(Themes in World History) Peter N. Stearns - Happiness in World History-Routledge (2020)

Happiness in World History
Happiness in World History traces ideas and experiences of happiness from

early stages in human history, to the maturation of agricultural societies
and their religious and philosophical systems, to the changes and diver-
sities in the approach to happiness in the modern societies that began to
emerge in the 18th century.
In this thorough overview, Peter N. Stearns explores the interaction
between psychological and historical findings about happiness, the rela-
tionship between ideas and popular experience, and the opportunity to
use historical analysis to assess strengths and weaknesses of dominant con-
temporary notions of happiness. Starting with the advent of agriculture,
the book assesses major transitions in history for patterns in happiness,
including the impact of the great religions, the unprecedented Enlight-
enment interest in secular happiness and cheerfulness, and industrializa-
tion and imperialism. The final, contemporary section covers fascist and
communist efforts to define alternatives to Western ideas of happiness, the
increasing connections with consumerism, and growing global interests in
defining and promoting well-being. Touching on the experiences in the
major regions of Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and North America,
the text offers an expansive introduction to a new field of study.
This book will be of interest to students of world history and the history
of emotions.
Peter N. Stearns is University Professor of History at George Mason

University, USA. He has written widely both in world history and in the
growing field of the history of emotions, and regularly teaches courses in
both areas.
Themes in World History
Series editor: Peter N. Stearns
The Themes in World History series offers focused treatment of a range

of human experiences and institutions in the world history context. The
purpose is to provide serious, if brief, discussions of important topics as
additions to textbook coverage and document collections. The treatments
will allow students to probe particular facets of the human story in greater
depth than textbook coverage allows, and to gain a fuller sense of histori-
ans’ analytical methods and debates in the process. Each topic is handled
over time – allowing discussions of changes and continuities. Each topic is
assessed in terms of a range of different societies and religions – a llowing
comparisons of relevant similarities and differences. Each book in the se-
ries helps readers deal with world history in action, evaluating global con-
texts as they work through some of the key components of human society
and human life.
Gender in World History

Peter N. Stearns
Neutrality in World History

Leos Müller
Globalization in World History

Peter N. Stearns
Time in World History

Peter N. Stearns
Migration in World History (Third Edition)

Patrick Manning with Tiffany Trimmer
Agriculture in World History (Second Edition)

Mark B. Tauger

Peter N. Stearns
Peter N. Stearns
First published 2021
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© 2021 Peter N. Stearns
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Stearns, Peter N., author.
Title: Happiness in world history / Peter N. Stearns.
Description: First Edition. | New York: Routledge, 2021. |
Series: Themes in world history |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020037263 (print) |
LCCN 2020037264 (ebook) | ISBN 9780367561031
(paperback) | ISBN 9780367561055 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781003096436 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Happiness—Philosophy. | Happiness—History.
Classification: LCC B105.H36 S84 2021 (print) |
LCC B105.H36 (ebook) | DDC 302/.14—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020037263
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020037264
ISBN: 978-0-367-56105-5 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-0-367-56103-1 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-09643-6 (ebk)
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Contents
Acknowledgments vii
1 Introduction 1
2 Psychological Basics 12
PART I
The Agricultural Age 21
3 Early Agricultural Society 22

4 From the Philosophers: Happiness in the Classical Period 37
5 From the Great Religions: Happiness – and Hope? 54
6 Popular Pleasures 71
PART II
The Happiness Revolution, 1700–1900 87
7 The Happiness Revolution in the West 88

8 The Expansion of Happiness? The New Expectations
Encounter Industrial Society 108
9 Global Developments in the 18th and 19th Centuries 134
PART III
Happiness in Contemporary World History 149
10 Disputed Happiness, 1920–1945 151

11 Communist Happiness 164
vi Contents
12 Comparing Happiness in Contemporary Societies 174
13 Western Society in Contemporary History: Even Happier? 188
14 Happiness Goes Global 202
15 Conclusion 213
Index 221
Acknowledgments
A number of people provided great assistance in finding relevant materials:

on the history side, Benedict Carton, Joan Bristol, Brian Platt, Marcus
Collins, and Peter Mandaville; on psychology, Deborah Stearns, Yulia
Chenstova, and Kostadin Kushlev. I am very grateful to Jack Censer and
Darrin McMahon for their suggestions on the manuscript; Jack Censer’s
reading was exceptionally careful; Darrin McMahon’s pioneering work
in the field has offered real inspiration. Patricia Mikell provided invalu-
able research assistance and constructive comments, while helping with
manuscript preparation. Thanks also to Kimberley Smith, the Routledge
editor who encouraged the project. Finally, much of the book was written
during the Covid-19 quarantine, which was a bit ironic; and I thank my
wife, Donna Kidd, who shared the experience, often fairly happily, and
my children and grandchildren who contributed from afar.
1 Introduction
Early in the 18th century, it was common for literate individuals in Britain
and North America to emphasize the importance of a “melancholic de-
meanor” in the face of a rather joyless, judgmental God. Some might ac-
tually apologize, in letters or diaries, for moments of laughter, admitting
that they should spend their time with “graver people”.
Fast forward a few decades toward the middle of the century, and lead-
ing intellectuals are proudly proclaiming “Oh happiness! Our being’s end
and aim” (Alexander Pope) or “the best thing one could do (is) to be al-
ways cheerful, and not suffer any sullenness” ( John Byrom). And not too
long after, a group of American revolutionaries would boldly proclaim
“the pursuit of happiness” as a basic human right. The fashionable stance
toward happiness was changing dramatically.
Other examples, a bit less striking, suggest other patterns of change. As
their religions took hold, Christian and Muslim leaders sought to con-
vince the faithful that full happiness must await the attainment of heaven,
deliberately challenging many assumptions about pleasure in this life.
M iddle-class parents in Britain and the United States, in the mid-19th
century, began to establish the custom of regular celebrations of children’s
birthdays – for several reasons, but primarily because they sought a new
way to provide happiness. Communist governments, in the 20th century,
worked very hard to promote ideas about happiness that would differ both
from religious and from dominant Western concepts, and the process
proved quite challenging.
Happiness may be a constant human goal – though that can be debated –
but it unquestionably evolves. How it is defined, what expectations and
judgments it provokes, and – probably – how happy people actually are,
can shift dramatically depending on a combination of ideas and material
conditions. Often the change is somewhat gradual, but as the 18th-century
example suggests, it can be impressively swift. Opening this process to his-
torical inquiry can reveal a lot about the past but also about how our own
commitments to happiness have formed.
This book seeks to extend the evaluation of happiness by asking how
major ideas and practices aimed at defining and attaining happiness have
altered over time; how different cultures have approached the subject; and
2 Introduction
how concepts and initiatives today can be better understood through anal-
ysis of how they have emerged from the past. In the process, we will also
periodically address the really challenging question of how happy people
“actually” have been, and are today.
***
The history of happiness covers many different regions of the world and
several distinct periods of time. It involves a mix of formal ideas and more
diffuse popular assumptions. It includes explicit efforts to generate happi-
ness, from activities like traditional festivals; to the apparatus of modern
consumerism; to broader attempts to improve levels of health and comfort.
It traces ways that people have defined happiness, the extent to which they
have actively expected happiness in their lives, even the important in-
stances where, for religious or other reasons, apparently popular pleasures
were viewed with suspicion. Always, the focus is both on understanding a
key feature of the past and applying this understanding to an assessment of
the often-eager quests for happiness in society today.
A reasonable first question, however, would simply be: is this a subject
with a history at all? Isn’t happiness a basic feature in the human emotional
arsenal, and not really subject to significant changes or variations? Babies
everywhere, for example, regardless of time period or regional culture,
learn how to smile by the time they are four weeks old (and some experts
argue they actually figure this out even earlier). They are thus able to ex-
press this aspect of their mood and also manipulate their parents, many of
whom are suckers for an infant’s smile. It would be hard to argue that there
is much history here. Furthermore, psychologists have demonstrated, in
arguing that happiness is a basic human emotion, that people everywhere
usually agree on what a happy face looks like.
A variant on this argument, also heavily dependent on psychology, ad-
mits that there are lots of gradations in happiness but insists that they are
mostly the function of individual personalities. Some people are simply
born happier than others. One study claims that as much as 80% of a per-
son’s happiness is innate, and therefore that urging someone to be happier
is about the same as urging him or her to be taller – there’s nothing much
to do about it, and certainly no reason to look at history.
Or finally, leaving psychology for what might be regarded as pop phi-
losophy, happiness is simply a bit of a mystery. We often have trouble fig-
uring out whether we ourselves are happy, let alone other people or people
in the past. We wonder if certain conditions normally generate more hap-
piness, but we’re not sure: hence, the old argument about whether money
“buys” happiness (often accompanied by a somewhat wistful hope that
it does not). Or we might throw up our hands at the range of individ-
ual tastes involved: some people are deeply happy watching their sports
teams win, but others, in the same society, could care less about sports.
Introduction 3
Happiness, in this line of thinking, is unquestionably an interesting topic,
but it’s simply too ill-defined to warrant historical study. Dan Gilbert, a
psychologist who has all sorts of interesting things to say about happiness,
admits that we will never have a “happymeter” that infallibly indicates
how much happiness there is, or even exactly what it is, and if this is true
for the present it is even more true for the past.
The historian of happiness can grant all these arguments – up to a point.
There are innate features to happiness across time and place; yet, as we
will show, even smiling is a social variable, capable of change (at least
post-infancy) depending on cultural assumptions and even dentistry. And
it is probably true that, in any society, some people are more disposed to
happiness than others; but this does not override larger beliefs and as-
sumptions that make some societies, and some time periods, different from
others where happiness is concerned.
Finally, we can certainly agree that a precise definition of happiness is
really hard to come by and that specific tastes unquestionably diverge – but
one reason for this confusion is the fact that a society’s ideas about what
happiness is, and how much of it we should expect, change over time. All
of this is to say, in other words, that the history of happiness is compli-
cated, but historical analysis can nevertheless contribute actively to how
we can understand the emotion both today and in the past. The difficulty
in offering a single definition of happiness is in a sense an invitation to
trace the various conceptions in different regions of the world, how they
have changed over time, and how pervasive notions today have emerged
from the past. To the extent that a history of happiness not only explains
current approaches but also contributes to any personal evaluation of what
happiness means, its service is amplified.
^^^
This book further complicates the study of happiness by looking at it in

a world history context. The goal is to connect what we know about
changes and variations in happiness to a global framework and in turn
to introduce regional diversity to the subject at various points in time.
This is a tall order, compounded further by the unevenness of available
work on the subject: more on Western Europe, for example, than on Latin
A merica, more on China than on Africa. Further as we will see, there may
have been more fundamental changes in the Western approach to happi-
ness in modern times than in most other regions, except insofar as they
have tried to come to grips with this aspect of Western example. But this
does not mean that the modern Western take on happiness is the best ver-
sion imaginable (it has some built-in disadvantages, as we will see). And
it certainly does not suggest that other cultural approaches have somehow
disappeared. Indeed, interactions among various happiness standards form
an important part of contemporary emotional history.
4 Introduction
Huge opportunities exist for further research on the history of hap-
piness even in the Western tradition, and certainly on the world stage.
While all sorts of historical research bears on the subject of happiness –
from treatments of the great philosophers to work on material condi-
tions or changing levels of health – there is less explicit coverage than one
might imagine, partly because the subject can seem so diffuse. Happiness
is something of a pioneering historical venture. At the same time, enough
spadework has been done on several different societies in several different
time periods to venture a brief survey. The results contribute additional
perspectives beyond what is available from attention to one region alone
and certainly help explain the various contemporary approaches involved.
And if they also whet the appetite for further comparative work, all the
better.
^^^
Modern Russian adage: “A person who smiles a lot is either a fool or an

American.”
One way to begin to get a handle on the study of happiness, but also its
global complexities, is to look at the fundamental contemporary fact that
happiness varies a lot, today, from one region to the next – or, at least,
claims about happiness vary greatly. Ever since 2012, the Gallup orga-
nization and the United Nations have sponsored an annual international
happiness survey, which among other things involves careful polling of a
sampling of individuals from each major country around the question of
where, on a scale of one to ten, they would rate their own happiness today.
(The idea that this kind of attention to international happiness is worth-
while is, itself, a novel and intriguing development.)
The responses demonstrate striking differences. The happiest nations –
happiest at least by self-report – are for the most part highly industrialized
and Western: leading the list, usually, are the Scandinavian countries along
with Iceland, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Canada, and New Zealand.
Not too far behind are bigger and arguably more complex societies, like
the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States. At the bottom
of the list are societies that are not only extremely poor but also often
involved in bitter civil conflicts: South Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and
Syria.
With this, the obvious but nevertheless significant point: people’s hap-
piness can vary a lot depending on political, military, economic, and ep-
idemiological circumstances. This is true today, and there is every reason
to assume it has been true over time as well. Hence, historically, some
time periods are likely to have been happier than others: people in the
Roman or Han Chinese empires, at their height, with considerable pros-
perity and internal peace, were almost certainly happier than their coun-
terparts in the same societies once invasions and disease helped topple the
Introduction 5
great imperial structures. And there may be more subtle judgments, about
the relationship between circumstance and happiness, that can be applied
to the historical record as well, that will help explain not only levels of
happiness but also changes in the ways the condition is defined.
But the contemporary polling data harbor one other kind of differen-
tiation that is at least as interesting, and certainly more challenging, than
the relationship between happiness and objective circumstance. One set
of societies, today, consistently score more toward the middle of the scale
than in its upper reaches, despite considerable prosperity, good health,
and low crimes rates: Japan, South Korea, and indeed most of East Asia
(only Taiwan and Singapore, in the 2019 poll, even placed in the top 35).
In contrast, another set, though not at the top of the rankings, often score
quite well despite lower levels of economic performance: a number of
Latin American or Caribbean countries, headed by Costa Rica, Panama,
Mexico, and Trinidad-Tobago.
What’s going on here? Pretty obviously, cultural conditions – whether
happiness is rated highly as an explicit value – play a major role in de-
termining social response to a pollster’s questionnaire. Some cultural
systems encourage people to want to portray themselves as happy, and
while this cannot overcome desperate material circumstances it can cer-
tainly generate surprisingly positive responses when conditions are at least
comparatively neutral. In contrast, some societies that rate quite high in
larger terms of well-being promote far more measured responses. In all
likelihood, differences of this sort go beyond polling responses to basic
divergences in personal evaluations of what happiness is all about, and how
highly it rates.
This phenomenon has been extensively studied for the United States
and Japan, two societies that, objectively, might score rather similarly.
American culture is primed for cheerfulness, and although levels have
slipped a bit in recent years the ability to convey “positivity” is a deeply
ingrained response. Japan, in contrast, is far less individualistic. Personal
evaluations depend more on a sense of family and community cohesion,
taking comfort in one’s place in a group, rather than maximum individual
satisfaction. As one study puts it, “the emphasis is on relating to others, fit-
ting in, and harmonious interdependence”, which does not easily comport
with a questionnaire on purely personal ratings. In contrast, Americans
are very comfortable, culturally, with attending to the self. The distinc-
tion goes beyond polling, to deeper differences in the way satisfaction
is defined. And it shows up, as well, in some of the behaviors associated
with happiness in what might, on the surface, seem to be rather similar
consumer cultures. Both Americans and Japanese, for example, buy things
when on vacation, though Americans are a bit more avid; but Japanese
more often buy gifts for family members and others back home, while
Americans devote more attention to items for themselves. Different emo-
tional scales are involved.
6 Introduction
Distinctions of this sort play a huge role in the history of happiness,
because they allow us to trace the origin and evolution of definitions of
happiness in different parts of the world, at the level of formal philosophy
and religion, but also, at least to some degree, in terms of more popular
values as well.
For the kinds of variables that shine through so clearly in the regional
differentiations also apply, at least in principle, to probable changes over
time. The polling experts themselves are eager to highlight the impor-
tance of change, even over the eight years of their global operation: there
might be less reason to read their reports if the rankings never shifted.
And in fact, recent deteriorations in places like the United States are worth
evaluating, along with the striking advance (within the Scandinavian or-
bit) of Finland, currently the world’s happiest place. But far more to the
point is a larger historical inquiry, that looks at evolving patterns over a
much longer time frame, along the dual criteria of objective conditions
and cultural prompts.
To be sure, and this will be obvious in the chapters that follow, we lack
the abundant data for the past that are available today. There are no hap-
piness polls, or even precise measurements of Gross National Products or
physical and emotional wellness before the contemporary era. Yet a vari-
ety of data do exist, often particularly on the cultural side. An increasing
number of historians have been exploring various aspects of past emotions
and patterns of change, and while attention to happiness has not been at
the top of the list a variety of studies are available. A historical focus on
happiness, in fact, can help draw together some of the other work in the
history of emotion, touching obviously on patterns and changes in sadness
or envy and even connecting to aspects of love or fear as well.
The most explicit fulcrum for the historical study of happiness involves
the variety of ideas about happiness that began to form a substantial part of
philosophical inquiry and religious guidance at least from the classical civ-
ilizations onward. This formal intellectual record can be supplemented by
other evidence about how people sought pleasure and at times commented
directly on their own conceptions of happiness. These wider materials
become particularly abundant for the modern period that began to open
up in the 18th century, enhanced by more popular guidance as well – as
societies began to generate lots of advice to people about how to be happy,
as politicians began to fold happiness into their proclamations and as ad-
vertisers began to try to sell goods in terms of their potential to contribute
to happiness. All this creates a central historical thread: how key societies
have tried to define what happiness is and how these ideas and maxims
have changed over time. But this book will also, more tentatively, return
periodically to issues of “actual” happiness, to talk about how cultural
values and objective conditions may intertwine to generate larger trends.
Before turning briefly to the book’s organization, it is vital to go
back to the most challenging question raised, if only implicitly, by the
Introduction 7
contemporary polling data, where the cultural aspects not only intrigue
but baffle. It is important to recognize that Americans are readier to say
they are happy than their Japanese or South Korean counterparts, despite
having little objective reason to do so. But are they “really” happier, or to
put the question more provocatively, are the Japanese despite comparable
wealth, less violence and longer life expectancies “really” less happy? Ul-
timately it is impossible to say, for the differences in each society’s cultural
criteria preclude a single judgment. This elusiveness bedevils historical
evaluations as well, meaning that we can do a lot with the changing values
and circumstances relevant to happiness but never claim with absolute
certainty that we have captured a truly objective emotional experience.
We will deal, for example, with such questions as whether modern people
are on the whole happier than their premodern ancestors, and we will es-
tablish some probabilities around both cultural assumptions and objective
conditions – but there must always be room for debate about whether a
common quality has been identified.
While undeniably frustrating, this feature of happiness – the lack of a
single objective standard – actually helps justify a historical effort, and one
that stretches over a number of regional societies. What follows will not,
again, offer a single determination of a complex phenomenon. It will, how-
ever, show how various societies have tackled the question of what hap-
piness is and how much of it should be expected, and how contemporary
criteria have emerged from earlier, and often very different, formulations.
***
Not surprisingly, since this is a historical study, the following chapters

proceed roughly chronologically, but with some pauses to deal with com-
parative issues in a single time period and to venture an initial foray into
interdisciplinary considerations.
The first full chapter elaborates on some of the existing findings and
claims about happiness, emanating particularly from the discipline of psy-
chology, which have developed around largely contemporary (and mainly
Western) evidence. Historians can take issue with some of the arguments,
especially those that press too far toward claiming a universal or basic
emotional experience, but they can also make use of a number of conclu-
sions. Ultimately, any evaluation of happiness must feature interdisciplin-
ary components, and it is vital to begin, if briefly, on this basis.
Chapter 3 is also interdisciplinary but in a much more specific histori-
cal context: here the question centers on happiness levels in the first type
of human society – the hunters-gatherers – and the possible decline of
happiness when hunting and gathering yielded to agriculture. A number
of anthropologists have contributed thoughts here, in what is admittedly
a somewhat speculative arena, but a few historians have also taken up the
charge.
8 Introduction
Several chapters then turn to conditions of happiness in various agricul-
tural societies and periods when happiness was explicitly debated perhaps
in part because so many obvious challenges began to emerge. Chapter 4
deals with classic formulations by Greek-Roman and Confucian philoso-
phers, who had a lot to say on the subject, along with some questions about
how influential the philosophers were in society at large. Then the focus
turns, in Chapter 5, to the major religious formulations, which developed
various and influential approaches to happiness while usually arguing that
true, durable happiness could only be found beyond this earthly plane.
Chapter 6 takes up more popular approaches to happiness, strongly influ-
enced by religion but with somewhat separate efforts to seek happiness in
festivals, in opportunities for children’s play and, often, through a chang-
ing pattern of urban entertainments.
Chapters in Part II turn to more modern conditions, beginning in
Chapter 7 with a true revolution in ideas about happiness in the Western
world that took shape in the 18th century. Not only the content and range
of the new ideas, but also the factors that promoted them, demand assess-
ment. Chapter 8 continues this theme by looking at the ways this revolu-
tionary approach to happiness began to be installed in ordinary life – and
some of the constraints and frustrations that could be involved as well, in-
cluding differences by social class and gender. Chapter 9, still focused on the
18th and 19th centuries, deals with some of the larger complications of the
Western ideas about happiness, including responses and objections in other
world regions. The Western happiness “revolution” had some wider influ-
ences, but it was hardly dominant and it provoked some vigorous debates.
Part III deals with developments in the past century. Chapter 10 deals
with various currents during the troubled interwar period: continued
exploration of the Western happiness theme, but also deliberate attacks
on the same theme in fascist societies, plus some alternative nationalist
approaches. Chapter 11 traces the complicated efforts of communist so-
cieties, beginning with the Soviet Union, to develop a distinctive ap-
proach to happiness, at once recognizing the importance of the goal but
disputing the Western approach. Chapter 12 returns to the comparative
theme for the postwar decades, elaborating on some of the differences
suggested by the international polls. Chapter 13 returns to the West itself,
with further efforts to promote happiness but also growing signs of strain,
for example in clearer definitions of the problem of psychological depres-
sion. Chapter 14 returns more specifically to the comparative and global
theme, among other things introducing additional survey data but also the
new efforts to promote a new kind of positive psychology and its interna-
tional influence; happiness was gaining some new global components. A
conclusion then turns briefly to the larger questions about happiness over
historical time, and the implications of historical findings.
Each major section deals both with ideas about happiness and, to the
extent possible, with popular experience, and the interactions between the
Introduction 9
two including probable expectations. Often, ideas will offer the clearest ev-
idence at a given point in time, but it is not always easy to determine their
actual influence, particularly before the more modern periods. Ultimately,
changes in the values associated with happiness and material conditions
broadly construed combine to shape the history of this crucial emotion.
^^^
The growth of historical work on happiness stems from several sources. The
subject looms large in many philosophical systems, which has justified a
good bit of research and synthesis simply as part of basic intellectual history,
particularly for the Greco-Roman tradition and for Chinese Confucianism.
As noted, the topic has also gained attention and perspective from the larger
advance of study in the history of emotions. This field was proposed several
decades ago, as part of a belief that human psychology was itself a historical
variable, inviting a greater understanding of different conditions and assump-
tions that marked periods in the past. Historians of emotions argue convinc-
ingly that key emotions are in large part culturally constructed, rather than
serving as standard products of human biology: this argument very clearly
applies to happiness, and the history of happiness in turn helps illustrate the
process of cultural construction. Additionally, a number of other emotions
attach to the historical patterns of happiness: several related emotional expe-
riences like boredom and envy have generated considerable research – some
of these ancillaries have actually received more attention in the history of
emotion than has happiness itself, where opportunities for further research
abound. Finally, at a time when many people are anxiously evaluating their
own happiness, the need for historical perspective is abundantly clear.
Also it is vital to note (as discussed below in Chapter 14) that many
countries, and not just in the West, have picked up a new and explicit
interest in happiness in recent years. The mountain nation of Bhutan has
pioneered in trying to measure national well-being; the United Arab
Emirates has a government ministry devoted to happiness, a theme that
also informs its police force. Here, clearly, is another basis for thinking
about the evolution of happiness on a global scale.
Finally, though this is a related point, recent attention to the history
of happiness has also been linked to the growing interest in positive psy-
chology and human well-being. Understanding how historical conditions
and even basic guidelines for well-being have changed over time, and
how current interests – including the well-being movement itself – have
emerged from the past, can enrich the recommendations and impact of
well-being advocacy today. While history does not determine exactly
what happiness is, it provides an active basis for assessing some of our own
assumptions and limitations. Thinking about the subject historically may
contribute to constructive efforts to promote well-being, on a social as
well as individual basis.
10 Introduction
Appendix
World Happiness Report Selected Rankings 2019
Rank Country
1 Finland
2 Denmark
3 Norway
4 Iceland
5 Netherlands
6 Switzerland
7 Sweden
8 New Zealand
9 Canada
10 Austria
11 Australia
12 Costa Rica
13 Israel
14 Luxemburg
15 United Kingdom
16 Ireland
17 Germany
18 Belgium
19 United States of America
20 Czech Republic
23 Mexico
24 France
25 Taiwan
31 Panama
39 Trinidad-Tobago
54 South Korea
58 Japan
68 Russia
79 Turkey
93 China
140 India
149 Syria
150 Malawi
151 Yemen
152 Rwanda
153 Tanzania
154 Afghanistan
155 Central African Republic
156 South Sudan
Helliwell et al. (2019).
Further Reading (and Watching)

For a rich overview with a primarily Western focus:
McMahon, Darrin. Happiness: A History (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006).
Several introductions to the growing field of the history of emotion provide a
context for historical work on happiness:
Introduction 11
Boddice, Rob. The History of Emotions (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2018).
Matt, Susan J., and Peter N. Stearns. Doing Emotions History, (Champaign: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press, 2013).
Oatley, Keith. Emotions: A Brief History (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004).
Plamper, Jan, and Keith Tribe. History of Emotions : An Introduction First edition
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
Reddy, William. The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001).
Rosenwein, Barbara H., and Riccardo Cristiani. What Is the History of Emotions?
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018).
On the question of Japanese and American culture:
Markus, Hazel R., and Shinobu Kitayama. “Culture and the Self.” Psychological
Review 98 (1991), 224–258.
On issues of defining happiness:
Gilbert, Dan. Stumbling on Happiness (New York: Knopf, 2006).
For the international polls:
Bruni, Luigino, and Pier Luigi Porta. Handbook on the Economics of Happiness
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007).
Helliwell, John F., Richard Layard, and Jeffrey Sachs. World Happiness Report 2019
(New York: Sustainable Development Solutions Network, 2019).
Helliwell, John F., Richard Layard, Jeffrey Sachs, and Jan-Emmanuel De Neve,
eds. World Happiness Report 2020 (New York: Sustainable Development Solu-
tions Network, 2020).
Mathews, Gordon, and Carolina Izquierdo, eds. Pursuits of Happiness: Well-Being
in Anthropological Perspective (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010).
On historical inputs for the current wellbeing (positive psychology) movement:
McMahon, Darrin, ed., History and Human Flourishing (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2020).
Stearns, Peter N. “History and Human Flourishing: Using the Past to Address the
Present.” In Louis Tay and James Pawelski (Eds.), The Handbook of Positive Psy-
chology on the Arts and Humanities: Theory and Research (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2020).
Consult also:
Happy. Directed by: Roko Belic (San Jose, CA: Wadi Rum Films, 2011).
2 Psychological Basics
Happiness is hard to define, even in our own lives. A variety of eminent

thinkers, through centuries of human history, have commented on how
elusive the emotion is, how much its definition varies from one person to
the next. This is a challenge for any student of happiness, but there is one
discipline that, particularly in recent decades, has worked hard to gain
greater precision. Psychologists have not fully resolved the mysteries of
happiness – why for example two people in very similar objective situa-
tions report very different levels of happiness – but their work does pro-
vide some foundation for the subject. Scholars in the discipline have been
trying to define key characteristics of happiness for some time.
To be sure, a movement in recent decades, labeled Positive P sychology,
has made the subject a particular priority, arguing that the discipline
had been spending too much time on mental health issues and negative
emotions; we will come back to this in Chapter 13. But even before this,
psychologists had established some parameters for an understanding of
happiness, which can contribute to other kinds of inquiry.
They have definitely made some gains. For instance, an early effort in
the field assumed that youth and low aspirations were essential prerequi-
sites for happiness. Young people, it was argued, are particularly healthy
and perhaps particularly hopeful; not wanting very much makes it easier
to be content (a theme that we will encounter at various points in history).
However, more careful observation and experiment have cast doubt on
both propositions. Young people are often fairly happy, but so, surpris-
ingly, are old people, despite greater health problems and more limited
life expectancies. And, depending on personal emotional makeup and the
extent of hope, people striving ambitiously for more can be happy as well.
The goal in this chapter, summarizing some psychological work on
happiness, is to offer a further initial orientation, on a subject that can
be hard to pin down – without pretending that the result is a definitive,
once-and-for-all statement. Psychologists themselves still disagree about
some key points – for example, the extent of genetic predisposition in the
individual experience of happiness. Further, a history of happiness must
emphasize the ways the emotion, and even expressions such as smiling or
laughing, can vary and change, rather than seizing on a single definition
Psychological Basics 13
of the experience. Psychology, in contrast, often implies a rather uniform
human phenomenon, or purely individual variables. Still, the discipline
can guide some initial thoughts about the subject, before we turn to the
greater complexities of the historical record.
What is happiness for? One good question, which is less obvious than it
might seem, simply involves the purpose of happiness. Most people may
want it (we will see that representatives of many cultures say this, one way
or another), but this does not mean they always know what good it does.
However, at least since the work of Charles Darwin, a number of psy-
chologists have been at pains to try to figure out how particular emotions
help the human species, and this is a useful first step in thinking about
happiness.
Many psychologists argue that there are certain “basic” emotions, in-
nate to the human species (and possibly some other animals as well) that
reveal themselves through standard facial expressions. Happiness is on ev-
ery basics list, if only because there is such a clear way to express it through
smiling, and because this expression, in turn, is universally recognized
whatever the local culture. Presumably, facial expressions were vital to
human interactions well before language was invented, and we still rely
on them heavily.
The realization that happiness is basic makes the question of its function
all the more compelling. We know what fear is for – to prepare for flight
from danger – and we know the basic function of anger; but what about
happiness?
The most compelling answer is that happiness helps us realize that
something we are doing is working out well and we should keep doing it,
at least recurrently, whether the “it” is a personal relationship or some as-
pect of a job or a rewarding sport or entertainment activity or a particular
form of prayer. Happiness provides emotional reinforcement. Happiness
results from the achievement of one’s goals – again, in a variety of life’s
categories, and encourages further efforts in the same direction.
By the same token, happiness helps counter other, more troubling emo-
tions, like fear or anger, which are also useful but which are by definition
disruptive. Indeed, a key aspect of psychologists’ research on varied levels
of happiness centers on how different individuals manage to cope with
disruptive emotions and keep them in check, generating greater happiness
as a result. Another illustration of this balancing function of happiness: it
helps lower blood pressure.
Finally, happiness may help individuals relate more successfully with
other people; we are a sociable species, and happiness may facilitate the
relationships we need. Smiling, for example, can be a useful approach to
strangers, predisposing them to constructive interactions. We will see that
some cultures emphasize this function of happiness more than others; too
much random happiness may seem bizarre, depending on the value sys-
tem. But it is probably fair to grant some sociability function for happiness.
Basic definition. Psychologists have tried to push beyond the fairly obvi-
ous proposition that happy people “feel good”. A happy person manages to
maximize certain supportive or positive emotions, like joy and pride, and
minimize emotions that are more painful. But that finding, though true,
does not necessarily advance understanding very much.
In general, happiness involves a combination of external circumstance
and internal, personal reactions. This is one reason that the emotion varies
so much from one person to the next. Some people see their lives over-
whelmed by bad luck or a particular misfortune, while others figure out ac-
tive coping strategies. One study examined workers involved in repetitious
motions on an assembly line, endlessly repeating procedures that could be
extremely boring; some workers, instead of yielding to the boredom, kept
experimenting with more efficient hand motions or developed pride in
exceeding the expected pace, and were quite happy as a result. “It’s better
than anything else,” one worker reported: “It’s better than watching TV.”
One approach – actually, a very old one, because philosophers have
been working on this for a long time – distinguishes between “hedonic”
and “eudaimonic” happiness. The hedonic argument sees happiness sim-
ply as maximization of pleasure and greatest possible avoidance of pain;
and because each individual has his or her own definitions of pleasure
and pain, this approach is fairly subjective. Eudaimonic approaches, in
contrast, emphasize a wider definition of what is good for a person, rec-
ognizing among other things that some people may think they feel happy
doing very harmful things; here, some objective conditions, like positive
relationships with others or virtuous activity, go into the real meaning of
happiness whatever a person’s individual likes or dislikes. Many psychol-
ogists, like many philosophers before them, end up seeing happiness as a
combination of both approaches.
In recent decades, many psychologists, trying to make happiness more
objectively measurable, introduced the idea of “subjective well-being”,
or SWB. This approach may allow some attention to objective circum-
stances, like how many friends a person has or how healthy she is, but it fo-
cuses primarily on self-reports, what people say about how happy they are
or how happy a particular kind of experience makes them. (This approach
helps explain the excitement about polling data, which after all depend
primarily on whether people say they are happy.) Researchers in this vein
admit all sorts of problems about self-report: people may misremember,
they may try to please the pollster – a key problem in cultures that place
a high premium on seeming to be cheerful; their mood may vary unpre-
dictably. But in final analysis, this approach argues that what people say
about how happy they are is an inescapable feature of happiness research.
Some researchers make a distinction between “life satisfaction” and
SWB. Here, subjective well-being reflects temporary states, whether a per-
son is feeling happy at any given moment; whereas life satisfaction involves
tapping into a longer view, less subject to fluctuation. “Life satisfaction”,
plus the fact that many people learn better coping skills over time – like
how to deal with anger – may help explain why, in many societies today,
older people are among the happiest age categories.
Psychologists report one other important finding about happiness,
though it too is fairly obvious: no one is happy all the time. A “happy
life” always involves fluctuations and balances. The emphasis on a person’s
“coping strategies”, as part of SWB, highlights the importance of recog-
nizing and dealing with challenging experiences and emotions and not
being overwhelmed by them.
Many leading happiness researchers, such as Ed Diener, also argue that
most people are in fact fairly happy, high on a life satisfaction scale – across
cultures and objective circumstances, at least in the contemporary world.
Most people, in other words, are predisposed to at least mild levels of pos-
itive moods and happiness. One study, for example, reports that in 86%
of the various countries studied, people self-report at over 50% on a hap-
piness scale. Another way to put this: people have an impressive ability to
find a certain amount of happiness even in challenging situations, which
helps explain why they are able to keep going. Thus, for example, people
paralyzed in a car accident, after initial depression, soon revert to their
previous happiness level.
Happiness researchers have also tried to deal with interesting questions
about the relationship between happiness and constructive action. It might
be possible to argue, for example, that happy people are particularly naïve
and selfish, ignoring the world’s many overwhelming problems in favor of
pursuing their own narrow pleasure menus. In contrast, positive psychol-
ogists work to demonstrate that happy people are more productive not just
in terms of personal success but in terms of social outcomes as well. They
are more altruistic than average. Quite possibly many happy people seek
to combine personal pleasure and with social responsibility.
This issue goes back to the wider social functions of happiness. Happy
people tend to make the people around them happier – both because
happy people usually behave constructively (or even virtuously, to use a
word that risks sounding old-fashioned) and because their own moods are
partially contagious. The idea that happiness involves service to others
goes way back to older philosophies and religions, but it seems to have an
empirical basis as well.
There is a tension, nevertheless, between viewing happiness as an in-
dividual emotion, centered on maximizing individual pleasure and ful-
fillment, and a more social approach. When happiness tells an individual
that goals are being achieved and that he or she should keep going, the
individual aspect may predominate. But happiness can also have a basic
social dimension, assessed in terms not just of personal goals but effective
relationships. In this latter aspect, happiness will tell a person to keep
associating with others and show affection. The balance here will reflect
personal values but it will also be shaped by the larger culture – the extent
to which the culture is individualistic or collectivist. This is a balance or
tension that looms large in the history of happiness.
Genetics. Researchers have spent a lot of time arguing about genetics,
or the extent to which a person’s capacity for happiness is built into the
personality at birth. At an extreme, some genetic determinists argue that
telling a person to be happy is a worthless gesture, with the only result
making a less-than-happy person feel even worse. It’s all in the genes.
Thus studies of identical twins reveal remarkable similarities in emo-
tional moods – including levels of happiness – even when the individuals
involved have been raised separately and in very different circumstances. It
was a Dutch twins’ study that claimed about as much as 80% of happiness
potential was genetically determined.
This finding is arguably rather pessimistic, leaving individuals little they
can do about happiness, and most psychologists today do not go to such
extremes. Even so, the figure of 50% determinism is widely accepted, as
a precondition for an individual’s potential for happiness, grumpiness or
something in between. Some observers have noted that this very contem-
porary finding is in some ways a modern version of an older belief that hap-
piness depends largely on luck. Genes or luck, nothing much to do about it.
To be sure, the genes involved have not been identified, and in all prob-
ability a considerable number of different genes are involved, complicating
any systematic claims. Some of the genetic researchers themselves have
backtracked a bit, arguing that even people born with gloomier dispositions
can and should try to modify their fate. A few have even joined the parade
of “how-to” books about happiness, discussed further in Chapter 13. After
all, as cynics have noted, it is hard to sell a book that simply tells people
they are doomed to their genetic fate. Indeed, there has been a considerable
rebellion, since around 2000, against too much genetic p essimism – among
other things, people note that modern medicines and other therapies can
significantly modify the genetic emotional heritage.
For the historian of happiness, the genetics debate proves interesting but
also somewhat distracting or misleading. The importance of individual
predisposition can be granted, but it plays little role in an agenda that looks
primarily at larger, collective patterns over time. Further, the genetic ap-
proach may not take adequate account of the variety of happiness goals
that human societies have produced. Might an individual not predisposed
to lots of “fun” flourish in a culture that highlights happiness in prayer and
contemplation of the divine?
Most current psychologists, certainly, while making a brief bow to the
geneticists, devote their primary attention to a how-to approach, emphasiz-
ing what we know about how people can achieve greater happiness. Many
of their findings repeat ancient wisdom, as the more erudite and generous
contemporary practitioners admit. Some may be more culturally or his-
torically specific than the psychologists realize – when it comes to matters
like consumerism, for example; this is a problem to which we must return.
But the conventional list can nevertheless be helpful, both as an indication
of the state of current psychological knowledge and as a checklist which,
with due caution, may serve as a useful historical guide as well.
Desires and state of mind. As psychologists debate the best options to
achieve happiness, they grapple with several approaches. One tack, called
desire theory, amplifies the hedonist explanation of happiness. People who
figure out how to maximize their desires, and limit frustration of desire,
are the happiest. This approach is popular with many economists, who use
standard of living measurements to determine social good. It also seems to
resonate in modern, consumer-oriented societies. And it may appeal to a
popular belief as well, that the best way to be happy is to get more of what
one wants. This approach, further, places great stock in external circum-
stance, like levels of wealth, marital status, and so on.
Against this, and again reflecting many earlier philosophical and reli-
gious emphases, other authorities tout the importance of internal disposi-
tion. They point to studies showing how different individuals register very
different happiness levels despite the same objective conditions – for exam-
ple, students reacting to the same grade for a course. Here, within reason,
happiness depends less on what happens to us than on how we respond.
And, the argument goes on, there are many things that people can do to
improve their mental outlook – including, as positive psychologists insist,
learning to pay more attention to the good things that happen in life.
A preliminary list. The catalog of those factors contributing to happiness
over which individuals have some discretion is neither long nor, in the
main, very surprising, but it is worth keeping in mind before diving into
the history of happiness.
Health is a vital component, with all the usual accompaniments in terms
of eating habits, sleep, and appropriate levels of exercise. Next on the
list is self-esteem, a positive outlook, a willingness to forgive one’s own
mistakes. But, quite apart from the fact that this is not necessarily an easy
category to work on, there are also warnings about too much attention to
the self – an old problem for many religions as they sought to emphasize a
different, more spiritual kind of happiness.
Healthy relationships with others figure high on the list, involving
friendships and (often) family plus positive emotional links, extending also
to emotional emphases such as love and gratitude. Loneliness is an enemy
here, though some historians are pointing out that some cultures see lone-
liness as a positive attribute; this is complex territory. Most psychologists
also believe that “virtuous” behavior – an altruistic outlook toward others,
outright generosity – captures an important component of happiness as
well, in contrast to arguments that stress a more selfish approach.
The factor of religion, or what one happiness psychologist called the
“connection to a larger beyond”, also enters into the equation. Studies in
the United States often find that people with religious beliefs and practices
are happier than others. On the other hand, most of the polled happiest
countries in the world, like the Scandinavian nations, are unusually secular.
Here is another conundrum that warrants historical attention – including,
obviously, the type of religion involved. We will return to this tension in
Chapter 15.
Hope and aspiration. Most happiness psychologists believe that a demon-
strable connection exists between hope and happiness. Certainly, many
people are able fairly cheerfully to go through uncomfortable periods in
life armed with a firm hope that things will be better at some later point.
The ability to trade short-term denial for longer-term happiness is an im-
portant attribute. On the other hand, hope can be vulnerable, and when
frustrated can lead to greater unhappiness. Further, the nature of hope is
very much a historical variable: hope for salvation in a life to come? Hope
for a better society? Hope for personal fame and fortune?
Psychologists have also demonstrated, somewhat accidentally, that the
relationship between happiness and hope depends not just on personality,
but on social class. A famous experiment in 1972 presented children with
the choice between having a marshmallow immediately, and waiting ten
minutes with the marshmallow available but not consumed – after which
the prudent child would get two. The results showed that some children
could use hope to override short-term satisfaction and gain greater happi-
ness in the long run. These children were arguably destined for greater life
success. But in fact more recent work shows this was not what the exper-
iment proved. Rather, lower-class kids consumed the marshmallow right
away because life had already taught them to seize happiness whenever
possible, because it might not be available later on. The nature and pos-
sibility of hope, in other words, constitute a social and not just a personal
variable – like other aspects of happiness.
Aspiration levels pose a similar conundrum. Many cultures have urged
people to be content with what they have, and some psychologists, also,
wonder if low aspirations help avoid disappointment and therefore con-
tribute to happiness. On the other hand, a sense of building for the future,
sometimes not just for oneself but for one’s children, can be a powerful
component of happiness. In some cultures, lack of aspiration may be seen
as an unhappy characteristic. Here, as with hope, we are almost certainly
dealing with a cultural and historical variable, though possibly with some
individual personality factors folded in as well.
Hope and aspiration may be social as well as individual factors. Some
cultures not only define distinctive hopes but may depend on different
levels of hope, which in turn affect the way individuals within the culture
assess their own happiness. Here, individuals are urged to sustain their
happiness in the belief that the whole society or group will gain greater
justice or greater religious enlightenment later on. Indeed, most of the
factors on the list of contributions to happiness have a social as well as
personal dimension, as in the extent, for example, to which particular so-
cieties actively encourage health or promote familial affection.
The downsides of happiness. Psychologists who work on happiness offer
a few cautions, along with their attempts to figure out how to promote
more positive outcomes. These, too, reflect some peculiarly modern and
Western characteristics, but they are worth noting and may have some
value in assessing historical developments.
For happiness, like all emotions, requires some constraints. An unthink-
ing commitment to happiness, particularly short-term, sensual happiness,
can lead to risky behavior. Excessive happiness may dampen creativity;
while happiness usually improves responses to a social environment it may
also promote routine behaviors, rather than encouraging innovation. On
another front, happiness can simply be inappropriate, for example in situ-
ations that call for displays of grief.
But the greatest caution applies to what many psychologists see as an
unrealistic effort to seek happiness too regularly and too explicitly, invit-
ing disappointment. Too much attention to happiness and unduly frequent
questioning about whether one is happy or not are actually counterpro-
ductive. Somewhat ironically, many of the researchers who devote them-
selves to understanding happiness urge that many people make their lives
more difficult by thinking about happiness too often.
A further agenda. Many specialists in this branch of psychology urge that
there is still much to learn. Tensions in the field, for example between the
hedonistic and the more altruistic approaches, have not been fully resolved;
what balance generates the more genuine happiness? A number of experi-
ments lead to some truly dubious conclusions. For example, some researchers
recently tried to demonstrate that happiness involves careful attunement to
the surrounding emotional context. “Feeling right”, or being in tune with
the relevant group, might be more important than feeling personal plea-
sure, and some experiments have supported this conclusion. But there is an
obvious problem: what if the group involved is dominated by fear or hatred?
Conformity to this type of emotional context might be a very destructive
kind of happiness, perhaps making a mockery of the whole concept.
But the main agenda of psychological research on happiness currently
centers on building more empirical evidence for the attitudes and be-
haviors that will most predictably enhance individual happiness – around
qualities like curiosity (good), resilience (good), gratitude (good), trying
to correct one’s weaknesses (probably bad, if not balanced by even greater
attention to one’s strengths). Some of the ongoing findings are fairly pre-
dictable, but others strike out in unexpected directions. Here, psycholog-
ical research becomes part of the larger contemporary, and increasingly
global, approach to happiness, as more and more groups and even govern-
ments seek not only to measure but to generate happiness.
Psychology and history. Psychological and historical inquiries into an
emotion like happiness have an uneasy but potentially productive relation-
ship. To a historian, some psychological findings seem far more limited
by a specific time and place than psychologists themselves often realize.
Thus it may be true that too many people, today, spend too much time
asking themselves if they are happy or not; but it is unlikely that this was a
significant problem in many periods in the past, or in many other cultures
today, where happiness is simply less frequently discussed. Happy people,
today, are more likely to enjoy personal success, which in turn supports
happiness; but was this true, say, in the 17th century, or in India today
when happiness is less routinely expected or defined in other ways? His-
torical approaches to happiness introduce more realistic complexity into
some psychological findings, and they also explain how some current psy-
chological patterns have emerged from a somewhat different past. In this
sense, they provide greater understanding than psychology alone can offer.
On the other hand, there is no question that historians can also ben-
efit from many of the findings and clarifications concerning happiness
that recent psychological research has provided. And, in the end, the
two disciplines share many of the same basic questions about this elusive
phenomenon.
Further Reading
Biswas-Diener, Robert, Todd B. Kashdan, and Laura A. King. “Two Traditions
of Happiness Research, Not Two Distinct Types of Happiness.” The Journal of
Positive Psychology 4, no. 3 (May 1, 2009): 208–211.
Diener, Ed, Eunkook M. Suh, Richard E. Lucas, and Heidi L. Smith. “Subjective
Well-Being: Three Decades of Progress.” Psychological Bulletin 125, no. 2 (1999):
276–302.
Diener, Ed, Satoshi Kanazawa, Eunkook M. Suh, and Shigehiro Oishi. “Why
People Are in a Generally Good Mood.” Personality and Social Psychology Review
19, no. 3 (August 2015): 235–256.
Diener, Ed, Samantha J. Heintzelman, Kostadin Kushlev, Louis Tay, Derrick
Wirtz, Lesley D. Lutes, and Shigehiro Oishi. “Findings All Psychologists
Should Know from the New Science on Subjective Well-Being.” Canadian
Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne 58, no. 2 (May 2017): 87–104.
Diener, Ed, Richard E. Lucas, and Shigehiro Oishi. “Advances and Open Ques-
tions in the Science of Subjective Well-Being.” Collabra: Psychology 4, no. 1
(May 1, 2018): 15.
Fredrickson, Barbara L. “Positive Emotions Broaden and Build.” In E. Ashby
Plant & P.G. Devine (Eds.), Advances on Experimental Social Psychology, 47, 1–53.
(Burlington: Academic Press, 2013).
Gruber, June, Iris B. Mauss, and Maya Tamir. “A Dark Side of Happiness? How,
When, and Why Happiness Is Not Always Good.” Perspectives on Psychological
Science 6, no. 3 (May 2011): 222–233.
Lykken, David. Happiness: The Nature and Nurture of Joy and Contentment (New
York: St. Martin’s, 1999).
Myers, David. The Pursuit of Happiness: Who Is Happy, and Why (New York:
Morrow, 1992).
Ryff, Carol D. “Happiness Is Everything, or Is It? Explorations on the Meaning
of Psychological Wellbeing.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57 (1989):
1069–1081.
Part I
The Agricultural Age
Agricultural economies began to emerge about 11,000 years ago, and

while they gained ground only gradually they ultimately encompassed
the bulk of the world’s population. As a result, at least 6,000 years of the
human experience can legitimately be grouped under the heading of an
agricultural age, when most major societies were shaped by the nature of
the agricultural economy. Only about 300 years ago did the hold of agri-
culture begin to yield to the rise of an industrial alternative.
Many world history surveys divide the long Agricultural Age into several
main segments: a formative period; the emergence of initial, river-valley
civilizations; a classical period, when expanded cultural and political zones
developed in China, India, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean, from
about 600 BCE to 500/600 CE; a postclassical period after the collapse of
the great classical empires, dominated by the vigorous missionary religions
but also growing trade; and finally an early modern period, 1450–1750,
characterized by still further commercial growth and the inclusion of the
Americas in interregional commerce.
This conventional periodization contributes to what we know about
the history of happiness, but does not fully define it. The chapters that
follow simply focus instead on three very rough chronological divisions:
the emergence of agriculture itself; the classical period, where several ma-
jor philosophical systems grappled with the definition of happiness; and
finally (with two chapters) the substantial impact of the great religions but
also the fuller development of popular entertainments – extending from
about 300 CE through the 17th century.
3 Early Agricultural Society
Here’s the possibility: early humans, living in hunting and gathering

societies, were not only probably pretty happy, but also happier than many
people in societies that arose later, amid more complex economies. Most
specifically, the rise of agriculture, though it gradually displaced hunting
and gathering in many areas, probably worsened the human condition in
a number of measurable ways, creating new possibilities for u nhappiness.
And if this is so, it may explain two kinds of developments later on: first,
compensatory arrangements that sought to create new opportunities
for happiness, usually outside the constraints of ordinary daily life. And
second, a new need to talk about what happiness really means, which
would become a considerable preoccupation of intellectual and religious
leaders in many rising civilizations.
Here’s the complication, before we turn to the evidence: we simply
cannot conclusively prove this hypothesis, for we have no direct records
of humans’ emotional state before the invention of writing or more elabo-
rate art. It is indeed quite likely that these early societies did not generate
an explicit idea of happiness at all, since, while there were many specific
problems, the normal conditions of life could be judged to be fairly satis-
factory, with little need to single out particularly happy circumstances. No
special effort or formal concepts were required. This is also the conclusion
of a number of anthropologists who study some of the hunting and gath-
ering groups that still survive: they lack words or beliefs about happiness,
but they live in conditions, and with expectations, that are consistent with
considerable happiness in fact.
This is not the first time we’ve confronted the dilemma of trying to
figure out if people are happy even though they may not say so very
directly: interpreting contemporary Japanese satisfaction, despite rather
modest happiness polling ratings, involves a bit of a leap of faith. Con-
temporary Western standards lead to expectations that happy people
should be willing to talk about their happiness, and when they do not,
as least as vigorously as Westerners do, there is something of a dilemma.
Yet it was suggested, briefly, in Chapter 1 that the Japanese may well
be about as happy as Westerners are, given the objective conditions of
their lives, despite different polling results. It’s culture, not “reality”, that
Early Agricultural Society 23
creates a different impression – though those cultural differences make
it difficult to be sure.
The same dilemma, but on a much wider scale, applies to evaluating
happiness in hunting and gathering societies, when we are trying to as-
sess conditions and attitudes vastly different from our own. It is vital to
remember the amount of sheer speculation involved, in arguments about a
group’s emotional experience even where explicit claims, or even explicit
vocabularies, are lacking. But a number of historians, and certainly many
anthropologists, find a happiness assessment plausible, and if it is, it puts
the later history of happiness, and efforts to define happiness, in a really
new light.
Again, the basic argument is simple: many hunting and gathering
groups, though lacking clear concepts or vocabularies around happiness,
were and are in fact quite happy, often freer from some of the challenges
to happiness that more complex societies experience.
A First Cut
We can begin with the historical speculations (derived from work in sev-
eral disciplines). Here are some of the advantages of hunting and gathering
societies, from what we can glean from archeological and anthropological
records. Their populations enjoyed relatively good nutrition, high in pro-
tein and free from refined carbohydrates – thus better than the average di-
ets both in agricultural and industrial societies. The popularity of “paleo”
diets by health-conscious people today testifies to the advantages involved
(which also raises the issue of why so many modern people, who can af-
ford alternatives, find that unhealthy diets make them happier). Evidence
from skeletal and dental remains show that hunters and gatherers were less
likely to suffer from malnutrition than their peasant counterparts once
agriculture arrived. They were also, on average, taller. Life expectancy
wasn’t bad if one survived infancy – admittedly, a darker spot; people liv-
ing into their sixties were common. Infectious diseases did not seriously
affect these groups that moved around in small bands, and outright epi-
demics were rare to nonexistent. To be sure, medical interventions were
not available when illness did strike, though knowledge of herbal remedies
was extensive. Wars were also rare, though there is some debate about
this. The first clear evidence of war dates from only 14,000 years ago,
toward the end of the hunter-gatherer period when crowding may have
begun to increase in a few regions: a cluster of skeletal remains, all in one
spot, suggest violent conflict in one location in northeastern Africa. Or-
dinarily, hunter-g atherers responded to the threat of violence by simply
moving away – they operated amid abundant space. Really long-distance
displacements would be challenging, but often a shift to an adjacent ter-
ritory was possible. After all, on the eve of agriculture there were only
about 10 million people scattered over the entire world. Most groups also
24 The Agricultural Age
developed a number of explicit practices aimed at keeping peace with their
neighbors: formal gift exchanges and frequent intermarriage headed the
list. While usually scattered, hunting and gathering bands in some soci-
eties might meet annually for some collective ceremonies, usually around
heralding the sun either at its lowest or highest points in the year. Yearly
festivals of this sort, with some feasting, were common around sites like
Stonehenge, in England. Here was another way to promote positive re-
lationships. Good nutrition; fairly good health; considerable and indeed
probably normal peace – not a bad list.
The societies were also relatively egalitarian. A few distinctions may
have existed for some leaders; some skeletons have been discovered with
ornamental jewelry, probably not available for most people. But there
were few social distinctions and little economic inequality overall. This
could well have minimized envy and resentment – and one of the topics
to consider in later societies, including our own, is the extent to which
inequality causes active unhappiness in more complex structures, not an
easy issue. Men and women had different economic roles, but both were
extremely important to the food supply and were recognized as such. On
this basis women had some voice in group affairs. Gender issues almost
certainly less troubling than they would become later on.
Some scholars go on to speculate that considerable freedom existed as
well. Certainly there were few constraints on individuals who decided to
leave a group and strike out on their own, though survival might be an
issue. Among Australian aborigines, a tradition of “walkabout” covered
individuals who decided to travel around for a while, for whatever reason,
then returning to their kin. Group norms might constrain behavior in
these small clusters, though some have argued that shaming – so common
in more complex societies – may have been less intense. Sexual habits, at
least in some cases, were less constrained than would be the case later on.
Three obvious caveats to all this: first, there’s a lot we don’t know,
though this historical sketch is substantially confirmed and amplified by
more purely contemporary anthropological studies, discussed below. We
can assume for example that these groups normally spent relatively little
time at work, given normal availability of food, but we do not know
directly.
Second, there were certainly drawbacks in hunting-and-gathering life.
Individual violence was not infrequent: while the collective graves caused
by war seem rare (though this may of course mean they simply have not
been found), individual skeletons with heads bashed in are not uncom-
mon. To be sure, specific implements designed primarily for violence do
not emerge until, again, very late in the hunter-gatherer period (the first
explicit weapon, not much use for hunting, was a mace), but obviously
hunting apparatus or found objects like rocks could be used earlier on.
There was also danger from animals, though the invention of fire and
the domestication of dogs – both occurring well before the end of this
period – undoubtedly helped a bit. Depending on the region, getting
through harsh winters could be challenging, though the nutritional ev-
idence suggests considerable success. This society, in other words, had a
number of measurable advantages but it was not a paradise, which legiti-
mately complicates speculations about happiness.
And finally: we don’t know that these people were happy. There is no
direct evidence available to deal with this question. We can surmise that
they were reasonably satisfied and probably had little sense of alternatives,
which may be a component of a certain kind of happiness. The historians
who have painted the brightest pictures of these societies generally assume
that their inhabitants were largely content but probably lacked any explicit
concept of happiness, for there was no need for one. Conditions were nor-
mally fairly good, and there was no active sense of alternatives and hence
little frustration. But this picture rests on informed guesswork.
More from Anthropologists

A number of anthropologists, looking at the small groups of hunter-
gatherers still existing today, say much the same thing as historians do,
but since they can observe more directly they have some additional bits
of evidence.
Here are the key conclusions from a study of the Khoisan or Bushman
people of the Kalihari desert, in contemporary Namibia and Botswana,
based on years of observation. The first point emphasizes the balance
between work and other activities: these people work about 15 hours a
week on average, leaving the rest of the time free for socializing with family
and friends, loafing and napping, and pursuing various hobbies. Children,
too, are relatively free from formal obligations, leaving lots of time for rela-
tively unsupervised play; they learn some skills and social habits, of course,
but on an informal basis.
Life is not trouble-free. There are personal tragedies and sadness, in-
cluding death. Fighting occasionally occurs, particularly after drinking.
Some seasons are more challenging than others, in a region where there
are considerable periods without rain.
But there are relatively few needs, and most of them, normally, can be
taken care of rather easily. The society has developed great skill in hunting
and in identifying the plants that are useful for food and medicine. The
people are well adapted to their environment and comfortable with it.
They also strongly emphasize group solidarity and deliberately play down
individual achievement or blame. When a hunter returns from a produc-
tive hunt, for example, he will minimize his success rather than trying to
go one-up on his colleagues: hence, arguably, few problems with envy or
resentment. The society is also relatively unstratified, with few gradations
in wealth. While men and women are seen as different, women’s contri-
butions are clearly recognized and their opinions valued.
Much of this, not surprisingly, echoes the conclusions of historians we
have already examined. But the anthropologists can add in a few other
points, concerning the attitudes involved. There is little sense of striving.
These people do not think in terms of improving their lives, and in fact
they don’t think much about happiness. They have words for joy or sad-
ness, but not for “being happy” in any long-term sense. The constancy of
life, not aspiration, is the dominant theme. Everything is oriented to the
present, on meeting immediate needs. The people don’t wonder if they
are doing better than their ancestors did – in fact there is little interest in
ancestors at all. Nor do they compare themselves to other groups or indi-
viduals. The key, obviously, is a distinctive culture that provides a fairly
steady sense of contentment without the formal apparatus other societies,
including our own, commonly associate with happiness.
Other anthropologists extend this argument in additional ways. Much
has been made, for example in dealing with Australian aboriginal cul-
ture, of the deep connections to nature expressed in animist religions –
connections that many later, more sophisticated religions would lose sight
of in developing ideas about more remote, and sometimes angrier and de-
manding, gods. Anthropologists also comment further on the importance
of group solidarity and a sense of belonging.
These overall characterizations are not uncontested. First, some an-
thropologists shy away from characterizations about one type of society
being happier than another, arguing that the judgments involved are too
complex and that most societies forge some valid notions of happiness.
Second, and more specifically, some scholars stress the hardships of life,
the constant struggles against predators – both animal and insect, the pe-
riodic bouts of collective violence that some contemporary groups engage
in. (Given greater constraints on space, war may well be more common
in contemporary hunter-gatherer societies than it was earlier on, though
there are some contemporary groups that avoid it completely.) Many recent
studies emphasize the complexity of some hunting and gathering societies,
as against generalizations that imply a standard primitive simplicity. It is
quite possible, indeed, that generalizations about all current hunting and
gathering groups are off the mark, that some are markedly happier and
more peaceful than others. The subject, clearly, is complicated. And it is
vital to remember that even in the most positive arguments about happi-
ness, we are assuming emotional experiences that the groups themselves
do not articulate, and this carries some risk.
Nevertheless, it does seem clear that old assumptions about the pre-
dominant nastiness and brutality of our hunting and gathering past are
really mistaken. Life could be fairly good, particularly because defini-
tions of needs were kept modest. Material conditions had positive features
and, perhaps even more important, a culture could be developed that pro-
moted satisfaction over aspiration. As the more optimistic anthropologists
suggest, modern people, casting about for ways to make themselves feel
happier, have undoubtedly created a false sense of early humanity, with ar-
guments about life being (in the words of the English philosopher Thomas
Hobbes) “rude, brutish and short.” It is time to reconsider that prop and to
base our ideas about the history of happiness on a less linear, more complex
foundation.
Characteristics of Agricultural Societies

