EDITION Z 1976

THE FLIGHT SAFETY DIGEST OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

 THE OPINIONS EXPRESSED IN THIS ARTICLE ARE
THOSE OF THE AUTHOR AND ARE NOT TO BE
INTERPRETED AS DFS OR CANADIAN FORCES
POl-ICY . WE PRES~NT THIS ARTICLE "FOR THE SAKE
OF ARGUMENT" EDITOR .

~ " ~ ; I ~,',' N ON A RAFT

A short time ago, a helicopter pilot came into my oftice ideal conditions it becomes a challenge which generates ten- the pilot's aviatiun career would he of some help . It certain-
and inforrned me that he had asked to be temporarily removed siun, fatique, and yes, fear, For day-in . day-out exposure I ly wouldn't hurt .
",<
from flying dutics . I was rather shocked by the news since I would classifv. it one of the most demandin g, unfur g ivin g What about our selection processes? I have been assured by
have known this young man for several years and have always roles facin~~ a ('F pilot in peacetime . 1 have had surne expcri- a senior medical officer that our initial aircrew selection pro-
respected his ability and drive. He had considerable experience ence in this rc~le myself, and 1 can guarantee that there is cedures are very good . Basically, they ensure t}tat our aircrew
in the Destroyer borne helicopter programme, and had re- nothing like a night landing to a rolling Destroyer deck for trainee is physically sound, has tlte mechanical skills reyuired,
centl Y been rnade a Crcw Commander. stirring the adrcnalin and tightening the sphincter rnuscle . Yet is aviation motivated, and possesses the level of intellect re-
On pursuing the rnatter further, I found that he had never despite the demands of the rolc, and the freyuency of expo- y uired, without an Yg ross PYs cholo~'cal P roblems, That is a
really been cornfortable f7ying at night from a Destroycr, sure, we have had only two Air Accidents in many thousands good start, but I strongly suspect that we are not as thorough
and had serious doubts as to his ability to land and take-ul'f of Destroyer landings and take-offs, Obviously then, the de- in matching the strengths and weaknesses of the pilot with the
from the ship at night, particularly wh~n there was any deck martds of the role are within the capabilitics uf tuday's CF role he will have to Perform . Ilow do we select who will go to
movement . Despite these doubts and fcars, he had soldiered pilot . 1 do thu~k, however, that we must continually assess high performance aircraft, who will end up in Transports, or
on for nearly eighteen munths hoping that with added exper- and nx~nitur the difticulty of the variety or roles that are Rotary Wing, or Long Range Patrol?
ience he would gain confidence . When this didn't happen, fie assigned tu our aircrew . ~l'here is an increasing tendency to di- Have we progressed to the professional thoroughness in
went to his Commandin g Officer, ex plained his P osition, ancl versify the tasks of our equipment, and operators, ln our ef- this decision process that marks initial selection? I suspect
. asked to be temporarily removed from flying duties . He cr- forts to meet these tasks we must guard against allowing the that we have not . A few years ago I tlew with a young co-
plained that his decision was based on Flight Safety considera- demands uf thc role to exceed our capabilities . It would also pilot who was chronically seasick, to the point where he re-
tions . Qver the years he had rcad many Flight Safety article~ be wisc to monitor exposure rates- as therc is little doubt quired hospitalization . He had known of his problcm before
which in essence said that if you had any personal problem~, that frequent exposure to a dcrnanding task over a period of coming to Maritime Command and had objeeted to his post-
or weren't comfortahle with what you were doing, then you time, will leacl to a build up uf tension, and accumulated ing. 1 understand he is now doing well in another Command .
should stop and ask for help . Our young pilot asked for help, fatigue . Either situation is putcntially disastrous . I know of a Navigator who has a deep fear of water, due to a
because, as he put it, he could visualize the day when he Was the pilut's training adequate'? To this question, 1 near drownin g in 1115 C1uIdI100(l, yet he too was fl Yg in in
would find himself alone in his liferaft, with the rest of the would givc an unqualified affirmative answer . In the past Maritime Command . Surely we can do better than that . If we
crew dead or missin g ilue to his inade y uacy- . I resPect hi~ few `cars thcre has heen great progress in mcasuring the must ensure that a valid testing procedure is estahlished to
decision, and admire his courage in making it . I would hope effectiveness c~f our flying training programs . Course Train- get the right aviator ul the rigltt job . Selection by acadenuc
that cvery pilot would have dte sense to ask for hclp undcr u~g Standards give the Instructor levels of perforrrrance that and flying grades, or by element of service, or age, is just not
sirnilar circumstances . his studcnt must reach hoth in 1'raining Cumrnand, and at
h Encouraging pilots to ask for hclp, however, is not the the Q I~erational Trainin~~;, Unit Level . At the Ot ~era tional
g ood enou Y~ .
In the preceding paragraphs I have attempted to throw
whole story. There are still unanswered questions . Firstly, Level we have imposed Standards C'hecks, Proficiency Checks, some light on some of the areas that could lead a pilot to
wh Y does t}us situation arise in the first I~lace? Secondlv, and Up^rading Chccks . At every level we have established the ntake the decision to stup t7ying. In so doing, I have complete-
-
once it has arisen, what do we do about it? I don't krtc+~~ means of deiining the st,rndard of performance our aircrew ly ignored the possibility that the decision could be the re-
thc answers but I am willing to put forth somc opiniorl~ must meet, ntethods ta ensure that they reach that standard, sult of the stresses and strains of everyday life . There has heen
and suggestions . and periudic tests tu prevent hacksliding . The one thing we so much written on this aspect, that there really is nothing to
llow did we arrive at the situation whcre a pilot has askecl ran't measure is the pilot's cunfidertce in his uwn ability . add, except to admit that these factors may, in fact, have been
tu he relieved of flying duties'? What went wrong? If yuu Ensuring th~t the pilot can perform the required rnanucuvrc, the source of our young pilot's problems . In any case, it is
cunsider this, 1 think that you will corne up with several in the required manner, fnr the recluired number of tirnes may now time to rnove on to the second P art of our p roblent.
other questions rather than an answer . Is ttrc upcrational well satisf_v the examiner that he Ilas rcarhecl the dcsired stan- When the pilot does ask to stop flying, even ternporarily,
role too demanding? Did we ensure that the man had suf- dard, hut it ~~~ill nut necessaril Y ensurc that the student has what do we do about it'? Basicall Y , there are onl Y two cuurses
ficicnt training to perforrn the operational tasks'? Did we re~ched the standard he has ntentally established for himself. uf action, cither we get rid of the pilot, or we get rid of his
select a man with the right physical and rnental makeup in The result cuuld he feelincs of inadec1 uac y~, and fear . Our problems . 1 would submit that too often we take the first
thc tirst place? Perhaps I have oversintpliiied, because we voun
. g hclicu p ter p ilnt is a case ut I ~outt . He I~assed everv test course and get rid of the pilot, The rationalc appears to be that
cuuld give an un q ualified Yes answer to all thcse 9 uestions, alun :; thc wav . and his o I~erational I~erforntance was such tlrat there is no roorn in an aircraft for anyonc who has any yualnts
and still arrive with a disturbed pilot, simply because we can- he was selected fur C'rew CorttrTrander vet throuctx~ut most uf about what he is duing. That I will accept . The "let's get rid
not eliminate all of the stresses and strains of ever Y da Y life, l this p eriod he had serious doubts :tl~ou t h'rs ability
~ . Ho w we of him" school then concludes that having once admitted to
will, however, discuss that aspect later. could ever solve this prublem . 1 dun't know . I would suggest, fear or douhts this pilot can never be trusted again, and we
To start with, is the operational role too dernanding'? In however, that a rnure personalited studentlinstructor relation- must ex pel hirn from die fraternitY . That I cannot acce P t. It
this particular instance I would say no . Landing a ten ton ship rnight be surne help, particularly in identifying t}tis lack is a rather Draconiart measure, somewhat artalgous to amputa-
helicu P ter on a 40 by SO foot movin g p latform is a challen gin~Tr, of conlidence in the first place . Perhaps psychological test- ting your foot tu cure an ingrown toenail . In one fell swoop
task ; at night it becornes very challenging ; and under less than ing during tlte training period, and at rcgular intervals during we waste the hundreds of thousands of dollars it has cost us

flight Commenr, Ed~t~on 2 1976 1

to train this rnan, face the additiunal rost of training l~is re- hide Itirn in some dark ~urner to heal hlnlSelf, we ~:ive him thc
placement, cause him serious financial loss, and prubably do bcst medical trcatment availablc, ;rnd ~~et hirn back into thc air .
irreparable harm to his self-respect . artd lus irnage in the avia- ~ roach to emotional Iiruhlems should he the same . The
Our ~ Ip
tion cummunity . I knaw we all say "I sure admire old Jack for adntinistrative procedures fur handling a pilot who reyuests to
having the eoura~e to quit flying" . when wlrat some uf us stop llying du in~ludc a mcdieal examination, but only as an
reiill Y believe is that old Ja~k eouldn't hack it sa he is some- adjunct to the administrative process . In most cases, the med-
how inadec 1 uate and inferiur, and wc better 6~et rid uf him be- ical exaittutation is performcd by the Fli~hl Surgcon rttember
fure he cemtaminates thc rest ul' us . Mure scriuusly, lhc si~ht uf the Bu ;rrd uf IncI uir Y . Witli all duc rcs 1~cct to thc trainin~~
of uld Jack hcin g shunted off to aviation ohlivion, will ver } ~ and knowledge of our flight surreons, I suhmit that medical
likely result in uther pilots hiding thcir problems rathcr than examination and treatment shc~uld precede and bc separatc
suffer the same fate . from any administrative iiCt1U11, and sltuuld hc carried uut hy by Maj William M. Douglas
Ilappily, lhc numbcr of timcs tltat thc pilot . whc> asks iur a~credited psychulogists and psyehi,ttrists . Onlv if treatntent is
,
help, t,ets the hoot is very small . Ohviously~ thcn,~ somt~ pcuplc
, , not reccnnmended or is nut su~~tssiul . ., ' shuulcl~ wc . ,
 pru~ecd tu 1~tv Grst assignment out of pilot training was back tu the If we don't give a guy a challenge now and then, he will
, ; ,. . ,,  or retro g ress . when what we want is for him to
wauld rather trv to get rid of the prohlem, than ~~et rid of the the :4dministrative actiun rcyuired tu reclassify ur releasc the 'Tw tet as an instruetur pilut . ;1t the time I wasn't sneaky stagnat~
pilot . 1 heartilv endorse this approach, but I don't harticularly patient . ln this way we wuuld cul uur pilut wastagc hy salva~ devious. and ~uld-hearted, so l hird to t,7et a waiver ; but these pro gress and become ex p erienc e d . He did n o t me a n to certify
care fur thc> way,; tt~ is nurntall~
, , donc .l'rtt surc wc can all rc~all ing the curable, and +vould dentunstrate an aphruach to the necessary' traits soon came along, and 1 could join the ranks uf evervone
, to "?00 art dl1 '."
occasions when a pilot has , . ~,one
,- to his Commanding Officer prublem that would encourage the trouhled pilut to come m yl) eer_S . 1 remember with morst t y es. thz tirst time 1 raised Another sure point is t}te tendency for a lot of old heads to
with his flyin~~ problems, ancl shortlv tltere ;~fter he has been furward . the flaps on a studcnt in the round~>ut, therehv winning a coke talk down to a new' guy and keep him in his "rightful place"
c1 uietly. switrhed tu Base 0 p s for a .rest . ln manv- cases tltis ln tlus rather lert~tliy narrative I have tried tu say that when and the coveted . "~~ ee . 5ir
. , rt~ l ouhed I~ust like Y uurs exce P t for until he "earns his spurs ." 1 artt a great believer in tradition ;
a Pp-roach is successful, but 1 wcnrld su ggest that in manv. 4ases a pilot rutncs forward with a request to stop flying, we should the tou~hdow'n'" and as I said earlier, a rnan must show that he is deserving of
it has not solved the problem, and we have ultintately lost thc cundurt a sear~h uf our whole selection and trairting prucess, A i tti. . u a~. . tt w~~tsn ' t lune aftcr 1 p assed m y~ last 1~has e ~~h e~~k his weather category or flight lead status, or whatever . But
. ., ,
patient . Wltut this approaclt does is to remove the nail that and of the upcratiunal rolc itsclf, tirstly to cnsure that wc dId
'l w , .dJ. ~.,crtr f tt,d a S'a full-tled ~ed '~,1t'r Training Contrnandu  some of the old timers around the command remind me of
caused the inlection . hut then le~tve the infection to cure it- > >  ,ancJ lrained the riRht peg for thc right hole . and
scl~ctcd that I Icarn~d most stu dent s ~an ~~ uut stick~and-rudder most a Tarzan movie . 1[t S11Urt, the road to experience and hroad
self . Sometimes it does eure itself, but i ftel that more uften it secundly ta ensure that we haven't macle the hole tuu bil; for 11 s m ~ertai n are ~ a s. . A I rat uf p eu F le w rth 16UU hours in the expertise is fuunded on challenge and the necessary trust t}tat
dOCS n()1 . lt IS nty 01)Inlon th ;lt we 111USt taCe up t0 tlte t ;~Ct the pe~a . Concurr~ntly,
~ ~ we ntust rce,u~nrt.i
, ,- J ' >
that ~ac, ,,trc, taccd
-, .~- "dog whistle" couldn't t7y as guud a "vcrtical 5" or "ehan- alluws t}tis challenge .
that tension, fati~ue, feelittks uf inadeyua~y, and inordinate with ;r medical problcm, and uttempt tu curc it . rathcr than delle" as one of their students . There is another side to tlte coin . 1 knuw of one wing
, , . ,- .as- ntcdt~al
, ~ ,. . ,, tu }tandle this : Unc,,
fear, .uc medical 1_r~lcms,
~ ~~c} and must bc, tr~,rtcd reclassif_vin~~ or rclcasing thc pilot . lf wc fail tu du so, I can There were seseral wavs Y uu tried to where virtually all newies are restricted to white ticket limits .
wc,> will
hrohlerus . When u pilut breaks an ann wc don't lirc ltim . ur turc.scc , , ~tihen
,  thc, day , , find that one man in a raf~t . fake out the studcnt and told hirn that y~ours was still hetter, To nty mind, that's a good rule . I also know one headquarters
and ch ;tnged his hypothesis about your ancestry to a definite type who says, "I have 3000~io?!!! hours, and 1 can busi 300
cunclusion ; or two )~ou F,~ave }tim a few verbal hints on huw and one any ~`~~$'~~(/ tirne ." He is wrong.
tu makc the specific maneuver still better, titen you waited! You show me a newie type who is getting the barc rnini-
For what'' You waited until'19ohile ealled that the runway ~ was Inllttl5, and I'll show you someone who has no business any-
clused ; waited until he w~as faced with something he hadn't where near :30U and une . Lvery time I hear one of these guys
seen or expe~ted . Then . yuu reasscrtcd your superiority . on an ego trip trying tu bull his way around a syuadron, I
Now, what is my lung-winded introduetion leading to? t}tink fondly uf an exarnination for mental incompetence .
Toughts for the Swivel Chair Warrior Louk around! You'll see that more than half of the United
States population is less than _'8 years of age . 7~his statistic EXPERIENCE NOT EVERYTHING
To paraphrase Voltaire, the general statement that ex-
or Assu~rre Yorrr Positio~t repeats itself, in the rated portiun uf our Air Force, and
explains why a lot uf peuple in h'SAFE are not too far removed perience alone yualifies an individual for a specific task is
frurtt ~I raining Curnrnand . Sure, it's going to take more to inherently wrong (the headquarters type mentioned tltinks
THE DEATH knoll has just suunded, or ~u il seems . Y'our ~an relocate un ihe basis uf their d?risiuns . Lven ;t numbcr of confusc thcm than it does a,r l PT student . But, it can happen . Vol ta ire i s a n e le c tr'rc ca r) . A g u y who rs
' filling h'ts sta ff squ a re
,r. t~,u ll n I'cnt t U~r the ne~t _ }e,tr ) ) , .~ . Fu1 h
,
'~J ' .~ i .S to I rlc_t
) F,rl~r~ _ huurs quadrapeds stup and assumc an upright lu~sitiun frum which The bad netivs is that now the utdividual rnay not have sume- I S g Oln g t 0 haVe t o face u p to t he fac,~t t h~at h c c.an ~' t usua' 1 ly
. -~ .`,. .. `
u da~- vut ~an lu~k tu~ ,rrci tu tasnn,~ yuur ssvivcltn` wltcel thcy ~an hcttcr dccidc which was~ to gu . But ~.~iils whcn man une in the cuckpit to help him . satisfy two rnasters . Currenc Y in the U .E . aircraft ma Y be
.- . .., .
~).t,i
a r mtc .rnd uut uf a utcdrlrc,d atxdta . .~y.,~i. ~a~kc.t
 . ., . 71tc
- whule stuod on his hind le~ s was this capability tu relucate . ur tu What can be done'' First, acknowledge that a guy whu is essential to job performance ; but except in rare instances,
i de a rs t,nU ti ,,, h fU Ill~k'~ 'a It1. t ~,, ~ ) t,-i
I t,c r t u rI t i~tt hi 5 s tnl S . Rut it 'S intplzntent dc~~isiuns th ;it wc had rathcr bc in sume ulher through pilut training, UTl`, and phase training is pretty his ahility to yank and bank is going to be somewhat degraded .
,.
rtally nut all lhat bad . First. thc job musl be ne~essary ur yuu plarc, fully' espluited . uniyue . (Jive Itim all the help he needs, and rnake sure he is If he confuses t}us wit}t the flunking of a virility test, he has
,
~;rtl itlak4 d ~1111trlbUtll)Il hy' ~U fr
, ,EJtln  It1 ellml118t11)n . Gaud manat;cntcnt enccrurages ciecisionmakers tu t;et uul un progressin~ . But . if he deserves trust, give hirn yuur trust . Let alre~a d y flu n kcd a maturity test .
Yuu'rc bound to makc a cuntrihutiun if yuu're half the llteir f~eet 1ur a few~ huurs a sveek, realirin ;; from exprric~ncc him be ehallenged! 'vVhat does all this mean? l believe that the evolution from
ti E~~cr thc ;1rmv. thinks .~uu are . Une thin~,. that will hel I ~ vou . at th ;rt this pusitiun is fienefi~:i ;tl tu thc.ir tv'urk, rc~~ardlcss ~tf the neophyte to veteran is based on successfully rtteeting challenge .
.vuur desk is to cunsider .vutn~ hudv:!wsitic~n . I'svchulu ists a~tivrty . POINTS TO REMEMBER
. , lake away the challenge, and yuu slow down or stop the
have i'ound ;i cu~r~l~ t h_ t; t w"cz n hu
t ~,iticn _ c-l~ ~ > c>~. rtiun~and
. . . thourht
v
Lawyera wh~r rnust tu ;tke razur-shurp ~unrlusiuns affecting I knuw a funncr wing cummundcr Inow ;t majur ~,eneral} evulutiun . But, to ~aveat, once a veteran . one is not always a
. ., Ls i n~, . stttmt,
~ ~ ,,and
prc ~c., ss
 ~~ . . ~ 1 li ~~-,
s ~ ~nc 
,r r ~alls t I tr~~ s tand
~ Ines ,md iiupri5iunment plcad thcir cases standing up . ~Vhat whu walkcd intu the ~ummand p ust cm a "weather" da y,~ and proficient veteran . Our younger, less e~cperience pilots are not
re~liruntt . wuul~ vi~u tttink if~ yuur dcfense atturne~ sat duwn to ;rrgue after ascertainin~ that the Wx was at and ex P ected to stay ' at going to develop unless they are given the nt ;rximum freedom
, ~ ;ctsun
. .,
,1 1 is su Pp osrd tu bc mure re~e p tive tu ideas and Ihc la~ls.- .,: }'cuplc with pr~bl~ms gu fur lunr w~lks . llclmsmen t t nums 15' rth `uud ,alt~rnate_,
(,'a l 1 m~Il'I , . , S had
' sume rather purnt~d cunsistent with established directives . It is alsu axiurnatic that
infurmatiun in the sithn rpusitiun . Cuusider . fur e~~m I~le ~ who ntust k~rp lheir ships on ~uur5e reg~rdless uf the wind remarks fur the Uperations people . His puint was this : If a the older heads sumetimes need to be returned to speed before
c1 ;1SS1'()0 r11 Ur trUStees' m'e ,r . r1 per tiU_ r1 IS Su 111(
t t In r I ~S ec1 t 1a ha' Ve ntake tlreir decisiuns on tlrcir feet . Chariut drivers w~ith slashing man has heen certified hy competent authoritv tu be able to their developed and tested skills can be safely used .
mure ~reative ide;rs in the reclining Iwsitiun, a hard Fwsitiun knives on their wheels stood at the reins . If cuckpit si~es and p erfurm to c e r tar
~ ~n s tanderds
~ ~ . then let him. His ancillar~
. , ,p, umt
. :
tu achieve at a desk, thuugh surue seem to matrage . ~I'he last Air Scoo~
restraint mechanisrns ever permit . w~e mav find aviators tl_ti
P osition is thc une wc arc most cuncerncd with Ior vuu . as a better ii thev are less f~~lded uver .
decisiunrnak~r . Tltis is the standing pusition . The shrinks tell In sumntarv, . when vuu
. tind .yuurself assi k~ned tu ;c ~esk 1 uh,
us de~isions ;rre easiest tu make un your feet . rememher the I~usitions rnc~st ~unducive tu vour . wurk, Stand
The evolution uf this I ~rucess can be seen ;rs a currelation tu up' Get off yuur swivel!'~1ake hetter dccisiuns'
evulution itself . Aniruals are the un11 rlass uf Iivin:l tlting~ tltat L~'.S. Army Ar'i~tiru Drs~est

