(2020) 1 SLR 0695
(2020) 1 SLR 0695
(2020) 1 SLR 0695
[2020] SGCA 12
Facts
The parties went to arbitration over disputes relating to the construction of a
power generation plant in Guatemala (“the Plant”). The appellant, China
Machine New Energy Corporation (“CMNC”), was the contractor, and the
respondents, Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC and AEI Guatemala Jaguar Ltd
(collectively, “Jaguar”), were the owners of the Plant. The parties’ relationship
was governed by an engineering, procurement and construction contract (“the
EPC Contract”), under which CMNC was to construct the Plant for an
approximate sum of US$450m. In December 2013, after the works fell into
delay, Jaguar terminated the EPC Contract, and engaged other contractors to
complete the works.
In January 2014, Jaguar commenced arbitral proceedings against CMNC (“the
Arbitration”) under the EPC Contract, and claimed, amongst other reliefs, the
cost of completing the Plant (“the ETC Claim”). The substantive dispute
between the parties centred on the quantum of the ETC Claim, and the parties’
preparations for the Arbitration focused on the production of contracts, invoices
and other supporting documents evidencing the costs of completion, as well as
the preparation of expert reports on the issue of quantum.
Broadly speaking, the procedural issues raised in relation to the production of
documents fell into three categories. The first concerned restrictions placed on
the disclosure of sensitive documents, which, CMNC submitted, had severely
hindered its ability to assess and therefore address Jaguar’s case on the quantum
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 696 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
of Jaguar’s ETC Claim. In this regard, Jaguar had sought to withhold disclosure
of documents containing information identifying its post-termination
contractors on the basis that CMNC might misuse that information to interfere
with the ongoing work to complete the Plant. In September 2014, the tribunal
(“the Tribunal”) ordered that the sensitive documents be produced on an
“attorneys’ eyes only” basis (“the AEO Order”), meaning that sensitive
documents would only be disclosed to CMNC’s external counsel and expert
witnesses, and not to its employees (subject to CMNC’s right to apply for
disclosure). This was superseded less than a month later by a redaction ruling,
under which Jaguar would disclose the sensitive documents to CMNC’s
employees, albeit with any information identifying Jaguar’s contractors redacted
(“the Redaction Ruling”). The Redaction Ruling was itself subsequently
modified by a procedural order relieving Jaguar of the obligation to redact and
disclose (to CMNC’s employees) documents pertaining to claims with a value of
less than US$100,000. These restrictions (the AEO Order, as modified by the
Redaction Ruling and the subsequent procedural order) were subsequently lifted
in March 2015; sensitive documents were thereafter disclosed to CMNC’s
employees without restriction.
The second issue concerned CMNC’s access to project documents documenting
the work CMNC had completed before Jaguar’s termination of the EPC
Contract (“the Construction Documents”), which was necessary so that CMNC
might value the completed work, and thereby assess and challenge CMNC’s
claim for the cost of completing the work that remained uncompleted.
According to CMNC, it lost access to these documents after it was forced to
leave the work site following the termination of the EPC Contract.
The third concerned Jaguar’s rolling production of documents evidencing the
cost of completion (“the Costs Documents”). Over the course of the Arbitration,
Jaguar produced four tranches of documents corresponding to four updates to
the quantum of its ETC Claim. The first tranche of documents was produced in
February 2015, and the fourth and final tranche was produced on 5 June 2015. In
the present proceedings, CMNC challenged both the propriety of allowing
Jaguar to continually produce the documents, as well as the manner in which
they were produced. On the former point, CMNC contended that the Tribunal’s
failure to put an earlier stop to the continual updates to the quantum of Jaguar’s
ETC Claim resulted in CMNC not having sufficient time to prepare its response.
On the latter point, CMNC argued that its difficulties were compounded by the
disorganised and haphazard manner in which the documents were produced.
According to CMNC, the Tribunal’s mismanagement of the Arbitration (in the
three aforementioned aspects) made it impossible for it to promptly prepare and
file critical lay and expert evidence addressing the quantum of the ETC Claim. In
particular, these difficulties meant that a key responsive expert report prepared
by CMNC’s quantum expert (“the Gurnham Responsive Report”) was filed out
of time, and was therefore not properly considered by the Tribunal, in breach of
CMNC’s right to be heard under Art 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (“the Model Law”), rendering the award
liable to be set aside under, amongst others, Art 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law
and s 24(b) of the International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed)
(“IAA”).