This, then, brings us back to history, and the basic question: what hap-
pened to happiness when, about 12,000 years ago, some groups began to
turn away from hunting and gathering and develop agriculture, a dra-
matically new economic system that would, though very gradually, gain
ascendancy in many parts of the world and that certainly began to support
the largest concentrations of people.
For the record, agriculture arose separately in at least three places (Black
Sea region, south China, Central America), which certainly suggests that
some real needs for change must have developed in several previously
hunting and gathering regions. And from these three centers agricultural
systems would fan out widely; innovations on the southern edge of the
Black Sea, for example, ultimately reached not only the entire Middle
East, but also North Africa, the Indian subcontinent, southern Europe
(and then from these spots ultimately further still). But the spread was
arguably surprisingly slow; it would be several thousand years, for exam-
ple, before southern Europe was drawn in, despite being reasonably close,
geographically, to the initial agricultural center. Undoubtedly one key
explanation for this involves the still-limited level of interregional contact
and the difficulties of long-distance transportation. Arguably, however,
the frequent lags reflected conscious resistance of many hunting and gath-
ering groups who were aware of agriculture and simply did not want to
make the conversion. Resistance, of course, could simply reflect stubborn
attachments – as among men who did not want to give up the excitement
and prestige of relying on hunting for a farming life that might seem pro-
saic by contrast. But it also could express a real understanding that agricul-
ture, in many ways, could make life worse (possibly including an inchoate
sense that it would reduce human contentment).
For there were, in fact, a number of drawbacks, as against the character-
istics of hunting and gathering. On the most basic level, diets deteriorated
for most people (whose stature, as a result, declined). Agriculture produced
more food than hunting and gathering did, but it was of lower nutrient
quality – more carbohydrates from grains and (in the Americas) potatoes,
but far less protein – even with the domestication of some animals. Levels
of disease went up: most agriculture involved settled communities that
were, as well, somewhat larger than hunting and gathering bands. Hence
more opportunity for contagion and local pollution. As most agricultural
societies also came to engage in some long-distance trade – which had its
advantages, in terms of expanding the variety of goods available – periodic
plagues became a normal feature of life as well. And all this involves not
only changes in material existence, but emotional life as well, most nota-
bly in expanding opportunities for fear and grief.
Work was harder. Farming requires longer hours than hunting, though
there is downtime in winter. In some cases, the physical demands of
planting and harvesting might be more intense as well. This is a huge
distinction.
Wars became more common. Agricultural societies accumulated some
surplus, which meant targets for raiding. When (ultimately) formal states
emerged as well, this brought professional soldiers and, in some cases,
rulers eager to make their mark through conquest. Of course there were
countervailing impulses: many agricultural communities worked hard to
build defenses, many rulers sought peace. Agriculture itself suffered from
war. This was one reason, in the early centuries of the new economic
system, that troops would cease battle during harvest time, to go home to
help – a nicety that was fairly soon abandoned in favor of military goals.
Agriculture everywhere massively increased inequality, creating grow-
ing gulfs between a wealthy upper class and the masses of the laboring
population (which might in some cases also be burdened by compulsory
systems such as slavery or serfdom). Gaps also developed between urban-
ites (though they were relatively small in number) and the rural popula-
tion. Gender inequality was at least as intense, and perhaps an even more
vivid contrast with hunting and gathering conditions. For several reasons,
all agricultural societies introduced patriarchal systems that held women
to be markedly inferior to men, tended to emphasize their domestic roles
and confinements, and barred them (with individual exceptions) from any
public or political functions.
Small wonder that some recent scholars have argued, with Jerrod
Diamond, that the transition to agriculture was “the worst mistake in the
history of the human race”. Small wonder as well that some of the h
istorians
who have focused on happiness contend that in all probability, the transi-
tion also reduced the level of human contentment – making happiness more
problematic than it had been with hunting and gathering.
Causes and Complexities

The downsides of agriculture were very real, but they were not of course
the whole story. The bleak picture sketched here raises the obvious ques-
tion: if agriculture created so many problems, why did people turn to it
in the first place? This then leads to the second, more subtle issue: what
opportunities did people have to adapt, to seek and find happiness in these
new conditions?
A third issue can be noted: some of the drawbacks of agriculture, partic-
ularly in terms of nutrition and disease, would be addressed subsequently,
with industrialization, when on average the material framework for hu-
man existence clearly began to improve. But this is for later, when we turn
to the complex issues concerning happiness and modernity.
On agricultural society itself, there are several questions. First, why turn
away from hunting and gathering at all? Early agricultural systems may have
developed in part out of necessity, with no great thoughts about long-term
impacts on material or emotional life. In some regions, climate changes may
have reduced the amount of large game available for hunting; over-hunting
itself might have contributed, for while hunter-gatherers were sensitive to
the environment, they were capable of killing more animals than the sys-
tem could bear. And as gatherers, women at least would have learned the
potential of deliberately planting seeds rather than simply picking from the
wild – an option that could help address any hunting crisis.
Then, whatever the initial spur, agriculture did bring one huge set of
advantages: agricultural economies could produce a much greater quantity
of food than hunting and gathering groups could provide, which led quite
quickly to an unprecedented increase in human population. There is an
irony here of course: the system generated larger numbers of people who
may have faced far more problems than their ancestors had, and food sup-
ply itself could falter in periodic famines. But there is no doubt about the
basics: in terms of sheer numbers of people, there was huge gain.
And this leads to two further factors that help explain the gradual spread
of the system (despite continuing holdouts in regions that simply did not
buy in). First, population numbers could generate force. We know that
agriculture spread in Europe in part simply because groups from the Mid-
dle East, needing more space, migrated in and compelled adoption of the
new system, converting or subduing hunting and gathering rivals. (This
would also occur in North America, of course, much later on.) There was
no conversion, no careful weighing of pros and cons, involved.
Second, it was quite possible that many people could take pride in the
advancement of the species and, more specifically, in their own larger
families. Boasting about reproductive prowess – and casting shame on the
families that could not reproduce – was a common feature of agricultural
societies, though men were more likely to brag than the women whose
lives were more directly involved.
(It is worth noting that agricultural economies also facilitated the pro-
duction of alcohol, and a few scholars, not entirely frivolously, have claimed
this may have played a role in easing the burdens of the new economic
system, particularly for men. Recipes for producing beer and fermented
spirits unquestionably commanded some of the first uses of writing in
several early civilizations. And the complex relationship between drinking
and happiness becomes an issue from the early agricultural society to the
present day.)
Down the line, agriculture also generated possibilities for creating
small cities and supporting a fraction of the population available to do
other kinds of work, producing tools, ornaments, even fine art. These
possible advantages do not explain agriculture’s first arrival – they lay
in the future; but some preliminary innovations might factor in. More
immediately, some scholars argue that in providing opportunities to
settle down, to build more solid houses and amenities such as wells,
even the earliest agriculture could have attracted some converts; but it
is not clear that people accustomed to wandering a bit would find this
advantageous.
Necessity; compulsion; some advantages clearly combined both to
generate agriculture and to facilitate its dissemination. Where happi-
ness levels fit into this equation remains elusive; no explicit comment
is available, at least until much more recently when we can trace the
tremendous discomfort experienced by some groups, for example among
indigenous Americans, when pressed to abandon the hunt in favor of
settled farming.
Adaptations and Inequalities

Most of the history of happiness from about 9,000 BCE until the 17th or
18th century CE involves trying to figure out how agricultural popula-
tions dealt with the constraints of their situation, capitalized on the advan-
tages, or – in between – tried to figure out compensations. Still focused
on the early stages of agriculture’s introduction, two points stand out: new
class distinctions and the impressive capacity of people to adapt.
First, early on, a minority of individuals – physically bigger, more force-
ful and aggressive, able to take over more land – began to carve out an
upper class life that was, on average, measurably different from the condi-
tions of the bulk of the population – even deliberately different. A decisive
recent historical study has emphasized how, since the early days of agri-
cultural civilization, a distinctive upper class has been an almost invariable
feature of the social experience.
Food supply was better for this small group, particularly in terms of
meat and protein. As one result, aristocrats and landlords were physically
larger than their lower-class counterparts, taller by several inches on av-
erage. This size distinction would persist, in places like Great Britain,
into the 1930s. And the difference could generate other advantages: bigger
people could see themselves, and be seen, as naturally superior.
Disease was a problem for upper classes too; issues here were less easy
to evade. But early on, wealthy groups had some opportunities to flee
plagues; and their housing, more capacious, might provide a slight shield
against the worst forms of contagion. They could also afford fancier tombs,
if these offered some comfort.
This upper class routinely took greater advantage of the opportunity
for large families; here is where male pride in substantial breeding showed
through most clearly. In contrast, ordinary folk, without the means to
support too many offspring, faced greater tension. They wanted enough
children to provide family labor and carry on the family line, and there
could be pride here as well. But too many offspring would be disastrous,
potentially ruining the family economy. Hence, in most agricultural so-
cieties, ordinary families had six to eight children (up to half of whom
would die in infancy) and cringed at the prospect of exceeding this level
(which in turn was about half of what an average family CAN breed, if it
goes at the process without constraint). Periods of sexual abstinence were
almost essential to keep numbers manageable, given the absence of control
devices. But still, many families could overshoot; a clear response to this
tension, again in many agricultural societies at least until the past millen-
nium, was a high rate of infanticide.
It was the upper class, of course, that could also take the fullest advan-
tage of new opportunities to acquire jewelry, fine artisanal products, and
the most elaborate entertainments – though ordinary folk, particularly in
the cities, might gain some access as well.
But this first reaction is, overall, fundamental: the constraints and op-
portunities of agriculture generated massive social distinctions. A minority
was able to take special advantage and, surely, despite a host of problems,
its members were far more likely to be and feel actively happy than their
inferiors. Indeed, the opportunity to feel superior might itself generate a
new sense of pleasure.
The second point, about adaptation, as we focus attention on the
masses of the population, is trickier, and in some sense it will preoccupy
us through several of the following chapters. Here is a basic analytical
challenge: some of the problems we can identify, in our retrospective
judgment and informed by what we know about the contrasts with ear-
lier, hunting and gathering existence, may not always have appeared to be
problems to those involved. More elaborate religions could also factor into
popular calculations, in explaining the woes of ordinary life, as we will see
in Chapter 5. (And we must not forget the possible pride in raising large
numbers of children and a sense, however vague, of contributing to the
species or the family lineage.)
The issue of nutritional quality, for example, is a problem we can see
clearly in hindsight, but it was probably not consciously realized except
amid outright famines. And we will see that agricultural people gener-
ated periodic opportunities, in festivals, to eat better and more abundantly
than was normally possible, and the contrast may have been truly sweet.
(Periodic rather than more routine pleasure may have been an important
feature of agricultural life, and it might support an active sense of happi-
ness through anticipation and recollection.)
Work could certainly be seen as a huge burden, though active mem-
ory of the greater leisure in hunting and gathering probably faded fairly
quickly. But while the burden could not be denied, almost every agricul-
tural society designed some holidays when work could recede and, above
all, introduced some form of weekend – every five, or seven, or ten days,
the length of the week varied. This was an entirely artificial unit of time,
with no relation to any natural cycle. But it provided a recurrent day in
which people could shift greater attention to worship, or to marketing, or
simply to relaxing.
Growing and persistent inequality can sound ominous, and it would
generate periodic social protest and individual unhappiness. But it could
also prove acceptable, for a number of reasons. The idea that aristocrats
were better than other folk, and deserved their relative good fortune,
might be surprisingly widely accepted if the message was driven home
persistently; the same held true for the idea of male superiority, which
many children began learning literally from infancy. Or people could
manage simply to ignore radical inequality in day-to-day life, tending to
their own affairs; aristocrats, most obviously, were often distant figures,
and women sometimes figured out ways to keep men away from their
daily routines.
The main point is that human beings are surprisingly adaptable, and
often find reasons for satisfaction and even dignity that they prefer to
nagging discontent. Clearly, most people were certainly happy enough to
seek to have children, to carry on – and from a species standpoint, this was
the main requirement. It is important not to force our own value system
on the past, and to assume unhappiness or dissatisfaction that people at the
time did not experience.
To be sure, as we will see, there were plenty of observers, in many
early civilizations, who talked about the whimsical balance between for-
tune and misfortune, and the lack of control most people had over their
own fate. This certainly suggested some degree of uncertainty about the
availability of happiness. The Chinese, particularly, frequently discussed
the randomness of luck (while acknowledging that people should enjoy
good luck if they found it). And there were darker visions still. A Persian
thinker in the 6th century BCE voiced a sentiment that may well have
been widely shared:
Short as human life is, there is not a man in the world, here or else-
where, who is happy enough not to wish – not only once but again
and again – to be dead rather than alive. Troubles come, diseases afflict
us, and this makes life, despite its brevity, seem all too long.
While we lack the direct evidence, on either side of the introduction of

agriculture, to prove the claim that people were less happy than their
counterparts had been in the simpler hunting and gathering economy, the
probabilities are clear. At the least, it seems safe to claim that happiness
became increasingly problematic, which is one reason that so many early
intellectuals and religious figures would come to believe that they had to
address the topic directly.
The Lure of a Past Golden Age
Amid the undeniable uncertainties and the amount of speculation re-
quired, given lack of explicit evidence of how the people who experienced
the transition actually compared their agricultural lives to those of their
near ancestors, there is one final type of data that may be particularly sug-
gestive of an awareness of loss.
Almost all agricultural societies, as they developed oral and then writ-
ten stories about human origins, created a deep belief in a past Golden
Age, vastly superior to ordinary life in their own time and, in many ren-
ditions, clearly supremely happy – an age from which present-day society
had deteriorated.
The Greek writer Hesiod, in the late 6th century BCE, painted the pic-
ture clearly in his book, Works and Days. Humanity’s first age, which he
called golden, featured people and gods mingling peacefully. People indeed
lived like gods, without “sorrow of heart” “remote from toil and grief.”
They feasted joyfully, and grew old without losing their youthful appearance;
when death occurred, it too was peaceful, as if going to sleep. “And they had
all good things, for the fruitful earth unforced bore them fruit abundantly.”
But the age did not last, and Hesiod described a steady decline to silver,
bronze, heroic, and iron (his present day); Gods abandoned cohabitation
with man after the silver age, because human greed and folly became too
much to bear. Here was a clear descent in the quality of life and the avail-
ability of happiness.
Many later Greek writers, including Plato, picked up on the Golden
Age idea, and it was also central to some of the writings of the leading
Roman poet, Virgil. For Virgil, the first age, when people had just de-
scended from the gods, also featured ease, but there was more. There was
no private property – any boundary lines were “impious”, because the
earth gave its bounty freely. Another Roman writer, Ovid, added that this
blissful period required no government or punishments, because people
pursued the good naturally.
Somewhat similar visions emerged in other cultures. Hindu teachings
also saw a procession of ages for humankind, though here there was a be-
lief that they might recur in a cyclical fashion. A “First and Perfect” age
was described in the great early Hindu epic, the Mahabarata. There was no
buying and selling, there was “neither poor nor rich”. Disease was absent,
“there was no lessening with the years”, “no sorrow, no fear”. And people
were supremely virtuous, readily abandoning earthly desires (a spiritual
theme not present in the Greek and Roman visions). “It was the time
when all people were happy.”
A number of Native American peoples, such as the Cree and the Navajo,
also ventured ideas of a past age when the gods moved among people and
laid out basic truths about harmony with nature, peace, and equality. Here,
the tone was more optimistic, holding that at some future point these virtues
would be recaptured, as people came together to realize the ancient teachings.
African creation stories often featured, again, the idea of an early exis-
tence that was prosperous and peaceful. Some added particular emphasis
on the initial harmony between people and animals, which was then dis-
rupted by human acts such as the invention of fire.
Confucius, writing in a time of internal strife and political disarray in
China, also looked back to a better past, emphasizing that crucial ideas of
harmony and balance had been developed centuries before. His vision was
less grandiose than the Greek or Hindu golden age notions, focused more
on the belief that an earlier political dynasty had established a just and
peaceful order from which his own society has deteriorated. In this view,
while it was vital to turn back to the ideas and models of a superior past,
these might be recaptured by proper imitation in the present.
Traditions in the Middle East emphasized the perfection, but also the
loss, of a golden age. Persian mythology generated the belief that in the
earliest time, the world had been populated by gods who lived in pros-
perity and peace – another image of a lost golden age. Humanity initially
flourished in a prosperous, divinely established garden that was a kind of
paradise. Some scholars believe that this notion was then picked up by
early Judaism and translated into one of the most influential of all, the
fall-from-perfection scheme: the Garden of Eden and the human inabil-
ity to sustain this perfection because of greed – a classic image of how
happiness can be spoiled by irrational dissatisfaction. The word “Eden”
itself may have been derived from an ancient Hebrew word for pleasure,
suggesting the dominant theme involved.
For the idea of Eden, which would be transmitted from Judaism to the
other Abrahamic religions, Christianity and Islam, emphasized the ease
and abundance of this first human phase. Material goods flowed from
nature without effort. Interestingly, in contrast to visions in other cultures
that stressed harmony with nature, the Biblical account placed humankind
atop the rest of the natural order, commanding lesser creatures to provide
abundance. (In the Qu’arnic version however, early humans were simply
told that they could “eat of the bountiful things, therein, as ye will.” For
our purposes, however, the result was the same as with the other visions
of a Golden Age: a life of ease, freedom from worry.) Furthermore, other
negative emotions, such as shame, were absent as well. Only the human
inability to accept this contentment without wondering if there might be
more, disobeying divine orders, forced people out of this ideal state and
into the burdensome existence that followed.
***
The idea of a lost Golden Age, impressively ubiquitous in the cultures that
arose in agricultural societies, does not of course prove that people actu-
ally remembered that their conditions had deteriorated in so many respects
with the move away from hunting and gathering. Indeed a few hunting
and gathering societies themselves generated ideas of an earlier ideal. And
the whole notion may have been an impulse to conceive what perfection
might be like, to give free rein to imagination and also, possibly (as with
the Biblical story) find ways to chide people into better behavior
But the pattern is at least suggestive. In many of the stories, several of
the probable deteriorations noted by historians and anthropologists are
specifically addressed, particularly the changes in work and equality. Peo-
ple who had to work harder with agriculture may have preserved some
vague recollection of an earlier time when this level of exertion had been
less necessary. The same could apply to the need for new concern about
disease, or the existence of greater inequality. It is not implausible to read
the Golden Age stories not just as flights of fancy but a flickering remem-
brance of better things past.
Without question, finally, the stories certainly encouraged people to
think of their own existence as flawed in many ways, well beneath imag-
ined perfection and possibly, as well, a punishment for human arrogance.
References to a Golden Age were not designed to highlight the happiness
available in daily life.
***
The transition to agriculture occurred, for most societies, several m illennia

in the past. Modern societies, while they have not renounced all the
Golden Age stories entirely, tend to think about the past very differently,
assuming that progress, not deterioration, is the true historical trajectory.
(Though some people are still tied to a belief that there must have been
more happiness “back then”, as frequent references to “the good old days”
suggest.) The first formal history of happiness, written in 1772 by the
Marquis de Chastellux, was built around this confident assumption: what
he called “public felicity” had clearly increased since humankind’s earliest
days. This dramatic recasting was part of what Darrin McMahon calls the
“revolution of expectations” associated with a very different view of hap-
piness from the characteristic approach of writers in the agricultural age.
Yet, as we have seen, the assumption of linear progress from the earliest
human societies is, at the least, highly questionable. People in agricultural
societies, faced with a number of problems almost certainly more acute
than those encountered in hunting and gathering groups, at least vaguely
aware of deterioration, had to think about happiness more explicitly than
their ancestors had done. Few of them, particularly in the lower classes,
could expect it with confidence. Ideas of luck or pure chance loomed large
in most of the formal discussions of happiness in the agricultural civiliza-
tions. Indeed, the word happiness in the English language, deriving from
an old Norse term for luck and emerging in the 14th century, emphasized
chance, being favored by fortune, gaining a broader meaning of content-
ment only somewhat later.
Further, ideas and word meanings aside, agricultural people had to gen-
erate some new ways to mitigate some of the constraints most of them
faced, or to find some kind of compensation. All this was quite different
from the implicit experience of happiness characteristic of many hunting
and gathering groups. The kind of writing about happiness that emerged
in the agricultural civilizations – a clear legacy from this long phase of the
human experience – was in part simply the result of this new means of
expression, available to none of the hunting and gathering groups. But it
was also the product of the new need to grapple with constraints, to won-
der about alternatives, almost certainly in ways that would have seemed
unnecessary before agriculture’s advent.
Further Reading
For two superb sketches of the historical argument:
Harari, Yuval N. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind (Toronto: Signal, 2014).
McMahon, Darrin. “From the Paleolithic to the Present: Three Revolutions in
the Global History of Happiness.” In E. Diener, S. Oishi, and L. Tay (Eds.),
Handbook of Well-Being (Salt Lake City, UT: DEF Publishers, 2018).
On issues of inequality:
Boehm, Christopher. Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
Flannery, Kent V., and Joyce Marcus. The Creation of Inequality: How Our Prehis-
toric Ancestors Set the Stage for Monarchy, Slavery, and Empire (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2012).
Scheidel, Walter. The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone
Age to the Twenty-First Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).
For relevant anthropological work:
Hill, Kim, and A. Magdalena Hurtado. Aché Life History: The Ecology and Demog-
raphy of a Foraging People (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996).
Poirier, Sylvie. A World of Relationships: Itineraries, Dreams, and Events in the
Australian Western Desert (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).
Sahlins, Marshall. Stone Age Economics (Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), es-
pecially the first chapter on “the original affluent society”.
Suzman, James. Affluence without Abundance: The Disappearing World of the Bushmen
(New York: Bloomsbury USA, 2017).
On complexities in evaluating contemporary groups, see for example:
Diamond, Jared. “The Worst Mistake in the History of the Human Race.” Dis-
cover Magazine (May, 1987).
Pascoe, Bruce. Dark Emu: Black Seeds: Agriculture or Accident? (Broome: Magabala
Books Aboriginal, 2014).
On the issue of war:
Kelly, Raymond C. (Raymond Case). Warless Societies and the Origin of War (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
See also:
Briggs, Jean L. Never in Anger; Portrait of an Eskimo Family. (Cambridge, MA:
4 From the Philosophers
Happiness in the Classical Period
There is simply no real record relevant to happiness in the many centuries

after agricultural economies first took shape. We can surmise, as discussed
in the previous chapter, but that’s about it. We know that grain yields were
fairly high in the early centuries of agriculture, at least in northern Middle
East, which may have produced some satisfaction along with the higher
birth rate. Modest agricultural surplus also permitted the establishment of
the first small cities (though the vast majority of the population remained
rural); these too had some advantages but they could also be targets of
raids and their health conditions were bad, with mortality rates notably
higher than the average. (This rural-urban disparity would last until about
a century ago.) But all of this is scattered and vague in terms of levels of
happiness or the criteria involved.
Early Civilization
Evidence begins to expand once early civilizations began to form in a few
centers from about 3,500 BCE onward – generating more elaborate art,
writing, and formal governments. Civilizations had their own drawbacks,
with even greater inequality and, sometimes, increased warfare, but they
could offer some compensations even aside from the enjoyments of the
upper classes.
Indications from ancient Egypt are particularly interesting, along with
the possibility that this society offered more support for happiness than
most of the early civilizations. Here is a case where objective conditions
and value systems seem to have intersected to support expectations of
happiness. There’s an interesting comparative challenge here, among the
various river-valley civilizations, so long as the lack of extensive direct
evidence is recognized.
Egyptian society offered several objective advantages: relatively long pe-
riods of peace, for the region was rarely invaded and did not consistently at-
tempt further conquests. The Nile River provided a fairly reliable source of
irrigation, which in turn bolstered the food supply. And while Egypt fea-
tured considerable inequality, including the patriarchal gender system, its
slave population was relatively limited and women were treated somewhat
more favorably than was the case in many other early civilizations. Here,
at least potentially, was a hospitable environment for the experience of
happiness – and a warning as well that we should not be too sweeping in
our generalizations about the disadvantages of agricultural societies.
Egyptian culture encouraged a sense of gratitude to the gods for the
basic qualities of life, including family and children, adequate health and
material support, and assurance of a proper burial. One Egyptian ruler en-
capsulated this idea of happiness by citing “Life, Prosperity and Health” af-
ter signing his name on official documents. An inscription on a tomb read,
He who keeps to the road of the god, he spends his whole life in joy,
laden with riches more than all his peers. He grows old in his city,
he is an honored man in his home, all his limbs are young as those of
a child. His children are before him, numerous and following each
other from generation to generation.
And an ordinary Egyptian was cited as saying, when asked what he would
most miss when he died, “My wife, my son, beer, my dog, the river.”
Egyptians also devised a wide range of diversions, though more for the
upper classes than others: archery, sailing, swimming, and several imagi-
native board games.
The most interesting testimony to an Egyptian belief in happiness was
a distinctive idea of death and the life thereafter, always assuming a proper
burial and a favorable judgment by the gods. The afterlife was perceived
as an extension of patterns already experienced, just without illness, sad-
ness, or death. A tomb inscription conveyed the message: “May I walk
every day on the banks of the water, may my soul rest on the branches of
the trees which I planted, may I refresh myself under the shadow of my
sycamore.” The notion that eternity was in some ways a continuation of
life, though without the frailties of the body, was an unusual suggestion
that one did not have to wait on death to find a reasonable amount of
contentment. Finally, common scorn for non-Egyptians and a general lack
of interest in traveling outside of Egypt reflected a belief that Egyptians
themselves were living the best life possible.
What we know about the most comparable river-valley civilization,
in Mesopotamia, suggests considerable contrast, again probably reflect-
ing more frequent warfare and a less reliable environment for agriculture.
Mesopotamian gods, often angry, inspired fear and obedience, requiring
service and sacrifice rather than promoting an emphasis on the positive
qualities of earthly existence. To be sure, appropriate cultivation of one’s
personal god could produce benefits in this life, but on the whole the re-
ligious culture inspired a considerable sense of gloom and apprehension.
And again in contrast to the Egyptians, life after death was a perpet-
ual time of darkness, rather than some kind of affirmation. To be sure,
like the Egyptians the Mesopotamians developed a variety of games and
Happiness in the Classical Period 39
diversions, so the negative impressions should not be pressed too far, but
a noticeable degree of pessimism does characterize many accounts of the
basic culture.
All of this is suggestive at best. We know even less about approaches to
happiness in other early civilizations, though it is worth remembering that
in China, Confucius would look back at a formative period in which rulers
provided harmony and balance. What we can take from the impressions of
Egypt and Mesopotamia does suggest ways in which objective conditions
and ideas could combine to produce different regional approaches to hap-
piness, within the larger constraints of agricultural societies.
The Classical World

The situation changes considerably in the next major period in civiliza-
tional history, though still within the basic framework of an agricultural
economy. The societies that began to take shape in the eastern Mediter-
ranean and in China after about 800 BCE generated far more extensive
records than their predecessors and, in all probability, a more active in-
tellectual life overall. Most important, in these centers and also in India,
philosophical or religious systems began to be developed that would
spread widely within each region and would provide a cultural legacy
that proved surprisingly durable in these areas and often in neighboring
countries as well.
Debates about the nature of happiness were central to the cultures of the
classical world. It is important to remember that these same classical societies
were the first to build elaborate pictures of a prior Golden Age, suggesting
already some sense that available levels of happiness had, through human
folly, somehow deteriorated. And these same societies tended to tie personal
happiness to a strong element of sheer luck, another interesting constraint.
But there more was involved. The two great philosophical traditions
that formed in the classical period, both in the 6th–5th centuries BCE,
devoted explicit attention to the problem of defining and attaining happi-
ness. (More purely religious approaches will be taken up in the next chap-
ter.) Both traditions, in turn, strongly influenced later regional patterns,
though particularly in China and its neighbors. Confucian values, broadly
construed, still help shape expectations and responses in East Asia. Greek
and Roman traditions are less salient, but they are still consulted as part
of Western and East European intellectual life and they wielded extensive
influence at the time.
The Social Framework

It may seem self-evident that once more formal intellectual inquiry began
to develop, discussions of the nature of human happiness would gain a
prominent place. After all, it’s a great and vital topic. It is also possible that
the vague sense of deterioration from a prior Golden Age would inspire
commentary – most obviously with the Confucian idea of the past.
There was another source of inspiration, directly attached to basic fea-
tures of agricultural civilizations as they had developed by this point, that
would shape philosophical discussion in both these major centers: the life-
style options now available to upper-class males.
For whatever the limitations of conditions for the majority of the pop-
ulation, the upper classes carved out some distinctive opportunities for
enjoyment. There was the attraction of pursuing still-greater wealth, sym-
bolized by legendary rulers like Croesus in Greece. High living could also
include unusual indulgence in wine or sexual pleasures. The Greeks even
had gods that represented this kind of excess, like Dionysius. Opportuni-
ties of this sort, in real life as well as mythology, inevitably raised questions
about their relevance to true happiness – particularly in societies where the
upper classes also sought to justify their existence by offering constructive
political leadership. Both Chinese and Greek philosophers grappled fairly
directly with the issues involved, reaching somewhat similar conclusions
around this specific focus. Some scholars indeed see their efforts as essen-
tially a rebellion against the kinds of values that had defined upper-class
life to that point, in an effort to reach a higher level of happiness, one
that was less dependent on luck or circumstance and one that had deeper
human meaning.
This social framework would also raise questions about the applicability
of these philosophical concepts to life beyond the reaches of the upper
class. Here, Greek and Chinese approaches diverged somewhat, in ways
that might also affect their wider social impact.
The Greek Approach

Beginning with foundational figures like Socrates and Plato, Greek
philosophers sought to make it clear that a largely material focus could not
serve as the core of human happiness. A certain degree of physical comfort
and support, along with good health, provided important preconditions,
but the main emphasis was different. In working to clarify this distinction,
Greek thinkers established one of the first attempts to define a field of
knowledge around the nature and achievement of happiness.
Socrates made it clear that happiness was a primary human goal: “What
being is there who does not desire happiness?” But Socrates, and in his
wake Plato, quickly stipulated that material or sensual pleasure, however
widely sought, was not the substance of real happiness. Desire in fact must
be carefully limited, carefully directed away from sheer sensuality in a
process that would require real discipline. Happiness does not consist – as
the Greek upper classes had long believed – in wealth, or drink, or even
power, but rather in “the better elements of the mind”. Pursuit of wisdom
might make true happiness available regardless of physical hardships or the
whims of fortune. For Plato, it was Socrates himself, pursuing wisdom and
harmony, who had managed to live “like a god” and find true happiness.
Aristotle, following on the heels of Socrates and Plato, wrote even more
extensively on happiness, in work that would prove particularly influential
over time. While Aristotle was somewhat more tolerant of earthly plea-
sures than his predecessors, he was equally insistent that true happiness
could only be found in the attributes that distinguish humans from all
other creatures: reason and virtue. Happiness was in fact nothing more
than an “activity of the soul expressing virtue.”
In this vision, pursuit of mere physical pleasure was essentially a form
of slavery, more akin to “grazing animals” than true qualities of human
beings. Wealth, comforts, even friends and family, though valid to a point,
were not the stuff of true happiness, whose pursuit might require some
truly difficult choices.
In his most influential work on the subject, Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle
set about trying to define the ultimate purpose of human existence. He
was at pains to distinguish true happiness from the kind of fleeting plea-
sures that might result in sensual satisfactions or even interactions with
friends. Rather, happiness was a culmination of a whole life devoted to
living up to one’s full potential as a rational human being. “For as it is not
one swallow or one fine day that makes a spring, so it is not one day or a
short time that makes a man blessed and happy.” For this reason children,
among other things, cannot be considered happy, because their potential
for a flourishing human life has not been realized.
Aristotle consistently emphasized the distinction between humans and
animals in his definition of happiness. This was why he saw pursuit of
pleasure as an unworthy basic goal, because it was common to animals as
well as man. Rational capacity is what constitutes the human essence, and
perfecting that capacity is the core of happiness. The goal is not to deny
physical urges, but to channel them in ways appropriate to the exercise of
reason. As he said in the Ethics,
The function of man is to live a certain kind of life, and this activity
implies a rational principle, and the function of a good man is the
good and noble performance (of this principle), and if any action is
well performed it is performed with the appropriate excellence.: if
this is the case, then happiness turns out to be an activity of the soul
in accordance with virtue.
In the short term, pursuit of virtue can seem painful, for it can require a
sacrifice of more superficial pleasures. Developing a good character re-
quires effort, but it is moral character – what Aristotle called “complete
virtue” – that is essential to true happiness. “He is happy who lives in ac-
cordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external
goods not for some chance period but throughout a complete life.” Even
friendship, which Aristotle esteemed as part of happiness because it com-
bines intellectual and emotional satisfactions, must be rooted in virtue,
wanting the best for friends regardless of mere pleasure and seeking to join
with them in goodness and morality.
Aristotle’s emphasis on rational virtue as the essence of happiness in-
volved the capacity not only to think about doing the right thing, but
actually doing it; this could not be a merely passive quality. But the phi-
losopher also stressed the importance of pure intellectual contemplation
for a truly happy life. The ultimate expression of our rational natures is
rational reflection, including lifelong curiosity. This capacity, along with
promotion of virtuous character, should be the true goal of education.
In all this Aristotle, more than Socrates and Plato, had to acknowledge
the wider Greek belief in the importance of chance or luck: the mere de-
sire to achieve virtue and exercise reason was not enough. Even moderate
living, another Aristotelean emphasis, might not suffice. A person could
pursue virtue all his life and still encounter some disaster in old age that
would spoil the whole effort. And it was essential to have adequate eco-
nomic means, good health, and even physical attractiveness to pursue the
cultivation of virtue and reason. People cannot do “fine actions” without
resources, and they cannot have the “character of happiness” if they look
“utterly repulsive” or if they are alone or childless. While Aristotle was
optimistic in some moments about opportunities to achieve happiness,
he also emphasized a number of constraints. The necessary preconditions
could not be created by the individual alone, there had to be some good
fortune. There is no escaping the ambiguity here. Ultimately Aristotle
hoped that it would be happy people – virtuous and rational (and lucky) –
who would lead society, but he had to admit that they might be few in
number.
Aristotle’s greatest achievement, though clearly building on his prede-
cessors, was to establish happiness and its achievement as a central philo-
sophical goal and to distinguish it from merely physical satisfaction. His
influence – for many centuries he would be known as “The Philosopher” –
would extend around the Mediterranean and beyond, affecting work on
happiness in the Middle East as well as Europe, eastern Europe as well as
western.
A Darker View: Greek Tragedy

The Greek cultural legacy was not of course philosophical alone. The
powerful dramatic tradition contributed as well, among other things, set-
ting up a division between comedy and tragedy that would have enduring
implications. While performances of comedy loomed large, it was really
the tragic tradition that deserved particular emphasis, contributing to a
sense of ambivalence about happiness that was on the whole lacking in
Chinese culture in the same period.
For the themes in tragedy elaborated on the sense of the unpredictabil-
ity of happiness that even Aristotle had conceded – but with far more vivid
specifics. A son mistakenly kills his father and blinds himself as punish-
ment, or a man sleeps with a woman who turns out to be his mother, who
then kills herself in remorse. In some of these dramas, gods simply toy with
hapless mortals. Revenge is another common theme, another way plans
can be thwarted and happiness denied. In some cases human folly causes
the problems, but more often the situation spins out of control without
any wrongdoing. As the messenger in one Euripides play proclaims, “no
man is happy”. Another play bemoans humankind as an “unhappy race”
“doomed to an endless round of “sorrow, and unmeasurable woe.”
The notion of a powerful series of dramas completely devoid of what, in
modern terms, we might call happy endings was a striking reminder that
the happiness the philosophers sought was often denied in Greek culture.
The role of luck or chance was undeniable, painfully driving home one
of the themes we have already noted as characteristic in agricultural societies.
Beyond this basic point about lack of control, some scholars have spec-
ulated that public performances of the tragedies served as emotional re-
lease for the audience – as catharsis, particularly by allowing harmless
expressions of fear or pity and by offering dramatic contrasts that might
make daily life a bit more palatable: at least most people did not have
sons who had to blind themselves. It is also true that many performances
were capped by a brief but more amusing play – and that the audiences
frequently drank a good bit of wine during the show. The overall impact
on the actual experience of or expectations for happiness is not easy to
calculate.
Greek and Roman Successors

Later Greek and then Roman philosophers maintained many of the em-
phases of the founding figures, but added some significant emphases.
Several writers argued that people should be responsible for their own
happiness, rather than serving as puppets to mere chance or to be doomed
to tragic ends. Happiness is, or should be, the one possession humans can
be sure about. A second emphasis related closely to this issue of control:
philosophy should not only guide to happiness but should help deal with
human pain and suffering. Cicero, the Roman politician and writer, com-
pared philosophy to medicine: just as doctors aided the ailing body, so
philosophy should address an ailing soul.
One school of thought, launched by Epicurus in the 4th century,
broke further with the earlier tradition by emphasizing the importance
of physical pleasure: “pleasure is the beginning and goal of a happy life”.
Epicureans argued then that rather than fighting this aspect of human
nature, people should indulge it. But this did not mean the simplest kind
of hedonism – Epicureans in fact were not so radical, though their ideas
could be abused. Epicurus blasted “sensuality” – “continuous drinking
and revels, nor the enjoyment of women and young boys”. Rather, people
should base their lives on reasoning and sober virtue, carefully thinking
through every choice in life. Avoidance of unnecessary pain was a key
goal, and Epicureans worked hard to dispel needless fears about death or
angry gods. Short-term satisfactions must be weighed against the possibil-
ity of longer-term suffering. People’s basic needs were actually very few:
avoiding cold, hunger, and thirst. If these requirements are taken care of, a
person can be as happy as the gods. It was vital to keep things simple: “He
who is not satisfied with a little, is satisfied with nothing.”
The other main philosophical school that passed from the Greeks to
the Romans, the Stoics, even more obviously urged the importance of
limiting desire. Many Stoic writers actually narrowed Aristotle’s teachings
to emphasize virtue alone as the key to happiness. Riches, beauty, honor
were really irrelevant. As the Roman writer Seneca urged, “The happy
man is content with his lot, no matter what it is” – though in other pas-
sages Seneca admitted his own delight in wealth and luxury. Cicero went
so far as to argue that a perfectly virtuous man could be happy even under
torture.
This heightened emphasis on the importance of limiting human
desires – an impulse that would be carried further in major religions such
as Christianity – arguably responded to two or three factors. The emphasis
might certainly recall, implicitly, some of the limitations on life in agri-
cultural societies, where urging the importance of making do with little
could make good sense, More specifically, both the Epicureans and the
Stoics were trying to deal with the obvious problems in the earlier Greek
approach: the fact that true happiness, a life of virtue that assumed pros-
perity and good health, was available only to a very few, as even Aristotle
had ultimately admitted. It was important to open a path to happiness to
people less blessed by good fortune. Finally, both of these philosophical
schools developed after the Greek city states had fallen into disarray, and
life became more unpredictable. It seemed vital to develop an approach
that was less vulnerable to the external world – and here, clearly, there
would be many similarities to other, later approaches to happiness that
sought to limit the individual’s dependence on the larger environment.
This approach might widen philosophy’s social appeal. One Stoic
writer, Epictetus, was a Greek enslaved to a wealthy Roman in the 1st
century CE, allowed by his owner to study extensively. He picked up on
the Stoic belief that by limiting desires, an individual can achieve happi-
ness regardless of external conditions. “That which is happy,” he wrote,
“must possess in full all that it wants” – and that means stifling all cravings
and appetites. These ideas certainly reduced dependence on the trappings
of upper-class life, though they appealed as well to many privileged people
like the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius. But, in narrowing the purview
of happiness, this form of Stoicism also required unusual self-discipline.
Epictetus was quoted as saying “We have no power over external things,
and the good that ought to be the object of our earnest pursuit, is to be
found only within ourselves”, and he himself, even after gaining freedom,
lived a rigorously simple life.
Despite some obvious and significant disagreements, a basic consistency
joined the Greek and the Roman approach. Happiness remained a primary
human goal; it was not dependent on purely subjective interpretations,
but was at base the same for all (however hard to attain); it depended on
virtue and rational control; and it was to be achieved over a lifetime, not
in momentary or purely sensual pleasures. This was a powerful vision that
exercised real influence beyond the ranks of philosophers; and it stands
in obvious contrast to many of the ideas of happiness that would develop
much later, in the modern world, and that seem to predominate today.
Happiness in Chinese Philosophy

As in Greece and Rome, classical China generated a number of schools
of thought, both in philosophy and religion. There were pessimists who
claimed that human beings are evil, requiring discipline from a powerful
state; happiness might be almost irrelevant in this vision, where the leading
challenge was assuring some kind of social order. A major religious strand
developed with Daoism, that urged simplicity, frugality, and attunement
to the basic rhythms of the universe. Daoism remains one of the main
recognized religions in China today. Ultimately, however, it was Confu-
cianism that came particularly to shape the Chinese approach to happi-
ness (often combining with the Daoist emphasis on harmony) and would
ultimately influence cultures in other parts of East Asia. Confucianism
itself was elaborated over time, as later philosophers such as Mencius em-
bellished the early writings; but a basic approach remained fairly stable.
Confucius and his followers shared much of the Greek interest in defin-
ing human happiness and would reach several similar conclusions. Like the
Greek philosophers, Confucius and indeed the early Daoists were highly
critical of the life they saw around them, arguing that too many people
pursued hollow goals, vaunting purely sensual satisfactions over true hap-
piness. Like the Greeks as well, Confucianists and indeed Daoists believed
that, properly conceived, happiness can be found in this world and that
it is a valid and worthy goal. In contrast to the Greeks, however, Confu-
cianists placed greater emphasis on the importance of linking individuals
and wider communities, yielding a somewhat different overall approach.
The core concept, for Confucianism and Daoism alike, centered on
being in harmony with the natural order, perceiving and following “the
Way” (Dao). When life was in accord with heavenly patterns and pro-
cesses, it could be filled with satisfaction and joy; Confucianists empha-
sized that happiness was both an objective condition, in terms of balanced
patterns in life, and a deep emotional experience.
Confucius himself offered the profound pleasure available in listening
to music as an example of the kind of harmony he sought. Engaged in
music, the feet begin to move in rhythm, hands move as well in response
to the patterns, and the individual is embraced in this larger experience.
Both mind and body are engaged. A disciple claimed that Confucius was
once so wrapped up in music that he simply forgot about more worldly
things: “for three months he did not eat meat.”
Another practical example of how an individual could find a wider har-
mony involved the Confucian fascination with manners and rituals. As
with music, there was a basic order here that transcended personal concerns.
The problem with most people, in the Confucian view, was that they
became so consumed with distracting worries that they lost sight of the
basic alignment, which in principle was widely available. With harmony,
however, other concerns faded away; “He did not allow his joy to be af-
fected” by lesser concerns.
This approach created considerable ambiguity about the role of material
conditions in happiness – a conundrum similar, in broad outline, to prob-
lems Greek philosophers had tried to deal with. On the one hand, a person
focused on alignment with the Way should not be bothered by hunger or
cold. A happy person is not concerned about poverty but “anxious lest he
should not get to the truth.” On the other hand, Confucius also made clear
that a good government should strive for general prosperity. Enriching the
population took priority over providing education – implying, clearly, that
happiness might be hard to achieve for people lacking basic material stan-
dards. By the same token, while Confucianists were quite certain that
blatant pursuit of wealth was a false goal (and there was great suspicion
of merchants on that basis, who ranked low in the social hierarchy), there
was nothing wrong with enjoying creature comforts. “Eating coarse rice
and drinking water – there is joy to be found in such things.” They simply
should not displace the more basic goals.
The good life did not involve fulfilling all desires or attaining the great-
est power, but centers on achieving ethical desires. Prudence and moral
constraint were essential components.
The Chinese approach placed great emphasis on virtue and a love of learn-
ing. “Those who are not virtuous cannot maintain themselves for long either
in a state of want or joy”, for they have no basic anchor in life. A person who
followed the Way, in contrast, would always do what is right and proper.
Moral action should be like music, drawing the individual into a larger har-
mony in which the self was subsumed in a greater good. Devotion to study
and learning about humanity helped align with the Way and provided direct
satisfaction as well: “isn’t it a joy to study and practice regularly?” “Eager
pursuit of knowledge” allowed a person to forget about sadness or even
physical discomfort. It was not enough simply to do the right thing, as many
ordinary people tried to do: it was important to cultivate understanding, to
seek the kind of virtue that underlay correct behavior.
Achieving the kind of alignment that produced true pleasure took a
great deal of experience; it did not come easily, and it was far more pro-
found than any transient experience. A person can’t really know happiness
“until you catch the sense after a long time of practice” – another simi-
larity to the claims of the Greeks (and a fascinating contrast with modern
Western beliefs that children can and should be happy).
The Confucian approach also involved deep connections with other
people. Greek and Roman writers had also placed great emphasis on the
importance of friendship, but the centrality of interactions with others was
arguably even stronger in the Confucian system. Attunement to the Way
itself involved attunement with humanity.
This emphasis on others, in turn, showed up in two respects. First, it
was vital to treat others fairly. The famous Confucian phrase, anticipating
later Christianity, urged “do not do unto others as you would not want
them to do to you.” In political life, as well, Confucianism insisted that
those in power treat the general population with respect and consider-
ation. Good behavior, not mere laws, provided the basis of the Confucian
social system (and it sometimes worked).
The other aspect, more directly linked to happiness, emphasized the
importance of friendship. “Is it not delightful to have friends come from
different quarters?” Pleasure was far greater in groups than when experi-
enced alone, and indeed true happiness could not be found in isolation.
Mencius added, “The argument for enjoying together is based on the fact
that all men share the same feelings.” Confucianists also believed that
group pleasure could be enhanced by a bit of wine, which could contrib-
ute to the sense of harmony, though they characteristically warned against
excess. More broadly, Confucian happiness was deeply connected to the
idea of a shared community culture.
The philosophical approaches to happiness generated, entirely separately,
in classical China and the classical Mediterranean offer an intriguing mix
of similarities and differences. The concept of the Way was unquestionably
distinctive, and the Greeks placed much more emphasis on the superiority
of humankind over nature. Confucian insistence on the links to human-
ity and the importance of participation in a group for the achievement of
happiness suggested an even more important distinction in practice, which
arguably carries over into East Asian culture even today – as later chapters
will suggest. Greek interest in friendship as a component of happiness sim-
ply did not match Confucian valuation of the role of community.
Clearly, regional differences in basic concepts of happiness enrich and
complicate historical analysis, and the comparative challenge began to
emerge early in the history of civilization.
But the similarities are marked as well, as both philosophical schools
worked to distinguish true happiness from superficial pleasure or indul-
gence and also, tentatively, to offer an approach that might override life’s
miseries. Shared emphasis on virtue and learning, and the distinction
between truly happy people and the many who wasted lives on more trivial
goals, provided another vital linkage. It might be argued that, on balance,
the commonalities were more impressive than the differences – including
the belief in the importance of happiness and the human capacity to find it
on this earth.
Impact: Where Does Philosophy Fit?

There are several reasons to pay attention to the rise of philosophical inter-
est, in a larger history of happiness. The conclusions of people who spent a
great deal of time trying to sort out the components of happiness can cer-
tainly stimulate thinking today; even areas of disagreement can contribute
to better understanding. The main lines of classical thought, both from
China and from the Mediterranean, certainly deserve comparison with
ideas that came later, as a way to calculate change or continuity over time.
One key conundrum, however, involves a set of questions that warrant
more extensive comment: how influential were these ideas in their own
day? How do they contribute, or do they contribute, to an evaluation of
the larger experience of happiness in these two great classical societies?
There are several angles to explore here.
The Philosophers and Ordinary People

We have seen that both in Greece/Rome and in China, the writers on
happiness attacked many of the common perceptions of happiness they
saw around them, finding them tragically off the mark. In both societies
also, they grappled with questions about the extent to which happiness
was even conceivable among the bulk of the population, almost by defi-
nition less likely to enjoy the material conditions that while not the core
of happiness, at least established a suitable context. Both Confucianists
and the Greek thinkers operated in a highly hierarchical society, which
they found entirely natural, even essential to the proper conduct of the
state. Did they even think that their ideas were relevant to the bulk of the
population?
We have seen that thinkers in both societies, aware of the issue, sug-
gested considerable ambivalence as they built concepts of happiness that
went well beyond basic physical pleasures. Plato and, even more, Aristo-
tle, were fairly candid in arguing that probably only a few people would
have the combination of wisdom and virtue, on the one hand, and good
health and prosperity on the other, to achieve happiness. Slaves were out of
the question; both philosophers viewed many slaves as a basically inferior
species. Women did not come into play at least for Aristotle, again too
intellectually stunted to measure up. And even in the upper classes, dis-
traction by lower pleasures or sheer bad luck would keep many from hap-
piness. Plato was almost vicious in his characterization of how most people
behave: living “day by day”, often indulging in “sensuous pleasures” like
drinking or playing music, sometimes exercising but often idling, with
no sense of virtuous direction at all. Plato’s only real hope, and Aristotle
largely agreed, was that some elements of the aristocracy could rise above
all this and find happiness through a clearer purpose in life.
Other Greek and Roman thinkers were less categorical, particularly
when, as with the Stoics, they sought the kind of happiness that might
coexist with poverty. Even here, however, it was widely assumed that
happiness depended on some level of abundance.
Confucian writers were similarly conflicted. They wrote of the possi-
bility of virtue and learning even in the lowly born. But they also pointed
out how often ordinary people chose to seek inferior goals or merely sim-
ulated good behavior without really exploring virtue and the Way. And
while some degree of comfort was not essential to happiness, it could
certainly play a role so long as it did not deflect from the basic priorities.
Despite what we might call elitist assumptions, the classical concepts
of happiness certainly could appeal beyond the ranks of the upper classes.
We have seen the deep impression on the slave Epictetus (who would go
on to teach philosophy in his own right). Connection might be difficult
however, particularly in societies where the vast majority of people were
both rural and illiterate. And even for the upper classes, who might indeed
encounter the ideas through school or tutoring, it is not clear how far the
influence went.
Competing Options
Given these limitations, and the lack of much direct evidence about the
emotional experience of nonintellectuals in the classical period, it is hard to
claim great insight into “actual” happiness in this early period – p articularly
given what we know about the limitations of agricultural society.
What is clear, however, is that the classical societies did develop a num-
ber of opportunities for pleasure and enjoyment that differed considerably
from the recommendations of the philosophers. Indeed, it was this very
context that inspired people like Aristotle and Confucius to come up with
what they saw as more meaningful values. Outlets were far greater for the
wealthy than for the vast majority, but there was some overlap.
The most interesting development – though Egypt and Mesopotamia
had provided precedents – was the spread of popular forms of entertain-
ment that provided some contrast with the ordinary routines of life. Most
of them were recurrent, offering special occasions periodically during a
year rather than on a daily basis. People might look forward to them even
though, from week to week, regular work routines predominated.
Thus in China, the creation of a traveling circus dates back well over
2,000 years ago – emerging, in fact, shortly after the life of Confucius.
There is some debate about where the popular circus began – some argue
that it started in the courts of the wealthy – but most scholarship suggests
an origin among ordinary peasants and artisans. Among other things, pro-
ficiency in juggling tools such as hammers or knives began to translate
ordinary diversions into opportunities for entertainment. Acrobatics and
pole balancing were also introduced early on, along with other variety
acts. What began as local performances, often associated with the cele-
bration of the lunar new year, evolved gradually into the establishment of
professional troupes which traveled around the country, ultimately pro-
viding entertainment for royal courts as well.
Athletic festivals, designed to honor the gods as well as to provide en-
tertainment, developed widely in classical Greece, capped of course by
the periodic Olympic games. Romans built even more elaborate stadi-
ums throughout the empire, for races and other athletic contests includ-
ing some brutal clashes among gladiators. Even more important, perhaps,
were the kinds of local festivals that periodically sought to honor the gods,
usually involving feasting, opportunity to drink, and entertainments by
musicians and others.
We do not know, of course, whether these occasions made people happy,
but they surely had that goal at least in part. In a backhanded way they
confirmed some of the limitations of agricultural societies, by suggesting
that only departures from the normal routine were capable of providing
real pleasure (a notion largely absent from the rhythms of hunting and
gathering cultures). Their existence nevertheless suggests a fairly explicit
realization of the need for pleasure.
For the upper classes, opportunities for enjoyment were far greater and,
on the whole, more regular – though these groups participated in recur-
rent festivals and games as well, as participants and spectators alike. Sexual
pleasure stood high on the list, for people who had some time to spare
and funds to support their interests. In China, many upper-class men took
concubines to supplement their official wives. The number of these concu-
bines long depended simply on the man’s ability to support, but toward the
end of the classical period numbers were limited by law, varying depend-
ing on wealth and rank. Roman celebration of sexual indulgence was sug-
gested by vivid representations of the phallus that adorned many wealthy
homes at least by the time of the Empire – suggesting the importance of
fertility but also male pleasure. In Greece and to a lesser extent Rome,
upper-class men frequently took young boys as lovers, sometimes devel-
oping passionate attachments. Upper-class life also involved enjoyment of
abundant food and drink. Famously, Greek and Roman religion directly
celebrated the importance of indulgence through gods like Dionysius and
Eros who provided example and inspiration.
Romans actually developed a term, “Felicity”, that incorporated some
of this delight in earthly pleasures, though it also involved fertility and
prowess in war. The word originated – characteristically – in the idea
of good luck, but it came to acquire a larger meaning. Romans might
shout “felicity” at a wedding, expressing hope for good fortune, fecundity,
prosperity – and happiness. The twin notion was that worldly pleasures
offered opportunities for happiness and that they depended on the bless-
ings of the gods.
Back to the Philosophers – and Legacies