~i Flighr Comment, Edition 2 1976

 1
r

their thing autumatically at lower altitudes. But waiting can be chest. Obviously, the crew of a stricken bird should do every-
very suspenseful, especially while you are plummeting towards thing pussible to slow it down to the 400-knot range befure
a surface obscured by darkrtess or clouds . punching out .
_ This shouldn't pose a problern in most cases. Ejection
What Happens! experience has shown that when an emergency occurred at
J3
Huw long dues it take to free fall from 40,000 to 15,000 high speed or high altitudc, there was usually time to slow the
feet? You can figure about 120 seconds. So, if you can aircraft down appreciably, or descend to a lower altitude
remember tu hack your watch before you pull the handle, and before ejecting . Should there not be sufficient time, ejection
can read the luminous dial on the way duwn, yuu can put is the unly alternative for survival, and the choice is already
away your anxiety. Even withuut the watch, you have little made . More than one person has gone out above 600 knots
chance of passing that preset barometric aneruid setting without serious injury .
withuut knowing it . f ts reliability is arnazingly high, and odds There has not been a suigle ejection fatality in the USAF
of its working exceed those for arriving alive on a drive from definitely attributable to parachute opening shock . The
your house to the ncighborhood bratwurst stand. relatively few high-speed, high-altitude ejection fatalities that
Can you expect to be aware of what's happening after you have been recorded were attributable to either severe flailing
pull the handle? Probably, but much depends un seat stability. and/or ram air pressure which occurs before parachute opening.
P Crew members have survived ejections in open seats from as Even in these cases, extensivc chute damage has been
., :' . .=~~~ high as 78,000 feet (in pressure suits) . However, between remarkably luw .
~O,UUO and 50,000 feet the probability of initial pitching or
c~ tumbling is yuite high ; and at 40,000 feet, the tumbling rate, What Do You Do!
which is double that at sea level cart P roduce ne gative artd The threshold value for lethal injury resulting from ram
positive G-furces . air pressure is approximately 8.S psi, which is equivalent to
Wltile yuu can expect only low seat-spinning rates to an IAS af approximately 600 knots. Lethal injuries from
develop at lower altitudes due to the shorier equipment flailing could occur at slightly slower speeds . In the event of an
operating times, high-spin rates above 40,000 feet have pro- ejection at high speed, the forward velocity of the seat-man
iluced seriuus disorientatiun, visiun blurring, and nausea mass will decelerate frum ?S tu SO percent during the first
during past csc;apes. Flat spins may develop at high altitudes, one or twu secunds after separation from the aircraft . Thus,
causing the seat to rotate in a h~rizontal plane, with or with- the chute will deploy near or within its structural limitations
out an attached drogue . Pendulum effect is also a possibility as well as within man's physiolagical tolerances.
during extended descent pcriods, and may be aggravated by So what do you do when faced with a dire emergency at
abnurn~lal budy movements . high speed and high altitude? If possible, get beluw S00 knots
and 40,UU0 feet before punching uut. lf that is not possible,
Know the System
get below 600 knots at altitudes up to 45,000 feet . Assuming
5u, while a persun ejecting at low altitude can expect a
that you have emergency oxygen, and the system will work as
rapid onset and short duration of unstable movernent, hlgh-
desrgned, altttude rs less crrttcal up to 45,000 or SO,OUO feet
altitude ejections will produce more severe movements -
than ram arr pressure at speeds in excess uf SSO to 600 knots
-- particularly those of a disorienting nature .
IAS .
Post-ejection seat movement should nut be cause for Above all, know your equipment. Take the bird down to
alarm, providing tlte crew membcr has a working knowledge
reasonable escape parameters at the first indication of trouble,
uf the seat system . But attemptrng to mfluence seat stability
then allow your cxpert knowledge and the eyutpment get yuu
they need to know what they wrll face tf they punch uut by waving the arms during (lescent, or overriding automatic
safcly uut of a culd place .
immediately,and should be able tu weight theirchancesagainst seat se P aration devices to g o manual ~ ex p ect where TO's
staYg
in with the bird des P ite its difficulties . recummend it), will probably worsen the situation .
The most startling finding is the number of extremely high
lf you fly supersunic at very high altitudes and haven't Unless there are commanding reasons for other actions,
speed (combat) ejections . Of those cases in which speed at
wondered what you would do if the bird became uninhabitable Don't Freeze to Death the escape equipment should be given a chance to complete
tlme of e~ection was known or reported, almost one-half
in a huny, then you are a very trustutg aviator, indeed! On the We know that man needs heat and uxygen to survive, artd its nurmal operating sequence, and crew members should
occurred at speeds above 450 knots indicated . There were 18
other hand, considerable pondering may not have provided that there is P recious little of eitlter above 3U 000 feet . Tltis is not allow gyratiuns tu lead them into precipitate actions.
between 450-499 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS) with four
you with any satisfactory solutiuns, and you may have taken a good rcasun tu dress warttrly and wear fligltt gloves despite
The Effects of Speed major injuries, one of which was attributed to windblastl
refuge in the thuught that it just can't happen . sweltering ground temperatures, and to preflight the emergency
flailing ; 44 were initiated at between 500 and 599 KIAS .
The problem is that it can. I remember sweltering on a oxygen supply . There is also very little air pressure at high Ejecting at SOU knats wnuld be like stepping out into the
There were 20 major injuries in this group, with seven being
summer afternoon while watching the sky far the appearance altitudes, and ejection above 45,000 to 50,000 feet without a granddaddy of all hurricanes, with winds four tirnes greater
related to windblastlflailing ; finally, there were nine ejections
of a parachute. Its wearer had ejected following a collisiun p ressure suit ex P oses the crew member to decom p ression, with and dynamic forces 16 times larger than a Florida headliner.
in excess of 600 KIAS . Four of six major injuries in these cases
well above 35,000 feet, the chute had deployed almost irn- the possibility that the bluod will boil - with fatal results. A few Kansas tornadoes have lifted buxcars off thc rails. At
were due to the effects of windblast . Thus, of 71 total ejections
mediately, and he descended for many minutes before we saw But assurning that the crew mernber clears the aircraft S00 knots, the same boxcar could pull five G's.
You would hardly believe that the human form could at speeds above 450 knots indicated, 30 crewmen received
hirn silhouetted against the sky in his summer flight suit . And intact, he still faces the prospect uf either a long free fall or
major injuries, and only 12 were directly attributable to high
that hurt, because while we stuod in 100-degree temperatures, an extended descent under a deployed chute . The latter is by survive exposure to such forces . But that's not the case at all .
Man has been thrown into airstreams uf S00 knuts or higher Q-forces . Noncombat experience has consistently shown a
it was 1SS degrees colder where his parachute ridc had begun, far the more hazardous since the emergency uxygen supply
mure than 100 tunes and stayed tugethcr arnazingly well . very limited exposure in the higher speed ranges . For example,
and the cold almost took his life . lasts unly 8 to 10 minutes (In the F-4 systern the emergency
Generally, any airstream of 40U knots or better is capable in a recent three-year study of 325 noncombat ejections, only
Cunsider the plight of the crew flying a full-profile func- oxygen stays with the seat, and is lost all together .), while
seven were initiated at speeds of 450 knots indicated, with one
tional check flight in an F-4 . They siart at 38,000 or 40,000 p arachute descent from 4S,UUU feet tu 1S ,000 feet can take as of bruising the skin, arrd at higher speeds it can ~ut or tear .
related injury . The combat experience quite dramatically
feet to Mach 2 . Then they zuom to 4S,UUU feet tu check burner much as 24 minutes. In addition, the period of time with chill When sP eeds exceed S00 knots ~ the flailin g of arms and le gs
illustrates the effectiveness of open ejection seats at high
relight and pressurization . If the bird starts tu fall apart as the factor tem peratures below -2S de Rrees, even u~ surTUner at can cause major injuries and fatalities . (Leg restraints and
speed .
Mach nears the lg~e , or if a bad fire develo P s, what do the Y du'? medium latitudes, would be at least 2U minutes - arnple time education on body position have reduced these injuries during Aerosfiace Safety
They need to slow the aircraft down - if it's possible . They for frostbite on exposed flesh, ur death by freezing. recent years.) Above 600 knots the airstream pressure exeeds ()ur thanks to !lfichacl (~r~si, 1lartin-Baker Field Representative for
need to lctse a great deal of altitudc - if they can . Certainlv This shuuld bc rcason enuu to let the seat and chute do 1,2U0 pounds per square fout, and is capable uf caving in the s~~mc of the iufurmatiun in this articlc .

4 Flight Commenl, Ed~tion 2 1976 5

 The Bends KNOW YOUR POSITION
by Maj Charles L, Pocock Jr.
by LCoI R.W. Fassold Directorate of Aerospace Safety