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 697 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
The High Court judge (“the Judge”) dismissed CMNC’s application to set aside
the award. The Judge rejected CMNC’s submission that the Tribunal’s
management of the process of document disclosure was a breach of CMNC’s
right to be heard, and held, in any case, that CMNC did not suffer any prejudice
that justified setting aside the award.
(1) The right to be heard – which referred to each party’s right to present its
case and respond to the case against it – was a fundamental rule of natural
justice. The parties’ right to be heard found expression in Art 18 of the Model
Law. However, the Art 18 right to a “full opportunity” of presenting one’s case
was not an unlimited one, and was impliedly limited by considerations of
reasonableness and fairness: at [87], [88] and [97].
(2) What constituted a “full opportunity” was a contextual inquiry to be
undertaken within the specific context of the particular facts and circumstances
of each case. The proper approach was for the court to ask itself if what the
tribunal did (or decided not to do) fell within the range of what a reasonable and
fair-minded tribunal in those circumstances might have done. In undertaking
this exercise, the court had to put itself in the shoes of the tribunal, and this
meant that (a) the tribunal’s decisions could only be assessed by reference to
what was known to or had been brought to the tribunal’s attention at the
material time, and (b) the court would accord a margin of deference to the
tribunal in matters of procedure and would not intervene simply because it
might have done things differently: at [98], [99] and [103].
(3) The imposition of the AEO Order was not without basis. On the evidence
that had been placed before it, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the possibility of
misuse of the sensitive documents gave rise to “serious concern” was an entirely
reasonable one. The Tribunal’s approach could, in some respects, be analogised
to how a court would approach an application for an interim injunction made
on the basis of contested facts, at a time when final findings on those contested
facts simply could not be made, and where the overarching focus was to
minimise injustice by balancing the competing interests as best it could: at [111].
(4) The fact that the AEO Order adversely affected CMNC’s ability to prepare
its case was not fatal to its legality – the AEO Order was intended to strike a
balance between Jaguar’s interest in confidentiality and CMNC’s interest in
access for the preparation of its case, and necessarily represented a compromise
between those interests. In any case, any unfairness occasioned by the AEO
Order was substantially mitigated following the Redaction Ruling, under which
redacted versions of the sensitive documents were disclosed to CMNC’s
employees: at [113] and [116].
(5) CMNC’s submission that it had been prejudiced by the Tribunal’s failure
to order Jaguar to disclose the Construction Documents was entirely without
basis. First, CMNC never requested the production of the Construction
Documents for the purpose of preparing its case. Second, CMNC’s own filings in
the Arbitration suggested that it had been perfectly able to assess the value of its
pre-termination work with reasonable accuracy: at [124] and [125].
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 698 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
(6) There was no basis to impeach the Tribunal’s decision to allow Jaguar to
continue producing the Costs Documents until 5 June 2015; the Tribunal had
accounted for CMNC’s interest in addressing those documents by granting it an
extension of the time for the filing of the Gurnham Responsive Report to 18 June
2015 in the exact terms sought by CMNC in its request for relief. In deciding to
grant the extension and impose a later cut-off date, the Tribunal sought to
balance between Jaguar’s interest in presenting material relevant to its claim, and
CMNC’s interest in having a reasonable opportunity to meet Jaguar’s case. The
course which the Tribunal chose was entirely reasonable in the circumstances:
at [131] and [132].
(7) The Tribunal’s decision not to grant CMNC a second extension of the
deadline for the filing of the Gurnham Responsive Report was not unreasonable
or unfair. CMNC’s request for the second extension had been premised on its
contention that the final tranche of documents produced on 5 June 2015 was
unusually voluminous. However, there was nothing to suggest that the final
tranche of documents produced was unusually large when compared to the
second and third tranches. Even if it were, CMNC would have known of this
immediately after the documents were produced on 5 June 2015, but did not
request the extension until some 12 days later, on the eve of the deadline:
at [134], [140] and [141].
