American Security Project

U.S. Strategy in the South China Sea

Author(s): Madeline McLaughlin
American Security Project (2020)
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U.S. Strategy in the South China Sea

Perspective
-
Madeline McLaughlin

October 2020 i

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BOARD OF DIRECTORS

The Honorable Gary Hart, Chairman Emeritus Scott Gilbert

Senator Hart served the State of Colorado in the U.S. Senate Scott Gilbert is a Partner of Gilbert LLP and Managing
and was a member of the Committee on Armed Services Director of Reneo LLC.
during his tenure.

Vice Admiral Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.)

Governor Christine Todd Whitman, Chairperson
Vice Admiral Gunn is Vice Chairman of the CNA Military
Christine Todd Whitman is the President of the Whitman Advisory Board, Former Inspector General of the Department
Strategy Group, a consulting firm that specializes in energy of the Navy, and Former President of the Institute of Public
and environmental issues. Research at the CNA Corporation.

The Honorable Chuck Hagel

Brigadier General Stephen A. Cheney, USMC (Ret.), Chuck Hagel served as the 24th U.S. Secretary of Defense and
President of ASP served two terms in the United States Senate (1997-2009). Hagel
Brigadier General Cheney is the President of ASP. was a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations; Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs; and Intelligence Committees.

Matthew Bergman Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy, USA (Ret.)

Matthew Bergman is an attorney, philanthropist and Lieutenant General Kennedy was the first woman
entrepreneur based in Seattle. He serves as a Trustee of Reed to achieve the rank of three-star general in the United States
College on the Board of Visitors of Lewis & Clark Law Army.
School.

Ambassador Jeffrey Bleich The Honorable John F. Kerry

The Hon. Jeffery Bleich heads the Global Practice for John Kerry is a distinguished fellow for global affairs at Yale
Munger, Tolles & Olson. He served as the U.S. Ambassador University. In 2013, Kerry was sworn in as the 68th secretary of
to Australia from 2009 to 2013. He previously served in the state of the United States. Kerry served for more than twenty-
Clinton Administration. five years as a U.S. senator from Massachusetts.

Alejandro Brito General Lester L. Lyles, USAF (Ret.)

Alejandro Brito is President of Brito Development Group General Lyles retired from the United States Air Force after
(BDG), LLP. In the last twenty years, Mr. Brito has overseen a distinguished 35 year career. He is presently Chairman of
the design, construction, development and management of USAA, a member of the Defense Science Board, and a member
over 1,500 luxury housing units in Puerto Rico. of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board.

The Honorable Donald Beyer

Congressman Donald Beyer is the former United States Dennis Mehiel
Ambassador to Switzerland and Liechtenstein, as well as a Dennis Mehiel is the Principal Shareholder and Chairman of
former Lieutenant Governor and President of the Senate of U.S. Corrugated, Inc.
Virginia.

Lieutenant General Daniel Christman, USA (Ret.) Stuart Piltch

Lieutenant General Christman is Senior Vice Stuart Piltch is the Co-Founder and Managing Director
President for International Affairs at the United of Cambridge Advisory Group, an actuarial and benefits
States Chamber of Commerce. consulting firm based in Philadelphia.

Robert B. Crowe Ed Reilly

Robert B. Crowe is a Partner of Nelson Mullins Riley & Edward Reilly is a Senior Advisor to Dentons, the world’s
Scarborough in its Boston and Washington, DC offices. He largest law firm.
is co-chair of the firm’s Government Relations practice.

Lee Cullum LtGen Norman Seip, USAF (Ret)

Lee Cullum, at one time a commentator on the PBS Lieutenant General Norman R. Seip, USAF (Ret) served in the
NewsHour and “All Things Considered” on NPR, currently Air Force for 35 years. His last assignment was Commander of
contributes to the Dallas Morning News and hosts “CEO.” 12th Air Force.

Nelson W. Cunningham David Wade

Nelson Cunningham is President of McLarty Associates, the David Wade is a consultant helping global corporations and
international strategic advisory firm headed by former White organizations with strategic advice, public affairs and thought
House Chief of Staff and Special Envoy for the Americas leadership, crisis communications, political intelligence
Thomas F. “Mack” McLarty, III. gathering, and federal and legislative strategy.

Admiral William Fallon, USN (Ret.)

Admiral Fallon has led U.S. and Allied forces and played a
leadership role in military and diplomatic matters at the highest
levels of the U.S. government.

