Jacaban vs.

People
G.R. No. 184355
March 23, 2015

Facts:
In Cebu City Philippines, on July 15, 1999, the evidence for the prosecution established that P/SInsp. Ipil H. Dueñas
then of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) filed an Application for Search Warrant to search
the premises of Jacaban’s residence at J. Labra St., Guadalupe, Cebu City to seize several firearms of different kinds.
A Search Warrant was then immediately issued to the applicant by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos.

On July 16 1999 at 12:45 AM, SInsp. Dueñas and his team, upon arrival to the appellant’s house, served and
explained the search warrant. The team were accompanied by three barangay tanods from Brgy. Guadalupe as they
did their search. They found that the petitioner had in his possession and control several firearms, magazines loaded
with live ammunition, and several other accessories for firearms without securing the necessary license/ permit from
any competent authority.

The defense of the petitioner presented his sister, Felipenieri as witness. She was present during the conduct of the
search. According to her, the petitioner was not the real owner of the house searched, it was their uncle Gabriel
Arda.

Issues:
Whether or not the RTC decision finding him guilty of the charged crime is premised on its erroneous conclusion
that he is the owner of the house where the unlicensed firearms were found.

Ruling:

The Court was not convinced with the petitioner’s argument that the house where the firearm, ammunitions and
other items were found was not owned by him. If he really were not the owner of the house, he should have
protested the arrest, but he did not protest it at all.

Gabriel Arda, the alleged owner of the house did not testify. He was allegedly suffering from hypertension. The
defense, however, did not file a motion to take his deposition.

The petitioner’s sister, Felipenieri, testified that the owner of the house was not present at the time of the raid.
However, the circumstances showed that he had control of the house as when the PAOCTF served the warrant and
after which conducted the search, he merely observed them and did not protest at all and he did not call for the
alleged owner of the said house.

The Court sentenced the petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for illegal possession of
firearms ranging from six years of correccional in its maximum period, as minimum to six years, eight months and on
day of prision mayor minimum in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
 Navaja vs. De Castro
G.R. No. 182926
June 22, 2015

Facts:
This case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc., represented by Atty.
Edgar Borje, against petitioner Ana Lou Navaja. It was alleged that when petitioner was still its Regional Sales
Manager she falsified a commercial receipt in claiming for reimbursement for the expenses incurred for her meals.
She made it appear that she incurred expenses amounting to P1,810.00 instead of the actual amount of P810.00 at
Garden Café, Jagna Bohol.

Navaja is charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Jagna-Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol.

The RTC denied the petition of Navaja contending that the case for falsification of private document against her was
filed with the MCTC which had no jurisdiction due to the wrong venue. In its ruling it stated the MCTC correctly
pointed out that the issue of improper venue was resolved when the Regional State Prosecutor held that there are
sufficient evidences indicating the falsification took place in Jagna. In a sworn statement by a certain Ms. Cheryl
Lavaro, she narrated that after she issued the receipt to Ms. Navaja, the latter borrowed her pen and, in her
presence, wrote something on the said receipt. The Regional State Prosecutor then concluded that Ms. Lavaro's
statement “describes an apparent scheme or pattern of altering receipts right after issuance. The borrowing of the
cashier's pen and the use thereof must have been intended to create an impression that the receipt was prepared by
the cashier herself.”

Navaja elevated the case to the CA, to which it was dismissed and the RTC’s findings was affirmed.

Issues:
Whether or not CA’s reliance on Lavaro’s statement in upholding the venue of the case is a violation of Section 34,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court was correct.

Ruling:
The Court has held that such evidentiary rule has no bearing in determining the place where the crime was
committed for purposes of filing a criminal information which merely requires the existence of probable cause.

The concept of probable cause for purposes of filing criminal information was aptly expounded in Fenequito vs.
Vergara Jr. Probable case are such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In
determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is
determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry
as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
 ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon
G.R. No. 195956
March 11, 2015

Facts:
Overseas Filipino worker Angelo dela Cruz was kidnapped by Iraqi militants and as a condition for his release, a
demand was made for the withdrawal of Filipino troops in Iraq. After negotiations, he was released by his captors
and was scheduled to return to the country in the afternoon of July 22, 2004. Both GMA-7 Network, Inc. and
petitioner made their respective broadcasts and coverage of the live event.