One tends to assuciate tfte bends with diving aetivities . but shortly after the descent . Occasionally . a residual weakrte~s ur ® My first day under the hood of a T-6 wasn't particularly brakes, completing the landing without even catching a wing
aircrew, as well as divers can be bent (besides at the bar) . Re- soreness may persist for a day or so (like a mild sprain or satisfying, I remember very little about the experience except tip. This was a fortuitous coincidence of aircraft and runway
cent PYh siolo g ical incidents and subse 9 uent discussions with bruise). The bends, ut itsclf, is not an immediately hazardous that afterwards 1 felt very inadequate . During the debriefing, pusitioning that would befuddle the odds makers .
aircrew suggest a review of this topic is warranted . Iligh condition, bt~t it intlicates you are suffering frorn dccum- huwcver, my instructor told me something I will never forget . ® A bet no odds maker would touch is one on the pilot
altitude or aviatur's bcnds is une form vf clecnntprc~ssiort pressiun sickness, are set up for sornething rnore serivus, and "Instrument flying is a lot like getting along in the Air Force who doesn't respect MEAs, MOCAs, minimum sector altitudes.
sickrtess and this can he a seriuus hazard for svme vf uur Cl~ shuuld get tv a lower altitude as soun ati possihle . and lifc . Attitude and position are everything . Your attitude Keep in mind that in a non-radar environment the pilot is
tlying fraternity . The term clrnkec is used to describe the second rnust must be positive and under contrul and you must be solely responsible for terrain avoidance. Many of us have flown
Decompression sickness is a disturbance in the bvdy re- common manifestation uf decompressivn sickness a ~undition absolutely certain of your position before moving ahead to and trained in a radar environment so long that we mistakenly
sulting from the pressure differential between surrounding which can rcsult if bubbles ludge in lftc small bluud vessels uf another ." use the same procedures when suddenly presented with a
barometric pressure and that of the gases dissulvetl in thc budy the lungs . The symptoms are a tightness ur discomforl decp ® Aircraft instrument develo P ments over the past 20 Years non-radar situation . ln a non-radar environment there are only
tissues and fluids, includinK the blvud . Wlren the pressure in the centre vf the cltest, a dry cough and difticulty in hreath- have made attitude control accidents ver Y rare . CY ros don't three times a pilot may descend below published MEA,
surrotutding the budy is reduced sufficiently and rapid envugh, ing, with a scrts~ uf suffucatiun and ~l ~ ~ Ereh~n
i ~ s'un
r . T hls ~an he tumble now, stand-by gauges are installed, electrical systems MOCA, or minimum sector altitudes, regardless of the
body gases (principally nitrugen, o~ygen, carbun dioxide and an extrcmcly dangcruus conditiun becausc nut unly can have becotne redundant , failure warnin g sy stem s have been clearance received : (1 ) When You are VMC and can remain
watcr vapour) come uut of svlutivn and forrn tiny bubbles . hypoxia develop quickly, hut the respiratury and cardiuvas- added, and so un, and sa un . Positivn accidents, on the other VMC until landing, (2) after station passage and established un
~hhese bubbles, either directly, can reduce or stup lhe nurntal cular impairment can li'ad tv cvmplete collapse . If yvu suffer hand, continue tv occur with agonizing regularity . Aircraft the P ublished outbound course ,() 3 when established in a
blood rirculation and, therefvre, the function uf~ thc arca t}te chukes , an itttrtrediatc enlert;enc y descent and landint,; fur position can be thought of in four simultaneous relationships published holding pattern . Pilots who didn't follow these three
invulved . Eaactly what happens depends un a multitude of medical attentivn is essential . to a point over the ground : Longitudinal, lateral, vertical and rules have scattered airplanes over the landscape of the entire
factors, including the size uf tlre bubbles and where they 1 he other two less common manifestations uf high altitude time, The use vf all available navigatiun aids to accurately world .
IodRe . Due t v c~e rtaln
' c,~h,ar~t~tt-ustr~s
. . , ~' ' - of l~ ttbb lr-s
~ ,rnd
, w herc, thc,y
, decumpressiun sickness, central nen~ous sr~stern sl~ntptnrrts and deterrnine the aircraft's pusition is cssential to long life and a A DC-8 pilot received a clearance, "cleared for an
they are difficult tu redissolve, unless the surruundint; pres- skin distr~rhatrces, are usuall Y , (hut not necessarilvl, successful career . approach", and started descending to the initial approach
. I ~receded
sure is increascd to at least the pressure that existed befvre by the hends or chukes and are serious cvnditiuns . It should ® Thc most humhle person I ever heard of was the airline altitude . The IAFA was several thousand feet below the MEA
they develuped . Pressure dif~ferentials are rarely great enou ;~h be firirly obvivus that if bubbles rcach thc ~etrtral nervcrus pilot who mistakenly landed his 707 on a 3500 foot private and the minimum sector altitude, and the aircraft was several
to cause decom p_ressiun sickness below an altitude of _'S .000 system (brain au~ spinal curd), the results may he pretty strip near Columbus, Ohio . After the passengers had been miles out, The last item on the cockpit voice recorder was the
feet, althuug}t cases liiive uccurrcd as low as 1 ~,000 feet . wcird and frightening if not fatal . Furtunately, this rarely transpvrted tu their destination by bus, he personally co-pilot stating, "according to the radar altimeter we're 400
There is an impurtant ekccption tv this rule : fnllowing scuba uccurs in high altitude decompressiun sickness but when it apulogized to each for the inconvenience he had caused them . feet above something" .
diving (cven tu unly ?0 feet or so), decvmpressiun sickness does, the list of Iwssible effects is lung and cumplicated . Humble but cuurageous . ® A heavy jet transport was descending for approach . At
can occur at altitudes as low as S,OOU feet e .g . in prcssurir.ed These include visual defects, vertigu or dizziness, cunfusiun, ® I was talking to the fire chief at Cltu Lai shortly after a 24,000 feet and about 4'f~ minutes out he received a clearance
aircraft ar driving up a rnvuntain! luss of courdinatian, numbness or tingling of the ~xtremities, cvntract carrier captain landed his DC-8 on the 3000 foot strip to descend to 18,000 feet, which was the initial a PP roach fix
Four manifestations of decompression sickness are cont- paralysis and unconsciuusness . Th~ picture is cvnrplicuted at Marhle Muuntain instead of the 10,000 fuot runway at Da altitude . Two and a half minutes later the aircraft crashed into
monly dcscribed : hy many uf these symptoms being sinrilar tu thuse fuund Nang . The chief said : "That man was a pretty poor navigator, a 20,000 foot mountain at the 18,600 foot level. The
with hypozia and / or hypcrvcntilation, and they usually but une hell of a pilot" . Bvth of these pilots were lucky to be mininwm sector altitude was 24,100 feet and the MOCA was
(1) hends
are tentpurary and disappcar on descent . l'nfurtunatcly, alivc, but, being "a hell of a pilot" is little consolation if you 24,000 feet, Unless you are on radar vectors, a clearance to
( ~) chokes there is a risk of the condition prugressing to uncunsciuusness can't hosiiion the aircraft at thc right runway . descend does not mean you will be clear of terrain .
(3) central nervvus system symptoms before a controlled deseent ~an be II111Gliccl . © There are two C-141 crews whu are lucky tu bc alive, "Che ck y our watch o r make seven-hundred-twenty
(4) skin disturbances Skin disturban~es can he deceptively innu~ent in that because they knew Ihcir pusition relative to an airport and degree turn to right" was my clearance when I incorrectly
they may indicate wide disscmination of thc huhhles and were ablc to position their disitbled aircraft over the runway reported my position and time at M1H0 radio . I had glanced at
B y far thc rnust curnntun manifcslatiun uf hi 1 r altitudc the imrttincnt risk uf something mcrre dangeruus h,rpheninf; . bel'ore it touched down . The first was on a forrnation training the clock and the minute hand was clearly pointing at four,
decompression sickness is tlte bE~ncls, a term used Whetr bubble The svm
. P tums are usuall Y an itch y~, I ~ricklinrr, and!ur I rainfu) mission when the thrust revcrsers dcployed on three engines. but I had a mental short circuit and erroneously reported
formatiun pruduces pain in the juints, bones ur muscles, ~fhis rash which bc~~ins suddenl y ~ut
~ d sn m~times is .tc~ rnl anr~d by All efforts to close them were futile . With one engine shut MIHO at "Two Five" . The alert FSS operator immediately
pain is usually describcd as bcing steady, ~ccp, dull . boring hut ur cold tlashes . The curnmonest lucatiun is thc skin of duwn, two in revcrse idle, and one at TRT p lus, the P ilot was challenged the 5 minute error to maintain airway separation .
ur aching and, in fact, is uften similar to that suf~f~ered by the abdomen, chest ur thighs . (There can be a rash ur rnuttling able tv maintain just better than stall speed with a 6000 foot Now, l try to "Check my watch" closer .
mattv. of us followin ¬~ a TABT~ sllvt, The usual lucation is vf the skin which is either not uncomfortable, or unlv ten~er per minute rate of descent . As the aircraft came out of the The crew of a C-124 obviously didn't "Checkee their
somewhere in ihe arms vr legs, particularly the knees or t0 tUUllr ). y 10,000 f~oot overcast, the pilot put the gear down and flaps at watch" when they impacted the jungle, wings level, 22 miles
shoulders . The pain eiften is mild, starts ~radually and is rnvre We must nute a tinal . uncununun, but rnust dangeruus APPROACH . A minute and one-half later, with a tremendous and mure than 5 mintrtes past tlte rnissed approach point.
annuying and distracting than incapacitating . Surnetimes, uutcvme of~ deeumprcssion sickr~es~ a ~umpletc cullapse, fl~ar e , t l te arrcraft
' was safely on the ground at Baker, Oregon, They were apparently concentrating so hard on tracking
however, it ntay appear suddenly anc] be severe, causing a luss This is usually prcecdcd by one of ihc ~unditiuns we have Municipal Airport . outbound from the NDB and looking outside for the runway
of nurmal function uf thc juint . What happens ncat witlr described, but the caich is, in svme of these cases, it ~an ® In tlte other case, the aircraft was on downwind for a in the night fog that they lost track of the missed approach
bends is very variable . lf the altitude is ntaintained (or irr- uccur at gruund level rnanv huurs after all syntptun~s uf thc VFR approach to Addis Ababa lAP when a hard uver ailerun point.
creased) the pain rentains, gcts worsc ur, rarcly . cascs or gucs initial conditiun have disa I > 1 >eareci . It I r~as lccn
~~ ~ knu w n tu curtdition materialized . The pilvts fought the rall with aileron ADIZ and ATC violations for being off track are
away completely . However, this easing or disappearance uf the happcn suddenly ,rt ~rltitude t,'itftuut crrt,r rraraing, hut this and rudder . The airplane cumpleted 180 degrces of turn and unpleasant enough : but a track violation by mother earth can
symptoms dues nut indicatc disappcaranec of the hubbles, nor is extremel Y rare . was sliding out of the sky with nearly 90 degrees of bank . As a rwn your whole life . From the Spad tv the F-1 l l, pilots have
reduce the risk uf recurrcnce af the pain ar the later develop- What detcntrincs whctlrcr ur not an individual will suffer last resort the pilot iirewalled the low engines and idled the tried to argue with mountains. None have won and few have
rrrent of a mure serivus furm of de~om p ression s~ic~kl t ess . lf ct> >e decumpression sickness'.' Well, of wurse, the altitude is the ltigh cngines . The airplane grudgingly responded and as it came survived to claim second best . Position may not be everything
deseends immediately, however, (causing compression uf the rnost impurtant single factor . Alt11UU,r;h there is somc in- to a wings level pvsitivn, touched down 3000 feet down the but it sure beats being out of position .
hubbles), bends symptums will usually disappear c]uring ur dividual variation in susceptibility, cveryunc will succumb if runway . The pilot, deployed the spoilers and jumped on the Aerospace Safe~y
cont'd on page 17
6 Flight Comment, Edition 2 1976 7
 CPL E . ~1[LVILLE CPL 13 .5. C:1~IPBELL
During inspection of the engine intake area of a Cpl Campbell was assigned line duties and had just

~ SFrow J
Cpl W .C . Harker
fi._:.
MC'pl H .J . Clark
~ ..r.-a
Cpl B .F . Buote
CC130 Hercules during a primary inspection, Cpl Mel-
ville noticed a portion of the wire hinge that secures
the torquemeter shroud panel protruding from its
normal position . The relatively small area and upward
completed a "B" check on a Tutor. While waiting for
the next aircraft to be parked, he went beyond the
"B" check requirements and did a thorough check of
the aircraft . In doing so, structural abnormality was
CPL C.C . COX curvature of the intake makes it an extremely diffi- found in the tail pipe . Further investigation revealed
cult area to inspect, but Cpl Melville expanded his in- a four inch crack in one of the tail pipe flanges .
While carrying out a turnaround inspection on a vestigation and discovered that 95% of the left-hand Cpl Campbell's keen observation and his diligence
CF104 Cpl Cox noticed what appeared to be a crack side and 50°~° of the right side hinges were worn in going beyond the requirements of the check, avert-
located on the nose strut cylinder at the attachment through to the point of being noneffective . Contin- ed a possible aft section fire .
point for the drag strut . Closer examination convinc- ued operations of the engine would have resulted in
ed him that it was a crack so he informed his super- CPL J.44 .1 . LESSARD
the panel coming loose and possible ingestion of the
visor . NDT personnel were called in and they hard-wire hinge with catastrophic destruction of the During towing operations of a CF101 Cpl Lessard
positively confirmed the crack . Had this aircraft been i/ ~ engine . heard an unusual squeaky noise coming from the
flown with this crack it is most probable that the gear WO S .E . Johnson Cpl C .C . Cox Cpl J .A .P . Parent His awareness and thoroughness was instrumental aircraft . He had the towing stopped and tried to
would have collapsed on take-off or landing causing in averting a possible in-flight engine failure and isolate the area of the unusual noise . After repeated
serious damage to the aircraft or injury to the pilot . brought to light an unsuspected trouble spot. starts and stops the noise was located in the nose
The following day while doing a turnaround on CPL W.C. H4RKER wheel area. The nose wheel was removed and it was
another aircraft he again found what he thought to While returning to the servicing blister after com- CAPT R .G . KIGH'~LEY discovered that the bearings were dry and on the
be a crack on the main landing gear . This time NDT pleting "A" checks on the flight line, Cpl Harker dis- While conducting an ASW mission twenty miles point of seizing .
personnel determined that it was not a crack but a covered a spring lying on the tarmac . The spring was from the ship, the number two engine failed . Check It is this form of conscientiousness and extra
scratch or casting flaw. identified as part of the Tutor aircraft nosewheel list procedures were followed and as the aircraft effort that prevents accidents and saves costly repairs .
These two instances of very close and meticulous steering mechanism that prevents the nosewheel from closed the ship, stores were jettisoned, fuel was PTE E. DECLARA
inspection by Cpl Cox are indicative of the profes- engaging while using rudder . dumped and emergency gear was made ready in the While performing a routine start on a visiting
sional manner in which he carries out his work . All aircraft on the flight line were visually checked event the aircraft had to ditch . The ship reported CF133 aircraft Pte DeClara noticed that the solo
serviceable and airborne aircraft were alerted of a pos- 60 knots of relative wind with slight deck motion . pilot had neglected to remove the rear canopy safety
CPL B.F . BU07 E sible steering malfunction on landing . A power check revealed that a minimum of 37 Kts pin before strapping in . He removed the pin and gave
While no abnormalities resulted when the aircraft could be maintained with 100°~~ torque on the num-
While carrying out a daily inspection on a J79 en- it to the pilot . Were it not for Pte DeClara's alert
with the problem landed, the alertness and initiative ber one engine . Because of the small power reserve, removal of the pin, efforts by the pilot to eject the
gine installed in CF104 aircraft number 714, Cpl
displayed by Cpl Harker prevented a possible acci- Capt Kightley elected to execute a no hover free canopy during an in-flight emergency would have
Buote noticed a small damp spot on the aircraft main
dent. deck landing with the beartrap removed from the failed .
fuel line where it is welded to another line. This weld flight deck . Capt Kightley flew a picture perfect Pte DeClara's alert attention to duty and know-
is in a difficult place to see, which makes the finding
w0 S.E . JOHNSON single engine approach to touchdown-a feat that ledge of visiting transient aircraft could have pre-
of this damp spot the result of a thorouyh inspection . has only been done once before in the history of vented serious injury or perhaps loss of a pilot had a
In order to determine if it was a major unservice- "WO Johnson was a member of the fire fightiny
helicopter/destroyer operations . bailout situation occurred .
ability Cpl Buote applied power to the aircraft and team which responded to a 'hot-brakes' situation on a
Capt Kightley displayed a high degree of pro-
operated the fuel booster pumps then returned to CF101 Voodoo . During the cooling off period, WO
'1iCPL J .L . MCCORI4ACK
fessionalism and skill in returning a valuable air-
investigate the damp spot and found a steady flow Johnson noticed a scrape on the right oleo leg and
craft frorn a very hazardous situation, MCpI McCormack, an airframe technician, was
of fuel from this area, Closer examination of the sub- pointed it out to the Aircraft Servicing Officer . In-
conducting a periodic ins~ection of the Labrador
ject line revealed that it was cracked at the weld . Had vestigation revealed that the oleo retraction linkaye
helicopter rescue boom . During this rnspectron which
this fuel leak not been found, it could have developed bolt had been installed improperly causing the nut
was being done with a tilted mirror and a flashlight
into a serious fire hazard . and the end of the bolt to rub on the oleo leg, If the
through a small hole in the aircraft flooring, he found
The thorough manner in which Cpl Buote invest- situation had gone undetected it could have resulted
what looked like a scratch on the underside of the
igated this Flight Safety Hazard is indicative of the in a serious undercarriage problem. WO Johnson is to
pivot tube support assembly .
professional approach which he continually exhibits be commended for his alertness and sense of responsi-
Further inspection with the aircraft floor boards
in carrying out his various duties and assignments . bility ."
removed revealed one crack 7'/~ inches long and
another one inch long in a radial direction around
Cpl E . Melvrlle Cpl B .S . Camphell
CPL J .A .P. PARENT 'NCPL HJ . CLARK Pte E. DeClara the pivot support . Nondestructive testing confirmed
During an exercise Cpl Parent was detailed to ass~st While carrying out an "A" check in the CH136 the cracks with an edd y curre n t test . Le f t undetected,
Cpl MCpI Capt these cracks would have eventually caused the rescue
the Voodoo Servicing Section . In the course of a "B" Kiowa helicopter MCpI Clark discovered two small
J .!11 .J . Les~ard J .L . McCormack IZ .G . KiglttlcV boom to fracture, very likely causing an in-flight
inspection he observed the second row of compressor cracks in ihe skid tube saddle assemblies . The cracks
blades of the right engine to be damaged . As this was were located on the inside lower portion of the as~ emergency with serious injury or death to a para-
not his trade and the damage difficult to determine in sembly and were covered by a light coating of mud . rescue specialist .
the second compressor stage, he immediately advised He took extra time and wiped off this area findiny ~IICpI McCormack is to be commended for his
an AE Tech who confirmed his findings. the cracks . alertness and thoroughness of inspection in pre-
No doubt Cpl Parent's alertness and extra effort in The extra attention to detail by MCpI Clark during venting a potentially serious incident . His action
the performance of his duties prevented an airborne a routine check undoubtably saved the aircraft from exem~~lifies the contributions made to flight safety
emergency and saved costly repairs of the engine . further damage . by conscientious technicians .

8 9
 CPL S. ROBERT$
CAPT D.J . LEON,4RD gasket, Had this aircraft been allowed to fly an
Capt Leonard was conducting a low level training While inspecting the starboard aileron during a airframe overheat surely would have been indicat-
mission in a CF104 aircraft when the "Oil Level primary inspection on CP107 Argus aircraft 10713, ed thus aborting a mission and possibly affecting
Low" light illuminated on the Annunciator Panel . He Cpl Roberts found a little play in the ~ 1 aileron the safety of the crew .
immediately retarded the throttle to 88°/o to ensure rudder interconnect tab . Further investigation of the
maximum engine life, activated the Emergency Noz- tab push pull rod indicated some play in the tab end CAPT J .C. PARKER
zle Closure System, and selected the Oil Level Switch MCpI BJ . Short Capt D.J . Leonard and the connecting bolt . Not being satisfied that this Capt Parker was the instructor pilot in a Tracker
to low . The "Oil Level Low" light remained on which was the fault, Cpl Roberts removed the access panels aircraft returning from a navigation training exercise .
indicated that there would be a severe loss of engine to the aileron gear box and found the push pull rod Approximately twenty miles from Base both pilots
oil . Capt Leonard quickly dialed in Munich Radar on from t he gea r box to the tab bellcrank had loose heard a loud explosion from the port engine area, The
tf~e UHF and advised them of his intention to carry rivets and elongated rivet holes in the eye end of the engine instruments showed that the oil pressure had
out an immediate landing at Erding, the nearest push rod. Cpl Roberts reported the situation to his immediately dropped to zero and the port tacometer
military airport . After being advised that Erding was superiors and proceeded to rectify the problem . Cpl needle was indicating zero RPM ; however, the pro-
closed he requested vectors for a straight-in pre- Roberts displayed an exceptional degree of alertness peller was rotating . Capt Parker immediately feather-
cautionary approach at Munich . By this time the oil and skill in what seemed to be insignificant play in ed the port engine, but the propeller refused to
pressure was fluctuating 10 psi and he could smell the tab control system . feather although the ammeter readings confirmed
fumes in the cockpit. While inspecting the flaps on Argus 10742 during operation of the feather pump . An emergency was
Capt Leonard conducted a successful approach at a primary inspection, Cpl Roberts noticed corrosior~ declared and shortly thereafter, with the port prop
Munich using 88% power . After touchdown the oil forming on the attachment end of the flap asym- still windmilling and the aircraft undergoing moderate
pressure was observed at zero . The entire emergency metric switch cable . Further investigation by Cpl vibrations from the dead engine, Capt Parker carried
had lasted approximately three minutes from first Capt V.L . Olsen Cpl G.J . Aube Roberts revealed that corrosion had caused seizure out a successful single engine landing at Shearwater .
indication to successful landing . MCpI R.H . Hartwell of the end of the attachment cable to the flap attach- Subsequent investigation revealed that the engine
Capt Leonard's immediate response to this critical ment bolt, preventing it from rotating during flap had undergone a catastrophic failure that had caused
emergency prevented the loss of a valuable operation- movement which caused the end to break at the turn- almost immediate seizure while the prop continued to
al resource . He is commended for his high standard of dled this potential air accident in a highly profession- buckle , The lockwire used to safety the attachment rotate, shearing bolts in the engine and on the pro-
professionalism . al manner . to the turnbuckle barrel was all that held the attach- peller mounting, possibly even damaging the engine
ment end to the operating cable . Had this condition mounts themselves .
CPL G.J . AUQE
CAPT V .L. OLSEN gone undetected, it most certainly would have re- Faced with an emergency situation not covered in
MCPL R .H . HARTWELL While Cpl Aube was working on the wing of one sulted in a serious air incident . either his AOI or emergency checklist, Capt Parker
On Sunday, 12 October 1975, Moose Jaw ATC was aircraft he noticed the vent mast of the adjacent reacted cooly and skillfully, and as a result was able
CF101 to be slightly off of it's proper position . A CPL J .R . BRIAND
alerted by Regina Control that the pilot of a Stinson to recover the aircraft without further damage . The
on a VFR flight to Regina was trapped above an over- closer investigation revealed that 3 of the 4 attach- While carrying out a daily inspection check on high standard of professionalism he displayed is a fine
cast cloud layer 2,000 feet thick based at 1500 feet ment points of the vent mast were broken and on aircraft 114156, Cpl Braind noticed what appeared example to his student and fellow Tracker pilots .
AGL . The pilot estimated that he would arrive at physically checking other aircraft in the hangar he to be a ruptured gasket on the left side of the en-
found several others to be loose. Based on his ob- gine combustion chamber inspection panel . CPL J .G. RICHARZ
Moose Jaw with a twenty minute fuel reserve, but
was unsure whether he could reach Regina . Since servation and discoveries a special inspection was Bearing in mind that it would take a keen eye to On start up of a recent Otter pilot trainer, Cpl
the pilot has only flown in cloud once, and that was initiated and all Voodoos were inspected . Loss of observe such a problem with the particular area J .G. Richarz, stopped the engine start up procedure
to get on top, he was very apprehensive towards the vent rnast in flight would result in the collapsing being so confined, further investigation with his just prior to the pilot engaging the starter, Cpl
letting down . The aircraft was not equipped to navi- of the external fuel tanks. flashlight revealed that the gasket was indeed rup- Richarz had noticed a small amount of fuel emitting
gate and communicate at the same time, and this re- There is no doubt that Cpl Aube's alertness and tured . from the bottom of the engine cowling . The pilot was
sulted in lengthy communication gaps . Due to this extra effort in the performance of his duties pre- Cpl Briand immediately entered a major unser- informed, and an engine tech was summoned to in-
communication problem the team of Cap Olsen and vented an airborne emergency and loss of valuable viceability against the aircraft which consequently vestigate . Fuel was discovered all over the top of the
MCpI Hartwell had a difficult emergency to handle . resources . resulted in the removal and replacement of the engine . A split primer line was found to be the
Initial radar contact was made thirty-three miles to MCPL B.J . SHORT cause . If the engine had been started, a serious fire
the west by MCpI Hartwell, but the aircraft was in During a primary inspection of an Argus engine could have occured .
the navigation mode and no positive identification MCpI Short discovered a crack in on~ of the engine Cpl Richarz careful attention and timely pre-
could be made . Verbal communication with the mounting ring secondary support tubes . The location cautionary action averted a potentially dangerous
pilot was difficult which led to the pilot not being of the crack was such that only a very oblique view- fire situation .
able to understand the instructions that Capt Olsen ing angle was possible and the cracked area was CPL L.E. CHRISTIANSON
was attempting to give him . Eventually Capt Olsen very difficult to illuminate, Also an accessory clamp While carrying out a Daily Inspection on a Tutor
achieved visual identification by vectoring the Snow- was positioned on the tube immediately adjacent to aircraft, Cpl Christianson noticed what he thought to
bird T-33 to the observed target . the crack such that visual detection of the crack was be a hairline crack on the first weld from the forward
Capt J .C . Parker Cpl L.E, Christian~on
The aircraft was now switched to radar frequency extremely difficult even when its location was clamp of the tailpipe . During further investigation
in preparation for descent . MCpI Hartwell assured the known . Cpl J,R. Briand Cpl J .C . Richarz Cpl S. Roherts by Aircraft Snag Section, the thermal blanket was
distressed pilot that his descent through cloud would Although not fully qualified on all aspects of Argus removed and a crack approximately six inches in
be gradual with no turns . The aircraft penetrated operation, and still under OJT, MCpI Short demon- length was revealed .
cloud without incident and soon after the pilot strated a very professional approach to his task, and Cpl Christianson's keen observation and profession-
reported visual contact with the runway lights. his attention to detail in finding the crack possibly al approach to his job averted further aircraft damage
The team of Capt Olsen and MCpI Hartwell han- prevented a very serious in-flight failure . and a possible in flight incident .