The importance of hopes for pleasure, and the variety of institutions and
customs that sought to provide it at least periodically, returns us to the
question of the relevance of the classical philosophies. The Roman spec-
tator, shouting his hopes that an ill-favored gladiator should die, or the
Chinese circus fan, did not reflect any particular awareness of the for-
mulas of the Stoics or the Confucianists. There was clear disjuncture
between the demanding definitions of happiness offered by philosophy
and the wider interest in pleasure. This in turn leaves the issue, what did
happiness really mean in the classical period, difficult if not impossible
to resolve.
Yet it would be rash to dismiss the philosophers too glibly. In the first
place, the philosophers themselves recognized the importance of wealth,
abundant children, and sheer luck as components in happiness – Aristotle
called these “features that people look for in happiness”. We have seen that
both the Greeks and the Chinese wrestled with the balance between these
components and the more demanding qualities of virtue or harmony –
they did not dismiss them entirely.
Second, the strictures of the philosophers – that too much emphasis on
earthly pleasures was misplaced – had some impact beyond their limited
readership. Emperors, like Marcus Aurelius, could buy into their ideas
and seek restraint and virtue in their own lives. Chinese leaders often
frowned on excessive indulgence and periodically punished upstart busi-
ness tycoons who flaunted their wealth. Criticisms of excess also abounded
during the early centuries of the Roman Empire, when indulgent aristo-
crats were seen, correctly enough, as losing the virtuous quality of their
ancestors.
Entertainers themselves, though they won audiences, were character-
istically held in low regard. In China, entertainers (and prostitutes) were
part of the category called “mean people”, ranked below all the productive
groups and in principle required to wear green scarves to designate their
humiliating status. Successful Olympic athletes won fame in Greece (one
of the reasons they often tried to cheat in the games), but most entertainers
were similarly near the bottom of the social order and treated accordingly.
Here, the tension between larger concepts of propriety and true happi-
ness, and the provision of popular entertainment, was clearly expressed.
(And it would be a long time before entertainers fully escaped this status
hierarchy, and when they did, it would suggest that ideas about happiness
themselves were changing.)
It would be wrong, then, to dismiss the philosophers’ approaches to
happiness too readily. They had impact at the time, even though they did
not monopolize the search for happiness. And their ideas could shape or
affect attitudes toward happiness later on, among intellectuals and possibly
beyond.
Here, however, a final distinction emerges, familiar enough in world
history after the classical period. Confucianism, eagerly promoted by
some of the most successful Chinese dynasties, came to outlast the classical
empire, resurfacing and extending its legacy well into modern times. This,
along with the interest among some Confucianists in guiding ordinary
people as well as the wealthy toward a true concept of happiness, arguably
had a lasting impact on the Chinese approach to happiness – not a mo-
nopoly, but a strong influence that ultimately extended beyond the elites.
In the Mediterranean, the ideas of the philosophers lived on as well; they
would revive and be reread at several points. But their hold was shaken
by the partial collapse of the Roman Empire and their popular influence,
limited at best, would be further redefined by the rise of Christianity
or Islam.
***
When the Athenian leader Pericles vaunted the great achievements of

his city-state, just a few years before its tragic collapse, he talked about
democracy and freedom. He touted opportunities “for the mind to refresh
itself from business,” with “games and sacrifices all the year round”, with
elegant buildings that “form a daily source of pleasure and help to banish
spleen.” When the 18th-century British historian Edward Gibbon termed
the heyday of the Roman Empire the point in time “when the human
race was most happy and prosperous”, he pointed to leaders who ruled
with “virtue and wisdom”. Were these historical junctures – Athens and
Rome at their height, along with the successful Han dynasty period in
China – indeed some of the happiest in the human experience? If so, by
what criteria, and what role did the careful philosophical explorations of
happiness play? Here are some crucial, and difficult, questions to consider
in trying to evaluate the history of happiness over time and place. And
why (a question that bedeviled Gibbon) did the achievements not last?
Further Reading
On ancient Egypt,
David, A. Rosalie. Handbook to Life in Ancient Egypt (New York: Facts on File,
1998).
Mark, Joshua J. “Daily Life in Ancient Egypt.” Ancient History Encyclopedia
(September, 2016).
For an overview of the formation of classical cultures,
Bellah, Robert N., and Hans Joas. The Axial Age and Its Consequences (Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012).
On Greek and Roman concepts of happiness,
Annas, Julia. The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993).
Haidt, Jonathan. The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom
(New York: Basic Books, 2006).
Hughes, Gerard J. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle on Ethics (London:
Routledge, 2001).
McMahon, Darrin. Happiness a History (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press,
2006).
Mikalson, Jon D. Ancient Greek Religion, 2nd ed. (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell,
2010).
Nussbaum, Martha C. (Martha Craven), 1947–. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and
Practice in Hellenistic Ethics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
White, Nicholas P. A Brief History of Happiness (Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub.,
2006). *which focuses largely on Greek thinkers.
For Confucianism,
David, Susan, Ilona Boniwell, and Amanda Conley Ayers. The Oxford Handbook
of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Chen, Shaomin. “On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confucian
and Daoist Perspectives.” Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5, no. 2 (2010):179–195.
Hsu, Becky Yang, and Richard Madsen, eds., The Chinese Pursuit of Happiness;
Anxieties, Hopes and Tensions in Everyday Life (Oakland: University of California
Press, 2019).
Ivanhoe, Philip J. “Happiness in Early Chinese Thought.” In S. A. David, I.
Boniwell, and A. C. Ayers (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Happiness, 263–278
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Shaoming, Chen. “On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness from the Confu-
cian and Daoist Perspectives.” Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5, no. 2 (2010):
179–195.
On popular entertainments,
Gunde, Richard. Culture and Customs of China (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
2002).
Swaddling, Judith. The Ancient Olympic Games. Rev. and enl. ed. (London: British
Museum, 1999).
5 From the Great Religions
Happiness – and Hope?
The ideas of the philosophers, and the challenges of assessing their impact
on the history of happiness, center on the period that runs from about
600 BCE to the collapse of the classical empires between about 200 and
450 BCE – though their legacies would extend beyond this point. As we
turn to the role of the largest religions in the history of happiness, we em-
brace a more diffuse time period. Two religions that gained and retain wide
influence, Hinduism and Buddhism, originated in India by the 5th or 4th
century BCE (Hinduism a bit earlier). Christianity and Islam came later, in
the 1st and 7th centuries CE respectively. This chapter, as a result, ranges
over a wide and varied chronological span, though it is fair to note that
overall, it was in the centuries running from about 300 to about 1,400 CE
that religions and their missionary expansion wielded particularly strong
influence in much of Asia and Europe and in several regions in Africa.
Religion and concerns about happiness had long intertwined. In earlier
agricultural societies religion had often shaped beliefs about propitiating
the gods to prevent calamities or promote good fortune. Egyptian reli-
gion, more distinctively, sought to enhance the possibility of earthly hap-
piness and carry it over into life after death. Greek and Roman religion
certainly emphasized the importance of divine favor, but also used religion
to highlight the lack of human control and to exemplify certain kinds of
pleasure.
The great religions that arose in India and the Middle East were some-
what different, certainly more elaborate and ultimately capable of winning
far wider adherence. Each of the four was distinctive in many ways. The
Abrahamic religions of the Middle East differed from the Indian faiths
in the emphasis on a single God and a clear concept of heaven. Bud-
dhism attacked Hindu reliance on priestly ritual and its emphasis on social
inequality.
From the standpoint of happiness, however, the four religions had one
key point in common: they all insisted that true or complete happiness
was not to be found in earthly existence but rather, at least for the truly
fortunate, after life, in another spiritual plane. Only Buddhism left the
door open to some earthly fulfillment. Arguably, the religions constituted
one of the most sweeping compensations for the limitations agricultural
The Great Religions: Happiness – and Hope? 55
societies imposed on work, health, and material conditions, by arguing
that current problems might be surmounted in a later phase of existence.
The religions all introduced a clearer role for hope, in balancing recogni-
tion of the shortcomings in daily life with an expectation that there were
better things to come. They might provide particular consolation for those
who most suffered from inequality and deprivation. For some people, at
least, the religions also offered new glimpses of happiness even in life on
earth – through spiritual happiness and joy, even a sense of rebirth – in
ways less clearly available in earlier, polytheistic faiths. Finally, all the re-
ligions could provide their faithful with a vivid sense of fellowship and
belonging, another way in which, despite the emphasis on rewards beyond
this life, they could contribute to happiness here and now.
All the major religions proved capable of attracting wide followings,
usually across other political and cultural boundaries – in contrast to other
interesting religions that confined themselves more exclusively to a partic-
ular group or region. This unusual appeal had something to do with the
religions’ complicated role in defining paths to happiness. It also helps ex-
plain why these religions would continue to play a major cultural role well
into modern times and foster expansion into additional parts of the world.
The major religions certainly repeated a number of the recommen-
dations of the classical philosophers, with some direct borrowing from
the Greeks in Christianity and Islam. All four of the religions, seeking
to appeal to a diverse audience, worked to balance the ultimate spiritual
aims with practical recommendations about gaining some happiness and
relieving anxiety in ordinary life. All, however, introduced new elements
into the idea of happiness and, for some at least, significantly redirected
attention to new uncertainties concerning the proper goals for life on this
earth.
Hinduism
Traditional Hindu approaches to happiness, as the religion evolved in
classical India, were complicated by the relationship to the caste system.
The religion made it clear that members of each caste should live up to
the duties of the caste – warriors should be good warriors, artisans good
craftsmen – and that this would prepare for spiritual advancement in the
next, reincarnated life. This framework provided a sense of direction, but
it did not directly refer to happiness.
There was, however, a larger approach, more widely relevant though
particularly for the upper castes. Hinduism distinguished among three lev-
els of happiness. Physical pleasures came first, from comforts and sensual
enjoyments; then mental, focused on a sense of fulfillment and freedom
from sickness and anxiety. But finally spiritual happiness, or atmanandam,
which involves freedom from the cycle of births and deaths and ulti-
mate union with the Self as a soul in the highest heaven – obviously,
unobtainable in this life. The happiness available to mortals should not
however be pursued for its own sake, for this leads to attachment or bond-
age. Rather, it can be accepted as part of a life in which ultimate liberation
remains the highest goal. Doing one’s duties on earth – back to the caste
obligations – provides some temporary happiness, hoping for later, perma-
nent liberation later on.
Hinduism established something of a tension between fulfilling earthly
goals while recognizing the larger hope for the future, and striving for
some glimpse of greater spiritual fulfillment. In all cases, selfishness and
desire should be avoided. And it was quite acceptable to seek some pros-
perity and comfort, and certainly to enjoy family life including sexual
pleasure. But it was also tempting, particularly in later age after social and
family obligations had been fulfilled, to seek seclusion and contemplate
the ultimate purposes of human life and the nature of liberation, renounc-
ing other goals including earthly knowledge. Suffering is unavoidable in
this life, not only because of illness and aging but also because of the
attachment to impermanent things – an attachment that cannot be easily
escaped. Temporary happiness, through sensuality or even friendship, is
always a trap, because it binds people to misleading and impermanent
goals. Ultimately, both minds and bodies must be restrained, lessening
dependence, and with careful discipline some of this liberation can be
achieved even during life. Physical self-discipline and even deprivation –
there was great respect for holy men who had no worldly goods and de-
pended on charity – can be enhanced by prayer and meditation. But the
results are only an approximation of the final goal. The ultimate bliss is
incomparably greater than any happiness that mortals gain on this earth.
In working the tension between duties and liberation, Hinduism early
on adopted a number of practices that could establish a path toward hap-
piness. Yoga routines were developed to discipline the body and promote
meditation, helping a person distinguish between impermanent attach-
ments and true, transcendent reality. Suffering could be set aside in favor
of an inner peace. The exercises also lifted an individual from self alone,
and into a sense of coexistence with everyone and everything. Various
forms of yoga developed over time, continuing well after the classical pe-
riod and ultimately spreading to other cultures as well – but always in the
interest of reaching toward a distinctive kind of happiness.
Several contemporary versions of Hinduism in India tend to downplay
the idea of happiness in favor of a larger concept of well-being. Their
practitioners continue to argue that it is almost impossible to free oneself
from the burdens of life, though children can briefly enjoy a time of in-
nocence and then, in later age, people can gain a greater sense of inner
coherence. But they see earthly happiness as a misleading concept, in
favor of perhaps a somewhat more modest set of emotional goals attached
to well-being. We will return to some of these distinctions in the final
main chapter.
Buddhism
Buddhism built on many Hindu beliefs and practices, but established an
even more striking stance on happiness and the worldly condition – in
some ways, the most radical of any of the major religions. For Siddhartha
Gautama, who became known as the Buddha, was deeply impressed with
the miseries and impermanence of life around him and sought a path to
happiness that would free people from the limitations of ordinary exis-
tence. Further, in attacking Hindu reliance on the caste system, he offered
an approach that was in principle applicable to everyone, regardless of
social position.
The story is that Buddha, raised in an affluent family that tried to shelter
him from normal concerns, once ventured out into the real world and was
appalled at the poverty, disease, and death that surrounded him. This led
him to question the transience of life and its pleasures.
For Buddhism went beyond most commentary in commentating on the
various miseries that surrounded life, to emphasize that even achievements
that many people esteem, that seem superficially to provide happiness, are
miseries as well. Buddhist writings devoted considerable attention to the
various and misleading forms of apparent happiness, from sensual pleasures
to the achievement of wealth or power, from family life to education. All
were ultimately found wanting, which means that most people badly mis-
construe the real source of happiness. To be sure, Buddhist writings often
discussed more limited forms of happiness, notably in terms of avoidance
of disease, but the main emphasis always rested on spiritual goals.
Thus many wealthy and educated people are miserable. The reasons?
Worldly achievements of this sort are often fleeting, and those who have
attained them feel great anxiety about simply holding on. Even more, the
people involved fall into the trap of always seeking more, developing a
kind of desire that can never be fully satisfied. As the Dhammapada – the
great collection of Buddhist sayings – stipulates: “There is no happiness
greater than the perfect calm.”
To live unafflicted amid the afflicted is to be happy. To live without

ambition among the ambitious is to be happy. To live without pos-
session is a happy life like that of the radiant gods. To live without
competition among those who compete is to be happy.
Buddhist writings seek to distinguish between affliction and suffering: af-

fliction, such as a physical disability, comes from external sources, beyond
human control; but suffering is something people do to themselves.
At first glance, Buddhism is sometimes assumed to offer a markedly
pessimistic view of life, particularly through the insistence not only on the
many common misfortunes but also on the fundamental misery inherent
in apparent pleasures and achievements. In fact, Buddhism urged that
there were clear, if demanding, paths to happiness and that every indi-
vidual could, though with great effort, pursue these paths. To be sure,
the u ltimate goal was Nirvana, or freedom from the cycles of death and
rebirth, which in some versions of Buddhism would come only through re-
incarnation. But approaches to Nirvana, or even for some, such as Buddha
himself, achievement of Nirvana in this life were possible through careful
cultivation of the mind.
“All we are is the result of what we have thought. It is founded on our
thoughts. If one speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows one,
like a shadow that never leaves.” “One should know what happiness is,
(and) having known what happiness is, one should be intent on inward
happiness.”
It goes without saying that Buddhism emphasized the need for a moral
life and renunciation of impulses that only lead to further misery, like
hatred or violence. Ethical conduct – in speech and action – is an essen-
tial category in the eightfold path to happiness. Buddhism also urged the
importance of compassion, for consideration for all life. To an outsider,
a certain tension may seem to exist between the Buddhist emphasis on
withdrawal and personal contemplation and obligations to the rest of hu-
manity but in principle Buddha saw personal happiness as deeply related
to the happiness of other beings in the natural world.
Beyond this, Buddhism emphasized the importance, though also the
difficulty, of achieving peace of mind, by detaching oneself from all crav-
ing, achieving a mental state free from the passions, needs, and wants of
life. “If by leaving a small pleasure one sees a great pleasure, let a wise
person leave the small pleasure and seek the great.” Buddha urged his
followers to pursue “tranquility and insight” as the mental qualities that
would lead to Nirvana, or the ultimate reality. The goal was a capacity
simply to exist in the present.
The effort would be demanding. Buddhism insists that achieving proper
mental discipline comes only from great effort, over an extended period
of time. A first step is simply learning to avoid negative or unwholesome
thoughts; in a later stage, the mind is cleared from such thoughts and be-
comes ready for wholesome tranquility. “Mindfulness”, or the capacity for
deep concentration through meditation, is central to this effort. A person
“who with tranquil mind has chosen to live in a bare cell knows an un-
earthly delight in gaining a clearer and clearer perception of the true law.”
All excitements cease, giving way to a perfect calm. Buddhist writings set
forth a series of achievements toward perfect contemplation: first, mental
barriers and impure intentions disappear, yielding a sense of bliss; then,
activities of the mind cease, and only bliss remains; in the third stage, bliss
itself begins to disappear leading to the final achievement – a total peace of
mind, which Buddha described as a deeper sense of happiness.
From the outset, Buddhism established several complicated tensions,
many of which persist in Buddhist practice today. The injunction of
compassion might press against the emphasis on passivity, on withdrawal
from things of this world. Buddha’s own example, in renouncing wealth
and comfort – indeed, learning how to abandon all craving – and seeking
a life of privation, suggested the importance of embracing poverty and
celibacy as preconditions for a life of true contemplation. Fairly quickly,
groups of monks and nuns formed that depended on charity for their daily
survival. But what of others, for whom such a radical renunciation did not
seem possible? Buddhism was, at base, truly optimistic about the possi-
bility of achieving the kind of happiness that was indeed the proper goal
for humankind; but the emphasis on the effort required might, for many,
temper the optimism.
As Buddhism spread from India to other parts of Asia, a host of vari-
ants developed, with different specific practices and, in a few cases, some
startling redefinitions of certain practices; at one extreme, a group of
monks actually urged extensive sexual indulgence as a means of seeking
greater spiritual fulfillment. Always, however, there was a deep interest
in stressing the goal of human happiness and establishing paths toward its
achievement.
Christianity
Christianity, emerging initially as an effort toward radical reform within
Judaism, originated entirely independent of Buddhism, yet it developed
many similar features, particularly in seeking a happiness far different from
the fleeting pleasures of material life. A tension emerged around the extent
to which withdrawal from the world was essential to spiritual fulfillment
that bore some resemblance to Buddhism as well. The religion placed less
emphasis, however, on the possibilities of achieving more than a glimpse
of true happiness in this life, pointing more exclusively on the hope of
achieving salvation and an eternal life in heaven.
The ultimate goal for Christians centered on gaining entry into Heaven,
or what Jesus termed the Kingdom of God, vastly different from and vastly
superior to life on earth. Jesus described heaven as a place where “the
last will be first and the first will be last,” implying a reversal of the kind
of social hierarchy that left the majority of people powerless and poor.
Most Christians came to see heaven as a place (either real or metaphorical)
where Christ sat on the right hand of God, surrounded by angels and those
people who have gained salvation. One Catholic pope described heaven as
“neither an abstraction nor a physical place in the clouds, but a living, per-
sonal relationship with the Holy Trinity. It is our meeting with the Father
through the mediation of Christ and the Holy Spirit”.
This emphasis on a final goal, a deep contrast with ordinary life,
meant that many Christians placed unusual reliance on hope. Many early
Christians, in fact, believed that a new order was imminent, that Christ
would soon return to establish a Kingdom of God on earth. But even
after these expectations faded, Christians periodically generated m illennial
movements – in Europe, later in Latin America and elsewhere – that saw
paradise right around the corner, often in response to particularly acute
social problems that called out for a radical alternative. Seeking a “new
heaven and a new earth”, these movements elaborated on a theme in the
Book of Revelation in the Bible, that referred to a “holy city, a New
Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride
adorned for her husband.” More consistently, Christians would pin per-
sonal hopes on their own access to paradise after death, and in some cases
organized much of their life around this goal by minimizing attachment to
worldly things and fulfilling religious obligations.
Visions of heaven – whether personal or part of a larger millennial
thrust – could themselves be deeply satisfying, taking their beneficiaries
far from any ordinary cares or concerns. One early Christian, describing
an ecstatic dream and its taste of the future, simply exclaimed: “And then
I woke up happy.” At an extreme, many early Christian martyrs, suffering
torture or death, were sustained by the belief that their suffering would
take them directly to their celestial goal.
Many Christian writers were quite explicit in their contention that as-
cension to heaven and access to the presence of God was true happiness.
Boethius, a sixth-century writer, put it this way:
Since men become happy by achieving happiness, and happiness is it-

self divinity, clearly they become happy by attaining divinity…. Hence
every happy person is God. God is by nature one only, but nothing
prevents the greatest possible number from sharing in that divinity.
All of this, of course, could dramatically reshuffle normal priorities. For

if the purpose of life lay beyond life, experience on earth was almost, by
definition, of secondary importance. This meant that the problems people
encountered, in sickness or economic distress, might in principle be en-
dured through the hopes for a better life to come. This might particularly
apply to the poor or, as Christ put it, the “meek”, who would have the
readiest opportunity to gain salvation precisely because they were not dis-
tracted by worldly achievements. For the Christian framework also meant
that what seemed to be the pleasures of life must also be reevaluated, for
they were of lesser importance and might indeed, as with Buddhism, dis-
tract from the true goals.
Many Christian leaders embellished this recalibration of normal life
with a deep sense of the sinfulness of mankind and the basic misery of
human existence. As the most influential early Christian theologian put
it, “count no man happy until he is dead.” Augustine of Hippo, the au-
thor of this stark phrase, had a life experience not totally different from
that of Buddha earlier on. He lived his early adulthood amid considerable
luxury and sensuality, but he could find no fulfillment in this pattern.
He kept wanting more, finding himself never fully satisfied. At one point
he encountered an impoverished beggar who was laughing and joking,
clearly expressing a “peaceful happiness” that Augustine himself had never
achieved. Augustine’s own conversion to Christianity, in 386 CE, finally
gave him what he saw as the true perspective on the meaninglessness of
worldly pleasures and the capacity to aspire to true happiness.
Armed with this basic realization, Christian leaders endlessly urged
their followers not only to endure life’s problems with their hopes for sal-
vation, but to realize the dangers of apparent pleasures that would distract
them from their true goals. Overindulgence, or gluttony, became a basic
sin. Many Christians paid unusual attention to the snares of sexuality,
and indeed the Catholic Church, in ultimately mandating priestly celi-
bacy, made it clear that complete sexual abstention was the clearest path
to salvation. Even within marriage, where procreation was an appropriate
goal, too much enjoyment might be dangerous. Other worldly goals were
also suspect: pursuit of fame or wealth could easily lead people astray, for
they could not provide true happiness. Christ himself had emphasized that
it might be very difficult for a rich man to enter heaven – like passing a
camel through the eye of the needle. Augustine, writing as the Roman
Empire was beginning to collapse, was also aware of the dangers of lead-
ers’ lust for power, which could lead to unspeakable acts of violence, to the
“vast mass of evils” that he saw around him.
And there was a final issue, on which Christians frequently disagreed:
granting the importance of downplaying worldly attachments, were there
positive things that the faithful could do, in this life, that would enhance
their opportunities for access to the true happiness of salvation? Many
Christians, leaders and ordinary believers alike, believed that some com-
bination of moderation and discipline, plus good and virtuous works, plus
adherence to the rituals of the Church and faith itself in Christian teach-
ings would do the trick.
Others, however, were not so sure. Augustine himself came to em-
phasize the magnitude of human sin that led to the expulsion from the
Garden of Eden: all people thereafter were cursed with this burden, this
original sin. And only God’s grace, not their own actions or beliefs, could
save them. People could not by themselves achieve real faith or virtue;
they constantly fell short. Even the classical philosophers, or perhaps par-
ticularly the philosophers, who believed that people could set themselves
straight and achieve a virtuous happiness, had simply been wrong. But
God had predestined some for salvation, it was His choice, not the result
of any human effort. This was the true “happiness of hope”, in Augustine’s
words, that would allow the saved finally to see God and realize – after
death – all their true desires.
This emphasis on divine predestination, which would be picked up later
by Protestant leaders, was clearly double-edged. It did offer hope, which
was sorely needed since there was nothing people could do to find real
happiness in this life. But it could also create deep doubt – for who could
be sure he or she was predestined, since simply trying hard was pointless?
Christianity could create a truly existential anxiety.
Most Catholic leaders, though never renouncing Augustine, offered a
somewhat less rigorous vision. People could, by moral conduct, restraint,
and faithfulness to the Church, advance their opportunities for salvation.
Thomas Aquinas, the great 13th-century theologian who was arguably
the most important Catholic writer after Augustine, actually went a bit
further still, to claim that people could actually, through their own efforts,
achieve some taste of happiness in life – what he called “imperfect happi-
ness” – even though true fulfillment could only come after death.
Aquinas was working after the rediscovery of Greek and Roman
thought following centuries of intellectual disarray precipitated by the fall
of the western Roman Empire. Deeply impressed with Aristotle’s insis-
tence on human reason as the path to truth and happiness, Aquinas sought
to blend this with Christian teaching. He devoted a whole section of his
great work, the Summa Theologica, to the knotty problem of happiness.
Like Augustine, and indeed like virtually all Christian thinkers, Aquinas
emphasized that true happiness could not be attained in life: people nat-
urally sought it, but they were plagued by too many unfulfilled desires to
achieve their goal. For true happiness, the direct knowledge of God, was
available only to a purified soul. Then the ultimate pleasure is available,
obliterating all sadness and fulfilling all true desire.
In the meantime, however, people can use their reason to gain some
elements of the ultimate truth – hence an imperfect happiness on earth.
Even here, it is vital to be aware of the snares of worldly goods; physi-
cal pleasures may yield “enjoyments”, but these will be very short-lived,
leaving people unhappy, aware that they were missing something. But
through reason, aiming toward a contemplation of truth, and virtue, this
partial happiness – what Aquinas called “felicity” as opposed to perfect
happiness or beatitude – is available.
The great Christian achievement was to recast the definition of hap-
piness and remove it from life on earth. The result confirmed the attacks
on lesser pleasures that Greek and Roman philosophers had already em-
phasized, while more vividly highlighting the misery of human existence.
While Christians were urged to be content with their lot in life and grate-
ful to God for what they had, hope was the true beacon. Left for debate
was the question of whether some glimpse of happiness was possible before
death, and whether any human effort could help provide this glimpse.
Islam
The Prophet Muhammad and later Muslim thinkers worked on many of
the same issues that preoccupied Christians, and came up with many similar
conclusions – including the attainment of true happiness only in Heaven.
But they also offered a more positive view of some aspects of earthly exis-
tence, and while this did not suggest a fundamental difference in the ulti-
mate definition of happiness, it did raise some distinctive issues.
The Qur’an and later Muslim writers made it clear that happiness in the
hereafter, or everlasting felicity, is the goal of the believer. All the joys that
people experience in this world are a means to the basic goal, and Muslims
should express their gratitude to God for the blessings granted to them.
“And as for those who are happy, they will be in Paradise, abiding there so
long as the heavens and the earth endure.”
Purely physical pleasures exist, but in and of themselves they are shared
with the animals. Health, wealth, even friendships are transient, they can-
not provide permanent happiness. As the Qur’an states: “Are you content
with the life of this world, rather than with the hereafter? Yet the enjoy-
ment of the life of this world compared with the hereafter is but little.” At
the same time, if taken in the right spirit, and not as ends in themselves,
earthly joys are bounties from God and should be gratefully received.
Those who have done good in this world, and believed in God, will merit
otherworldly happiness on the day of judgment.
Heaven itself, in the Muslim view, offers “a happy life, in an exalted
garden…Eat and drink to your satisfaction in consideration of what you
had left in previous days.” The basic quality of eternal happiness is the
presence of God: the faces of true believers will be “fresh with joy and
will be looking at their Lord.” But there is a material aspect to Heaven
that is noteworthy as well: an abundance of food and drink, beautiful sur-
roundings and clothing, the company of one’s family. Negative emotions
have vanished.
In this world, believers should put their faith in God and be satisfied.
This is the basis of true contentment, which is a prelude to the joys of
Heaven. But, taken in the right spirit and not as ends in themselves, some
worldly goods can be enjoyed. Wealth, for example, is acceptable, and
Muhammad particularly praised the calling of merchants. If the wealthy
strove for virtue, if they gained their wealth ethically and used it properly
including contributing the required amount to charity, and if they focused
ultimately on spiritual rather than selfish ends, there was nothing wrong
with enjoying their achievement.
To be sure, some distracting pleasures were banned to faithful Muslims,
notably the consumption of alcohol. Gluttony might be attacked directly
as well: the Qur’an specifically noted, “Do not waste; God does not love
the wasteful”, and a later commentator added pointedly: “God does not
love overeating.” But the image of heaven, and aspects of Muslim rit-
ual, suggested some appreciation of good food. Attitudes toward sexual-
ity were particularly revealing. There was great concern about regulating
sexual behavior, punishing violations, and making sure that sexual urges –
what the theologian Al-Ghazali called “carnal desire” – were kept within
bounds. This was one reason that sexual activity was restricted during the
holy month of Ramadan. And a few versions of Islam were even more re-
strictive: in the 9th century, a separatist section, the Kharji, urged the spir-
itual value of celibacy. Overall, however, Islam accepted and even valued
sexual pleasure within marriage, with wives expected to make themselves
attractive and husbands offering adequate foreplay to assure their partners’
pleasure. The emphasis on women’s right to sexual fulfillment – noted
specifically by Al-Ghazali – was a distinctive feature.
As with Christianity, Islam saw life as a constant struggle with sin. But
there was no original sin; people were born good. By the same token, if
properly directed and controlled, the pleasures of life were meant to be
enjoyed. One writer put it this way: “Whoever works righteousness –
whether male or female – while he (or she) is a true believer (in the one
true God) verily, to him We will give good life” – meaning material pro-
vision and contentment – as well appropriate reward in Paradise.
Misguided people, along with lacking the proper faith in God, simply
overdo the pursuit of earthly goals for their own sake. They seek too
much wealth, too much “play and amusement”, too many children, too
much “show and boasting.” A true believer accepts all that God bestows,
including material goods, but uses them toward the real objective of pleas-
ing God. “Those who desire the life to come, and strive for it as it ought
to be striven for…they are the ones whose strivings find acceptance and
reward.”
Ultimately, while Islam did not require the level of rejection of pleasure
that Christianity implied or suggest the same level of human incapacity, it
did establish a clear tension with daily desires. It was vital to keep clear fo-
cus on the ultimate goal, the only source of true happiness – by qualifying
for Paradise. This meant attending to God’s requirements, beginning with
faith, and constantly struggling to keep base impulses in check.
This was the message of the later theologian who most specifically
addressed the question of happiness, the Persian Al-Ghazali, writing in
the 11th and early 12th centuries. The goal in his work was to revive the
basic truths of the faith but also to reconcile the spiritual thrust of Islam
with some of the thinking of philosophers like Aristotle – a combina-
tion not entirely unlike that of Aquinas later on where Christianity was
concerned. His book, The Alchemy of Happiness, emphasized the point
that “ultimate happiness” could be achieved only in the hereafter, when
people were freed from their bodies and gained what Al-Ghazali called
“active intellect”. By using his reason in this life, man could be spiritually
transformed, weaning his soul from worldliness to a complete devotion
to God. For his part, God has sent thousands of prophets to earth to teach
men how to purify their hearts from baser qualities “in the crucible of
abstinence”. Al-Ghazali’s alchemy is described as “turning away from the
world”, with four components: knowledge of self, knowledge of God,
knowledge of the world as it really is, and “knowledge of the next world
as it really is.”
Here, explicitly, pursuit of the goal of eternal happiness required a clear
head and rigorous discipline in this world – a formula that, in broad out-
line, was shared by all the great religions.
The Question of Impact

The religious approach to happiness invites the same kind of tests as those
applied to the philosophers in the previous chapter: what was its ulti-
mate impact on the expectations and experiences relevant to happiness?
How might religion shape happiness beyond the sphere of prophets and
theologians, priests and monks?
Here, the importance of the question is magnified by the fact that all
the major religions sought, and achieved, a massive response, as literally
hundreds of thousands of people, particularly after about 300 CE, con-
verted from polytheism to one of these powerful faiths. To be sure, some
of the leading writers, like Aquinas, addressed a more limited audience of
students and fellow theologians. But the larger messages reached a huge
following, clearly shaping popular approaches to happiness and continuing
to wield substantial influence still today. How can their impact be assessed?
How fully did the religions reshape wider definitions of happiness, and
how much happiness – new or old – did they provide?
The question is complicated by the differences among the religions, and
by divisions and changes within the religions themselves. Nevertheless,
there are several valid lines of inquiry.
The Holy Option

Some people devoted their lives to seeking, and often finding, religious
joy, and while this approach to happiness may not have been entirely
new – after all, there had been priests in other religions – it almost cer-
tainly became more widespread under the aegis of the great faiths. And
while the people involved were most likely to serve religion directly, as
priests or imams, as monks and nuns, individuals from other walks of life
might participate as well.
What were the components of a happy/holy life? Typically, first, con-
siderable asceticism in disciplining and limiting bodily desires, usually
well beyond what was regarded as religiously essential. Long periods of
abstinence, often complete celibacy, helped prepare the individual for con-
centration on the divine. But with this preparation, over time, a person
might at least glimpse the infinite, or as one description of a Christian
saint put it, rise above “every visible and invisible creature, soar over all
understanding and, deified, enter into God who deifies him.” This kind
of mystical rapture emerged in all the religions, and surely provided a deep
kind of happiness – an anticipation, indeed, of the larger happiness that
awaited after death.
Deep spiritual joy lends itself to a number of psychological interpreta-
tions, but it clearly constituted a distinctive kind of happiness (though that
may be too mild a term). Hildegard of Bingen, one of a number of female
Christian mystics in the 12th and 13th centuries, talked about a “vision of
the soul” she had experienced even in childhood.
In this vision my soul…rises up high into the vault of heaven and into
the changing sky and spreads itself out among different peoples…The
light which I see thus is not spatial, but it is far, far brighter than a
cloud which carries the sun.
This was a transcendent experience, which supported Hildegard through

many periods of illness by allowing her to glimpse the divine.
The encounter with religious joy could come both to individuals and to
groups. Clusters of monks and nuns supported each other’s quests, in Buddhism
and in Christianity alike. In Islam, gatherings of Sufi mystics sought con-
tact with the divine. Some discovered that coffee, imported from Ethiopia,
could promote their transcendence when consumed in group sessions meeting
through the night – thus establishing the first use of this beverage outside of
Africa. A number of Christian monastic gatherings deployed music to facil-
itate a higher experience; indeed, some mystics, like Hildegard, contributed
compositions directly.
Deep religious joy was not necessarily a goal for all or even most who
became religious officials. Many Christian monks became known for their
gluttony. A few groups of Buddhists actually experimented with a variety
of forms of sexuality. And even individuals who sought religious ecstasy
might not find it.
On the other hand, some ordinary people, not part of any kind of
officialdom, might seek and gain a sense of oneness with the divine, at
least periodically in their lives. Buddhism and to an extent Hinduism,
indeed, suggested that with practice deep spiritual satisfaction might
be more widely available. Here was one way in which the great reli-
gions not only redefined happiness, but provided direct access even on
earth.
The Faithful
For the many people for whom the special experience of religious ecstasy
was not relevant or not available, the great religions unquestionably pro-
vided other opportunities for happiness, some of them rather new.
Awareness of the existence of a holy minority might be one such source.
Some versions of Buddhism argued that the lives and experiences of the
saints brought holy credit and benefit to other believers. In Christian festi-
vals, contact with holy relics might provide a brief sense of transcendence
and the experience of awe.
All the religions – though this was by no means entirely new –
encouraged satisfaction through shared fellowship with other believers, as
in the daily communal prayers in Islam. Crucial rituals offered opportu-
nities for special sacrifice, which could offer a sense of purification, some-
times associated with certain earthly pleasures as well. Thus Ramadan
enforced a month of privation during the day – shared with others – while
offering special feasting particularly when the month drew to a close. In
Christianity, the renunciation of certain foods during Lent, again a shared
experience, was preceded by more earthy celebrations of Holy Tuesday.
Religion also motivated new forms of group travel, in pilgrimages to
holy sites. This was particularly marked with the ambitious pilgrimage to
Mecca encouraged for Muslims, but Christians and Buddhists had targets
as well. Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales describes a pilgrimage that, despite the
fundamentally religious purpose of visiting a great cathedral, had the air
of a spring vacation with a host of worldly elements. The fact that the pil-
grimages were available to women (again, in all the major religions) was
another interesting feature.
Prayer itself, private and communal alike, could comfort, though it
more commonly sought to ward off trouble than to promote positive hap-
piness. For some, a sense of the closeness, even companionship of God was
deeply reassuring, possibly inhibiting loneliness. None of this is explicitly
attached to happiness, but it could provide a relevant context.
All the religions encouraged charity. This was a very specific element
in Islam, but prominent in Christianity (including Orthodox Christianity)
as well; Hindu and Buddhist ascetics depended extensively on alms. This
could provide a deep sense of satisfaction to those who gave, most obvi-
ously to the wealthier groups whose life purposes might otherwise seem
somewhat suspect.
For many, finally, religion offered opportunities to reconsider goals
during the course of life. While the major religions did not the place the
same degree of emphasis on maturity that the philosophers had – religious
joy might come to people at various ages, as with Hildegard – the fact was
that many people redoubled their commitment to religion in later life, as
part of spiritual and emotional preparation for death. Buddhism, in stress-
ing the long experience required for spiritual advancement, identified an
age factor directly. In Christianity, many merchants, pious during life but
pursuing profits as well, underwent a conversion experience later on, often
giving their wealth to charity and joining a religious group.
The various sources of satisfaction, religious or religiously linked, could
produce a sense that life itself should be filled with a sense of joy. To be
sure, there was some skepticism attached, since purely worldly happiness
could be so deceiving. In the Catholic Church, St. Francis, who took
such obvious pleasure in nature and religion alike, urged that “it is not
right for a servant of God to show sadness and a dismal face.” Buddha,
as many faithful have pointed out, was almost always represented with a
smiling face. The Prophet Muhammad was known for his cheer; as one
companion noted, “I have never seen anyone who smiles more than the
Prophet does.” Muhammad also urged the importance of meeting others
“with a cheerful face”. In Christianity, Protestant leaders picked up on
the importance of happiness. Martin Luther contended that “all sadness
is from Satan,” a sign of the absence of God’s grace. John Calvin insisted
that the praise due to the Lord could only come from a “cheerful and
joyous heart”. An English poet put it this way: “Rejoice always, in your
prosperity … and in your adversity too.”
The Darker Side

Religion could also promote a sense of anxiety and despair, particularly
when the readiest compensations, in the earthly pleasures that might be
available, were held to be flawed at best, and at worst positively d angerous –
or as the Buddhists put it, yet another form of misery.
A number of historians have described the acute sense of fear and guilt
that ran deep among many Christians. Preachers, Catholic and then even
more Protestants, hammered home the sinfulness of mankind and the per-
ils of life after death. For, after all, for Muslims and Christians alike, the
hope of eternal happiness in paradise was balanced by the horrors of hell
for those judged unworthy. Real-world disasters, like a plague, could be
taken as signs of God’s wrath. While Christian leaders might officially
urge joy, ordinary sermons more commonly played up the miseries and
terrors of this life and the risks of damnation.
Paintings and sculptures, many widely visible, emphasized pain and
death. Church doors were surrounded by depictions of ladders – some
rising up toward the heavens, but others plunging downward, into the
very physical and grotesque torments of the damned. Evidence of death
was widespread, with cemeteries, placed in churchyards, a daily reminder
of the transience of life and the sinfulness of mankind.
To be sure, Buddhist and Muslim art displayed less fascination with
death and the macabre, but some of the overall judgments of human frailty
and the perils of ordinary life were not totally dissimilar. Indeed when
Buddhism arrived in China, from contacts with India, many Confu-
cianists were deeply and unfavorably struck by what seemed to be a very
negative view of ordinary familial or political life, the extent to which
happiness could be found – with difficulty – only by turning away from
normal engagements.
All of this was meant to be balanced by hope, as well as the joys that
might respond to divine grace. But for some, at least, religion might be a
source of more pain than comfort. The tension could be very real. And
there was a strain, in both Christianity and Islam, that looked forward to
the end of the world, when the sinners would be damned once and for all
and the perils of earthly existence would give way to the full reign of God.
Religion in Historical Time
The major religions originated in very different specific times and circum-
stances. They resulted from the inspiration of particular prophets – though
Hinduism emerged more gradually – and their influence cannot be neatly
pinned to a single historical period.
It is true, however, that the great age of religious conversion in Asia,
Europe, and parts of Africa occurred as the great classical empires were
collapsing, as epidemic diseases made new inroads in China and Europe,
and as nomadic invasions and internal warfare increased. People turned
to one of the new faiths for a host of reasons, but surely in part be-
cause they seemed to acknowledge the miseries of this world and offered
some hope that greater happiness might be available when earthly life
ended. Scattered evidence suggests that the periods of greatest disloca-
tion caused genuine psychological discontent. Thus tombstones around
Rome increasingly carried the inscription, “I was not, I was, I am not”,
hardly an ode to joy. The religious definitions of happiness were not
caused by new levels of distress, but they surely responded to them
in part.
In a few cases, indeed, the distinctive religious age yielded somewhat
when conditions improved. Most obviously in China, the popularity of
Buddhism came under new attack when, under the Tang dynasty, political
and economic stability had returned.
In most instances, however, the religious approach to happiness would
outlast any particular period of time, continuing to shape or at least deeply
influence the definitions and experience of happiness into the modern
age and indeed to the present day. No religious monopoly on happiness
resulted, but there was no denying the force of the religious message or the
hopes and anxieties it entailed.
Further Reading
On history of hope,
Burke, Peter. “The Dawn of Hope.” The Furrow 64, no. 11 (November 1, 2013):
620–624.
Cohn, Norman. The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mys-
tical Anarchists of the Middle Ages, Rev. and expanded ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1970).
For general orientation:
Armstrong, Karen. A History of God: The 4,000 Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity
and Islam (New York: Random House, 1993).
Coomaraswamy, Ananda. Hinduism and Buddhism (Mountain View, CA: Golden
Elixir Press, 2011).
On Hinduism and Buddhism,
Bercholz, Samuel, and Sherab Kohn, eds. The Buddha and His Teachings (Boston,
MA: Shambhala, 1993).
Ricard, Matthieu. “A Buddhist view of Happiness.” In David, Susan, Ilona
Boniwell, and Amanda Conley Ayers (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Happiness
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
Selin, Helaine, and Gareth Davey, eds. Happiness across Cultures Views of Happiness
and Quality of Life in Non-Western Cultures (Heidelberg: Springer Netherlands,
2012).
On Christianity and happiness,
Baumgartner, Frederic J. Longing for the End: A History of Millennialism in Western
Civilization (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
Davies, Brian. Aquinas (London: Continuum, 2002).
Dupre, Louis, and James Wiseman. Light from Light: An Anthology of Christian
Mysticism. (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2001).
Emerson, Jan Swango, and Hugh Feiss. Imagining Heaven in the Middle Ages: A
Book of Essays (New York: Garland Pub., 2000).
McCready, Stuart, ed. The Discovery of Happiness (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks,
2001).
McMahon, Darrin M. Happiness: A History, 1st ed. (New York: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 2006).
Newman, Barbara. Voice of the Living Light: Hildegard of Bingen and Her World
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
On Islam,
Corbin, Henry. History of Islamic Philosophy (London: In Association with Islamic
Publications for the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 1993).
Esposito, John L., and Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad. Islam, Gender, and Social Change
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
Keddie, Nikki R. Women in the Middle East: Past and Present. (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2007).
Leaman, Oliver. An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Watt, William M. Al Ghazali: The Muslim Intellectual (Chicago, IL: Kazi Publica-
tions, March 2003).
On religious fear and guilt,
Delumeau, Jean. Sin and Fear: The Emergence of a Western Guilt Culture, 13th–18th
Centuries (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).
Muchembled, Robert. Popular Culture and Elite Culture in France, 1400–1750
( Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985).
6 Popular Pleasures
The basic dilemma is worth repeating. We do not know how happy p eople
were during the “religious age” (or how many were made anxious by the
thundering sermons); or how they defined happiness; or even whether
happiness would have been a relevant concept in their communities.
There is no evidence to measure how many found inner peace through
one of the religions (or perhaps even greater spiritual bliss), or indeed how
many people would have said that inner peace was the core of their idea of
happiness. We know that religion had an influence: we have direct records
of some, like Hildegard, who gained a taste of the divine, and we know
that they had colleagues; but it is impossible to be more precise.
This chapter, building on the kinds of activities more briefly discussed
alongside the classical philosophies in Chapter 3, talks about another kind of
satisfaction – possibly in some cases deep satisfaction – that developed con-
currently with the religions and that attracted wide popular participation –
sometimes, indeed, cutting across lines of social class and gender. Many of
the people involved may also have shared religious joy and hope. But it is also
true that many of the activities discussed in this chapter drew considerable
concern from religious authorities, as being too frivolous and distracting.
Even here, we cannot measure happiness. We can make some plausible as-
sumptions, because people often suggested how important the activities were
and how much they enjoyed them. Even art work helps here: Just take a look
at some of the village scenes pained by the 16th-century Dutch artist, Pieter
Breughel, for a sense of – sometimes bawdy – popular merriment. We can
argue that along with religion itself, some of these activities helped people
compensate for the notorious downsides of agricultural life, including often
meager daily diets and regimens of hard work. There are some implied defi-
nitions of happiness involved, but they are rarely explicit. Yet they certainly
add to the evidence that finding recurrent distractions from the standard pat-
terns of daily life, in all but the most impoverished circumstances, provided
important sources of satisfaction and, probably, real sources of happiness.
One final preliminary. Some of these popular pleasures, common in rel-
atively advanced agricultural societies, have since been lost or attenuated.
This introduces a complexity into evaluations of modern happiness that
we will return to later on.
Work
The greater burdens of work constituted one of the most telling features
in the contrast between agricultural and hunting and gathering societies.
It is important to remember that most visions of a Golden Age emphasized
the absence of the need for work, and implicitly at least, images of heaven
in a life to come highlighted the cessation of work obligations as well.
Still, human beings are inventive when it comes to identifying sources of
satisfaction, and work in agricultural societies – particularly for some key
groups – developed some clearly positive features.
In the first place, for most people in both countryside and city, the most
strenuous and stressful work was confined to a few periods in the year.
Planting and particularly harvest time for the peasants involved long days.
Coal miners faced especially high demand in December, thanks to the ad-
vent of colder weather and, at least in Europe, preparation for the holiday
season. At most other times, the pace slackened. In addition, many work-
ers mixed in what we might see as leisure during their workday – taking
naps, chatting, wandering around. Some group work was also facilitated
by chants and songs.
One category, though well below the upper class, found special strengths
in work. Urban artisans developed skills and even a sense of artistry that fed
a sense of pride and satisfaction. The emergence of this group, along with
the development of cities in every civilization, was a major innovation in
the experience of work. It is vital to note that artisans were a minority in the
population as a whole even in the most advanced agricultural societies:
most workers were peasants, and even in the cities large groups of un-
skilled, sometimes transient workers outnumbered the craftsmen. But ar-
tisans were important, and their opportunities may have supported a sense
of pleasure. Furthermore, their attributes blossomed in a wide range of
regions: artisans in Japan, for example, were at least as proud and privileged
as those in Europe, and there are similar manifestations in the Middle East
and among skilled metalworkers in Africa.
To be sure, attaining a high skill level was no small chore. Apprentices
spent years getting ready, often forced to menial tasks and subject to fre-
quent beatings – even when their master-artisan supervisors were family
relatives. But this might make the ultimate achievement all the sweeter.
After training, people had to produce a “masterpiece” to show that they
were qualified, but once that was done there was considerable freedom
to display creativity in work (always subject to the whims of wealthy
customers), along with enjoying a sense of fellowship with neighboring
craftsmen. (In many cities, craft specialties clustered together, with neigh-
borhoods of leatherworkers or metalsmiths.) Many artisans also enjoyed a
period of wandering from town to town before settling down – this was
a cherished privilege in pre-modern Japan – which provided other oppor-
tunities for enjoyment.
Popular Pleasures 73
In several regions, the pleasures of artisanal work were enhanced by
membership in a guild. Craft guilds offered a number of protections, to
workers and consumers alike, as they sought to limit damaging compe-
tition or unsettling changes in techniques. Both in Japan and in Western
Europe, guilds were often linked to religious symbols and shrines. More
prosaically, they sponsored an array of group activities – parades, banquets,
ceremonial competitions with other guilds – that displayed the pride of the
craft and provided warm fellowship. Artisanal work might involve some
tension between a desire to demonstrate personal prowess and the empha-
sis on group solidarity, but it was often the combination that provided the
deepest satisfaction. Note that while the most visible strengths of artisanal
work were primarily centered on men, some female crafts flourished as
well, at least during some periods of time.
The leading sources of popular pleasure taken up in this chapter empha-
size non-work activities that provided clear contrasts to the daily routine.
But some form of happiness in work itself, associated with achievement
and pride, must be considered as well.
Sex
We do not know much about popular sexual pleasures. It is widely assumed
that many people were constrained by hard physical labor and, often, some-
what limited diets in ways that would affect their sexual interest. Many
couples, faced with the need to try to avoid having too many children and
the absence of reliable birth control devices, needed to abstain from too
much activity, particularly by the time they reached their 30s. Interestingly
some couples deliberately sought a final child later in their thirties, hoping
for someone to help in their later age; but this was more a coping strategy
than a positive expression of happiness. Assumptions of male superiority
could also play a role in sexual behavior, potentially affecting female re-
sponse. And, as we have seen, religions might advise against too much
sexual interest – or even vaunt celibacy as spiritually preferable.
Still, many signs point to the pursuit of sexual pleasure, though particu-
larly for the upper classes; for urbanites; and for men. Prostitution developed
early; it is listed in the first Mesopotamian chart of existing professions, in
2,400 BCE. All major cities had houses of prostitution – sometimes, re-
vealingly, called houses of pleasure, not infrequently located near churches
or mosques. Between the 16th and 18th centuries CE, Japanese cities de-
veloped a network of pleasure houses, in which prostitutes were licensed.
Some of these evolved into larger entertainment centers, where talented
women performed without necessarily offering sex; this was the geisha
tradition that began to be solidified in the 18th century.
We have seen that in many societies, upper-class men regularly took
on concubines primarily for sexual pleasure. Artistic representations fre-
quently featured sexual themes, though these did decline somewhat under
the influence of the major religions. All societies also generated sexual
manuals, some of which circulated widely and advised on the means of
increasing pleasure. During the Arab Golden Age, in the 11th and 12th
centuries, a number of stories, like the 1101 Nights and The Perfumed
Garden, highlighted sexual pleasure in ways that did not strictly adhere to
Islamic principle. Even earlier, in 828, a Bedouin poet, asked what love
is, replied: “To look at each other constantly and to kiss each other re-
peatedly, this is already paradise.” In Europe, a pamphlet amusingly called
“Aristotle’s handbook” advised on the best sexual positions. And while
birth control was a real issue, many societies, from ancient Egypt onward,
experimented with devices, including animal bladders used as condom,
that might at least reduce the risk of unwanted pregnancies, allowing some
explicitly recreational sex even within marriage. Finally, though premar-
ital sex was actively discouraged, it did sometimes occur. In Europe, once
a couple was engaged they often had sex, with a resultant first child born
about seven months after the wedding.
Sexual activity and interest, in other words, could factor into available
pleasure, though there were, unquestionably, a number of constraints, in-
cluding abundant community shaming for activities deemed inappropriate.
Children’s Play
Childhood could also offer unexpected opportunities for pleasure, some
of which might even factor into adult experience at least to some extent.
Historians have debated many aspects of childhood in agricultural so-
cieties, including the alarmingly high infant death rates and the extent to
which parents, partly because of the fear of loss, may have limited their at-
tachment. Physical discipline was not uncommon (though Europeans seem
to have been particularly prone, a habit that shocked native A mericans
during the decades of colonization). Work obligations started early and
contributed to parental insistence on obedience and respect. Notably, as
we have seen with the philosophers, there was no active concept of a
happy childhood; to the extent that adults mused about their early years,
they never viewed them as highlights, often mentioning the sternness of
their fathers and softening only in noting their more affectionate mothers.
The modern idea of childhood as the happiest time of life – to be taken
up in a later chapter – was simply absent. This does not mean that adults
wanted their offspring unhappy, but it is quite clear that an explicitly pos-
itive linkage did not exist. To the extent that adults commented on child-
hood in general, they stressed their preference for adult-like qualities, not
childish ones. Only deep expressions of grief at the loss of a favored child,
though not too common, modify this picture. Childhood and happiness
did not easily mix.
However, there is one vital exception, which may provide an unex-
pected glimpse of happiness that might at least occasionally carry over
into adulthood: Children played a lot and were frequently left to their
own devices. The great historical claim here first emerged several decades
ago, in the study of play by Johann Huizinga, a medievalist, who pointed
to the huge gap between traditional play and the more adult-controlled,
school-oriented activities that passed for play in more modern societies.
But the findings have been confirmed by other historians, and also by
anthropologists working on contemporary agricultural societies. Rural
villages, particularly, though offering generalized group oversight over
children, left young people to their own devices for long stretches of time
during which there was no pressing work. Clusters of children were able
to pursue a variety of games and activities and – the core of the argument –
could have a great deal of fun in the process.
Play, as Huizinga pointed out, is a natural attribute, displayed by many
animals as well as humans. It contrasts with ordinary activities, providing
a sense of release but also opportunities for experimentation that are less
possible in daily routines. All human cultures develop special words for
play, some of them focused on children’s play but extending into other
meanings – such as games in general or sexual activities. The Chinese, for
example, featured a main word that described children’s games but other
activities as well, along with two other words, for contests of various sorts
and for organized contests in particular. Arabic words highlighted play but
also mocking and teasing.
Unquestionably, childhood, again across cultures, offered special op-
portunities for play, and also a need for play that would contribute to
social and skill development. What was noteworthy about children’s play
in agricultural societies was its immunity from extensive adult control
and its spontaneity. To be sure, games were passed from one generation
to the next – tag, for example; and in some cases a few toys or balls were
involved. But children could also innovate as they filled part of their days
in their small groups. Not infrequently, the separation from adult supervi-
sion caused accidents; falling through the ice in winter play was a common
problem, and there could be other injuries. Occasionally authorities tried
to intervene against some of the more violent games, such as rough forms
of football, but they were not always successful.
In rural villages, play offered particular opportunities to interact with
nature, but even in the cities children managed to engage in street games
and other activities that highlighted play. Most historians also emphasize
that play opportunities became available to a wide range of social groups –
even including enslaved children to a degree; indeed, wealthy youngsters
might be more confined in play by the manners of their class and the need
for some formal schooling than poorer children were.
Some of the more inventive children’s games might explicitly seek to
create enjoyment out of disaster. The English game “ring around the rosie”,
for example, originated from the recurrent bubonic plagues that burdened
Europe from the 14th through the 17th centuries. “Rosie” referred to the
marks plague victims developed on their skin, with a “ring” around the
rose-colored sore. “Ashes, ashes we all fall down” initially derived from
the extensive cremation of the multitudes of dead bodies. And the po-
sies, finally, referred to nosegays wealthy folk would carry to counter the
stench of death. Here, arguably, was a revealing balancing act in agricul-
tural societies: the exposure to problems like epidemic disease might be
compensated, in small part, by translation into children’s play.
Hide and seek and blind man’s bluff were other games devised by chil-
dren that continued to appeal for many centuries. Children also played
with simple equipment, like stilts and see-saws, that they could construct
relatively easily by themselves.
A vital aspect of children’s play before modern times featured inter-
actions among various age groups, from fairly young children to people
who today would be regarded as young adults. Agricultural societies were
not rigidly age-graded, and adulthood occurred gradually, depending on
work and marital status. Play, in other words, was not centered on smaller
children alone.
This age range helps explain why, in the view of scholars like Huizinga,
play activities spilled over into the enjoyments available for adults as well.
In the first place, adults could gain pleasure in watching children’s play
or even participating directly. Beyond this, they could incorporate play
principles into their own activities as well. Huizinga stresses that behaviors
in war – before the advent of today’s fearsome weaponry – could involve
a play element, and indeed some societies developed warlike games that
were nothing more than play at their base. In Western Europe, as feudal
warfare declined by the 13th and 14th centuries, knights began to com-
pete in jousting tournaments that were themselves a form of play, and
also provided entertainment for crowds of spectators. The fact that they
involved some danger to participants was part of the play element.
Fun
Spilling over from play, agricultural societies developed a number of forms
of fun, and these often became more elaborate as the societies gained
greater wealth and structure. Typically, they were far more widely avail-
able in cities than in the countryside, which helps explain why, despite in-
ferior health conditions, migration to the cities continued to be attractive
to many people even as the bulk of the population remained rural. The
upper classes, in this category, enjoyed opportunities not widely available,
employing jesters or sponsoring more organized activities like plays and
concerts. In China and later in Europe, royal households even developed
private zoos that displayed exotic animals, a privilege not opened to a
wider public until the 18th century or beyond. These special opportu-
nities aside, it is not always clear how generally available some types of
entertainment became.
However, even in offering a brief sampling of opportunities for fun
in agricultural societies, several points are clear. First, people have been
very imaginative in inventing diversions, which suggests both need and
opportunity – beyond levels available in hunting and gathering communi-
ties. Second, some entertainment forms emerged in agricultural societies
that remain characteristic of key regions today, as in Chinese opera or
Western popular drama. And third, many forms were widely copied, even
in the agricultural age; indeed, borrowing forms of entertainment – as in
the spread of Chinese playing cards to the West during a heightened pe-
riod of contact – was one of the chief results of interregional trade. It is no
exaggeration to suggest a real thirst for additional opportunities for fun.
All this leads to a fourth point: while some popular entertainments devel-
oped early on, they tended to become more diverse and elaborate during
the same centuries that the great religions were gaining ground. They
interacted with the religions but also contrasted with them, suggesting a
need for alternate forms of release.
Professional entertainers were still widely regarded as low in status, even
when they performed for royalty. That some of their work was religiously
suspect hardly helped their standing; religious concerns explain why, in
Europe, it was not permissible for women to act, with female roles taken
on by young men. But entertainers were highly valued in fact, though
rarely wealthy, because of the diversion they provided.
At the same time, many opportunities for fun did not depend on en-
tertainers at all, but facilitated a wide popular participation. In a society
where most people remained illiterate, and when books were rare in any
event, oral performance played an important role in providing diversion.
Storytellers emerged quite widely, often providing opportunities for older
people to display their wisdom and long memories. Listening to various
kinds of recitation – for adults as well as children – was a much more
important form of entertainment than would be the case when literacy
spread and printing made books more widely available.
While storytelling traditions emerged everywhere, they were particu-
larly strong in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Storytellers, called griots
in parts of West Africa, might entertain and advise kings, but they also
enjoyed considerable local prestige. In villages, drums often announced a
story session after an evening meal. Griots talked about the doings of the
gods; about natural phenomena, like why chickens can’t fly (they were
once the king of birds, but arrogant behavior caused the gods to strip them
of effective wings); great attention was also paid to stories of the family
lineage, providing deep knowledge of kinship ties.
In the Middle East, a tradition of poetry recitals was particularly distinc-
tive, and it gained ground after about 600 CE. Poetry recitals entertained
royal courts, but they also featured in market squares. Poets offered praise
and criticism of figures of the day (mostly praise, when they performed for
royalty). They often discussed love, particularly unhappy love; and they
sometimes offered graphic sexuality. Wine poetry was another popular
theme, despite or perhaps because of disapproval by Muslim clerics. One
poet, Abi Nuwwas, in the 9th century, offered this hymn to wine: “Sing
to me and give me some wine to drink, serve me a goblet to distract me
from the call to prayer.”
Many societies invented games, and while some were particularly avail-
able to the upper classes, others had wider appeal. In many European
villages, for example, a village square created opportunities for bowling
games. The Chinese invented card games during the Tang dynasty. Chess
originated in northern India, around the 6th century CE, and then spread
through Persia and the Middle East, from which it would later make its
way to Europe. Characteristically, no elaborate equipment was necessary
for most games; only the military-like jousting competitions constituted
an exception.
Popular sports often invited wide participation, as well as entertainment
for spectators. Village soccer games flourished in England (using inflated
animal bladders or leather contraptions), sometimes with violent results.
Wrestling and tugs-of-war were also popular. During the Song dynasty,
the Chinese introduced a form of golf, with two teams of about ten men
each hitting a ball with a stick to see which side could get it into a hole
most often; the Chinese also had a version of soccer. Kite flying was in-
vented early in China but initially for military signaling only; it became a
popular form of entertainment and competition during the Tang dynasty.
In Central America, the Toltecs developed what might be called a form
of basketball, where teams competed in front of spectators to get a ball
through a hole at the side of the court, often with dire consequences for
the losing side; fortunately, the hole was small enough that it may have
been hard to win or lose.
Many cities featured casual forms of entertainment, particularly on
market days. Bear baiting was popular in Europe, along with sword swal-
lowing or fire eating. In China, though the institution had developed
earlier, touring circuses became more common and elaborate. China also
pioneered in fireworks as an entertainment form. Even during the Han
dynasty, many people burned sticks of bamboo to create loud sounds,
and then later explosive powder was added for further effect. Fireworks
themselves were invented during the Song dynasty; ordinary people could
buy them from street vendors, though there were also far more elaborate,
occasional displays to entertain royalty. The addition of color to fireworks
was added in the 14th century. From China, fireworks came to the Middle
East, where they were known as “Chinese flowers.”
Street musicians offered entertainment in many cities, and music was
also available in some villages. African storytelling, for example, often
had a musical element. Drumming was an important activity in places like
Africa and China, serving practical purposes of communication as well as
entertainment.
In Europe by the 16th century, popular theater offered another option
for diversion in the cities – and while special seats were reserved for the
high and mighty, ordinary people had access as well, frequently watching
plays while eating and drinking and greeting actors, loudly, with cheers
and catcalls. By the 16th century, lots of ordinary people, many illiterate,
were filling the “cheap seats” in theaters in London, where they watched
plays by Shakespeare and others, or coming to the opera in Naples. The
shows were in the afternoon – there was no safe lighting available for
indoor entertainment at night – and they were marked by trumpets sig-
naling that a performance was about to begin; there was as yet no need for
precise entertainment timetables. Theatrical props and costumes remained
minimal; words or music alone were meant to be sufficient. The audience
chatted continuously during the performance, with far less sense of a need
for restraint than most modern audiences have developed. Quite possibly,
in addition to the quality of the material, this impromptu byplay added
to the fun.
The basic point is clear: even ordinary people had periodic access to
a number of forms of diversion and were creative in their development.
Some of the entertainments devised by agricultural societies remain popu-
lar today, others have faded from view and a few (like marketplace poetry
readings) would probably not appeal to modern tastes. Formal perfor-
mances and wide popular participation combined; emphasis on pure spec-
tatorship was less pronounced than that it would become later on. The
impressive list of options should not obscure the fact that most normal
days did not feature much opportunity for distraction, particularly in the
countryside. And again, there is little explicit evidence about the levels
of enjoyment involved, about how much all this created a distinct sense
of happiness or how it related to the more urgent religious approach to
happiness during the same centuries. The fact, however, that many enter-
tainments became somewhat more elaborate over time certainly suggests
their positive role.
The Festival
It was the periodic festival that really constituted the most distinctive con-
tribution to potential happiness in agricultural societies, by creating ex-
periences and memories that were rather different from the patterns that
would emerge in more modern times, as the festival tradition diminished.
Indeed the special features of the festival, along with religious consolation
and exultation, would anchor any argument that agricultural societies in
fact figured out how to be just as happy as hunters-gatherers had been,
despite the various new burdens agricultural conditions imposed. More
prosaically, festivals frequently offered opportunities for different social
classes and age groups, as well as both genders, to participate in a common
experience of pleasure and community solidarity.
The nature of specific festivals varied immensely by region; indeed,
one of the charms of the festival tradition was expressing and reinforcing
a sense of particular local identity. Certainly there were a number of com-
mon features: many areas celebrated the summer solstice, and versions of
planting and harvest festivals were widespread. But local history; variants
on one of the major religions; and other factors complicate any sweeping
generalization about when festivals occurred or precisely how many there
were – not to mention their celebratory trappings.
Nevertheless, many basic features were widely shared. First, there were
a great number of festivals, lasting from a day to five days or more (like the
Hindu Diwali, or festival of lights; and many common celebrations of the
many days of Christmas). It has been estimated that a significant festival
occurred at least once a month in Western Europe, and there were still
more in the Eastern Orthodox tradition. Hinduism offered a bewildering
variety of festivals, depending on the particular region in India. Festivals
marked religious occasions above all, including some standards like Easter
or Diwali, but also local patron saints or gods, as well as commemorations
of locally significant historical events like a major military victory in the
past. In southern Italy, for example, an annual festival celebrated a defeat
of Muslim invaders that had occurred several centuries before. Itinerant
market fairs provided another opportunity for celebration, and in some
cultures occasional weddings or wakes took on a festival atmosphere as
well. For people who did not have much daily access to entertainment –
particularly, the rural majority – the sheer frequency of festivals was a vital
break from the grind of work.
It was what happened during the festival that really mattered, of course,
particularly in terms of the experience of happiness and the contrast with
normal routines. Feasting was always an important component. For many
people who had little or no daily access to meat, festivals often provided a
cherished indulgence. The slaughter of a lamb or goat was a vital feature of
many celebrations in the Middle East and southern Europe. In many cul-
tures, unusual drinking was also part of the celebration, offering a break
from normal abstinence and/or a chance to get drunk. But it was not just
the nature and quantity of the provisions that were striking, but also the
care lavished (by women) on their preparation, for this was not a matter
that received much attention on a daily basis. In Europe, it was revealing
that when cookbooks began to circulate, particularly after the introduc-
tion of printing, they concentrated entirely on community celebrations;
attention to cooking for the family only emerged in the 18th century,
when some aspects of the festival tradition were already in decline. Festi-
vals were not only a time when one ate well – that was hardly surprising –
but for many people the only time one ate well.
Colorful clothing was another festival component (often, for both gen-
ders), again stressing the theme of providing contrast with the ordinary.
In cities, festivals provided guild members with opportunities to wear
emblems of their craft. Individual display was discouraged, for festival
dress emphasized common membership in the group.
A crucial feature was the wide variety of entertainment available, much
of it participatory. Some festivals obviously offered religious ceremonies of
various sorts, some rather somber, but there were other activities as well.
And some festivals, like Guy Fawkes Day in England, celebrated from the
early 17th century onward, had no religious content at all.
For wealthy villages, or festivals in the cities, some professional enter-
tainment might be imported. For example, a circus tradition began to
develop in Europe in the 17th century, quite separate from the much older
Chinese pattern, and small troupes might be attracted to a major village
gathering. But amateur activity, by members of the community itself, was
far more common, providing the bulk of what was offered to local festival
audiences.
Fire and light were important components, a source of delight for peo-
ple who, on ordinary nights, had little illumination. Strings of lights pro-
vided the centerpiece of the Diwali celebration. Many European festivals,
including Guy Fawkes, featured large bonfires. In European communities
affected by Norse traditions, not only in Scandinavia proper but also parts
of France, a summer solstice celebration involved burning a large tree,
meant to express devotion to the sun. Many festival activities in fact main-
tained old pagan traditions of this sort, sometimes (as with coloring eggs
for Easter) blending them with the religious calendar.
Again depending on local custom, animal performances played a role.
Many European villages featured bear- and bull-baiting as well as cock
fights. Only in the later 18th century, in places like England, did some
groups begin to protest these blood sports, armed with new ideas about
cruelty. Cockfights, embellished by various rituals as well as eager bet-
ting by onlookers, were core elements of celebrations in many parts of
southeast Asia.
Sports events loomed large. Again in Europe, various ball games, w
restling
matches, and competition in stone throwing were familiar features, stress-
ing rivalries within the community. While festival sports did not approach
the intensity of the old Olympic games, a man who made a name for
himself in an activity like wrestling could move up in the local prestige
rankings.
Dance performances played a great role in many regional festival cus-
toms, usually involving drums and sometimes other musical accompa-
niment. In China, festivals called forth special versions of the lion dance
or other processional dances, with colorful homemade costumes. Morris
dancing was a staple in England, usually featuring only male performers.
This was a dance imported from Europe that began to be performed for
royalty in the 15th century, and then migrated to the countryside by the
1600s, with many peasants joining in. The term “Morris” presumably de-
rived from “Moor”, reflecting a feeling that the dance seemed exotic, from
the colorful costumes to the stylized movements. The spread of Morris
dancing reflected the expansion of popular entertainment options over
time, and the capacity to adopt new traditions that offered challenges to
performers and enhanced the sense of spectacle for onlookers.
India developed an unusually rich array of popular dance styles, often
reflecting old regional traditions; here, women characteristically played
the leading role, though one regional genre, the Kathakali, featured men
in rather military-like routines. Indian dances usually involved musi-
cal accompaniment, with instruments made locally, and, typically, very
bright costumes. The festival tradition in India also featured large masses
of flowers.
Dance activities in many festival traditions emphasized participation
over spectatorship, allowing people to share in the pleasures of rhythmic
motion and the sense of solidarity with the group – what one historian
calls “muscular bonding”. These were collective, not individual, displays.
In this sense, they offer particularly vivid illustration of the communal
qualities of happiness festivals were meant to provide.
Underlying the various specifics of festivals and their regional variety
were several characteristics that deserve emphasis. First, festivals were de-
signed to express and strengthen community ties. Outsiders were usually
not invited – and that could include the marginal poor in some villages,
who were not regarded as really belonging. (This obviously contrasts with
festival remnants or revivals today, where outside tourists often serve as
primary audience.) Community solidarity could cut across other social
lines, however, grouping villagers who varied in property holdings; and
local gentry often joined in as well, expressing their solidarity. Presum-
ably, the sense of belonging, as well as the specific entertainments, added
to the pleasure festivals provided.
Many festivals directly blended religious devotions, for Christian saints
or gods in the Hindu pantheon, with feasting and other earthy pleasures.
Here too, the combination might enhance satisfaction, reconciling some
of the different definitions of the components of happiness available to
ordinary people in a religious age.
Festivals could also, quite deliberately, serve as safety valves for some
common community tensions. Sporting events in European villages, such
as tugs-of-war, often pitted young married men against bachelors, groups
that might otherwise resent each other. Young people in their teens and
early twenties, though not part of the village power structure, often had
special license in festival times. European tradition maintained several fes-
tivals, called Feast of Fools or Feast of the Ass, which allowed parodies of
religious and political authorities and placed some subordinates in positions
of power for a day. Bands of youth could be allowed, on these occasions, to
commit pranks and even minor acts of vandalism, presumably letting off
steam to compensate for the obedience and drudgery required of them in
the normal routine. Some of these festivals periodically veered into levels
of violence, drunkenness, and sexuality, which could lead to official efforts
to suppress. At their best, however, by briefly turning normal patterns up-
side down, they made the normal more acceptable at other times.
Many students of the festival tradition, finally, emphasize the distinctive
sense of the timing of pleasure that the festival calendar implied: occasions
of particularly vivid delight that stood out precisely because they were not
usually available. For populations not far from the edge of subsistence,
unable to afford or even imagine more regular outlets, the intensity of the
experience would feed memories and anticipations that could carry people
through the long stretches of time that intervened.
***
Several reactions might respond to the short description of the various