(8) The Tribunal’s direction that Jaguar need not address the material
belatedly filed by CMNC had to be distinguished from a direction that Jaguar
ought not do so. The former direction was not a de facto exclusion of the
evidence as it left it open to Jaguar to deal with the material to the extent it was
able, and left it open to the Tribunal, in that light, to consider the material and
give it such weight as it deemed appropriate. In any case, even if the Tribunal’s
direction could be read as a de facto exclusion of the material belatedly filed by
CMNC, such an exclusion was well within the competence of the Tribunal to
order, and was not unfair or unreasonable in the circumstances: at [148], [149]
and [151].
(9) CMNC’s complaint that the Tribunal had failed to consider the allegedly
disorganised and haphazard production of the Costs Documents in its
management of the Arbitration was without basis. In assessing whether the
Tribunal had acted unfairly, it was of crucial importance that the court examine
what exactly the Tribunal had been told about the alleged difficulties that the
complaining party faced. In this regard, CMNC did not mention Jaguar’s
allegedly disorganised and haphazard production of documents in its requests to
the Tribunal for extensions of time for the filing of the Gurnham Responsive
Report. It was not until after the extended deadlines had lapsed that CMNC
informed the Tribunal of these alleged difficulties in its application to belatedly
admit the Gurnham Responsive Report: at [159].
(10) While CMNC had, at various junctures in the Arbitration, raised
objections to the Tribunal’s management of the procedure for document
production, it never stated what it stated in the setting-aside proceedings – that
the cumulative effect of the issues raised earlier was such that the prospects of a
fair arbitration had been irretrievably lost as a result of the Tribunal’s
mismanagement of its procedure (or alternatively, that the scheduled
evidentiary hearings could not proceed). On the contrary, CMNC had, by its
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 699 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
Case(s) referred to
ABB AG v Hochtief Airport GmbH [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (refd)
ASM Shipping Ltd of India v TTMI Ltd of England [2005] EWHC 2238 (Comm)
(refd)
LW Infrastructure Pte Ltd v Lim Chin San Contractors Pte Ltd [2013] 1 SLR 125
(refd)
On Call Internet Services Ltd v Telus Communications Co [2013] BCAA 366
(refd)
PT Reasuransi Umum Indonesia v Evanston Insurance Co 23 December 1992,
[1992] WL 400733 (SDNY, 1992) (refd)
Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd
[2007] 3 SLR(R) 86; [2007] 3 SLR 86 (folld)
Triulzi Cesare SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 114 (refd)
Trustees of Rotoaira Forest Trust v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 452 (refd)
Legislation referred to
International Arbitration Act (Cap 143A, 2002 Rev Ed) s 24(b) (consd);
s 24(a)
Arbitration Act 1996 (c 23) (UK) s 33
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 700 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
[Editorial note: This was an appeal from the decision of the High Court in
[2018] SGHC 101.]
Introduction
Background facts
Sometime in November 2010, Jaguar Energy exercised its option under the
DPSA to issue debit notes in lieu of making cash payments. In all, Jaguar
Energy issued a total of 61 debit notes with a total value of approximately
US$129m.
8 Signs of trouble first appeared in 2013, when CMNC failed to meet
the scheduled take-over dates for both phases of the works. In October and
November 2013, Jaguar Energy issued notices of breach, and reserved its
right to terminate the EPC Contract. In response, on 28 November 2013,
CMNC purported to exercise its “step-in rights” as secured lender under
the DPSA to take over Jaguar Energy’s rights under the EPC Contract. On
the next day, 29 November 2013, Jaguar Energy notified CMNC of its
intention to terminate the EPC Contract, and requested that CMNC vacate
the work site (“the Site”) within 15 days.
9 The Site comprised two separate areas: the “Construction Area” and
the “Living Quarters”. On 11 December 2013, Jaguar Energy fenced off the
Construction Area and prevented CMNC’s employees from entering
CMNC’s site office, which contained documents related to the construction
of the Plant. At that stage, CMNC retained access to the Living Quarters
and therefore to project documents that were stored in laptops and
computers that had been kept in the Living Quarters.