~o 11
 `` -
f _---
------" > ,-

\
J~

Ifyou zv~nt to live, have

MET~HING IN RESERVE
by Maj Don Janson
% ~ .~~~°j`,r::~'~i_Y/~ .

IIc ' N' us an ukl Jigirtcr 1)rlot 1 c 'Iro sc ttlcd nr

' 11rc, rrc rghbur~ho~d, une speck uf infurntation that ruuld help nte nuw . parachute ltarn~ss }tad nut be~n ~onnected! survive an attempt to climb out over the side and parachute
, . ,, ., . .,
a rrd 1rc 1rud rrr ude tlr~ :~ce ~ cul~ eg u r. t ~ u c , u r r 1 ,,
Ic uJ - tr nr c s ur c r . 1 !re " .~~nd then it ~ante . suunding cle ;rr and joyuus abuve the 1~'e tuuk uff and clintbed thruugh a jet blaek night tu manuallv . Yet, to ride the bird tu the gruund in tutal d~rkness
. ,-,, , . a .
uthcr l,rds and l u~uukl cru++~d uruund r~lrcrr +tc cuukl
. .~, ., , , . -  . .and had just , stttled

to lrcur noisz of glas~ta and laught~r In a l .undon ~lub . 36,OU() tc,ct fur a lung night's drive when was a forhiddin g p ras~e~t
t ~ . T h en I .ear~
s ~ ~I te d tor
' something
.~, . ~ 1S'rkl (' r)rr zl7 at Urc r . t 1rc, 1l~ . .~,
rc 5. (1 ~ f:rrr , . u r rd I
1 rt~5 .ti tc ll rcs 0
.l J 1, ~ (17 c "I'cl bf~t 'hn Jir~c lruuuds 'c rurrldrr't get urvu.r~ ri'urn nrc," an explusiun shuuk the bird, and tltcSky . . .around us brightened . estra, and as we ate up the ;tltitude I had thrown in for reserve,
supposc it's more thurt cuincidertce thut sereral uJ~ us lutter suicl thc red-Jucecl :lustraliurr ut lhe table rre.~t to nrirrc . "But Luuking back, we cuuld buth see jets uf lire sprayin~ into I found it .
, ul 
~~r n cd lrrs clrrh and raul tcd c.r. th c, cluuds
, , ., n urrr
in .1 igIrtus urrce 1 Justcnccl rn'sc~ll un 'is tail, 'c~ .+~udclc~rrlt~ star-ts to trrnr irr It eame from a 4onvers ;ttiun 1 had with a tlight surgeun
.l the wrindstre ;trn . and I knew that tlre turbinc wheel Irad tllruwn
ut+'rr, tigIrter . It'Irrrr I trr . ta .1 i~llv++~ Ynr, rnr
. bl~wrrirr'S 1~it.1 ire srra1~s . sc~me buckets uut the side . during the nuun break at a pressurization charttber .
. . .,
.~1rrd i1 his st~nc
r s rrrsl~ l'rred c 1 ur c ~u r c c rs , t 1rc"
.t ul_fc ~ Jc U'rr rc d a Bac~k un thc~ trrr.j I leurrr the cleril 'as crarrked a little J1ups irr 1 ~ut tlte thruitle and ntaster fuel switch . and put the nuse "Under conditions of stress," he had said, "a person who is
, ., , i,, ~, 
J'ourrdutivrr Jor our srrrrrrul . Consicler, J~tr cxanrhle, tlrc~ stora~ t/rcn tlrc .,, s~ecd'sguldcurrubit . duwn sharply until lhe 11ame diecl uut : then shallo+s~ed tu a not trained to handle a bad situation can become so tense that
Ire tuld abuut his J irst errcuurrter . "'~'ilh my tycs glued acruss the ~ircle, and still hulding all long . dark glidv . There svas plenty uf tinte .'w~'c had 30,000 feet his muscles almost freeze up, and he can't perform simple
llre turn that 1 ~uuld get . I re~ched my left h ;rnd duwn besiiie to lose . and 1 used it to ~ulnt the panie in the passenger . and actions ."
., ~1 , . _ ~ t t1 y'~n r g , ' ~ h e lek~ln,
t ,, ~ ~ ++; .as. .ar t
hat 1 tlidn't knuw ~ .a~utt .. tlte seat ;Inii set the tl ;rps lever tu tlte first nutch . \utlring tu plan the altitude at +rhich we wuuld leave the bird . In the dull beam frol~t my tlashlight the altimeter unwound
. ,,, , , 3 - '
uu ea~ rr uf d ;rrkn c ss un +v hrch '~ ms, . . . IJ tlt rn huurs bul~tt ecl Irkc seemed tu happen at tirst . But evcr su slu+vly my prups began On a winter night like that, there was nu desirc to punch dangerously, but 1 rttanaged to speak with calm forcefulness :
a ~o ~ r k . Bu t I kn , c.~ 11' tl t~at I di d n't krr ~ u w rlllI c, II . a . nd lit ~~r~a Il y , ,a ++, .a~, my Iralf ul~ the ~Ir~le . Then 1 cuuld see the nose uf uut hig}t and dangle freezing for a long des~ent . The buok "l.isterr carc~Jullv! Uv e.ractlt~ +ti~irut 1 tell -vou . Put yuur
tu eal
, dr S tan~e ' ., . . r
~am P ~d ' +5' rtltln
. It carut
 a , . of tltc, ' tc
~' IV u Id 11 cad
'' s ar
' 0und . the 109 pull in slightly, see the bird uscillate a little, then said 1,5(l0 feet wuuld be ;rbout right . Then 1 remembered the lread u,~ainst thc hcadrcst. Put .t~uur Jcet rn positrorr : Prrt l~our
., ., . . ,
.y~, tour of us.. tuok off over the sands uf \orth
' .Anytiva settle b~~k tu the s;rrtte ;rrr . tl,htzr ace, and seented tu hear. a,  aln . ,
hi~ +surds : 'Ycrrt rc riglrt hand arorurd tlu> c/cctton
> trigger, This trrnE, don't
.~ fr~" > tls, r,il
I~ a . ',rr 1 d 1> rcr rt l 1, r In~ t~i ~a ~ut ~ r I~ le c- ~ t n e +t~ti~- ~1: 1 ll ) s . "lt tuuk at leust thr~~e full lurns tu Itrin ;; him thruugh the uh~~uys . got to lrar~~ sonrc~tlrirrg in res~rr~e : Su I jacked up our sdueczc! Instead, jerk it tv+vard yvrc irear~ily. No+a~!
,
'l~otally utedltnt tu instructiuns, 1 lateheil my .,I -3K tc~ n t y ~ top uf nty wirtdscreen, plus artuthtr tunt arrd a lt ;rll tu bnng
.
exil altitude by arwthcr _,OOU feet . There carne a sudden explusion, and then tlte intercum was
.,
I ea. cl cr s wr n :,, ,and hu n ~, c> n gr i n t lti~ as a~ 1 0 .) s tr~~ers reached uut him duwn tu the sigltts reticle . ~1nd during that I~st little time, Thr p ;tssengor was thuruughly rcbricf :d by the trruc we silent . My passenget was gone . r'ive seconds later I syueezed
Iras t me anc ~ i set h i nt ah la~ ze . T h e n I hruke awa y ~ hard , :rncl 1 ~:uulcln't unclerst ;ind whv he ,jusf helcl tltat turn +vhile I lined apprua~hed tltt chosen altitude : uur dark visors +vere duwn, the tri~bg er un m y~ e'e~tiun seat, and w~s blasted clear of the
t .. J
fuund m y ~self in a tr g ht s~iral . loukln .. ,r~luss a .~()(1-~, :Ird void
...
1 him up ineh b~~ inc:h . l3ut he was still turnint;, with the tu{~ uf and I had a flashlight trainecl un the instruments . :1s l pulled air~raft .
~a t a lU c) trs 'rn t r tu lr' ht > n ~rn anil ~luse u It nl e . 'r~e 11 , e rt, r1 ea, I ~ tl t e tlrc, ..~.anutty
. glintini; ancl his la~c. turned h ;r~-k tu+vards ntc u+tr the jettison lever and felt the canupy go, l had high ltopes of a There was nu tune tu read the altimeter just befure I left
. , .,
derk in nu time ; and +vith full power and all tlre ba~k stick thc tus shoulder +vlren thc bullcts c ~l ludcd in u trail a~russ hinr . perfeut ejectiun . Thruugh the rush uf noise uver the Intc.l~um I the air~raft and su I can't caleulatc thc closeness uf uur
h~Irds +vn t r Icl t .r~ k e, tlt e t wu of us still s t uod on +s In ~r~ tr' 1~s un "Flying back, when my arm quit twitching and the blood tulil the passenger tu pla~e his ttead against the headrest, put es~ape . But I do knuw tbls : after the chute opened it was a
, , . ~tr - tht, ~Ir~le,. . ,, , the ejcctiun lnt;gcr ~ , un the
upt osrte srd~~ neltl t e r : r h le tc~ rlus e . a~ nd ea ~h quit throbbing on the side of my neck, I understood what had Itis fcet intu pusitiun, ;utd syuc~u very short des~ent tu the farmyard where 1 landecl much tuo
knu+ving that tu break the ring wuuld bring quick cleath . sh ctrt tu- h .r. ve curtt > ,~ ,
happened to the other guy . He had exhausted all his know- arntrest . Then 1 waited titr the hl,rst . Five secunds passcd, and . p ensated fur th~ del:rv. in uur c J ectiort had I
"1 dun't knu+v huw tnan Y tintes we went ruund . l du knuw ledge . He had never learned a law that became almost sacred to he ss~ ;rs ~till there! nut planned thal extra reserve .
th ;tt it berame unb~arablv, hut in~idc llrc gricnlruuse ~anu p :v . me - that you've gotta have something in reserve!" ")'uu lrure~ to du it . ~Syuee~t~ il rw++~'" I repz :rted . And I also knu+v that the altitudc +s~uuld have ntade little
thut 1 grew sc~aking wet with fear and pcrspiratiun, and that llis very frightened vuiee caught nte by surprise . diffcrcnce tu the passenger had 1 not taken the extra time and
ruy rikht arm ~~hed frum pulling un the sti~k . MY TURN I Irur~ .' ~S'otlring lruhl~eu~d!" duuble-checked his straps befure starting the engine . bVith twu
1lur> .t~ timc~s irr thc t~rrsuirrg,t~c~ars I lurcl ue°cusiun tu rt~rrrerrrher ".Sduec~=c it aguin'" undone, lte wuuld have fallen tu his death .
WHAT WAS IT? tlrut aclrice. ., .~rrcl , rrtunr
. . tirrres it srzatclr~d
, . mc art~ut~. Jrurn } , l,rst frum thz back ;eat . Thtn his vui~e ruse tu+vards pani~ . As it was, his parachute draped across a puwer line and
"And :rll the timz . m~ nllnd +vas ;ear~hing back through t ragec1 r~ . Trti c t!r c nr gIr t t 1re tu rbruc~
' hlc +c . "1'rc~ triE~d and tried. It t+~ur~'t r+~ork!" gently stopped him just a fuut ;rbove a con~rete high+vay . He
c I ass e s 1 1t,rd
~ . r rt, .s l h~,td h earcl
: rt te i td~ d , t h e 1 e~tt ~ u_n aerudy- lt +v~as lalc . and ver y ruld . I tuld the ~~rew rhief tc~ check th~ "Y~c~rr're sure .ruu ure sqrree.:irrg tlre ejectivrr triggc~r rtnder stepped to the surface, caught u ride +vilh an attra~live cueil .
nanties, lift, attd clrag ; and manuals I h ;rd read . l +was searclting tll~ ~, ht sur g, eun s I ala~hutc
., . . and stral~ him i nto the h~a~k ~ - .eat
ti ~ ct
r- tlrc kandle orr the right arnr rest , .,  and had the best steak uf t}te huuse, free, at the restaurant
. 
for something eatra fur that additiunal little scrap uf knuw- the ~i~-33 while 1 did a fast walk-around insF~ectiun . 'hhen l Ilis answer was a high~pitched , 'l es,,: where he waited after CdlllItg the base .
ledge ur experience wltirh +a~as tlte nasun fur hours uf reading, ~t ;trted to clirnb in . but thoukht better uf it . and de~ided to ~ut 1 failed to tell lllrtl that he owed the ride . and tbc stcak .
fur hundreds u1' sometimes laughed at yuestions, and many persunally check rny pusscnger . That little bit of attentic~n SOMETHIN~ MORE tu an uld tighter ace whu taught nte that the unexperted ~an
, I n ~ l 1S t~'11~tn t 0 JtU nc'1 and ex lort~ 5 that
~,1. ~n ~re mc)5 tl~' J ust wuuld make hint feel easier durin~ his first ride in a jet air~raft .
g P , w, h1y mind had gone far bevund the conversatiun . I ~uuldn't pile upun the unexpected and that when it dues, you can di~
hut air . ~ut uf th ;rt m :r ;~ uf +vur d s ;rnd ideas th e re h ;id +t~> h e And uddly enuu~,h . I dis~overed that tlte leg stra F~s uf his P uneh out +vithuut him, and there +vas no w ;tv-
. he ~ould unlcss you have sumething in reserve . Air .Scoo~

is Flight Comment, Edition 2 1976 13

 HEY BLUE FOUR,
that an excessive altitude luss was being announced (1U00 feet 11te rear seat pilot secured the huod and assunted cuntrol of
everv four tu six secunds) which should have alerted the pilot the air~raft, wondering why the FE had not initiated the right
to sontc unusual P rublent . Additionallv, . ,t secund 1~ilot, who turn . Witltuut crosschecking any uther instrumentation, the
tivas well as the tirst P ilot, had access to a cum t ~letelv~ u (~erable rear seat pilot upplicd control pressures to establish the aircraft