ways pre-industrial people seem to have tried to have fun, even aside from
the distinctive regional specifics. One reaction might emphasize how fa-
miliar this seems, certainly compared to the rather different sources of
happiness attributed to hunting and gathering societies. After all, modern
people seek many similar diversions, building on precedents set by the
agricultural civilizations, though we benefit from being able to combine a
number of different regional patterns – fireworks as well as Shakespeare –
thanks to the unfolding of greater global contacts. And if we enjoy many
of these opportunities today, seeing them as part of our happiness, maybe
the evaluation can be extended back in time.
Yet important differences should stand out as well, complicating the
effort to assess the level of happiness among our agricultural ancestors.
We will explore many of these distinctions more fully later on, but some
markers now may be useful. First, it is not clear whether the notion of
“having fun” can be applied to these societies, save perhaps as part of
children’s play. Certainly, particularly in the countryside, most people
had no daily access to the main sources of fun. Enjoyment was periodic,
governed by a fairly traditional calendar, not something to splice into
the normal day. This may have made the opportunities all the more
meaningful – this was the great strength of the festival tradition, which
modern people have diluted in their insistence on more frequent fun. But
the sporadic quality makes evaluation of daily happiness more difficult.
Furthermore, fun was community-centered, not focused on individual
or even family – as the cookbooks of the time suggested. This may or
may not have made happiness richer than is the case today, but it was
certainly different.
The question of disparity in access looms large, though it is still an issue
today to some degree. To be sure, wide participation in many activities –
rather than reliance on a few professionals for performances – was a strik-
ing feature of the festival tradition. On the other hand, the differences
between the urban and rural experience could be huge, in terms of the
diversions available. Social class distinctions were immense, even in the
cities, affecting the range, the frequency, and the quality of entertain-
ment. Gender also loomed large, though it was somewhat less salient in
the festival tradition or in children’s play. Men could, quite simply, attend
activities that were unavailable to women (though women could go to
Shakespeare’s plays, just not act in them); disparities in sexual enjoyment
and even in access to alcohol were also quite real.
Family life surely provided happiness for women, and some cultures,
as with Hinduism in India, made a particular point of delighting in a
child’s birth and lavishing praise on the mother. But overall, family life did
not feature as prominently in discussions of happiness as might be imag-
ined (except in the desirability of having children as a mark of success) –
and this raises some additional questions about the status of happiness for
women. The elderly were a final category that did not figure prominently
in popular diversions, save presumably as spectators, with the important
exception of the story-telling role.
The emphasis on group activities in many of the principal diversions
also had a flip side: it was hard for an individual to step aside, to indulge
more purely personal tastes. Festivals compelled attendance for those in-
volved. In France for example, if a head of household refused to contribute
straw for a bonfire honoring the local saint, he would be widely shamed,
with many villagers claiming that he was likely to break a leg or suffer
some other misfortune in retribution.
Then there was the issue, for both genders, of how entertainment and play
related to religion, or even philosophy – a question that lingers today, but less
urgently. Periodically, the clash in standards of propriety and in definitions of
“true” happiness complicated popular life considerably. In the Middle East,
the narrowing of interests to a greater emphasis on religion alone, after the
Arab “Golden Age” retreated by the 13th century, reduced some of the out-
lets that had previously flourished – like the public praises to earthly delights
in marketplace poetry. In China, authorities periodically clamped down on
signs of consumer indulgence among the urban middle classes, even putting
some offenders to death. Similar sumptuary laws, seeking to regulate mate-
rial life according to status, cropped up periodically in Europe. In Europe as
well, the rise of Protestantism led to another set of clashes with popular taste,
particularly among groups converted to Calvinism. To be sure, Protestant
leaders encouraged a rather positive evaluation of the pleasures of married
life. And Puritans have been given an unjustly bad press: they were quite
capable of commenting on the joys of alcohol or marital sex. But they could
also be grim. They disliked colorful clothing. They disapproved of some
of the plays that had long delighted the people of London, shutting some
of them down entirely. They disliked many of the trappings of traditional
festivals, and Protestant disavowal of saints dramatically reduced the number
of holy days for festivals in any event, by as much as 50%.
Disputes over happiness, and whether it should be sought in this life at
all, complicate any effort to figure out what happiness was like, and how it
was interpreted, just a few centuries back. Certainly, while opportunities
for entertainment did expand at several points in the millennium after
600 CE, there was no systematic change in the most authoritative defini-
tions of happiness itself. Fun was available, though hardly predominant,
but it could provoke doubts as well as satisfactions.
Further Reading
On pre-industrial work:
Crossick, Geoffrey. The Artisan and the European Town, 1500–1900. (Aldershot:
Scolar Press, 1997).
Farr, James Richard. Artisans in Europe, 1300–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
Holcombe, Charles. The Genesis of East Asia, 221 B.C.–A.D. 907 (Honolulu: As-
sociation for Asian Studies and University of Hawai’i Press, 2001).
Laslett, Peter. The World We Have Lost (New York: Scribner, 1966).
Rosser, Gervase. The Art of Solidarity in the Middle Ages: Guilds in England
1250–1550 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
On sexuality:
Phillips, Kim M., and Barry Reay. Sex before Sexuality: A Premodern History
(Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2011).
Stearns, Peter N. Sexuality in World History, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2017).
Weeks, Jeffrey. What Is Sexual History? (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2016).
On play:
Chudacoff, Howard P. Children at Play an American History (New York: New York
Frost, Joe L. A History of Children’s Play and Play Environments Toward a Contempo-
rary Child-Saving Movement (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010).
Huizinga, Johan. Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture. (Boston,
MA: Beacon Press, 1955).
On fun:
Bowsher, Julian, and Pat Miller. The Rose and the Globe: Playhouses of Shakespeare’s
Bankside, Southwark: Excavations 1988–1991 (London: Museum of London
A rchaeology, 2009).
Crego, Robert. Sports and Games of the 18th and 19th Centuries (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 2003).
Crowther, Nigel B. Sport in Ancient Times (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
2007).
Eales, Richard. Chess the History of the Game (Reprint, Mountain View, CA: Ishi
Press, 2019).
Hawkes, Terence. Meaning by Shakespeare (London: Routledge, 1992).
Kennedy, Phillip. The Wine Song in Classical Arabic Poetry: Abū Nuwās and the
Literary Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).
Plimpton, George. Fireworks: A History and Celebration (New York: Doubleday
Books, 1984).
On the festival tradition:
Falassi, Alessandro. Time Out of Time: Essays on the Festival, 1st ed. (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1987).
Gerson, Ruth. Traditional Festivals in Thailand (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University
Press, 1996).
Hecht, Jennifer. The Happiness Myth: Why What We Think Is Right Is Wrong (New
York: Harper, 2007) – an important study in several respects.
Malcolmson, Robert. Popular Recreations in English Society 1700–1850, New ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
On dance as part of the festival tradition:
McNeill, William Hardy. Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human His-
tory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
Singha, Rina, and Reginald Massey. Indian Dances: Their History and Growth
(New York: Braziller, 1967).
On misrule:
Davis, Natalie Zemon. Society and Culture in Early Modern France: Eight Essays
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976).
Harris, Max. Sacred Folly: a New History of the Feast of Fools (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Part II
The Happiness
Revolution, 1700–1900
In the 17th/18th centuries in Western Europe and much of North A merica,

a dramatically new approach to happiness emerged, which would alter
how happiness was defined and how many people began to reframe their
own expectations. This formative period for the new ideas of happiness
would extend through the 19th century, thus cutting across the long Agri-
cultural Age and embracing the beginnings of the industrial society.
This new period was primarily defined by the unprecedented debates
over what happiness was all about and by efforts to implement the new
ideas. Though “revolution” is not an inaccurate term, it took time for
various groups to come to terms with novel expectations. The adjustment
was further complicated by various impacts of the industrial revolution, as
it gradually reshaped living standards, recreational outlets, and even family
life. The global context presents another set of complications that extend
through the whole period: the “revolution” was at this point a Western
development, and its global impact would long be limited. The power that
Europe projected in these centuries, through imperialism and economic
influence, may indeed have inhibited a global reassessment of happiness.
7 The Happiness Revolution
in the West
It is not hard to define the revolution in ideas about happiness that occurred
in Western Europe and much of North America in the 18th century. In-
creasing numbers of intellectuals argued that human beings could control
their own destinies – they were not victims of chance or divine judgment –
and that pleasure and comfort on this earth were acceptable, even desirable,
goals. In principle, these same intellectuals contended that earthly happi-
ness should be available to everyone; and properly ordered societies should
steadily expand opportunities for mental and material satisfactions. Older
ideas of happiness through perfection in virtue or through the blessings of
an afterlife were not abandoned, but they were increasingly subordinated
to the new enthusiasms for earthly joys. Savoring the here and now and
seeking worldly success did not detract from real happiness, they defined
its essence; and some commentators added, there was no merit whatsoever
in pain or deprivation.
While charting the unprecedented arguments of Enlightenment writers
offers the most direct evidence of the revolution in definition and expecta-
tion, other manifestations also demonstrated considerable popular partici-
pation in this fundamental change – and these new features may have been
even more important. Smiling became more fashionable. People were in-
creasingly urged to be cheerful, and to expect those around them to be
cheerful in turn: a “cheerful revolution” was arguably as significant as
the unprecedented concepts of happiness, for it created new standards for
acceptable emotional behavior. A novel kind of consumerism suggested
that many people were taking greater pleasure in the acquisition of things.
A change this profound inevitably included a number of complexities.
While there really are solid indications that the revolution extended beyond
intellectuals alone, it is impossible to chart the extent of the popular reso-
nance: surely, the literate more than the illiterate, for example, and the urban
and middle class more than the rural and working class. Not surprisingly,
resistance also swelled. A traditionalist religious minority objected to the
movement away from sin and damnation. Other conservatives, influenced by
classical values, found the new happiness goals shallow. And it is vital to re-
member that the revolution was, at this point, Western alone, without much
influence on the rest of the world – a global issue to which we must return.
The Happiness Revolution in the West 89
0.0160%
0.0140%
0.0120%
0.0100%
0.0080%
0.0060%
0.0040%
Happiness
0.0020%
0.0000%
1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
Figure 7.1 F
requency of the word “happiness” in English, 1600–2008, Google
Ngram Viewer, accessed July 13th, 2020.
0.00240%
0.00220%
0.00200%
0.00180%
0.00160%
0.00140%
0.00120%
0.00100%
0.00080% Cheerful
0.00060%
0.00040%
0.00020%
0.00000%
1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
Figure 7.2 F
requency of the word “cheerful” in English, 1600–2008, Google
Ngram Viewer, accessed July 13th, 2020.
Still, complexity should not obscure the fact that a fundamental shift
was underway, one that continues to influence conditions of happiness
even today. Two Google Ngrams, which chart the frequency with which
a word was used compared to all other words in English-language writ-
ing, highlight the shift dramatically. References to happiness, rare in the
early 17th century, began to soar; and roughly the same trajectory applied
to the adjective “cheerful”. A fundamental reconsideration was underway
(Figures 7.1 and 7.2).
The Backdrop
In retrospect we can see that several developments in Europe and the
North American colonies in the 16th and early 17th centuries prefigured
the revolution, but at the same time it would have been very hard to
predict the revolution even in 1700, when many Western societies were
continuing to emphasize the importance of sober restraint.
90 The Happiness Revolution, 1700–1900
Here were some of the preparatory developments:
• Protestantism might have created a new sense of opportunities for

happiness for some. As noted in Chapter 4, both Luther and Calvin
spoke about their belief that God intended people to be happy. Protes-
tant faiths also encouraged a greater sense of possibilities for individual
contact with God, without the intermediary of priests; and it attacked
monastic practices of self-denial and celibacy as irrelevant to salvation.
One study of English Protestant intellectuals argues that, by the 17th
century, they were encouraging people to turn away from a sense that
happiness was a matter of luck and accept “worldly felicity” as part of
self-improvement. On the other hand, many Protestant leaders clearly
discouraged an array of popular entertainments as frivolous, along
with colorful clothing and other embellishments; they did not em-
phasize joy in their long and somber church services, and they could
fill people with dread about the omnipresence of sin.
• The scientific discoveries of the 17th century, many of which won
considerable popular attention, could promote a greater belief in the
powers of human reason and the possibility of improving over past
knowledge and superstition. Here was an important building block
for the future. At the end of the century, philosopher John Locke ap-
plied this new sense of confidence to an attack on the idea of original
sin, arguing that people are born with a blank slate, neither good nor
evil, which could be turned positive through education. On the other
hand, the scientific burst created measurable anxiety among many re-
ligious groups. It also began to undermine traditional beliefs in magic,
which many had found comforting.
• New kinds of consumerism began to gain ground, not to be sure for
the very poor but for many groups beyond the aristocracy, reaching
even the ranks of skilled artisans. Imported products like sugar, coffee,
tea, chocolate, and tobacco may have – literally – added spice to life.
They also encouraged interest in related products like porcelain serv-
ing sets, as family meals began to become more elaborate; other out-
lets, like coffee houses, provided opportunities for fellowship for men.
Beds began to become more comfortable. How much this added to a
positive sense of happiness at this point is hard to gauge, but there may
have been at least modest change.
• Radical protesters, for example among extreme groups like the Dig-
gers and Levelers during the English civil wars, began to wonder if
dramatic social and political changes could not produce new levels of
happiness, through greater equality. “Why may we not have heaven
here, and heaven hereafter too” – a theme that would become much
more important later on.
• It is possible that the first signs of a greater interest in happy endings
began to emerge in the 17th century, though the great surge would
await the 19th and 20th centuries. One minor dramatist thus rewrote
Shakespeare’s great tragedy, King Lear, to provide a happy ending,
and it would be performed that way for another 150 years before the
original was reinstated. In Naples a new opera based on Virgil’s Aeneid
retooled the story to end happily, rather than in suicide.
• Some new words began to enter the English language, which were
relevant to a new interest in happiness. Notably, the word “fun” began
to be employed – derived from earlier medieval terms for jesters or
fools. It was first used as a verb in 1680, a noun in 1700. “Fun” con-
tinued to be associated with tricks or hoaxes until about 1730, when
it began to refer to amusements pure and simple.
These examples are straws in the wind, and they should not be exagger-
ated. Older ideas about the limitations of happiness clearly persisted. John
Locke, for example, also wrote about human folly, reflecting both classical
and Christian emphasis on human frailty, “We are seldom at ease, and
free enough from the solicitation of our natural or adopted desires”; “in
this imperfect state, we are not likely to be ever free from (uneasiness) in
this world.” A book on the Art of Contentment by an English conserva-
tive, in 1675, placed even greater emphasis on the elusiveness of happi-
ness. “Though every man would have happiness,” the greater majority
lose themselves in “blind pursuits”. Happiness is in fact available to all,
if they would only seize it, through recognizing the “grand and ultimate
happiness” of the next life; this could allow an “intermedial” happiness
now if people would only defer to authority and accept their present cir-
cumstances. There was no revolution in traditional voices like this.
Before the Big Change

Generalizing about a public mood is always risky, as so many differences
exist among individuals and groups, but a few speculations are possible
before turning to the arrival of more fundamental change.
First, while the 17th century did see a number of positive changes in the
human condition, as with new consumerism, some clear setbacks r esonated
as well. Diseases, including periodic plagues, continued to run rampant.
In 1665, the last great bout of bubonic plague occurred in England,
quickly killing up to a quarter of the population of London. Major wars
could be deadly as well. The Thirty Years War caused enough disease and
destruction to carry off at least a quarter of the population in Germany,
where it would take decades to recover. Frequent conflicts, though less
bloody than the struggle in Germany, continued later in the century,
particularly around the ambitions and destructive strategies of France’s
absolute monarch, Louis XIV. Here is another case where events and cul-
ture could combine in generating a common, and hesitant, approach to
happiness.
On the more purely cultural side, smiling was not encouraged in the
16th and 17th centuries, at least the kind of wide, spontaneous smile that
would show a lot of teeth. In the first place, thanks to sugar and tobacco
and a lack of dental care beyond the painful removal of rot, many people
simply lacked any teeth to show, and clearly sought to control smiling as
a result. France’s “Sun King” Louis XIV, for example, had no teeth; it
has been speculated that the most famous smile of the earlier Italian Re-
naissance, the Mona Lisa smile, was mysterious mainly because she was
working hard not to show her discolored or absent teeth.
Beyond the dental challenge, broad smiles and open laughter were of-
ten actively criticized, seen as reflecting a distressing lack of emotional
control. Upper-class manners insisted that a boisterous laugh was a sign of
poor breeding, really no better than a yawn or a fart. A French Catholic
writer argued, in 1703, “God would not have given humans lips if He had
wanted the teeth to be on open display.” Children might smile, to be sure,
but an adult should have learned to know better.
In France again, reactions to theatrical comedies were often deliberately
restrained. The great comic dramatist of the period, Molière, did win
royal patronage, but he often ran into trouble: first, his plays frequently
made fun of topics that were off limits, like church or aristocracy, and
were simply banned. But second, the fashionable audiences that were vital
for patronage insisted that laughing aloud was a behavior one would ex-
pect only from the “cheap seats”. Openly enjoying too much fun, in other
words, was vulgar, and Molière insisted that his purpose was not so much
to entertain – though he did that – but to “correct the faults of men”.
Restraint might be even more widely recommended in Protestant re-
gions like Britain or the Atlantic colonies of North America. Several
historians have noted a preference for slight melancholy in the moods of
these regions, as people, conscious of their sins, sought to “walk humbly”
in the sight of God. Many diary writers took solace in portraying them-
selves as “doleful”. A head of household berates himself after punishing
a servant: “and hence I am induced to bewayle my sinffull life, for my
failings in the presence of God Allnighty.” Another commented that in
his view, God “allowed of no joy or pleasure, but of a kind of melancholy
demeanor and austerity.” Still another noted that severe melancholy,
though distressing, was far better than sin. This was the atmosphere in
which many also expressed regret for even a whiff of lightheartedness
with friends or relatives, as they “grievously” reflected on their “Levity”
at an evening gathering. This does not suggest that experiences of joy
were absent, but they seemed to occasion genuine personal concern, and
there might be real hesitation about seeking them out. It was no acci-
dent that one of the striking medical texts of the 17th century, Richard
Burton’s lengthy Anatomy of Melancholy, while suggesting ways to modify
extremes, also noted that “no man living is free” from “melancholic
dispositions.”
None of this is meant to argue that there was no interest in wide-
spread happiness before the 18th century, except for a hope for a better
world in the life to come. The signs of change should not be forgotten.
The same upper-class belief that laughter was vulgar suggests that lots of
ordinary people welcomed opportunities for fun, in popular theater and
beyond, as had long been the case. Emphasis on melancholy may itself
have been a dubious privilege of the literate, where the combination of
religious anxiety and the reigning code of manners might be particu-
larly fierce. It is important to remember after all that many preachers
still urged the possibility of happiness simply through trying to be good
and please God, and there were many claims that accepting one’s lot in
life could be a source of cheer. Traditional wisdom could still count for
something. The evidence does point, however, to continued limitations
on any embrace of happiness, before a more dramatic set of ideas and
practices burst forth, mainly after about 1730, that would change the
scene decisively.
New Concepts of Happiness

A new idea of happiness, and perhaps an even newer idea of its accessibility,
was a basic feature of Enlightenment thought in the 18th century, on both
sides of the North Atlantic. Earthly pleasures – dancing, food, singing, the
company of friends – were no defiance of God’s will, but a life as nature
intended. The British poet Alexander Pope put it this way in his 1734 Essay
on Man: “Oh happiness, our being’s end and aim! Good, pleasure, ease,
content! Whate’er thy name.” A Scottish philosopher, Francis Hutchison,
became one of the first writers to discuss the importance of a social com-
mitment to happiness, implying that politics might have to be recast toward
this goal. People deserved to be happy; by mid-century French writers
were even talking about a “right to happiness”.
Discussions of how to attain happiness spread in intellectual and ruling
circles across the continent. In Poland, the College of Nobles organized a
lecture series on “Man’s Happiness Here Below”, while the ruler of R ussia
organized a celebration featuring the “goddess felicity” and a massive
“Temple of Happiness”. By the end of the century the subject had become
commonplace, which could obscure the extent to which this was a truly
unprecedented outpouring of hope and expectation.
Christian writers themselves picked up the theme, writing pamphlets
with titles like I Want to Be Happy or The School of Happiness. Of course
they noted that full happiness could be found only in the afterlife, with
God, but most of their attention centered on good feelings in the here and
now. One historian has argued that the Enlightenment in fact began to
change the old Christian question, how can I be saved? into a new one:
how can I be happy? And while the new philosophers certainly referred to
classic Greek and Roman writers as they discussed the pursuit of felicity,
their approach was really quite different, in centering on pleasure itself and
not some greater goal.
The new interest informed the development of what would come to be
known as the social sciences, another fundamental Enlightenment contri-
bution. Early psychology was not fully involved, but nascent sociologists,
political scientists, and economists were deeply interested; their goal was
both to elaborate on the definition of happiness and to suggest how society
could be organized to maximize its attainment.
Thus in Britain what became known as the utilitarian school, initially
guided by Jeremy Bentham, insisted that the purpose of government, or
indeed any public action, was the “greatest good of the greatest number” –
and by good, he meant happiness. This extended the ideas suggested earlier
by Francis Hutcheson. “It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number
that is the measure of right and wrong,” Bentham wrote in 1776. Some
budding social scientists argued that it was possible to build mathematical
models bent on maximizing happiness. A number of scholars working in
this vein acknowledged that people in the past had been unable to maxi-
mize happiness, but that science could now cut through outdated thinking
and demonstrate a clear path.
The enthusiasm was European-wide (with some eager North American
participants as well), with contributions from Italy and Germany as well
as Western Europe. Legal scholars and budding criminologists chimed
in. The pioneering jurist Cesare Beccaria based his ideas for the massive
reform of criminal punishments on the importance of limiting suffering
and unhappiness and imposing only those penalties effective in correcting
behavior: his guiding principle, by now familiar enough, were policies
that worked toward “the greatest happiness of the greatest number of in-
dividuals.” Economists like Adam Smith, seeking the best arrangements
for economic growth, assumed that greater prosperity would bring greater
happiness, which in turn was mankind’s proper goal. As another scholar
put it – the French writer Chastellux, who wrote what he said was the
world’s first history of happiness: “are there any more beautiful, more
worthy of our attention than those which have for their object the happi-
ness of humanity?” The focus itself, plus the implicitly democratic belief
that happiness could and should be open to all people, plus the conviction
that societies could be changed and improved in ways that would promote
happiness – this was a quietly revolutionary combination.
Some interesting disagreements surfaced amid all this discussion. A few
writers, particularly in France, veered off into discussions of sheer sensu-
ality, and in some cases actively experimented with pleasure-seeking in
this domain; thus the famous lover Casanova wrote about the transcen-
dence of “immediate sensual enjoyment.” The sensualists prompted other
Enlightenment authorities quickly to criticize their “dissolute” habits. A
few writers admitted that a certain amount of illusion, or wishful think-
ing, was essential in the quest for happiness: there were lots of problems
in life that had to be overlooked in the notion that happiness was readily
available. Christianity remained a concern. There was wide agreement
that old-style Christianity had missed the mark: mankind was not sinful,
monastic-style denial of pleasure was truly misguided. But while a few
ventured into agnosticism, more tended to argue that there was a God
who in fact supported the human quest for happiness. This was the view,
for example, of Benjamin Franklin across the Atlantic.
An important debate arose about the role of civilization in happiness.
Most Enlightenment advocates were urbanites, interested in a variety of
sophisticated pleasures including the joy of learning and rational inquiry.
But another strain, most vigorously advocated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
argued that real happiness was to be found in simpler pleasures, that people
needed to return to a more “natural” existence. And this approach struck a
real chord. The 18th century featured a proliferation of “pleasure gardens”,
in which city dwellers could enjoy the beauties of nature, and there was
even a movement, popularized by people like France’s ill-fated queen Marie
Antoinette, to reconstruct farming cottages and water mills to indulge
tastes for a simpler life. But while writers like Rousseau were deeply critical
of many Enlightenment ideas of pleasure, Rousseau himself reinforced the
central message: people “must be happy.” “That is the first desire which
nature has impressed upon us, and the only one which never leaves us.”
The centrality of the Enlightenment to the new commitment to hap-
piness, amid some variations on the theme, is undeniable. This was one
of the basic ways this intellectual revolution transformed Western cul-
ture, well beyond the reaches of philosophy alone. For the Enlightenment
thinkers were also ardent popularizers. They wrote deliberately for a wide
public: the French thinker Voltaire, for example, was one of the first in-
tellectuals to make a good living simply selling books, not relying on aris-
tocratic patronage for his support. They issued unprecedented summaries
of knowledge to help spread the word, while a variety of pamphleteers
offered a host of vigorous summaries. Their ideas were taken up not only
in the fashionable salons, organized for the well-to-do, but in the growing
network of coffee shops, where public discussions might reach an audience
beyond those who purchased books and pamphlets directly. The question
of how many people were touched by the new ideas of happiness is not
easy to answer, but this was not a movement of elites alone.
One sign of this was an increasing tendency for people to celebrate the
advent of a new year with specific anticipations of the happiness to come.
Thus an almanac heralding the year 1766: “May the New Year and those
that follow bring happiness and peace to the hearts of all men.” New
knowledge had brought measurable progress during the year past, and
there was more to come. The common phrase “happy new year,” how-
ever, would enter common usage only in the 19th century. Here too, the
18th-century revolution in happiness launched a set of habits and vocabu-
lary that would become more elaborate over time.
Causation
Specifying the causes of this cultural revolution is something of a chal-
lenge. It is much easier to lay out the new concepts themselves than to
explain their provenance and popularity. Basic changes do not however
spring up unaided, by the musings of intellectuals alone, and they cer-
tainly do not gain an audience without a larger context. At various points
in human history, ideas about happiness – both positive and negative –
have been shaped by a combination of ideas and material circumstances.
This formula certainly applies to the transformation of happiness in the
18th century.
Three major factors intertwined. First, on the ideas side, Enlightenment
beliefs about happiness clearly extended the achievements of the scientific
revolution of the previous century – a familiar point. The demonstration
that human reason and experiment could explain many of the workings
of nature – like the principles of gravity – and unseat many older errors
promoted wider ideas of progress and improvement, and tended also to
draw attention to the workings of this world rather than the next. The
celebration of reason also undermined earlier beliefs about human sin,
raising questions about other traditional religious ideas where the human
potential for happiness was concerned. The translation of scientific discov-
ery into revolutionary concepts of happiness was not inevitable, just as the
extension of science into social science required a certain leap of faith. But
the connections were clear enough.
Connection was facilitated by the second factor, again not brand new
but cresting by the middle of the 18th century: a steady improvement in
material standards of living for many people – not everyone, to be sure,
but a growing number. There was greater access, for example, to more
colorful, and more easily washable, clothing, thanks particularly to the
rapid expansion of the cotton industry. By the middle of the century lots
of people began using umbrellas, vital particularly in Europe’s climate. To
be sure, a few English writers complained about a weakening of character:
a real Englishman should be able to withstand the rain, but in general
the innovation was welcomed. Home heating devices improved. Growing
use of whale oil lamps even cut into darkness at night (though this also
allowed more sweatshop work in the burgeoning factories). Chair design
improved, and chairs became more widely available. It is also true that
more people also gained access to watches and clocks, though whether a
greater ability to tell the time contributes to happiness or not remains an
open question. That aside, new standards of comfort had wide impact.
The complex relationship between consumerism and happiness, begin-
ning to take shape at this point, launched a recurrent theme in modern
history. People were buying things in part to show off – this was a motive
behind buying fancy watches – but also because the “things” gave them
direct pleasure. It is also true that improving standards could also promote
greater aspiration, where frustrations could complicate the picture. But
there can be little question that a better material life facilitated belief in
new possibilities for happiness. Indeed, it is precisely at the point when
living standards begin to advance that consumerism has its most positive
impact – as would be true in other societies later on. Here was additional
motivation for the new preachers of happiness, and for those who heard
them.
Finally – the third factor – a bit of serendipity. For reasons that are
not entirely clear, Europe became essentially plague-free for a number
of decades from about 1730 onward. Endemic diseases continued to take
their toll, but recurrent catastrophes largely disappeared. This made nat-
ural disasters that did occur, like a great earthquake in Lisbon, more no-
ticeable and lamentable, but there was a real relaxation in normal anxiety.
And while wars did not vanish, they were not particularly bloody, nor,
outside of central Europe, did they affect large sectors of the population.
The greatest conflict, the Seven Years War that began in 1756, only killed
20,000 Britons, and even the French did not suffer too badly – just to
note two countries that were particularly involved in the happiness surge.
Intellectuals were aware of the new atmosphere, particularly the easing of
plagues, and it gave them hope for the future; and the change helped cre-
ate the favorable audience as well. To be sure, epidemics and deadly wars
would return, but by that time the contours of the happiness revolution
were already set.
A combination of factors is almost always involved in any major hu-
man change, and this certainly applies to happiness. European living
standards, for example, were not necessarily better than the Chinese
in the mid-18th century, but the Chinese did not at this point have a
scientific revolution to build on. The Russian upper class had access
to the scientific revolution, and they did evince interest in the ideas of
happiness; but Russia did not yet experience a wider change in physical
comfort – hence a different outcome. It is less easy to assess the impact
of the interruption of the plague cycle – though in the early 2020s, beset
by the coronavirus pandemic, we can imagine what a relief it may have
been. But Enlightenment optimism may have owed as much to this fac-
tor as to the other two.
Happiness Plus: A Ripple Effect

Enlightenment ideas about happiness were connected to several other de-
velopments, some of which would play an ongoing role in the progress
of happiness itself. Without venturing too far from the basic topic, it is
important to discuss a few durable extensions.
Many Enlightenment thinkers were famously optimistic. They be-
lieved that the world was improving around them but also that, as people
gained in education and old institutions were reformed, further progress
in the future was assured. The most sweeping declaration of progress
was offered by the French writer Nicolas de Condorcet, who published
his Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind in 1795,
offering formulas for the “perfectibility of society”. Ironically Condorcet
wrote the book while he was trying to escape arrest by French revolu-
tionary radicals, and indeed the book appeared the year after Condorcet
was jailed and died in prison. Here was dramatic testimony to Enlighten-
ment faith, but it also illustrates one of the key corollaries of Enlighten-
ment thought: the encouragement to hope, and to hope not for a better
life in heaven but a better life just around the corner in the here and now.
The new kind of hope could connect to happiness for individuals, as
they planned what they thought of as their own better future; or it could
provide hope to larger clusters of people as they pinned their happiness
on the better society that would result from a social movement or even
a new technology.
The Enlightenment, and several other developments in 18th-century
popular culture, placed new emphasis on the individual, rather than the
importance of ties to a group. Scholars debate the question of when indi-
vidualism began to characterize Western culture, but there is little ques-
tion that it received a massive boost at this point. A humble example: it was
in the later 18th century that popular naming practices began to change. A
penchant for using the names of ancestors or religious figures gave way to
an interest in choosing more novel names for one’s offspring – to empha-
size their special qualities. And an old habit of reusing the name of a child
who had died ceased entirely; every individual must be cherished, and
that included those who had previously passed away. At the political level,
huge emphasis began to be placed on individual rights, including freedom
of religious choice. In marriage formation, individual preferences began
to gain greater weight, over traditional reliance on parental arrangements.
The shift had many facets, prompting changes from personal life to revo-
lutionary aspirations.
In turn, the new ideas of happiness were intricately connected to the
surge in attention to the individual: it was on an individual basis that
happiness should be most commonly sought and evaluated. It was the in-
dividual who had the right to pursue the goal of happiness. We have seen
already that the intimate connection between individualism and happi-
ness continues to mark Western culture, as distinct for example from the
Japanese approach, yielding very different answers to contemporary ques-
tions about whether one is happy or not. It was in the 18th century, on the
Western side, that the formula began to take shape.
Finally – though this is a less familiar link – the novel ideas of happiness
were associated with new thinking and new practices concerning death,
facilitated of course by the interruption of the plague cycle. Enlighten-
ment faith in science and overall optimism encouraged a belief that, with
progress, human beings should be able to prolong life, that the specter of
death would recede. At the same time, new ideas about contagion – not
the germ theory yet, but an antecedent – prompted widespread efforts to
relocate cemeteries, to move them farther away from daily interactions.
All of this raises the possibility that the new ideas of happiness connected
to a growing distaste for death; and indeed, the relative frequency of pub-
lished references to death began to decline rapidly, a trend that would con-
tinue into the 21st century. Actual death rates long remained fairly high; it
was only in the past century that a fuller separation between happiness and
death became possible. But the seed was planted earlier, and it continues
to generate questions about whether modern ideas of happiness, in the
Enlightenment tradition, fail to take adequate account of death’s inescap-
ability. We will see, in Chapter 14, that some non-western societies are
currently raising this issue directly, as debate about the nature of happiness
becomes more global.
Keep Smiling
The most important extension of the new thinking about happiness into
other aspects of daily life came with the concurrent emphasis on the
importance of cheerfulness. Here was a change that is less easy to pin
down than happiness itself – it did not lend itself to sweeping intellectual
formulas – but it may have been at least as significant.
Enlightenment philosophers did offer some contributions in this area.
Francis Hutcheson, for example, wrote extensively on the value of laugh-
ter. He disputed older ideas that people only laughed at others’ misfortune,
or that laughter was a sign of poor breeding. On the contrary, laugh-
ter helped build bonds between people, contributing to a more humane
society.
The main interest, however, centered on a growing interest in cheer-
fulness, outside the domain of formal philosophy. Cheer was not a new
word in the English language. Initially referring to facial expression, it
had begun to take on positive connotations in the 15th century. But refer-
ences began to increase rapidly by the later 17th century. It was in the 18th
century that more familiar uses and associations began to emerge, like the
idea of Christmas cheer or shouts of cheer to express group emotions (such
shouts presumably began first in the British navy). Most revealingly, a
brand new phrase, “cheer up”, first appeared in 1670. Its relative frequency
began to increase only in the later 18th century, but from that point on
would gain ground steadily into the 20th century (though, interestingly,
more precipitously in American English than in English more generally).
The phrase revealed a new belief that people should be able to generate a
more cheerful demeanor and that it was appropriate to tell them to do so.
Unsurprisingly, as cheer went up, references to melancholy went down
quite steadily, until by the later 19th century it had become a virtual lin-
guistic relic (Figure 7.3).
0.0000900%
0.0000800%
0.0000700%
0.0000600%
0.0000500%
0.0000400%
0.0000300% Cheer up:
0.0000200% eng_us_2009
Cheer up:
0.0000100%
eng_gb_2009
0.0000000%
1600 1650 1700 1750 1800 1850 1900 1950 2000
Figure 7.3 F
requency of the phrase “cheer up” in American English, 1600–2008,
and British English, 1600–2008, Google Ngram Viewer, accessed July
13th, 2020.
For the new idea was that not only people should be happy, but that
they had a responsibility to appear happy, yielding something of a new
cheerfulness imperative. The result showed both in written advice and,
even more strikingly, in a new willingness to smile broadly, and to expect
smiles in return. Good manners began to be redefined toward emphasiz-
ing the positive.
The notion of a new responsibility to appear cheerful began to crop up
in commentary, including private diary entries, from about 1730 onward,
both in Britain and in the Atlantic colonies. It may have reflected not only
the increasing emphasis on happiness but also the extent to which more
and more urbanites were involved in commercial dealings with strangers,
which inevitably promoted a need to embrace the most effective meth-
ods of self-presentation – sometimes with a religious reference added in
as well. Thus one John Byrom wrote in 1728, “It was the best thing one
could do to be always cheerful … and not suffer any sullenness … a cheer-
ful disposition and frame of mind being the best way of showing our
thankfulness to God.” A Boston writer in 1758 went further in suggesting
the desirability of having cheerful people around – even across class lines:
“The cheerful labourer shall sing over his daily Task … a general satis-
faction shall run through all Ranks of Men.” People also began urging a
quick recovery of good cheer even after a disaster, as in a brutal yellow
fever epidemic in Philadelphia in 1792. For oneself and others, it was im-
portant to put on a good face.
This was where the new interest in broad smiles came in, a sign of ap-
proval for, and even insistence on, more open emotional expression. Out
with tight-lipped self-control and a kind of grimace-like smile, in with
greater spontaneity. Novels – a new genre in their own right – began to
describe women with “enchanting” or “sweet” smiles, a clear new signal.
New types of dentists emerged in urban areas on both sides of the Atlantic
by the mid-18th century, eager to take care of teeth rather than pull them.
A host of innovative products, including toothpicks and brushes, were
introduced to maintain the smiles, and artificial aids like lipstick were
designed to highlight the whiteness of teeth. Smiling gave evidence that
a person was keeping up with the latest consumer products, as well as dis-
playing the right kind of emotion. Smiling for several decades seemed to
be a particularly French or Parisian specialty; a Scottish traveler to Paris
in the 1760s complained about how Parisians seemed to be smiling all
the time – a reminder of how culturally specific modern smiling is, and
how it can actually seem annoying to others. Parisian smiling may have
taken a hit with the French Revolution, when skulls became associated
with the ravages of the Terror and the showing teeth seemed less ap-
propriate. But smiles would recover in France, and certainly more open
smiling became current elsewhere during the happiness revolution. Thus
for several decades in the 18th century, Americans who had their portraits
painted deliberately presented themselves with smiling faces. More gener-
ally, even before 1800 a number of European travelers noted how cheerful
A mericans seemed to be, commenting on their “good humor” and con-
stant “cheerfulness” expressed through a ready smile.
For men, emphasis on the importance of smiling was accompanied by
an increasing effort to discourage crying – a display that had been quite
common for men in the 17th century when melancholy was more in fash-
ion. Full conversion to the idea that masculinity and tears did not mix
awaited the 19th century, and it involved more than the promotion of
cheerfulness. Still, a growing sense that displays of sadness signaled weak-
ness was consistent with the notion that a cheerful demeanor was the most
appropriate form of self-presentation.
It was revealing, also, that new words began to be introduced to desig-
nate individuals who were not really depressed or deeply sad but who were
not keeping up with the social need to seem cheerful. “Sullen” was a word
that was already available, but in the late 18th century the term “sulky”
was added (probably adapted from a different German word). Sulky was
initially applied to servants, an interesting indication that people were
beginning to want even their inferiors to seem cheerful. Later, as we will
see, the term also began to be applied to recalcitrant children, particularly
adolescents, and additional neologisms would be added to highlight unde-
sirable resistance to the displays of good spirits.
Individual Happiness: Sexuality and Consumerism

Far from the pens of philosophers and even some of the promptings to-
ward cheerfulness, a number of groups in Western society developed new
or expanded opportunities for pleasure in the later 18th century. It is not
always clear whether these linked to an explicit goal of happiness, and they
also provoked criticism, but they may have contributed.
Few individuals tried to emulate the sexual antics of a Casanova, but
popular sexual habits changed considerably. Growing access to money
wages, even for some young people, plus rural crowding and the begin-
nings of greater urbanization weakened community and even paren-
tal controls over sexual behavior, particularly for elements of what can
broadly be called the working classes (in the countryside as well as cities).
Sexual activity before marriage became more common, as evidenced by
a rising rate of illegitimate births. Even within some marriages, sexual
activity may have increased. These developments are hard to interpret,
and they often put women at a disadvantage. But what one historian has
called the first modern sexual revolution was certainly consistent with a
new interest in pleasure and with growing secularism – at least for some.
The relevance of growing material comfort to the happiness revolution
has already been noted, as has the link between consumerism and smiling.
As consumerism advanced in the later 18th century, it tightened the con-
nections with happiness, while raising a number of questions that would
persist well beyond this point.
None of the philosophical proponents of happiness argued that hap-
piness rested primarily on the acquisition of things. Cultivation of the
mind, enjoyment of freedom, connections with nature – these were vital
sources as well. In the British colonies of America the notion of happiness
was particularly connected to independent land holdings, though material
prosperity entered in as well. The fact was, however, that interest in the
acquisition of consumer goods continued to advance on both sides of the
Atlantic, and for many people served as one path to happiness. Further,
both the philosophers and many ambitious individuals now agreed that
seeking wealth was an acceptable means of promoting happiness and in-
dependence alike.
Shopkeepers and manufacturers began developing new methods to con-
vince people that the acquisition of things, and even the act of shopping
itself, could further happiness. As one French commentator noted, an in-
creasingly commercial society made it seem like men and women could
“buy and sell happiness” in various items of pleasure. Advertising began
to develop, taking advantage of the advent of weekly newspapers; while
there were no explicit claims yet that purchasing something would bring
happiness, there were many references to comfort and keeping up with
the latest trends. Shopkeepers – as their numbers proliferated – began or-
ganizing store windows to be as enticing as possible. Other gimmicks,
such as pricing one item below cost to draw people into a store where they
would immediately be tempted to buy more, proliferated – indeed most
of the apparatus of modern consumerism developed at this point at least in
embryo. For their part, manufacturers worked hard to test popular taste,
quickly ramping up production of designs that proved particularly attrac-
tive. The strategy reflected a new awareness that popular pleasure could be
identified and used to promote further sales.
There is not a lot of direct evidence from the 18th century on the
emotional experience of the people who were participating in the new
consumerism, beyond the obvious fact that they were clearly drawn to
the process. Consumerism was beginning to be attached to courtship and
romantic love. This was a key reason for the growing interest in more
stylish clothing. In 1797, an enterprising London publisher even offered a
book of phrases men could use to make their Valentine’s greetings more
romantic. Connections among consumerism, affection and (through this)
happiness were clearly emerging. On another front, wills began to include
specific designation of items, particularly furniture or tableware, that their
owners wanted to pass on to cherished family members as a sign of their
affection – another indication that happy emotions were now attached to
material objects. Consumerism, in other words, was beginning to con-
tribute to happiness and allow the expression of remembered happiness in
turn. It provided one of the channels for the new individual quest to gain
and express greater pleasure.
Collective Happiness – and Joy: A Political Dimension

The growing interest in happiness and earthly hopes did not apply only to
individuals, however, nor was it confined solely to the more affluent social
groups. One of the most significant findings in the history of popular pro-
test is a transition from traditional goals, which emphasized returning to
some real or imagined past condition, to a “proactive” approach which em-
phasized the right to progress – the right to conditions better than ordinary
people had ever experienced before. Various groups began to imagine that
they could achieve new levels of happiness, collectively, if only they could
gain economic or political reforms. Here was one way that new hopes at-
tached to the “pursuit of happiness” could translate into collective action.
This new search for happiness broke through clearly during the French
revolution, where many ordinary people gained opportunities for political
voice. Thus a rural village lawyer in France, Joseph-Marie Lequinio, from
humble beginnings, gained a small role during the revolution’s radical
phase, through which he could express his visions for the collective happi-
ness that was just around the corner. “All, in a word, whoever we are – big
or small, strong or weak, young or old – we all dream of happiness, we
want only to be happy, we think only of becoming so.” Thanks to the rev-
olution, further, Lequinio could make it clear that the quest for happiness
had nothing to do with waiting for an afterlife – this was only a trick that
had deluded ordinary people for too long. Nor, however, did happiness
center on personal wealth or individual pleasure. The real secret of hap-
piness lay in working for progress for the masses, in “the love of others”
or “public felicity”. And, hinting at the new force of popular nationalism
that was taking shape in France, Lequinio also attached this new vision
of collective devotion to the “love of patrie” – the love of the fatherland.
Official documents from the French revolution referred to a similar
notion of a “happiness for all”: thus, the 1793 constitution stated directly,
“The goal of society is common happiness”. For people like Lequinio,
happiness centered on the destruction of tyranny, the end to religious hy-
pocrisy, the advancement of the common man.
This kind of vision – a belief that greater happiness lay just around the
corner under the spur of popular protest – would pop up recurrently, from
this point onward. It would motivate a variety of revolutionary agitators
in Western Europe – radical and nationalist alike – through the risings of
1848. It would spur the more visionary trade union movements, includ-
ing British Chartism. It would inspire socialist and communist leaders in
many countries. This was an ambition for collective happiness that could
sustain some of the most devoted adherents of the variety of new protest
movements that cropped up from the late 18th century onward.
More than expectation could be involved. Shared enthusiasm and fel-
lowship could provide happiness for many ordinary people even during
the struggle itself, as they met, sometimes in secret, to plan their next
moves and express their devotion to the cause. Songs, chants, fraternal
embrace could reinforce the sense of comradeship involved, a kind of
shared happiness that was possible even before the goals were realized.
Occasionally, at least when victory seemed within grasp, this sense of
collective happiness could generate feelings of real joy. Take, for exam-
ple, the night of August 4, 1789, when the French revolutionary assembly
managed to meet together for the first time as the old regime was toppling.
The mood was magical, “We wept with joy and emotion”, one partici-
pant wrote. All the representatives, across social ranks, “treated each other
with fraternal friendship”, and the assembly would go on to pass motion
after motion designed to create a better society. Moments like these, of
contagious happiness founded on shared visions for the future, were not
common, but they would crop up recurrently in modern history to show
the new power of high hopes.
Assessing the Happiness Revolution: A First Cut

A genuine revolution in the definitions and expectations associated with
happiness occurred in the 18th century, in much of the Western world. It
was obviously complicated by different particular approaches, and especially
the sometimes clashing options presented by the emphases on individual
versus collective fulfillment. Praise for sensual indulgence jostled against
the idea of happiness through self-sacrifice for the public good or even
individual happiness through consumerism or education. The shared ideas
of realization in this world and hope for future progress might be obscured
by competing specific goals. The same applies to the disputes Rousseau and
his followers provoked, about the tensions between modern civilization
and a more natural happiness.
Predictably also, the new ideas of happiness, of whatever stripe, encoun-
tered many critics. The crusty Samuel Johnson, in England, when asked
whether a person can be happy in the moment answered simply, “only
when he is drunk.” Johnson, a rather traditional Christian (who also loved
his wine), wrote scathingly about the “vanity of human wishes”. Only
faith in an afterlife could provide glimpses of happiness on this earth.
Enlightenment writers themselves sometimes faltered, admitting mo-
ments of sadness, even despair. Greater knowledge might actually increase
human misery. A number of leaders worried that happiness was being
distorted by the emphasis on personal pleasure – an old concern, which
the newer trends could heighten. Thus, Immanuel Kant lamented the fact
that “the principle of one’s own happiness” might actually undermine
morality, obliterating the difference between virtue and vice. “Making a
man happy is quite different from making him good.”
Criticism and doubt legitimately complicate appraisal of the scope of the
happiness revolution by 1800. Many traditional Christians, from oppo-
nents of the French revolution to Protestants still deeply attached to belief
in original sin, clearly stood apart, even if they did not always become
active opponents of the new beliefs. Large numbers of people, particularly
amid the illiterate minority or in the countryside, probably were simply
unaware of the new ideas. Even some of the participants in new behaviors,
the eager consumerists or those involved in premarital sex, may have had
no real sense that they were expressing new values. It is impossible to de-
termine the extent of conversion, even to new expectations for the future,
particularly in societies where death rates remained high and many people
continued to suffer serious deprivation.
For the new approach to happiness involved deep cultural change, and
this usually takes time. As the following chapter suggests, it was in the
19th century that many of the basic new ideas about happiness began to be
translated into more concrete beliefs and practices – and even then there
were ongoing limitations. But the foundations were clearly established.
Growing numbers of people were coming to believe that they should
be able to find happiness in their lives and, equally important, that they
should present a happy face to the world around them.
Further Reading
Two basic works on the transformation are:
Kotchemidova, Christina. “From Good Cheer to ‘Drive-by Smiling’: A Social
History of Cheerfulness.” Journal of Social History 39, no. 1 (2005): 5–37.
McMahon, Darrin M. Happiness: A History, 1st ed. (New York: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 2006). This book is a pioneering guide to the intellectual history of hap-
piness, with particular attention to the 18th-century revolution.
See also:
Boddice, Rob. A History of Feelings (London: Reaktion Books, 2019).
Greene, Jack. Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British
Colonies and the Formation of American Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1988).
McMahon, Darrin M. “Finding Joy in the History of Emotions.” In Susan Matt
and Peter Stearns (Eds.), Doing Emotions History (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 2013).
Slack, Paul. The Invention of Improvement: Information and Material Progress in
Seventeenth-Century England, 1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
Wootton, David. Power, Pleasure and Profit: Insatiable Appetites from Machiavelli to
Madison (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018).
On the ways Enlightenment ideas were popularized:
Darnton, Robert. The Business of Enlightenment Publishing History of the Encyclope-
die, 1775–1800 (S.l: Belknap Press, 1987).
On melancholy:
MacDonald, Michael. Mystical Bedlam: Madness, Anxiety, and Healing in S eventeenth-
Century England, 1st pbk. ed. (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]: Cambridge Uni-
Stearns, Carol Zisowitz. “‘Lord Help Me Walk Humbly’: Anger and Sadness in
England and America, 1570–1750.” In Peter N. Stearns and Carol Z. Stearns
(Eds.), Emotion and Social Change: Toward a New Psychohistory, 39–68. (New
York: Holmes & Meier, 1988).
Watkins, Owen C. The Puritan Experience: Studies in Spiritual Autobiography (New
York: Schocken Books, 1972).
On smiling, both before and after the big change:
Jones, Colin. The Smile Revolution: In Eighteenth Century Paris (Oxford: Oxford
See also:
Braddick, Michael J., Joanna Innes, and Paul Slack. Suffering and Happiness in En-
gland 1550–1850: Narratives and Representations: A Collection to Honour Paul Slack,
1st ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
Stearns, Peter N. Satisfaction Not Guaranteed Dilemmas of Progress in Modern Society
(New York: New York University Press, 2012).
Vincent-Buffault, Anne. The History of Tears: Sensibility and Sentimentality in France
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991).
On comfort:
Crowley, John E. The Invention of Comfort: Sensibilities and Design in Early Modern
Britain and Early America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2001).
DeJean, Joan. The Age of Comfort When Paris Discovered Casual—and the Modern
Home Began (New York: Bloomsbury USA, 2010).
On consumerism:
Roche, Daniel. A History of Everyday Things: The Birth of Consumption in France,
1600–1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Stearns, Peter N. Consumerism in World History: The Global Transformation of Desire,
2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2006).
On sexuality:
D’Emilio, John, and Estelle B. Freedman. Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in
America, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
Shorter, Edward. “Illegitimacy, Sexual Revolution, and Social Change in Mod-
ern Europe.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 2, no. 2 (October 1, 1971):
237–272.
On individualism:
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
Wahrman, Dror. The Making of the Modern Self Identity and Culture in
Eighteenth-Century England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
On changing attitudes toward death:
McManners, John. Death and the Enlightenment: Changing Attitudes to Death among
Christians and Unbelievers in Eighteenth-Century France (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1985).
Stearns, Peter N., ed., Routledge History of Death Since 1800 (London: Routledge,
2020).
See also:
Pape, Walter. “Happy Endings in a World of Misery: A Literary Convention
between Social Constraints and Utopia in Children’s and Adult Literature.”
Poetics Today 13, no. 1 (1992): 179–196.
Shackleton, Robert. “The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number: The His-
tory of Bentham’s Phrase.” In Theodore Besterman ed., Studies on Voltaire and
the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1972).
8 The Expansion of Happiness?
The New Expectations Encounter
Industrial Society
In 1904, a producer in the new movie industry, G.W. Bitzer, filmed a “Cake
Walk” dance at the popular New York beach, Coney Island. The film fea-
tured male-female pairs of dancers, smiling broadly and often m ugging
for the camera, improvising more and more elaborate dance routines,
while spectators cheered and often joined in. Americans were increasingly
expressing themselves through novel forms of leisure, creating what some
at the time and since have called a new “play ethic”. Were modern people,
at least in the West, finally learning how to have fun? Were they smil-
ing more often because they were happier than ever before? Or was the
situation, in historical perspective, more complicated?
The 19th century unquestionably saw the translation of many of the
basic guidelines of the happiness revolution into a variety of new practices,
some of them experimental but a number increasingly adopted among
many groups in the Western world. Somewhat ironically, happiness now
generated less explicit political interest than it had during the revolution-
ary decades of the 18th century, but the real action lay elsewhere. Some
new ideas about happiness emerged as well, but the emphasis really shifted
to various aspects of popular culture. The notion that people should be
able to find happiness and appear happy showed up in a number of new
expectations, practices, and behaviors.
The century also witnessed the industrial revolution, launched slightly
earlier in Britain but now really beginning to reshape society both in
Western Europe and the United States. This massive process challenged
happiness in many ways, but it also generated new needs and new expres-
sions. It is vital to remember that industrialization did not create modern
Western ideas about happiness: these were already part of the cultural
context. The 19th century formed the period in which the implications of
industrialization for happiness first played out; but this was also the point
at which specifically Western concepts of happiness helped shape the pop-
ular response.
The challenge was clear enough: in a situation where many groups were
predisposed to seek happiness and even to expect people around them to
be cheerful, how could these principles be translated into the emerging
forms of industrial society? And what new complications emerged? The
New Expectations Encounter Industrial Society 109
partial merger of the happiness imperative and Western industrial society
became clearer in the second half of the 19th century, as the industrial-
ization process outgrew its initial birth pains, but some important trends
emerged early on.
The Cultural Framework
Philosophy and Science

Happiness remained a vital theme in Western intellectual life during the
19th century. Enlightenment emphases persisted, with some new twists;
but alternative approaches developed as well – some of them supporting
the belief in happiness, others raising new perspectives. Several schools of
thought had direct impact on the actual experience of happiness but, over-
all, there was no systematic revolution to match what the Enlightenment
had already produced.
A progressive approach. A number of writers built directly on the 18th-
century legacy. Most liberal economists and political theorists continued
to argue that happiness was the chief human goal and that greater freedom
would steadily expand opportunities for its achievement. For John Stuart
Mill, for example, happiness was the “test of all rules of conduct” and the
true goal of life. Devoted to liberty, Mill granted that in principle people
should have the right to make unhappy choices, so long as these did not
unfairly impinge on others, but overall he confirmed the Enlightenment
approach. Most liberals remained optimistic that prospects for happiness
were improving, thanks to industrial progress and political reform; in-
deed, what now seems a rather simplistic view of history developed, rather
in the spirit of Condorcet, that saw contemporary society as the pinnacle
of human happiness to date, with even better things to come.
Liberal nationalists added the importance of the nation-state to the lib-
eral vision. Particularly in Italy and Germany advocates promoted the idea
that achieving national unity (with a constitutional and parliamentary po-
litical order to follow) would provide a vital spur to progress. The individ-
ual would be enhanced by belonging to a common national community.
To be sure, leaders like Giuseppe Mazzini worried that the notion of hap-
piness, itself, placed too much emphasis on the individual, and urged the
importance of duty; this was a tension that would become more important
later, under more conservative versions of nationalism.
Though bitterly opposed to liberal economics, Karl Marx and his fol-
lowers also built on Enlightenment ideas. Marxists condemned the cap-
italist system around them, which was clearly making most people more
and more unhappy, indeed alienating them from society. Only revolution
could correct this misery. But revolution would come, and Marx massively
spurred the kind of hope for a happier future that popular protest move-
ments had already begun to generate. Once the capitalist order had been
overturned and the proletariat was victorious, true happiness on earth
would at last be possible. As Friedrich Engels put it, “there exist certain
irrefutable basic principles which being the result of the whole of historical
development, require no proof ”: these were that “every individual strives
to be happy” and that the “happiness of the individual is inseparable from
the happiness of all.” The Marxist vision would in fact provide comfort
to many participants in the rising labor movement and would help shape a
major approach to happiness in the 20th century.
A Romantic approach. Early in the 19th century, a growing Romantic
movement drew a wide array of thinkers and artists on both sides of the
Atlantic, with some offshoots that continued even after 1850. Romantics
contested the Enlightenment in many ways. Notably, they objected to the
undue insistence on reason, seeking more passion and wild beauty than
the 18th century had emphasized. In some cases this led to direct disputes
with the emphasis on happiness itself. Romantic intellectuals might be at-
tracted to more traditional Christianity. They might savor darker visions,
and even delight in scenes of melancholy and sadness. From this strand of
Romanticism came the earliest version of the suffering artist, misunder-
stood by his time but resolute in his unhappy condition.
This was not however the only Romantic approach. Romantics also
talked about joy (more commonly than happiness). Thus the English poet
Percy Shelley: “All art is dedicated to joy, and there is no higher or more
serious undertaking than to make men happy.” From this Romantic im-
pulse would come a wealth of poetry and fiction, along with visual arts,
often highlighting scenes of nature or the charming simplicity of peasant
life, that were expressly designed to bring pleasure to their viewers. It was
from this same impulse, and a poem by the writer Friedrich Schiller, that
Ludwig van Beethoven would write the fourth movement of his ninth
symphony, the “Ode to Joy”, undoubtedly the most influential musical
tribute to happiness ever composed.
Impacts: utopianism and variety. In combination, the progressive and the
romantic impulses combined to generate other contributions to happiness
in the 19th century.
The first was a fascinating series of efforts to create special communities
where social organization would introduce maximum happiness here and
now. Utopians criticized the industrial world taking shape around them,
but they believed that alternatives were possible, without revolution, that
would solve all the problems of greed and inequality. Largely conceived
in Europe, actual utopian experiments spread particularly on the more
abundant land available in the United States.
Charles Fourier, for example, envisaged a community in which differ-
ent kinds of work would be freely contributed, with the results equally
distributed among members. “Universal happiness and gaiety will reign. A
unity of interest and views will arise, crime and violence will disappear…
Elegance and luxury will be had by everyone.” Some utopian communities
also sought to maximize sexual pleasure. And, while all the communities
ultimately failed, some of the aspirations involved might provide hope
even to people unable to participate in such dramatic experiments.
More important in the long run was the extent to which Enlightenment
and Romantic legacies might combine in producing greater diversity in
the novels and works of art and music available to growing audiences.
Greater, though still incomplete, freedom of the press plus improvements
in printing technology and literacy supported a wider range of opportuni-
ties than had been available in the 18th century. For several decades, large
numbers of people were attracted to public lectures, often in the progres-
sive spirit. Romantic writers contributed a host of novels and short stories,
some highlighting sorrow, others (like Young Frankenstein) indulging in
fear and horror, still others featuring fulfillments of young love. On the
whole, the most popular work tended to offer happy endings – the bud-
ding writer Louisa May Alcott was told by her publisher that her stories
must have an upbeat ending in which the principal couple successfully
marries – but the variety itself was impressive. Accommodation to differ-
ent tastes – including, now, those who took pleasure in being artificially
frightened – was not an unprecedented cultural feature, but it unquestion-
ably extended in the 19th century.
Science and doubt. A third general intellectual current took shape par-
ticularly after 1850, and without displacing progressive or neo-romantic
themes it raised some new doubts about happiness. Charles Darwin,
though himself a happy man convinced on the whole that people in gen-
eral could seek happiness, famously linked humankind with the animal
world in his groundbreaking Origin of Species in 1859. Darwin noted that
many animals displayed an interest in pleasure, but his findings might cast
doubt on any special or higher human quality to happiness. Most human
emotion, after all, could now be linked to analogues in the animal world,
and happiness was no different.
A few decades later Sigmund Freud raised another set of complications
from the standpoint of psychiatry. Much human action is determined by
an unconscious, and while the unconscious might seek pleasure it was
also burdened by a host of fears and repressions that could severely com-
promise mental health, not to mention happiness. Freud hardly denied
the possibility of happiness, but he unquestionably made it seem more
complicated, more likely to encounter frustration or be undermined by
darker impulses.
Partly because of the new scientific emphases, partly because of a cer-
tain Romantic legacy, a segment of European high culture at the end of
the 19th century became fashionably pessimistic. The fin de siècle mood
highlighted a sense of cynicism and decadence, a feeling that bourgeois
civilization was drowning in materialism, that a crisis was imminent. For
some – for example, those who turned to militarism or virulent anti-
Semitism – happiness, either now or in future, was almost irrelevant.
These were, on the whole, still minor themes, and even the more com-
plex findings of the biologists and psychologists did not necessarily have
much impact on popular views of happiness. It was revealing that the
many newspaper commentaries that looked back on the recent past and
anticipated the future, as a new century came into view in 1900, strongly
emphasized the positive. This had been a great century, full of progress
from the abolition of slavery to the advent of universal education, and the
new century would be even brighter, with even greater possibilities for
human happiness. Still, it is probably fair to say that the intellectual cli-
mate around happiness had become somewhat more complicated.
Popular Culture: Signs of Good Cheer

