HEIRS OF THE LATE APOLINARIO CABURNAY, G.R. No. 230934. December 02, 2020

Download as docx, pdf, or txt
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 3

DEL MONTE LAND TRANSPORT BUS COMPANY and NARCISO O. MORALES, petitioners, vs. CARLITO T.

ABERGOS, respondent. G.R. No. 245344| December 2, 2020Doctrine:

Teodulo could dispose of his 9/16 undivided interest therein by virtue of Article 145 of the Family Code
because that pertained to him as his separate property in his subsequent marriage to Perla under Article
130 of the Family Code, his disposition of the entire subject property cannot be entirely valid as his right
to dispose as a co-owner is limited by Article 493 of the Civil Code to the share or part pertaining to him.

Facts: Teodulo married twice and has children from the first marriage. After the death of his first wife
(Perpetua) and while married to his second wife (Perla), the husband entered into a contract with
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest (Apolinario Caburnay) wherein he sold property acquired in his first
marriage without the consent of his second wife nor the children from the first marriage. Apolinario paid
the initial payment of 40,000 pesos out of150,000 which was acknowledged by Teodulo in a handwritten
receipt. Thereafter, Apolinario's family occupied the property. Then, the second, third installment was
made until the remaining balance was only 30,000 pesos. However, Teodulo passed away before the
balance of the purchase price could be paid. Consequently, Apolinario's advanced age and failing
memory, no follow-up was made thus, the purchase price remained unpaid until his death. Later, the
property was subject to Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Teodulo and the subject property was
given to Jesus Sison. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate be declared null
and void and be compelled to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor upon payment of the
remaining balance ofP30,000. RTC and CA denied the complaint since there is no showing that
respondent Perla gave her consent to the sale of Teodulo's share of the subject property. Thus, the sale
is void.

Issue [Civil law: consent of co-owner]: Whether or not the Teodulo could validly dispose of his share in
the property acquired during his first marriage without needing to obtain the consent of his second
spouse and his other seven co-owners. – YES. Only to the portion of Teodulo’s share. Ruling: The third
paragraph of Article 130 of the Family Code provides that a mandatory regime of complete separation of
property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage should the surviving spouse
contract a subsequent marriage without liquidating the conjugal partnership property. When a complete
or total separation of property governs the property relations, no portion of the properties of the
marriage will be common, and the fruits of the properties of either spouse, as well as his or her earnings
from any profession, work or industry, will belong to him or her as exclusive property. Each spouse owns
the property which he or she brings to the marriage or which he or she may acquire during the marriage
by onerous or gratuitous title. Given that complete separation of property governed the subsequent
marriage of Teodulo and Perla, the 9/16undivided share or interest in the subject property of Teodulo
belonged to him and remained with him as his separate property when he married Perla. Thus, he could
have disposed of this without need of consent from Perla.
The disposition or encumbrance of the entire property is valid only if the other heirs or co-owners give
their consent thereto pursuant to Article 491 of the Civil Code, which provides that none of the co-
owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even
though benefits for all would result there from. Petitioners' invocation of Article 92 to justify that the
subject property is excluded from the community property of Teodulo and Perla, and is partly Teodulo's
separate property, which he could alienate without need of Perla’s consent, is incorrect. As to their
invocation of Article 103, which applies to community property, it is likewise.

incorrect because the property regime of Teodulo and Perpetua was the conjugal partnership of gains.
Thus, the applicable provision is Article 130 of the Family Code. Based on the elements of sale, the
transaction between Teodulo and Apolinario is indeed a contract of sale. There was a meeting of the
minds: Teodulo agreed to transfer ownership of and to deliver the subject property and Apolinario
agreed to pay the purchase price of P150,000.00. The object is the subject property,
which is determinate and licit. For Teodulo, the cause or consideration was the receipt of the payment
of the purchase price while for Apolinario, it was the transfer of ownership and delivery of the subject
property to him. Not only was the sale between Teodulo and Apolinario perfected, it was partially
consummated. Teodulo had substantially complied with his presentation as the seller when he placed
the subject property in the control and possession of Apolinario without reserving its ownership. What
was left was the transfer of the certificate of title covering the subject property from Teodulo to
Apolinario. As control and possession of the subject property had earlier been ceded by Teodulo to
Apolinario after the payment of the initial P40,000.00 on September 23, 1994, without any stipulation
that ownership in the subject property would not pass to Apolinario until he had fully paid the price, the
quoted proviso in the October 20, 1999receipt had no effect on the ownership of the subject property
having already been transferred to Apolinario by actual delivery

The proviso is simply a reservation of a portion of the purchase price to ensure the transfer of the
certificate of title from Teodulo to Apolinario. Sale being a reciprocal obligation, both Teodulo and
Apolinario stood to benefit from the proviso. Teodulo would not need to spend his own funds to effect
the transfer of title and Apolinario could be assured of the transfer of title by making sure that the
remaining P30,000.00 would be spent for that purpose. Despite the existence of a valid contract of sale
over the subject property between Teodulo and Apolinario, the sale is effective only to the extent of the
share or interest of Teodulo therein pursuant to Article 493 of the Civil Code which, as discussed above,
is 9/16 of the subject property. Therefore, while Teodulo sold the entire subject property which he
owned in common with his seven children, the sale only affected his undivided share and Apolinario
acquired only Teodulo's 9/16 abstract share in the property held in common. While Teodulo could
dispose of his 9/16 undivided interest therein by virtue of Article 145 of the Family Code because that
pertained to him as his separate property in his subsequent marriage to Perla under Article 130 of the
Family Code, his disposition of the entire subject property cannot be entirely valid as his right to dispose
as a co-owner is limited by Article 493 of the Civil Code to the share or part pertaining to him. The sale
by Teodulo of the subject property to Apolinario was not necessarily or totally or entirely void, for his
rights as a co-owner to the extent of 9/16 thereof was effectively transferred, making the buyer,
Apolinario, a co-owner of the subject property to that extent and a trustee for the benefit of the coheirs
of Teodulo, his seven children, in respect of their combined 7/16 interest therein that was not validly
sold to Apolinario. Upon Apolinario's death, petitioners stepped into his shoes and became co-owners
together with Jesus of the subject property.

You might also like