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American Security and the Oceans In this Report:
This paper discusses the importance of working with allies as the US seeks to strengthen its
position in the South China Sea. It examines the benefit of increasing joint exercises with
India, Japan, and Australia, as well as the possibility of assisting regional states to increase
their own defensive capabilities. The US has ceded leadership in the region by withdrawing
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and failing to ratify the UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea. Now, as it seeks to engage diplomatically with ASEAN states, it will have to focus
on following through in its diplomatic efforts and seek new leadership opportunities in the
region. It will also be necessary for the US to counter China’s narrative in the South China
Sea by creating its own narrative—clearly conveying the importance of laws and norms in
the international community.

Interact:
Discuss the the South China Sea with the author on Twitter @MaddieMcLaughln
Learn more about ASP at @amsecproject

IN BRIEF

• Secretary Pompeo released a statement in July that strengthened the US’ stance on
the South China Sea dispute and denounced China’s actions in the region.

• Working with allies and other states interested in the region will be key as the US
seeks to increase its presence in the South China Sea.

• The US should engage in more joint exercises with India, Japan, and Australia.
Additionally, the US can be instrumental in assisting ASEAN states to develop their
own defensive capabilities.

• Deepening current diplomatic relationships, following through in diplomatic

efforts, and seeking out new leadership opportunities will allow the US to achieve
its objectives in the region.

• Public diplomacy will be an important aspect of the US’ strategy as it seeks to portray
a law-based international system as the alternative to China’s way of conducting
international affairs.

About the Author

Madeline McLaughlin is the National Security Strategy intern at ASP. She graduated from the
University of Utah in 2019 with a Fine Arts degree and a political science minor.

www.AmericanSecurityProject.org
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 AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT

Strengthening the US Position on the South China Sea

In a July news conference, Secretary Pompeo released a statement on the US’ position concerning China’s actions
in the South China Sea. He stated: “The United States champions a free and open Indo-Pacific. Today we are
strengthening US policy in a vital, contentious part of that region — the South China Sea. We are making
clear: Beijing’s claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea are completely unlawful, as is
its campaign of bullying to control them.”1 The statement rejects China’s territorial claim to Mischief Reef,
Second Thomas Shoal, and James Shoal, as well as any maritime privileges associated with those territories. It also
includes China’s claims of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending from Scarborough Reef and the Spratly
Islands. Pompeo explained that, due to a lack of legal basis, the US rejects China’s claim of the Nine-Dash Line
as well. In accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the US does not recognize China’s claim
to any “waters beyond a 12-nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands (without
prejudice to other states’ sovereignty claims over such islands).” Finally, the statement denounces China’s efforts to
prevent surrounding countries from utilizing resources in the region, namely China’s actions against fishermen and
disruption of offshore energy development.2

In the face of previous aggression, the US has released statements3,4,5 expressing displeasure with Chinese actions.
In light of this, Secretary Pompeo’s statement does not necessarily represent a completely new strategy for the
US in the South China Sea. Instead, it is a strengthening of the current US position, aligning the US’ official
stance in the region with its actions. The stark language signals to China and others interested in the South China
Sea dispute that the US intends to be more actively engaged in the region. International reaction to the US’
statement was mixed, with some publications questioning whether this policy stance would actually mean more
engagement by the US in the South China Sea, or whether it is an empty statement. Others, apparently bolstered
by a stronger US stance, have also taken new stands against China’s actions in the South China Sea. Australia filed
a declaration with the UN that echoed much of the language used by Pompeo to clarify the US’ position. Malaysia
also recently spoke out through a diplomatic note to the UN6 when China responded negatively to a submission
by the Malaysian government to UN Convention on the Law of the Sea claiming the existence of overlapping
territories in the South China Sea. Following similar lines, the note rejected China’s claims in the South China Sea,
particularly those associated with the Nine-Dash Line.

