
:5 to start construction on a promising site that the minister had found in the
Sawara district of Yamashiro province, 'because he planned to move the
capital (sento AtF) there.'16 By the 15th, the monarch had already procee
to the site, Kuni-no-miya, and 'there began to construct a capital.'17
On New Year's Day of Tempyo 13 (741), 'The Emperor (tenno 3kr) held
court in Kuni-no-miya for the first time; the palace compound was not yet com-
pleted, so they surrounded it with curtains.'18 The location of the capital
remained an unresolved issue, and the court spent much of the following four
years roaming the home provinces in search of a seat, not deciding until 745 to
return to Heijo, and then only after much debate.
It is noteworthy that among Shomu's acts in this five-year sojourn in the
wilderness are some of the most important of the entire Nara period-the
decree establishing a network of provincial temples and nunneries was issued
from Kuni-no-miya, as was the decree legalizing the permanent private posses-
sion of newly opened rice fields, the legal basis for shoen -T landholdings.19
The location of the capital continued to be an active issue and remained in
doubt through much of 744. On the 15th day of the First Month the monarch
left Kuni-no-miya for Naniwa-no-miya,20 at the head of Osaka Bay, and in a
poll of the nobility taken on the 1st day of the intercalary First Month a slim
majority favored Naniwa over Kuni as the site for the capital. A poll of people
in the marketplace (ichi 4i) showed that 'all wanted to make Kuni-no-miya the
capital, but there was one who desired Naniwa, and one who desired Heijo.'21
It was only after a series of earthquakes in mid-745 that the issue was decided
in favor of 'Heijo-no-miya'('the Heijo court'), whither Shomu returned on
Tempyo 17(745).5. 11. The imperial arsenal caught up with the court only at
the year's end, moving from Kuni-no-miya to Heijo on the 15th day of the
Twelfth Month.22
That Shomu's departure from Nara and his vacillation over where to locate
were not merely brief imperial progresses to commodious vacation spots or
other temporary quarters may be seen by comparison with the much briefer
Envoys
Yet Sakimaro was sufficiently in tune with Shomu's whims that, for all his
grief at the demise of Nara, he could with equal emotion celebrate the new
'capital'28 at Kuni-no-miya, for 'Many are the provinces / And unnumbered
the dwelling-places of men,' where 'Well did our sovereign . .. / . . . establish
after his august desire / The great imperial abode,' which '. . . shall ever re-
main / The imperial abode for a hundred ages.'29 Indeed, Sakimaro proclaim-
ed, the Futagi Palace 'shall remain the great imperial abode / Immutable for
all ages,' and only 'Should the waters of the Izumi River / Ever cease to flow, /
Then the great imperial abode- / Then only-might suffer change.'30 When
Shomu pulled up stakes once more and tried Naniwa as his capital, it suddenly
became 'the Ajifu Palace [at Naniwa], on which I [Sakimaro] never tire to
look. 31
Thus even Nara in its glory was susceptible to abandonment and decay.
Within a span of less than five years ShOmu had 'established' two new
'capitals' that were to be the 'great Imperial abode immutable for all ages',32
in provinces outside Yamato, in violation of Kakinomoto no Hitomaro's X-I4;
AFM injunction that it was 'in Yamato that spreads to the sky' that emperors
'ruled the realm under heaven, each following each like generations of the
spruce.'33 Hitomaro had not been able to comprehend why Tenji XKl, r. 662-
671, would 'abandon Yamato, and cross the fair blue hills of Nara'34 for
another province, just as Shomu was doing now, nearly a century later.
What is at issue here, however, is not the reasons for Shomu's five-year
search for a new capital, a search that ended up where it started, in HeijO.