ABS-CBN "conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival of dela Cruz at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and the subsequent press conference." ABS-CBN allowed Reuters Television Service
(Reuters) to air the footages it had taken earlier under a special embargo agreement.

ABS-CBN alleged that under the special embargo agreement, any of the footages it took would be for the "use of
Reuter’s international subscribers only, . . . no other Philippine subscriber of Reuters would be allowed to use ABS-
CBN footage without the latter’s consent."

GMA-7 to which the respondents Atty. Felipe Gozon, Marissa Flores, Jessica Soho, Grace dela Peña-Reyes, and John
Oliver Manalastas are connected made necessary preparations for its live and non-live news coverage of the arrival
of dela Cruz. GMA-7 being subscribed to CNN and Reuters, received a live video feed of the latter’s coverage of dela
Cruz’s arrival.

GMA-7 unaware of the special embargo agreement between ABS-CBN and Reuters, carried the live news feed of
Reuters in its program “Flash Report,” together with its live broadcast. Apparently, GMA-7 was not aware nor did it
receive any notice that Reuters was airing footages of ABS-CBN.

Petitioner ABS-CBN then filed a criminal complaint against respondent for copyright infringement under Sections 177
and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code.

Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanzo issued a resolution which found probable cause indicting dela Peña-Reys
and Manalastas. Consequently, the Information for violation of the Intellectual Property Code was later filed.

The Court of Appeals later rendered a decision overturning DOJ Secterary Agra’s Resolution and sustaining the
previous DOJ Secretary Gonzalez’s Resolution in that GMA had only aired a five second footage of the disputed live
video that it had received from Reuters and CNN as a subscriber. Also, the respondents had not received any notice
of the right of ownership of ABS-CBN over the footage. As such, the airing of the footage was done in good faith and
thus exculpates them from criminal liability.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondents can invoke the defense of good faith to argue that probable cause exists.
2. Whether or not the CA was correct in overturning Secretary Agra’s finding of probable cause.

Ruling:
(1) The Court Rule that the respondents cannot invoke the defense of good faith to argue that no probable
cause exists.

Infringement under the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum. The Intellectual Property Code is a special
law. The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum prohibitum. “An act which is declared
malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.”

Crimes mala in se pre-suppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to do so, while crimes
mala prohibita do not require knowledge or criminal intent.
Unlike other jurisdictions that require intent for a criminal prosecution of copyright infringement, the Philippines
does not statutorily support good faith as a defense. Other jurisdictions provide in their intellectual property codes
or relevant laws that mens rea (criminal intent), whether express or implied, is an element of criminal copyright
infringement.

The Intellectual Property Code requires strict liability for copyright infringement whether for a civil action or a
criminal prosecution; it does not require mens rea or culpa.

Respondents argue that live broadcast of news requires a different treatment in terms of good faith, intent, and
knowledge to commit infringement. (they cited a case of Columbia Pictures vs CA and Habana et. Al where there was
an obvious copying in literary works from an existing material. GM were merely receiving a live video feed and they
merely aired the CNN and Reuters live video feed which they were authorized to carry in its news broadcast because
they were a subscriber of the companies)

Respondents’ arguments must fail. Respondents are involved and experienced in the broadcasting business. They
knew that there would be consequences in carrying ABS-CBN’s footage in their broadcast. That is why GMA-7
allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon seeing ABS-CBN’s logo and reporter.

To admit a different treatment for broadcasts would mean abandonment of a broadcasting organization’s minimum
rights, including copyright on the broadcast material and the right against unauthorized rebroadcast of copyrighted
material. The nature of broadcast technology is precisely why related or neighboring rights were created and
developed. Carving out an exception for live broadcasts would go against our commitments under relevant
international treaties and agreements, which provide for the same minimum rights.