International Importance of South China Sea

The South China Sea has long been an area of interest for the US and its allies.7 The sea’s natural resources, such
as oil and gas, and its abundant fishing are important to countries that border the region. For those states, as well
as the international community, it is a vital waterway because of the large amount of trade that runs through it.
Approximately 80% of international trade travels by sea,8 with one-third9 of that trade passing through the South
China Sea. It is also significant for the international community because of China’s excessive territorial claims that
demonstrate a lack of regard for the laws of the sea and international norms. While disputes over the South China
Sea date back to the 1970s, it has been a particularly tense area since the UN declared China’s claims invalid in
an arbitration between the Philippines and China in 2016. Despite winning on most points in the arbitration,
the Philippine government did very little to pressure China to conform to the ruling. China refused to accept the
ruling and declared the arbitration invalid due to its belief that territorial disputes are not regulated under the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).10 However, Article 288 of UNCLOS11 states that when a dispute
arises concerning jurisdiction the matter will be examined and a decision will be made by the tribunal. In the
arbitration, the tribunal concluded that while some of the Philippines’ claims fell beyond their jurisdiction, a large
majority were valid for that arbitration.
1
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Since the arbitration, China has continued to
further develop its claims in the South China
Sea. The country views these claims as vital for its
national security, both as a result of the advantage
that it gains through military facilities on these
territories, and because the South China Sea is
the gateway for China’s Maritime Silk Road.12
However, as China has sought to more firmly
secure this waterway, its disregard of the laws
of the sea and its willingness to act according to
the principle of ‘might makes right’ has caused
alarm in the international community. If China
is allowed to push forward in this way, it sets
a dangerous precedent, sending the message
that international law can be set aside when
inconvenient for a nation’s interests.

In response to the recent increased pressure,

China has stood its ground and continued
pushing forward. Following Pompeo’s remarks,
the Chinese Embassy published a response
which stated: “We advise the US side to earnestly
honor its commitment of not taking sides on the Territorial claims in the South China Sea. Image source: Voice of
issue of territorial sovereignty, respect regional America.
countries’ efforts for a peaceful and stable South
China Sea and stop its attempts to disrupt and sabotage regional peace and stability.”13 China has continued
pressing its advantages in the region—conducting high-intensity naval and bomber exercises in late July.14 It has
also changed the classification of some of the disputed areas from offshore navigation to coastal navigation.15 These
actions, as well as the recent creation of administrative districts for the Spratly and Parcel Islands, further the
country’s control over those areas and strengthen its claim of the islands as territories of China.

US Strategy in the South China Sea

Up until this point, the US’ actions in the region have mostly consisted of Freedom of Navigation Operations
(FONOPs), whereby US Navy ships pass through disputed territory. These operations preserve the rights given
to states in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Because of the strength of the US Navy,
this has frequently been a go-to strategy for the US as a response to any country’s excessive maritime claims.16
This is likely to continue, being strongly favored by the current administration. In the South China Sea, these
FONOPs generally have two objectives. The first is to protest China’s excessive maritime claims in the region, such
as arguments that underwater islands afford China the traditional 12 nautical miles of territorial waters, despite
the fact that this is contrary to UNCLOS.17 US FONOPs dispute this claim by passing within 12 nautical miles
of these contested areas. The FONOPs also challenge China’s assertions in the South China Sea by refusing to
notify it before conducting maneuvers. There have been five or six FONOPS each year since 2015. This number
increased last year to nine FONOPs.18 As of August 2020 there have been three FONOPS.19,20

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 AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT

Soon after Pompeo’s statement in July, the Assistant Secretary of State David Stilwell noted that “nothing is off
the table”21 for the US going forward. US officials have mentioned the likelihood of more future FONOPs and
the possibility of sanctions.22 While there is a chance that these measures could deter China from progressing
further with its aggressive behavior, the success of any US action in the South China Sea depends largely on how
it is carried out. Unilateral US actions are unlikely to have a strong enough effect on China. In the past this has
largely been due to China’s insistence that the US has no stake in the South China Sea dispute and should not be
involved. Now, as relations between the US and China have taken a sharp downward spiral in the last year, ignoring
unilateral US actions is a more viable option than ever before. Recognizing that this issue is of vital importance to
many US partners and allies, the US should act as a leader in the region by working towards creating a consensus
among other states affected by China’s tactics in the South China Sea. With this in mind, the US strategy in the
region should focus on:

• Multilateral engagement.
• Building up the defense capabilities of allies.
• Strengthening diplomatic ties.
• Encouraging a united front to discourage China from following its current course, both diplomatically
and through joint military exercises.
• Creating an attractive alternative to China’s way of conducting international affairs.

Military Exercises and Strengthening Allies

In the face of China’s continued aggression and expansion, one of the US’ main objectives is to ensure a free and
open Indo-Pacific. Military exercises allow the US to be continually ready if an actual conflict were to happen,
but mainly operate as a form of deterrence. These exercises remind China of the naval might of the US and the
importance of the region to the international community. After Pompeo’s announcement, an increased naval
presence can be the first step in demonstrating the
US’ strengthened commitment to involvement
in the South China Sea dispute.