Rather, two points are fundamental. First, HeijO was somewhat less an 'im-
mutable' capital than we are accustomed to think, but still retained some
characteristics of a court site that had to compete with other candidates in the
capital district. A second, corollary point is that the emperor and the court
were not confined to a single capital city, as they would become in the Heian
period. The strongholds of provincially based nobles could compete with Nara
in attempting to attract the court thither because these nobles had power bases
outside the 'capital', or rather, the court where the emperor happened to
reside.
Similarly, it seems likely that the move in 784-794 to abandon the Nara Plain
as a capital district was based on constants in royal and national politics at the
time-perhaps the same sorts of issues that had led to the establishment of Hei-
jo and the designation of the Nara Plain as capital district seventy-five years
earlier, or to Shomu's repeated 'transfers of the capital' in the 740s. Conflicts
within the Yamato royal group, among the various royal lineages, and within
the nobility who were their allies, were among the major determinants of
changes in royal venue prior to the founding of Heijo, as will be seen below.
It is noteworthy that the establishment of the permanent Heian-kyo at the
end of the eighth century correlates closely with the resolution of the last major
conflict until the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries35 between competing lines
within the royal lineage group over the scarcest resource for which its members
could compete: the unique 'high office' of the Yamato kingship, which had
evolved into the office of the 'emperor' of 'Nihon'.36
Prior to the foundation of the capital at Nara as the first 'permanent' capital
city, the 'capital' had generally been located at the court of the reigning king of
Yamato. This propensity to pick up and move the 'capital' has often been ex-
plained by reference to Shinto conceptions of the polluting quality of death,
and the especially polluting effects associated with the death of a king. The
death of a king polluted his residence, it is argued, and required the transfer of
the court and capital to a new, ritually pure location.37 But this view appears to
accept the simplistic historiographical tradition of a unitary 'imperial' line
descended from the gods and surviving to the present day. Native ideas of
pollution may have played a role in the compulsion to move the court/capital,
but this is an insufficient explanation, since there is not a one-to-one cor-
respondence of 'imperial' reigns and seats of the court. If we are to explain
these early changes of royal venue, it is now clear, from the work of Cornelius
J. Kiley in particular, that we must attend more closely to the nature of the
'royal' class, its social structure, its marriage practices, and its child-rearing
customs.
First, as Kiley shows, the 'old dynasty' (pre-Keitai Wf*, r. 507-531) archaic
35 On the dynastic schism of the fourteenth 'at the top' of a social organization, which is
century, see H. Paul Varley, Imperial Restora- 'unique and non-duplicating', such that 'the
tion in Medievel Japan, Columbia U.P., 1971. scarcity of the resource [represented by the
36 I am using the term 'high office' here in office] magnifies the conflict situation that cen-
the sense defined by Jack Goody, in the In- tres around the transfer of the office from one
troduction to Succession to High Office (Cam- individual to another.'
bridge Papers in Social Anthropology, 4), 37 Sansom, p. 82.