n 1 NEED 1=~LP
ADI and yet they either disregarded ur failed to note the in a 30 degree ri ;ht bank . At this time . he noticcd the headlltg
differences betw~een the twu systents . As a result, the aircraft indicator turnitt~ while the attitude indicator was indicatin g a
cras}ted and fuur lives were lost . Whv? Lctss uf control, sure ; 15 degrec nuse up, wings level attitude . A partial panel unusual
but wh y~ luss uf i;ontrol~ Perha f~s a~ cou 1~le of reasons . One attitude rorovery was attcrnptcd as he utfurrned the FE of his
heing that the initial ADI failure was insidiuus in that no attitude indicator loss . The FE recuvered the aircraft frum
"uff' flags were visible . iind rnaybe the seeond was the in- near 90 degrees of bank and aborted the flight without further
ability tu revert to a basic partial panel technique which pro- incident . After this the simulator folks fixed their machine so
bablv. ~uuld have sto Pl~ed the se y uen~e befure it reall y~ s~.;ot tltey could duplicate the exact seyuence, withuut, of course,
started . telling the p ilots. Within one week, four of nine P ilots tested
by Maj Charles Barr 1~here ;rre uther indicatiuns, in other air~raft, of this same crashed within 10 seconds after the malfunction was intro-
Directorate of Aerospace Safety inability to revert to hasie hartial panel flying techniyues when duced . We are not talking about low levels uf flying experienee
loss uf an attitude indicator uccurs . ln supporl of this argu- in this wing . The lowest ntan had 988 hours in aircraft type,
ntent let's review the folluwing arcidents : while the high timer had ovcr 5500 total hours with ?377
The tirst concerns a flight of three on a day uttercept and in type .
1 don't know tivho tirst said it . perhaps we would have to go role in lhis stur y . A rti ght takeoff . attitude indicator luss instrument training mission . Shurtly after takeuff the lead In the majurity of the attitude indicator failures presented
all tlte way back to Francois Pil ;rtre de Rozier to get tu the dctected at or ncar lift-uff . the abilit~ tu dete~t tlre failure . aircraft etttered la y~ered clouds un established climb s P eed. here some significant points come tu light . l~irst, in all cases
source uf origin, But t}~ere is a Lertain ring uf truth tu the ade q uate schoulin~~c in p artial )' anel fl y ~inir~ . an ohsetVant cu P ilut
W}tile in the ~louds the pilot intuitively felt sumething was where the p ilot was tra pt~ed ,tnd needed help . instrument tlight
age-old saying that llying i~ ltuurs and hour5 of burcdurn tivho was willin~b to s1~eak when he realiieii thin~s w~ere E~Juin ~~
wrong with the aircraft ; however, he failed tu intmediately eonditions existed . Se~ond, the tran~ition tu uther flight
intermingled with moments of stark terrur . frum bad tu wurse q uickl y an~, linall y , the realizatiun, b y' the detect the source of the problem . He did . however . noticc a instruments was slow or non-existent . Tltird, withuut visual
Fortunatelv. . our trainin~=b and uur aircraft svstems ~ive us, instruiaor, th ;tt he was in trouble and needed hclp . tifty knut decrease in airs P eed as he roncentrated on maintain-
, b
reference tu the hurizon and/or a slow instrument crosscheck,
ln most seriuus in-fli~~ht emer~en~ies,
b the tools with which to The uther stury uc~urred sonte years later, during the , cn~uuntered
, ,
irrg a nurmal pitch attitude on his ADI . As the airspeed was an unusual attitude wes within seconds .
cu (~e ~and, mure often th .ut nut, we are able to return our ~air height of the Vietnum cuntlict and invulves two cluse personal dropping thruugh 300 kias the inertial navi~ation unit failure Well then, unc might ask, where du we gu frum here? 1
vehicles to their uttended Fiuint of landin~ with nu mure than friends af minc who, 1 hupc, will lurgivc tny rclating this stury light illuminated and the Af)( tumbled . Aircraft cuntrol was wish I had an immediate answer, but l dun't . Perhaps one
anuthcr t;uud bar stor y tu be told . 'I'ltcrc is . uf cuursc . unc very here . The mission was u bornher deployntent frum thc LI tu
transferred to the rear seater, a non-pilot, who was unable to suspect area is our training . ln years gune by . we trained
insidious ntalfunction that, g iven the rig ht time and circurtt- Guam . Shurtly :rfter caast ~tut the tirst Al)1 t'ailed . In con- reruver the aircraft . Both crewmembers e'ected
J successfull y~ . utilizing an instrurnent hood ;tnd at least occasionally on a
stance, could eause that mument uf terrur and might rather sideratiun uf the furecast weather and daylight tlying huurs,
abru pytJ ~ terminate v uur existence said failure being that thc~ pilut . aguin an inslructur, elected tu cuntinue the ntissiun .
In another accident the air~raft, shurtly after lift-off, P artial P artel ; i .e ., headirt K indicator, altirtteter, airspeed indica-
entered instruntent tlight ~unditions . Again the pit~h attitude tor, tum and sli P indicatur and vertical velocity . Today this
unrecor;nized attitucle indicaturjattitude direcaur indicator Subsequently, witlt l lawaii undcr ltis wing tip . thc secontl and
was established at ten degrees nose up as the aircraft accelerated seems to be a lost art or, at lcast, has a minimum level of
1'ailure . last Ar)1 f;tiled .
tu climb speed . At approximately ?SO kias the pilot noted acce 1~tance ; however, the facilities are available fur such train-
flistorically, Air Force aircraft average une hundred Alll Here' ; the situation : huth Af)Is inuper~tive . destin :rtion
flashing whecl ligltts and ehccked lltc gear indicalurs LU CUrt- ing tltrough simulation and at least one of our MAJCOh4s has
failures per year . Furtun ;rtelv . must tailures are successfullv weather furccast goud, iiay visual meteorological cunditions
firm the gear pusition . Wltile transitioning back to the tlight recently reinstituted .just such training as an integrul part of
dealt with in tlight and therefure unly remain in~idents . enruute and ;tn apcrativc auto pilut . The decision : cuntinue to
instruments . the pilot indicated the aircraft felt strange ; their tlight simulation program . With regard to the instruntent
Ilowevcr . over the last six and ouc-hall years we have had destination . J udgment - not good, for two reasun : ( I ) everyone
Ituwever, the attitude indicatur still indicated a ten det;ree ltuud, I didn't like it when I was tlying it and I think the
eleven accidents in which ADI failure was indentified as either can use a da y~ or two in Hawaii, and (~) the unknuwn ~000
climb . Suddenly the pilut gut yuite light in his seat and in- decisiou bv' must 111 ;1JCOMs to do awav with it was a valid
eausal ur cuntrihutory . miles ahead.
furttted his back seater that suntetlring wasn't right . Cruss- one . lfowever . in P ra~ticin~h instrtuttent ntaneuvers withuut
~I'ltcre is nothing uniyuc about the ADl f ;ulure . in that it Ladv Luck was ridinK with this crew this day ttnd, in fact,
clrecking his itltirneter and vertical vcloi;ity, thc pilot nuted the some restrictive device, une has a tendency to cheat, which 1
can and does occur in all types ul' aircral'L What is tuuilue the trans-Pacitic crossing was routine . However, at Guaru
altitude to be decreasing tltrough ~000 feet at between 500 most sincerelv diseourage . The tinte tu learn to fly good
is the total inability by some uf our piluts to handle this yuu guessed it the weather was less than UptlrtlUitt . Much tu
and 100U feet per ntinute . B~ck pressure was applied to instruments is durin~ Vh1C c-onditions . All it reall Y takes is
entergency in tlight . Fortunately the recurd shows th :tt in the the surprise ul' Guaru Approach the pilot requested a no-gyro
establish a positive cliiuh rate as the aircr~ft broke through the dedicated effurt and prartice . Thrs also rs the titne to learn tu
majurity uf ei<ses this is nut lruc . (~CA whirh was immediately rejected with wurds similar to,
clouds in ~ five-tu-ten degree nose-luw, right wing-low attitude . cope with suclt entergencies ;ts attitude indicator failure . I
There are some good stories uruund abuut pcopl~ whu , .We dc~n't appruve pra~tice nu- Ky ru a pf~ruachcs here ." And .l
Ba~k pressure was increased and the nose rotated through the still have a one-yuarter inch plywuud cutuut, specifi~ally
challenged the system and won .1 personally know uf a ~uuple am sure Guam was equally surpriscd at the nezt response they
huriron just as thr' :tircraft crussed a st~nd uf trees . After tree designed to cuver an attitude indicatur, which was presented
that are nut refle~~ted anywhere within Air Furce re~urds but heard ~rackling thruugh tlieir ~arphunes : "Hey babes, I don't
imparl, the aircraft was successfully tluwn abuve the cluud tu me years agu hy my aircraft contmander . 1'1ltltuugh 1 nu
still renrain lruc . Buth sturies relute tu bumber class aircraft think -vuu tutderstancJ .1'his ain't fur P raetice ." Suffire it to sa Y
deck . With assistance frum anutlrer member of the Ilight, a lun ger use it, it's still a valid tool fur teachin gP artial P anel
and both by coinciden~c invulved the island uf Guum . l~ur the the :rppruach tiaas lluwn anti the aireraft landed safely .
successful approach and landing was made . tlying .
tirst story we have to go ba~k u few ycars, to tlre du_vs evhen Can we challenge this pilot's judgment'? Sure 1 h ;tve and he
lf your wing doesn't have a valid simulatur instrument
the li-~7s were rctlexine to this island . has hitnself . N~'hat we can't challenge is his ,chilitv ;utd his Even mare recently, une uf our Air tiutional Guard piluts
experienred an attitude indicator failurc during an annual training prugram ~tsk them to develop one . Ilcll . l'vc been out
Th~ fli~,ht in~ols~d e nr~,ht takc-uff fur a redcpluy mission
i, ` deeply fuunded unilerstanding uf partial panel instruruent
uf ~untrul iltUre than unce in ;~ simulator but, furtunatcly,
~0 ~ ~~ ~~

to the states . Takeuff roll was uneventful thruugh lii't-ut'f at tlying techniyues, tecltniques gainecJ thruugh ntany Itours of instrument check . Whether the guy passed ur failed the ch~~rk-
,, ride is nut tmEortent
' ~ ~ for this~ w rrttng
~ ~ . Bt t t 1 fee I t h e subse q uent never uncr in an airplan~° .
which time the instructur pilctt re~ut,nired he had experie~nced piartial panel 1lying artd simul~tiun . Tltuse techniyues that
The ability to handle an attilude indicatur failure depends
an attitude indicator failure . ln his own wurds, he knew it was were taught in the uld schuol . ~tf fifteen ti~ears ago ; that 1'm action laken by tltis wing is, perhaps some small part of the
story shuuld be told s~ evcryone has a clear tutderstanding as uppermust un your otivn capahilities w'rth the key
~ ~ bein g the
no sweat and that he ~uuld handle it . ln fact he did for ~ n~~t sure are being taught ur pra~ti~ed today .
~apiibility tu recugnize the malfunctiun . Sumetimes it's
minule ur two, un partial panel . He was actually feeling pretty Tltere are uf ~uurse thuse incidents where :1ll1 lailures to why the local experiment was conducted . .
easy in thut tlte red uff-fl ;t is visible, suntetimes it's not . Fli~ht
good far this bricf tinte periud, knuwing he hacl everything result in a catastrupliic loss uf life and equipment . ft w~>uld he 'I'he examinee, in the rear cockpit, briefed the flight
examincr (FE) priur tu takcul'f that, al'ter lift-uff . Ite wuuld be instrumcnts are presented ut a package and more cucs are
under cuntrul . Suddcnly, from the rear cu~kpit, the cupilut subjective on my part to say tltai . in all cases . the luss ctf tlte
lowerin g the hood and that anv de p arture instrurtiuns g iven availahle than just those presented by tlte attitude indicator .
asked, in a typical copilut's vuicc : "Iley bus~, wltat tlte hell is ;1D1 was detected in tinte tu ch :tnge the sequence ut- events
were to he followed hy the FF until he (the examinee) was H~wevc .r, t 1 ws e cues are nut available without an instrument
t;uut~z un ." leading tc~ the accident . }luwever, in unc case . ul wltirlt 1 :uu
crusscheck, and, quite honestly . that's yuur best chance for
'fhe feehng of euplturia was hr~~ken . the instruetor pilut persunally ;nvare, tlti~ did o~rur . In thut ~asc tlte pilot . l'ullow- ready tu assume control uf the aircraft . After lift-uff, depar-
survival . Work on it, practice every chance you get in butlt the
realiced hc ~a~as in truuble and he infurmed the ~upilut that hz in z' a p resessin g .11)1 . tlew Itis aircr :tft intu a hank~, p ~ ic 1 t atti- ture euntrul clcared the airrrait . Atter lite-utt, departure
simulatur and in tlight, and, perhaps . rather than beeuming an
had lc~st his attitude indi~ator and transferred cuntrul uf the tude frum which he was unahle tu recuver. ln my opiniun cuntrol rleared the aireraft fur a right turn uf tifty degrees,
Air Force statistic, yuu too will have a good h~r story to tell .
aircr;rtt tu him . Cir~umstan~es ~ertainly pluyed a significant nture tltan ;tdeyu~te ~~erhallviiual cues were beink pruvi~ed in un ~ourse .
Aeros ace Safti et ~

Flight Comment, Edition 2 1976

uFO~s
Fact or
Airlincs L)('-(, . pilotted by Captain J .L . Kidd between Phila-
ilellhla
f and Wasllln?ton, was furred into a dive tu avuid a
"glraminr li~;ht" . First aid was required for several passcngers
who were not we,trin~ their seat bclts .
Just bcfure nridni~llt un :lpril 14 . 195q, at S .UOU feet .
United Airlines fli~~ht 193 over Long Beach . Calil~urnia .
~aptained by .1 .11 . Schiedel, was forced intu a sudden climhinb
turn by a brigllt red light . breakinn a stcwardess' ankle and
should he enoubh tu warrant a bmad ongoing guvermnent-
f~unded scientific investigation of these occurrenees . But as far
as is puhlicly known it has nut had t}us cffcct .
ln Canada, the National Research Council scrves as a re-
pusitory fur what are called "Non-Meteoritic Sightings" . The
Council inlterited thc Artned Forces' file when the ntilitary
opted out of the UFU husiness . Tlte file, which is open to the
public . is expanded ant} maintained without special staff or

Figment?
thc leg of one uf the passen`,ers . funding . NRC . thercfure, can only investi~ate reports that
3 :30 a .rn ., March 9, 19i7, a Pan Americun DC-bA f7ight show promise uf new or valuuble scientilic infurmation .
?57 en ruute from New Yurk to San Juan . Puerto IZico, I iU In the l.lnited States, J . Allen Hynek, for _'0 ycars l!FO
rttilcs east uf Jacksonville . h'luridn . was yankcd into a sudden consultant to the U .S . Air l~urce . heads up the Centre for
climb hy ('aptain Matthew Van 1~'inkle tu avuid a collisiun UFU Studies at Northticld . lllinois . Dr . Hynek is a noted
with a beam of "brilliant light" . Four other plane crews r~- astrunorrtcr and Chairman ut thc Lindheimer Astronomical
purled simili,r 5i~ltlin~s itr thc arca . A stcwardess and several Research Centre . He bclicves the solution to the UFU enigtna
by Robert Rickerd National Research Council P asscn ~~crs werc in'ured,
I is the responsibility uf science and has rathert:d around him
July 17, 1957, Flight (~SS Dallas-Lns An~eles . with 85 intcrcstcd en~ineers
r and scientists who are pP re ared tu vivc of
ln thc early rnurning of Novemher ll, 1975, the staff at passen~~ers on buard, was tlrrown into a dive hy its pilot Cap- their timc tu hclp sulve the riddlc . The Centre has nu govern-
CFB Falconbrid~Je trackcd unidcntified radar blips ntoving tain Fd Ba~hner to avoid a strange "object'~ IUU tniles cast uf rnent affiliations ; technieal facilities arc provided by private
u p wards at altitudes hetween ~_',000 and 7? .UOU fecl in the EI Paso . Twu 1 ~assen~ers , were hus 1 ~italized . industr Y . antl 1 )ublic dunations P rovided its fundin .
vicinily of Sttdbury, Ontario. Visual si~htings were also madc and one type uf~ ohservation which is particularly tlifficult tu 10 .1 . f) .m ., .lul~. __,
 1 95.7, at 1 H ,000 feet, TWA Cun- Commcrrial artd rttilitary aircrew make the hest non-
, ., . _ ( tbs.erve,r
~ s uf serial ,-
by thc rnilitary base personncl and members of Regiunal and discnunt is the in-11i~ht rcporl hy airfine ancl military aircrew . stellation Flight ~l near Amarill~~, Tex~ts, was put into a dive Sl .r~ntltk
.
~ p ht,rt untetta be~at~ tse of their
, , ., t r~aulut~ ,tr tcl 1 r o fes.r~ 'o na~ 1 c~ c~ I ~t p e t en~e . Th c Y l~t
.
r c rall Y It~V e lll t 1 e
Provinctal f ulre.e Furces . but U .S . Air Natiunal Gttard jcts sent There are nu huaxes thuusands of feet in the air and crews are by C,rptain G .M . Schemel to avuid a big red and ~reett "light"
~~ appruached on a cullision cuursc . Tltc plane was forced
w lu~lr ,sh.,ya. nd t he safet of their )assen ,, ers and multi-milliun tlollar
to investigatc faund nothing . trained tu rccu`~nizc sun duts, the planet Venus, meteors, Y f
, t ..
h~,htnrn~. St . Elmu'ti Fire . and Radiusontlc ballcom ta return tu Amarilln, where first aid was administered and alrl ;ralt (1G, P Cllll
, Qn thr,tr, ~ klloWledbe, ~~ Sklll ilnd _lud~lllent
' r .
The event was descrihed in newspapers lhe followinl; day .
addin~ to the thousands uf worldwide repurts recurded since The AI11CrIC ;In 1nS11tUte of AstronantlCS an(1 ACrunaUtICs one passenger WaS ItOSpItJhzell . lt is to he haped that tltc lIFO will sorttehow return to
., pulicy and riclicule has ',  obscrvers,
1947 when the current era of the UFO started . But like all publishcd suntc scientilically baflling ~~ascs bascd un aircrcw lt is unfurtunate that ~urporat~ ashrun ~L c,rrn t ttUt ~ thc,sc l u unce ~ e~ ~am
~ r c P u r t f re c 1 Y
, . °
solid sightint;s lltat went before, which cuuld not be attrihuted and ratlar repurts in its journal " .-'Istrunautics and At,runau- cumhined tu shut uff tlte suurecs uf tltis type uf repurl in re- UIl tlltlr Sl h htln S w'It ho t t t fC ar 0 f ridicule . In the meantime .