Dominant popular ideas about happiness built more clearly on the themes
of the 18th century than was true for the world of intellectuals and artists,
though there was important overlap. Before turning to the principal in-
teractions between expectations and advancing industrialization – which
is where the main 19th-century history of happiness centers – we can
consider a few leading cases of continuity and enhancement.
The interest in cheerfulness continued to mount. Early in the nine-
teenth century, childrearing manuals in the United States began to em-
phasize the importance of “cheerful obedience” in children. Obedience
was an old interest, but the notion that it should be accompanied by cheer-
fulness was a really new (and potentially demanding) idea. The theme
would persist into the 1860s, when obedience began to drop away in favor
of cheerfulness all by itself. During the mid-century decade, the word
sulky was particularly directed at children who failed to follow through
on the new emotional requirement.
Early self-help manuals, while paying primary attention to the impor-
tance of frugality and hard work, sometimes noted how important it was to
be cheerful on the job. Thus the British guru Samuel Smiles p roclaimed –
his name was purely coincidental – “Cheerfulness is also an excellent
wearing quality. It has been called the bright weather of the heart.”
Southern planters began to emphasize the importance of cheerfulness
among their slaves, highlighting instances of singing and dancing and
claiming frequent smiling. This was a claim that had not figured in slave
descriptions in the previous century. A new ulterior motive was unques-
tionably in play: the myth of the happy slave was concocted in part to
counter the rising abolitionist sentiment. But the idea that a good planter
patriarch had happy slaves around him as testimony to his beneficent rule
may have comforted Southern whites themselves. It fit in with the in-
creasing hope for a cheerful social environment, as well as allaying fears
of revolt.
Cheerfulness began to feature in etiquette manuals. Thus Walter
Houghton, a popular later 19th century expert in the United States, while
stressing the importance of avoiding boisterous laughter or the horrible
habit of making puns, urged a positive approach in conversations with
others. “No one has a right to go into society unless he can be animating
as well as animated. Society demands cheerfulness – and it is the duty of
everyone to help make it and sustain it.”
Records of smiling in the 19th century are complicated by the fact that
the growing popularity of photography involved a time-lapse technology
that made sustaining a smile very difficult; 1900 was a turning point here.
But continued innovations in the English language suggests the mounting
effort to enforce the appearance of good cheer. Thus, along with sulky,
cranky came into use. Originally derived from German to describe peo-
ple who were sick, the meaning shifted around 1800 to mean “crabby
and irritable”. Crabby itself was an additional label, increasingly common.
Grumpy was yet another term that grew steadily in usage from the very
late 18th century.
Then in the 1890s, apparently first among college fraternities in the
United States, the words “grouch” and “grouchy” took on their modern
meaning, again denoting someone who was not meeting the current social
standard. For a time, to “have a grouch on” was a common slang expres-
sion. A story in 1902 amplified the meaning.
The Grouch, on the other Hand, gave a correct imitation of a Bear

with a Sore Toe. He carried a Facial Expression that frightened little
Children in Street Cars and took all the Starch out of sentimental
young ladies. He seemed perpetually to carry the Hoof-Marks of a
terrible nightmare.
The barrage of new or redefined terms was unprecedented, constituting

a revealing campaign to encourage adherence to the new norm and to
reproach nonconformists. Had it not been increasingly important to cajole
people into cheerfulness or to make them feel bad when they did not mea-
sure up, such novel words would have been unnecessary.
The 19th century was also the seat, chronologically, of the idea of a merry
Christmas, with appropriate family ceremonies attached. The first known
use of the term (from a British navy admiral, wishing well to his crew), oc-
curred in 1699, which was also the date of the carol, “We wish you a Merry
Christmas”. But it was in the 19th century that the term came into its own,
again translating the “happiness revolution” into compelling ritual.
The idea of celebrating Christmas was not new. This had long been
a festival that gave rise to feasting and, often, a good bit of rowdiness,
including efforts by poor people to intimidate wealthier passers-by into
small gifts. The idea of happiness was not explicitly attached. Indeed, the
rowdy quality so often got out of hand that Puritan authorities, both in
England and what became the United States, banned the practice. Though
it was restored fairly quickly as a holiday in Britain, it long remained rather
disreputable. In parts of Western Europe as well, Christmas was also as-
sociated with fright, with St. Nicholas or a companion striking fear par-
ticularly among children, or administering punishment for bad behavior.
It was only in the 1820s that an effort to revive a more sedate and posi-
tive Christmas began to take shape, with an indelible association with the
idea of happiness. A story by the American writer Washington Irving, in
1822, highlighted the kind of cheerful celebration that he had experienced
among Anglicans in Britain. Also in that year, Clement Moore wrote the
famous poem that came to be called The Night Before Christmas, with its
rich evocation of children’s excitement, a resolutely jolly Santa Claus, and
family gift-giving.
In Britain itself the crucial turning point came in 1843 with Charles
Dickens’ story, the Christmas Carol. It was this story that really began to
popularize the phrase: “Merry Christmas”, and to enhance the associa-
tion with family pleasure, feasting, and a charitable spirit. The story also
provided yet another term, “Scrooge”, to characterize people who were
not measuring up to the requisite happiness and generosity. It was also in
1843 that the first Christmas card was made available commercially, again
spreading the notion that this was a vital time for happiness.
Actual celebrations expanded accordingly. In 1856 the American poet
Longfellow commented, “The old puritan feeling prevents it from be-
ing a cheerful, hearty holiday, though every year makes it more so.” By
1860 many American states had made Christmas a legal holiday, and on
both sides of the Atlantic the German custom of setting up Christmas
trees became a standard part of the celebration. Gift-giving to family and
friends became steadily more elaborate. Here was a crucial illustration of
the steadily increasing commitment to happiness – though it would also
pose a challenge to non-Christian minorities in Western society.
Divisions of Industrial Life

Clear extensions of 18th-century ideas about happiness and cheer also be-
gan to combine with the sweeping effects of industrialization. Happiness
began to connect, or at least to be recommended, for a number of the basic
categories of industrial existence.
For growing numbers of people, the rhythm of ordinary life began to
change. Preindustrial society had been marked by the intermixture of
family, work, and relaxation time, spiced by the periodic festivals. A nor-
mal day involved alternations between labor and breaks, including chat-
ting and napping, all in a family context.
Industrial life was different, though this became fully clear only in the
later 19th century. Family and work were increasingly separated. Then,
as hours of work shortened, normal days were divided between time on
the job and a period (in addition to sleep) set aside for leisure and family.
Increasingly, the weekend was also expanded. Experiments with granting
Saturday, or part of Saturday, off began in Britain in the 1840s; the first
English-language reference to the “weekend” occurred in 1879, and soon
workers in countries like France also began demanding what they called
the “English week”. Here was another earmarked time for family and lei-
sure, plus any religious activity.
These new time divisions also described the categories in which specific
ideas of happiness and cheer began to be applied to the normal pattern of
industrial life. For many, family time was partially redefined in terms of
emotional satisfaction; the leisure component of happiness expanded no-
ticeably; the work category raised several vital issues. For people at least
partially predisposed to an expectation of happiness, accommodating to
the new rhythms of industrial life offered a mixture of opportunity and
challenge.
Happy Families
From a late 19th-century letter sent by an American to the woman he was
courting:
Dear Darling Sarah! How I love you, how happy I have been! You are
the joy of my life…. I cannot tell you how much happiness you give
me, nor how constantly it is in all my thoughts….My darling, how I
long for the time when I shall see you.
In many Western countries, the 19th century was the heyday of the ro-
mantic letter, filled with the association of love and happiness.
The history of the family is a huge subject, and a challenging one. The
Western family changed frequently over time, but assessment must always
be combined with a recognition that some families, regardless of the time
period, must have experienced some standard emotions – including re-
current happiness and a hope for more. We have seen that Protestantism
may have helped enhance the positive emotional experience of family life
in key parts of the Western world. In point of fact, however, it was only
in the late 18th century that the words “happy” and “family” began to be
commonly associated. Applying the growing anticipation of happiness to
family life was a crucial development at a time when, regardless of emo-
tional content, the family was undergoing a daunting set of challenges.
This was one of the arenas where the happiness theme interacted most ur-
gently with the structural changes brought by mounting industrialization.
The big changes – and they would occur whether a new happiness
theme was involved or not – centered on the reduction of the traditional
economic functions of the family. For, with the industrial revolution, pro-
duction moved out of the home – a transition that often occurred literally
within a few decades. In many families, men became the chief “breadwin-
ners”; women worked only until marriage, if at all, and at most informally
thereafter. Soon, children also lost their economic importance in many
cases. More complicated production equipment reduced the tasks that
younger children could perform, at least within a few decades, while new
expectations of schooling drew many children away as well. Increasingly,
children became an expense, rather than an asset, and not surprisingly the
birth rate began to drop.
These changes were compounded by other challenges, some of which
had emerged already in the 18th century. Most obviously, arranged mar-
riages declined as parental authority diminished. When young people
moved to the city – and rapid urbanization was a vital component of early
industrialization – parental control was directly reduced.
Of course family functions remained. Even as it declined as a production
unit, families could help adults cope with the difficult combination of work
and the other necessities of life: preparing food, maintaining some kind of
home, and caring for the children even with their reduced numbers.
But families were also being sought for emotional support, and this was
where the expanding notions of love and happiness came in. Increasingly,
many observers, and many family members themselves, argued that amid
the confusing changes of an industrial, urban society, the family provided
vital refuge – as one put it, a “haven in the heartless world.” A happy,
peaceful family would be able to raise children properly and would offer
adults themselves tranquility and satisfaction.
The family itself would presumably be launched by a romantic court-
ship, free from direct parental interference but not usually in conflict with
parental wishes. Through courtship, a couple would develop the kind of
love that would offer true happiness – the kind of love suggested in the
many letters courting couples actually exchanged.
Short of classic courtship, many single adults began to advertise for a
suitable mate in the local newspaper – a sign that traditional family arrange-
ments were often no longer possible. This recourse began first in London,
in the 1790s, but would spread widely on the continent and in the United
States, and later beyond. This want-ad section expanded steadily. Some ads
stressed a desire for financial security, but a growing number simply sought
an emotionally fulfilling partnership, the basis for a happy marriage. Thus
one ad expressed the hope of finding someone “with brains and heart (the
latter especially)”, while another, from a woman, wanted “love and affec-
tion”. Men often claimed that they had found success in other aspects of
life, but needed the loving partner to complete real happiness.
The image of the happy family, described in many advice books and
magazine articles through the century, would of course be completed with
children, who would be loved and loving in turn (and presumably cheer-
ful), plus, increasingly, the novelty of a family pet. When the happy family
could gather around the piano – another consumer innovation of the 19th
century, but widely adopted in the middle class and beyond – the picture
might seem complete (Figure 8.1).
0.0000450%
0.0000400%
0.0000350% Happy
Family
0.0000300%
0.0000250%
0.0000200%
0.0000150%
0.0000100%
0.0000050%
0.0000000%
1700 1720 1740 1760 1780 1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Figure 8.1 F
requency of the phrase “happy family” in English, 1700–2008,
Google Ngram Viewer, accessed May 27th, 2020.
This was powerful stuff, promoted by a variety of print materials and,

insofar as can be judged, truly sought by many people in their own right.
Without claiming that the fact of a happy family was brand new, there is
little question that it was more explicitly noted, and more widely sought
as a goal in itself, than ever before in Western society. The term “happy-
family” emerged powerfully, and for the first time, in published material
in English right at the end of the 18th century, and then crested periodi-
cally in the decades that followed.
The combination raised two questions: the obvious one – of how many
people actually sought, much less found, this emotional experience in
family life, will be discussed at the end of this chapter. For now, we can
simply note that the same value system that touted the happy, loving fam-
ily also gave rise to a mounting divorce rate; for if a family was not happy,
could a partner not freely seek to pursue happiness some other way?
The second question is more subtle, but it has been much discussed:
was this particular combination, either in principle or in fact, aimed at the
happiness of both husband and wife, or slanted disproportionately toward
the former?
The issue of gender and happiness has come up before – back with
Aristotle, for example, or with some of the sources of pleasure available
in premodern cities – and it is an important one. The notion of a loving
courtship implied that emotional satisfaction of both partners was in-
volved, and letters and diaries suggest this was often the case. Women as
well as men could find happiness as they fell in love. In practice, however,
and particularly in industrial settings where men alone were bringing
down a wage, the relationship could turn markedly unequal, with men
calling the shots without much attention to the impact on a wife’s happi-
ness. Further, even in the imagery, women were seen as disproportion-
ately responsible for the family’s emotional well-being, called upon to
maintain a happy disposition for husband and children alike. Male virtues
and male work should be matched by the particularly affectionate quali-
ties of good women.
There is no reason to be too cynical about gender disparities. Wives
and mothers did have more latitude in the home than ever before, and the
responsibility for promoting happiness might truly be compatible with
happiness itself. But there could be some new tension.
The Happy Child

Children were a vital part of the happy family model, a component that may
have first been expressed in the idea that they should be expected to con-
tribute cheerfulness in response to loving parenting. But the idea gradually
emerged that they should be happy themselves. Google Ngrams suggest
that the combination “happy childhood” was rarely used in E nglish-
language writings before 1830, but once introduced its relative frequency
rose quite rapidly.
For the idea of the happy child was a major innovation, one of the really
important extensions of the growing interest in happiness in general. We
have seen that traditionally, children and happiness were not normally
associated. They might have been happy, in fact; their opportunities for
play were truly important. But they were not expected to be happy, nor
was there any overall parental obligation in that regard. Childhood was
too precarious, the duties of work too pressing for childhood to seem a
particularly happy stage of life. This was why, in memoirs, childhood had
almost never been recalled with much pleasure.
This now began to change. Raising happy children was not simply
part of the new family imagery, but an increasingly explicit goal in itself.
Parents began to seek active ways to make their offspring happy. This
was the principal reason, for example, behind the emergence of news-
paper comic strips, which began, revealingly, to be called “funnies” in
the later 19th century. Pioneering work here was done in Germany and
Switzerland, but the genre flourished particularly in the United States.
By 1905, American papers were regularly offering the Sunday funnies, a
section that was long shared by parents and children alike as a source of
mutual amusement.
Nothing indicated the shift toward cherishing the happy child more
than the rise of the birthday party – a genuine 19th-century innovation on
both sides of the Atlantic. Before this time, birthday celebrations had been
limited to upper-class adults. Rulers had publicly proclaimed birthdays,
going back to the Egyptian pharaohs; here was a chance to evoke the adu-
lation of faithful subjects. Christmas, of course, highlighted a birthday, but
this also was a special case. Aristocratic adult males may have celebrated
birthdays in the Roman period, and they began to do so again in Western
Europe in the 18th century. But ordinary people, no; and children of any
class, not at all.
The first child’s birthday party in North America involved the daughter
of a wealthy family in Boston, in 1772. It provided a chance for the fam-
ily to display its wealth, and teach the child the importance of gratitude.
Gradually, in the first half of the 19th century, the practice spread – aided
by new equipment that allowed commercial bakers to concoct and sell
fancier cakes – and it became more clearly associated with honoring the
child and creating a happy occasion. Various books and articles began to
discuss the birthday and what its purposes were; women’s magazines made
this a regular feature during the second half of the century. One of the
great institutions intended to symbolize the modern importance of hap-
piness was being born. By mid-century, popular birthday books began to
guide people in what to do.
Parties were still, by standards today, fairly low-key. Family and a few
friends; cake and often fruit (which was a more infrequent treat a century
and a half ago); modest gifts. Children were expected to be grateful, and
sometimes in the upper classes they gave some goodies to servants, as an
expression of charity. Religious overtones were common as well.
But the main focus was the child and its happiness, with a bit of con-
sumerism thrown in. An early birthday manual told children that properly
done, “your birthdays will be happy ones”. Another commented, “poor
little things, they need all the fun they can get.” Yet another more gran-
diosely suggested that a child’s birthday should be a “rejoicing jubilee” –
after all a full year was “a glorious thing”. An American authority put the
birthday in the larger context of the happy family, seeing it as the expres-
sion of “domestic felicity”.
The expanding practice did prompt a bit of revealing criticism from
social conservatives. Some already worried about consumer excess: the
term “selfish indulgence” was bandied about. Others argued that chil-
dren should be giving thanks to parents and to God, rather than getting
so much attention themselves. But the greatest concern – reflecting the
way children themselves were connecting to happiness – was the fact that
children were increasingly expecting birthday parties and gifts as a matter
of course, giving them an inappropriate hold over their parents; “the pres-
ents were regarded (by both children and their parents) as the discharge
of a debt.”
But the birthday, and the explicit association with a child’s happiness
and expectations, was irrepressible. More and more groups participated,
so that by 1900 it was clearly a commonplace. To be sure, another 26 years
would pass before the classic hymn “happy birthday” would see the light
of day, confirming and spreading the emotional standard still further; but
in fact it was already a done deal. Attention now shifted to providing
birthday celebrations for adults themselves.
To be sure, children in birthday-honoring families were not always
happy; the celebrations themselves could misfire. But the idea that children
should be happy; that parents had responsibility for this; that childhood
should be looked back upon as a happy time; and that finally, an unhappy
childhood was something to deplore – these major changes were well es-
tablished by 1900, and would only develop further thereafter.
Along with merry Christmases, happy birthdays represented an unprec-
edented effort to institutionalize happiness in Western society, both occa-
sions representing ways that 19th-century families strove to translate the
earlier happiness revolution into an annual cycle.
Work
In contrast to the changing family ideals, the relationship between work
and happiness during the 19th century was far more problematic. The sub-
ject was front and center: work was the scene of dramatic changes during
the industrial revolution. And there was unquestionably an impulse to ap-
ply the happiness formula to this experience as well. But the connections
were more difficult; a number of unpleasant realities intruded. Indeed, the
idea that work and happiness might be rather separate subjects– expressed
today in the otherwise odd formula that urges attention to “work/life
balance”, as if work was not a part of life –began to emerge at this point, if
only implicitly. After all, one of the reasons to emphasize the importance
of happy families was a recognition that other aspects of modern life might
be rather grim. At the least, the happiness/work equation was a compli-
cated one in the industrial context.
Work had long maintained a rather uncomfortable position in visions
of happiness, as earlier chapters have discussed. The industrial revolution
added to the burdens in many ways, though because the types of work
available expanded considerably, generalizations are difficult. Certainly,
the kinds of satisfactions enjoyed by artisans in preindustrial economies
were progressively stripped away; they even lost ground in the craft areas
that survived. Skill levels were reduced in the interest of faster, more uni-
form production. Autonomy on the job decreased: more and more people
worked, lifelong, under the supervision of others. Early in the industrial
revolution, many workers made their displeasure quite clear, by frequent
labor protests and, often, returning to rural jobs whenever conditions
permitted. Most dramatic were Luddite efforts to destroy industrial ma-
chinery directly, in hopes of returning to an idealized artisanal economy.
None of these efforts really succeeded, though they may have given some
participants a bit of release, but they vividly indicated new tensions over
what work was all about – and the great gulf between many daily routines
and happiness.
In the long run, even when workers became more accustomed to novel
settings like the factory, several liabilities persisted. It was difficult to
maintain any sense of personal control, when foremen or other supervi-
sors monitored the shop floor and rigid rules sought to make routines as
uniform as possible. Many workers had little sense of their final product,
working as they did on only one segment of the manufacturing process;
critics like Karl Marx correctly indicated how this could generate deep
alienation. Most challenging was the sheer pace of work, which intensi-
fied steadily with each new generation of machinery. By the end of the
19th century many workers were complaining of nervous exhaustion,
and a series of new terms – from what was called neurasthenia to, later,
nervous breakdowns or stress, translated this pressure into diagnosable
disorders.
All this could increase the distance between modern work and hap-
piness. It was revealing that in the 19th century, no rich literature on
workplace happiness emerged – in marked contrast to the attention lav-
ished on the family. This would change later on, but for now the void was
noticeable.
Most telling was the absence of explicit reference to happiness in
the most widely publicized discussions of the importance and function
of work. Beginning in the later 18th century and reaching full flower
around 1850, a number of authorities laid out what can be called a new,
m iddle-class work ethic, and their views were shared by many actual
employers. Here was the formula: hard work was the anchor of success.
Putting in long hours, avoiding distractions, learning how to work rap-
idly and efficiently – these were the keys to a good life. People who did
not succeed, including the poor, had only themselves to blame, for they
clearly did not work hard enough. This was a powerful formula, preached
in all the industrializing countries by people like Ben Franklin, Sam-
uel Smiles, or Horatio Alger. What was missing – aside from occasional
recommendations about cheerfulness, from people like Smiles – was any
clear connection to happiness.
For their part, many workers, aware that this work ethic served the in-
terests of the business class, tried to pursue a different set of values, putting
in their time but also making it clear that they were reluctant to work too
hard, since the profits from their labor went to others. Many employers
complained that, thanks to chatting or wandering around the shop floor,
most workers contributed about 60% of the effort the owners claimed to
expect. The limitations of the work ethic were real, but the alternative –
working a bit more slowly – did not really feature happiness any more
clearly.
In many ways, industrialization simply deepened the old belief that
work and happiness did not mix, that whatever happiness might be avail-
able in life must be found off the job.
Many workers, of various sorts, did truly feel trapped, and profoundly
alienated. A German coal miner named Max Lotz, at the end of the cen-
tury, wrote of his hatred of his job, the extent to which it exhausted him
mentally and physically, leaving him even unable to sleep properly. While
his anguish was unusually articulate, many workers surely shared it to
some extent.
The picture of alienation, however, needs to be modified in several
ways, complicating any overall judgment of work and happiness in this
phase of the industrial revolution.
1 People varied in their responses to situations, and many struggled hard

to find some meaning in what they did. And jobs differed. Locomo-
tive engineers, by the middle of the century, often commented on
the pride they felt in driving their mechanical monsters through the
countryside. Puddlers, a new and dangerous occupation in the grow-
ing steel industry, took pleasure in their skill.
2 Members of the middle class, working in business or the growing
modern professions, might buy into the work ethic quite directly,
finding that devotion to the job really did bring a kind of happi-
ness even though they rarely used the word explicitly. Factory owners
struggling for success, doctors enjoying the growing prestige and ex-
panding knowledge available in medicine, could easily become ob-
sessed with their jobs, even finding it difficult to enjoy time off. They
would have been hard-pressed to come up with a different definition
of happiness.
Another tricky category took shape toward the end of the 19th cen-
tury, in the growing array of white-collar workers – a “lower middle
class” – that served as secretaries, department store clerks, primary
school teachers. Many of these people did not have intrinsically inter-
esting jobs, but they often absorbed the middle-class work ethic and
found satisfaction in toeing the line – proud, among other things, that
they were clearly superior to blue-collar factory hands.
3 Many members of the middle and lower middle classes, and in their
own way many workers, came up with a newer means of connecting
work and happiness: they modified much hope of deeply enjoying the
job itself but valued it for the support it provided for life off the job.
Segments of the working class came up with this option most ex-
plicitly, beginning around the middle of the century. British printers
in the 1850s began bargaining with their employers around the fol-
lowing formula: they would accept new machinery, higher speeds,
less rewarding conditions in the job in return for higher wages that
they could enjoy off the job. Work became, not a source, but an instru-
ment of happiness. Happiness, in turn, would be found in the pleasure
one could take in providing for the family (connecting to the happy
imagery around family life, and the real pride and love that success-
ful breadwinning could express). And it might be found, as well, in
higher levels of consumerism. Many middle-class personnel, similarly,
particularly as business bureaucracies began to supplant individual en-
trepreneurship, developed a somewhat comparable calculation, find-
ing that somewhat disappointing work could be balanced by the other
aspects of life that salaries supported. Instrumentalism might connect
work and happiness at least indirectly, so long as real earnings were
increasing.
4 Finally, and even more directly connected to the work ethic, there
was the lure of social mobility, another notion that began to win ex-
plicit attention from the late 18th century onward. What if the job,
whatever its current limitations, served as the basis for rising higher
in society? Here was a potential link between happiness and a very
specific kind of hope, that could prove quite compelling.
Mobility was not new: from Confucian China to medieval Europe indi-
viduals had periodically managed to rise out of the peasantry thanks to ed-
ucation or initiative or some combination thereof. But mobility was never
officially valued or promoted by any preindustrial culture: it was far more
important to urge contentment with one’s current position in life. This
now began to change, and from Prussia to the United States school systems
and popular articles began to promote the idea of getting ahead. This sat
at the base of the new work ethic: hard work would propel one forward,
make one, in Benjamin Franklin’s terms, “healthy, wealthy and wise.”
Happiness, here, centered on how work would connect to the future.
Not everyone found this relevant or possible. The impulse to remain in
place, to do what one’s parents did, was still strong. But there is no ques-
tion that the mobility theme became a powerful one. Particularly in the
United States, in a culture that boasted about individualism and equality
of opportunity, what people at the time and since have called the “Amer-
ican Dream” rested strongly on the notion that a person, or a person’s
children, could rise in life, and that success through mobility was in turn
the essence of happiness. As a German immigrant put it around 1850: only
in the United States could “the talents, energy and perseverance of a per-
son” have full “opportunity to display” and, presumably, seal success and
happiness in the future.
Links between work and happiness remained elusive in the first cen-
tury of industrialization. At the same time, the thrust of the “happiness
revolution”, plus sheer human adaptability, made it impossible to abandon
happiness in work entirely. In the process, however, much of the connec-
tion depended on satisfactions off the job, or on fervent hope for mobility.
Leisure
Without question, the most dramatic innovations involving happiness in
the 19th-century Western society centered on innovations in consumer-
ism and leisure. They were not necessarily more important than the new
commitment to the happy family, and indeed the two facets often con-
nected. But they steadily changed the nature of life off the job, even the
structure of the day and week, and clearly sought to serve a growing taste
for happiness.
Challenges to leisure were considerable in the new industrial context.
In the first place, there were strong remnants of older suspicions about
having fun, inherited from religious conventions or upper-class snobbery
about popular tastes. Second, industrial work itself simply took up a great
deal of time, and while this began to be modified by somewhat shorter
hours – factory days of 12, even 10 instead of 14 – the process of change
was slow. Third, as we have seen, the kind of instrumentalism that arose
in the workplace assumed that life off the job should become steadily more
entertaining: that was the modern happiness bargain, but it assumed that
leisure opportunities would respond accordingly.
And finally, novel leisure forms emerged in the aftermath of a sub-
stantial destruction of the old festival tradition that had served as such
an important source of happiness, particularly for the masses of people,
in preindustrial life. As cities grew, festivals were hard to maintain amid
groups of relative strangers; they had depended on relatively stable com-
munities. New police forces were suspicious of festivals, because they were
so often rowdy and might, in urban contexts, lead to collective protest.
Industrial employers disliked festivals because they took too much time
away from work and often left workers lethargic and hungover for days
after the festival itself. Here was a powerful combination of factors, often
supplemented by more traditional religious disapproval, that gradually dis-
mantled the festival tradition, leaving only remnants or, with Christmas,
confining them to a largely familial context. For several decades in the
early 19th century, there is simply no question that popular leisure deteri-
orated, focusing largely on increased drinking and modest family outings.
Modern leisure, then, had to provide compensation for work and ei-
ther duplicate or replace the older values of the festivals. It is not clear
that the innovations entirely did the trick – that’s a judgment for later –
but there was no question about the effort involved, particularly as work
hours shortened somewhat and more people gained some resources be-
yond subsistence.
Three new or expanding outlets deserve attention: a second phase of
modern consumerism; the dramatic expansion of entertainment outlets;
and the striking ascent of modern spectator sports.
Consumerism. The notion of using things and the process of acquisition
itself to provide happiness had already accelerated as part of the revolu-
tion in happiness that took shape in the 18th century. Now, however,
the process visibly expanded. Beginning in the 1830s a new institution,
the department store, became the urban consumer mecca, offering un-
precedented arrays of goods, alluringly displayed, to tempt and beguile
shoppers. In the United States, mail order catalogs offered similar oppor-
tunities to anticipate and enjoy a variety of goods, even in the countryside.
The goods themselves became more elaborate and enticing, thanks to
factory production and rising imports. Middle-class homes filled with im-
ported “oriental” carpets and lamps. Urbanites enjoyed an increasingly
sensationalist mass press, bent on conveying excitement and variety even
more than news. In the final decades of the century, the bicycle provided
a vital innovation. Useful to get to work, it was also a trigger for periodic
escapes. Bicycle trips ushered in a new road network. Courting couples
could use bicycles to get farther away from adult supervision, while wom-
en’s clothing had to become looser, less cumbersome to accommodate the
new machines.
Arguably, consumer opportunities, including the new pleasures of shop-
ping, were expanding rapidly enough to satisfy the needs generated by the
pressures of work while often, as well, embellishing family life. Yet ques-
tions about the real contribution to happiness became more complicated
as well. Were people buying things that really made them happy, or were
they simply being dazzled by department store displays? More sophisti-
cated advertising added to the conundrum: the first professional agencies
emerged in the United States in the 1870s, while improved printing tech-
niques and vivid language made posters and magazine pages more entic-
ing. Gone were ads that mainly touted the value and quality of the item; in
was material that directly connected items to a notion of happiness. Thus
by 1900 silk stockings were being presented not in terms of practicality
and durability, but because they were “bewitching”, “alluring” – “to feel
young again, buy our silk.” At an extreme, a new problem with klepto-
mania, mainly by middle-class women in a frenzy to buy, suggested that
consumerism could express more compulsion than happiness.
Entertainment. More than ever before, people began to buy entertain-
ment, rather than relying on occasional offerings or festival occasions.
Correspondingly, the prestige of leading professional entertainers began to
rise steadily – a clear sign of their new importance. Actors were no longer
relegated to the lowest rungs of society.
For some, periodic opportunities to travel – for pleasure, not for reli-
gious purposes – formed part of the new entertainment package. Upper-
middle-class families increasingly took advantage of the railway network
to take a few weeks in the country during the summer – often with the
husband staying back at work and only joining on weekends. Networks of
resort hotels sprang up in mountain and seaside locations near major cities.
Thomas Cook’s travel company emerged in the 1840s in Britain to help
travel novices organize regional and, soon, continental European trips. By
the end of the century, working-class families were taking weekend train
trips to beaches and seaside resorts.
The rise of the amusement park was an American contribution to the
growing interest in pleasure and entertainment, as the label suggested. It
also built on the opportunities industrial technology presented to provide
new thrills, with Ferris wheels and other devices, and an abundance of
electric lighting. The park maintained some of the earlier entertainments
associated with commercial fairs and pleasure gardens in Europe, but now
added more regular opportunities for excitement – beginning with the
rides built for the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago. Traveling car-
nival shows began to embellish rural county fairs and other occasions even
outside the amusement parks themselves.
In the long run, however, nothing was more indicative of the new
“fun ethic” than the expansion of popular theater, both in Europe and
the United States, during the final decades of the 19th century. What was
called music hall in Britain, vaudeville in the United States drew grow-
ing audiences to mixtures of comedy, dance, and music. Electric lighting
allowed several shows a night (which meant that audiences now had to
keep track of time, another leisure innovation), while urban streetcars and
subways carried crowds from various parts of the city.
Most popular theater had working-class origins, but it increasingly
drew middle- and upper-class crowds eager to escape the moralism or
stiffness of some of the more fashionable entertainments such as lectures
or orchestral concerts. The blending was fascinating. For their part, en-
tertainers toned down the language and sexuality of the performances to
meet their new clientele halfway. By 1900, this kind of popular enter-
tainment, and the professionals involved, would begin to populate the
new movie industry – expanding opportunities even further. In addition
to new technical effects, movie theaters also developed a new culture of
silence: mass entertainment no longer was supposed to include incessant
conversation, though this conversion would take some time.
Clearly, for audiences drawn from several social classes, for men and
women alike, for various age groups though disproportionately younger
adults, the question of what to do to have fun was increasingly easy to an-
swer, and this undoubtedly contributed, as least periodically, to a sense of
excitement and happiness. To be sure, the experience was largely passive:
spectatorship was reaching new levels. On the plus side, the exposure to
skilled professionals, rather than a largely amateur diet, may have counted
for something.
Sports. The unprecedented rise of sports, both participant and specta-
tor, provided the final main component of industrial-style leisure, again
particularly during the second half of the 19th century, in all parts of
the Western world (and soon beyond). Many sports derived from older
games – the phenomenon was not new – but the range and involvement,
and the level of emotion involved, were unprecedented.
Interest in sports rose steadily from the 1840s onward. Soccer football
drew the greatest attention in Europe, baseball in the United States; but
boxing and horseracing were extremely popular. American college foot-
ball developed from the 1870s; the great Wimbledon tennis tournament
began in 1877; the modern Olympic games launched in 1896. Professional
teams in baseball and soccer football steadily grew in popularity. Sports
had long played a role in recreation, but there is no question that the kind
of interest they were drawing by the second half of the 19th century was
truly novel. The emergence of sportswriting reflected but also promoted
increasingly passionate interest. The first magazine dedicated to sports ap-
peared in England in 1792; regular newspaper columns emerged in the
1850s, aided by the ability to send news of distant games by telegraph.
While some debate continues over its derivation, the word “fan”, first
applied to baseball and horseracing enthusiasts in the United States, ap-
propriately captured the fanatic interest that many people now applied to
sports: playing them, watching them, and reading about them in the new
sports sections of the popular press.
A host of plausible explanations have been offered for the rise of mod-
ern sports. The fields on which some of them were played contrasted
with the overbuilt urban environment. They allowed adult spectators
to recall games they played as children. Their speed and precision –
particularly, as standardized rules and record-keeping were developed –
meshed with the industrial age. They helped create communities, but
also allowed people to vent anger, even hatred, of other groups. They
provided catharsis amid the increasingly regulated, sometimes boring
routines of modern life.
Sports also made people happy, which is why they must figure promi-
nently in any account of the 19th-century effort to merge the interest in
happiness with the new structures of industrial society. Actual participa-
tion, aside from physical benefits, contributed to more positive feelings
generally, sometimes enhanced by fellowship with teammates. Spectator-
ship could be a mixed bag; teams lost, and many fans reported the strain
they felt in the home stretch of a competition. But they also expressed
joy – “I’m the happiest guy in the world” was a common exaggeration –
when their teams came through. The steady expansion of interest in sports
testified to their emotional role.
Happiness and a New Emotional Context

It is not farfetched to argue that for many people at least, the interaction
of cultural expectations of happiness and the formation of industrial soci-
ety generated a new aspirational model for happiness in real life. Family
came high on the list, now not primarily in terms of economic stability
or procreation (indeed, the numbers of children now must be more care-
fully limited than ever before): the key was positive emotional interaction
among the family members. The new range of leisure activities was a
second pillar, providing unprecedented opportunities for fun. In between,
with some question marks attached, was successful work: essential for eco-
nomic survival, possibly providing some intrinsic satisfactions, but also
embellished by hopes for growing prosperity and advancement.
The formula created a new set of ties between happiness and several
other emotions. The linkage with romantic love was fundamental: never
before had this connection been so strongly emphasized. As we have seen,
many people found it hard to imagine happiness without a loving family.
Envy was reevaluated. Long held to be a sin, a variety of advice liter-
ature, even from some of the churches, now began to contend that envy
was a positive quality, because it motivated people to dress better and con-
sume more abundantly. Happiness should not be obscured by envy, for in
a consumer society a bit of envy was now a good thing, providing a spur
to happiness.
Most striking was a new preoccupation with boredom. The word itself
was new – suggested at the end of the 18th century but becoming com-
monplace only after 1850. The neologism was revealing: without a clear
word for the experience, it is possible that people previously had endured
periods of dullness more passively and patiently than seemed possible in
industrial society. For now, particularly with the rise of new leisure inter-
ests; happiness became increasingly associated with frequent rather than
recurrent entertainment. Injunctions of cheerfulness made it clear that
it was more important than ever not to be boring or to be forced to tol-
erate dullness in others. The “fun” aspect of happiness needed frequent
feeding – which ironically might make it easier, when expectations were
not met, to feel impatient and unhappy. The new emotional connections
for happiness could be demanding.
Complexities
The links between happiness and more specific targets in family, work,
and leisure life in the 19th century raise a number of issues. Differences
in social class and, to a degree, gender, present some important red flags.
Areas of repression, or attempted repression, inhibited the pursuit of plea-
sure, while death posed a greater burden than Enlightenment optimists
had anticipated. Finally, there was the obvious potential problem of disap-
pointment: new expectations were clear, but they could be frustrated. All
three of these categories must be considered in any assessment of happiness
in 19th-century life.
Class Divides
Evaluation of happiness is always complicated by huge social inequalities,
from the advent of agricultural society onward, and the problem persisted in
the industrial age. Middle and upper classes had opportunities workers lacked,
while the rural/urban divide became more important than ever before.
Gaps were particularly acute in the first half of the century. The qual-
ity of working-class life in early industrialization has been debated, but
it posed huge challenges for happiness. Harsh and unfamiliar working
conditions combined with new limitations on popular leisure and few
opportunities for consumer indulgence.
Even when conditions eased, workers continued to reflect a different
approach to happiness from their middle-class counterparts. Less likely to
indulge in romantic definitions of family life, instead they formed fam-
ilies that might help provide some assistance in finding jobs or offering
support during economic recessions. Work was less likely to be leavened,
or complicated, by hopes for mobility; workers might be more realis-
tic here than their white-collar counterparts. On the other hand, while
workers had fewer recreational opportunities than their middle-class or
white-collar counterparts, there was some convergence around a new lei-
sure ethic. Indeed, as we have seen, middle-class types often learned how
to loosen up by participating in popular entertainments. While sports
interests first surfaced among the upper classes, by 1900 they embraced
workers as well, as fans and, sometimes, aspiring professionals where they
notoriously played games more vigorously, with less restraint, than elite
amateurs.
Class divisions might involve more, however, than differential access
or distinctive ideas. In societies where ideas spread increasingly readily,
groups that were unable to attain the dominant happiness standards might
also feel a new resentment, one that might not be fully satisfied through
hopes for a better society at some future point.
Sex and Death

Even for the middle classes, an interest in happiness was complicated by
several common concerns. Criticism of popular rowdiness and irrespon-
sibility continued, in a class that valued respectability. Emphasis on fairly
formal manners, in social situations, did not necessarily run counter to
an interest in pleasure, but it imposed some rigidity. Massive debates oc-
curred over the subject of drinking, where popular habits seemed partic-
ularly suspect. Active temperance movements sought, with some success,
to limit access to this form of pleasure, at least by restricting drinking
hours in bars and pubs. (Late in the century, a new concern about opiates
emerged as well.) The middle classes were not uniformly abstemious, but
there was tension.
Sexuality, however, was the most obvious concern. Middle-class codes
insisted on the importance of preventing premarital sex, and even advised
against too much sexual ardor within marriage; respectable women, in
particular, were not supposed to have much sexual desire. More than re-
spectability was involved here: middle-class life depended on reducing
the birth rate and, absent reliable and available birth control devices, this
forced reliance on periods of abstention. Unusual efforts to repress mas-
turbation was one sign of the new anxiety about sex, and this too could
affect adult behavior. Only toward the end of the 19th century did this
prudish aspect of middle-class morality begin to relax a bit, most notably
permitting greater interest in sexual pleasure within marriage. But sexual
sticking points would continue to affect the “fun ethic” well into the
20th century.
Death was an acute challenge as well. The interest in happiness argued
for limiting the impact of death – this had already been clear during the
Enlightenment – but death rates remained fairly high until about 1880.
Several characteristic reactions reflected the tension. A growing move-
ment, on both sides of the Atlantic, sought to remove cemeteries from
city centers and to make them more park-like, to ease the encounter
with death. Later in the century, interest in embalming revived, as a
new breed of professionals vied to make dead bodies as life-like as possi-
ble, and the actual preparation of the body for burial shifted from home
to funeral parlor. There was an effort, in other words, to reduce the
interaction with death. But the 19th century also emphasized elaborate
expressions of grief and mourning; arguably, in a culture that normally
valued good cheer, death was now provoking even more sorrow than
before. Here, certainly, was a substantial complication in a search for
happiness.
Great Expectations
A final complexity in any evaluation of 19th-century happiness involves
recognition that several of the key adjustments to industrial life involved
aspiration and risk. This was least obvious in the vital leisure category: of
course, one or more of the new recreational outlets might prove disap-
pointing, but there was a growing range of choice to compensate. Rising
sports interests were perhaps the most vulnerable: passionate spectator at-
tachments were routinely disappointed when the team lost. The intensity
of fan involvement could make this a real emotional blow. On the other
hand, other aspects of the spectator experience could provide some recom-
pense, and teams did sometimes win. Research has shown that, happily,
people remember team victories more clearly than defeats.
Family aspirations were another matter. The happy family ideal was
real, but it was undoubtedly cherished more often in principle than real-
ized in fact. Many a loving couple began with every hope of maintaining
a happy relationship, only to encounter growing stress when, for example,
a man’s work interests began pulling him away or the woman’s responsi-
bility for bearing and raising children bogged her down; love and gender
inequality did not always mix well. At an extreme, the vulnerability of the
happy family showed in the rising divorce rate; but even aside from this,
excessive aspiration often invited disappointment.
The same was definitely true for the role of hope in cushioning the
experience of work. Mobility dreams were great, but they could easily
be frustrated. Business failures dotted the 19th century, and they often
brought public disgrace; a new industry developed around keeping credit
scores, and many people were found wanting. Aside from failure, the rise
of big business thwarted many middle-class hopes to set up shop on one’s
own; even lawyers were increasingly forced into large, impersonal offices.
Americans, deeply wedded to beliefs in rags-to-riches stories, may have
been particularly vulnerable to the gap between hope and reality.
Finally, even the interest in cheerfulness might provoke unexpected
resistance. The need to invent the series of new terms for grumpiness
or grouchiness suggested that some people simply resisted the new stan-
dards. Christmas celebrations were splendid, but there were Scrooges
around. The attachment to symbols of happiness surely helped shame or
prompt people into some compliance, but here too there might be gaps
between aspiration and performance. The glum faces that stare out from
19th-century photographs reflected the state of technology, but perhaps
a bit more.
***
Unlike the 18th century, where the Enlightenment crafted the basic
framework for reconsidering happiness, the 19th century offered no overall
orchestration. Leading developments occurred at the level of popularizers –
like the people who wrote manuals for parents – and the various sponsors
of new kinds of entertainment. Specific social experiments were interest-
ing, like the utopian communities, but the real action centered on finding
ways to implement the interest in happiness and cheerfulness amid the
emerging patterns of industrial life.
Industrialization itself arguably created new opportunities for happi-
ness, by the end of the century, particularly through greater leisure time,
a wider range of consumer products and, though it had not yet fully reg-
istered, improving health conditions. Yet new challenges emerged as well,
in the workplace and the new social and gender divisions. Efforts to pro-
mote happiness and pressures to appear cheerful could create tensions of
their own – even for children. A key question – would industrial society
advance human happiness? – had yet to be answered.
Whatever doubts we may have in retrospect, there is no question about
the confidence felt in some quarters at the turn of the century. Greeting
the new century, the New York Times thundered, with an enthusiasm that
Condorcet would have recognized: “We may therefore say without fear of
dispute that men are freer at the end of the Nineteenth Century than at its
beginning. Are they for that reason happier? Demonstrably, and beyond
the possibility of doubt.” And again:
We renew the expression of our belief that the sum of human hap-
piness has been largely augmented in the last hundred years by the
transfer of the control over the destinies of nations from the hands of
Princes to the hands of the people.
And there was more to come, with further advances in medicine, “na-
tional wealth”, and knowledge.
Further Reading
On relevant ideas about happiness,
Quennell, Peter. The Pursuit of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge,
von Eckardt, Ursala. The Pursuit of Happiness in the Democratic Creed: An Analysis of
Political Ethics (New York: Praeger, 1959).
On utopianism,
Beecher, Jonathan. Charles Fourier: The Visionary and His World (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1986).
Taylor, Keith. The Political Ideas of the Utopian Socialists (London: Cass, 1982).
On Christmas and birthdays,
Baselice, Vyta, Dante Burrichter, and Peter Stearns. “Debating the Birthday:
Innovation and Resistance in Celebrating Children.” Journal of the History of
Childhood and Youth 12, no. 2 (April 1, 2019): 262–284.
Restad, Penne L. Christmas in America: A History (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
Waits, William Burnell. The Modern Christmas in America: A Cultural History of Gift
Giving (New York: New York University Press, 1993).
On the family and romantic love,
Coontz, Stephanie. Marriage, a History: How Love Conquered Marriage (New York:
Penguin Books, 2006).
Lystra, Karen. Searching the Heart: Women, Men, and Romantic Love in Nineteenth-
Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).
On pets,
Grier, Katherine C. Pets in America: A History (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2006).
On children,
Fass, Paula S. The End of American Childhood: A History of Parenting from Life on the
Frontier to the Managed Child (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
Mintz, Steven. Huck’s Raft: A History of American Childhood (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004).
Olsen, Stephanie. Juvenile Nation: Youth, Emotions and the Making of the Modern
British Citizen, 1880–1914 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).
On work,
Berlanstein, Lenard R. The Industrial Revolution and Work in Nineteenth-Century
Europe (London: Routledge, 1992).
Rodgers, Daniel T. The Work Ethic in Industrial America, 1850–1920, 2nd ed. (Chi-
cago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2014).
Stearns, Peter N. From Alienation to Addiction: Modern American Work in Global
Historical Perspective (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2008).
Thompson, E. P. (Edward Palmer). The Making of the English Working Class, 1st
Vintage ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1966).
On the new leisure,
Adams-Volpe, Judith. The American Amusement Park Industry: A History of Technol-
ogy and Thrills (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1991).
Bailey, Peter. Music Hall: The Business of Pleasure (Philadelphia, PA: Open Uni-
Gleason, William A. The Leisure Ethic: Work and Play in American Literature,
1840–1940 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
Jackson, Lee. Palaces of Pleasure: From Music Halls to the Seaside to Football, How the
Victorians Invented Mass Entertainment (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2019).
Levine, Lawrence W. Highbrow/lowbrow: The Emergence of Cultural Hierarchy in
America, 1st pbk. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
On the rise of sports,
Anderson, Nancy F. The Sporting Life: Victorian Sports and Games (Santa Barbara,
CA: Praeger, 2010).
Crego, Robert, and Gale Group. Sports and Games of the 18th and 19th Centuries
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2003).
Guttmann, Allen. Sports Spectators (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
Steen, Rob. Floodlights and Touchlines: A History of Spectator Sport (London:
Bloomsbury, 2014).
On envy and boredom,
Fernandez, Luke, and Susan J. Matt. Bored, Lonely, Angry, Stupid: Changing Feelings
about Technology, from the Telegraph to Twitter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
Matt, Susan J. Keeping up with the Joneses: Envy in American Consumer Society,
1890–1930 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003).
On various complexities,
D’Emilio, John, and Estelle B. Freedman. Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in
America, 3rd ed. (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2012).
Sandage, Scott A. Born Losers: A History of Failure in America (Cambridge, MA:
On death,
Farrell, James. Inventing the American Way of Death, 1830–1920 (Philadelphia, PA:
Temple University Press, 1980).
Stearns, Peter, ed., Routledge History of Death Since 1800 (London: Routledge, 2020).
On the issue of modern inequality and happiness,
Ahmed, Sara. The Promise of Happiness (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
2010).
9 Global Developments in
the 18th and 19th Centuries
No overarching or worldwide pattern of change emerged in attitudes and

experiences involving happiness during the centuries in which Western
standards were shifting so rapidly. The new Western ideas about happiness
did not yet exercise a clear global influence, nor – with a few exceptions –
did they even provoke any explicit reaction. Regional religious traditions,
or in parts of East Asia the Confucian legacy, had more to do with shaping
happiness than did any new cultural influence; continuity was more obvi-
ous than change. To be sure, a few religious innovations are worth noting,
such as the rise of the strict Wahabi or Salafi version of Islam in what is
now Saudi Arabia, which ushered in new restrictions on secular activities;
but the impact was long confined to that particular region.
Nevertheless, the increasing global reach of the West – through the
familiar combination of military conquest, imperialism, and economic
exploitation – surely had potential implications for happiness. During both
the 18th and 19th centuries, but particularly once industrialization took
hold in the West, the economic gap between the West and other parts
of the world expanded considerably. Western societies became richer,
though the results were not evenly distributed; but more to the point
other societies actually saw their living standards deteriorate. Growing
Western pressure to produce cheap foods and raw materials often drove
wages down; in some cases, rapid regional population growth contributed
to poverty as well. Further, the century also experienced serious cycles
of epidemic disease, particularly in a recurrent pattern of cholera out-
breaks. The combination of new problems and old introduced important
constraints on happiness in many regions, generating some deep popular
grievances.
Even as it deployed new economic and military power, the West made
no particular effort to export its revolutionary ideas about happiness. To
the extent that Western countries worked to extend a new cultural in-
fluence, sometimes with references to a “civilizing mission”, the targets
centered on certain local customs viewed as immoral or unproductive,
or in some cases on reforming educational systems, rather than any par-
ticular concepts of happiness. Somewhat ironically, given the challenges
to religion in the West itself, missionary activity guided much of the
Developments in the 18th and 19th Centuries 135
West’s wider outreach aside from outright imperialism and economic
pressure. None of this was irrelevant to happiness, but the relationship
was at best indirect.
Yet the combination of growing Western influence and regional polit-
ical and economic change could promote some novel debates about what
happiness was all about. The result never generated a fully Western model,
but there were some new combinations – most obviously, in Russia and
Japan and possibly in Latin America. Any world “happiness map”, as of
1900, would be unusually complicated.
The problem of evidence looms large in any assessment of global pat-
terns in the age of imperialism – partly because of the absence of any
systematic cultural change, partly because the subject of happiness has not
won a lot of research attention from historians of this period outside the
West. At a guess, if there was any large global trend it would center on a
deterioration of happiness, mainly because of economic and political de-
cline and Western interference. But even this is speculative, and may not
take adequate account of the new ideas that were also gaining ground or
the power of existing regional traditions.
This chapter will proceed in three sections. The first briefly sketches some
key developments in China and the Ottoman Empire, two of the large states
that avoided outright Western control; both suffered growing instability in
the 19th century that had some implications for happiness. The second sec-
tion centers on the relevant impact of Western imperialism, as it affected
some traditional outlets for pleasure and promoted religious change. Finally,
turning more specifically to the later 19th century, we will consider some
additional reactions, around the introduction of new forms of consumerism
and the rise of non-Western nationalism in several key societies.
The Chinese and Ottoman Empires

In China, established Confucian ideas about happiness were not systemati-
cally displaced. A host of relevant traditions largely persisted. For example,
emphasis on parentally arranged marriages, with betrothal gifts from the
groom’s family and a dowry from that of the bride, continued. These were
largely economic arrangements with little concern for emotional factors,
though of course it was assumed that a family was vital to happiness. The
double happiness symbol in Chinese calligraphy was attached to the wed-
ding ceremony; on the other hand, it was common for brides to display,
and often to feel, considerable sadness because they were being detached
from their parents. The implications were complex, but they were not
fundamentally novel in light of established traditions.
However, the 19th century brought numerous challenges to Chinese
society overall, and these could be highly relevant to happiness. Economic
dislocations mounted, partly because of growing Western interference
but also thanks to growing population pressure. British insistence on
importing opium led to widespread drug problems, and when the govern-
ment tried to resist it was forced to back down.
This mounting instability was the context for an extraordinary new
religious movement, which ultimately provoked an exceptionally bloody
civil war, that lasted from 1850 to 1864. What is often called the Taiping
rebellion was led by Hong Xiuquan, who translated some training under
an American Baptist missionary into a hybrid doctrine that, he claimed,
would purify China and establish a “heavenly kingdom” on earth – with
Hong himself as king. Private property was to be abolished, the sexes were
to be equal but largely kept separate, and a strict moral code was imposed.
Some of the rhetoric of the Taiping version of Christianity and its idea of
a heavenly mandate framed the importance of absolute obedience to the
movement in terms of happiness: “One portion of disobedience to heaven
will be met with one portion of weeping/And one portion of reverence
will be met by one portion of happiness.” The idea of happiness through
collective loyalty was a theme that would recur, in China and elsewhere,
even though the Taiping movement itself was ultimately brutally crushed.
It had picked up, though arguably distorted, some earlier Chinese values as
well as a version of Christian millenarianism, but it probably also reflected
the growing difficulty of finding happiness in the increasingly grim envi-
ronment of late-19th-century China.
Although the Ottoman Empire suffered some of the same challenges
as China in the 19th century, including growing Western interference
and political instability, some new references to happiness were less
idiosyncratic.
The big focus of the middle decades of the century rested with massive
reform efforts, the Tanzimat reforms, undertaken by the central govern-
ment. Most of these reforms were not explicitly directed at happiness –
again, happiness was at most a minor political or religious theme in many
regions during the 19th century. The reforms aimed at improving legal
structures, creating a more efficient state, attempting to spur industrial
growth. Reform-minded sultans were indeed interested in Western mod-
els. They began to import Western art and sponsor translations of Western
literature, and they were certainly eager to incorporate Western science.
However, the Western preoccupation with happiness did not figure ex-
plicitly on this cultural agenda.
Yet references did occasionally creep in, and even a limited association
of reform and happiness might have been something of a precedent for the
future. Thus, an article in 1862, touting the importance of expanding edu-
cation, offered a convoluted reference to happiness as part of the rationale:
The only way to glorify the state is to expand general education. Both
female and male students should attend schools. A woman that makes
her family happy should be decent in both secular and spiritual prac-
tices. Education of girls is the duty of their parents.
The argument that education of women was important mainly for family
improvement was a common one in the 19th century, even in the West,
but the notion that family happiness was a criterion was an interesting
extension of the argument in the late Ottoman period.
Other linkages between happiness and what might be regarded as mod-
ernization were more straightforward. Thus in 1904 – after the reform
period itself had ended in failure –an appeal for support for a railroad
development project in Hejaz province assumed an obvious connec-
tion: “Everyone should help in an initiative that will bring happiness to
300 million people.” Again, there is no basis for contending that standards
of happiness were shifting significantly in the Middle East at this point,
but the fact that the term was displayed in order to justify change was
something of an innovation.
Imperialism and Happiness

