Communicative Intentions
Communicative Intentions
TERM PAPER
YEREVAN-2023
CONTENTS
Introduction--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusions---------------------------------------------------------------------
References-------------------------------------------------
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this research is to learn communicative intentions and analyse the key language
based on EL course books …………………………
This book was written by Simon Kent, David Falvey, Gareth Rees, Ien Lebeau, David Cotton and
they divided it into 3 parts. We wanted to know why they did it and why in such a way. We also
wondered if this type of book helps in learning the language, and how good it is.
The concept of speech acts is firstly developed by a philosopher; John L. Austin in his book How
to Do Things with Words. Austin defines speech acts simply as the action performed by saying
something." By means of utterances, ones can get others to do something. In other words,
speech acts are actions which are performed via utterances.
Theoretical part
Acts of speech can be broken down into three categories: locutionary, illocutionary, and
perlocutionary acts. In each of these, too, the acts can either be direct or indirect, which
quantify how effective they are at conveying the speaker's message to its intended audience.
According to Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay's "Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics,"
locutionary acts are "the mere act of producing some linguistic sounds or marks with a certain
meaning and reference," but these are the least effective means of describing the acts, merely
an umbrella term for the other two which can occur simultaneously.
Speech acts can therefore further be broken down into illocutionary and perlocutionary
wherein the illocutionary act carries a directive for the audience, such as promising, ordering,
apologizing and thanking. Perlocutionary acts, on the other hand, bring about consequences to
the audiences such as saying "I will not be your friend." In this instance, the impending loss of
friendship is an illocutionary act while the effect of frightening the friend into compliance is a
perlocutionary act.
Locutionary act
In speech-act theory, a locutionary act is the act of making a meaningful utterance, a stretch of
spoken language that is preceded by silence and followed by silence or a change of speaker—
also known as a locution or an utterance act. The term locutionary act was introduced by British
philosopher J. L. Austin in his 1962 book, "How to Do Things With Words." American
philosopher John Searle later replaced Austin's concept of a locutionary act with what Searle
called the propositional act—the act of expressing a proposition. Searle outlined his ideas in a
1969 article titled "Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language."
Speech Act Theory is a subfield of pragmatics that explores how words and sentences are not
only used to present information, but also to perform actions. As an utterance, a locutionary act
is considered a performative, in which both the audience and the speaker must trust certain
conditions about the speech act. These conditions are called felicity conditions and are divided
into three different categories: the essential condition, the sincerity condition, and the
preparatory condition.
1.Preparatory precondition: 1) the speaker believes the event will occur and be detrimental to
the hearer; 2) the speaker believes that it is not obvious to the hearer that the event will occur
2.Sincerity condition: the speaker genuinely believes that the event will be detrimental to the
hearer
3.Essential condition: the utterance counts as an attempt by the speaker to have the hearer
recognize that a future event will be detrimental
Subactivities
The locutionary act is divided into sub-activities that are part of it and give it meaning. These
subactivities are the phonetic, phatic and rhetic acts.
Phonetic act
It consists of the emission of certain sounds that are considered part of the linguistic sounds.
For example, "Maria is sick".
Phatic act
It consists in the emission of certain terms or words that require intention and intonation. For
example: "Mary is sick?"
Rhaetian act
It consists of using the terms or words with a certain sense or reference more or less defined;
that is, a statement full of meaning.
To say something always is to perform the phonetic act of pronouncing certain sounds, the
phatic act of uttering grammatical expressions and the rhetorical act of using such expressions
with certain meaning.
Illocutionary act
In speech-act theory, the term illocutionary act refers to the use of a sentence to express an
attitude with a certain function or "force," called an illocutionary force, which differs from
locutionary acts in that they carry a certain urgency and appeal to the meaning and direction of
the speaker.
Although illocutionary acts are commonly made explicit by the use of performative verbs like
"promise" or "request," they can often be vague as in someone saying "I'll be there," wherein
the audience cannot ascertain whether the speaker has made a promise or not.
The terms illocutionary act and illocutionary force were introduced by British linguistic
philosopher John Austin in 1962's "How to Do Things With Words, and for some scholars, the
term illocutionary act is virtually synonymous with speech act.
Whereas Austin used "performative" to talk about certain kinds of utterances as having "force,"
his term "illocution" rather names a quality or aspect of all utterances. They will have a
locutionary sense or meaning, an illocutionary force, and a perlocutionary result. This approach
has encouraged the view that even true/false constative statements have illocutionary force (as
in "I hereby state and affirm") and even performatives can be evaluable as true/false
statements (as "guilty" verdict might be right or wrong). It is also often emphasised that Austin
introduced the illocutionary act by means of a contrast with other aspects of "doing" by
"speaking." The illocutionary act, he says, is an act performed in saying something, as
contrasted with a locutionary act, the act of saying something, and also contrasted with a
perlocutionary act, an act performed by saying something. Austin, however, eventually
abandoned the "in saying" / "by saying" test (1975, 123).