to hoax or natural phenomena . thc Falcunbnd~~ report hacl no tics" fur study hy its members . Although no ~unclusions wcr~  cent ycars . tur upon reading them . une must wunder, if in thc occaaw~ ,' r ta, 1 , uod sc hd htt ma n at}~ r c ee I c tro nr c re P or t s b Y
., . carllr f c r und w rtntsscs Ir ke tl t e Fal~ ~ ~~c n h rI'~~
d e si ~°b~ w'1
. pb h t tn tl
bottotn Itn~ no answer to this intriguing riddle wlrich had drawn it was evident that this aueust hodv felt that the UFO certain Ilirht mudes . s~rch inud~nis might not ~ontrihute to .
bec=n taunling ubservers fur ?R years . sub~cct
J dcscrvcd furlhcr stud y , ~ . ur artually ~ause, a fatal ntisltap . This iansideratiun alone rruntitltrr lu titUllt tlrc belicvers,
The scientific cuntntunity cannut be said tu have cunducted Thc Cundon Conrnriltce and the U .S . Acailemv of Sciences
an all-out researrh prograru desif;ned to ~et to thc bottom uf who endorsed thcir half~-million dollar rc p urt a ~ rccd that 1 ) nu
the UFO eni~ma, but there have bcen nolable exceptions, and impurtant information was being hcltl baek frum lhc public by
some of thc aura which had heen built up aruund it Itas as a the ~overnment : ~) the unidentifieds posed nu threat to
result heen stripped away . l~or exatnple, a widely puhlii:ized national seeurity : 3) nuthing uf scientific value had becn lcarn- cont'd from page 6
ed in the f) rev'I~~ t r s ..1 Y tats, , .,r ~ e .~r r~d
, ~ ~ 4 ) tht.re , t u he nu re~son
piece of "evidence" held up by bclievers of extraterrestrial Ip thc ;Iltitltclc is lut;h cnulrt;h . As ntcntiuncd, tirc threshuld is exposed tu this phenomenon if a cabin pressur7zatiun failurc
VISItalIOIIS by LJF[)'S had heen the (1lSl;OVCry Of L10Ui',hrlllt- , concern
, , but th~~ re~ .rl ,
to s~it t r p a~ n rn
' v~cstrr~ttr
'~~~ 'v~
c. ,t~cr
~ ~~ t cY
~ tu studv
, the {~henurttenon on rel;;rrded as beinh as luw as lii,U00 t~ct occurred and, for some reason, an adequate emergency descent
. , ~~ ~ ° .
shaped "burns" in fertile soil which was thereafter unable tu an utt~uing basis, but they also cuncurrcd tltat thcre ~a~ere bcl;rns al altitudcs ahovc __,UUU fcct . Rcrucmlcr t}luu ;,lt, tf was nut possible,
.
support any furnt uf vcgctation . important arcas uf utmusph~rrc. uptics, radio w~tve
1- ,~ «-
prc t La,atron you have heen scuha divin~ shurtly hef~ure the flight the What are the actiuns that shuuld be remembered by those
-
Une uf the earliest recardcd , ~xarnples
 uf these rings in and atmos Pheric electricitv- where scien~e clid nu t have all thc , , ,iltitude is ~,UOU fect
d,rngcr -, (ttr . r.v~n
 luw~r)
 . There are, in whu are suhjected tu t}~is ituzard? l~irstly, if yuu have been
Nurtlr Arnerica had been the suurce uf no little awe and answers . addititm, recut;nized prcdispusin~ factors unce the threshold enga~ed in scuba or other divin~ activities don't do any sort
. ~ ntay lie the ~lte
superstitiun fur two centuries on Chatltam Cuuaty . Nurth Th~retn ~ t ctf ~~lucs t a thc idcnlit y ui~ lh~, Ul ; U Ira~ bccn cxcceil~d . In gcncral, tltc ltiglter lhe altitude . the ul~ llying ur otherwise ascend to hi~h altitudes (e .g . high
, . ,
Carolina . Callcd thc "llevil's Tramping Ground", lcgcnd Itad and in the interc, .e t ct f fll ¬,, ht s~. afetv
, ' . cw~~ry cl 1 crl ~hutld r I ellac
t~ le luncer the eaposure, the culder the temperature, thcn thc altitude rhantbcr or mountain travel), unttl .,4 hours have
_  ,.d the sterile 40-foot circle , . . .> >
it that the devil himself ltad ~rtat~ t c t I ckrt r rnr ~t
l . t }e
t p I~l )
t r otrtcrta~ a n cI Lnn ' T It u t r tt-ro m h e hin c l the
'
greatcr thc risk . I~~ercise at altituclc (as ntight uc~ur in a ,
elapsEd, . Having mentioned chambers, we shuuld add that the
, , . .a r t, . . re a I , 1 ,, - ,, , . ,, a .
durutg nightly walks while plutting freslt troubles to plague "lau K htcr curtain" . l ur w h~lhcr t h ~v r r ~ut , I F U s transporl aircrafl with the llit;ht ent;ineer trying tu rectit:y risk uf ilc,Lumpr~ssron si~kn~ss In the high altitudc eharnbcr
humanity! are visible, and as such cuuld cause an invuluntary reaction a sn .t~, ur lilc luadnlastcr wurkrnr , ~ ~, . . .~,
with car,,u) ~ ,.
l,rtally in- portiun ur aeruntedical trainin~, is, for the student, . luw, and
' w'rdc,l
~ y- whieh ~c') uld 1))c se 'a p 0tential danger t 0 pa's5 en~er , 1. . ~rt,
' 'W ',tn ll
,
, sttuatiuns,
ln r~~ent yea rs , ~~ dditional rin gs wcn , f und" ut creascs thc ri,k of this {thenonntenun occurinh . Persunal cunsidered au arreptahlc necessity . llnltk~ uthtr
,,
separ~t~d parts of the world Braril . Nc,w Lealand and at ,
aircraft, c.s L)t~rallv. at nr ht . I~actctrs ;Ire kntr~a~n, statistically at Ieast, to increase suscepti-
 ,, . .,,,, . ,,, . this is a well ~ontrolled . bricf and infreyucrtt cxpusurc . with
several sites in Canada . I hc atrllnc c .rt w ,tnd 1~ assinger s In ~ t h e fu 1 I c~wln t, wulcl y~ hilitv tu tltis illucss, c .c: . uhesilv, uld a~e (over 3U!), previous the capability uf rapitl descent and imntcdiate medical assis-
Two interested Canada Department of Agricu(turc scicntists publicized UFO c ;tses unduubtcllly wuultl huve agreed with Inlury tu a lunlt (tur thc bcnds) , and Inalleduat~ flwd Intake lalt~e,
wurking in thc Suil Researc:h Institute at Ottawa, focussed the last statentent . The unidentilieds are ?,~outl dinner con- crr llellV(lr~ll(fll . If you havc symptoms in (ligltt which ntay be due to
, ~, Ontariu . , .
their attention un onc uf the,se area s nea~ r Sterltn versation and may cvcn srrrv~ ~ ~ a~ s a~ d iv~r r, t i r t ~,1 side shutv un a llaving dcs~nbc.ll tlte , .
pulcnlral ,
COIlstllUt,nl,l,S llf 111~,11 decnmpression si~kness (mctst likely the bends), tht, lullowing
 t lt t he fl rll s )e ~trum of analvsis ., ,
., ,I~tuall
' ~ V '
Samples of sarl erE cxpus~d 1 , summer evcnin ~, bul whcrc airrraft urcu f)ants ,tr~ Y altitudc dccornpressiun sickrress in rather ~rint ntedical terms, immeliiate actiun is recurnntended :
and it did not take tao long tu asccrtain that the soil con- shakcn up or hurt that is a diffcrent mattcr . we must nuw put tltings back in proper pirspectivc . Most uf ~ ~ct un 100% oxygen
tained a sufficient atnount of anh y~druus uric acid to inhihit _' :15 a .m . . July ?3, 19qR, at S,OOU feet hetween Iluuston us whu tly as crew ur passen~~er are nut at any signiti~ant risk
~ nr~a ke ; t n en~er~~enc Y descent as suon as p ussible to as low
the gruwth of ve~ctation . From there . it was nut tuo difficult and Atlartta, an Eastern ;~irlines DC-3, pilotted by C .S . ('hiles of suiferinr lle~umpressiun sickness . Some ui our CF person-
to connect this substance artd the ring shape to a quite cum- artd J .B . Whittcd, hail tu take evasive actiun tu avoid a "hril- nel howcver, ran be re~ularilv ehpuscd tu this ha~ard, namely :
;rn allitude as is feasible
mun ;Ind down-ta-earth cause-the "Fairv Ring" tilushruum . liant ob-ject" near Mont,omery . Alabama . ~ ;~dvise someone on the ~round
I . C- ;3 piluts . and
The "burned" rings were thus Jiscredited unce and tor all as 9 :35 (~ .m ., December 5, 1945 . Piuneer Airlines L~li ~ht G3 reyuest tJte 11i ;;ht surgeon meet you un landing
evidence uf space-craff landin~s . DC-3 scrvice to Albuquerque was approa~hed head-un by a ~ . acrurtredi~~al tr ;unirt~ unit st ;iff .
~ lanil as suort as pussible
But nut all v~sttges o f t he (IFO p henomena ~an be dis ~osed "green fireball" and the captain was forced to pull the air- As well, circumstanres mav leacl a Twin Uttcr ur Buffalu You slluuld proceed with this plan, evcn if tuur syrnptunts
of su easily cspccr~tlly mtr lt i I~I e si~~htin is like thc l~alcon- ~raft up inta a ti~ht turn tu avuitl it, (and ;I sirnificant numhcr uf pcol~le) tu hazardous altitudes . dis ;l {{
~ icar cum I~letelv. durin~Te the descirnt . Get vourself
. salel Y
brid ;e one made hy rcspunsible members uf the comtnuruty, 1' :10 a .m . . Octoher 19 . IctS~ . at ~ .OOU fcet . an Arncrican Of iourse, anyune tlying in a pressurizecl aircraft could be cont'd on page 23

16 Flight Commcnt, Edition 2 1976 17

 wftich can ignite amhient curnbustible gases. do a good job of internal startin~ in warm weather . But the
Tite susceptihility nf nicads at hi~h temperatures becante cold weather lirnitations of LA batteries rea PP ear with freezinR
known earlv when the term therrna! n«ruwat' was cuincd . wcatlter . lt is thus pussiblc tu get thc bcst of both worlds by
which p henomenon describes a hut batter y that starts acce p t- usin ; LA batteries for summer operations, and nicads for
ing more current at cnd of charge . instead of less as it normally winter operation~, since present configuration of nicads is for-
shuuld . Thermal runaway in turn sets the stage for cell short- tunatelv, interchan geable with e q uivalent size lead-acids as re-
in~, and cum p lete batterv. failure . gards form fit and functian . Such recaurse to lead-acids

The hot and cold affair

Power demands, not required . escalated and the battery was constitutes an interim solution fur selected applications until
tasked to start turbinc engines, turbofan cnaines. and then to research and design can resolve the present thermal shortcom-
re-start thcm at short intervals on helico P ters and un short-le~ ings of the nickel-cadntiurn vented system in aircraft batteries.
Cummands are encuuraged lo develop such a dual capability

between your aircraft and

jets and turhoprops . Since the battery heats up on discharge
and is slow to dissipate heat . these dernands when unchecked, for nicad app]ications such as the CUH~IN Helicopter where
can put the present generation of nicads through the thermal the uptional use of an L .A . alternate has been approved .
ceiling of cellophane . which is the mentbrane that North

the nickel cadmium battery

American nicad battery manufacturers use Ibetwccn twu MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT
layers of Ilyl0lt) for platc scparator . 1'ropcr shop rnaintcnance, at frequent enough intervals, is
also essential ta the successful operations of nicad batteries,
This thermal ceilinR is functionally taken as 130°F (S,S°C)
r . . . e anger hlaintainers and supervisors can also do much to foster relia-
althuuglt a new battcry can exceed tltut temperature . When the
DAASE 6-3-2 bility by ensuring that the aircraft service cycle is satisfactory
cellophane separator has broken down, bridges build up
for the battery . and by reading CFTU C ~33-1S5-OOOJMF-000
through the nylon and the result is a cell shurt-circuit, causing
and applying its instructiuns . especially as regards these high-
self-dischar~e and uverhcating uf thc ccll . which can then
lrghts :
spread to contiguous cells one after the other . As a cell shurt
circuits, the battery terminal voltage goes down by a 1 .3 volt a . Balance of cells, inspection uf cells, rejection of bad
increment . Since cell-shurting can result from the last internal cells .
INTRODUCTION at temperatures down to -40` C (-40~F) . start, thc battcry~ will thcn dcmand rnorc charging current h . Setting the electrolyte level of cells.
Using nickel-cadmium hatteries in aircraft invalves cont- VoltabeJLoad
.i Characteristics Th~, nt~
' ~ke 1-~admi
~~ t rttt hat- frum the constant voltage hus, leading tu excessive overchar~,e " ~ v c . Use of like cells (same type, vendor and rating) in one
promises . tery maintains a relatively stahle voltage under varying load when airhorne, and to thermal runaway . Thus thermal run- battery .
Among other guodies, the early sixties brought on that new conditions, due to its very law internal resistance, away, and discharge overheatin ; causing cell shortin~~, are two d, I roper torquing uf cell terntinal hardware .
fang led , all sin i,6 hP ower P ackage offered as a
Jin ~ . all dancinT, failure prucesses initially distinct, altltough tlte end results are e . Luwcr the vultage regulatur (VRj setting in the spring
panacea for power users called the nickel-cadntiurn battery . DISADVANTAGES f~recluently entwined . The thermal runaway of u hattery can las pcr thc aircraft instructions) . hor aircraft such as Sea
Sorne advertisers l ;tid it un kind of thick too . "WhY f1 Y lead High Initial Cost The cast of nickel-cadmittm batteries be hrouhht under control hy stopping battery churging, i .e . . Kin ;, CFS, Cf1147 which do not havc an acljustable d .c .
weight around 'r"
. was onc qucstiun which stood out rn ' l~old is cunsiderabl Y hi g her than that of lead-acid batteries, and ef- by turninn the air~raft battery switch ot'f . Thus isolating the VR setting, the alternative is to shorten the aircraft ser-
. v? , ,
print in the trade magazines . managrng to su~g,est that _ ~ fective maintenartce is required tu enahle its operational ad- battery from the charginh bus will limit the energy dissipated v'r~e
~ wcle
~ o f t h e h~
. attery . i .e . , t ake i t off' the aircraft for
" w as sc~mehow li gltter tltan SS 1~ounds of lead .
pounds of nickel vantages to he realized . Also, ccll interchangeahility means to that of the battery 1tSClf. "1'trrlllitg the battery switch off at sho 1-~ reconditiunin~5 at 7S hours, or even SO hrs . instead
The nicad and its benefits were of course uversold, but numerous expused, removahle connectiuns which have to be sr~h
t c, a~ tnne
~ w'tll alsu
~ prt,vent
~ t 1 te generatu
~ r be~nn
t ~ overloaded uf 100 hrs,
there are nevertheless sorne advantages in the use of this bat- kept clcaned ancl tightened . Handling care is required tu pre- and subscqucntly failing as a result of the battery failure.
tery, althuugh these are mure convincing when stated ubjec- vent intercell sparking . FLIGHT SAFETY
tivelv . or when curttrasted with correlated drawbecks as in Electrolyte Contamination The KllH electrolyte con- MANAGEMENT An uvercharging battery evolves combustihle gases, which
CFTO- C -93-
. 1 _~5-
_ UU01'~1F-001
, . Fi ~ ure _~- 1-4 which is n~ p ro- tarninates easily, buth in the cells and in cuntainers, unless it 7 he low thermal ~~eilin:; uf the ttic ;td b,tttery, and its sluw are norrnally contained by the airtig}tt stainless steel battery
, su p eriurit y' uf . -, tltc,, prescrtt f;crtcratiun uf rticads
du~~d below for conveni~nc,c . The ~~n.ld we~tther
~ is kept covercd at all tirnes . KUH eleetrolyte has an aftinity thermal dissipatiun, ntakt, case and are vented overbuard . lf an aircraft battery overheats
nicads is of prime importancc in Canada, and their flat volta n e for carbon dioxide (C0~) in antbicnt air, causing ~ reaction .
tuuchv lu use in suntmc,r . Since the hatteries heat up un charge
-
and glucs into thcrmal runawaY~ it is wisc to turn the batte
, , -
I .T I ,