10 On 14 December 2013 (upon the expiry of the 15-day notice period),
Jaguar Energy informed CMNC of the termination of the EPC Contract
with immediate effect, and asserted that the DPSA was also therefore
automatically terminated by its own terms. On the same day, Jaguar Energy
terminated CMNC’s access to Project Solve, which was a shared online
document platform which contained communications and construction
documentation relating to the Project.
11 CMNC’s staff continued to reside in the Living Quarters until 20 June
2014, when CMNC’s employees were, by an order of the Guatemalan
courts, sent to an immigration shelter. According to CMNC, Jaguar then
seized two desktop computers and hard drives containing documents
concerning the Project from the Living Quarters. CMNC’s employees were
subsequently released from the immigration shelter on 28 July 2014.
The arbitration
12 On 28 January 2014, Jaguar commenced arbitral proceedings (“the
Arbitration”) against CMNC under cl 20.2 of the EPC Contract. Clause 20.2
provided for disputes to be referred to a Singapore-seated arbitration
conducted under the 1998 Rules of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce. Notably, cl 20.2 provided for an expedited
arbitration: it required that the award be issued within 90 days of the
selection of the third arbitrator; or, if the majority of the arbitrators agreed,
within a further 90 days.
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 703 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
17 On 1 May 2014, the parties agreed to amend this timeline. The agreed
timelines were set out in Procedural Order No 2 (“PO 2”) dated 7 May
2014. PO 2 provided for the exchange of the parties’ experts’ reports on
19 December 2014, and fixed the main evidentiary hearing for January and
February 2015. We note that these hearing dates fell well after even the
extended 180-day deadline for the issue of the Tribunal’s award stipulated
in cl 20.2.
on them, and if the order was made, these employees would not be able
properly to instruct counsel. Second, CMNC would not in fact misuse the
information. Third, Jaguar’s request was tantamount to an invitation to the
Tribunal to pre-judge fiercely disputed matters concerning CMNC’s
conduct. Fourth, the concept of AEO disclosure was a feature of domestic
dispute resolution in the US and should not be imported into international
arbitration.
23 On 25 September 2014, the Tribunal ruled in favour of Jaguar, and
permitted its disclosure of the 13 Exhibits and the other documents on an
AEO basis. On CMNC’s point that the use of AEO orders was a peculiarity
of domestic dispute resolution in the US, the Tribunal noted that such
orders have in fact been employed in international arbitrations to preserve
the confidentiality of disclosed documents. The real question was whether
such an order was required in the present, and in determining that issue the
Tribunal weighed and balanced the competing interests of both parties as
follows (at [17]–[19]):
17. The Tribunal views with serious concern the possibility that disclosed
documents could be used for the ulterior and quite improper purposes which
[Jaguar] assert[s] may be undertaken by [CMNC]. On an application such as
this it is not possible to reach any concluded view of the risk that [CMNC]
may undertake such improper use of disclosed documents. Indeed the
Tribunal wishes to make very clear that it has not done so and although
noting the competing contentions of the Parties it will not be subsequently
influenced by these contentions which, if ultimately relevant, will be decided
by the Tribunal after a full evidentiary hearing. …
18. It is noted that tensions between the Parties in relation to this dispute are
running high and therefore it is appropriate that the Tribunal adopt an
approach to this issue which is likely to minimise these tensions and provide
assurance to both Parties that, to the extent possible, the sensitive documents
disclosed will not have a chance of being used other than for the purposes of this
dispute.
19. Also to be taken into account is the need for both Parties to have an
adequate opportunity of presenting their cases.
[emphasis added in italics and bold italics]
24 While the Tribunal did not reach any concluded view on Jaguar’s
allegations that CMNC would misuse the relevant documents, it
nevertheless considered the possibility of misuse to be a “serious concern”
which needed to be addressed. Having regard to both CMNC’s interest in
access for the purpose of preparing its case, and Jaguar’s concerns over
confidentiality, the Tribunal crafted an AEO regime (“the AEO Regime”)
which in its view struck an appropriate balance between these competing
considerations.