Imperialism and happiness are not commonly associated terms, and with
good reason. European imperialism arguably brought some benefits on
occasion: the initial, robust railway network in India, the efforts to end
formal slavery in Africa. But imperialism also brought new economic con-
trols aimed at benefiting the home country: thus, in India, the British
long sought to discourage manufacturing in favor of reliance on British
imports, while in many regions of Africa European agents pressed local
populations into low-wage labor in mines or on sugar plantations. Political
controls might be slightly more ambivalent, benefiting certain groups and
providing some new kinds of training; but always the top slots, and the
policymaking, were reserved for European officials.
Even the widely proclaimed notion of a European responsibility to
bring civilization to the barbarians was not usually framed in terms of
happiness, quite apart from its obviously demeaning vocabulary. The
“white man’s burden” emphasized promoting good order and improving
education, but also correcting moral deficiencies and, often, encouraging
missionary activity. Europeans might have claimed, if pressed, that all this
would improve happiness, but they did not make the connection directly.
And many subject people would have been unlikely to see happiness even
remotely involved, and historians of the colonial experience would largely
agree. Most African historians, for example, would argue that the Enlight-
enment ideal of a happy, self-determining individual had little influence
on their continent, in any formal sense.
Not surprisingly, when happiness did occasionally show up explicitly
in imperialist rhetoric, it seemed to apply to the conquerors, not the con-
quered. Thus an American apologist, Senator A.J. Beveridge, writing in
1900 on the heels of amid United States expansion in the Caribbean and
Pacific, pointed to his nation’s “divine mission” in bringing progress to
the “savage and senile” peoples of the world – a mission that “holds for us
all the profit, all the glory, all the happiness possible to man. We are the
trustees of the world’s progress, guardians of its righteous peace.”
Still, without pretending great detail for a subject that has not received
much explicit attention, a few connections between colonialism or impe-
rialism and happiness might be suggested – often toward addressing some
probable deteriorations depending somewhat on the group involved.
Latin America. Spanish and Portuguese colonization of Latin America
brought huge hardships beyond the experience of defeat in combat. Dis-
ease carried away over 80% of the population. Established rulers and upper
classes were shunted aside. New labor systems imposed harsh burdens on
many indigenous workers, for example on sugar estates or the Andean
silver mines. It is hard to imagine that unhappiness, and active awareness
of unhappiness, did not increase at least for a considerable period of time.
The slender direct evidence on the subject comes mainly from Catholic
clergy, eager to convert native populations to Christianity. The conver-
sion process itself was not always as harsh as might be imagined, as many
traditional beliefs and even some local leaders were able to blend their
views and activities with those of the Church. But the Catholic view-
point dominated commentary on emotion and, perhaps combined with
the native experience, tended to emphasize sadness and melancholy over
happiness.
In colonial Mexico, for example, faithful Catholics, focused on the joy
that might await them in heaven, found it natural to think of a life in this
world filled with sorrow. Undue despair was not acceptable, for it would call
God’s mercy into question; but excessive happiness was not normal either.
Images of a suffering Christ or a sorrowing, tearful Mary – a Mater dolorosa –
were widespread in the colonial Church. Images of the V irgin Mary with
flowing tears were common. Religious ceremonies and processionals high-
lighted grief as well. This emphasis might well have corresponded to the
many hardships of life during the colonial period. Many individuals, seek-
ing religious solace, reported strong feelings of melancholy.
Most direct evidence about emotional standards and experiences during
this period comes from European colonists, who had brought Catholicism
with them; we know less about indigenous people. But the colonists rou-
tinely described indigenous communities in terms of melancholy, and this
may have been an accurate reading, as conversion to Catholicism com-
bined with the real challenges of life under Spanish rule. Thus, one speech
to upper-class indigenous women stressed:
Oh, my daughter, in this world, it is a place of weeping, and afflic-

tions, and unhappiness… Listen carefully my child. The earth is not
a good place. It is not a place of joy. It is not a place of contentment.
Similar sentiments about sadness and tears, and the need for humility,
were conveyed to young men as well. The Virgin of Guadalupe, which
became the most famous Catholic symbol in Mexico, was represented as a
consoler for the miseries of this life: as a Nahua account put it in 1649, she
would “listen to their weeping and sorrows”.
By the 17th century, some European visitors contended that the emotional
tone of Mexican life had become measurably different from the standards
common in Europe itself, and the emphasis on sadness was the key point.
Glimpses of happiness do emerge. Religion itself was a source of conso-
lation that might at least lighten the load in anticipation of salvation later
on. One source also noted the rewards of reproduction, “with which we
multiply in this world. All of this gives us some contentment to life, so that
we do not suffer with continuous weeping and sorrow.” Ardent Catholics
also talked of the happiness that could come from the contemplation
of God. Indeed, some ordinary Mexicans were sometimes described as
“drunk on God”, as they experienced what was often profound joy from
mystical experiences in their relations with the divine.
More prosaically, the colonial experience also offered an array of amuse-
ments, which formed the most common sources of happiness outside of
religion itself. There is abundant evidence of Mexicans’ ardent pursuit
of pleasure, or what was often described as “delight”, through various
diversions. Some of the distractions were personal, as individuals, for ex-
ample, took pleasure in studying astrology. But many communities also
held celebrations, often combining a religious occasion with parades and
feasting. Carnivals and dances occasioned a great deal of laughter. Popular
culture managed to rescue a number of older traditions, including colorful
clothing, while also creating new styles that blended native, European and
often African elements. Sheer joy in sociability was part of this same pop-
ular tradition. Occasionally the Church would try to intervene against too
much earthly pleasure – there was a great deal of suspicion about excessive
local sexuality – but there was a good bit of de facto tolerance as well.
Officially, and possibly in real life, this experience of happiness was seen
as transitory, not a normal or steady condition. This is where sorrow pre-
dominated. But the popular experience may have provided real precedent
for expectations of happiness later in Latin American history.
What does not seem to have happened in the 18th century – the last
century of colonial rule – was the kind of happiness revolution that was
occurring in Western Europe and the Atlantic colonies at that point. En-
lightenment thinking did have some impact, but amid limited literacy and
restricted printing facilities its range remained narrow. There is some ev-
idence that the upper classes in Mexico (European in origin) were begin-
ning to think of excessive melancholy as a medical disorder that warranted
treatment, not a normal emotional state. But the full apparatus for a larger
redefinition of happiness was not present. Among other things, there were
no sweeping changes in consumerism or levels of material comfort. And
while the worst ravages of imported diseases had passed by this point,
health conditions remained precarious as well.
Another component would be added in the early 19th century, how-
ever. Leaders of the wars for independence, like Simon Bolivar, had been
thoroughly steeped in Enlightenment thought, including of course the
thinking that had gone into the United States’ Declaration of Indepen-
dence. Bolivar was particularly influenced by British utilitarianism, and
wrote and spoke frequently about the “greatest happiness of the greatest
number”. “The most perfect system of government is that which results in
the greatest possible measure of happiness and the maximum of social se-
curity and political stability.” He argued that Latin Americans were rising
on behalf of liberty and freedom “out of that universal human instinct to
aspire to the greatest possible happiness, which is found to follow in civil
societies founded on the principles of justice, liberty and equality.” An
ardent nationalist, he also spoke of the happiness associated with national
independence and “la patria”.
This kind of thinking would persist in 19th-century Latin American
history and beyond, providing a consistent liberal current that had much
in common with its counterparts elsewhere in the Atlantic world. But
this liberal strand encountered more opposition in Latin America than in
Western Europe or the United States, among other things from an en-
trenched Catholic Church that maintained its rather different ideas about
happiness. And, suffering still from severe economic disparities with the
industrial West, Latin America did not engender the standards of living as-
sociated with evolving Western ideas about happiness. The result is some-
thing of a conundrum: a genuine link with the happiness revolution, but
also a measurable distance.
One other 19th-century development warrants attention: a growing
interest in marital love, and the importance of this kind of bond for happi-
ness. Already in the colonial period, the notion of a “bad life”, or mala vida,
had been associated with domestic discord and, sometimes, outright do-
mestic violence. By the 19th century, this evolved into a fuller definition
of the role of a solid marriage in a happy life – along with the awareness
that bad marriages were still common, and damaging. The new aspirations
for marriage differed from the ideas about romantic love developing in
places like Britain and the United States: mutual respect and obligation,
rather than deep emotional fulfillment, seem to have been the goal. But
they did contribute to some sense that happiness might be a permanent
part of a good life, rather than an episodic experience amid common sor-
rows. Latin American ideas of happiness continued to evolve.
The result is something of a comparative challenge. Evolving Latin
American concepts of happiness seem to have been somewhat distinctive,
particularly when the pleasures available from popular celebrations are
added in. Linked to a larger Western pattern to some extent, they devel-
oped in a different context – including less emphasis on individualism –
and featured different emphases. It is tempting to suggest a connection
between this early Latin American interest in happiness and the distinctive
regional levels suggested in contemporary happiness polls, but we simply
do not know enough yet about this aspect of Latin American history to
evaluate the relationship.
Sub-Saharan Africa. The impact of imperialism on sub-Saharan Africa
came much later than was the case in the Americas; it was just begin-
ning to take shape in the later 19th century. Quite apart from chronology,
it involved much different levels of European influence. There was no
sweeping depopulation of this huge subcontinent, and while European
settlers moved into some areas, they never had more than a minority foot-
hold; and in key areas, including populous West Africa, their footprint was
smaller still.
Yet there was influence, and some relevant elements can be suggested
even though the subject of happiness has not yet commanded much atten-
tion among historians of Africa. The most obvious changes were disrup-
tive. Africans in many regions were pressed to work for low wages, often
in unsafe conditions. Men were often pulled away from their villages,
while many women stayed back, destabilizing family life. Customary eco-
nomic patterns were upended in favor of producing precious metals, min-
erals, cotton, vegetable oil, and other items destined for the export market.
Material challenges were compounded by other innovations. Mission-
ary activities attacked traditional beliefs and sometimes unseated village
leaders. Europeans also criticized African sexual habits, using terms like
“debauched” and “licentious”, and they sometimes tried to introduce new
regulations, particularly directed toward women. Polygamy, customary
in parts of the subcontinent, was widely deplored. New laws, based on
European codes, could have diverse effects; in some cases, it became easier
for women to divorce; in other instances, the authority of husbands and fa-
thers was reinforced. Overall, it seems highly probable that many A fricans
felt increasing strain.
On the other hand, there were some positive features, including an
ability, in many rural regions, to hold on to key traditions. Emphasis on
the vitality of family life and extended kin relations remained strong, de-
spite some challenges: here, arguably, was a core element of the African
definition of happiness. Zulus, in southern Africa, stressed the importance
of “building the homestead”, for the sake of one’s happiness but also that
of other living relations and even one’s ancestors. Creating a large family
promoted happiness by providing security. At the same time, a variety
of customs, sometimes including witchcraft accusations, worked to keep
any individual from overstepping community norms and accumulating
too much prosperity or happiness; undue personal happiness could attract
feelings of envy and misery from others, and sometimes the vocabulary
used to describe happiness embraced these dangers as well.
Many Africans may have experienced a larger feeling of connectedness,
to a wider community – again reflecting an idea of happiness focused on
relationships rather than individualism. A new word for humanity, ubuntu,
was introduced into a Bantu language in southern Arica from the middle
of the 19th century, though it would gain greater importance later on. It
conveyed a sense of sharing with a larger humanity, with an emphasis on
kindness.
Religion could also be a source of support, despite the changes en-
couraged by Muslim and Christian missionaries. While conversions to
Christianity deeply offended village elders, they might provide new
meaning to other members of the community, such as women and young
people. Various versions of Christianity developed, including some re-
gional adaptations. On the whole, while Christian leaders might bela-
bor sinfulness, they did not convey the kind of sorrow that had pervaded
Latin American Christianity during the colonial period. In practice, they
also brought educational and medical reforms, which could add to the
positive message. Religion in Africa gained intense loyalties, and fre-
quently featured an emphasis on joy and hope. Many Protestant preachers,
particularly, offered “gladness” and good tidings through the promise of a
personal relationship with God.
One other potential component of happiness gained new prominence
in the late 19th century, though it had divisive consequences. Workers in
some of the African mines made enough money to return to their villages
periodically, eager for sexual or romantic conquests. They disrupted tradi-
tional, parentally arranged relationships. Often they bought enough cattle
to pay for “seduction fines” or even to offer the customary bridewealth
gift without their fathers’ contribution or consent. In other words, they
were implementing a novel and more individualistic definition of pleasure
or happiness. Similar themes emerged from signs of new types of consum-
erism in some urban areas, at least by the early 20th century. No Longer
at Ease, a Nigerian novel, set in Lagos during the 1920s, features a young
man, who has received a Western-style education and holds a job in the
colonial administration, who is so preoccupied with his consumer lifestyle
that he ignores his traditional obligations to his extended family, refusing
to go back to the village when a parent dies.
Obviously, in this confusing period around the turn of the 20th cen-
tury, no one definition of happiness prevailed – and there were many
reasons for mounting discontent. The combination of traditional or more
novel sources, and the tensions among them, raised important questions
for the African future.
Russia and Japan

Not surprisingly, Russian and Japanese developments involving happiness,
including some explicit discussions, were rather different from those in other
regions outside the West by the end of the 19th century. These were the
two countries where reforms proved most extensive, compared for exam-
ple to the Ottoman Empire, and where early industrialization took shape.
Contacts with Western ideas plus the extent of social disruption created a
distinctive context.
The two countries shared several key features. First, for both, reform
was a serious business, rarely framed in terms of happiness. For better
or worse, both societies launched industrialization without the prior re-
consideration of happiness that had occurred in the West: there was no
“happiness revolution” to help guide responses. Second, clear resistance
to Western ideas of happiness emerged in both cases; debate arose in the
West as well, for example, expressed in the end-of-the-century pessimism
popular with some intellectuals, but the Japanese and Russian alterna-
tives were more elaborate and more widely shared. Third, however, some
important overlaps emerged with Western notions as well, including the
impact of new forms of consumerism.
Russia. As Russia experienced its mixture of reform and repression from
the 1860s onward, several general reactions emerged, creating a distinctive
overall balance. Evidence comes largely from the literate upper and middle
classes; as usual, the orientations of the masses of the population are less
clear, though high rates of rural and urban protest certainly suggest con-
siderable unhappiness.
Some groups, at least some of the time, were delighted with the changes
they saw around them. Modern cities came in for particularly favorable
comment, particularly as they installed street lighting, as department
stores were imported from the West (the first store in Moscow was set
up by a French businessman), and as consumer goods proliferated for the
well-to-do. Shop windows filled with “the inventions of Western civili-
zation” – easy chairs, silk stockings, household goods. Cities were “bright
temples”, filled with a “mood that is bold and full of the joy of life”. The
most popular novel of the early 20th century, entitled the Keys to Happiness
(1910), featured a young woman deliberately bent on finding happiness.
Urban entertainment centers, including popular theater, highlighted the
“pursuit of happiness”; even advertisements for patent medicines (many
imported from the West, and of dubious merit) claimed they would
contribute to the “joy of life”. This optimism was a new component in
Russian culture, and it would build into a Marxist approach in the 20th
century, particularly in its commitment to economic progress.
But a second reaction featured strong disapproval, and while similar
criticisms of consumerism arose in the West itself there is little doubt that
the Russian concern was stronger, particularly among the upper classes and
many intellectuals. Much of this “happiness”, after all, was foreign, as well
as shockingly novel. Women were criticized for their new slavishness to
fashion. The novelist Tolstoy lamented somewhat obscurely that “women,
like queens, have forced nine-tenths of the human race to labor for them
as their slaves”. Morals were decaying; upper-class women, with their
fancy dresses, were no better than prostitutes. Another criticism, some-
what inconsistently, blasted the new uniformities created by factory-made
products; everyone now looked the same. Foreign influences, along with
the new machines, were destroying “the former good nature, the convivi-
ality, the appealing disorderliness and freedom” of traditional Russian life.
Even peasants, that staple of Russian life, were picking up on new tastes,
and some of them, buying urban clothing, were beginning to look like
“dandies.”
Debate between “westernizers” and conservatives in Russia went back
to the early 18th century, but it picked up new intensity at this point.
While conservatives rarely zeroed in directly on happiness, they certainly
mounted a steady campaign against Western values. In their eyes, the
Russian soul centered on religion and a deep sense of community. It was
vital to preserve these traditions against the lures of individualism and
innovation. Many conservatives began emphasizing the importance of a
distinctive Russian nationalism, a sense of passionate group identity that
could serve as an alternative to more facile ideas of happiness.
A third theme to a great extent cut across liberal and conservative lines,
though it certainly resisted Western-style optimism. A sense of loneliness
and despair cropped up frequently in Russian commentary, often empha-
sizing the word “disillusionment” and arguing against the “senselessness
and purposelessness of modern life”. Struggle and suffering replaced any
sense of happiness; at most, this approach centered on “happiness denied”.
This was a dark pessimism, feeding anarchist or “nihilist” groups that saw
no recourse but to engage in often random violence, often at deliberate
risk to their own lives. Some anarchists, to be sure, held out hope for a bet-
ter society in future, but others, including those that were frankly suicidal,
simply saw chaos, with no happiness in sight.
Japan. The sweeping reforms Japanese leaders began to introduce from
1868 onward, in the so-called Meiji era, were framed in terms of stern
purpose and devotion to the common good. The slogan “rich country,
strong army”, bent on preserving national independence and advancing
national strength in face of growing Western pressure, had little to do
with Western-style definitions of happiness. And, quite apart from solemn
official pronouncements, the beginnings of Japanese industrialization were
built on the backs of highly taxed peasants, female silk workers laboring
in miserable conditions, and strict, though not always successful, efforts to
repress any significant popular protest. This was a solemn nation.
There were, of course, outright Westernizers, who not infrequently
brought up a happiness theme. Thus the leading educational reformer,
Fukuzawa Yukichi, who studied widely in Europe and the United States,
spoke directly of what he called “the greatest happiness of the greatest
number”. Carefully noting the many merits in Japanese traditions, which
should not be completely overthrown, Fukuzawa urged the advantages of
Western education and Western science, which is where he thought the
West had an edge in promoting happiness. For a few years after introduc-
ing mass schooling requirements, in 1872, even the Japanese government
seemed open to promoting new values, installing an American to head up
its education unit. And a new interest in science and technology did prove
to be durable features of modern Japanese culture.
Further, while the Japanese did not rush into avid consumerism – for
quite a while, watches and clocks, along with tooth brushes, were the only
Western items that drew wide popular enthusiasm – there was certainly
some change. Department stores opened in Tokyo by the 1890s, though
they were long associated with foreign products and had to work hard, of-
fering music and theatrical entertainments along with consumer items, to
build a clientele. Larger changes in popular fashion would await the 1920s,
but some new interests emerged. The first Western-style chair was in-
stalled in a public building as early as 1871. Baseball, learned initially from
American sailors, also won new attention, particularly when a Japanese
team beat an American group in the 1890s.
However, the dominant official approach warned against facile defi-
nitions of happiness and undue individualism. A change of tone at the
education ministry set in from 1881 onward. Group loyalty was now em-
phasized, as Western texts in the social studies were newly banned. School
curricula filled with attacks on excessive selfishness or personal preoccu-
pations. Consumerism also came in for rebuke. An Imperial Rescript in
1908 urged people to be “frugal in the management of their households…
to abide by simplicity and avoid ostentation, and to insure themselves to
arduous toil without yielding to any degree of indulgence.” Japanese con-
servatives, including many successful business leaders, emphasized Confu-
cian themes like obedience and a sense of duty, criticizing individualistic
ideas of “self-reliance”. Many leaders played up military virtues, talking of
“faithfulness and righteousness”, and “fulfillment of one’s duty”.
Arguably, in fact, Japanese officials at this point were developing some-
thing of a nationalist alternative to Western ideas of happiness, leavened by
emperor worship. Devotion to a common cause, self-sacrifice, displaced
more direct discussions of happiness. Group loyalty and a sense of belong-
ing potentially provided a sense of satisfaction that was different from the
Western formula, even to the point of a distinctive vocabulary.
Yet even this is not quite the whole story. Quietly, by 1900, in the throes
of urbanization and industrialization, many Japanese were also finding a
new interest in family life, though without all the bells and whistles of the
contemporary Western version – aided in this case by advice offered by
Japanese converts to Protestantism, newly permitted though not encour-
aged by the reform regime. Thus a home education manual in 1894 urged
that the “true essence of domestic entertainment is for all in the house,”
with man and wife to come together for mutual enjoyment. Parents could
look at a baby’s “endearing face” and “smile together”. This new emphasis
could at least modify earlier traditions that had husbands largely seeking
pleasure outside the home, or, within the home, the notion that wives
should simply serve husbands (who might even eat alone). Interestingly,
the purchase of dining tables began to become popular by 1900, suggest-
ing joint family dining instead of gender isolation. The theme of happi-
ness in the Meiji period generated a variety of responses, clearly different,
collectively, from those in the West or indeed in Russia, but involving
considerable change from purely traditional patterns.
***
No region adopted Western patterns of happiness during the 19th century.

Some areas were simply uninterested – it is vital to remember that most
people were still rural, and largely unaware of changes that dispropor-
tionately affected urbanites. Many religious leaders, as in Hinduism or
Islam, simply maintained a traditional approach, urging the importance of
spiritual exercises as the best chance for glimpses of happiness in this life.
A number of groups were actively opposed to Western concepts, though
focusing on what they saw as the downsides of individualism and consum-
erism more than on happiness by name; in a few cases, most notably Japan,
something of an alternative was being vigorously promoted, through
group loyalty and nationalism. But this was not the whole story, for a
combination of economic changes and Western influence did introduce
some new enthusiasms for certain forms of happiness as well. Much of this
diversity – including but not confined to outright resistance – would carry
over into the more elaborate global patterns that emerged during the 20th
century.
Further Reading
On the Taiping rebellion,
Reilly, Thomas H. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom: Rebellion and the Blasphemy of
Empire (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004).
Yapp, Malcolm. The Making of the Modern Near East, 1792–1923 (London: Long-
man, 1987).
On Latin America,
Lipsett-Rivera, Sonya, and Javier Villa-Flores. Emotions and Daily Life in Colonial
Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2014).
Seed, Patricia. To Love, Honor, and Obey in Colonial Mexico: Conflicts over Marriage
Choice, 1574–1821 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
On Africa,
Achebe, Chinua. No Longer at Ease (London: Heinemann, 1964).
Carton, Benedict. Blood from Your Children: The Colonial Origins of Generational
Conflict in South Africa (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000).
Eze, Michael Onyebuchi. Intellectual History in Contemporary South Africa, 1st ed.
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
Therborn, Göran. African Families in a Global Context (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika-
institutet, 2006).
On nationalism,
Suny, Ronald Grigor. The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Col-
lapse of the Soviet Union (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).
On Russia,
Geifman, Anna. Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894–1917
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
Steinberg, Mark D. Petersburg Fin de Siècle (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2011).
Steinberg, Mark D., and Valeria Sobol. Interpreting Emotions in Russia and Eastern
Europe (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2011).
On Japan,
Minichiello, Sharon. Japan’s Competing Modernities: Issues in Culture and Democracy,
1900–1930 (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi Press, 1998).
Seidensticker, Edward, Donald Richie, and Paul Waley. Tokyo from Edo to Showa
1867–1989: The Emergence of the World’s Greatest City. (Tokyo: Tuttle Pub.,
2010).
Tobin, Joseph Jay. Re-Made in Japan: Everyday Life and Consumer Taste in a Changing
Society (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).
Part III
Happiness in Contemporary
World History
By the early 21st century, when the influence of social media began to
become a global phenomenon, almost anyone posing for what was now
called a “selfie”, anywhere in the world, was careful to smile broadly. It
became more important than ever before to look happy. To be sure, some
societies encouraged more smiling than others, but it is also probable that
encouragements to smile became more widespread than ever before.
There was still no single global history of happiness during the past
century. Many key regions maintained distinctive approaches to happi-
ness; even family happiness continued to be variously defined. As before,
variations in material standards and earlier cultural traditions combined in
several different regional patterns.
Some common trends did emerge, however. The influence of consumer
culture, some of it shaped by Western standards, became more wide-
spread than ever before. As more and more societies industrialized and
urbanized – developments that began to encompass most of the world’s
people – older ideas about happiness could be shaken. By the early 21st
century, some outlines of a global, or at least multi-regional, approach to
happiness could be discerned.
On the whole, the Western commitment to happiness has held on fairly
well, in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, though it has faced some internal challenges; in recent decades,
some influences from other cultures have added to the regional approach.
And limitations of the Western commitment to happiness have also be-
come more obvious.
At the same time, the past century has seen a number of deliberate at-
tempts to development alternatives to Western models of happiness, some
reflecting updates on traditional values, others, as with communism, seek-
ing to strike out in newer directions.
Not surprisingly, analysis of happiness during the past century must
also account for some internal chronological divisions. The miseries of
world war and economic depression prompted some particularly vigorous
disputes over happiness in the decades after 1920. Ideological controversies
were less sharp after1945 and particularly as the Cold War faded. This was
150 Happiness in Contemporary World History
the point at which some global dimensions to happiness began to emerge,
but in complex interaction with regional trends.
Far more clearly than in the 19th century, developments in the past sev-
eral decades, with most of the world generating basic features of industrial
society including urbanization, begin to allow an interim assessment of
the larger implications of industrialization for happiness – and a tentative
comparison with the assessment applied to the advent of agriculture in
Chapter 3. The conclusion takes up this challenge directly, if somewhat
inconclusively.
10 Disputed Happiness, 1920–1945
This chapter highlights several dramatically different trends affecting hap-

piness in various parts of the world during the period of the world wars
and great depression. On the one hand, World War I put a serious damper
on happiness in Western Europe, ushering in a period of doubt that sig-
nificantly modified dominant 19th-century patterns. Yet at the same time,
though particularly in the United States, earlier themes were amplified,
with some important additional components. The rise of fascism in many
parts of Europe during the 1920s and 1930s signaled an explicit rejection
of the primacy of individual happiness, offering a starkly different defini-
tion in which the word happiness rarely figured explicitly at all. Finally,
in the rising anti-colonial and nationalist movements, leaders like Gandhi
and Ataturk developed yet another set of alternatives concerning happi-
ness, informed by earlier traditions but also the needs of nation-building.
There is, deliberately, no unifying theme in all this: the only unity is the
shared chronology of the troubled period between the world wars. Global
patterns remained highly diverse, though none of them was static. A few
patterns would leave only a modest legacy – interwar despair and fascism,
as interrelated responses to military and economic disaster, would not sur-
vive intact. But the theme of diversity would continue to complicate the
contemporary history of happiness.
Shock
World War I was a horrible war, the bloodiest ever fought, to that point,
in such a short span of time. Death rates in the many millions were com-
pounded by the presence of many mutilated survivors, visible reminders
to themselves and those around them. The experience of brutal trench
warfare and constant bombardment marked even those who were physi-
cally unscathed, in ways they felt the civilian society around them could
not understand. A British poet, Wilfred Owen, himself killed in the later
stages of the war, pointed to what he called “that old lie”, that it was at all
noble to die for one’s country.
The war was all the more shocking because of the widespread optimism
that had preceded it: expectations of happy progress can make realities
seem particularly disheartening. Many troops had initially gone off to bat-
tle, in 1914, assuming that the struggle would be easy, with quick and glo-
rious victories and back home in a few months. British recruitment posters
claimed explicitly that joining the army was a path to happiness. But actual
combat troops soon found out the brutal truth. More generally, Western
societies had been widely exposed to the kind of confidence expressed in
the glowing turn-of-the-century evaluations, which claimed that decades
of progress in the 19th century would unfailingly continue in the century
to come. This was now almost impossible to believe. A generation of ar-
ticulate young people, whose ranks had been particularly decimated by
trench warfare, would grow into adulthood confused, often despairing.
At the intellectual level, the new mood was best captured by Oswald
Spengler, whose book, The Decline of the West, was published in 1918.
Spengler argued that Western civilization was in its death throes, that an
event like the war was merely an episode in an irreversible collapse. Less
important than its stark claim, the book’s wide popularity – it was quickly
translated from the German into several other languages – suggests how
it captured and furthered the public mood. New artistic styles also arose
to convey confusion or despair, particularly around surrealist or Dadaist
themes.
Economic dislocations greatly heightened the problem. Massive infla-
tion affected several countries right after the war, and then the global
depression seized center stage beginning in 1929. Unemployment reached
unprecedented heights, causing the psychological trauma of job loss com-
pounded by rising poverty. In the United States, suicide rates increased by
about 25% during the worst years.
The ensuing decade of the 1930s was further marked by growing in-
ternational instability, and with the rise of Nazi Germany and an aggres-
sive military regime in Japan, war fears mounted. Confidence faltered, as
the leadership of many Western countries seemed unable to contend with
growing economic and diplomatic problems. Again in the United States,
a fictional radio broadcast in 1938, about an alien invasion, caused consid-
erable panic, a sign of the level of public anxiety.
Expectations of happiness had never been evenly distributed in Western
society, and the problems of the interwar years were not uniformly shared.
But it seems very likely that many people experienced substantial deterio-
ration in their sense of satisfaction or hope. The culture of happiness was
not replaced, but it was certainly challenged.
New Frontiers
These same decades, however, saw continued signs of happiness in some
sectors of Western society. Not only were some of the established themes
maintained, but at least two further components were added, both of
which would continue after World War II.
Disputed Happiness, 1920–1945 153
Both the continuities and the enhancements showed the power of the
culture that had already been established. Persistent commitments to hap-
piness also reflected the fact that some sectors of the population, most
obviously in the middle classes, were able to continue to enjoy opportu-
nities as consumers and spectators despite the disruptions around them,
intensifying earlier interests in sports and enjoying the steady expansion
of the movie industry. Stiff Victorian manners relaxed, as more revealing
female fashions demonstrated. The new phenomenon of “dating” began
to replace more formal courtship. The picture was not uniformly bleak,
even in the depression-wracked 1930s.
It is also worth noting that this was the period when public smiling be-
came easier to record. Improved photography eliminated agonizing waits
for a picture to be taken, and the popularity of presenting one’s smiling
face was impossible to resist. Politicians like Franklin Roosevelt, in the
United States, mastered the public appeal of the wide smile. Contribut-
ing as well was a crescendo of advertisements for toothpowder and paste,
claiming a shining smile as a rewarding outcome.
National factors entered in. The United States was largely free from the
postwar gloom that measurably affected many in Europe. Despite some
war deaths and dislocations, the country was not deeply altered by World
War I; indeed, its global economic position measurably improved.
Indeed, American popular advice literature filled with more recom-
mendations about happiness and cheerfulness than ever before. Many chil-
drearing manuals now routinely included a chapter on “how to make your
child happy” – a 20th-century innovation; and a few whole books on the
topic emerged. Parents, it was now assumed, had a responsibility to make
sure their children were happy, though there was some confusion over how
much effort this required: were children naturally happy, so that parents
simply needed to avoid messing them up, or was extra care essential? The
often-discussed notion of an “unhappy childhood” reflected the impor-
tance of trying to provide the contrary and a sense of how failure would
continue to reverberate into adulthood. (The phrase began to be widely
mentioned for the first time in the interwar years.) The wider emphasis
on the cheerful family was also maintained; a husband should be able to
rely on his wife’s “never-tiring” good humor, and a proper wife should
“always wear a smile”. In some quarters, clearly, the happiness revolution
was alive and well.
American cheer. For many foreigners today, one of the easiest ways to
spot an American is by a wide and frequent smile. Unusual, or at least
unusually displayed, American cheerfulness wins frequent comment,
particularly among Europeans. It can be very disconcerting. It can seem
disrespectful, or simply fake. But it was and is certainly widely noticed,
along with a European sense that Americans remained naively overopti-
mistic. A Finnish observer, recently asked about how to identify Ameri-
cans, repeated a modification of the Russian joke: when one sees someone
smiling broadly at strangers, the assumption is he is either insane, drunk,
or A merican. American businesses, trying to set up shop in Europe, often
try to preach smiling salesmanship; this was an issue as Walmart tried, and
failed, to gain a foothold in Germany.
The question is: when did this American proclivity first emerge?
Some comments about unusual American cheerfulness go back to the
early 19th century. Harriet Martineau, a British visitor, noted how her
hosts not only smiled a lot but told an inordinate number of jokes to try to
get her to do the same. Was this cheerful emphasis part of the democratic
culture Americans were trying to build in the wake of the successful rev-
olution? Was this being baked into “national character” at this early point?
One theory argues that societies that receive many immigrants –
including but not confined to the United States – emphasize smiling be-
cause, amid different cultures and languages, positive facial expressions
become vital in trying to create a constructive atmosphere. (The same
theory also notes that lots of smiling does not necessarily indicate special
happiness.) But this does not entirely explain the special American pro-
clivity, compared for example with Canadians.
Conditions between the wars may have amplified disparities at least
in terms of transatlantic comparisons, given the greater challenge many
Europeans encountered from the burdens of World War I and ensuing
tensions. Whatever the causes – and explaining comparative differences in
smiling is something of an analytical challenge – what is clear in that the
United States began to take the lead in some of the further innovations in
the “happiness revolution”, even when these quickly involved other parts
of Western society as well.
Thus, it was in 1923 that the Disney Company began its fabled enter-
tainment career, from a base in California, explicitly around the theme of
“creating happiness”. The company quickly became involved in redoing
classic fairy stories for children, eliminating cruelty and sadness in favor
of uniformly happy endings and creating new characters, like the reso-
lutely cheerful Mickey Mouse, meant to promote delight for parents and
children alike. Here was one of many instances in which an American
innovation would quickly generate wider impact.
Another American innovation was revealing, the introduction of canned
laughter into radio and then TV comedies (in 1946; it was first used on
television in 1950) – in contrast to patterns in Europe, where home audi-
ences were left to decide on their own whether to laugh or not. Did the
American gimmick suggest greater cheerfulness, or a greater compulsion
to seem cheerful – or a bit of both?
Or on another front: during or shortly after World War I that the song
“Happy Birthday” first appeared in the United States; its use in a 1931 Broad-
way show was what sealed its popularity, by which point it began to spread
to other English-speaking countries and soon appeared in a variety of trans-
lations. Here was another American contribution to a happy popular culture.
Happiness at work. Two other innovations, emerging in the United States
but with active European involvement, not only illustrated but measurably
intensified the continuing commitment to happiness, even in the difficult
terrain of the interwar decades.
The first involved a more explicit attempt to associate happiness and
work – an area that had constituted a bit of a conundrum during 19th-
century industrialization when the relationship of happiness to the domi-
nant work ethic was at best ambiguous.
Older ideas that work could be an instrument for a happier life off the
job, or the basis for social mobility, persisted strongly. But now a clearer
notion began to creep in that work could or should be enjoyable in itself.
Two related sources contributed.
A new subdiscipline, industrial psychology, began to emerge toward the
end of the 19th century. Initial practitioners were German, but the field de-
veloped definitively in the United States shortly after World War I. Industrial
psychologists strove to study the workplace, and workers themselves, in order
to make the production process more efficient and to reduce labor strife.
Some of their innovations had little to do with happiness, but others directly
sought to improve worker morale. Studies by leaders like Elton Mayo discov-
ered, for example, that judiciously placed rest periods improved productivity;
so did playing soft music for 45 minutes every hour. A great deal of attention
was devoted toward training foremen and other lower-level managers to be
more tactful with workers, including listening to grievances more patiently.
By the 1930s, on the heels of this kind of guidance, many corporations began
to establish personnel, or human resources, departments, and while these
had several functions, trying to make work more enjoyable, or at least less
burdensome, was a prominent goal – as is still the case today. Here was a bu-
reaucratic innovation that soon took hold in most Western countries.
At the same time, the growth of managerial bureaucracies and pro-
fessional sales forces prompted explicit attention to the importance of
cheerfulness at work. Training courses emerged to “produce cheerful
salespeople careful to avoid provocation of vital customers”. By the 1930s,
American railroad companies were introducing “smile schools” to repro-
gram conductors and sales clerks. Dale Carnegie, also in the 1930s, made
cheerfulness the keynote of his courses for aspiring salesmen, and for his
widely popular book, How to Win Friends and Influence People, Carnegie
boasted about his ability to keep smiling even in the face of the angriest
customer, arguing that this was the best way to close the deal.
None of this necessarily made work, even for white-collar personnel,
a happier experience. Indeed, the emotional manipulation involved could
be extremely stressful. But increasing resources were being devoted to try-
ing to promote happiness and, even more widely, it became steadily more
important for certain kinds of workers to seem happy. The old theme –
dating back to the 18th century – of wanting people around oneself to be
cheerful was gaining an additional venue.
Grief and death. One of the great challenges to 19th-century ideals of
happiness, the high death rate, was substantially redefined by the early 20th
century throughout the Western world – despite the huge losses in war.
By 1920, infant death rates were down to as low as 5% of all children
born – massively below the 25% or more that had still been common just
40 years before. Further, while the influenza epidemic of 1918–1919 had a
major impact, the epidemic cycle thereafter was greatly modified, thanks
to improved public health measures. Overall, in the advanced industrial
societies, widespread death was increasingly confined to older age groups.
Finally, it was also in the first half of the 20th century that death began to
occur primarily in hospitals, rather than in or around the home.
All this meant that encounters with death were becoming far less com-
mon than they had ever been in the human experience. It became far
easier to embellish the 19th-century impulse to smooth over this un-
pleasant reality, and to hope for continued progress in future. Doctors,
death-fighters by training, now became the dominant figures in dealing
with death, with more traditional consolers relegated to lesser roles. A key
ingredient in happiness, now, might involve not having to think about
death much at all.
One immediate result of this transformation, widely discussed in popular
magazines in Europe and the United States in the 1920s, was a redefinition
of grief from essential to undesirable. As one popular magazine intoned,
“Probably nothing is sadder in life than the thought of all the hours that
are spent in grieving over what is past and irretrievable.” Any prolonged
tearfulness suggested “something morbid, either mental or physical”. Man-
ners books shifted gears, from offering long passages about how to deal
politely with a bereaved family to urging that displaying much grief was
now simply discourteous, an unreasonable burden on other people. Any-
one suffering from more than temporary grief was urged to get psycho-
logical counseling, and a whole category of “grief work” developed in the
field simply to promote greater control. It is no exaggeration to suggest that
having to deal with other people’s grief, particularly outside the immediate
family, now often seemed to be an unreasonable burden on happiness.
Correspondingly, mourning practices steadily diminished, on both
sides of the Atlantic (modified only, in the United States, by high levels
of religious devotion). Gone were elaborate draperies at the windows of
a home where a death had occurred. Disappearing even were black arm-
bands. Funeral services became shorter, and children were often kept away
entirely. Death still happened, but it should be as unobtrusive as possible.
Even the preferred manner of death changed. For centuries, a good
death had meant a process that might take several weeks, when an older
person, suffering most commonly from a respiratory ailment, would have
a chance to say goodbyes to friends and family. Now, for almost every-
one, the best death was sudden and unexpected, requiring no thought or
preparation at all.
These huge changes in the incidence and experience of death ultimately
provoked an equally huge debate, about whether happiness is really best
served by minimizing death – though arguments about the deleterious
effects of the so-called modern “taboo” about death emerged mainly after
World War II. Is modern happiness dangerously shallow because death is
relegated to the background? Are people actually more fearful of death,
in this sense less happy, because they encounter it with less preparation? A
variety of evidence suggests that many people actually make their deaths
needlessly complicated by failing to prepare appropriate arrangements in
advance. For example, many avoid specifying whether they want life pro-
longed through “heroic” medical measures. This kind of reluctance argu-
ably illustrates a radically redefined problem of happiness and death.
At least superficially, however, the decline of death – including the un-
precedented fact that parents no longer had to expect at least one child to
die, as a matter of course – contributed to a larger emotional realignment
from the early 20th century onward, on both sides of the Atlantic. Increas-
ingly, psychological experts and popularizers alike distinguished between
positive and negative emotions, with the latter to be avoided as much as
possible (and with parents urged to protect their children accordingly).
Fear, anger, grief, shame, and even undue guilt normally were seen to
serve no useful function, and while they could not be avoided entirely
they should be downplayed. This left the way free, in principle, for emo-
tions like love, joy, or possibly moderate envy – emotions that were com-
patible with active consumerism, and with happiness.
Pleasures. One of the striking features of the 1930s in most Western soci-
eties, though probably particularly in the United States, was the successful
pursuit of pleasure amid the more obvious grimness of the Depression.
Social class was a vital factor here: workers suffered more than business and
professional groups, the young more than the middle-aged.
But the growing entertainment industry, headed globally now by the
Hollywood studios, sought to lighten the mood whenever possible. Happy
endings became a movie staple, with only elite art films daring to buck
the trend. Shirley Temple became a characteristic star, with extraordinary
popularity as a child actress: as Franklin Roosevelt put it, “It is a splendid
thing that for just 15 cents, an American can go to a movie and look at
the smiling face of a baby and forget his troubles.” But there were many
others – romantic sensations, comedians, dancers – to provide distraction.
Professional sports and college football were booming. The popularity
of “Happy Birthday” – often sung to celebrating adults via a “singing
telegram” – was directly attributed to its service as antidote to Depression
worries. In Britain the end of the decade even saw the first steps in the
next mass distraction: television.
Relative affluence (alongside grinding poverty) and the expectation
of happiness were arguably generating an unprecedented combination
in the 1930s: a dismal decade combined with a widespread commitment
to fun. World War II would continue this odd combination, particularly
for American troops, with elaborate efforts to provide Hollywood-style
entertainment shows in military camps (comedians and attractive female
starlets preferred). The United Service Organizations (USO), formed in
1941, specialized in organizing performance tours for military facilities at
home and abroad.
Fascism and Happiness

Adolf Hitler, the leader of Nazi Germany, made his position very clear:
“The day of individual happiness has passed,” Italy’s Mussolini offered
essentially the same point: “Fascism is therefore opposed to all individ-
ualistic abstractions based on eighteenth century materialism….It does
not believe in the possibility of ‘happiness’ on earth as conceived by the
economistic literature of the 18th century.” Nazi and fascist leaders did
not often talk about happiness directly, but they quite deliberately sought
to build a different sense of human purpose from the concepts of happi-
ness that had been building in the West for a century and a half. While
the fascist attack on happiness is not often highlighted, it was actually a
prominent – and extraordinary – feature of the movement. Conventional
happiness, indeed, became an enemy.
Correspondingly, cheerfulness was replaced with stern faces and mil-
itary bearing. As Mussolini put it, “Life, as conceived of by the fascist, is
serious, austere….The Fascist disdains an ‘easy’ life.” Discipline and au-
thority were the new watchwords, all under the guidance of the State and
its leader.
The fascist experiment was fairly short-lived, largely buried with defeat
in World War II. But the experiment was an interesting effort to counter
the standard expectations of happiness with a dramatically different model.
In this vision, the individual was to be subsumed through passionate
loyalty to the nation – or in the Nazi case, the Volk, or race – and the
state. Duty and devotion were the hallmarks. Huge rallies sought to create
an excitement that would easily supplant more personal pleasures. Many
forms of modern consumerism were discouraged, some of them dismissed
as modernist decadence. As Mussolini put it,
Fascism sees in the world not only those superficial, material aspects
in which man appears as an individual, standing by himself, self-
centered…urge(d) toward a life of selfish momentary pleasure, but
also the nation and the country, individuals and generations bound
together by a moral law, with common traditions and a mission which
by suppressing the instinct closed in a brief circle of pleasure, builds
up a higher life, founded on duty, in which the individual, by self-
sacrifice, the renunciation of self-interest, by death itself, can achieve
that purely spiritual existence in which his value as a man consists.
Fascism, and particularly its Nazi version, also urged the importance of a
family life devoted primarily to childbearing, with women clearly subor-
dinate to their husband.
The causes of this effort to replace what had seemed to be well-established
notions of happiness in countries like Italy and Germany were complex.
Disruption and disappointment from World War I, serious economic dis-
location combined with forceful leadership, masterful propaganda, and in-
timidation through force. For many people, happiness had been declining
anyway, so the appeal of a radically different model might make sense.
Fascism also sought to provide alternatives for some of the conventional
trappings of modern happiness. Both Mussolini and Hitler created new, col-
lective opportunities for leisure. In the German case, a movement inter-
estingly called “Strength through Joy” sought to provide workers with a
number of outlets, tailored for people with relatively low wages and im-
bued with Nazi propaganda. From 1933 until preempted by the outbreak
of World War II, Strength through Joy organized films, plays, concerts, and
day trips. Hiking was strongly emphasized; fascists liked to tout physical
activity in preference to undue intellectualism. Ambitious annual vacations
were offered through standardized mass resorts, as the movement for a time
became the largest tourist operation in the world. By 1938 a large minority of
Germans were taking Strength through Joy holidays. There was even some
effort to recruit foreign tourists as well, in one case featuring Germany’s
propaganda minister uncharacteristically grinning out from a colorful poster.
The fascist effort to displace conventional happiness was also fueled by
active propaganda and intimidation by a network of secret police. Youth
movements promoted excited group loyalties, hoping to build a different
type of personality for the future. And of course any sign of dissent was
ruthlessly repressed. It is hard to evaluate the balance between acceptance
and fear in this effort to create an alternative to happiness.
Nationalism Outside the West: Other

Visions of Happiness
Though overshadowed by military conflicts and economic challenge, the
interwar years also saw the solidification of a number of crucial nationalist
movements outside the West. While the need to take a stance on happi-
ness was hardly the leading nationalist concern, it was not uncommon to
offer brief comments. No leader fully embraced the Western concept of
happiness – among other things, too much individualism and consumer-
ism could distract from the common cause. This had already been a chal-
lenge for Japanese national leaders of course, but now it applied to other
regions. On the other hand, fascist bombast ( Japan partially excepted)
gained few adherents either.
Two emphases were attractive: one would simply emphasize the impor-
tance of duty and social obligation, since building the nation or achieving
independence were fundamental to happiness of any sort. The other might
more elaborately appeal to national cultural traditions, to emphasize a
concept of happiness that was much more clearly differentiated from either
the Western or the fascist approach.
Turkey. Kemal Ataturk led in the foundation of the new Turkish nation
on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, in the early 1920s, and then served as
president until his death in 1938. He was an ardent modernizer and reformer,
incorporating many Western values into his drive to make Turkey a lead-
ing nation. Changes ranged from requirements for wearing Western-style
clothing, to utilization of the Latin alphabet, to granting women the vote.
In his work, he walked something of a fine line in overseeing major changes
that would not, however, impose complete Westernization; he was eager,
for example, to avoid Western-style political competition.
In this vein, without attacking Western ideas of happiness directly,
Ataturk was eager to emphasize an alternative vision. First, he wanted to
associate happiness with nationalist success. In 1933, on the tenth anniver-
sary of the foundation of the Turkish republic, he offered a list of the many
improvements in national life over the previous decade. He claimed that
Turkey was well on the way to becoming a great nation, and would soon
lead the world in levels of prosperity and civilization. This meant, in turn,
that happiness consisted in rejoicing at this national success: “Happy is the
one who says, ‘I am a Turk’”. This catchy phrase was used periodically by
later regimes to promote loyalty to the system, and it simply sidestepped
larger questions about more personal definitions of happiness.
But Ataturk could go further, beyond the strictly nationalist emphasis,
to insist that happiness consisted of working hard for national progress.
The necessary thing for anyone to be happy and contented is working

for the ones who will come after him rather than working for himself.
One can reach true delight and happiness in this life only by working
for the existence, honor and happiness of the future generations.
This was a slightly different, perhaps vaguer formulation than the Japanese
approach in the Meiji era, but it had similar overtones. It lacked the bom-
bast and self-sacrifice of fascist definitions. But it also clearly suggested
an alternative to the more individualistic, consumer-oriented Western
approach.
India. Nationalism in India under British rule had begun, fairly mildly,
in the 19th century. It became much more vigorous after World War I,
in part because many Indian troops had served in the war and gained
fuller awareness of nationalist goals. Demands for outright independence
mounted.
A number of leaders helped spearhead agitation, but without ques-
tion Mohandas Gandhi was the most visible and influential among them.
Gandhi’s outlook was shaped by a number of influences; Hinduism was
the most profound, but Gandhi also read Western and Russian authors,
blending a number of different ideas into his own philosophy. The result,
most famously, was a deep commitment to nonviolence and, ultimately,
certain reforms in India’s tradition including abolition of the caste system.
But a distinctive approach to happiness was another interesting feature of
Gandhi’s approach.
For Gandhi saw happiness not in terms of duties to the state or society,
though he believed deeply in the importance of service to others; and cer-
tainly not in terms of personal pleasures on advancement. Rather, harking
back to some of the thinking common among earlier religious and phil-
osophical leaders, happiness was a matter of cultivating a proper mindset.
His most famous quote on the subject went as follows: “Happiness is when
what you think, what you say, and what you do are in harmony.”
Some people, particularly in more recent decades, have interpreted
this as a praise of what is now called positive thinking, as developing
attitudes that encourage self-love. It might also be seen as an appeal to
be trustworthy, to match actions with beliefs; Gandhi placed great stock
in integrity and sincerity. Probably the core meaning, however, involves
the emphasis on harmony, on alignment of the self and the surrounding
environment; as with many earlier Hindu thinkers, the importance of
truth-seeking and self-realization was fundamental to Gandhi’s beliefs.
These were the elements that other Hindu and Buddhist thinkers have
emphasized in embellishing Gandhi’s thoughts, and that helped win him
a reputation as a Mahatma, or “great soul” from many Indians at the time.
Further, this more spiritual approach to happiness was fully consistent
with Gandhi’s deep interest in peace and non-violence, as well as his lack
of any particular concern for the material aspects of life. Peace within one-
self was a vital component of social peace in the more conventional sense.
For all his undeniable success in galvanizing Indian nationalism, Gandhi
was an atypical figure, compared to nationalists like Ataturk or even most
of his colleagues in India. While passionate about independence, Gandhi
did not want to see India march in the path of economic development or
greater military power. He envisaged a rural and artisanal economy, delib-
erately different from most of the societies of the 20th century. His views
on happiness are, correspondingly, unusual, however thoughtful. He does
remind us, though, that traditional ideas and new movements could com-
bine in unpredictable ways, and that earlier, religious views on happiness
wielded continued influence. The role of tradition in Indian concepts of
happiness – though not exactly a Gandhian formula – will gain further
attention in Chapter 11.
***
Happiness became a disputed concept in the decades of war and depression,

not just because of varied traditions but because of new levels of competition
for people’s loyalties. The results added to global diversity, though some of
the statements proved short-lived. The only common denominator was a
growing sense that the topic of happiness had to be explicitly addressed in
modern politics, even if the resulting definitions clashed directly. This need
to produce clear-cut standards for happiness would also play a considerable
role in the rhetoric and policy generated by the rising communist move-
ment, first in the Soviet Union and then more widely.
The absence of a clear global standard for happiness clearly complicates
analysis for these troubled decades, and the emphasis on a largely regional
approach would be modified later in the 20th century. But the interest
in finding some alternative to Western concepts, even as the West added
some new ingredients to the commitment to happiness, suggested an im-
portant challenge that would echo in subsequent decades as well.
Further Reading
On the growing role of governments and businesses in trying to advertise and
sell happiness,
Davies, William. The Happiness Industry: How the Government and Big Business Sold
Us Well-Being (London: Verso, 2015) – applicable to later periods as well.
On the impact of World War I,
Winter, Jay Murray. Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History
in the Twentieth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
On cheerfulness,
Kotchemidova, Christina. “From Good Cheer to ‘Drive-By Smiling’: A Social
History of Cheerfulness.” Journal of Social History 39, no. 1 (2005): 5–37.
For the American mood between the wars:
Allen, Frederick Lewis. Only Yesterday; An Informal History of the 1920s (New
York: Harper, 1931) and Since Yesterday: The 1930s in America (New York:
Harper, 1939).
On changes at work,
Hochschild, Arlie Russell. The Managed Heart Commercialization of Human Feeling,
Updated, with a New Preface (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).
On grief and death,
Ariès, Philippe. The Hour of Our Death, 1st American ed. (New York: Knopf,
1981).
Gorer, Geoffrey. Death, Grief, and Mourning (New York: Arno Press, 1977).
Stearns, Peter N. Revolutions in Sorrow: The American Experience of Death in Global
Perspective (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007).
Stearns, Peter N., ed., Routledge Modern History of Death (London: Routledge,
2020).
On fascism,
Paxton, Robert O. The Anatomy of Fascism (New York: Knopf, 2004).
Redles, David. Hitler’s Millennial Reich: Apocalyptic Belief and the Search for Salvation
(New York: NYU Press, 2005).
On Ataturk,
Gokalp Ziya, and Robert Devereaux. The Principles of Turkism (Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1968).
Hanioğ lu, M. Şükrü. Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography, Revised Paperback Edition
On Gandhi,
Erikson, Erik H. Gandhi’s Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence, 1st ed.
(New York: Norton, 1969).
Gandhi, Rajmohan. Gandhi: The Man, His People, and the Empire. (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 2008).
11 Communist Happiness
Beginning with the Soviet Union in 1917, communist societies would play
a major role in world history for at least 80 years, with important echoes
still today. Communist leaders faced a fascinating dilemma concerning
happiness. On the one hand, happiness was a vital goal; there could be no
sidestepping happiness through references to duty or an afterlife. M
arxism,
and communism in its wake, was in this sense fully in the tradition of the
Enlightenment, even when it spread to societies outside the West.
While communists embraced happiness, they were resolutely opposed
to the kind of happiness that, in their view, was being emphasized in the
West itself. They saw Western-style happiness as inconsistent with their
commitment to social progress toward an ultimate goal of equality and
freedom. It risked in fact distracting ordinary people from the noble task
of building toward this ideal future. In this sense, Western-style happiness
was a bourgeois trap, a foreign lure, that had to be vigorously opposed.
So the question was how to define a definite but distinctive idea of hap-
piness. Part of the challenge was resolved by pointing to the future, but a
future here on earth: full happiness could not be achieved until the revo-
lution had completely obliterated all traces of capitalism and its trappings.
But hope was not enough. Communist leaders, eager to inspire popular
loyalty – and particularly, working-class loyalty – needed to offer some
happiness in the present as well.
The challenge of defining a communist approach to happiness became
even more acute when Cold War competition with the United States
heated up in the late 1940s. Americans made no bones about showing
their consumerist version of happiness at every turn, using international
fairs to tout the latest in kitchen conveniences and other consumer lures.
Communists, eager to prove the superiority of their system, were torn
between wanting to show they could beat Americans at their own game
through growing strength and prosperity, and continuing to work on a
distinctive definition of happiness.
By this point, the challenge of Marxist happiness was also being taken
up by the Chinese, after the communist victory in 1949. Here was another
opportunity to build an alternative version, with some explicitly Chinese
values added in as well.
Communist Happiness 165
It is vital to remember that all the major communist societies in the 20th
century were also seeking to accelerate the process of industrialization,
a process that Western societies had advanced a century or more before.
Early industrialization, as we have seen, places its own stresses and con-
straints on happiness, and this must factor into the assessment of commu-
nist alternatives as well.
The Soviet Commitment

Writing recently about Lenin, the leader of the communist victory in
Russia in 1917, A.J. Polan argues that Lenin’s fundamental vision resem-
bled that of Thomas Jefferson a century and a half before. Both men wanted
more than the removal of the evils of a current regime; they sought to
build a new society in which people would be able to achieve a new level
of happiness through a greater range of freedom. Lenin himself argued, in
defending the need for revolution, that Russians faced “two roads, free-
dom and happiness or the grave”.
To be sure, Lenin and other Russian leaders talked less frequently of
happiness than Enlightenment enthusiasts had done. They also, true to
Russian culture, smiled rather rarely, though Lenin apparently loved good
jokes and Stalin liked to portray a happy crowd looking up at him with
smiling faces. The whole Soviet project involved a complex mixture of
undeniable hopes for the future, when a socialist society would have been
fully constructed, and a deep interest in emphasizing measurable levels of
happiness in the new Russia that was already being built. But there was
no question that happiness was the ultimate goal, in contrast for example
to the fascist effort to move away from a concept of happiness altogether…
To many in a Western, and particularly American, audience, discus-
sion of Soviet happiness in any terms other than false propaganda may
seem odd, even objectionable. And there was no question, particularly
under Stalin in the 1930s and 1940s, of a strong element of outright
indoctrination – though even with this, it was revealing that so much ex-
plicit emphasis was placed on happiness. The regime relied heavily on fear
and repression, killing millions of its own citizens, especially under Stalin.
But it also massively expanded education, advanced public health and re-
duced child mortality, and provided many opportunities for mobility. Its
claims for happiness were not always entirely hollow.
It is also important to remember that Russia had established some
slightly skeptical approaches to happiness before the revolution. Commu-
nists would work hard to change prior culture, including a major assault
on established religion; and they certainly sought to construct a more posi-
tive attitude, explicitly attacking gloom or despair. But some of the themes
developed in the tsarist days were not entirely erased.
Work. Communist leaders were even more comfortable than happiness
advocates in the West in seeing work and economic life as the central
pillar of happiness – assuming the injustices of the capitalist system had
been eliminated. By the 1930s, posters of strong, hopeful workers and
peasants – rarely smiling, but certainly conveying a positive air, heads
held high – were becoming a staple of the government-sponsored Socialist
Realist style. In 1935, what was called the Stakhanovite movement was
launched, named for a coal miner, Alexy Stakhanov, who presumably pro-
duced 14 times his allotment of coal in a single shift. Heroic workers began
to be identified in all sorts of industries to symbolize Soviet economic ad-
vance and the rewards of hard work. Of course the program fit the agenda
of a regime pushing for rapid industrialization, but it also highlighted this
aspect of happiness. As Stakhanov’s daughter claimed, “He loved his job,
and everything he achieved was through his hard work.”
Childhood and youth. From the beginning, the Soviets placed great em-
phasis on the younger generation, hoping to convert it to a set of values
different from those of the tsarist days. Not only schools but various young
communist groups proliferated. By the 1930s, these efforts combined with
a growing need, centered on Stalin’s obsessive concern with loyalty, to
promote the successes of a regime now two decades old: the government
and communist party worked hard to convince people that progress was
occurring, that happiness was steadily gaining ground – and young people
formed a key audience.
“Thank you, dear comrade Stalin, for a happy childhood.” This motto
began to be painted over the entrances to kindergartens and nursery
schools. Even orphanages filled with similar messages. Posters depicting
a serious but benign Stalin in front of widely smiling young people be-
came common – a key part of the upbeat poster campaign more gener-
ally. Children’s stories filled with similar themes. The campaign featured
collective happiness – the whole society was advancing – not individual
fulfillment. But there was no doubt about the powerful emphasis.
Some of the literature directly addressed the idea that suffering was a
basic part of Russian culture. Communist success was meant to unseat
this image, with the promise of even further gains in the future. The
program also highlighted what it claimed was the obvious unhappiness of
capitalist society in the West: the mistreatment of workers, racism, lack of
opportunities for women. And every effort was made to embed this idea
of happiness deeply into personal life. The programs for children were one
aspect of this, but the happiness theme also infused popular cookbooks and
other materials. And, without question, many people were persuaded –
including some in Russia and Eastern Europe today who look back on the
communist period with deep nostalgia.
Collective programs. Soviet emphasis on happiness did not rest on propa-
ganda alone. Stalin and other leaders were deeply conscious of a need to
promote popular satisfaction, particularly in the growing working class –
despite the demands of an industrializing economy. While wages remained
rather low – with rewards for individual productivity – the regime worked
hard to provide a number of collective outlets for popular entertainment
and pleasure. The range of available performances steadily expanded, in-
cluding movies as well as theater and dance productions and, particularly
after World War II, a wide array of spectator sports.
State-sponsored vacations constituted the most ambitious effort, very
similar to what Nazi Germany was developing in the same period. Here
was a chance to provide reward for work but also an annual alternative,
without the need to cater to individual tastes. Huge beach resorts were
built on the Baltic and Black Sea coasts. Specialized programs catered to
youth groups, while more luxurious spas rewarded higher-ranking offi-
cials with thermal baths and other amenities.
By the 1970s and 1980s, Soviet tourism became even more venture-
some, encouraging vacation trips to other communist countries. By this
point, about half the population was taking an annual trip of some sort.
The program, despite its collective overtones, also promoted a sense of
personal choice and some degree of self-expression. People began to ar-
range their own specific trips and, obviously, had a growing range of in-
dividual options.
The dilemma of consumerism. When it came to more routine consum-
erism, and its potential relation to happiness, the Soviet regime faced a
more difficult problem, which it never fully resolved. There were two
constraints. First, despite increasingly successful industrialization, this was
not a wealthy society, and investments continued to privilege heavy indus-
try and weapons development. Building a rich range of consumer options
proved difficult. But the Soviets also worried about the individualist aspect
of consumerism, which conflicted with the interest in a more collective
definition of happiness and the desire to create a visible alternative to the
presumably decadent values of the capitalist West.
As a result, the goods available to most Russians tended to be of low
quality; by the 1960s for example, it was fairly easy to get television sets
but they often did not work well. Early on the Soviets converted a previ-
ous department store to a state-run operation nicknamed GUM, with a
prime location in Moscow. By the 1950s, 130,000 people were visiting the
Moscow emporium daily – second only, globally, to attendance at Macy’s
in the United States. But again, the products on display were inconsistent
at best.
Equally interesting, from the standpoint of happiness, was the lack of
attention to service. GUM clerks did not even have cash registers, using
abacuses instead. Waiting lines were long even for basic foods. Clerks were
not encouraged to smile, or even be particularly civil. In a proletarian
society it seemed more important to let clerks express themselves, despite
often grumpy results, rather than try to manipulate them emotionally.
But it was impossible to avoid consumerism entirely. As early as 1934
a luxury foods store opened in Moscow, for communist party bigwigs,
complete with imported delights. By the 1950s, more and more Russians
became at least vaguely aware of consumer standards in the West; this was
also the point at which the United States government began to use inter-
national fairs to brag about American appliances and the like. Even aside
from this, some attention began to be devoted to clothing, which was not
as uniformly drab as Western Cold Warriors liked to claim.
In 1959 the Russian premier, Nikita Khrushchev, visited the United
States, where his hosts again showed off American consumer styles. He was
genuinely shocked by the scanty costumes he saw on a Hollywood set – by
Soviet standards, public sexual display was another sign of d ecadence – but
he ended his visit with a revealingly ambiguous slogan: “We will bury
you,” in reference to the emphasis on consumer happiness in the United
States. Did this mean the Soviets would triumph with a different version
of happiness, or was it a boast that they could beat Americans at their own
game? The tension was never resolved, and contributed to the dissatis-
faction that ultimately brought the Soviet Union down at the end of the
1980s.
Communist China
As leaders like Mao Zedong worked to build a communist society in
China after they won control of the government in 1949, their approach
to happiness resembled that of the Soviet Union in many ways. However,
some crucial differences did emerge. China was a poorer country, wracked
by over a century of unrest and external invasion; building an industrial
society was a more demanding process, at least for several decades. Even
though Mao vigorously attacked Confucian traditions, Chinese culture
may have facilitated an emphasis on collective rather than individual
satisfactions.
As had occurred with the Soviets, Chinese leaders quickly began to
expand education and improve public health. They had fewer resources,
however, to build some of the community facilities that the Soviets high-
lighted, such as public resorts. Further, while pointing to the ultimate goal
of a classless society, Chinese communists in some ways were attempting
an even more dramatic social and cultural restructuring than had occurred
in the Soviet Union. For example, they tried to reduce the hold of individ-
ual families (while pressing for a high birth rate); a widespread system of
communes sought to introduce collective meals and limit separate family
activities.
Mao himself had considerable experience in working to orchestrate
changes in emotional patterns. During his long years of struggle against
Chinese opponents and Japanese invaders, with a largely peasant follow-
ing, he had emphasized the validity of anger against injustice, seeking to
modify traditional Confucian deference – with some success.
The Great Leap Forward. The Maoist approach to happiness went
through two somewhat distinct phases. In the first phase, extending into
the 1960s, great energy was devoted to what the leader called the Great
Leap Forward, seeking to promote rapid industrialization without how-
ever a strong technological infrastructure. The communist party urged
mass loyalty by emphasizing, on the one hand, deep indignation against
the traditional structures that had brought such misery to the people, and
on the other, equally deep hope in rapid progress. Small-group meet-
ings highlighted “enemies” of the working class, including older ways of
thinking, but also emphasized what one scholar has called “euphoria” –
excited hopes for an imminent brighter future. One revealing motto sug-
gested the basic message: “Hard work for a few years, be happy for a
thousand”.
This approach placed little emphasis on happiness here and now. Con-
sumer options were extremely limited, as the government tried to mo-
bilize all available resources for investments in the future. Clothing, for
example, was deliberately drab: following Mao’s lead, a unisex jacket,
usually in muted colors, was widely adopted. At most, inspiration from
Mao himself was supposed to provide uplift “Chairman Mao said a word,
Happiness dropped from the sky”; thanks to the Leader’s vision, “the sound
of happiness is like thunder…old people laughed till they cried.” Thanks to
Mao and the Communist Party, “any miracle” can be created.
This encompassing propaganda utilized some of the same apparatus that
Stalinists had employed in the Soviet Union. Images of a “happy Mao”
were distributed. Posters often proclaimed simply, “Chairman Mao gives
us a happy life,” complete with smiling crowds.
A new debate. The Great Leap Forward, however, was a gigantic failure,
and by the 1960s widespread disillusionment called Mao’s own position
into question. Many younger Party members, particularly, began to ex-
press an interest in more material possessions and greater leisure time. The
result, briefly, was an intriguing, if somewhat manipulated, discussion of
what happiness was all about, now that future-oriented euphoria had be-
come insufficient.
Here was the new wisdom: “Happiness is a Hard Day’s Work”. Mao and
his followers began to emphasize this new message in the mid-1960s. His
statement capped a yearlong, rather public debate about the nature of hap-
piness in communist China. A number of newspapers, first in the northern
region, then nationwide, began instead to suggest the need for greater
satisfaction here and now. As a writer from Hainan island put it, “I do not
agree with the opinion of some comrades that ‘hardship is happiness’.”
“What is the use of the products of this kind of labor or hard labor? Do we
not labor for the sake of enjoying these products and material things?” Or
another: “I think that happiness means leading a peaceful and pleasant life,
not a life of fighting amid hardship every day.”
After some hesitation, the Party came down hard on this soft, “bour-
geois” definition of happiness. Newspapers that carried the appeals soon
featured explicit correctives, causing some to believe that the whole debate
was a setup to highlight the “right” approach and to help identify enemies
of the revolution who might need “special education.” To be sure, prog-
ress was not going to be easy, but it must involve far more than material
goods; moral qualities must be “appreciably raised”: “The happiest and
most satisfactory Communist society…is the result of selfless labor and
arduous struggle carried out for a long time by our revolutionary forerun-
ners and our revolutionary successors.”
“Since the bourgeoisie regard personal happiness as above everything
else, their idea of so-called happiness naturally consists of eating, drinking
and having a good time.”
As far as the proletariat is concerned, collective happiness is above