According to the conception adopted by Bach and Harnish in 'Linguistic Communication and
Speech Acts' (1979), an illocutionary act is an attempt to communicate, which they analyse as
the expression of an attitude. Another conception of the illocutionary act goes back to Schiffer's
book 'Meaning' (1972, 103), in which the illocutionary act is represented as just the act of
meaning something.
According to a widespread opinion, an adequate and useful account of "illocutionary acts" has
been provided by John Searle (e.g., 1969, 1975, 1979). In recent years, however, it has been
doubted whether Searle's account is well-founded. A wide-ranging critique is in FC Doerge
2006. Collections of articles examining Searle's account are: Burkhardt 1990 and Lepore / van
Gulick 1991.
Illocutionary force
Several speech act theorists, including Austin himself, make use of the notion of an illocutionary
force. In Austin's original account, the notion remains rather unclear. [according to whom?]
Some followers of Austin, such as David Holdcroft, view illocutionary force as the property of an
utterance to be made with the intention to perform a certain illocutionary act—rather than as
the successful performance of the act (which is supposed to further require the
appropriateness of certain circumstances). According to this conception, the utterance of "I bet
you five pounds that it will rain" may well have an illocutionary force even if the addressee
doesn't hear it. However, Bach and Harnish assume illocutionary force if, and only if this or that
illocutionary act is actually (successfully) performed. According to this conception, the
addressee must have heard and understood that the speaker intends to make a bet with them
in order for the utterance to have 'illocutionary force'.
If we adopt the notion of illocutionary force as an aspect of meaning, then it appears that the
(intended) 'force' of certain sentences, or utterances, is not quite obvious. If someone says, "It
sure is cold in here", there are several different illocutionary acts that might be aimed at by the
utterance. The utterer might intend to describe the room, in which case the illocutionary force
would be that of 'describing'. But she might also intend to criticise someone who should have
kept the room warm. Or it might be meant as a request to someone to close the window. These
forces may be interrelated: it may be by way of stating that the temperature is too cold that
one criticises someone else. Such a performance of an illocutionary act by means of the
performance of another is referred to as an indirect speech act.
Perlocutionary act
In speech-act theory, a perlocutionary act is an action or state of mind brought about by, or as a
consequence of, saying something. It is also known as a perlocutionary effect. "The distinction
between the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act is important," says Ruth M. Kempson:
Ruth M. Kempson
"The perlocutionary act is the consequent effect on the hearer which the speaker intends
should follow from his utterance."
Kempson offers this summary of the three interrelated speech acts originally presented by John
L. Austin in "How to Do Things With Words" published in 1962:
"A speaker utters sentences with a particular meaning (locutionary act), and with a particular
force (illocutionary act), in order to achieve a certain effect on the hearer (perlocutionary act)."
"Intuitively, a perlocutionary act is an act performed by saying something, and not in saying
something. Persuading, angering, inciting, comforting and inspiring are often perlocutionary
acts; but they would never begin an answer to the question 'What did he say?' Perlocutionary
acts, in contrast with locutionary and illocutionary acts, which are governed by conventions, are
not conventional but natural acts (Austin [1955], p. 121). Persuading, angering, inciting, etc.
cause physiological changes in the audience, either in their states or behavior; conventional
acts do not."
Nicholas Allott gives this view of a perlocutionary act in his book, "Key Terms in Pragmatics":
"Consider a negotiation with a hostage-taker under siege. The police negotiator says: 'If you
release the children, we'll allow the press to publish your demands.' In making that utterance
she has offered a deal (illocutionary act). Suppose the hostage-taker accepts the deal and as a
consequence releases the children. In that case, we can say that by making the utterance, the
negotiator brought about the release of the children, or in more technical terms, that this was a
perlocutionary effect of the utterance."
Shouting "Fire"
In her book, "Speaking Back: The Free Speech Versus Hate Speech Debate," Katharine Gelber
explains the effect of shouting "fire" in a crowded venue:
"In the perlocutionary instance, an act is performed by saying something. For example, if
someone shouts 'fire' and by that act causes people to exit a building which they believe to be
on fire, they have performed the perlocutionary act of convincing other people to exit the
building.... In another example, if a jury foreperson declares 'guilty' in a courtroom in which an
accused person sits, the illocutionary act of declaring a person guilty of a crime has been
undertaken. The perlocutionary act related to that illocution is that, in reasonable
circumstances, the accused person would be convinced that they were to be led from the
courtroom into a jail cell. Perlocutionary acts are acts intrinsically related to the illocutionary
act which precedes them, but discrete and able to be differentiated from the illocutionary act."
Marina Sbisà, in an essay titled, "Locution, Illocution, Perlocution," notes why perlocution can
have a surprising effect:
"Perlocution has no upper border: any consequential effect of a speech act may be considered
as perlocutionary. If breaking news surprises you so that you trip and fall, my announcement
has not only been believed true by you (which is already a perlocutionary effect) and thus
surprised you, but has also made you trip. fall, and (say) injure your ankle. This aspect of the so-
called 'accordion effect' concerning actions and speech actions in particular (see Austin 1975:
110-115; Feinberg 1964) meets general consent, apart from those speech-act theorists who
prefer to limit the notion of perlocutionary effect to intended perlocutionary effects...."