One does not need to know that he or she is copying a work without consent to violate copyright law. Notice of fact
of the embargo from Reuters or CNN is not material to find probable cause that respondents committed
infringement. Knowledge of infringement is only material when the person is charged of aiding and abetting a
copyright infringement under Section 217 of the Intellectual Property Code.

Thus, unless clearly provided in the law, offenses involving infringement of copyright protections should be
considered malum prohibitum. It is the act of infringement, not the intent, which causes the damage. To require or
assume the need to prove intent defeats the purpose of intellectual property protection.

(2) Petitioners, being corporate officers and/or directors, through whose act, default or omission the
corporation commits a crime, may themselves be individually held answerable for the crime. The existence
of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and
intentionally caused the corporation to commit a crime. Thus, petitioners cannot hide behind the cloak of
the separate corporate personality of the corporation to escape criminal liability. A corporate officer cannot
protect himself
behind a corporation where he is the actual, present and efficient actor.

However, the criminal liability of a corporation’s officers or employees stems from their active participation
in the commission of the wrongful act.

The City Prosecutor found respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas liable due to the nature of their
work and responsibilities.

The Court agrees with the findings of the City Prosecutor as to finding respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and
Manalastas liable. Both respondents committed acts that promoted infringement of ABS-CBN’s footage,
adjudging from the nature of their work and responsibilities.

There is probable cause that respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas directly committed copyright
infringement of ABS-CBN’s news footage to warrant piercing of the corporate veil. They are responsible in
airing the embargoed Angelo dela Cruz footage. They could have prevented the act of infringement had they
been diligent in their functions as Head of News Operations and Program Manager.
There is probable cause that respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas directly committed copyright
infringement of ABS-CBN’s news footage to warrant piercing of the corporate veil. They are responsible in
airing the embargoed Angelo dela Cruz footage. They could have prevented the act of infringement had they
been diligent in their functions as Head of News Operations and Program Manager.

Secretary Agra, however, committed grave abuse of discretion when he ordered the filing of the Information
against all respondents despite the erroneous piercing of the corporate veil. Respondents Gozon, Duavit, Jr.,
Flores, and Soho cannot be held liable for the criminal liability of the corporation.

Mere membership in the Board or being President per se does not mean knowledge, approval, and
participation in the act alleged as criminal. There must be a showing of active participation, not simply a
constructive one.
 Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et. al
G.R. Nos. 212140-41
January 21, 2015

Facts:
NBI and Atty. Baligod filed a Plunder Complaint with the Ombudsman against Sen. Jinggoy Estrada (Estrada).

The following month, another Plunder complaint against Estrada was filed, this time, by the Field
Investigation Office (FIO) of the Ombudsman. Estrada seasonably filed his counter-affidavits in the two
complaints.

Eighteen of Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints likewise filed their counter-affidavits.

Subsequently, Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter qAffidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings.” The Ombudsman denied the said request.

Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s Order denying his Request, Estrada then
went to the SC via a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO enjoining the Ombudsman
and the NBI from conducting further proceedings.

During the pendency of Estrada’s petition before the SC, the Ombudsman furnished him copies (most but
not all) of his co-respondents’ counter-affidavits.

Issues:
Whether or not the requirements of due process under the Ang Tibay case are applicable to preliminary
investigation such as Estrada’s case.

Ruling:
No. It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause, and "probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a
summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his
accusers to establish his innocence." It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a preliminary
investigation has no right to cross-examine the witnesses which the complainant may present.

Simply put, the Ang Tibay guidelines for administrative cases do not apply to preliminary investigations in
criminal cases. The investigating officer, which is the role that the Office of the Ombudsman plays in the
investigation and prosecution of government personnel, will never be the impartial tribunal required in Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in conducting a preliminary
investigation, after conducting its own factfinding investigation, is to determine probable cause for filing an
information, and not to make a final adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties under the law,
which is the purpose of the guidelines in Ang Tibay. The investigating officer investigates, determines
probable cause, and prosecutes the criminal case after filing the corresponding information.