individual happiness, spiritual life is above material life….We shall
not hesitate to go through thick and thin and then our whole spiritual
world will be filled with a sense of pride and happiness.
This was a more extreme approach than that taken by most Soviet lead-
ers. It argued that even after the achievement of communism, “arduous
labor” would still be necessary. Devotion to the cause, fighting for the
people and noble ideals, would always be the essence of “glory and hap-
piness”. The definition was arguably rather vague: what happiness was
not was much clearer than what it was or would be. The spiritual refer-
ences were left unspecified. But there was little mistaking Mao’s desire
to maintain the sense of struggle that had brought him to power in the
first place.
Cultural revolution. The new emphasis went well beyond rhetoric, as Mao
introduced what would come to be called the “cultural revolution” (offi-
cially, the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution”) in 1966. R emnants of
older institutions and ideas were brutally attacked by groups of commu-
nist youth called the Red Guards. Local communist leaders were assailed,
amid the new authorization to struggle and rebel. Institutions like univer-
sities were substantially dismantled.
In this effort, many intellectuals and students were forced to go to the
countryside, to engage in agricultural labor that would presumably purge
them of residual “bourgeois” sentiments, deliberately disrupting their lives
at the time and, as things turned out, often well into the future. Here was
a concrete illustration of the notion that work for the collective cause was
the essence of happiness.
The cultural revolution itself failed by the mid-1970s, and Mao himself
died in 1976. China soon adopted a host of new policies that included
new limitations on family size, greater encouragement for conventional
economic growth and even some private initiative, and far more exten-
sive contacts with the outside world. As with the Soviet Union ten years
later, though without a formal renunciation of communism, China was
launched on a new path.
Aftermath
The communist attempt to develop a distinctive approach to happiness
was intriguing. This was hardly the first effort to attack material pleasures
and entertainments for their inadequacy or to insist that happiness must
be based on some higher principles. It was, however, the most extensive
program that had emerged since the West’s happiness revolution, the most
ambitious attempt to develop alternatives within the context of an indus-
trializing society. The program was shaped in part by the political needs
of the communist parties and the leadership cults of Stalin and Mao, but
it also responded to a valid underlying question about the purpose of life
in an industrial age.
The effective failure of the most ambitious experiments did raise a fur-
ther question, for Russia and China alike: after decades of intense propa-
ganda and systematic attacks on what was seen as a Western approach, how
would happiness now be defined? Could some other option be developed?
Answers to the question are still being developed. Considerable nostal-
gia for the days of Stalin or Mao – surprising, to most outside observers –
reflects the power of the earlier communist message and the difficulty of
defining acceptable alternatives. Both China and Russia have also seen
a greater emphasis on nationalism; both have seen a partial revival of
religion – though in the Chinese case particularly, carefully monitored
by the state.
But both countries have also witnessed a considerable turn to more
consumerist values. By the 1990s a breed of so-called “new Russians”
emerged, essentially a new urban middle class, eager to take advantage
of a growing array of consumer goods. A similar phenomenon occurred
in China as industrial prosperity mounted; a new online shopping day
for example, introduced on 11/11/2011 as “Singles’ Day”, quickly be-
came the largest consumer festival in the world. Studies early in the 21st
century claimed that most Chinese were now defining a good life in
terms of adequate “freedom to choose” and “having the means to obtain
desired resources.” To be sure, this appeal to more self-expression might
be leavened with a bit of traditional wisdom as well, as with a father who
advised his adult son, in 2002: “Strive to be content and you will find
pleasure.” But the new orientation was a far cry from the days of Stalin
or Mao.
In China particularly, new levels of individual ambition emerged, further
suggesting a recalibration of ideas about happiness. “I struggle for a better
life. It is this struggle to improve that makes life worth living.” “I want to
embrace and enjoy life as much as I can.” “I want a challenge. Money isn’t
everything, but it is important these days.” Or most succinctly: “Happiness
is a good motive.” Attitudes of this sort often focus not only on personal
satisfactions and self-fulfillment, but on a commitment to creating oppor-
tunities for an even better life for one’s child. Emotional commitment to
the nuclear family, and for women particularly an intense bond with what
is usually a single child, also loom large in the contemporary value system.
Both in Russia and China, experiences shared with other consumer so-
cieties form a growing part of the contemporary picture, from Shanghai’s
Disneyland to spectator passions for sports like soccer and basketball. A
student in Shanghai explains that he likes to go to McDonalds restaurants
not because the food is better, but because it gives him a sense of partic-
ipating in a cultural experience with youth around the world. A Russian
woman describes her first visit to McDonalds when it opened in Moscow
in 1990: she was so excited that she kept the burger wrapper as a souvenir.
She was particularly impressed with the smiling employees who actually
wiped the table after a customer left. (The smiles reflected deliberate com-
pany policy, as against the national tradition.)
Questions remain, however, in both countries. In both cases, after all,
distinctive earlier approaches to happiness leave a legacy, and the commu-
nist experiment itself, as well as its disappointments, are recent memories.
While some observers find happiness levels higher in China than they
were in the Maoist past, others note the nation’s relatively low interna-
tional ranking and some probable slippage in recent years. Russia, also,
has faced a happiness problem, judging by international polls. The dis-
locations of rapid industrialization – and the extent to which many peo-
ple, particularly in the countryside, feel left out – definitely leave a mark.
Russians’ widespread willingness, under Vladimir Putin’s presidency, to
emphasize national aspirations over consumer goals raises another set of is-
sues. People in both these major countries may still be experimenting with
post-communist options for happiness. Finally, the turn toward greater
authoritarianism after 2013, particularly in China, has seen a revival of
propagandistic uses of happiness reminiscent of the earlier communist
systems. Thus when authorities destroyed a Uighur cemetery in north-
west China, as part of the larger repressive effort, they installed a recre-
ation center that they revealingly named, “Happiness Park”. Concerned
about relatively low international rankings, the Chinese government, and
many individual Chinese scholars, have worked to address the problem of
advancing happiness by encouraging new consumer outlets – more feel-
good films, amusement parks – and also by promotional rhetoric.
Further Reading
On the Soviet Union,
Balina, Marina, and Evengy Dobrenko, eds. Petrified Utopia: Happiness Soviet Style
(London; New York; Delhi: Anthem Press, 2009).
Bonnell, Victoria E. Iconography of Power: Soviet Political Posters under Lenin and
Stalin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).
Boym, Svetlana. Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia (Cambridge,
Koenker, Diane P. Club Red Vacation Travel and the Soviet Dream (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2016).
Pisch, Anita. The Personality Cult of Stalin in Soviet Posters, 1929–1953: Archetypes,
Inventions and Fabrications (Acton: Australian National University Press, 2016).
Polan, Antony J. Lenin and the End of Politics (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984).
On China,
Pye, Lucian W. “Mao Tse-tung’s Leadership Style.” Political Science Quarterly 91,
no. 2 (1976): 219–235.
Schram, Stuart R. (Stuart Reynolds). Mao Tsê-Tung (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1967).
Yu, Liu. “Maoist Discourse and the Mobilization of Emotions in Revolutionary
China.” Modern China 36, no. 3 (May 1, 2010): 329–362.
On more recent developments,
Fong, Vanessa L. Only Hope: Coming of Age under China’s One-Child Policy
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
Stites, Richard. Russian Popular Culture: Entertainment and Society since 1900
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
Tang, Wenfang, and William L. Parish. Chinese Urban Life under Reform: The
Changing Social Contract (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
12 Comparing Happiness
in Contemporary Societies
Is it useful to try to compare levels of happiness from one country to the

next? The answer is not entirely clear, for there is a real danger of juxtapos-
ing apples and oranges. But it is certainly tempting to try, and the process
can generate some important findings even if some basic questions cannot
be definitively answered. While some duly cautious historians have shied
away from the challenge, other social scientists have been eager to jump in.
This chapter focuses on regional developments concerning happiness
since World War II, largely beyond the implicit debate between commu-
nist and Western approaches. For, even in decades in which global contacts
increased notably, regional features continued to play a great role in both
levels and conceptions of happiness. In turn, the regional factor highlights
the opportunities for comparison – but also the complexities involved.
The obvious problem centers on the tension between features that can
be juxtaposed with a fair degree of accuracy – like Gross National Prod-
uct, or life expectancy – and cultural attributes that are much harder to pin
down. Distinctive beliefs and values, and even particular political systems,
can significantly evaluations of happiness quite apart from specific eco-
nomic or demographic conditions. Differences in language often express
this cultural component. The recent international happiness rankings
cited in the introductory chapter already suggested some of these issues.
This chapter, though by no means suggesting a full global comparison,
explores some dimensions of the challenge in two ways. First, we will
briefly consider the results of two elaborate research efforts undertaken
in the late 1950s/early 1960s and mid-1970s, respectively. Then we will
venture two case studies, for India and Japan, respectively, where distinc-
tive cultural factors play a substantial role in shaping the expectations and
experiences of happiness.
Projects in the Social Sciences

While polling data explicitly targeting happiness on a cross-national level
did not develop until recently, social scientists in the postwar decades ea-
gerly measured closely related topics like hopes and fears or anticipations of
the future. Two major projects found significant but not fully predictable
Comparing Happiness in Contemporary Societies 175
differences among a number of different nations. One, led by Hadley
Cantril on the “patterns of human concerns”, offered an elaborate survey
covering various nations drawn from wealthy/capitalist, communist, and
other countries including Brazil, India, the Philippines, and Nigeria. The
survey was conducted in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in a period of con-
siderable global economic growth and, in some societies, great optimism
about the promise offered by recent political change (national indepen-
dence in Nigeria, the recent communist revolution in Cuba). A second
study in the early 1970s, on anticipations of the year 2000, surveyed ten
countries representing similar global clusters.
Both studies concluded that national patterns tended to override in-
ternal differences. Everywhere, to be sure, distinctions based on living
standards and educational levels mattered, as did age and (more rarely)
gender. Internal variations were more evident in some cases than others:
more in India and the Philippines, for example, than in the United States
or Cuba (with the important exception, in the United States, of African
A mericans, whose frustration levels were unusually high). But something
of an overall tone could be captured nevertheless, which is where the na-
tional component predominated.
Around 1960. Several conclusions can be drawn from the ambitious ef-
fort to categorize major concerns about 15 years after World War II.
First, very broadly speaking, people in different countries reflected sim-
ilar characteristics relevant to happiness. Almost always, economic fac-
tors loomed largest when people tried to evaluate hopes and anxieties.
Health and family issues followed closely. Personal concerns of this sort
always outweighed larger topics such as political structure or international
conditions. People in a few countries did project some larger interests.
West Germans, fresh from defeat in war and caught in the midst of the
Cold War, worried about peace when they assessed their individual sit-
uation; recent instability pushed political concerns up on the agenda in
the D ominican Republic and Brazil. Nowhere, however, did larger issues
outweigh the primacy of more personal criteria.
Further, Cantril and his colleagues concluded that almost everywhere,
at this point in time, hopes outweighed worries. They also noted that
growing global knowledge was contributing to shared aspirations for a
better life.
Second, some of the key differences among countries were entirely
predictable based on levels of economic development. Thus, when West
Germans or Americans talked about their standard of living aspirations,
they referred to bigger cars, possibly a boat, opportunities for travel, or (in
the United States) the ability to send the children to private schools. Ref-
erences to health, and hopes for better health, were also more common in
the prosperous nations. Americans frequently noted their expectation that
their children would be able to do better than their parents – usually with
considerable confidence.
The conversation was far different in Egypt, or Nigeria, or India, where
more widespread poverty clearly constrained aspirations. An Egyptian
noted, “I would like to have more sons to help me with my farming”; he
also wanted a cow. Two times more Indians than Americans talked about
outright inadequacy or economic deterioration. Indians often mentioned
hopes for enough land to avoid starvation; one respondent went a bit
further in talking about the desirability of running water and maybe
even access to electricity. Often these narrow, though completely under-
standable concerns spilled over other domains: Indian respondents, for
example, expressed few specific fears or hopes regarding their children,
for immediate issues seemed more pressing. In the Philippines, comments
or expectations concerning health were impressively infrequent, com-
pared to the predominance of references to the economy or the family.
Fatalistic statements like “I can only hope that God will help me” were
not uncommon.
Key attitudes in communist countries fell in between what was then
often called the “first” and “third” worlds – mirroring their intermediate
position in economic development. Poles talked about hopes for better
housing – rather than discussing either starvation or the need for a bigger
car. They were careful to note that they had made great progress in the
previous five years and expected more in the five years to come, while
recognizing that they had a long way to go.
All this said, the most impressive conclusion to draw from the studies of
the Cantril team was the real unpredictability of many crucial attitudes –
the lack of full correspondence to any economic development scale. A
number of key contrasts, particularly within the category of wealthy, in-
termediate, or poorer nations, highlighted cultural preferences indepen-
dent of material standards.
Thus references to the role of the family in happiness varied greatly:
far more common in the United States than in West Germany, or in
still-Catholic Poland than in more secular Yugoslavia. Within the less-
economically developed category, only in Egypt and the Philippines did
a large minority of people report that they valued wealth for its own sake,
rather than linking it to other goals.
But the most important unpredictability centered on hope. Nigerians,
newly independent though on average very poor, looked forward to great
personal and national advancement in the future. Indians and Brazilians,
in contrast, seemed apathetic and resigned. They conveyed little sense of
either individual or social progress. Indians, particularly, frequently used
religious references to explain how they must accept their lot in life during
their present incarnation.
Levels of aspiration varied, another element in defining hopes. A mericans
were far more complacent than West Germans, or Yugoslavs, or Nigerians.
They were not apathetic so much as satisfied. They did discuss progress
in their personal lives, but they essentially took it for granted. Yugoslavs,
under unusually competent communist leadership, Israelis, Nigerians, and
West Germans were more ambitiously hopeful.
Again, this was not directly a study about happiness. One can debate
whether complacency or hope for a brighter future is a better measure of
happiness. But the differences the Cantril group uncovered, and partic-
ularly the areas where national distinctions clearly reflected some special
political or cultural factors, clearly highlight the complex variables in-
volved in personal attitudes and expectations.
Looking toward 2000. A cluster of social scientists surveyed ten countries
in the early 1970s, asking people how they anticipated the upcoming new
century, just 25 years away. Two questions, touching, on happiness ex-
plicitly, revealed a great deal about expectations, offering further evidence
about the complex role of hope.
Thus in India, 52% of those polled argued that happiness would be
greater in 2000 than it was at present. And a full 46% said that the present
was so unhappy that only the future mattered. In contrast, Czechoslovaks,
under communist rule, while even more hopeful about the future (57%),
were noticeably less glum about the present (31% saying that things were
so bad today that only the future mattered).
In contrast, probably predictably given their greater average prosperity,
Britons, Norwegians, and Dutch were notably less focused on the future.
Only 10% of Norwegians, for example, thought that happiness would be
greater a quarter-century out. But very few of this group had soured on
the present: only 17% of the Norwegians said that things were so bad to-
day that all they could do was think about the future.
Data of this sort are not entirely clear-cut. Were the majority of Indians
really optimistic at this point (in contrast to the apathy that seemed to
prevail, in the Cantril study, just 15 years earlier)? Or did their expec-
tations about 2000 mainly reflect their sense that things were really bad
right now: how, in other words, did optimism and pessimism balance out?
Were Norwegians less convinced that the future would be better because
they were so pleased with the present, or because they had greater doubts
about whether new technologies and further economic development really
brought progress? The scholars involved in the project wondered whether
people in some highly developed societies, like Norway, had somewhat
soured on the magical prospects of future technologies.
Data from Japan suggested further complexity in the role of economic
development in shaping evaluations of happiness. While the Japanese ex-
pressed more hopes for the future than the West Europeans did, at 36%,
they were markedly uncomfortable with the present despite the rapid
economic growth around them. Almost as large a group as in I ndia,
at 42%, said that the current situation was so bad that only the future
mattered – raising the same question as in India about whether their ra-
tios really reflected optimism or rather the high levels of contemporary
unease.
Both the Cantril and the Year 2000 studies are now more than a half-
century old. They do not reflect current material or cultural realities –
much has altered since then, and we already know that beliefs about happi-
ness can change, sometimes quite rapidly. But the data are worth remem-
bering both as a bit of a benchmark that can be used to evaluate particular
national situations more closely – such as, for example, the elusive topic of
happiness in Japan; and as a wider reminder that there is simply no ready
formula that can fully anticipate values and expectations in this aspect of
the human experience. Regional conditions, offering distinctive combi-
nations of beliefs and standards of living, continue to shape evaluations of
happiness even in a globalizing world.
Happiness in India
Since gaining independence in 1947, India’s contemporary history has
been a considerable success story. Unusually among former colonies, the
nation has preserved democratic forms – becoming the largest democracy
in the world. Despite ongoing inequality, the caste system has been out-
lawed and considerable efforts undertaken to undo its legacy. Conditions
for women have improved – again, despite continuing problems; rates of
child marriage, for example, have dropped. While considerable child labor
persists, levels have fallen, and education has spread. The economy has
expanded; agricultural production now limits the risk of famine, and in
recent decades overall economic growth rates have soared, creating a large
middle class. The nation has avoided major war.
To be sure, India’s development has been more modest than that of
neighboring China. Urban growth has been considerable, but the nation
maintains a rural majority. Poverty levels have dropped and access to mod-
ern amenities such as electricity and running water has improved, but deep
problems persist. Endemic political tensions include difficult relationships
between the Hindu majority and a large Muslim minority.
India’s trajectory over recent decades raises some basic questions about
happiness: have improvements in levels of satisfaction followed from the
substantial changes that have occurred – or have these been too rapid, or
not rapid enough? How do contemporary trends interact with more tra-
ditional views about happiness, including those espoused by people like
Mohandas Gandhi in the decades before independence? Interpretation is
further complicated by the vast size and internal regional and social dif-
ferences amid the Indian population. It is unsurprising that no one size
fits all.
Hedonism. All societies, from the formation of civilization onward, have
offered opportunities for material pleasure, particularly of course for the
upper classes, and despite its deep religious traditions India has been no ex-
ception. Classical India in fact produced an exceptionally elaborate manual
concerning sexual pleasure, the Kama Sutra, and there were philosophers
as well who advocated sensual enjoyments. The region has also generated
some of the world’s most sophisticated culinary traditions.
During the past several decades, urbanization and economic develop-
ment have produced wider opportunities for pleasure. India does not lead
the world in consumerism, but consumer interests have expanded, partic-
ularly in the growing middle classes. New customs, such as beauty pag-
eants, have been imported with considerable success, while also drawing
traditionalist criticism.
India has also generated the world’s largest movie industry, particularly
around the productions collectively known as Bollywood, and while Indian
films are quite varied, an unabashedly escapist tone has predominated since
the industry began to take hold in the interwar period. Bollywood movies
typically combine music, action, and romance (often with considerable sex-
uality), adapting traditional Hindu stories to a modern setting. B ollywood
films draw large audiences, eager for their money’s worth from perfor-
mances that often last three hours; they are usually rewarded with tales of
individual heroism, star-crossed lovers, and appealing show tunes. The im-
portance of this form of pleasure translates into great fame and considerable
fortune for the leading Bollywood stars, male and female alike.
More recently, television has amplified some of the pleasures available
from going to the movies. While only 10% of all Indian households had
a TV set in 1990, by 1999, after a decade of rapid economic growth, this
figure soared to 75%. Entertainment fare now broadened to include a wide
variety of dubbed Hollywood movies – which provoke a mixture of de-
light and disapproval. Interestingly, reflecting growing consumerism, ad-
vertisements in India are even more likely than those of the West to claim
that their products will increase happiness.
A variety of efforts during the past several decades have sought to
blend Indian consumerism with more traditional entertainment forms.
Bollywood’s reliance on older storylines provides one example of this. A
number of programs designed to increase happiness feature popular pre-
sentations of customary music and dance styles. Some efforts, admittedly,
fall flat: an effort to combine a beauty pageant with expertise in regional
culture failed because the people who knew the culture refused to com-
pete for beauty, while the contestants who did present themselves knew
little about the culture. But in other cases, the combination has worked
well and can mediate between newer forms of pleasure and older values.
Traditional themes. Deep commitments to Hinduism among India’s ma-
jority provide opportunities for vigorous assertion of older ideas of happi-
ness, from a variety of thinkers and popularizers. Often, these play against
the trappings of modernity, with insistence that happiness does not come
from social mobility or consumer pleasures but must center on spiritual
growth. A number of advocates urge in fact that Indian values offer inter-
national inspiration for genuine well-being, against the shallower ideas of
happiness generated by consumer societies.
Quotes from several recent essays on happiness reflect the Hindu frame-
work. “Happiness lies deep within us, in the very core of our being.
Happiness does not exist in any external object, but only in us, who are the
consciousness that experiences happiness.” “Whatever turmoil our mind
may be in, in the center of our being there always exists a state of perfect
peace and joy, like the calm in the eye of a storm….Happiness is thus a
state of being – a state in which our mind’s habitual agitation is calmed.”
Ideas of this sort, explicitly conveying values expressed in the great Hindu
epics, have a substantial audience in India and indeed beyond. The themes
of detachment from the illusions of the external world, and the importance
of inner cultivation, continue to be emphasized by a variety of I ndian
thinkers.
This approach also highlights the importance of collective well-being,
and not just health and happiness for the self. Everyone should have the op-
portunity for a happy life, and not simply a few particularly spiritual leaders.
A traditional prayer thus gains new attention: “May all be happy, may all
be free from disease. May all perceive good, and not suffer from sorrow.”
The centrality of family. A recent anthropological study of happiness India,
by Steve Derné, stresses the strong hold of a rather traditionalist com-
mitment to family, and while this is not unrelated to the more spiritual
approach it offers different emphases and tensions. The focus here is on
group support and connectedness, heavily centered on relationships be-
tween adult children and their parents. Evidence in this particular study
comes from upper-class Hindus, and it is not clear how widely representa-
tive the findings are. The happy family, according to these respondents, is
based on a distinctive, or at least decidedly non-Western, approach to love.
Families are formed on a sense of duty, and love derives from this rather
than the other way around; nor is love focused on the spouse alone. In-
deed, the spouse may not seem to have any special qualities at all, but sim-
ply serves to anchor a family that is judged primarily in terms of pleasing
older parents. Too much purely spousal love is in fact dangerous, because
it might induce a couple to become “careless” and “forget their duties
to their (wider) families.” Further, the love involved is not confined to
family but spills over into a love for the whole society. Always, there is an
abiding concern about how one’s behavior will be judged by others – and
particularly the family elders. As one man put it, nothing should be done
“without asking father”. “Our mental state is that all problems are solved
in the way father says.”
This approach to happiness explicitly prioritizes custom and group ap-
proval, with no interest in individual self-fulfillment. The importance of
arranged, parentally approved marriage remains central; polls show that
over two-thirds of all Indians believe in arranged marriages, including a
majority even in the lower classes – though in an urbanizing society the
matches are not always easy to orchestrate. Some men, frankly stating
that they do not like the wives their parents found for them, nevertheless
say they are happy because they are fulfilling their duty to their elders.
More generally, many Indians feel very uneasy in situations where senior
authority figures are not involved or where their support cannot be deter-
mined. At most, there is some admission that individual wishes cannot be
entirely subordinated, that a person should be able to make some decisions
on his or her own – an example used was wanting to go to the movies
whether parents approved or not.
The family-centered definition of happiness allows many Indians
to filter the entertainment fare now available to them, allowing many
Hollywood themes, such as rampant sexuality, to be either ignored or
disapproved. As one man put it in 2001, “Love marriages are only stories
in films. In real life they are not possible…. I know I’ll marry according
to my parents’ wishes.” At the same time, there is real concern that the
television fare now available may undermine family values. This can lead
to outright protests, as in riots that chased couples from a restaurant when
they were trying to celebrate Valentine’s day (an obvious foreign import).
In a changing society, India’s approach to happiness and family could be-
come an active source of anxiety or contestation.
The puzzle. When international happiness polls began in the 21st century,
it was striking – and to some, truly surprising – that India ranked extraor-
dinarily low. In 2019, it stood at 140 out of 156 countries tallied, just barely
above societies in clear crisis like Syria or South Sudan. This was obviously
well below levels of nations that might otherwise seem roughly comparable
in terms of economic development, like China or Russia.
Most observers seeking to interpret the results tended to focus on short-
term issues, in particular a rash of new problems in India – a recently
slowing growth rate, new levels of political turmoil around a controversial
though popular president – that pushed the nation’s low rankings even
lower (from 133 to 140 in the most recent polls).
Surely, however, recent deterioration was far less significant than the
low position in the first place – and this brings us back to some of the
basic problems in interpreting the Indian case. Possibly the lags in Indian
development were simply not matching the expectations of key segments
of the population, who could see that societies that were changing more
rapidly, like neighboring China, were doing better. (Remember how a
majority of Indians, in the mid-1970s, had assumed that happiness would
be greater by 2000.) Or, the change that was occurring seemed too great
for many Indians, given more traditional ideas of happiness – there was too
much strain on family values, too much distraction from the older ideals of
spiritual development. Or, the mixture of Indian ideas of happiness simply
did not comport well with an internationally based questionnaire that
tended to highlight an individual’s state of mind – in which case the poll
results, though interesting, were not really indicative of Indian happiness
at all. Is this fundamentally another case of a distinctive, valid approach to
happiness that just does not fit currently conventional notions?
It is frustrating for a student of happiness not to be able to pick defin-
itively among these options. It would be far tidier to be able to say, 35%
of India’s lag results from the inappropriateness of the polls, 35% from
inadequate modernization, and the remainder from excessive moderniza-
tion. Obviously, this kind of precision is impossible. It is clear that India
maintains a distinctive approach to happiness, while sharing in some of the
newer global interests; and that there seem to be significant issues about
the levels of satisfaction that currently result.
Japan
Several building blocks for happiness in modern Japan were clearly set
before 1945, though the devastating loss in war inevitably raised new chal-
lenges (including a postwar plunge in happiness levels). The Japanese had
already moved toward an approach to happiness that was less individualis-
tic than its Western counterpart. However, to the extent that the alterna-
tive had involved a heavy emphasis on nationalism, it had to be rethought
after 1945 when defeat in war raised inescapable questions about the na-
tion’s priorities. Further, greater exposure to American influence during
the postwar occupation, and even more the steady advance of the Japanese
economy that created greater opportunities for consumerism, introduced
new factors as well.
There is little question that postwar adjustments encouraged several rel-
evant changes in Japanese culture. The decline of aggressive nationalism
did not eliminate national pride – there was still great celebration, for
example, for success in international sports competitions – but adjustments
did occur, and certainly a military value system ebbed considerably. Reli-
gion also shifted. Japanese regimes before the war had strongly emphasized
the traditional Shinto religion, but this was now partially discredited.
While a number of vigorous Buddhist groups arose, and the Japanese gen-
erally continued to use Buddhist and Shinto rituals for occasions like fu-
nerals, religion came to play a lesser role in daily life. Changes of this sort
might well impinge on happiness, potentially affecting some meaningful
options.
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 1, the recent advent of global happiness
surveys highlights another parameter: the fact that the Japanese, despite
their economic and political achievements over the past 70 years, tend to
score in the middle of the range – noticeably lower than one might expect.
As with India, it is not easy to determine how meaningful these results
are, but they certainly suggest, from another angle, a distinctive Japanese
take on happiness.
The concept of ikigai. One anthropologist, trying to explain the relation-
ship between Japanese approaches to happiness and patterns in the United
States, or the West more generally, emphasizes the central importance of
the term ikigai, which centers on the question of what makes one’s life
worth living, or which seeks to identify the focus in life that creates this
sense of worth. The Japanese often discuss the term – more often than
they discuss happiness directly, resulting in statements like “my ikigai is my
family” or “mine is mountain climbing.” The term crops up frequently
in book and magazine titles throughout the postwar decades, and it is also
the subject of national polls, as when 24% of all mothers claim that their
ikigai is their children.
The word suggests something of a tension between a sense of individual
fulfillment and a larger sense of obligation. Thus many Japanese men pro-
fess that work is their ikigai, but while in some cases this means that they
find work rewarding, probably more often it reflects a deep loyalty to their
employing company. Women similarly are often devoted to their family
mainly in terms of fulfilling a sense of duty or obligation in that particular
role. Here is one way that the Japanese approach to happiness is less likely
to reflect a desire for self-expression than is true in the West. Where ikigai
involves fulfilling a duty, it also indicates a commitment to a group and
group norms – an older theme that persists in modern Japanese culture. It
is relatively easy, for example, to shame a worker into staying late for over-
time by asking about his loyalty. On the other hand, it is important to note
that people have some choice in deciding their ikigai, often fairly early in
life, even though some choices – like a predominant work focus for men –
are particularly socially encouraged. This kind of tension between indi-
vidual fulfillment and group norms arguably goes back to the Meiji era.
In postwar Japan, ikigai rarely has any religious connotations, in con-
trast, for example, to definitions of happiness for many Americans that
often have a strong religious component. Here too, the Japanese depen-
dence on a sense of group belonging and approval is particularly strong,
displacing the need for religious validation.
During most of the postwar period, dominant expressions of ikigai have
been highly gender specific. Men choose work, which means abundant
devotion to the employer and typically very long hours, clearly at the
expense of much family time. And while salary levels are not irrelevant,
there is more focus on group performance; this contrasts with the more
ambivalent, often instrumental approaches to work common in the West.
Women, for their part, center on the family and the extensive duties of a
good mother, which involve not only childrearing but careful oversight of
a child’s educational progress. Needless to say, this male/female contrast
can generate significant tensions within the family itself, where annoyed
wives have to come to terms with the fact that their husbands’ commit-
ment lies elsewhere.
Pleasures. Satisfactions in Japan are not captured by ikigai alone. The
nation offers robust opportunities for enjoyment, ranging from somewhat
traditional and distinctive outlets, such as the famous public baths, to some
of the more standard pursuits of a consumer society. It is no accident that
Japan, along with the United States, has led the world for many decades
in the creation of new toys and playthings for children, or has pioneered
in entertaining forms of animation. Many Japanese children, carefully en-
couraged to do well in school, are often given extensive compensatory
play times.
Some distinguishing features apply even in this category. The Japanese
are ardent consumers, but they also save more than their American coun-
terparts. Drinking plays a noticeable role in Japanese male culture. The
Japanese baths have few counterparts elsewhere; one study argues that they
involve more acute sensory pleasures than most Westerners seek, and they
certainly provide opportunities for family engagement, as when fathers
play with their sons in a public bath. As noted earlier, even gift-buying
can express somewhat distinctive values. When the Japanese visit the
Disneyland gift shop near Tokyo, they typically buy presents for friends
and family; their American counterparts, in California or Florida, buy
items for themselves.
Still, it is important not to overdo the distinctions. Japan plays a strong
role in global consumer culture, which means that it shares in and helps
guide widely popular forms of entertainment. A study around 2010
showed that Japanese rated entertainment a slightly greater priority than
the British did, though both were a bit lower than American levels. A
focus on the family is another broadly common feature, despite gender
distinctions. While the same 2010 study showed a much lower priority
for marriage or romantic love in Japan, commitment to family itself was
almost as strong as in the West – everywhere heading the list of factors
regarded as essential to happiness.
Deterioration? Early in the 21st century, 65% of the Japanese rated them-
selves happy or somewhat happy compared to 84% in the UK and 88% in
the United States. A similar, and revealing, gap involved hope: 49% of the
Japanese, but 60% and 65% of Britons and Americans, respectively, said
they were hopeful about the future, and there were even greater disparities
in degree of confidence about whether hopes would be realized.
Some of these distinctions can be fairly readily explained. Japan’s lower
levels of religious commitment contrast with the role of religion in sup-
porting American hopes, and we have seen that the challenging relation-
ship between ikigai and happiness complicates polling results whenever
Japan is involved.
But almost all observers believe that happiness levels in Japan have been
dropping in recent decades, despite the nation’s affluence and some of
the highest life expectancy levels in the world. Two or three factors are
involved.
First, the Japanese economy fell into prolonged doldrums by the 1990s,
after decades of gains; this stagnation objectively limited living standards
and also dented any sense of optimism about the future. Even a still-
prosperous society, in the industrial age, may depend on a sense of con-
tinued advance.
Second, many Japanese are rethinking ikigai or transferring it to a
greater sense of self-realization. While working hours for men remain
long, the stress this causes has become more visible. Further, in the trou-
bled economy, more employers are offering only short-term employment
arrangements, rather than lifetime guarantees; why, then, commit one’s
sense of obligation to the company? For their part increasing numbers
of women are pushing back at the idea of primary family commitments.
They seek jobs; they are often reluctant to have children; many even avoid
marriage – all in the interest of gaining opportunities to carve out their
own course in life.
Third, Japan’s rapid aging creates its own stresses. Many older people,
having devoted adult life to work or family, find it hard to define happi-
ness once their active period has passed. And large numbers are simply
alone, in a society that values group context.
The overall result is a society that is visibly reevaluating what life is
all about, and this, more than any objective deterioration, seems to be
responsible for the challenge to happiness. We will see that some of these
issues carry over into other advanced industrial societies as well, but they
have been particularly marked in Japan.
***
Four points emerge clearly from a focus on regional approaches to

happiness – apart from the obvious fact that it would be desirable to be
able to include even more parts of the world in this kind of analysis.
First, as noted above, dealing with happiness cross-culturally is very
difficult, precisely because of crucial differences in language and meaning.
Comparisons are revealing, but they also show how difficult it is to eval-
uate definitions of happiness that are unfamiliar – as with the distinctive
familial component in Indian evaluations, or the idea of ikigai in Japan.
Even amid globalization, vital regional distinctions remain.
Second, happiness does not correlate precisely with objective criteria
such as Gross National Product, though these are relevant in comparative
analysis to some degree. Almost every student of happiness knows this,
but it is important to emphasize given the importance many economists
continue to place on what seems easy to measure.
Third, it is simply not clear whether happiness levels can usefully be
compared. One recent scholar, Eunkook Suh, juxtaposing East Asia and
the West, explicitly argues that Westerners are happier; and there is no
question that they say they are, through comparative polling. Most an-
thropologists, however, are more cautious.
Fourth, compounding the challenge: happiness does not hold still, in
any region in the modern world. It really seems that Japanese happiness is
currently encountering new challenges, which may among other things
increase its differentiation from countries like the United States (though
American happiness is probably becoming less robust as well). Indians
strive in various ways to accommodate new influences while keeping
contact with more traditional thinking. The different levels of hope that
could be identified in polling data a half-century ago no longer describe
contemporary reality. Analysis of change has to be factored into any com-
parative statement.
For all the challenges, however, comparative analysis remains essential
precisely because regional frameworks retain such importance. Sweeping
formulas are impossible, but empirical analysis can pick up definable dif-
ferences around common components of happiness such as family, religion
or hope, and aspiration. The combination of cultural and material factors
is more difficult than the standard of living alone, but it can be addressed.
And even the fraught topic of levels of happiness, though unquestionably
complex, deserves attention. Closer to home, an appreciation of different
regional approaches offers perspective on our own ideas about happiness,
one of the standard benefits of comparative insight. Globalization itself,
the focus of Chapter 14, promotes a mixture of regional influences where
happiness is concerned.
Further Reading
On the classic polling data:
Hastorf, Albert H., and Hadley Cantril. “They Saw a Game: A Case Study.” Jour-
nal of Abnormal Psychology 49, no. 1 ( January 1954): 129–134.
Ornaver, Helmut, Haykan Wiberg, Andrzej Sicinsky, and Johan Galtung, eds.
Images of the World in the Year 2000 (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter Inc, 1976).
On Indian tradition,
Kumar, S.K., “An Indian Conception of Well-being.” In J. Henry (Ed.), European
Positive Psychology Proceedings (Leicester: British Psychological Society, 2003).
On Indian families,
Derné, Steve. Culture in Action: Family Life, Emotion, and Male Dominance in
Banaras, India (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995).
Freeman, James M. Untouchable: An Indian Life History (Stanford, CA: Stanford
Moore, Erin. “Moral Reasoning: An Indian Case Study.” Ethos 23, no. 3 (September
1995): 286–327.
Osella, Filippo, and Caroline Osella. “From Transience to Immanence: Con-
sumption, Life-Cycle and Social Mobility in Kerala, South India.” Modern
Asian Studies 33, no. 4 (October 1, 1999): 989–1020.
On Japan,
Genda, Yuji. “An International Comparison of Hope and Happiness in Japan, the
UK, and the US.” Social Science Japan Journal 19, no. 2 (2016): 153–172.
Hendry, Joy, and Gordon Mathews. “What Makes Life Worth Living? How
Japanese and Americans Make Sense of Their Worlds.” The Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute 3 ( June 1, 1997).
Kavedzija, Iza. “The Good Life in Balance: Insights from Aging Japan.” HAU:
Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5, no. 3 ( January 1, 2015): 135–156.
Kitanaka, Junko. Depression in Japan: Psychiatric Cures for a Society in Distress
Princeton, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).
Mathews, Gordon, and Bruce White. Japan’s Changing Generations Are Young Peo-
ple Creating a New Society? (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004).
Roberson, James, and Nobue Suzuke, eds. Men and Masculinities in Contemporary
Japan: Dislocating the Salaryman Doxa (London: Routledge, 2002).
For both India and Japan, see:
Mathews, Gordon, and Carolina Izquierdo, eds. Pursuits of Happiness Well-Being in
Anthropological Perspective (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).
Roland, Alan. In Search of Self in India and Japan: Toward a Cross-Cultural Psychology
See also:
Baumeister, Roy F. Meanings of Life (New York: Guilford Press, 1991).
Diener, Ed, and Eunkook M. Suh, eds. Culture and Subjective Well-Being. (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 2000).
13 Western Society in
Contemporary History
Even Happier?
A recent international survey, published in 2015, asked parents in many

countries what their most important goal was when it came to their chil-
dren. Western societies uniformly responded, with substantial majorities,
that the answer was happiness. France led the parade with 86% opting for
happiness, Canada rang in at 78%, the United States with 73%. Other soci-
eties chose differently: Mexico and India rated success at the top, C hinese
parents chose good health. Robin Berman, a childrearing expert who
travels widely in the United States, confirms the American preference:
“When I give parenting lectures around the country, I always ask the audi-
ence ‘What do you want for your children’…The near-universal response
I get is, ‘I just want my kids to be happy.’”
Happiness goals are alive and well in Western culture. The happiness
revolution marches forward, with some additional features but without
many new directions. Hesitations that cropped up in the decades of war
and depression were largely cast aside, at least until recently, and the search
for a fascist alternative was abandoned. As the childrearing poll suggests,
the Western commitment not only extended earlier trends, but stood
apart, at least to some extent, from the approaches of many other societ-
ies. Along with basic economic and political conditions, the combination
of cultural continuity and additional enhancement readily explains the
West’s distinctive position in international happiness surveys.
At the same time, the pervasive interest in happiness began to surface
some new issues, or at least to bring them to wider attention. Several
features of the contemporary Western commitment generated some trou-
bling constraints. While the problems involved did not unseat the basic
culture, they did raise important questions for the future.
Signposts
A number of indices confirmed the Western commitment to happiness
from the postwar decades onward, and often suggested further intensifi-
cation. Books and articles urging happiness and suggesting surefire paths
to attain it proliferated steadily, particularly in the United States. The
titles told much of their story: The Ladder Up: Secret Steps to Happiness;
Western Society in Contemporary History 189
33 Moments of Happiness; One Thousand Paths to Happiness; Baby Steps to
Happiness; and Everlasting Happiness. Two sources of happiness guidance
were particularly interesting, and they sometimes overlapped: many Prot-
estant leaders now urged that they had the keys to the kingdom of happi-
ness, as with the evangelical guru Billy Graham and his Secrets to Happiness.
Business advocates claimed that theirs was the road, as with 7 Strategies for
Wealth and Happiness, by “America’s foremost business philosopher”.
Connections with specific domains abounded. People seeking sexual
guidance could turn to the Joy of Sex; foodies had the best-selling Joy of
Cooking. Teenagers had special books showing them how to be happy; so
did African Americans.
While this varied literature offered a wide range of recommendations,
from religious faith to the importance of vegetarianism or feng shui, they
tended to agree that individuals could and should craft happiness on their
own: happiness was not a matter of luck, or divine selection, or the wider
social environment. Norman Vincent Peale, a radio evangelist, was a par-
ticularly important spokesperson for this kind of thinking, and his book,
The Power of Positive Thinking (1952) gained wide influence, selling mil-
lions of copies. The central message was clear: “Our happiness depends on
the habit of mind we cultivate. So practice happy thinking every day. Cul-
tivate the merry heart, develop the happiness habit, and life will become
a continual feast.” At times, Peale’s advice recalled earlier philosophical
approaches, as he urged the importance of modest expectations, humility,
and a capacity to appreciate small pleasures and cultivate “inner peace”. At
other points, however, he was less guarded: “No matter how dark things
seem to be or actually are, raise your sights and see possibilities – always
see them, for they’re always there.” “If you paint in your mind a picture
of bright and happy expectations, you put yourself in a condition condu-
cive to your goal.” Most obviously, positive thinkers could expect finan-
cial success; happiness and worldly ambition were perfectly compatible.
But the main point was the individual’s power and responsibility for the
achievement of happiness.
Books, magazine articles, and radio shows were not, of course, the
only signs that the commitment to happiness was running strong. The
Disney empire expanded its reach with a number of theme parks, mod-
estly proclaiming one of them “The Happiest Place on Earth.” Television
shows won popularity with titles like “Happy Days.” Bars began featuring
“happy hours”, a time to drink before dinner or as a transition from work
to home. The idea of happy hours may have originated around American
naval bases as early as 1913, but they gained much wider notice with a
number of articles in the popular press during the 1950s, about drinking
practices among the military. The happy hour idea spread widely in the
English-speaking world during the final decades of the 20th century, al-
though it also attracted efforts to regulate – in Ireland, for example – in
hopes of curbing excess.
Happiness and advertising became inextricably linked. Studies in the
early 21st century suggested that 7–12% of all print and television ads
explicitly linked products and services to happiness. Happiness might
come through investing in a new bathtub, or obtaining proper dentures,
or getting that new car, or buying a variety of stylish clothes or cosmetics.
The John Lewis department store chain in the United Kingdom regularly
sponsored happiness advertising in anticipation of Christmas, drawing
wide attention.
A wide variety of Happiness Foundations were established from the
1980s onward. Some had particular religious connections, with move-
ments like Scientology. Others aimed at greater awareness of the dan-
gers of alcohol or some other specific target. The obvious point was the
seemingly irresistible temptation to associate a considerable range of causes
with the notion of obtaining happiness.
In 1963, an American advertising executive named Harvey Ball created
the yellow smiley-face happiness image, which became an instant interna-
tional hit. The year was not a particularly happy one in the United States,
as the Kennedy assassination and growing involvement in the Vietnam
War dampened spirits. But this new image suggested that happiness was
available even so; an individual could express it by using the icon, and
the image in turn might spread cheerfulness to others. By 1971 yellow
smiley-face buttons were selling over 50 million copies annually, and
the image spread as well to tee shirts and other items. While Ball did
not copyright his creation, an outfit called the World Smile Corporation
stepped in to fill the void. By the 21st century, happy faces (with as many
as three dozen versions available) became the most popular emojis for on-
line communications, taking at least four of the top ten slots; by 2019 a
“tears of joy” symbol ranked as number one.
Happiness had become ubiquitous. Almost anyone in the contempo-
rary West was surrounded by opportunities to obtain happiness in various
ways; to express happiness; and of course to wonder if one was happy
enough.
Consumerism and the Lure of More

The Western link between happiness and consumerism was hardly new,
but it unquestionably gained new importance as economic growth cre-
ated “affluent societies” throughout virtually the entire Western world
between the 1950s and 1980s. Particularly noteworthy was the ability
of many manufacturing workers to win high standards of living. Stud-
ies of “affluent workers” showed that instrumentalism was advancing to
new levels, with difficult working conditions accepted in return for rising
consumer lifestyles. In the United States, opportunities to create more
interesting job conditions were sometimes rejected because they might
constrain high wages. At another social level, the late 20th century saw
the emergence of a group called “Yuppies” – young urban professionals,
usually in two-career marriages, who were focused on fashionable, afflu-
ent lifestyles. An intriguing British study, The Symmetrical Family, argued
that the purpose of family life (often without children) now centered on a
shared commitment to consumerism.
The growing attachment to consumerism showed in many ways, as
more and more people were able to explore this as a path toward hap-
piness. Motor bicycles and cars began to replace walking or mass transit
for many workers. In Europe, attendance at trade union meetings began
to drop in part because so many members were either working overtime
to pay off their vehicle – or enjoying the vehicle itself. Vacations became
more elaborate. New organizations like Club Med, in Europe, sprang up
in the postwar decades to facilitate more exotic holidays, particularly to
tropical destinations; it was increasingly possible to enjoy Western-style
amenities from Malaysia to Mexico.
The rise of the mall was symbolic of the newest stage of consumerism
in advanced industrial societies. Beyond department stores, malls offered
an unprecedented array of goods and services, mixing food and browsing,
often with a movie theater thrown in, and allowing literally day-long ab-
sorption in the process of shopping. Then in the 21st century the rise of
online opportunities, though reducing the ritual of the shopping experi-
ence, made quick access to goods more abundant than ever before.
Much of the new consumerism simply involved more. Spending on
Christmas gifts more than doubled in Western societies between the 1960s
and the year 2000. Low-income families in the United States were com-
mitting up to 5% of total income on birthday gifts, while on the more
affluent end some children’s birthday party invitations by 2000 were spec-
ifying that presents under $35 would be unacceptable. In between, a host
of organizations arose largely to cater to more elaborate parties. Average
home sizes increased in the United States, despite a low birth rate. So-
called McMansions offered huge spaces, sometimes to couples working
such long hours that they were actually not home much during most days;
the average size of the American home rose by 55% between 1971 and
2000, even as family size dropped. Interest in furnishings rose accordingly.
A House and Garden editor sought to explain the meaning involved: “Sure,
shopping and arranging (and hoarding) are materialistic pursuits, but they
also connected to deeper passions…they nurture our souls.” Many of those
involved clearly believed that they were pursuing happiness. Always an
option in discussions of happiness, materialism loomed larger than ever
before.
Innovations. New products were vital to this newest stage of consumer-
ism, and some of them changed the fundamental rhythms of life. Regular
television viewing became a basic leisure form from the 1950s onward,
and the array of entertainment and sports options steadily expanded. Even
more than with radio, television allowed viewers a deep association with
some of their favorite shows, finding fear in ubiquitous presentations of
crime but enjoying vicarious joy in a make-believe world where happy
endings usually predominated.
With the rise of the Internet from the 1990s onward, along with increas-
ingly permissive legislation, access to pornography became more widely
available than ever before, and this form of sexual pleasure undoubtedly
began playing a greater role in many people’s lives. By the 21st century,
the porn industry was a $12 billion operation in the United States alone,
$95 billion worldwide.
The growth of attachment to pets was another intriguing manifestation
of rising consumerism, deeply attached to notions of happiness particularly
in societies with declining birth rates. Spending on pets went up steadily,
with increasingly elaborate toys, pet “hotels”, and other accoutrements.
The expansion of pet cemeteries was another sign of growing emotional
commitment, the flip side of the happiness pets provided during their
lifetimes. By the 21st century, a third of all American pet owners said they
preferred pets over children. Disaster relief officials, beginning with a ma-
jor hurricane in 2005, found that people were increasingly unwilling to
abandon pets even for personal safety, and national evacuation procedures
had to be altered as a result. A rise of the notion of companion animals,
vital to emotional well-being, further extended the meaning of pet own-
ership for many people, and here too, laws had to change as a result, for
example to accommodate furry friends on airplanes.
The surge of electronic products, from the 1990s onward, was the final
new category that commanded growing attention as part of the larger rise
in consumer commitments. The need to have the latest gadgets, and the
devotion of more and more waking attention to such gadgets, became a
basic part of life by the 21st century, from childhood onward.
Always, with new products and old, there was a constant felt need to
get more. By 1995, 66% of all American households had at least three
television sets, often with a separate one for each child. Home computers
were supplemented by more portable laptops. The impulse for more, and
for the latest version, had been part of modern consumerism all along, but
it became steadily more pronounced. One of the reasons that home sizes
increased was to accommodate the profusion of things; and even with this,
a California study revealed that a growing number of people had to park
cars on the street because garages were needed for piles of consumer goods
including toys and games.
Contemporary consumerism was not of course a uniform experience
across the Western world. Living standards continued to vary greatly
by social class, and in many countries inequalities increased after the
1980s. Even aside from this, personal preferences varied greatly; one
of the vital ways consumerism could connect with happiness involved
opportunities to indulge particular personal tastes, even though there
were some widely shared interests such as passionate sports spectatorship.
Families and regions also varied in the extent to which they modified
consumerism through personal savings; American consumers were par-
ticularly noted for their willingness to go heavily into debt for consumer
pleasures.
The most interesting division may have involved choices between things
and experiences, though most consumer families enjoyed some of each.
European consumer patterns after 1945 featured a remarkable expansion
of vacation time, often upwards of five weeks per year for many working
and middle-class sectors. This kind of leisure growth did not spread to the
United States, where formal vacation time increased very little during the
same decades, and where a commitment to material acquisitions seemed
to command greater attention.
Sexuality and drugs. Growing interest in sexual pleasure amplified con-
sumerism in emphasizing the hedonistic aspect of contemporary happi-
ness. Several developments combined in this domain. A variety of experts,
and some feminists, increasingly emphasized the female capacity for plea-
sure, countering more traditional prudery. New contraceptive products,
particularly the birth control pill, enhanced the possibility of purely recre-
ational sex. Religious and legal restrictions on sexuality loosened, though
in the United States an effort to promote abstinence among young people
persisted. Most important, behaviors changed. The so-called sexual rev-
olution of the 1960s lowered the average age of first sexual experience, a
striking change particularly for women. Premarital sex became increas-
ingly common. And, though evidence here is less clear, sexual expecta-
tions within marriage increased as well. Correspondingly, representations
of sexuality in the popular media became steadily more graphic, quite
apart from explicit pornography. These developments added an important
component to popular expectations for happiness.
From the 1960s onward, a number of groups in Western society also ex-
perimented with drugs designed to produce happiness highs. By the 21st
century pressures mounted to legalize marijuana. Even government could
get into the act, sponsoring medical panels on such topics as “Beyond
Therapy: biotechnology and the pursuit of happiness.” Here was another
somewhat uneasy frontier.
Consumer emotions: loneliness, envy, boredom – and happiness? We have seen
that modern consumerism always had emotional components, beyond the
quest for happiness; but many of these increased, or at least became more
obvious, after 1945. Several raised some challenging questions about the
continued association between consumerism and happiness.
Reports of loneliness began to increase, particularly by the early 21st
century. A growing old age sector helped explain the new concern, as some
elders outlived their closest family contacts or simply found themselves ne-
glected. But changing consumerism contributed as well. Television made
spectatorship a more isolating experience for some viewers, compared to
earlier sociability, as participation in voluntary groups dropped. Growing
reliance on social media, displacing person-to-person contacts, seemed to
promote loneliness as well from the 1990s onward.
Envy, long a part of the consumer package, became more unpleasant for
some. The phrase, “keeping up with the Joneses”, had been introduced to
the English language earlier in the 20th century, but it gained new cur-
rency particularly by the 1970s, to refer to competitive consumerism in
suburbia. Even more interesting was the impact of social media on envy
in the 21st century, as it revealed a perverse aspect of the commitment
to happiness. Individuals on Facebook and other sites were eager to em-
phasize their own happiness in their self-presentations, complete with the
smiling selfie; onlookers, aware of problems in their own lives, sometimes
found this emphasis discouraging – it was easy for a viewer to think that
friends or acquaintances were happier than oneself.
Even more interesting, and potentially problematic, was the apparent
rise of boredom. Here was another modern emotion linked to consumer-
ism since the mid-19th century, but now it became both more common
and more pressing. References to the word increased steadily. A 1986 study
claimed that boredom had become “America’s number one disease”. The
growing availability of almost constant entertainment seems to have in-
creased impatience with any lull – and then the advent of devices like cell
phones, instantly accessible, heightened the problem still further. A new
idea of “micro-boredom”, in brief intervals between games or contacts,
suggested the new standard. Generational differences widened. Older par-
ents, raised to see boredom as a challenge to find something creative to
do, were nonplussed by their offspring’s complaints. “I’m bored” in fact
became a childish weapon, now implying that some adult – a parent, a
teacher – should step up with something fun (Figure 13.1).
As always, the relationship between boredom and happiness was
double-edged – as with so many aspects of consumerism. On the one hand,
it suggested the desire for more, for some means of gaining even greater
diversion and happiness. On the other, particularly as levels of boredom
0.000400%
0.000350%
0.000300%
Boredom
0.000250%
0.000200%
0.000150%
0.000100%
0.000050%
0.000000%
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Figure 13.1 F
requency of the word “boredom” in English, 1800–2008, Google
Ngram Viewer, accessed June 15th, 2020.
seemed to increase, it might suggest a dissatisfaction that outweighed hap-
piness. In 2020, amid the regulations limiting social interaction instituted
in response to a global pandemic, some observers argued that Western, and
particularly American, individuals faced unusual difficulties in handling
the crisis because so many were easily bored, seeking escape hatches in bars
and parties despite the dangers of contagion. More widely, the apparent
intensification of boredom translated a classic concern about happiness –
that expectations might make happiness harder to find – into some novel
specifics, in this case about the need for constant entertainment. Here, as
with envy and loneliness, the broader emotional offshoots of contempo-
rary consumerism suggested new concerns. Changes here could link with
some wider problems in the contemporary Western version of happiness.
Positive Psychology and Well-being

Consumerism and the desire for constant entertainment were not the only
translations of the growing emphasis on happiness in the Western world.
Industrial psychologists and personnel experts continued to consider ways
to make work a happier experience. Efforts to promote worker morale and
reduce stress continued. A great deal of effort went into protecting the
“work/life balance”. A number of programs allowed some employees to
work from home at least a day a week, to allow a change of pace. Wide-
spread adoption of “casual Fridays” reduced customary style requirements.
A growing tendency to refer to employees as “associates” tried to put a
happier face on inequalities in the workplace.
Colleges and universities, particularly in the United States, increased their
investments in programs designed to make education a happier experience,
though college students had long managed to combine education and fun.
Student life staffs expanded. Orientations became more elaborate, featuring
a variety of games and even camping experiences (with little reference to ed-
ucation). Several dozen American campuses built rock-climbing walls, and
in general student unions became more elaborate as part of the competition
for student interest. In the early 21st century a number of schools began to
bring puppies to campus during examination periods, to provide comfort.
As with the experiments with work, it was not always clear how effec-
tive these efforts were; reports of student anxiety and stress continued to
mount. But there was no question that a number of agencies were eager
to expand the promotion of happiness in new ways, beyond the narrowest
kinds of hedonism.
Campaigns for well-being. The most important specific change in this con-
text emerged from 1998 onward, with the introduction of what was called
positive psychology. This movement built on the more general impulse
toward “positive thinking” and on an earlier interest in “humanistic” psy-
chology within the discipline itself. As announced in a 1998 speech by a
leader of the new movement, Martin Seligman, positive psychology aimed
at using careful research to enhance the understanding of the ways that in-
dividuals could learn how to increase their own happiness. A new array of
experts and popularizers worked hard to shift efforts in the discipline away
from a focus on problems like mental illness, toward new opportunities to
build what many of them now called “positivity”. In the process, they also
sought to expand attention to a wider definition of happiness, away from
a primary emphasis on hedonism. While the movement had particular
traction in the United States, it soon built enthusiasm in Western Europe,
Canada, and Australia as well.
The movement oscillated in its use of the word happiness. Pronounce-
ments from people like Seligman emphasized the interest in “the scientific
study of human flourishing.” “Well-being” often seemed a better term than
happiness, since the latter so often seemed to focus on material pleasures
that could have rather fleeting effects. But the focus on a broad concept
of happiness was in fact reasonably clear. Seligman talked of promoting a
“good life” defined in terms of “authentic happiness and abundant gratifi-
cation.” The emphasis on positive emotions involved contentment with a
person’s past, happiness in the present, and hope for the future.
Always supported by explicit research projects, recommendations for
individuals aimed at expanding their well-being had several components.
Often, guidance repeated ideas that went back to the classic philosophers.
The importance of attention to physical health and moderation, for ex-
ample, reiterated longstanding advice. Seligman and others, while grant-
ing the importance of pleasures found in entertainment or relationships,
urged that transient enjoyments formed the least important part of real
happiness – another case where a finding first articulated by the classical
philosophers was being placed in a contemporary context. Further, the ba-
sic notion that individuals could and should advance their own happiness
confirmed older themes in the history of happiness.
Other findings arguably translated the interest in a broad and durable
kind of happiness into some newer emphases. One study, for example,
concluded that while having children can add meaning to life, this is not
necessary for happiness. This claim meshes with contemporary behavior
and the strong interest in individual decisions about happiness, but it was
hardly traditional wisdom. A number of positive psychologists also invited
people to pay more attention to experiences than to the acquisition of
material objects if they sought to maximize happiness, an interesting new
caution for a consumer society.
Positive psychology placed great emphasis on urging people to identify
their strengths and learn to play these up, rather than spending a lot of time
addressing deficiencies. This was consistent with stressing the importance
of moral and generous behavior, but again it departed somewhat from
earlier ideas about happiness which had usually involved greater attention
to character improvement.
Attitudes toward gratitude were revealing. Research in positive psy-
chology urged the role of gratitude in improving well-being, helping a
person identify the good things happening in life. But implementation of
gratitude could take some novel forms. People were urged to begin keep-
ing “gratitude books”, recording things that they were thankful for on a
daily basis. Here again, the emphasis on an individual approach to defin-
ing and promoting happiness was striking. Researchers granted that more
conventional expressions of gratitude, by actually thanking other people,
might be even more effective, but this kind of interaction took a back seat
to what an individual could do on his own – part of a larger surge in the
emphasis on individualism over social connection.
Critics most commonly contend that positive psychologists are over-
optimistic, downplaying real problems that make some people unhappy
or depressed in their insistence that individuals can create a happier life.
There is also concern that the movement exaggerates the importance of
explicitly aiming for happiness, of active planning, in contrast to simply
trying to live a good and useful life. The movement hardly monopolizes
discussions about happiness in the contemporary world.
In response, advocates insist on their recognition that real happiness
must involve a range of emotions, including periodic sadness. And they
point to research findings that seem to confirm the contention that pursu-
ing a positive psychology agenda has measurable effects, including reduc-
ing the incidence of depression.
Positive psychology has stimulated programs beyond strictly academic
study or approaches in individual therapy. Since 2000, it has contributed
actively to efforts by many employers and university administrations to
develop programs that will increase happiness in their areas of endeavor.
Thus a 2019 study found that the number of American companies of-
fering well-being programs had doubled over the preceding decades. Em-
ployers were increasingly eager to use such programs not only to reduce
health care costs, but also to improve morale and productivity. Many em-
ployers found that well-being programs were becoming vital to attracting
and retaining a talented workforce.
Many universities also eagerly signed on to a well-being approach,
which enhanced the existing interest in making college life a more
agreeable experience. Several universities and private secondary schools
in Australia, for example, began to highlight a well-being emphasis. In-
stitutions in a number of countries began to attempt measurements of
student and staff well-being – the Gallup Organization even developed
a “Wellbeing Finder” – and to promote programs that ranged from im-
proving physical health to introducing techniques of mindfulness and
meditation. It seemed particularly important, for student audiences, to
promote decisions that would maximize long-term happiness over short
run satisfactions.
The well-being movement did not transform contemporary approaches
to happiness, or contemporary constraints. It did however add an import-
ant new component, with its intriguing mixture of classic and innovative
approaches.
Problems: Sadness and Frustration