However, these plans have been disrupted by the

recent burning of the USS Bonhomme Richard.
The loss of the amphibious assault ship, which
had nearly completed two years’ worth of
upgrades, is a serious setback for naval plans.
The USS Bonhomme Richard burning in port. US Navy photo. The ship’s upgrades would have allowed it to
operate a force of F-35Bs, a capability currently
possessed by few other U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships. Addressing this deficiency will require a shifting of
23

focus towards forward operating bases in the short- to medium-term until more F-35 capable ships are upgraded
or built. Traditionally, this would have meant using the five US bases in the Philippines.24 However, with the
instability of the US-Philippine security pact and President Duterte’s interest in working with China, this may no
longer be a viable option. If bases in the Philippines cannot be used, the US will need to look to other states in the
region that may align more closely with the US in its stance against China.

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However, finding an alternative will likely prove difficult because of the regional states’ unwillingness to act too
strongly against China. Increasing cooperation with forces from other nations is another way that the US can
address aspects of this unexpected setback. The loss of the ship impacts the US’ ability to conduct forward-deployed
assurance. While the naval capabilities of Australia and Japan may not be as advanced as those of the US, working
collaboratively to continuously re-establish the freedom of any nation to conduct exercises in international waters
eases the burden that the US Navy has been bearing largely alone. Already this summer, the US, Australia, and
Japan have conducted a joint exercise in the South China Sea. The commander of the Australian Joint Task Group
stated that “The opportunity to work alongside the US and the Japanese is invaluable. The combined tasking
between our navies demonstrates a high degree of interoperability and capability.”25 An informal security alliance26
between the US, India, Australia, and Japan, known as the Quad, has been the basis for joint exercises in the South
China Sea in previous years. Revitalizing a regional security strategy among the Quad will allow those states to
share in the responsibility of hedging against China’s claims. It
will also enable the states to send a stronger united message to
China than any one state could send alone.

Any future movements from the Quad would be more

impactful if joined by one or more of the countries which form
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While
the international ramifications of the South China Sea dispute
give members of the Quad strong reasons for being involved
in the region, the addition of ASEAN countries would lend
legitimacy. Because China’s actions on the South China Sea US Navy ships conducting a joint exercise with the
Royal Australian Navy. US Navy photo.
more directly affect the national security of ASEAN states, their
motives appear to be clearer. The Quad, particularly the US, have been accused of stoking great power competition
or seeking to contain China. Because of this, ASEAN countries can also increase the chance that China will
recognize the international implications of its actions, instead of dismissing exercises in the South China Sea as
simply the actions of great powers wanting to stir up trouble in the region. In the past, ASEAN countries have
been reluctant to act forcefully against China because of ASEAN’s emphasis on avoiding the use of force to resolve
conflict.27 However, it would be enough at this stage for the governments of some of the ASEAN states to officially
endorse the actions of the Quad. While joint action from ASEAN is unlikely, some of the states may be willing
to officially back the Quad’s actions through statements, as ASEAN has recently released a statement backing
UNCLOS and the 2016 arbitration.28

The US can also be instrumental in assisting ASEAN states in building up their own defensive capabilities. This
can be done through programs designed to assist countries in further developing their security forces, such as the
Maritime Security Initiative29 or International Military Education and Training (IMET).30 As of the end of July,
the Vietnamese government had accepted a loan to boost its defense capabilities by building six patrol vessels.31
As these states improve their defense capabilities, they gain self-sufficiency and depend less on the US. Actively
prioritizing ASEAN states’ defense also dismantles China’s portrayal of ASEAN member states as being content
with its actions in the region.32 However, the US should also be cautious when determining which states to
work with in this capacity. Once a state’s military is trained, the US will not have control over how those military
capabilities are used. In Burma, the military has been carrying out atrocities against the Rohingya minority.
Because of this, Congress has ensured that Burma cannot participate in the IMET program by passing the Asia
Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, which prohibits funding for the IMET and Foreign Military Financing in
Burma through fiscal year 2023.33 This ensures that IMET training from the US cannot be used by the Burmese
military to perform human rights violations.34 Going forward, it will be vital that the US carefully consider current
circumstances of each state and possible future consequences before starting IMET in any of the regional states.
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 AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT

Working Through Differences within the ASEAN

U.S. diplomatic efforts are important for the future stability of the South China Sea. In 2016, the US pulled out
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which had been central to the US’ strategic pivot towards the Asia-Pacific.
Pulling back from the TPP has caused the US to lose a valuable opportunity to offer an economic alternative to
China for states in the region. This has also caused the US to miss out on the opportunity to set an example for
conduct, strengthen alliances, and boost its leadership role in Asia. The US has thus missed an opportunity to
increase its soft power in the region. To amend this, the US should strive to develop deeper relationships with states
in the region through traditional and public diplomacy. While generally improving relations between the US and
ASEAN states is beneficial in and of itself, there are two specific goals that the US should be working towards in
its diplomatic efforts. The first is to push for a Code of Conduct that is transparent and fair for the ASEAN states
involved in the dispute. Code of Conduct negotiations have
been occurring since the 2016 tribunal, but to little effect.
China has successfully exploited35 the differences among
the ASEAN states to prevent any significant progress on
the issue. Looking forward, the ASEAN states will need to
resolve or set aside differences in order to counter the larger
threat.

The US should use its diplomatic influence to encourage

collaboration and dialogue among ASEAN states as they
work to decide on the best way to move forward, and
should publicize the active role it is playing in doing so.
The ASEAN countries should also utilize diplomatic
Flags of the ASEAN member states. Photo credit: connections with China to forward their objectives if
Gunawan Kartapranata / Wikimedia Commons.
possible. Following the 2016 tribunal, the Philippines did
not press China to abide by the ruling. Instead, the two countries have created a closer relationship, finding ways
to mutually benefit. Since then, the Philippine government has been performing a delicate balancing act, generally
leaning more towards China, but still drifting back towards the US at times. President Duterte has been a main
force behind this shift towards China, having long criticized the US’ security strategy. Earlier this year, Duterte
announced that he would be terminating the bilateral security pact between the Philippines and the US, much to
the delight of China.36 This termination has since been deferred.37 While the Philippines’ closer relationship with
China makes it somewhat unreliable, its connection with China may also be invaluable to the ASEAN states as
Code of Conduct talks proceed.

A second pressing issue is the upcoming election for the judge’s position on the International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, which is responsible for settling maritime disputes. China is currently pushing for a candidate from its
own country, which would likely further complicate issues in the South China Sea. All members of UNCLOS will
have the chance to vote. However, this does not include the US because it has yet to ratify the convention.38 As a
result, the US is left to attempt to affect the proceedings of UNCLOS from the outside. Dialogue with states before
the upcoming UNCLOS elections is the only way for the US to push for other candidates. As China continues
to push for global influence, the US should counter it by strengthening the US’ relationships with other nations
and its own influence in the international community. To do this, the US will have to better follow through on
diplomatic efforts like TPP and seek new opportunities for leadership in the region – ratifying UNCLOS is a good
place to start.

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Combatting Disinformation
In a virtual meeting,39 China’s State Counselor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi painted the US as the peace-
disrupting force in the South China Sea. He claimed that:
• Relations in the region have reached a state of stability.
• Code of Conduct negotiations have been progressing.
• The US is seeking to disrupt the relations between China and other states in the region to further isolate
the country.
• The Chinese government is on the side of peace and willing to move forward with Code of Conduct
negotiations to ensure that peace is established in the South China Sea.

This narrative, of a peaceful China and a meddling US has been spread by the country’s government officials,
newspapers, and in online discussions.40,41 While China has continued pushing this narrative, its actions have
indicated different objectives, as confirmed by its continuing aggression in interactions with ASEAN states.

In order to continue building confidence in the US and allies’ intentions abroad, the US will have to actively
combat this characterization of its motives. Frequently, comments by the people of other nations have echoed
China’s rhetoric. These discussions call into question the US’ motives, believing the US’ increased interest in the
region can be attributed to the upcoming election or that it views the South China Sea as just another front on
which to combat China. Clearly conveying the US’ objectives in the region to foreign publics involved in the
dispute can lead to trust, but only if the US acts according to its stated objectives. In addition to breaking down
China’s narrative, the US should be actively creating a narrative of its own – one that emphasizes the importance
of international law and draws stark contrasts between an international order based on laws and China’s way. There
is a certain level of appeal in China’s way, to counter this will require a careful crafting of the US alternative that
clearly defines the benefits of the current international system. The US should also continue its public diplomacy
efforts through programs such as the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative and the Seeds for the Future small
grants program,42 to signal its ongoing interest in the people of the region. Proving that the US is truly invested
in the future of the ASEAN countries can lead to more trust among foreign publics of the US’ intentions in the
South China Sea.