25 This balance was achieved by the establishment of a two-stage process
by which documents subject to the AEO Regime would be disclosed. At the
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 707 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
first stage, and as a default position, any material designated “AEO” would
be disclosed to CMNC’s external counsel (and, as was subsequently
clarified, to expert witnesses as well), but not to CMNC’s employees. This
addressed Jaguar’s concern for confidentiality. However, at the second
stage, CMNC was expressly entitled to apply to the Tribunal for its
employees to be given access to AEO-designated documents for the
purposes of giving instructions to counsel, on the basis that the specified
individuals to whom access was to be granted be identified, the necessity of
their having access established, and an undertaking as to confidentiality be
furnished.
26 On 26 September 2014, CMNC requested that the Tribunal
reconsider its decision to allow Jaguar to disclose documents under the
AEO Regime, relying on, amongst other things, the concern that such
disclosure would hinder the preparation of its defence. On 30 September
2014, in Tribunal Communication (“TC”) No 51, the Tribunal upheld its
decision, noting that CMNC’s concerns relating to the preparation of its
defence were adequately addressed by its right to apply for employee access
to the documents under the second stage of the AEO Regime (at [35]–[36]):
35. In adopting the [AEO Regime], the Tribunal was conscious of the
general principle that full disclosure of documents relied on by a Party must
be made to the other Parties to an arbitration. …
36. The Tribunal is confident that once [CMNC’s] external counsel and
expert witnesses have had the opportunity of inspecting the documents in
question, they will be able to make an assessment of whether it is necessary for
[CMNC] for those documents to be disclosed to employees of [CMNC]. Once
such an assessment is made, it will be open to [CMNC] to make application to
the Tribunal for disclosure of those documents to its employees, as provided for
by the Tribunal. …
[emphasis added]
one of the 13 Exhibits, and CMNC requested that the Tribunal lift the AEO
Regime in respect of the remaining 12 exhibits which the parties could not
agree on.
30 Besides the disclosure of documents, a second procedural issue which
required resolution concerned the timelines leading to the main evidentiary
hearing. By RC No 48 dated 15 October 2014, CMNC sought a reset of the
timelines previously agreed and recorded in PO 2 on the basis that its
preparations had been delayed by the dispute over the AEO Regime, which
had “imposed severe practical limitations on effective defence preparation”.
Jaguar objected to CMNC’s request.
31 On 17 October 2014, a teleconference involving the Tribunal and the
parties was convened to address both the redaction issue raised in RC
No 43 and the timelines issue raised in RC No 48.
(a) On the redaction issue, CMNC submitted that redaction of the
names and identifying information of Jaguar’s post-termination
contractors would adequately address Jaguar’s concern as to
maintaining the confidentiality of that information, and that the AEO
Regime was therefore no longer necessary and should be lifted. Jaguar
did not contest CMNC’s point that redaction was in principle an
adequate substitute for AEO-designation, but sought permission to
redact an additional category of information – information relating to
the dates of key construction activities and dates of deliveries – on the
basis that that information might also be misused by CMNC to
interfere with the Project works.
(b) On the issue of timelines, CMNC informed the Tribunal that its
preparations were behind schedule; in particular, its experts would
not be able to file their reports as planned in December 2014, and
would instead require an additional two or three months, thus
necessitating an adjournment of the main evidentiary hearing
previously fixed for January and February 2015. For the same reasons,
it was submitted that a hearing which had been fixed
on 6–7 November 2014 in Toronto (“the Toronto Hearing”) for the
experts to discuss draft outlines of their opinions would likely be
unfruitful. The Tribunal requested that CMNC provide it a written
update on the status of its experts’ preparation, and indicated that it
was minded to proceed with the Toronto Hearing for the parties to
discuss case management, amongst other things.
32 On 19 October 2014, the Tribunal ruled in favour of CMNC on the
redaction issue and lifted the AEO Regime. The 12 disputed exhibits
(see [29] above) were to be disclosed to CMNC (including to its employees)
albeit with information identifying Jaguar’s contractors redacted (“the
Redaction Ruling”). As regards Jaguar’s request that information pertaining
to the dates of key construction activities also be redacted, the Tribunal
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 709 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
the Project works (see [15(c)] above). Both of these points were agreed
between the parties.