Several observers in the later 20th century began to identify several clear
limitations in the Western approach to happiness, that reflected important
complications in the contemporary experience. One involved a measur-
able lack of correlation between economic gains and perceived happiness;
the other, more dramatic, highlighted an increasing tension between hap-
piness and sadness. These issues developed alongside the growing aca-
demic interest in well-being, though positive psychologists did recognize
some of the issues involved. Some of the problems added substance to the
concern that too many contemporaries in Western society, including some
of the positive psychologists, were placing undue emphasis on the impor-
tance of striving for happiness.
The Easterlin paradox. Growing prosperity after World War II created a
measurable gap between objective improvements in the human c ondition –
in health conditions as well as living standards – and the level of happiness
articulated in polls and other self-reports. Westerners were not gaining in
happiness as rapidly as had been expected.
Richard Easterlin, an economist, using United States data between the
1940s and mid-1970s, argued that whereas at one point, increasing aver-
age income generated roughly equivalent improvements in reported hap-
piness, after a certain juncture that correlation ceased. In the American
case, even as prosperity continued to rise, reported happiness became flat
or dipped slightly. This finding has been confirmed for the United States
over a longer period of time, into the 21st century, and also for other de-
veloped nations. Various critics have tried to counter the finding, includ-
ing some psychologists eager to emphasize improvements in happiness, but
on the whole it has held up fairly well. Economic growth does produce
greater happiness but not constantly, and the linkages weaken over time.
Several factors contribute to this important caveat about modern hap-
piness. First, inequality colors the picture; average national levels con-
ceal great disparities and the resentments that can result. Second, people’s
memories fade: one generation does not recall the conditions of a century
past, and so has no active appreciation of how much better things are in
their own time. The same applies to memories of health gains: how many
contemporaries actively remember the time, just over a century ago, when
virtually every family would experience the death of an infant? Some-
thing of a gratitude gap results. Third, people often place greater weight
on hopes for further improvements in living standards, and frustration
that these are not arriving more quickly, than on current levels: this is an
old dilemma in the happiness field. Finally, the feeble correlations remind
us that after a certain point, people do not define happiness primarily in
terms of material standards; they look to other measurements. These four
factors can readily combine.
Evaluations similar to the Easterlin finding have also been applied to
individuals. In 2010 Time magazine highlighted another research report
which claimed that once a person had reached an income level of $75,000
a year, further improvements did not increase happiness. This confirmed
that up to a point, higher salaries do generate more happiness, because
of pride in the achievement and appreciation for the goods and services
available. But again, after a certain level the quest for happiness turns more
to other criteria; or to frustrations that salaries are not rising even faster;
or to resentment that a coworker enjoys an even higher salary – or some
combination of the above. And it is clear that most people earning $75,000
still want more, which adds to the complexity of interpreting the happi-
ness levels involved.
The $75,000 plateau has been even more widely disputed than the East-
erlin paradox. A fancy magazine, Town and Country, did its own calcu-
lation of what it takes to be happy (which included a private plane) and
concluded that a really happy person needed at least $100 million. Another
critic more sensibly suggested that the income needed for happiness would
vary with the individual. And it is vital to remember, when looking at
national happiness more generally, that most Americans have never made
$75,000 a year.
Still, both national and individual data suggest that the income/happiness
correlation is real but incomplete, and that, particularly in contemporary
history, trends in happiness tend to be flatter than purely economic data
would suggest. Rising consumerism and comfort had more impact in ear-
lier periods, for the world’s most affluent societies, than they have had in
recent decades. Many people want something more, or something differ-
ent, and they do not always find it.
Sadness. The second vulnerability in contemporary Western approaches
to happiness involves the pressure that expectations of happiness place on
the evaluation of sadness. Robin Berman, the pediatrician, argues that the
greatest weakness of American parenting centers on an unwillingness to
tolerate a sad child or periods in which many children will naturally be
sad. Cultural standards push parents to believe that a sad child must reflect
badly on them – a good parent should have constantly happy children – or,
to deflect their guilt, to assume that the sad child must be ill, requiring
medical attention and, often, some kind of medication.
The issue may go beyond childrearing. The steady intensification of
Western happiness culture may make sadness, or even temporary dips in
happiness, feel like personal failure. Positive psychology, though recog-
nizing in principle that sadness is normal, may enhance a belief that any
well-balanced individual should be able to generate happiness. We have
seen that even earlier in the 20th century, new tensions began to apply to
expressions of grief. On another front, some categories of service workers,
such as flight attendants, reported that the pressures to present a cheerful
front to surly customers ended up confusing them about their own real
emotions. Happiness standards, in other words, can be intolerant, making
a real or imagined deficiency in happiness harder to manage.
There is little question that since the 1930s, rates of psychological de-
pression have been increasing in Western society, affecting a growing
minority of individuals; by the 1990s, up to 15% of all Americans were
reporting at least one depressive episode in their lifetimes. These rates
surely reflected the growing clinical interest in depression, increasing the
frequency of diagnoses. They also seem to result from some of the larger
tensions of industrial, urban society; at least until recently, rural regions
seem to generate lower rates. But happiness expectations may enter in as
well, causing some people to believe they are depressed when they cannot
measure up and prompting doctors more readily to identify happiness in-
adequacies with illness. A 2008 study found that up to 25% of all depres-
sion diagnoses in the United States actually involved a non-clinical level of
sadness which, in a happiness culture, could not easily be accepted.
***
Developments in contemporary history demonstrate the strong hold that

the earlier “happiness revolution” maintains in Western culture. Many of
the basic features of consumer society continued to rest on claims and ex-
pectations for happiness, including cheerful salespeople. Western society
did feature tensions between hedonism and a broader approach to happi-
ness, a new version of a dilemma identified by philosophers early on. The
rise of positive psychology obviously reflected a desire to find new ways
to widen approaches to happiness. The discovery of new and troubling
byproducts of the commitment to happiness, from mounting boredom to
the challenge of sadness, confirms the distinctive Western commitment to
happiness but also highlights some troubling complications.
Further Reading
On consumer affluence,
Goldthorpe, John H. The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure (London: Cambridge
Lebergott, Stanley. Pursuing Happiness American Consumers in the Twentieth Century
Samuel, Lawrence. Happiness in America: A Cultural History (Lanham, MD: Rowman
and Littlefield, 2018).
Young, Michael Dunlop, and Peter Willmott. The Symmetrical Family. (New
York: Pantheon Books, a Div. of Random House, 1973).
On the Easterlin paradox,
Easterbrook, Gregg. The Progress Paradox: How Life Gets Better While People Feel
Worse, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2003).
Easterlin, Richard A., Holger Hinte, and Klaus F. Zimmermann. Happiness,
Growth, and the Life Cycle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
Stevenson, Betsey, and Justin Wolfers. “Economic Growth and Subjective
Well-Being: Reassessing the Easterlin Paradox.” Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity no. 1 (2008): 1–87.
On boredom and loneliness,
Alberti, Fay. A Biography of Loneliness: The History of Emotion. (Oxford: Oxford
Dalle Pezze, Barbara, and Carlo Salzani. Essays on Boredom and Modernity
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2009).
Fernandez, Luke, and Susan J. Matt. Bored, Lonely, Angry, Stupid: Changing Feelings
about Technology, from the Telegraph to Twitter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
Putnam, Robert D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000).
For a history of the wellbeing movement,
Horowitz, Daniel. Happier?: The History of a Cultural Movement That Aspired to
Transform America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
On well-being,
Compton, William. Introduction to Positive Psychology, 1st ed. (Boston, MA:
Cengage Learning, 1994).
Seligman, Martin E. P. Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and
Well-Being (New York: Free Press, 2011).
On emotional constraints for service workers,
Hochschild, Arlie Russell. The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
On sadness,
Berman, Robin. Unhappiness: The Keys to Raising Happy Kids (Santa Monica, CA:
Goop, 2016).
On depression,
Good, Byron, and Arthur Kleinman. Culture and Depression: Studies in the Anthro-
pology and Cross-Cultural Psychiatry of Affect and Disorder (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985).
14 Happiness Goes Global
Accelerating globalization, particularly over the past half-century, has

promoted an expansion of interest in happiness, among a variety of groups
and nations. To be sure, deep cultural distinctions have not been erased,
and while regional economic inequalities have diminished, huge differ-
ences in living standards remain. Some global features of happiness have
emerged, however. They have involved more than the importation of
Western standards to other societies, though this occurred to some extent.
They have also reflected some standard reactions to urbanization and im-
provements in standards of living and health. And they have highlighted
contributions to ideas about happiness from other regions, particularly
South Asia, which have increasingly enriched global discussions and even
amplified recommendations emanating from positive psychology.
Any serious student of globalization must note the often complicated
combination of regional and global forces, and this certainly applies to
happiness: there can be no argument that a single global standard of happi-
ness has emerged. Moreover, the political aspects of contemporary global
happiness pose a further complication. A wide variety of governments in
recent decades have found it useful to talk about their contributions to
happiness; indeed, happiness became a more explicit part of many political
agendas than ever before, even in comparison with the 18th century, and in
a wider regional array. This is in itself an interesting global phenomenon,
but it also entails a great deal of political manipulation, with states claiming
new programs and commitments without much attention to definitions
and experiences of happiness in the population at large. At the same time,
political showmanship is not the only feature of global approaches to hap-
piness. Wider commitments to consumerism, to happy holidays, and even
to experiments with well-being programs suggest other interests. A num-
ber of individuals and societies are struggling to figure out what happiness
consists of in contemporary life, and trying to move it forward.
“World Happiness Day” and the Global

Promotion of Happiness
In 2012, the United Nations established March 20 as an annual Inter-
national Day of Happiness, intending it as a regular global celebration.
Happiness Goes Global 203
“Conscious that the pursuit of happiness is a fundamental human goal…
Recognizing also the need for a more inclusive, equitable and balanced
approach to economic growth that promotes sustainable development,
poverty eradication, happiness and the well-being of all peoples,” the
General Assembly expressed the hope that the Day would be acknowl-
edged through programs aimed at raising overall awareness.
The Day was the brainchild of Jayme Illien, who had been born in South
Asia in 1980, orphaned and ultimately raised in the United States. Illien
headed a movement advocating “Happytalism,” urging the importance of
a broad approach to economic development that would have maximum
public happiness as its goal and outcome. The annual World Happiness
Report, also launched in 2012, noted in Chapter 1, was an outgrowth of
the same basic impulse.
The movement, for all its gimmicky aspects, sought to recognize the
important changes in global economic structure that were occurring as
more and more societies industrialized, but also to make sure that these
combined with an appreciation of the wider components in human hap-
piness. The combination of motives: political propaganda, Western influ-
ence including the notion of the pursuit of happiness itself, but also the
need to recognize other approaches to happiness, underlay much of the
global commitment to happiness that emerged by the early 21st century.
Happiness began to be considered an appropriate policy goal and the real
measure of human progress.
Programs and agencies. New initiatives abounded, in a variety of world
regions. A Journal of Happiness Studies was founded in 2000 by a group
of American and Dutch psychologists, aiming to promote research in
the field. A separate initiative, called the Happy Planet Index, launched
in 2006, aimed at using environmental impact as the basic criterion of
happiness, generating a very different set of international rankings from
that provided by the United Nations or the Gallup organization. David
Cameron, British Prime Minister in 2010, directed his government to
devise new ways to measure happiness beyond Gross National Product.
A variety of British writers and politicians regularly addressed what they
called a “happiness agenda”, usually seeking to promote various conser-
vative policies including limitations on immigration. On the other hand,
it was another Conservative government, just a few years later that set up
a major program to deal with loneliness in one of the British ministries.
Happiness was in the air, but it embraced a variety of goals.
In 2019, New Zealand made an even more explicit move, unveiling its
first-ever “well-being budget.” Targets included mental health, child pov-
erty, rights of indigenous peoples, plus developing a low carbon-emission
economy and promoting flourishing in a digital age.
Initiatives of this sort remained rather tentative. Many Western gov-
ernments had yet to buy into the idea of promoting well-being, sticking
to older, and more purely economic, definitions of national policy; the
United States fell clearly into this category, riveted on criteria such as
Gross National Product and stock market indices, despite important ini-
tiatives in the private sector.
On the other hand, interest now spread well beyond Western societies.
In 2016 the United Arab Emirates set up a Ministry of Happiness, linked
to entrepreneurial initiatives. Ohoud Al Floumi, appointed as the first
Minister, proclaimed, “What is the purpose of government if it does not
work toward the happiness of the people?” Claiming that happiness was a
“science,” she argued that it touched on “medicine, health, social science.”
“We’re trying to bring it from a broad framework into daily practice in
our society.” The operation worked closely with a Happiness Research
Institute in Denmark, though the results remained at best rather vague.
“Happiness meters” were installed in offices so that people could register
their levels of happiness, while police officers gave well-being badges to
good drivers instead of focusing on issuing tickets to bad ones.
Similar offices were established elsewhere, some of them clearly in-
tended for propaganda purposes at home and abroad – as in Venezuela in
2013, when the country was in economic freefall. Other governments,
however, consulted Danish and other experts, sincerely hoping to fig-
ure out programs that could address regional issues relevant to happi-
ness: thus South Korea sought advice on dealing with its stubbornly high
suicide rate, which persisted despite, or because of, its rapid economic
growth. While the Chinese government continues to chart its own path,
its explicit interest in happiness fits into the international pattern in some
respects.
Whether for show or distraction, or out of genuine concern, or from
some sense of global competition around devotion to happiness and its
rankings, politicians were devoting more attention to happiness than ever
before in world history.
Well-being initiatives. Growing international interest in positive psychol-
ogy was both cause and symptom of new global interest, as well-being
programs spilled well beyond Western societies. In 2018 the government
of New Delhi, India, launched a series of “happiness classes” for 11-year
olds, seeking to shift focus from academic achievement alone to include
emotional well-being. The official in charge noted that India had long
been turning out top professionals, but now needed to focus on turn-
ing out top human beings as well. After a first class, one seventh-grader
noted, “We should work happily. When you work sadly, your work will
not be good.”
Tecmilenio University, a large private system in Mexico, introduced an
elaborate well-being program in 2016. The President realized that train-
ing for jobs was not enough; a university should also help train for posi-
tive purpose and happiness in life. All first-year students began to take a
well-being course designed to emphasize character strengths and “mind-
fulness”, and each was expected to be able to answer a question about his
or her purpose in life.
Programs of this sort, spreading through most major regions of the
world to some degree, blended a recognition of the growing importance
of happiness, and the steps that psychologists were urging to enhance it,
with specific concern about stress and anxiety levels among students. The
problems, and at least some of the possible solutions, now seemed global.
Context: Living Standards

The growing interest in happiness built on major changes in material con-
ditions for much of the world’s population, particularly after the 1980s.
Rapid industrialization in places like China and Brazil combined with
growing economic opportunities for many people in East Africa or South-
east Asia. Improved public health measures also spread widely.
Best years in world history? By the early 21st century rapid reduction of
poverty, infant mortality, child labor and other traditional constraints
prompted some observers to argue that global progress was occurring at
an unprecedented rate. The data were striking.
Thus between 1990 and 2018, child mortality dropped, on a global ba-
sis, by 59%, and by the latter date fewer than 4% of all children born died
before reaching age 5. Between 2000 and 2016, life expectancy improved
by 5.5 years, again on a global basis, reaching an unprecedented average
of 72 years at birth. Improvements in medical care by this point insured
that urban health was better than rural, even as the majority of the world’s
population was living in cities, again for the first time in history.
Poverty dropped. One estimate held that 137,000 people per day moved
above the extreme poverty level, during every year since 1990. Access to
running water, toilets, and electricity expanded rapidly. Famines declined,
except in a few regions, and average stature increased – another sign of
greater access to a viable food supply.
Claims of this sort masked continuing regional inequalities, to be sure.
Average life expectancy in Africa, at 62 years, obviously fell below the
global standard; but rates of improvement were particularly great precisely
in some of the most disadvantaged regions. Global inequalities – aside
from a few areas in dire crisis – were dropping.
Gains of this sort – not always widely understood, amid the crises that
dominated the media and a certain degree of fashionable pessimism among
many academics – prompted some observers to contend that Enlighten-
ment anticipations of progress were finally being realized.
Global consumerism. Evidence of expanding consumerism on the whole
matched the basic indices of material progress, at least for a growing global
middle class. Tourism expanded, as masses of Chinese and Russian tourists
joined the more established streams from the West and Japan. By 2019 it
was estimated that 5 billion people around the world, the vast major-
ity of the population, now had cell phones. Interest in spectator sports
grew massively, thanks to instant access provided by satellite television but
also the spread of professional teams. Basketball became the second most
widely watched sport in the world, after soccer football, with networks of
professional teams in Turkey, China, and elsewhere.
The surge of interest and emotional investment in pets was another
intriguing global development. Japanese pet ownership was particularly
striking, with rapid expansion both in the number of pets and in the levels
of spending on their comfort. But devotion to pets also spread in China
and elsewhere.
Something like a global youth culture expanded on the basis of shared
consumer interests. Hip-hop, K-pop, and other musical styles spread
widely. In 2000 a new word, “teen”, was introduced into the Vietnamese
language, to designate young people devoted to popular music, fast foods,
blue jeans, and other staples; and soon a second word, “teen-teen”, was
added to single out those who were especially avid.
Happy holidays. A growing interest in highlighting happy holidays was
another sign of global change. Celebration of Christmas as a consumer event
spread in places like the United Arab Emirates or Turkey, shorn of religious
connotations. The word “happy” was increasingly applied to holidays that
originally had far different meanings. Thus in English Ramadan Mubarak,
or “blessed Ramadan” was increasingly rendered as Happy R amadan, even
though the holy month actually emphasized self-sacrifice; and a practice of
sending commercial greeting cards to accompany R amadan spread widely.
Chanukah was increasingly embellished among American Jews, to provide
a Christmas-like sense of happiness. Newer holidays, like the growing rec-
ognition of Juneteenth in the United States, almost always had the adjec-
tive happy tacked on from the outset.
Most revealing was the increasing internationalization of the birthday,
as a time for celebration and gift-giving for children and adults alike –
usually accompanied by a translation of the song Happy Birthday. (The
song is available in at least 30 languages.) Organizations offering to help
arrange birthday parties sprang up in Cairo, Shanghai, and Dubai.
What might be called happy consumerism was far more common in cit-
ies than in the countryside. It attracted people who were particularly open
to Western influences. But Western styles now commonly combined with
more local flavors: McDonalds fast foods thus offered a wide array of veg-
etarian options in India, Iftar meals in Morocco, wine and beer in France,
and teriyaki burgers in Japan. Consumer innovations from places like Japan
and South Korea, in music and animation, rivaled Western initiatives. A link
between consumerism and expectations of happiness was increasingly global.
Syncretism
As with consumerism, global happiness initiatives increasingly combined
Western-inspired themes with influences from other regions. This blend-
ing of concepts, called syncretism, became an increasingly important
aspect of discussions of happiness, among experts like the positive psy-
chologists and a larger popular audience as well. It remains valid to see
many of the happiness themes in contemporary world history as an ex-
tension of priorities developed first in the West, but this is not the whole
story. Western authorities themselves increasingly valued other practices
as they sought to enrich their own approach and modify the association of
happiness with hedonism.
South Asia. Hindu and Buddhist practices provided an increasingly import-
ant component of global happiness initiatives. Interest in Indian spirituality,
as a means of enriching or even replacing a Western approach, developed
early. It became an important feature of the 1960s youth rebellion against
Western values. In 1968 the famous Beatles singing group made a pilgrimage
to India to learn more about transcendental meditation, a trip that both sym-
bolized and promoted wider interest. In turn, various Indian spiritual leaders
developed centers and training programs in many parts of the world.
Mindfulness and meditation were the themes that gained particular at-
tention, increasingly incorporated into a variety of well-being initiatives
in the West and elsewhere. Both involved practices that were designed to
focus the mind on a particular thought, to improve awareness and achieve
a calm and stable emotional state. The values and techniques involved
were not new, but they contrasted with some of the more materialist,
activity-oriented impulses in Western ideas of happiness. Many people
found that meditation, whether associated with religious interest or not,
provided tranquility and even a sense of bliss. Following Indian tradi-
tion, many well-being practitioners began recommending at least two
20-m inute meditation sessions per day. By 2017, according to one study,
at least 10% of all Americans were regularly practicing meditation (with a
variety of specific techniques).
Bhutan. The small Himalayan nation of Bhutan developed an outsized
global role in discussions of happiness by advocating national measure-
ments of well-being that would go beyond purely economic criteria (cri-
teria by which the small country, relatively poor, fared badly). From 1971
onward Bhutanese leaders began advocating a Gross National Happiness
(GNH) measurement that would take into account spiritual, social, and
environmental factors. The idea that well-being should gain precedence
over economic growth hardly won universal acclaim – most develop-
ing countries proceeded resolutely to expand industry and trade – but it
did gain growing attention. Many of the happiness initiatives favored by
governments in the 21st century, from Britain to the Emirates, reflected
substantial interest in trying to go beyond material standard of living
alone – particularly given the increasing realization that living standards
and happiness did not fully correlate. And while the United States govern-
ment stayed away from the happiness issue, focused more conventionally
on economic criteria, American well-being programs actively embraced
the wider agenda.
Bhutanese values also gained attention as part of growing concern about
environmental deterioration. Its minister of education put it this way:
We believe that you cannot have a prosperous nation in the long run
that does not conserve its natural environment or take care of the
wellbeing of its people, which is being borne out by what is happening
in the outside world.
Some Bhutanese teachers went on to contend that the commitment to

GNH must go beyond environmental concerns, to provide a “philosophy
for life.” True to form, Bhutanese schools include regular meditation pe-
riods, soothing music to replace clanging school bells, and other efforts to
promote serenity.
The Bhutanese model hardly conquered the world. The nation itself
struggled with poverty and growing environmental change which threat-
ened water resources, with an uncertain future. But the notion of an alter-
native model did win some global attention. Specific Bhutanese ideas – like
the notion that one cannot live a truly happy life without thinking of death
at least five times a day – did create small initiatives in other countries,
even including online apps like WeCroak, to provide reminders of deeper
themes in life.
Japan. South Asia was not the only region to contribute to the grow-
ing global diversity of ideas about happiness. Key Buddhist movements in
Japan established global outreach to promote world peace and nuclear dis-
armament, often highlighting their commitment to programs that would
allow people to find “prosperity and happiness.”
Another fascinating initiative emerged in 2011 that soon caught global
attention. A woman named Marie Kondo, long fascinated with the impor-
tance of tidiness and influenced also by youthful service at a Shinto shrine,
published the first of several discussions of what she called the Konmari
method. The method centered on urging people to gather all their posses-
sions, in relevant categories, and then decide which items truly “sparked
joy” – while getting rid of the rest. Kondo claimed that cleaning and orga-
nizing things properly conveyed spiritual values in Shintoism, which can
be more widely shared. “Treasuring what you have, treating the objects
you own as disposable, but valuable, no matter what their actual monetary
worth, and creating displays so you can value each individual object are all
essentially Shinto ways of living.” Here was a new take on happiness and
joy in a consumer age.
Kondo’s publications, quickly translated into many other languages,
were followed by an array of television appearances and a flurry of ini-
tiatives in individual households in the United States and elsewhere. A
Netflix series in 2019 won wide attention.
***
Global contributions to discussions of happiness cut two ways. On the
one hand, they could directly counter dominant Western approaches to
happiness, including consumerism. On the other, they could combine, in
the West and elsewhere, potentially enriching approaches to happiness by
introducing additional values and practices. A variety of voices were con-
tributing to an increasingly global, if diverse, conversation.
Happiness Trends: The World Values Survey

Measuring global happiness is an inexact art at best, and for better or
worse it has not been undertaken very often. Earlier chapters discussed
some relevant initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as the recent
United Nations effort, stemming from the discussions surrounding the
International Day of Happiness, which provides some challenging com-
parative data. Only one project has covered a sufficient time period to
venture generalizations about trends over time – within the contem-
porary period – while also offering comparative evidence. The World
Values Survey offers some interesting material, along with explanations
that, as with any ambitious venture on global happiness, need careful
assessment.
The Survey. The World Values Survey (WVS) is an ambitious inter-
national social science undertaking, headquartered in Sweden but with
investigators in a growing number of countries. The Survey aims partic-
ularly at identifying national trends toward greater democracy; happiness
is not the primary focus. But the Survey has generated findings about
happiness over time, since its inception in 1981, and also explanations both
for trends and for comparative differences.
The principal findings run as follows: human values in countries around
the world divide according to two axes: one contrasts primary reliance
on tradition, including religion, with commitment to a more modern
secular-rational approach; the other contrasts societies or groups empha-
sizing survival and security, with those more eager for self-expression,
with high levels of tolerance and trust. Happiness is lowest in societies
where tradition and survivalism combine; highest in the secular/rational
plus self-expression group. A few societies fall in the middle, for example,
secular-rational but concerned about security.
WVS scholars further emphasize that while these divisions can be found
within societies, as with poorer groups stressing survival over more afflu-
ent self-expressers, divisions among countries are much stronger. In other
words, cultural combinations exercise a powerful influence over whole
societies.
Implications for happiness: comparisons. The results of this ambitious analy-
sis generate comparative patterns very similar to those of the World Hap-
piness Survey, which is somewhat reassuring except for critics who simply
distrust polling results. The happiest countries include the Scandinavians
and similar cases, with a Protestant tradition, deep impact from the En-
lightenment, and advanced industrialization. Many Middle Eastern
countries rank low, because of the combination of tradition and survival
concerns. China does somewhat better in these rankings than in the Hap-
piness Survey; India remains fairly low.
Several Latin American countries – Mexico, Brazil, Argentina – do
better than expected. Their economies have been improving, at least until
recently, but they also have been enjoying greater democracy and toler-
ance; yet sociologist Marita Carballo notes they also value religion, and
this cultural combination (modern but religious) may be an advantage
compared, say, to cases like China where greater secularism predominates.
Trends. The most important conclusion is that the vast majority of the
countries in the initial group of 54 saw happiness levels improve markedly
between 1981 and 2007. Only 12 lagged, and these were particularly con-
centrated in Eastern Europe where the fall of communism introduced an
overwhelming survival/security concern.
Most countries generated improvements: in the West, in Asia, in Latin
America, and parts of Africa. And WVS scholars rush to emphasize the com-
bination of factors involved. Economic development – industrialization –
plays the greatest role in encouraging a shift to secular/rational values and
away from traditionalism. But along with this, growing democratization
and tolerance promote a sense of freedom and agency, and opportunities
for self-expression. A wider variety of societies have moved to the posi-
tive side of the values ledger, though comparative differences still contrast
happiness levels in regions like Latin America or China from those in the
West. But the gaps may be narrowing – as they have been in economic
development.
Caveats. Several cautions attach to these intriguing findings – the best evi-
dence available for trends in recent decades. Modern culture may encourage
people to believe they should say they are happy, particularly when so many
varied governments are trying to promote happiness as a political goal.
Whether they actually are, or not, could be another matter – though even
a trend of trying to claim happiness would be an interesting development.
The Western values bias of the WVS may be troubling, a problem we
have encountered before in dealing with cases like Japan. Some coun-
tries, otherwise “modern”, may simply rate self-expression and individual
agency less vividly than their Western or Latin American counterparts,
but at the same time may have alternative definitions of happiness that do
not show up as clearly in a global poll.
The most dramatic red flag, however, involves questions about what
has happened, globally, since 2007. The Great Recession of 2008 set back
economic growth in some countries, though not all. For this and other
reasons, a number of societies have become less democratic and toler-
ant, more authoritarian, in the same recent timespan: this includes China,
Turkey, Brazil, the United States, and Russia, though in varying degrees.
Has happiness suffered accordingly?
Several countries, further, including the United States and Britain, have
experienced additional setbacks to measurable happiness in recent years.
Stagnating incomes in parts of the United States have reduced hope, and
modern happiness may depend strongly on a belief in achievable personal
and social progress. Symptoms such as growing opioid use and rising sui-
cide rates, quite apart from political disarray, suggest that something is
amiss. More recently still, in 2020, the challenge of the coronavirus pan-
demic and economic dislocation have reduced happiness levels still fur-
ther, though the setback may be temporary; 2020 was not a happy year.
These developments must be factored into any equation that argues for a
definitive global pattern of rising happiness.
***
Several global strands over the last half-century or more produce a messy
pattern – but possibly a pattern. Global interest in happiness has increased,
on the part of governments but also businesses and universities. This may
generate more happiness in fact, or at least a greater belief that happiness
should be emphasized. Definitions of happiness have expanded in some
cases thanks to a mixture of global influences. Economic development and
health improvements provide a plausible basis for expecting rising satisfac-
tion. And one massive data effort – the World Values Survey – suggests
that, on the whole, trends over time confirm the expected results: happi-
ness has been increasing.
None of this should neglect continued variety. A few countries, torn
by war and environmental damage, have seen happiness decline, as with
an Iraqi refugee who noted plaintively, in 2018, “I have forgotten what
happiness is.” Cultural factors, as well as differences in economic devel-
opment levels, continue to complicate the picture. Eastern Europe has
become a bit of a puzzle, with a growing regional turn away from the
patterns of liberal democracy and happiness rankings in the second quar-
tile internationally. But parts of the West, including the United States,
are generating new questions as well, with happiness was already stag-
nating despite economic advance but with further dislocations in recent
decades that have begun to push levels downward; a 2020 survey (reflect-
ing additional problems resulting from the virus pandemic and economic
collapse) found levels of happiness in the United States lower than at any
point since 1972.
Even for observers who take some understandable comfort in contempo-
rary global trends, it would surely be rash to project into the future. Global
changes over the past several decades, definitely; a measurable pattern at
least until very recently, probably; a clear path forward? Wait and see.
Further Reading
On global happiness initiatives,
Boddice, Rob. A History of Feelings, 1st ed. (London: Reaktion Books, 2019).
For data on material progress,
Pinker, Steven. Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and
Progress (New York: Viking, an imprint of Penguin Random House LLC,
2018).
Roser, Max. “Economic Growth.” Published Online at OurWorldInData.org
(2013).
On meditation,
Shear, Jonathan, ed. The Experience of Meditation (New York: Paragon House,
2006).
On global trends and comparisons,
Carballo, Marita. La Felicidad de Las Naciones, 1st ed. (Buenos Aires: SU-
DAAMERICANA, 2014).
Welzel, Christian. Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emanci-
pation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
15 Conclusion
Happiness has changed a great deal over the course of human history,
though in somewhat different ways in different regions. There is no ques-
tion that historical analysis improves our understanding of this human
emotion, even for observers primarily interested in contemporary patterns.
People may indeed have always wanted to be happy, but what they have
meant by this, and how they have been able to shape their experiences, has
varied greatly and depended on particular historical circumstance. Happi-
ness today is the product of past religions, the Enlightenment, commercial
capitalism, and the massive modern entertainment industry, psychological
advice, plus whatever personal, familial, and local variables add to the mix.
Complexities
The history of happiness is unquestionably complex: there is no tidy mas-
ter narrative to trace a steady evolution in any particular direction. Even
the question “are you happy?” would make no sense in certain cultures
and time periods. Here are some of the key problems encountered in this
historical sketch:
Relevant historical research is still widely scattered, with a dispropor-
tionate focus on the West. The conclusion, for example, that high levels
of reported Latin American happiness result from a unique combination
of Enlightenment ideas with continued religious support is intriguing,
but far more historical work is needed to flesh out how this combination
developed after the end of the colonial period. Many other key regions
are underserved, and even for the West ample room exists for much more
explicit research. There are a host of inviting opportunities, but in the
meantime, comparative conclusions must often remain rather speculative.
For the sheer variety of regional approaches to happiness is clearly a
challenging aspect of the history of happiness – at any given period of
time, including the present. Approaching alternative cultural systems and
linguistic preferences accurately is not an easy task. For the contemporary
period particularly, some of the most ambitious efforts to chart happi-
ness, as with the World Values Survey, remain suspiciously Western in
orientation.
214 Conclusion
For any period and any region, the tension between formal writing
about happiness, from philosophers or religious authorities or, more re-
cently, psychologists, and actual popular beliefs and practices is a funda-
mental issue. It is clearly easier to seize on the writings, but it is always vital
to look at what groups of more “ordinary” people seem to be saying and
doing. The two domains often relate, as with religious ideas and practices,
but they are rarely identical.
The challenge here may be particularly great in the more recent histor-
ical periods, even though we have a great deal more direct information
on popular concepts. For, from the Enlightenment onward, a variety of
modern systems have worked hard to tell people they should be happy and
cheerful. Corporations promote seemingly happy workers; Disney and
other consumer organizations preach happiness; communist governments
and, more recently, some of the well-being programs in contemporary
societies push in the same direction. All of this plays a valid role in the
history of happiness, but it also can distort results, even in polling data. It is
hard to sort out modern happiness from a modern encouragement to seem
to be happy. Another complexity to be aware of.
Religion clearly plays a central role in the history of happiness – but its
impact is not easy to determine. It may veer away from happiness in this
life to hopes for the next; it may promote fear or melancholy or outright
self-sacrifice. But it may also provide vital solace, even moments of tran-
scendent joy. The variety of religious approaches, and changes in major
religions such as the modern Christian embrace of happiness, complicate
the picture. In the contemporary period, available data on the relationship
between religion and happiness point in several directions. A number of
highly religious societies do not score well on happiness reports, and some
secular societies actually head the list. Attempts to explain these disparities
are helpful but not fully satisfactory. Thus rich secular countries, like those
in Scandinavia, build on prosperity, democracy, and tolerance to sustain
happiness without much need for religion, while societies that are reli-
gious but poorer understandably fare less well. Economic performance, in
other words, not religion is the key variable. But this distinction may over-
look the special role of religion in reported happiness in the United States
and especially in Latin America, or, by contrast, the complex combination
of religion, economic development, and low international scores in several
prosperous Islamic countries or in India. At the same time, a variety of
studies continue to cite religion as a positive contributor to happiness, par-
ticularly within individual societies, and many religious-like practices, such
as meditation, are gaining new emphasis. Again, generalization is difficult,
with different regional patterns and significant changes over time.
Finally, no dominant trend line can be established for a world history of
happiness. Some optimists, in the Enlightenment and again around 1900,
tried to argue that happiness had steadily increased from past to present
(perhaps with a bow to a primitive Golden Age), but this schema does not
Conclusion 215
fit the available facts. Fluctuations, rather than tidy trajectories, may best
capture reality – particularly at a moment, in 2020, when happiness in
many societies seems to be taking a nosedive.
Recurrent Themes
From the classical philosophers onward, and very much in the present day,
several general themes have intertwined with the history of happiness,
even at the popular level, and this can offer some coherence for the subject
across various time periods.
The tension between hedonistic definitions of happiness and those that
seek other, arguably deeper themes has affected discussions of the subject,
and actual choices, since the early civilizations. It remains a lively topic
today, as the efforts of the well-being advocates suggest. But it also affected
the balance between religious emphases and more popular pleasures in key
periods. A related theme, again recurrent both in philosophical treatments
and in real life, balances short-term, sometimes intense, pleasures against a
focus on more lifelong satisfactions, or possibly hopes for greater happiness
in a life to come or in a post-revolutionary world.
Another dilemma, noted early on, involves levels of aspiration. We have
seen that hunting and gathering groups may seem particularly happy be-
cause they live in the here and now. Correspondingly, many authorities
from the early civilizations onward urged modest expectations as a crucial
component of happiness. On the other hand, some people have always
sought more than they currently have – whether in material and social
standing or in spiritual fulfillment, and this might be a vital component of
happiness (or unhappiness) as well. Choices here may have become more
pressing in modern societies, when the idea of personal or social progress
burns brighter, but with greater potential frustrations as well. Individuals
may shoot too high but so, arguably, can some social movements such as
communism. The philosophers might have been surprised at the modern
specifics, but they would have recognized the problem.
A different topic, but again a recurrent one, juxtaposes luck versus hu-
man agency in the quest for happiness. Here too, the debate has involved
varying details, and some cultures have preferred one option over the
other. Some observers argue that groups or regions that today display un-
usual interest in gambling provide yet another contemporary indication
of an older emphasis on luck as the only real path to happiness. Modern
Western culture has tended to argue more for personal agency. But this
can leave some individuals convinced that their unhappiness must some-
how be their own fault. And new data, as with genetics, complicates this
ongoing discussion in additional ways.
Family looms large in most popular definitions of happiness. Here is an
aspect that the philosophers sometimes had less to say about, and which
some contemporary students of happiness bypass as well; most of the
216 Conclusion
explicit international happiness polls, for example, stay away from family
issues. It looms large in real-life assessments of happiness, however. This
said, the variety of family emphases complicates any easy generalization.
In many agricultural societies, sheer family size seems to have been the
most obvious component of happiness (at least in male-dominated rheto-
ric), and philosophers sometimes mentioned this as well. In many modern
settings, more explicit emotional fulfillment or shared consumer interests
play a greater role. The importance of attachment to parents provides yet
another approach to family happiness, apparently linking traditional and
more contemporary values in some regional societies. We have also seen
that ideas about children’s happiness and play constitute another important
variable over time.
Themes of this sort help organize comparisons among different regional
approaches to happiness, or changes from one period to the next, even
though they yield no tidy formulas. They also highlight the importance
of choice. One way to assess happiness today, as in the past, is to consider
whether different individuals and groups could opt for a version of happi-
ness that best suited their situation and temperament – even though others,
in the same region and time period, might pursue other preferences. Even
today, for example, in societies that for the most part do not equate family
happiness with lots of children; some individual couples happily – they
claim – opt for the older standard. Those modern societies that are fairly
tolerant have also added options to choose among religious and secular
approaches to happiness, which may contribute to a positive overall out-
come as well.
Major Changes in the History of Happiness

At this point in our historical understanding, and in trying to develop
a relevant world-historical framework, it has not been possible to mark
off tidy chronological periods for every stage in the history of happi-
ness. There have, however, been some particularly important turning
points.
The transition from hunting and gathering to agriculture, and then the
advent of formal civilizations, clearly denote a major watershed. Whatever
conclusions one draws about levels of happiness in hunting and gathering
societies, there is no question that agricultural civilizations introduced
several new and challenging issues in defining and achieving happiness,
which is why philosophers began to spend so much time discussing the
subject and why new words for happiness had to be introduced. High lev-
els of disease and death, frequent poverty, heightened work requirements,
patriarchal gender systems all added complications. In contrast to indus-
trialization (at least in the West), no prior buildup of new attitudes toward
happiness had arisen to cushion the impact of agricultural innovations or
disruptions.
Conclusion 217
Within the long agricultural period, the advent of more complex re-
ligions, most of them emanating either from India or the Middle East,
suggests another set of adjustments. Chronology here varies, but after the
collapse of the classical civilizations, that is, from the 5th or 6th century
CE onward, religions began to play a particularly powerful role in helping
to shape happiness in much of Asia, Europe, and parts of Africa. Religion
was never the sole factor in happiness, save for some individuals; it must be
balanced against other aspects of popular culture. But it could definitely
establish directions and constraints.
The “happiness revolution” in the West highlights major change, from
the 18th century onward. This was a striking departure in many ways,
from smiling cheerfulness to definitions of family happiness to new chal-
lenges in reconciling happiness and death. It needs careful treatment, both
because it did not erase earlier approaches in the West and because its
global influence was gradual and remains incomplete to this day. From
Russian communism to contemporary well-being programs in the Middle
East to gestures such as the International Day of Happiness and the very
idea of trying to measure happiness globally, however, some themes from
the happiness revolution turn out to have wide impact.
The challenge of industrialization. The advent of industrial society, first in
the West and now more widely, raises a fundamental question about hap-
piness and historical change: if agricultural civilization reduced or compli-
cated happiness in fundamental ways, compared to earlier human society,
what about industrialization compared to its agricultural predecessor?
The response is not easy, in part because of the impact of different re-
gional cultures: industrial Japan, for example, compared with the indus-
trial United States, or industrializing India compared to China. But some
suggestions can be ventured, and recent optimists like Steven Pinker have
plausibly argued that industrialization, and the cultural changes it has pro-
moted, does increase human happiness, though probably not as much and
not as steadily as would be expected from a simple standard-of-living con-
trast between a mature industrial society and its agricultural counterpart.
This argument can certainly be contested. Many historians would shy
away from a big generalization of this sort, arguing that modern historical
reality is more complex – particularly given how difficult it is to agree on
a definition of happiness. Others would point to the undeniable miseries
and injustices in the contemporary world, including persistent racism, and
disclaim any overall optimism; Pinker himself was explicitly attacked in
2020 on precisely these grounds.
Yet evidence relevant to happiness can be offered, without denying per-
sisting problems. Certainly, after some growing pains, industrialization
corrects some of the damage brought by agriculture: the quality of food
supply improves; average stature increases, and the stature gap between up-
per and lower classes eases; health and life expectancy gain massively and
contagious diseases decline; and gender inequality lessens. The duration of
218 Conclusion
work drops notably, though this category is complicated because the pace,
and sometimes the monotony, intensify.
To be sure, some problems persist from the agricultural age: social and
economic inequality, for example, does not decline much, persisting de-
spite new social systems. Family life and leisure life do change – as with
the decline of festivals and a reduction of spontaneous play for children:
but assessing the quality of the results is not a simple matter, though most
modern people, easily bored, would probably find it difficult to adapt to
the more occasional rhythms of the festival tradition. There is, on the
other hand, a vague “good old days” theme in contemporary culture that
suggests some doubts about recent trends in family life or entertainment.
Unquestionably, some new issues are also added in as the industrial soci-
ety matures. Religion does not disappear, but it undeniably becomes more
complicated in a more secular framework, and this may affect happiness
for some. Accommodating death in a more modern context may generate
new tensions. Environmental changes may affect happiness, and this will
probably loom larger in the near future.
Industrial societies almost certainly produce new levels of stress. In
Western society, this problem began to be noticed in the late 19th century,
under various names, and it has certainly persisted. Industrial societies also
encourage cultural changes that, in turn, promote rising expectations: for
social mobility, for greater wealth, for a better society, and these can lead
to various signs of frustration. In Western culture particularly, the pressure
to seem happy can itself generate tension, especially to the extent that it
fails to accommodate sadness. These are some of the reasons that happiness
does not increase as steadily as might be anticipated – along with the fact
that people understandably fail to recall the past conditions against which
the present might be measured.
With all this, and with due caution about the uses of polling data, sur-
veys do fairly consistently suggest that the happiest societies are ones in
which industrial levels have been achieved and accepted; where a culture
encourages recognition and expression of happiness (but not, perhaps, un-
due cheerfulness); and where welfare measures and high levels of social
trust add to a protective environment – a combination that, it must be
added, not all industrial societies fully achieve. And the comparative rank-
ings do not seem to change very rapidly, even as global reports of happi-
ness may have been improving overall.
Finally, the history of happiness also reminds us of fragility. Classical
philosophers and religious authorities long warned of this for individuals.
Well-being advocates, trying to promote attitudes that can override set-
backs, do the same in the contemporary context. But fragility applies to
societies as well as individuals. Major political collapse, an epidemic surge,
the aftermath of destructive war – developments of this sort have recur-
rently disrupted general happiness, in agricultural and industrial societies
alike.
Conclusion 219
In a year – 2020 – in which some major societies have been buffeted
by disease, economic collapse, and massive social protest – a really un-
usual combination of crises – and in which happiness is measurably on the
decline in many places, it does seem appropriate to end on a cautionary
note. Various suggestions, over the past 3,000 years, can help individuals
define happiness constructively and work to achieve it. History helps us
understand where our particular ideas about happiness have come from,
and what some of their strengths and limitations are as against other ap-
proaches. But happiness also depends on the social environment and on
actively paying attention to the greater good. This is where the challenge
lies, for the foreseeable future.
Index
Abrahamic religions 34, 54 Beethoven, Ludwig van 110

Achebe, Chinua: No Longer at Ease 142 Bentham, Jeremy 94
“active intellect” 64 Berman, Rachel 199
active temperance movements 129 Berman, Robin 188
adaptations and inequalities 30–32 Beveridge, A.J. 137
“affluent societies” 190, 199 Bhutan 9, 207–208
age of imperialism 135 Bitzer, G.W. 108
aggressive nationalism 182 Bolivar, Simon 140
agricultural age 21, 35, 77, 218 Breughel, Pieter 71
agricultural civilizations 30, 35, 36, 40, Britain 1, 92, 94, 100, 108, 113–115,
83, 216–217 125, 126, 140, 157, 207, 211
agricultural economies 21, 29, 37, 39 Buddhism 54, 57–60, 66–69
agricultural societies 8, 22–24, 71, Buddhist movements in Japan 208
75–77; adaptations and inequalities Burton, Richard: Anatomy of
30–32; anthropologists 25–27; Melancholy 92
causes and complexities 28–30; Byrom, John 100
characteristics of 27–28; golden age
33–36; religion 54 Calvinism 84
agriculture 7, 21–23, 27–32, 35, 37, 38, Calvin, John 68
150, 216, 217 Cameron, David 203
The Alchemy of Happiness (Al-Ghazali) Canterbury Tales (Chaucer) 67
64 Cantril, Hadley 175–178
Alcott, Louisa May 111 Carballo, Marita 210
Alger, Horatio 121 “carnal desire” 63
American culture 5 Carnegie, Dale: How to Win Friends and
“American Dream” 123 Influence People 155
Anatomy of Melancholy (Burton) 92 caveats 24, 198, 210–211
Antoinette, Marie 95 Chastellux, Marquis de 35, 94
Aquinas, Thomas 62, 65 Chaucer, Geoffrey: Canterbury Tales 67
Arab Golden Age 74, 84 childhood 66, 74–76, 118–120
Aristotle 41–44, 48, 49, 51, 62, 64, Chinese culture 42, 168
74, 117 Chinese Empire 135–137
Art of Contentment 91 “Chinese flowers” 78
Ataturk, Kemal 151, 160, 161 Chinese philosophy, happiness in 45–48
Augustine of Hippo 60–62 Christianity 34, 44, 47, 52, 54, 55,
Aurelius, Marcus 51 59–62, 64, 66–68, 95, 110, 136,
Australian aboriginal culture 26 138, 142
Cicero 43, 44
Ball, Harvey 190 “civilizing mission” 134
Beccaria, Cesare 94 collective happiness 103–104, 166, 170
222 Index
collective programs 166–167 The Decline of the West (Spengler) 152
collective well-being 180 depression 15, 151, 152, 157, 161, 188,
comfort 2, 5, 30, 40, 49, 56, 59, 67, 68, 197, 200
88, 96, 97, 102, 110, 139, 195, 199, Derné, Steve 180
206, 211 desire theory 17
communism 149, 164, 170, 210, 215 Dhammapada 57
communist China 168–170 Diamond, Jerrod 28
communist happiness 164; communist Dickens, Charles 114
China 168–170; Soviet commitment Diener, Ed 15
165–168 disputed happiness: fascism and
community solidarity 79, 82 happiness 158–159; nationalism
competitive consumerism 194 159–162; new frontiers 152–158;
“complete virtue” 41 World War I 151–152
complexities 4, 13, 88, 174, 213–215; “domestic felicity” 119
causes and 28–30; class divides
128–129; great expectations 130– early civilization 29, 32, 37–39, 215
131; sex and death 129–130 Easterlin, Richard 198–199
Condorcet, Nicolas de 98, 109, 131; economic dislocations 135, 152, 159,
Sketch for a Historical Picture of the 211
Progress of the Human Mind 98 Egyptian culture 38
Confucian fascination 46 Egyptian religion 54
Confucian happiness 47 emotional satisfaction 42, 115, 117
Confucianism 45, 47, 52 emotional well-being 192, 204
Confucius 34, 39, 45, 46, 49 endemic political tensions 178
consumer emotions 193–195 Engels, Friedrich 110
consumerism 2, 16, 88, 90, 91, 97, English Protestant intellectuals 90
104, 119, 122–125, 135, 139, 142, Enlightenment beliefs 96
143, 145, 157, 158, 167, 182, 202; Enlightenment optimism 97
competitive 194; contemporary 192, Enlightenment thinking 139
195; global 205–206; and happiness Enlightenment tradition 99
96, 193; Indian 179; individualism Epictetus 44, 45, 49
and 146, 159; sexuality and 101–103 Epicureans 43–44
consumer-oriented societies 17 Epicurus 43, 44
contemporary consumerism 192, 195 eudaimonic approaches 14
contemporary societies: happiness “eudaimonic” happiness 14
in India 178–182; Japan 182–186; “euphoria” 169
projects in social sciences 174–178 European consumer patterns 193
conventional happiness 158–159 European imperialism 137
cultural revolution 96, 170
culture 16, 18, 126, 130; American 5; facial expressions 13, 99, 154
Australian aboriginal 26; Chinese family-centered definition of happiness
42, 168; consumer 149; East Asian 181
47; Egyptian 38; global youth 206; fascism 151, 158–159
Greek 43; of happiness 152; Japanese “feeling right” 19
182–184; modern 210; preindustrial “felicity” 50, 51, 62, 63
123; regional 2, 179, 217; Russian festivals 2, 8, 24, 31, 113, 114, 124,
143, 165, 166; signs of good cheer 125, 218; athletic 50; Christian 66;
112–114; Western 95, 98, 188, 200, consumer 171; periodic 79–85, 114;
215, 218; Western happiness 199 traditional 2
customary economic patterns 141 fin de siècle 111
“First and Perfect” age 33
dance activities in festival traditions 82 Al Floumi, Ohoud 204
Daoism 45 Fourier, Charles 110
Darwin, Charles 12, 111 Franklin, Benjamin 121, 123
Index 223
French revolutionary radicals 98 Huizinga, Johann 75
Freud, Sigmund 111 “humanistic” psychology 195
frustration 8, 17, 25, 97, 111, 175, hunting and gathering 7, 22–24, 26–29,
198–200, 215, 218 31, 32, 34–36, 72, 77, 83, 215, 216
Hutcheson, Francis 93, 94, 99
Gallup organization 4, 197, 203
Gandhi, Mohandas 151, 160, 161, 178 ikigai 182–185
gender inequality 28, 130, 217 Illien, Jayme 203
genetic predisposition 12 “immediate sensual enjoyment” 94
genetics 16–17, 215 “imperfect happiness” 62
Al-Ghazali 63; The Alchemy of Happiness imperialism and happiness 137–142
64 India 39, 54, 55, 59, 68, 137, 160–161,
Gibbon, Edward 52 175, 177, 204, 206, 207, 214, 217;
Gilbert, Dan 3 festivals 80, 82; happiness in 178–182;
global consumerism 205 Hinduism in 56, 84
globalization 186, 202 Indian consumerism 179
global promotion of happiness 202–205 individual happiness 19, 101–104, 151,
Graham, Billy 189 170
Great Leap Forward 168, 169 individual violence 24
Greco-Roman tradition 9 industrialization 29, 108, 109, 112,
Greek approach 40–45 114–116, 121, 123, 128, 131, 134,
Greek cultural legacy 42 142–145, 150, 155, 165–167, 169,
Greek religion 50 172, 210, 216, 217
Guy Fawkes Day (England) 81 industrial life, divisions of 114;
happiness and new emotional
Han dynasty 52, 78 context 127–128; happy child
“happiness agenda” 203 118–120; happy families 115–118;
“happiness meters” 204 leisure 123–127; work 120–123
“happiness of hope” 61 industrial societies 23, 87, 108, 127, 128,
happiness revolution 87, 143, 217; 131, 150, 156, 168, 217–218
assessing 104–105; causation 96–97; inequalities 192, 195; adaptations and
collective happiness 103–104; 30–32; economic 24; gender 28, 130,
consumerism 88; fundamental 217; global 205; regional economic
change 91–93; individual happiness 202; social 128
101–103; new concepts of happiness instrumentalism 122–124, 190
93–95; preparatory developments “intermedial” happiness 91
90–91; smiling 99–101 International Day of Happiness 202,
happy families 115–120, 123, 130, 180 209, 217
Happy Planet Index 203 Irving, Washington 114
“Happytalism” 203 Islam 34, 52, 54, 55, 62–68, 134, 146
heaven 1, 54, 55, 59–63, 66, 72, 98,
136, 138 Japan 5, 142–146, 208; concept of ikigai
“hedonic” happiness 14 182–183; deterioration 184–185;
hedonism 43, 178–179, 195, 196, pleasures 183–184
200, 207 Jefferson, Thomas 165
Hesiod: Works and Days 33 Johnson, Samuel 105
Hinduism 54, 55–56, 66, 69, 80, 84, Journal of Happiness Studies 203
146, 160–161, 179 joy 26, 45, 46, 55, 65–69, 71, 90, 92, 95,
Hitler, Adolf 158, 159 103–104, 110, 127, 138, 139, 142,
Hong Xiuquan 136 143, 157, 159, 180, 192, 208, 214
hope and aspiration 18 Judaism 34, 59
Houghton, Walter 111
How to Win Friends and Influence People Kant, Immanuel 105
(Carnegie) 155 Keys to Happiness (1910) 143
224 Index
Kharji 64 Ovid 33
Khrushchev, Nikita 168 Owen, Wilfred 151
Latin America 35, 60, 135, 138–142, patriarchal gender system 37, 216
210, 213, 214 “peaceful happiness” 61
leisure 31, 72, 108, 114, 115, 123–131, Peale, Norman Vincent: The Power of
159, 169, 191, 193, 218 Positive Thinking 189
Lenin 165 “perfectibility of society” 98
Lequinio, Joseph-Marie 103, 104 Pericles 52
Lewis, John 190 periodic festival 79–85, 114
“life satisfaction” 14–15 Persian mythology 34
Locke, John 90, 91 philosophy: competing options 49–51;
loneliness 17, 67, 144, 193–195, 203 and legacies 51–52; philosophers and
Longfellow, Henry Wadsworth 114 ordinary people 48–49; and science
Lotz, Max 121 109–112
“lower middle class” 122 physical self-discipline 56
Luther, Martin 68 Pinker, Steven 217
Plato 33, 40–42, 48, 49
Maoist approach 168 poetry recitals, tradition of 77
Mao Zedong 168–171 Polan, A.J. 165
Marcus Aurelius 44, 51 Pope, Alexander 93
Martineau, Harriet 154 positive psychology 8, 9, 12, 195–200,
Marxism 164 202, 204
Marxist happiness 164 The Power of Positive Thinking (Peale)
Marx, Karl 109, 121 189
Mayo, Elton 155 preindustrial society 114
Mazzini, Giuseppe 109 Protestantism 84, 90, 115, 145
McMahon, Darrin 35 psychological basics: desires and state
“melancholic demeanor” 1 of mind 17; downsides of happiness
Mencius 45, 47 19; facial expressions 13; genetics
middle-class codes 129 16–17; “hedonic” & “eudaimonic”
middle-class parents 1 happiness 14; hope and aspiration 18;
Mill, John Stuart 109 “life satisfaction” 14–15; preliminary
“mindfulness” 58, 197, 204, 207 list 17–18; psychological work on
Moore, Clement 114; The Night Before happiness 12; psychology and history
Christmas 114 19–20
Morris dancing 81–82 psychological depression 8, 200
Muhammad (Prophet) 62, 68 psychological work on happiness 12
Mussolini, Benito 158, 159 psychology 94; dependent on 2;
discipline of 7; and history 19–20;
nationalism 103, 109, 135, 144, 146, “humanistic” 195; industrial 155;
159–162, 171, 182 positive 8, 9, 12, 195–200, 202, 204
Nazism 152, 158–159, 167 “public felicity” 35, 103
negative emotions 12, 34, 63, 157 “pursuit of happiness” 1, 103, 143, 203
neologism 101, 128 pursuit of wisdom 40
The Night Before Christmas (Moore) 114 Putin,Vladimir 172
Nirvana 58
No Longer at Ease (Achebe) 142 Qur’an 63
Norse traditions 81
Nuwwas, Abi 78 radical protesters 90
Ramadan Mubarak 206
Ottoman Empire 135–137, 142, 160 rapid industrialization 166, 169,
overindulgence 61 172, 205
Index 225
regional approaches to happiness 39, Smith, Adam 94
185–186, 213, 216 social class distinctions 84
regional diversity 3 social framework 39–40
regional economic inequalities 202 Socialist Realist style 166
regional religious traditions 134 social sciences 94, 96, 174–178
relative affluence 157 Socrates 40–42
religion 218; Abrahamic 34, 54; Song dynasty 78
Buddhism 54, 57–60, 66–69; South Asia 202, 203, 207, 208
Christianity 34, 44, 47, 52, 54, 55, Soviet commitment 165–168
59–62, 64, 66–68, 95, 110, 136, Soviet tourism 167
138, 142; Egyptian 54; Greek 50; Spengler, Oswald: The Decline of the West
Hinduism 54–56, 66, 69, 80, 84, 146, 152
160–161, 179; Islam 34, 52, 54, 55, spiritual joy 66
62–68, 134, 146; question of impact Stakhanov, Alexy 166
65–69; Roman 50, 54; traditional Stakhanovite movement 166
Shinto 182 Stalin 165, 166, 171
“religious age” 69, 71, 82 standard of living 17, 175, 186,
religious approach to happiness 65, 69, 79 207, 217
religious joy 65–67, 71 state-sponsored vacations 167
religious movement 136 Stoics 44, 49, 51
“right to happiness” 93 Strength through Joy 159
river-valley civilization 21, 37, 38 subjective well-being (SWB) 14, 15
Roman religion 50, 54 sub-Saharan Africa 77, 141
Romantic approach 110 Suh, Eunkook 185
Romantic intellectuals 110 Summa Theologica 62
Romantic movement 110 SWB see subjective well-being (SWB)
Roosevelt, Franklin 153, 157 syncretism 206–209
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 95
Russia 93, 97, 135, 142–146, 165, 166, Taiping movement 136
171, 172, 181 Taiping rebellion 136
Russian culture 143, 165, 166 Tang dynasty 69, 78
Tanzimat reforms 136
sadness 6, 25, 26, 38, 46, 62, 101, temporary happiness 56
105, 110, 135, 138, 139, 154, 197, Tolstoy, Leo 143
198–200, 218 traditional Hindu approaches to
Schiller, Friedrich 110 happiness 55
“selfish indulgence” 119 traditionalism 210
Seligman, Martin 195, 196 traditional Shinto religion 182
Seneca 44 traditional wisdom 93, 171, 196
sexual abstinence 31 “true” happiness 84
sexual activity 63; and interest 74;
before marriage 102 “ultimate happiness” 64
sexual indulgence 50, 59 United Arab Emirates 9, 204, 206
sexuality 61, 126; attitudes toward 63; United Service Organizations (USO) 158
and consumerism 101–103; and United States 17, 108, 110, 113, 116,
drugs 193; graphic 78; rampant 181 118, 123–127, 137, 140, 144, 151–157,
sexual revolution of 1960s 193 164, 167, 168, 175, 176, 182, 183–185,
Shelley, Percy 110 190, 195, 196, 198, 200, 203, 206–208,
Siddhartha Gautama 57 211, 214; British colonies of 102;
Sketch for a Historical Picture of the childrearing manuals in 112; leisure
Progress of the Human Mind (de growth 193; low-income families in
Condorcet) 98 191; middle-class parents in 1
Smiles, Samuel 111, 121 utilitarian school 94
226 Index
“virtuous” behavior 17 well-being 195–198; sadness and
frustration 198–200; signposts
well-being 5, 56, 179, 202, 203; 186–190
collective 180; emotional 192, 204; Western-style happiness 164
initiatives 204, 207; movement 9; Western-style optimism 144
positive psychology and 195–198; Works and Days (Hesiod) 33
programs 214, 217; subjective 14, 15 “World Happiness Day”
“Wellbeing Finder” 197 202–205
Western happiness culture 199 World Values Survey (WVS)
Western intellectual life 109 209–211, 213
Western society: consumerism
190–195; positive psychology and Yukichi, Fukuzawa 144

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Happiness in World History

Happiness in World History traces ideas and experiences of happiness from

Peter N. Stearns is University Professor of History at George Mason

The Themes in World History series offers focused treatment of a range

Gender in World History

Neutrality in World History

Globalization in World History

Time in World History

Migration in World History (Third Edition)

Agriculture in World History (Second Edition)

Happiness in World History

ISBN: 978-0-367-56105-5 (hbk)

3 Early Agricultural Society 22

7 The Happiness Revolution in the West 88

10 Disputed Happiness, 1920–1945 151

A number of people provided great assistance in finding relevant materials:

This book further complicates the study of happiness by looking at it in

Modern Russian adage: “A person who smiles a lot is either a fool or an

Not surprisingly, since this is a historical study, the following chapters

Helliwell et al. (2019).

Further Reading (and Watching)

Happiness is hard to define, even in our own lives. A variety of eminent

The Agricultural Age

Agricultural economies began to emerge about 11,000 years ago, and

Here’s the possibility: early humans, living in hunting and gathering

More from Anthropologists

Characteristics of Agricultural Societies

Causes and Complexities

Adaptations and Inequalities

While we lack the direct evidence, on either side of the introduction of

The transition to agriculture occurred, for most societies, several ­m illennia

There is simply no real record relevant to happiness in the many centuries

The Classical World

The Social Framework

The Greek Approach

A Darker View: Greek Tragedy

Greek and Roman Successors

Happiness in Chinese Philosophy

Impact: Where Does Philosophy Fit?

The Philosophers and Ordinary People

Back to the Philosophers – and Legacies

When the Athenian leader Pericles vaunted the great achievements of

To live unafflicted amid the afflicted is to be happy. To live without

Buddhist writings seek to distinguish between affliction and suffering: af-

Since men become happy by achieving happiness, and happiness is it-

All of this, of course, could dramatically reshuffle normal priorities. For

The Question of Impact

The Holy Option

This was a transcendent experience, which supported Hildegard through

The Darker Side

Several reactions might respond to the short description of the various

In the 17th/18th centuries in Western Europe and much of North A ­ merica,

• Protestantism might have created a new sense of opportunities for

Before the Big Change

New Concepts of Happiness

Happiness Plus: A Ripple Effect

Individual Happiness: Sexuality and Consumerism

Collective Happiness – and Joy: A Political Dimension

Assessing the Happiness Revolution: A First Cut

The Cultural Framework

The transition to agriculture occurred, for most societies, several m illennia

In the 17th/18th centuries in Western Europe and much of North A merica,