Conclusion
In order to effectively challenge China’s expansion in the South China Sea and ensure the future of a law-based
international system in maritime affairs, it is vital that the US shift its focus towards broader cooperation with
allies. The US should strive to strengthen not only its own position, but also the position, resolve, and capabilities
of other states affected by China’s actions. In order to accomplish these objectives, it will be necessary for the US
to:
• Collaborate more closely and frequently with the navies of other countries, particularly Japan, Australia,
and India.
• Assist states in the region to develop their own military capabilities.
• Strengthen relations with other states involved in the dispute through diplomacy.
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 AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT

• Reengage in the international community through organizations or treaties such as UNCLOS.

• Combat Chinese disinformation in relation to the South China Sea.
• Promote its own narrative by highlighting the benefits of a system based on international norms as
opposed to China’s way of conducting international affairs.

Many of these strategies have been used by the US in the South China Sea before, with varying levels of success.
Now, as the US approaches the South China Sea from a firmer policy stance, combining the use of these strategies
with an increased focus on allies, both in the region and beyond, can lead to progress in the South China Sea.

Endnotes

1. “U.S. Positions in the South China Sea,” U.S. Department of State, 13 July 2019, https://www.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-
claims-in-the-south-china-sea/, (accessed July 2020).

2. Ibid.

3. David R. Stilwell,“The South China Sea, Southeast Asia’s Patrimony, and Everybody’s Own Backyard,” U.S. Department of State,
https://www.state.gov/the-south-china-sea-southeast-asias-patrimony-and-everybodys-own-backyard/, (accessed July 2020).

4. Morgan Ortagus, “PRC’s Reported Sinking of a Vietnamese Vessel in the South China Sea,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.
state.gov/prcs-reported-sinking-of-a-vietnamese-fishing-vessel-in-the-south-china-sea/, (accessed July 2020).

5. Morgan Ortagus, “Chinese Coercion on Oil and Gas Activity on the South China Sea,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.
gov/chinese-coercion-on-oil-and-gas-activity-in-the-south-china-sea/, (accessed July 2020).

6. Tashny Sukumaran and Bhavan Jaipragas, “Malaysia rebukes Beijing as South China Sea ‘lawfare’ heats up,” South China Morning
Post, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3095406/malaysia-rebukes-beijing-south-china-sea-lawfare-heats, (July
2020).

7. “China’s Maritime Disputes,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/chinas-maritime-disputes, (accessed August

2020).

8. “How much trade transits the South China Sea,” CSIS China Power, https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-
sea/#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Conference%20on,one%2Dthird%20of%20global%20shipping, (accessed July
2020).

9. Ibid.

10. Fu Ying, “Why China Says No to the Arbitration of the South China Sea,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/10/
why-china-says-no-to-the-arbitration-on-the-south-china-sea/, (accessed August 2020).

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 AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1804328.shtml,

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The American Security Project (ASP) is a nonpartisan
organization created to educate the American public and the
world about the changing nature of national security in the 21st
Century.
Gone are the days when a nation’s security could be measured
by bombers and battleships. Security in this new era requires
harnessing all of America’s strengths: the force of our diplomacy;
the might of our military; the vigor and competitiveness of our
economy; and the power of our ideals.
We believe that America must lead in the pursuit of our common
goals and shared security. We must confront international
challenges with our partners and with all the tools at our disposal
and address emerging problems before they become security
crises. And to do this we must forge a bipartisan consensus here
at home.
ASP brings together prominent American business leaders,
former members of Congress, retired military flag officers,
and prominent former government officials. ASP conducts
research on a broad range of issues and engages and empowers
the American public by taking its findings directly to them via
events, traditional & new media, meetings, and publications.
We live in a time when the threats to our security are as complex
and diverse as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change,
energy challenges, and our economic wellbeing. Partisan
bickering and age old solutions simply won’t solve our problems.
America – and the world - needs an honest dialogue about
security that is as robust as it is realistic.
ASP exists to promote that dialogue, to forge that consensus, and
to spur constructive action so that America meets the challenges
to its security while seizing the opportunities that abound.

www.americansecurityproject.org

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