characteristic on discharge is another valuable asset since it can which produces potassium carbunatc ( K ~('U3) and d~rates and on dischar~,e, it is wise to ecunomize un us~t6e in hot switch off thus isalattn c the batte ry electricall Y . Utherwise
keep the clectronics going longer when it serves as the emer- , ,
batt~ry ~_apacity and performance . Due tu ltiglt plutc poro- weather . Savmt, on dischar~e. , automatically saves on charge . t he g e n e rat
~ o r or o t her char~in
b g source kee p s p ourin g energy
gency power suurce . sitv, the ccll clectrolyte is not casily replaced . That which is not taken out tlucs nut Itave to bc put back in . into the battery, which accelerates the runaway and can cause
One ~~oud way tu ecunomize un discitarge is to use external the battery to break duwn internally, i .e ., melting of cells,
ADVANTAGES welding uf plates and if the flight were prolonged enough,
NOTE : The stable density characteristic of the elec- powcr, c~pccially for starting the engine(s), wherever possible .
Long Life - A long life can be expected, with numerous For some helicopter hut weather ficld uperations where the eventually hurning holes in the battery case thus allowing
trolyte means that the battery State-of-
usage cycles . lndividual cells are replaceable, enahlingerunumi- hattery serves as an APU, it is tlesirable where practical that oxygen and hydrogen gases inside some aircraft compartment .
Charge cannot be ascertamed by S .G . read-
cal and cunvenient repairs in cases uf failure nf individual spare batterics bc brought along and that arrangements be The luadrneter rs an atd to the ptlut rn spottrng battery thennal
cells. Cells can be easily connected and discunnected . however in~s. ntade to have the hatterv remuved for cooling or for shup ser- runaway at an carly stage . Thc Battcry Ternperature Indicators
connector maintenance is necessary to ensure cunnector cfean- vicin{~r when it has been unavoidabl Y used tu excess at closc in- bcing istalled in all aircraft with Nicads will ease tttis task in
liness, security and lightness . Voltage/Charke Relatianship The stable vultage/Charge tervals . future . For more reading, see "l,oadmeters advertise Battery
Stable Density uf Electrolyte - The density of the electru- characteristie of the batte ry means that its state uf charhe
.. can- It is highly desirable tu avotd eharging the hattery wlten Truuble" in Fli :;ht Contment Jul-Au~b 197?, and "Batterv.
. , .  ,. . .
lyte is stahle under normal uperatut, ~onditions, and dues not nUt bt, eaSllv
. dettrntlned frOm IlJ vUlta g4 rtadlil t~ , l111'SS
I t Srlf~tl- hut, sav in exccss ul SS C, or when too hot to touch by hand . "I'ernperuturcs" in Flight Conuncnt Mar-Apr 1974 .
., . . , -, , , -
requrrc, Specific Cravity readings to be taken . ciently precise measuring instruments are availuble, li tht battcry is not depletcd, ur if the typt uf mission renders The battert~ toccclt t~st is a practical method of checking a
Vultagc/Charge Characteristics The voltage level varics Tcmpera t ,~rrc, / Performance Characteristics lir 1, h a mbiertt the battcry role as an entcr~,en~y puwer source secondary, the hardwurking nicad . If thc, battery, is tuo hot tu rcst u hand on,
little exccpt at extrernes of full-chari;e , pro-
and full-dischar~,e, tem p eratures ma Y inclu~c., thermal n tna~ w-a Y under certain likelihoud of airhorne batter_v failure can be decreased by turn- coolin~ time should be allowed befure another internal start is
viding a stable vultage under varying state-uf-charge con- charge c~mditions . (See Theory of' Operation) . rn~ the batten swtte,h uff when thc ~cncrator is turned on .
" li f ~ r ~ ~ i ~> > i .
attempted . First give the Battery the finger test, tlte way a
ditians . Volta~eJLuad Characteristies It is not casy to determine The P ilut has of cuurse tu rententber that ltis batterv switch is housewife tinger tests her pressing irun . Such a battery touch
,, , uf t,har.,e l , the lratte ~ vc > lta,c.
the statc  . of
.  . Alsu , bc~ause
TemperatureJPerfurntance The battcry . with ~U`~ KOH . y ry OFF, esltecially un sin,~le gencrator installatiuns . In such in- test is safe and is rccornmended after each flight in warm
very low internal resistance, verv- lu~tI ci~s , f,, e ~urrcnts
r ~~har , ~an
can withstand without dantage temperatures down tu -S~l`' C , t , stan~es, the battery switch can be turned hack un at a later weather . A battery which is tou hot to touc ;h will be in an ad-
(-6S° F) . Since electrolyte cuncentration does not vary with uccur under short-circuit ~unditions, which can _e 1 t a 7.ardc us
h stage uf the f1ight, such as on the befure descent check, su that vanced stage af runaway and there will be plenty of other
state of char~e, the freezin .P;,~ oint stavs at a fixed minimurn . to personnel and dama,ing to equipmcnt . lluring maintenance, tlte gencratur ean tup up thc battcry chargc . signs of what is happening, i .e ., violent gassing, overboard
, under luad wen
The batterv- voltag e remains rc,l~tttvc.l y stcadv
 , prccauttuns
, , .- ' ' . .
have tu be taken to prevent mtcrt,cll shorttn~,
' n In rnanv. sntall turbine a PP licatiuns, lead-acid LA balteries vcntina,. hissin~~~, sounds, or swellin g of the battcrv. casc .

Flight Comment, Edition 2 1976

 ThP A
The nicad hatteries used in CF aircraft are in a stainless UO tuuch test tlre batteries hefore eaclr start in Itut weather .
steel case with four strong clasps holding the cuver in place . DON'T cr~nk the engine(s) on the hatterv .
A battery undergoing runaway in an aircraft should he re- UON'T make re }~eated en~ine start attern ~ts un the batterv,
moved fr~mt the aircraft . with its cover in situ, takin~~ all I ~os- UON'T repeat internal battery starts at excessively freyuent
sihle 1~recautions . If tou hot to hartdle in situ, thc battcr Y casc intervals. .
can be temporarily coolecl using C0, from a tire extinguislter, DON"1' char~e t}te battery when thc battery is too hut .
this bein~ the only readily available means of coolin~~ normally DON'T reclrar~,e the aircraft hatterv. in the aircraft usinQ ea-
availahle around the aircraft, that does not leave rnuisture or tern~rl ground power .
residue and does not lead tu other aircraft problems . ()nce In view uf their advanta ;es, it is likely that nickel-cadrniurn
it is uut of the aircraft, the batten~ can be left to cuol bv it- batterics will be aruund for awhile . The CF is currentlv evalu-
self with the cuver in P lace : or if desired it can be cuoled b y ~ atin T a new memhranL su "~~estecl bv- UREO Shirlev's - l3uti- for
water or bv otfter convenient means . use in cells in lieu of cello I~hane and lab and field tests are
under way . Ot}rer cuuntries are investigatint; uther approachcs
SUGGESTED DOS AND DON'TS FOR FLIGHT tu the pruhlent .
CRFWS l!ntil new-!~eneration batteries become available, tlibht
UO ecunumize batterv utilization in hot weather. crews and ,~round crews can hel p enhance the reliabilitv , and
UU use crtemal startin~~~. P ower where available . safety uf present eyuipment by ohserving applicablc ~umpru-
UO space out b ;tttery engine starts as much us pussible . mises as described ~abuvc . The conjut;ated effurts uf all cun-
UO ntonitor the loadtucter rcadin~. ur the aTi wlten installed. cerned will in the future as it has in~the 1 ~ast, alleviate E~rub-
UO turn off the Ratterv~ Switch if the luadrrtcter reads hit;her lents and help rnaintain the relatively };uod CF recurd with
than normal . ni~ad hutteries .

r~ ;y,,
The autopsy conducted by the Flight '`1 ~an't hclp it . 1Villis . ( olonel 13irch called me and tald
Surgeon listed under "injuries incurred me we'll turn fc~ur mare birds fur night missions on Wednesday~
during mishap :" and Thursdatir . I've cancelled Hooker's guing away party until

A Blind Man's Look Body Part : Vertibral Column nezt week . Now, I know we're short-handed, It's oin to take
all of vou haulin' to~ether to ~et these birds off on time,"
Diagnosis~ Multiple Fractures and
Ser^eant Willis . rubbine.~ his red eves,
. s1~uke u p , "Sar~ e,
Dislocations ,.
Su the secund blind m;ut said, "tiu, it feels like a wall," and their errur unlv as the air~ratt began to settlz sluwly iutu the we can't turn t}tose birds fur an 1 SUO gu! No way! "
Cause : Ground Impact
thc third said . "This elz Iahant feels like a rupe ." Likc the five ()Ce ;rn . Thc Scniur ntastcr scr~teant pointed al him, "'rVillis, I
blind men in the stury descrihing the elepltant . sumc uf us ~14 crfticer is nut near a hangar ur pilut readyroum . Eiut The AF Form 711 put it more simply : didn't ask you to do it . 1 told vou to du it . That's al) I
sec aviatiun safety thruugh different eyes . when I'rn at the air ~~t' urt . it's ~~uud h tu lte ;ir p ilots discussin~~b "Royal, James J ., Jr ., Captain, 920901171, heve . . .let'S C~o ." .
~s a nuuratcd type . ruy views corne frum the hack seat saf'etv pructi~os in tlt~ir bull scssiuns . and tu scc pustcrs dis- FP, Pilot, F ."
ot the aircruft . It's tnli~ htening tu see +tirhat my presence back playrnb , ~~ thc ».c lifie~ s,~tv rn~, ma s.sa~e
., U s . I ha, v e ~,~, en  ca v i~s.dr u ppccl
~ un Captain Royall, for all p ractical Scene : 'fhe ~chedulin6 eounter
there «enerates . Uid the 1~ilot actuall )~ scc that I tivas stra FF > >ed a master ;iviator as he counseled two yuunb vv ;rrr ;rnt ut~ficers purposes, was dead two days prior to the Time : 1?45, 7 J :rnuary .
in pruperly'! Uid he luok ic> see if this ~round-puundcr Icft a because their _'U-Ininute fuel warniug light earTte un ana they, accident of 8 January, 1975 . "Dart~mit, Sarn vou told me 1 had tomorrow uff . I've
stra P han irr~ uut of the back dour? Uid he look to see that made a precautiunary landin~ in ;r farmer's field . First came alrcad ) r ruadc plans! " -
the duor vvas clused and latched sec~urelv'! I low ;ihutrt remind- praisc lar tllcir uinn ;rnship, and therr he yucstiuned lheir "Whoa . Slovv down, Jim . I had tu add some ni~ht
inc; nte that thc slecwcs un rny luti~~ues 'were rulled up :, I have I tclr « em nt t ~cr r ,rll ~ ow rn thi s tucl~ s h u rta~ c~ s Itu,ttr ~ 'o n t u u cc~ ~u r Srene : Squ ;tdrun commander's ufficer missions . "The uld man told me tu ily~ the Fuys who need the
wundered un ucc ;rsion whv , the cu P ilot didn't think Ite neecied in llle lirst p lace . I ho p e llis unkind wurds niade a lastin ~ Time : 081 ~ . b Januar_`r, nil;Jtt rcyuirc~mcnts . Sorn_~ ."
~,luvcs just because he was in the other seat . impressiun un thuse two lads . Thc squadrcn , ccrnmandtr
,~ , Icaned
,. back in his chair and "Sam, ti ort knc ~ ~vv 1 ' vc~ f.c~~ t so mc~ p eco
r. nal
~ pr obeI ms~ a~t
.
1 Iravc s etched t vv u v~u t r n~, men ~t u thrcru ~<rh tlt c.~ir }~nilr ht ti9v. turn tu cuurtsel , . came , ,, une day in the hungar when I balanced a penril betwecn lus forefint;crs . humc . Tumorrnw I vc ~.otta takc tht ktds cwer to m~~ sister's
' ~ ~ t ' , y ~ ~ ~
l

. ;i suldier , with a ~a~;,a rc t te in 111_'s I t',r nll . ~I 1 I" I~, ' I1'~r IntllI , .l.
check of ;tn airL:raft . lind' a cluestiunablc, .area. .,rnd apparently in a~ ;w
r "Sam . thc uld man wants us to gct sume night missions , ., . !t ~ s ,an crgltt-lruur
,~ ~ ~omtonc
. , , clse
,
placc ruund trip . Can't you gct
the interest uf missiun cumpletiun . pursuc it nu 1'urther . ~hhev sigrl witll alr ~crusol ~untaincr . un thc huard this week . The weather is killing us . . .wc to takc it' .' "
, , -
did nul usk rne if 1 w~as in ;r hurry . ;u I wondered why thc crevv 1'V~ Il ther e i t is . 1 ~ertainl h~~v~c nut descrr ~ b~cd t hc~ w h u Ic, cancellcd ei~ht lines last week and we onlv pot abuut half uur "Sorrv, Jim . . ." T}te scheduler picked up thc pltonc on
: ., , .
chief was nut cunsulted fur his expertisc~ . I h ;rve ;ilso watched ccl1 ~ h .. m t . I' rn steatu
>> ~r r ~ w ~, r c 1 ci,ctc
, - . > r ~~~tI ~c ~r I ~ te u~I w It h 1tL~ mission:
. s off durin~~~, uur I~~rst~ rt~~
IRl tt-ilv'n~>
- r ..1 >h .r s c . the third ring . Captain Kuy ;rll slanuntd , his hand down on thc,
, . . .  ,. ,
uthc~r pilc~ts ~_u thraugh tltat IcnKt}iy cflccklist, knuwing huw h ;rir-rarsrn ., : , t~rles
, . ,i~r td Il ~ c ue
~
. w' c.>- . ,lc ) ~rlct1 ~ h a ~ e t 1 1 e 'r r.
I uc 1 s ,rr F "Sir, wc'rc in a real bind .' Thc sclrcduling atirccr Icancd , . , . . ,
plcvr~.las countertup, turncd aruund and walkcd ,, ., out .
manv. times thcv, must ltav~~ dune it bclure . 1 antici F~~ted e .x}~eriences . 1'he une sure tlting l have fuurld is th ;it this safety furward in his chair . "l don't think we can get t}tree
cnjuyin~ rny riife much Inore as they meticuluusly cuvered busincss is c,v,crv unc~' ~ h uslness .' und w,c ,tll ~ shurr Id s t i ck., urt r turn ;trounds ;~ dav . 119aintenancc rs in a hind tu ~tvc , ~ ;v, us. twu . Scenc I' ;rrking spot cchu tw~o
ea~h and rvcrv . item, usin k~ the buuk . noses intu it . 'lhis rold weatlt~r has 1 ~ut a bunch ul thc aircraft duwn with Timc : I 71 ~, 8 Januarv .
,
I must adntit tu ;i de~ree ui ;mnovance when ;r cloud shelf I1~ unc flys tltem . fuels thelu . luaintains then~ . ridcs in thern lt ydraul'e ~ s hee n d uw n fo r,t~ wec, k w, rtl t a~
r Ic~ak~s . ( ) r rc-1ttree-sr~~ ha, "}lcs . ('hicl . let'S go . I m ~unna bc latc .'
, w 1 ti Ic, 'wc w, e r.,c m an OH->!~ -, . ~tie - r,
moved undcnrcath us unc,, day ur just slands un thc ~round, enviuuslv , ., . a~ thev. ruar utt . satetv. fuel I c~ak . I d ~ n l kn uv v, I 1- I ~~alr
~ i t c
n,mc.,~ ~,rn
~~ .eu pl ~~ rt u .~ w rtl t Ser~e ;tnt Willrs t,larcci at Capt ;rin Ruyall ;md turned hack
were ahuut -U ; rninutcs uut un a schcclul~d > _> huur tlr~ht, and h ;rs to he part ufhis life . Thcr~ rs nu ;rltcrnutive . ;rnother ttrrnaruuncl ." icr hts
'~>I rt>blcnt~ a hvcJraulic leak . His '1'ech Orders wcrc lav rn~,
- , r ., , , ~  ., . , ~ .
the I~ilut did a I ~i0-dc{,ree
~ turn and rcturned tu tlte air f t~~rt . Thc coluncl ltad turncd awav frutn his clticl' schedulcr at his fect, clused . llis attempts tc ~cl ,r sfccr~rlrst tc hts
Cc>ttrtesl~ C:olvrtc~l Rngc~rJ . h-c~tisc~b~irtg, (',S.-1R
13ut I alsu h ;rd tu recu~ " nize thr P ruiessiunal attitude u1 the and pressed a kev un the syuawk bus . "til ;trv . get me Colunel ~ir~raft had f~iled . . .h1aintenance Control told him it would
, ,, s ,rn . d ,r~ ir~ralt Chtitc~d Stutes .-1 rrrrr
Ftlut cunccinln~ the .atetv c t . hl's p~t~ sscn~cr Birch ." He swivelled ba~k aruund and fac~~tl the major, "S .rm . take at Ie3st thirtv minutes to ~et a man out to the aircraft .
:1 I'I:I TIU.',' 1)1( ;I :.S'1~
I was ~:uriou~ un several occasions as tu whv piluts and I'll talk to tnaintrrtunc:e . Yctu gu schcdulc thc ntissions . . .get ('~ Ptain Ruvall walked cwcr to his tormations lead aircraft as
.- . ( ~.11. .tc. ,t~rCu
('ulurtc, 1 /v-,c .tisc
. .,It,IR , rc >,cr , ,, .,
cupiluts ntade a br~ deal ahcrut passlng the cuntruls tu each LS a xruclt~utc c .J tltc~ 1 tt 1 attnt thosc ~uys on thc huard fur their night rlyuin~mcnts . the piloi was strappink in . St ;tndin~ on the kick-step, he
uthrr . Sinrc rnv invulvement in aviatiun I nuvv ~et . thc AV1 :1- C'ottrsc~ aru! tltr Sch~u! /i~r Irtsl~c~rtc~rs (~c~rtcrul. llc~ is u Jormc~r advised his leader he might be late, ;inil since there vvere no
TI()ti DIGh:S~I- arld ,~I1~~ RU :1Cfl, There s~~ a~ .s mv ,tn s w,cr . irtspcctcr gertctul~ t crth
~' Hcc~clduat .tcr, . s. , FI/th .ir
- nt i, u r t d t's r tc~tc~ Scene : M ;unt~nan~e linc shack spares, ntight eancc~l out ;rltu~ether . He secretlv huped they
., , .
(('U1 t S. t r.tut, tUA
- J.
,a} >>
f R0~1CH told of a llelicopter ilyink uff a ship w'ith each Ittsrertur
1 .
Lcucral -ll ~th 1 :'rt irtcc~r ' Ccntnratd
' 1 I Timc : 1330 . 6 Januarv . wuuld canx . sinrc hc had bc~n un th~ rc~ ;rd since si~ o'clock
aviator fhlrikln~,~, the uther h,td the contrnls . The~ re ;tlited ( 7t icagu, ll. Thc NCOIC stuud in front uf si~ vuun~a ser~~cants . tltat nturnink aftcr ;r ni~aht with vcrs liitlc sleeh antl ;r lut cri

Flighl Comment, Edition 2 1976

soul-scarclting. Divorce seemed the only solutiun . "ll~mn! "
he thought to himself, "I'ni gonn~ niiss those kids . , ."
to warm his numb fingcrs . His NC01C sat across from him . It
was evident he had nut sle I tt tlte ni~ rt before .
On the Dials 4. Missed approach altitude (if you are following the
published rnissed approach prufile) .
He was shuken uut uf these tltuughts h~ the chiel . who "~~'illis . arc vou sure there was nothing seriously wrong In our trovels we're often faced wilh "Hey you're an ICP, what ahoui such- S . A combination of all four .
was signalling him that his hird was rcad~- . Hc madc a quick with the hvdraulics
. on .vuur bird'' Y'uu krtuw, Ca I~tain and~sucf+7" "Usually, Ihese quesfions cannol be answered oul of hand ; if it

walkaruund and stra l> l>ed in . Bv. the tinie he ;oi the en f~~ne Ruvall's
. Ic~dcr said tltcrc nti~hl havc bccn surne kind of were thal easy fhe question wouldn't hove been osked in Ihe ~rst place . Now Ict's look at how. On a missed approach, just follow
cranked up, he heard lead call fur taxi . Srt.nalhn~ the chief to
. T ~ .
problem with his hvdr ;rulic svstcm ."
Questions, suggestions, or rebutlols will be hoppily entertoined ond if nor
the published missed approach until you reach an altitude that
onswered in prinl we sholl atrempt to give o personal answer Please direct any
pull chocks, he ran up to abuut eight~ percent ~nd turned unt "1ti'ell, thcre svcrs only. lhat small Icilk I ~au4~ tt ort communication to : Commandant, CF8 Winnipeg, Westwin, Mon. Attn : ICPS, will provide obstacle clearance . From there you can normally
un the tuxi lanc . Sergeant Willis turned his back on thc jet preflight and I fixed that . If vou ask me, that guy shuuldn't procced on cuursc or fullow ATC instructions .
blast and held onto his ~a p . The searin~ blast en 7ulfed him,
thcn subsidcd . Ilc threw his cap dosvn on the ramp in dis~.ust .
have heen fl~~in~
. g at all vesterdav
- - ."
Th~ old senior master sergeant louked up frunt his Obstacle Clearance on Takeoff In the casc of take off, the answer is not so easy . On most
take offs you provide yourself with terrain clearance visually .