An application of the Ang Tibay guidelines to preliminary investigations will have absurd and disastrous
consequences. x x x x The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the
evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a
prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,”
while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence
which would justify a conviction’.” The determination of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it
was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is merely required is "probability of guilt." To require
the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change the quantum of
evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to
substantial evidence of guilt.

Philippine Deposit Insurance v. Casimiro

Facts:
Petitioner PDIC, through its duly-authorized agents, filed a Joint-Affidavit charging private respondents Cu (as
the 85.99% owner of Bicol Development Bank, Inc. (BDBI), Zate (as Chairman/President of BDBI), and Apelo
(as a former employee of the BankoSentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) who acted as Bank Officer-In-Charge that
examined BDBI’s books and records,of the crimes of Direct Bribery and Corruption of Public Officials, as well
as violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

It was asserted that after the BSP Monetary Board ordered BDBI's closure, PDIC started to perform its
functions as statutory receiver, which includes, among others, the control, management, and administration
of BDBI as well as investigating the causes of BDBI's closure. In the course of the receivership, Gomez — a
former Cashier, Service Officer, and Treasurer of BDBI —came forward and through her affidavit, reported
the purported scheme perpetrated by private respondents that fraudulently concealed BDBI’s true condition
as a banking entity.

Gomez's affidavit outlines such scheme as follows: (a) Apelo would provide Cu an "advance warning" of any
impending surprise bank examinations on BDBI by BSP; (b) upon receipt of the "advance warning," Cu would
then make the necessary steps to misrepresent BDBI's status, such as instructing BDBI employees on how to
cover the possible findings/exceptions of the BSP examiner on the books of BDBI, as well as infusing cash
into BDBI's vault in order to make it appear that the cash listed in the books reflect the actual cash in vault,
and thereafter returning such cash to the source; (c) in exchange for such "advance warnings," Cu and/or
Zate gave Apelo as "professional fees" the aggregate amount of P140,000.00 by depositing the same to the
latter's bank account; and (d) to cover up such amounts given to Apelo, Cu and/or Zate, instructed Gomez to
initially cover the unofficial and unbooked cash disbursements in favor of Apelo by placing such amounts in
BDBI's books as "Other Cash Items," and thereafter, regularize and remove from BDBI 's books such
disbursements by including them in the other accounts of BDBI until they were completely covered. To
support such statements, Gomez provided copies of deposit slips showing that such amount was indeed
deposited to Apelo's bank account. She likewise asserted that in the course of her employment at BDBI, she
does not know of any official or legitimate transactions that BDBI had with Apelo that would warrant the
disbursement of the aforesaid amount in the latter's favor. Cu denied having ordered or instructed Gomez to
make such deposits to Apelo's bank account. He pointed to the lack of evidence to prove that Apelo was
aware or made aware of any alleged bank deposits made to her bank account, thus, negating the charge of
Direct Bribery against her and Corruption of Public Officials against him. For her part, Zate likewise denied
the allegations hurled against her, countering that Gomez's statements should not be relied upon for being
unfounded. Apelo did not file any counter-affidavit despite the Ombudsman's orders.

The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint for lack of probable cause, having found no proof that
Apelo withdrew the amounts deposited in her bank account.

Issues:
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict private
respondents of the crimes charged.

Ruling:
Yes. Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-rounded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is
probably guilty thereof. It does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained constitutes the offense
charged.

Verily, preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an
inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. The presence or absence of the
elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a
full-blown trial on the merits. Hence, "the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation, as well as
the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.”

In view of the grave accusations against them, Cu and Zate resorted to mere denials, while Apelo ignored
the complaint by not filing a counter- affidavit despite due notice, thus, miserably failing to debunk the
charges hurled against them. Indubitably, the foregoing establishes probable cause to believe that private
respondents may have indeed committed such acts constituting the crimes charged against them. As such,
they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial on the merits.
PCGG v. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 194159
October 21, 2015