Cambridge U.P., 1966, p. 2. That is, an office
Jomei (34) 1
r. 629-641 Takara Kotoku (36)
Kogyoku (35) r. 642-645 r. 645-655
CZ E ; Karu no Oji
CZ - Mommiu (42)
= cZ Hidaka no Ojo r. 697-707
>'> Gensh6 (44)
E~ 1- ell (4 Obito nlo Oji Fujiwara
rr 724-749
ce o Osabe Shinno
(deposed as crown Fujiwara no Ryoshi
Yamanobe no O (Momokawa's daughter)
Fujiwara no Omnuro Kammiu (50) ALi(;
(Tanetsugu's daughter)l r. 781-806
z () Heiei(51)Fujiwara no Kusuko
Heizei (51) * O Tanetsugu's Saa(2Saga (52) Tachibana no ,Junna (53)
daughter
X T r. 806-809 T (rebelled, 810) r. 809-823 Kachishi r. 823-833
-0 Takaoka ShinnoI
> > (deposed as crown Aho Shinno Fujiwara
S = prince, 810) no Junshi
CZ ce () i iNimmyo (54) Fujiwara no
Q~ r. 833-850 Takushi
2 Ariwara nor Ariwa
. Narihira Yukihira Mo Hanshi no Ojo
= ~~~~~~~~~~~Montoku (55) K6kO (58) HasinOo
gO O 1? ~~~~~~~~~~ ~~r. 850-858 T r. 884-887 1
Yozei (57)
r. 876-884 All succeeding emperors
death of a king often gave rise to a succession struggle, but when the successor
finally emerged, the venue of the court moved as much to be where he resided,
as to avoid the pollution attendant upon the death of his predecessor. Other-
wise if pollution were the principal issue, it would be difficult to explain the
occasional re-use of former royal palace sites.41
Such lineage conflicts over the succession-conflicts, in Kiley's terms, be-
tween segmentary factions centered on rival candidate royals-occurred often
in the first two centuries of the Keitai dynasty, sometimes involving bloodshed,
as in the 580s, the 640s, and the 670s. With inadequate rules of exclusion to
eliminate an excessive number of candidates for the throne, succession
disputes were virtually inevitable. Increasingly strategies were designed to
assure patrilineal succession, and to minimize the potential for succession
disputes. Two strategies were particularly important prior to the late eighth
century. The exclusion from candidacy of all but the eldest son, designated the
oe AR, of any heir-producing consort constituted a form of dynastic shedding
that simultaneously reduced the number of candidates to a smaller, more
manageable, and less volatile pool of eligibles, and enhanced the solidarity of
each group of uterine siblings by eliminating rivalry between uterine
brothers.42 In a parallel strategy, a stake-holder reign by a female monarch
assured that her successor would be an heir who was the lineal descendant of
her late husband and, of course, herself as well.43
The last major fraternal conflict in the late Archaic period was the Jinshin
Disturbance (Jinshin no Ran fE1IQ)L) in 672, when Prince Oama Xt-1RA
wrested the succession from the line of his brother, Prince Naka F4+ (Tenji, r.
661-671, leader of the Taika coup in 645). Oama unseated his nephew,
Emperor Kobun L r. 671-672, took the throne himself, and established his
court at Kiyomihara in the following year, reigning as Temmu. When Temmu
died in 686, his widow and niece, Sarara m A, succeeded him as stakeholder for
their son, Prince Kusakabe A But the prince died in 689 without ascending
the throne, and Sarara, as Emperor Jito t~JL,44 reigned until Kusakabe's son,
41 In the endleaf of Kodai Kokka no Seirit- Chapter 3. Hurst's view that female monarchs
su -tMM~o)0Ua, Chfio Koronsha, 1965, were primarily stakeholders whose main func-
Naoki Kojiro 6 lists the monarchs tion was to guarantee the identity of their suc-
from Kimmei to Mommu, showing, for exam- cessors has been challenged; see, for example,
ple, that Jomei's By first palace site, Asuka Patricia Tsurumi, 'The Male Present versus
Okamoto, was used twenty-six years later by the Female Past: Historians and Japan's An-
Saimei AjM, and again sixteen years after that cient Female Emperors', in Bulletin of Con-
by Temmu, while Saimei also used Kogyoku's cerned Asian Scholars, 14:4 (1982), pp. 71-75.
By Asuka no Itabuki site in 655 after a lapse 44 It is worth noting, in the context of the
of twelve years. debate over the nature of female occupation
42 Kiley, p. 47. of the Yamato kingship, that the name Jito
43 On the role of female monarchs of this can be glossed 'maintaining the lineage' or
period, see G. Cameron Hurst, Insei: Ab- 'maintaining the succession'. It is probably
dicated Sovereigns in the Politics of Late also true that this posthumous name was given
Heian Japan, 1086-1185, Columbia U.P., by male officials.