Scene : En route to the range

clipbo ;lrd, "Huw's tltal . Willis' "
"Wcll, Itcll, Sargc . . .thc guy was all screwcd up . Hc
and Missed Approach But huw can we provide ourselves with obstacle clearance on
take off when the weather is on limits?
Timc : 1835 . 8 Januarv. jumped all uver me because tlte bird wasn't re ;ld~~ tu ;zo, lle "Tiie pilot of an aircraft on departure or missed approach If the airport has a departure or SID, follow the published
"Tuck it in, two . . .vou're too far back .'- louked . . .you knuw . . .preocrupicd with sumcthing . When Itc procedure as you would for rnissed approach .
shall not comply with any ATC instructions until he has
Ca P tain Rovall
. thou ¬~tt to himself . "In .vour ear, .vau pulled uut of fhe chucks, he ilamned near blew rite over . . .he Before procecding further, let's look at CF take off limits .
assurcd himsclf of terrain clcarartce ."
SOB . . .I can 11y rings around you antl you krtow it . . .Jtow t}te didn't sc~crn tu rcali~.c wltut was guinr un . . ." We are authorized to use for take off, the rninintum MDA and
A pretty strong statement you may think . Wcll it has just
hell am l ~upposed to keep ,tny' kind of position with ~-ou The NCOIC ruhbed his neck, "Well, after talkin' to the vis published for the runway in usc.
been reconfnned with MOT in Ottawa that controllers are
bobbin g aruund . . ." guys this mornin,;, they said lte was une uf the best pilots in Before we blindly take off under the above rnentioned
providing "NO" obstacle clearence when they issue instruc-
About that time, he caugJit a tlickering liglri in lris the squadron . . .l gucss you ncvct knutiv . . ," minimum weatJter conditions we should consider ttte follow-
tions to aircraft on departure or misscd appruach . Ref:
peripheral visiun . "Lead, two, , .l tlunk I gut a problem . 1'm ing:
NOTAM 1/~6 Page 4? .
gonna movc out and clterk it ." Sten' : Offic:er's ('lub Citsual Bar Exarnple # 1 - A departure situation . You have just got 1 . The rate of climb fur your type of aircraft .
.,Rng. twu ." Tinte : 3330, c~ .ianuar~ . the wheels in the well and de l~arture control sa Y s "CAN- ?. Are iltere any obsiructions off the end of the runway
C.~ p tain Rovall
. rhecked the warnin bp
~ anel, hut there "l'uu knuw, Fred, when I told Jint hc hud to 11v that F'ORCL 1234, you are radar indcntiGed, turn lcft hcading that would prevent a straight ahead climb to an obstacle
, , nu Itt,hts
wcrc ~, ~ e nRtn
. (~laIlC111~, at hts ~" e nistn
~ r nt e rt ts, he rtoti,ed
c rttissiun dav befare vcstcrdav . ltc was prrlty upscL Saitl ltc had 220°, clirnb to $.000 fect ." That instruction sounds pretty clearance altitude (You will need to be familiar with
the hydruulic prcssurc was riglrt at the luwer limits ;tncl tu drivc sumcwhere . . .I never thoutt tt he would gu ahead and commandin g , and most of Y ou "ace" P ilots would p rohahl Y the airpurt or use a topographical map.)
tluiauating slightly . do it w~ith a night flight scheduled . Jeez, he musta' reallv been follow the instnlctiun if yuur aircraft was above 500 feet
"Lead, I think I've got a hydrauli~ problem . I'd hcttcr be~t, I shunlil have scheduled sunicone else . . ." - 3 . If there are obstacles, you can intercept a published
and at a safc manocuvcring spcctl . Beforc you makc tJtat
take this pig hack ." "Hey, 5artt . tiun't blame yuursell' . Yuu and I both knuw misscd appruach prufile and fly it .
turn, think about the first two statements . Have you achieved
"Jim, I had that bird a fcw davs ago, lt's OK . thc Jirtt rould Ilv. t}t~tt mission in his slee p . It was a damn sufficient terrain clearance if you proceed in that direction? 4 . If you are unahle to follow para ? or 3, it may be wise to
pressun, wrll
~ stay at the low~r ~
, hntit ;III - cl,rv
., lun~, . But if yott mainten~nce maltitn~ticm! 1 should have lecl h r lll b~ a ~k when Rentember, t}te responsibility fur ensuring terrain clearance raise your take off limits so that you are ahle to . An
don't think ti ou ~an haek it . I'll Iead .vau home ." he first told me he h,rd ~t prublem . 1 guess 1 wuuld have, but l at this stagc of flight lics entirely un your shoulders . The example of a take off that could be disasterous under
Ca P tain R l) ~all n,tl
~S C d a 1~rtt le 1'a SI
,, , ilew Ihul samc bird a cuuple of duys ago and told Jim nut tu
. %' h ' iit lhe 11 .11tIt1Eilt . cuntrollcr has no idca of your altitude ur rate of climb so rttinirttum weather conditions is, Rwy 26 at Victoria .
"Press on ;' he suid . worr~ about the low pressure . 1 gtress the darttn Itydraulic he has no way of knuwing if you are able to clear t}te sur- Thcre are many problems associated with obstacle clearance
system just gave up . . ." rounding terrain . He only expects you to folluw his instruc- on take off under mininntm weather conditions and tJtey will
Scene : The range tions after you have provided yourself with obstacle clearance . be dealt with more deeply at a future time when the answers
'Iirne : 1yU5, 8 January . Scene : Wing Conimander's O1'fice The only exception would be if the controller stipulates a
arc resolved . Mcanwhile, it is hoped that awareness of the
As he was pulling off from his first pass . Captain Ru~all Timc : 1600 . 10 J;~nuarv. specitic point at which to commence the turn . Only altitude ohstacle clearance problems associated with take off and
_ ght t o 1t'tms e I f , , . I kn
. e w , s~~ c~ n ,,ts, I l~~, , , tt was ~,c urk
tlinu as r~kli,d, fhe rc,ntntanfJer sat behind Itis desk . studvin~ a mess ;tgc . will be considered as a specific point . i .e . "When out of 3,000 missed approach will keep us from unscheduled contact with
tu be a bad P ass . I knew it ." 1Ie luuked u p at thc Maintenancc Officer, "Well . that's it . I'm fect turn lcft ." "terra finna" .
His radio crackled . st~rrv I c ;tn't tell vuu niore, but there wasn't much left of the Example * ~ You arc tloing a NDB Rwy ~~ approach to
Maj D.C. Deagnon
"Vego two, I had vour s~ore . . .unbelievable ~t six ." wre~ k~rke ." Sudbury an a Round Rohin tlight . The publishcd missed
Ca p tain Ruvall su pl~ressed ;tn invective and ro~ered tltc "Ycs sir, I `auess su . I'll pass on what we've got so far tu approach is "immediate right turn climhing to 3,000" . ATC
range officer . He thougJtt to himself. "C'nton, Jim, vuu ~an du the trouis1 ." gives you this clearance : "CANFORCE 1234 is cleared from
better 111311 th ;tt! " lie was ~Jcarcd in fur his second p ass and "1'he squa~irun rumnttncler c~lcarccl his tJtruat . "Darttn Sudbury to dcstination, malnlalrl 8,000 . On missed approach
rolled in tigltt and steep . As he w~s ahout to pi~kle, l~e ,tg;tin sltarne . Capt,lin Ruyall was onc uf our be~t piluts . I'm Ronna turn Icft . climb un cuurse ." cont'd from pape 17
cauglit a waming lig}tt out of the ecxner u1 his eye . I le luuketl ,
have to hite a portion of the cummunal hullet tuu . I t,ucss . I Do you follow the cuntroller's instructions or ttte published on the g round a nd 1 e t the fl'tgl t t su r g eo n try t o sort out t h e
over tu see w}tich li t it was. It was to be thc last thin g1 he shouldn't havc put Illm rrp fc~r night rangc wnrk without missed apprctach'? From earlier statements, we know the cause of your symptoms . The medical drill to expect, if you
ever did . checking tu see how lung it hacl been since he last flew a rught controller is not providing you with obstacle clearance . We do have had bends symptorns only and these have disappeared, is
nllstilUll ." know that if wc follow the published missed approach we are that you will be medically questioned and examined and
The accident report best describcd ihe irnpa~l . "Thc Thc wing ~untrnander luukcd uvrr ~t thc syuadron C0 . assured of obstaclc clearance . NOTE : 'I'here are numerous tcmporarily restricted from high altitude re-exposure,
aircraft impacted the ground approximately four hundred feet "Dull~t I~ccl luu badl`', Ruhhi~~ . It"s out uf otrr hands, towers off the end of the runway to the left . ln tltis situation probahly for ?4 hours. If you still have decompression sick-
from the target at the eleven o'clock pusitiun . T'he Rang~~ nuw . , .Yuu bctter grt back tu t~our sduadron . Yuur buvs arr the cantroller's instructions are to he followed only after ness sY m I atoms after lartdin g , or did have sYm P toms potent-
Control Officer stated it was travellJtn at a higlt rate uf spc~ecl hricl"in g for their 1 n00 6ru in 1 S niinutes . Yuu mit;ht
. w ;tnt tu you have followed the published missed approach and ially more serious than the bends (e .g . the chokes) you will
(approximatel~t 300 tu 350 hIAS} . _'Oc' nose luw, 10° ritatt let them kni~w wh~t we've got so f;fr ." achieved sufficient terrain clearart~e . re q uire, in addition, medical ohservation for at least ~4 hours,
bank on a heading of about Ol Sc' ruagnetie . Thc tcrrain was The twu men left the otti~e . The ~ulunel luukeil b ;tck Now tltat we have cunvinced thc non believers that tlte RarelY are more extensive medical measures re q uired.
flat and the intpact area was on a sltght upslupe . The aircraft clc,wn at lhe accident progress repurt message . He touk a red pilot is responsible for ohstacle clearance, the next queslion Rememhe r t h at de,~ort i p ress~on
r s'r~~kness is a n ont ta 1 h um an
was not in u yaw condition . The ~r ;tter dimensiuns were F~n~tl and vcr~ alc , wl_s untlerlined, " 'An exltaustr4t, but is What is ohstacle clearance and how do we achieve it? response to low surrounding pressures and does not indicate
iippruximattly ..0
i to SO feet and 10 fett
, dttp
 .at tht, luwcst
 . -
unsucrcssful . effort hus bc~n madc ,~ ~  uf
, > tu fintl tvrdtn~c There are several altitudes that provide ohstacle clearancc you have some medical abnorrttality that migttt jcopardize
point ." hydraulic tailurc, jammcd tlii~~ht ~ontrols . FOD, disrunnccted (1,000 feet above highest obstacle in the area being referred Y our flY ing career . The worst that is likel Y ta ha pP en to Y ou,
contrnl linkagc, malfunrtiuning trim cuntrols, or matcriel to) : if you respond correctly to this type of physiological incident,
Scene : The Base Ops Sn~ck 13ar failure which would exhl~in this acriticnt . Capture marks is that .vou get 1~oked and prodded a bit and P erhP as laid off
l . (~uadrantal (within ~S NM) .
Time : 11 S5, c) January . indii;ate stabilatur and rucltler husitiunirt ;~ were normal . "flte flying for a couple of days . T}tis is a good sight better than
Sergeant W'illis was ~upping a styrufoam ruatainer uf :' ? . Emergency safe (within 100NM) . what can happen if you suffer decumpression sickness and
p ilut ntudc no atlrm p l to e~r~t
I
cof-fec betw'een his ilunds . The ste ;rrn lrurtt the ~offce did littlc Ile put the repc~rt h ;r~k into a fitlder and left his t~ffiee . 3 . MEA for you routc (if yuu are on track), attempt tu rcmain at altitude .!
7~~7c : ittrrck
22 Flighf Comment, Edition 2 1976 Z,3
 ~]
Comments NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
DIRECTORATE OF fLIGHT SAFETY
None of us know as much as all of us - so pass the
word .
COL R . D . SCHUITZ
WRITE DIRECTOR OF FIIGHT SAFETY

In previous editions we have published pleas for MA1 D . R. WILIIAMS I,CCIL F . G . VIIIENEUVE

material for publication from field units, and in this fducotion ond analysis Invesligatian and prevention
issue we are going to have to rr~~peat the request . This
magazine exists for two basic purposes - to make
available to field units information which originates
from this and other headquarters, and to allow an inter-
change of information between field units,
1 one man in a raft
If you as a piloi, mechanic, or administrator
encounter a flight safety problem, it will probably 2 thougl~ts for the swivel chair wa~rior
eventually be encountered by someone else . Your
soluiion, or at least your warning, may prevent loss of 3 give a gu~ a chalienge
life or valuable equipment - but only if you spread the
word around . That is what we produce the magazine for 4 its always cold up there
- but you're not using it as much as you could .
6 the bends
We want this magazine to present the thoughts 1 know your position
of everyone in any way ass~ciated with air operations .
It exists as much for the loadmasters and supply techs 8 good show
as for the pilots, and as much for the armourers and tow
crews as for the navigaiors . We want to see this 12 something in reserve
ma 9 azine in crew-rooms sure, but we also want to find
it in the control tower, in transient servicing, and in the 14 hey blue four, I need help
base transportation office . Too often five or six copies
sit around unread in the aircrew briefing room while the 16 u .f .os' fact or figment
groundcrew qo without or have only months out of date
ed~t~ons to read . 18 the hot and cold affai~
If you have something to say about how the
operation is being run or could be improved - please
between your aircraft
drop us a note . We want to hear from you - we'll even and the ni-cad battery
~o a blind man's look
write your article for you - but first of all we want to
talk about it .
Incidentally, this request does not stnp at the
military community . There are thousands of Canadians z~ the accident
interested in the operation of aircraft (safely) and we are
eager io hear from our civilian friends also . If we could, 23 on the diols
through our efforts, save just one life this year - or
ever - it would be worth an awful lot of effort .

DO NOT WRITE
To us if you want to receive this magazine . We do not Editor CaptJohnD .Williams
handle circulation and your request will only be delayed
if routed through us . Art & layout J. A . Dubord
DDDS7 Graphic Arts
Write instead to :
INFORMATION CANADA
Flight Comment is produced by the NDHQ Direc-
Ottawa, Oniario, K1A OS9
torate of Flight Safety . The contents do not neces-
and send the cheque as Indicated in the masthead .
sarily reAect official policy ond unless ofherwise
stoted should not be construed as regulations,

1 . MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE AIRCRAFT

PHOTOS orders or directives . Contributions, comments ond
criticism are welcome ; the promotion of flight safefy
Flight Comment has a continuing requirement
is besf served 6y disseminating ideas and on-the-job
for interesting photographs related to aircraft opera-
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tions . If you have any colour or black and white pictures
Comment, NDHQ/DFS, Ottowa, Ontario, KlA OK2 .

2. Assess the situation

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tion orders should 6e directed to Information
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24
 In the sky suspended on wings ofeagles
in flight above far-reaching cloud .
Turned golden by the sunsets rays
Enclosed by the heavens peo
There is a onene~s in our bein
With life, and love, and all be
A knowledge o whot, ond wlty,
A wonderment only flyers can know.

There is a calm in these upper reaches

In this drowing room of th~ lesser gods
Untarnished by human fumbling ~ngers
Aloof from mans se(f'-created fog.

For none can inhabit this flowless realm

We can but intrude with our tlhunderous
Then we who would walk in paths of angels
Must all too quickly return to ground.
We live toride this cloud strewn trail
Wherever the driving wind may blow
And love to scale the billowing heights
Tl~pt d warf all those on the earth belo w

The onvil clouds and lightning flashes

The rainbow arcs of on autumn day
Are tapestries in our cathedrol
Which raise our eyes and make us pray
Thot the line we etch across the sky
Be bold, and strcright, and true
And that we never forget, in age
Thot such was the road we knew.
John D. Williams