37 The third point, which the parties were unable to agree on, pertained
to Jaguar’s request that it be relieved of its obligation to provide redacted
copies of contracts and purchase orders with a value of less than
US$100,000, leaving such documents to be produced on an AEO basis
(meaning that they would be produced only to CMNC’s external counsel
and experts). It appeared that CMNC was initially amenable to this
arrangement; it had, by way of an e-mail dated 28 October 2014 (just nine
days after the Redaction Ruling), indicated that it was agreeable “for now”
to relieve Jaguar of its obligation to produce redacted copies of contracts
and purchase orders involving sums of $100,000 or less. In fact, when this
matter was first raised in initial discussions on the draft PO 3, CMNC’s
counsel agreed to a similar concession. It was only subsequently, after
Jaguar proposed the insertion of language formalising the concession in the
draft procedural order, that CMNC resiled from its position, stating that,
after “further consideration”, CMNC “did not see any reason for inclusion
of this language” and concluded that it “does need access to such
documents” to be afforded to its employees for the purposes of preparing its
defence against the ETC Claim.
38 These three points were then addressed by the Tribunal in Procedural
Order No 3 dated 18 December 2014 (“PO 3”).
(a) A new procedural timetable was set pursuant to CMNC’s
request for an adjournment of the main evidentiary hearing to July
2015. As mentioned, these timelines had been agreed between the
parties.
(b) Provision was made for Jaguar to “continue to supplement their
production of documents … (to the extent such documents exist or
come into existence) due to the ongoing nature of the Project
completion effort”. This too had been agreed between the parties.
(c) On Jaguar’s obligations under the Redaction Ruling, which the
parties had been unable to agree, the Tribunal granted Jaguar’s
request for the modification of the Redaction Ruling. Under this
modified regime, the status quo under the Redaction Ruling was to
remain in relation to documents already redacted and disclosed.
However, in relation to any further documents to be disclosed by
Jaguar (whether in response to CMNC’s requests to produce, or as
part of the material which its experts would seek to rely on), only
contracts, purchase orders or invoices with a value of US$100,000 or
more needed to be redacted and disclosed; documents with a value
below that threshold could simply be produced on an AEO basis
(meaning only to CMNC’s external counsel and experts), albeit
subject to CMNC’s right to apply for production of such documents.
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 711 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
Chairman: So, the dates which have been specified for your
reports and the uploading of the database are likely to
be met?
Mr Gurnham: It will be met.
54 Mr Gurnham’s assurances notwithstanding, on 8 May 2015, the
parties agreed an extension of time for CMNC’s submission of the
Gurnham Responsive Report to 5 June 2015 (instead of 15 May 2015).
55 On 22 May 2015, Jaguar uploaded a third tranche of supporting
documents corresponding to the C-840 update (see [41] above).
56 On 29 May 2015, CMNC sought by RC No 217 a short extension of
time for the submission of the Gurnham Responsive Report to 10 June 2015
(from 5 June 2015) on the basis that it was “not possible or reasonable for
Mr Gurnham to have had a proper opportunity to analyse the large number
of documents relied upon by [Mr McGeehin]” which had been uploaded to
the data room since February 2015, including the aforementioned 22 May
2015 disclosure corresponding to the C-840 update (see [55] above).
57 Before the Tribunal could rule on CMNC’s request dated 29 May
2015 for an extension of time for the filing of the Gurnham Responsive
Report to 10 June 2015, CMNC requested (by RC No 219) on the very next
day, 30 May 2015, that (a) a cut-off date of 3 April 2015 be imposed on
documents to be relied upon by Mr McGeehin; or, (b) in the event the
Tribunal was minded to allow Jaguar to rely on documents produced after
3 April 2015, that, in the alternative, Mr Gurnham be granted an extension
of time for the filing of the Gurnham Responsive Report, to 18 June 2015.
RC No 219 stated, in material part, as follows:
Relief Sought:
12. Therefore, we submit that:
a) there should be a deadline imposed on documents to be relied
upon by [Jaguar’s] quantum expert and that date should be 3 April
2015 as committed to by both Mr McGeehin and Mr Sieracki at the
Hong Kong Hearing.
b) If the Tribunal is minded to allow any documents produced by
[Jaguar] after 3 April 2015, Mr Gurnham should be granted an
extension to submit his responsive report … We submit to 18 June.