Acts of Speech: Types and Examples
The speech acts they are statements, propositions or statements that serve so that the speaker,
beyond declaring something, perform an action. They are usually sentences in the first person
and in the present, as "to that you do not!", "As I tell you, I do not speak to you" and" l increase
its loss", that They can represent a challenge, a threat and a condolence, respectively.
The theory of speech acts was developed by J. L. Austin in 1975. In his theory, Austin does not
focus on the function of language to describe reality, represent states of affairs or make claims
about the world; instead, Austin analyzes the variety of uses of the language. This was his great
contribution to contemporary philosophy.
This theory is related to the concept of illocutionary or illocutionary acts, introduced by Austin.
It refers to the attitude or intention of the speaker in pronouncing a statement: c when
someone says: "I am going to do it", their intention (or illocutionary act) may be to utter a
threat, a warning or a promise; the interpretation depends on the context.
Types
American philosopher John Searle analyzed illocutionary acts and discovered that there are at
least a dozen linguistically significant dimensions that differentiate them. Based on this, he
made a taxonomy.
Assertive or representative
This type of acts engage the speaker with the truth of an expressed proposition. Some of the
illocutionary acts are: affirm, suggest, declare, present, swear, describe, boast and conclude.
Example
Directors
Direct speech acts seek the recipient to perform an action. Among others, illocutionary acts are:
order, request, challenge, invite, advise, beg and beg.
Example
Commissives
Commissive: an attempt to commit the speaker to a future course of action, include promising,
warning, threatening, guaranteeing, etc. Commissives are also a “world-to-words” fit but,
unlike directives, it is the speaker’s actions that will change the world rather than the listener’s.
Example
Expressive
This type of act expresses how the speaker feels about the situation or manifests a
psychological state. Among these are: thanks, apologies, welcome, complaints and
congratulations.
Example
Declarations
Example
In addition to distinguishing speech acts according to their general function (giving an order,
asking permission, inviting), these can also be distinguished with respect to their structure.
In this sense, Austin argued that what is said (locutionary act) does not determine the
illocutionary act that is performed. Therefore, speech acts can be direct or indirect.
Sometimes, a performative verb is not used; however, the illocutionary force is perfectly clear.
Thus, the expression "shut up!" In a given context can clearly be an order.
On the other hand, in indirect speech acts, the illocutionary force does not manifest itself
directly. Thus, inference must be used to understand the intention of the speaker.
For example, in a work context, if a boss tells his secretary: "Do not you think that skirt is not
appropriate for the office?", Is not really consulting his opinion, but ordering him not to use
that garment anymore.
Examples
Assertive or representative
- The best seller in the company is the one that makes the most sales, and I was the one who
made the most sales! (Boasting, indirect).
Directors
- Because of our friendship, I ask you to reconsider your attitude. (Request, direct).
- For our friendship, can you reconsider your attitude? (Request, indirect).
Commissives
- I assure you that if you do not come, I will tell everything to her. (Threat, direct).
- Well, you know how it is... I could tell everything to her if you do not come. (Threat, indirect).
- I bet he will not have the courage to appear before his parents. (Bet, direct).
- If you have the courage to appear before your parents, I invite you to lunch (Bet, indirect).
Expressive
- I already know that I should have taken you into account. (Sorry, indirect).
- You must be very proud of having achieved this success. (Congratulations, indirect).
- I appreciate all the support given in this terrible situation. (Gratitude, direct).
- I do not know how to pay all the support given in this terrible situation. (Thanks, indirect).
Declarations
- By the confession of your mouth I now baptize you in the name of the Father, the Son and the
Holy Spirit. (Baptism).
- By the power conferred by law, now I declare you husband and wife." (Declaration of
marriage).
- I declare him innocent of all the charges against him. (Legal acquittal).
Personality
I don't know.
I accept that
Education
Supposing we...
Crime
Medicine
It could be really bad for our reputation.
It would have also result in other patients coming forward with complaints.
Psychology
Environment
Globalization
Sport
Art
Business
Travel
I think we should….
Technology
I’m sure you agree with me, it’s our job to manage change…
If we were to…
International relations
Personality
In my opinion, ...
I suggest ...
I suppose..
Education
Crime
Medicine
If we support him too strongly, the press may get hold of the story
Architecture
It's a priority...
Psychology
It might be worth…
Environment
Globalization
Art
Travel
I suggest we…
How about…
Technology
If some of our staff lose their jobs ,it’ll have a bad effect on production
International relations
Personality
Education
Crime
Medicine
Architecture
Psychology
Travel
Technology
International relations
https://culturalstudiesnow.blogspot.com/2018/01/locutionary-illocutionary.html
https://sites.duke.edu/conversions/files/2014/09/Searle_Illocutionary-Acts.pdf
Cambridge university press
Berdini, F. and Bianchi, C. (s / f). John Langshaw Austin (1911-1960). Taken from
iep.utm.edu.
IT. (s / f). Realizations of Speech Acts. Direct and indirect speech acts. Taken from
it.uos.de.
Tsovaltzi, D.; Walter, S. and Burchardt, A. (). Searle's Classification of Speech Acts. Taken
from coli.uni-saarland.de.