47 It has been suggested, although without speaks of DOkyo as the emperor's 'reputed
clear proof, that the emperor and her priestly paramour'; Aoki, p. 478, doubts the charge,
adviser were romantically involved as well, while Ueda Masaaki fHI M, Nihon no Jotei
but this seems like the sort of charge that Con- H V&k%-, KOdansha, 1973, pp. 197-98, re-
fucian historiographers might naturally level jects it. See also Bender's discussion, p. 139.
at the last member of a dynasty. Hurst, p. 45,
power base of the Temmu line in Yamato to the center of Yamashiro province,
a stronghold of the Paekche immigrants, where his own maternal relatives
were entrenched. Heian-kyo and its early society were not much less Bud-
dhist than Nara and its society, and in Yamashiro, he could conduct the affairs
of state without interference from remnants of the Temmu line, the same peo-
ple who had put forth Prince Osabe a decade earlier.
The foregoing suggests that the Nara 'capital' city of Heijo partakes heavily
of the character of a 'court' for the Temmu dynasty. The Tenji line maintained
a strong identification with Yamashiro province even through a century of con-
centration of political power wielded by the Temmu line in the Yamato basin,
and it also possessed a sufficiently strong power base in Yamashiro to effect the
abandonment of the Temmu line's seat of power.48
One of the important foci for the separate geographic identification of the
two lines was, not surprisingly, the ancestral tombs. The Asuka/Nara area was
the burial area of the Temmu lineage. The Fujiwara palace constructed by
Temmu's widow Jito has even been described as a mandala emanating from
Temmu's burial mound, in which the axial north-south street of the palace
complex described a direct line from the palace itself to the tomb.49 The
Heijo capital looked south a short distance across the Nara Plain upon this
same mandala.
Heian-kyo, by contrast, is not only far from HeijO, but is also conveniently
near Tenji's old palace site at Otsu, and even closer to the site of Tenji's tomb,
the burial mound in Yamashina, just across Higashiyama from modern-day
Kyoto. When, after escaping the grasp of the Temmu line in the Nara Plain,
Kammu finally settled on the site of Heian-kyo, he was returning to the focus
of the Tenji line's ritual base, as well as being near the power base of his mater-
nal relatives.
That the issue between the two capital districts remained in flux is suggested
by the attempt of the eldest of Kammu's sons, Heizei +I, r. 806-809, after his
abdication to retake the throne in league with Fujiwara no Kusuko *An,
and move the capital back to Nara.50 The attempt failed; Heizei's children
were drummed out of the dynastic succession pool, and his grandchildren were
created commoners with the surnames Ariwara W-P and Oe XfL.
So the monarchy remained in Heian-kyo. Temmu had won the battle in
the Jinshin Disturbance in 672, perhaps, but Tenji's descendants won the war.
For the next millenium the monarchy had court and capital in the shadow of
Tenji's tomb.
Lineage identification with particular sites and particular provinces was a
powerful factor in political dynamics, lineage conflict, and choices of the loca-
tion of the court. The elegist for the Temmu line, Kakinomoto no Hitomaro,
surely recognized this. His 'Poem written ... when he passed the ruined
capital at Omi' is a a clear challenge to the legitimacy of the Tenji line for hav-
ing taken the 'capital' out of Yamato province. At the same time, the poem
asserts that the Yamato basin-not coincidentally the seat of the Temmu
lineage's power, and the site of its palaces and tombs-was the only legitimate
location for the 'capital':5 1
Since the reign of the Master of the Sun
at Kashiwara by Unebi Mountain,
where the maidens
wear strands of jewels,
all gods who have been born
have ruled the realm under heaven,
each following each
like generations of the spruce,
in Yamato
that spreads to the sky.
After the move from Nara, and particularly after the revolt of Heizei and
Kusuko, fundamental changes were made in both the succession system of the
imperial house, and in the relationship of the imperial house, its consort clans,
and the nobility, to the capital and the provinces. These changes guaranteed
both that succession to the throne would never again be challenged in the ways
it was by Temmu, KOnin, or Heizei, and that territorial challenges to the
primacy of Heian-kyo as the capital would not arise. For the move from Heijo,
this recent threat to Heian, and the controversy over the locus of the court and
the capital arose from several related factors.
First, the imperial lineage group proved inconveniently prolific, begetting
too many potential successors. Despite efforts at limiting the succession pool
through dynastic shedding techniques such as the Cie system,52 there were still
too many candidates to ensure smooth succession, or to guarantee an emperor
the certainty that a designated heir-apparent would succeed. Indeed, Temmu
himself was not an oe, but deposed his rival Kobun, who was. Furthermore, as
long as the nobility included clans of heir-producing consorts who resided in
territorial bases outside the court-town itself, there remained the danger of a
territorially based challenge to the locus of the royal court, and this, it seems,
is what occurred in the case of the abandonment of Nara.
The solution to the problem of surplus candidates for the succession has
been mentioned briefly in the case of Heizei's progeny. The imperial line
developed a new and more effective technique of dynastic shedding, of barring
unneeded scions from potential candidacy. Prince Oama, and other younger
offspring, titled oMi - X, C XE, or shinnC )iE, were still 'royal', in the sense that
they fully shared in the charisma of the Yamato line. If necessary, they could
succeed, as did Oama no Jfi or Shirakabe no C. They might be named heir ap-
parent, as in the case of Osabe shinnc, or sire heirs to the throne, as did Shiki
XM- no cji, Shirakabe's father. But Heizei's son Takaoka rA was deposed as
crown prince after the rebellion of Heizei and Kusuko, while the children of
his other son, Prince Aho PM, were demoted from royal status and expelled
from the succession pool, their charisma sullied by the new surnames Ariwara
and Oe. This technique of creating new lineages of 'subjects', a strategy one
52 Kiley, p. 47.
might call 'secularization of surplus royals', appears to have been a more effec-
tive method of shedding than had been previous techniques. Unlike the earlier
shedding ploys, no one successfully challenged this secularization process,
returning from a surname-bearing lineage group to succeed to the throne, and
as far as we can be certain, only one person, Taira no Masakado Ar d. 940,
openly tried.
That the Heian nobility was aware that the 'granting' of a surname was the
public mark of secularization seems clear from the first chapter of Genji
Monogatari gfi.$M~. Hikaru X, son of the emperor by a woman of relatively
humble family, has been bereft of his mother from birth. He is his father's
favorite as the young man's mother had been the emperor's beloved compa-
nion. As a result of this favoritism, Hikaru becomes the focus of considerable
political jealousy among the maternal relatives of other imperial offspring of
'better' family. The boy's fate is sealed, ironically, by the glowing prognosti-
cation of a physiognamist from Koryo, who predicts that he will 'ascend to
the highest place [i.e., become emperor]. '53 This prediction merely serves to
intensify the suspicions and hostilities of the maternal relatives of other royal
offspring, especially the Minister of the Right, grandfather of the crown
prince, and the emperor is forced to take drastic steps to save Hikaru:
Lacking the support of maternal relatives, the boy would be most insecure as a
prince without court rank, and the emperor could not be sure how long his own
reign would last. As a commoner he could be of great service.... He was so pro-
ficient [at his studies] that it seemed a waste to reduce him to common rank. And
yet-as a prince he would arouse the hostility of those who had cause to fear his
becoming emperor. Summoning an astrologer of the Indian school, the emperor
was pleased to learn that the Indian view coincided [with his own feelings, and
the Koryo physiognamist's prediction]; and so he concluded that the boy should
become a commoner with the name of Minamoto or Genji.54
53 The Tale of Genji, tr. Edward in NKBT 14-18, Iwanami, 1958-1963, 14, p. 45.
Seidensticker, Knopf, New York, 1976, 2 54 The Tale of Genji, 1, p. 15; Genji
vols., 1, p. 14. See GenjiMonogatari , Monogatari, in NKBT, 14, pp. 44-45.