Failing to impose such deadline or to grant such requested extension will
cause severe unfairness to [CMNC] and Mr Gurnham. It is entirely not
possible for Mr Gurnham to complete his responsive report even with the
5 days extension sought in [RC No 217] without any cut off date.
58 Notably, CMNC still did not request a postponement of the July 2015
main evidentiary hearing. Nor was any explanation given as to what had
transpired overnight such that the request made the previous day was no
longer sufficient.
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 716 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
Decision below
75 The judge below (“the Judge”) dismissed CMNC’s application to set
aside the Award, rejecting all three grounds put forward by CMNC (see
China Machine New Energy Corp v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC and
another [2018] SGHC 101 (“GD”)). We set out the Judge’s reasons to the
extent that they are relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
76 We begin with the Due Process Ground, which, as we shall shortly
explain, is the only ground pursued in the appeal. The Judge rejected
CMNC’s submission that the imposition of the AEO Regime had deprived
it of a reasonable opportunity to present its case. It was undisputed that the
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 720 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
Tribunal had the power to grant the AEO order; the only question was
whether the order was made in an inappropriate and indiscriminate way
(GD at [133]). The Judge held that it was not, for three reasons:
(a) First, the Tribunal did make a determination that there were
compelling grounds to impose the AEO Regime, and there was no
reason to disturb that determination (GD at [139]–[147]).
(b) Second, the Judge rejected CMNC’s submission that the AEO
Regime had unjustifiably shifted the burden of proof onto CMNC to
justify its request for disclosure of each AEO-designated document.
He held that the burden of proof was never moved to CMNC – it
remained on Jaguar to establish that for each document or class of
documents, an AEO order was warranted (GD at [150]–[152]).
(c) Third, the Tribunal did carefully weigh the potential prejudice
to CMNC in making the AEO Order. First, CMNC retained the
option of applying for access under the second stage of the AEO
Regime, but never availed itself of this avenue of access. There was no
basis for thinking that the application process would be “onerous and
impractical”; the Judge thought the process would likely have entailed
“a relatively straightforward exercise” (GD at [156]–[157]). Second,
the Redaction Ruling (which was made less than a month after the
imposition of the AEO Regime) would have cured any prejudice
caused by the application of the AEO Regime (GD at [158]). Third,
the Tribunal reset the procedural timetable for the Arbitration
pursuant to CMNC’s request by issuing PO 3, which reflected
timelines that CMNC itself had agreed to in the context of the AEO
Regime and the Redaction Ruling (GD at [159]). Fourth, after the
timelines were agreed, CMNC’s counsel gave multiple assurances that
they (and CMNC’s experts) were aware of the compressed timelines
and that they would be able to meet them (GD at [160]).
77 The Judge also rejected CMNC’s contentions that the AEO Regime
had significantly undermined its opportunity to present its case. In
particular:
(a) The Judge rejected CMNC’s submission that its counsel and
experts could not effectively analyse the Costs Documents due to the
AEO Regime, noting that CMNC could have but chose not to apply
for access to the documents for its employees (GD at [163]).
(b) The Judge rejected CMNC’s submission that the Redaction
Ruling did little to mitigate the prejudice caused to it by the AEO
Regime. While the Tribunal subsequently ordered that the AEO
Regime be reinstated in relation to documents with a value of less
than US$100,000 (see [39] above), the Judge noted that the total value
of claims affected by documents subject to the AEO Regime
(approximately US$14.5m) was far less than the total value of claims
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 721 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
Appellant’s case
81 CMNC’s case on appeal is much narrower than its case before the
Judge, and now focuses exclusively on the Due Process Ground. In essence,
CMNC’s case is that it was not accorded reasonable and equal due process
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 722 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
due to the cumulative effect of three operative factors: (a) the effect of the
AEO Order (amongst others) on CMNC’s review of the documents
produced by Jaguar; (b) CMNC’s lack of access to its own Construction
Documents which had been seized by Jaguar; and (c) the Tribunal’s failure
to apply a cut-off date to Jaguar’s rolling production of large quantities of
documents in support of its ETC Claim very close to the main evidentiary
hearing.
82 These three factors did not just cause CMNC to lose preparation time
for the main evidentiary hearing; they disabled CMNC from being able to
meaningfully interrogate the evidence in time, with the result that three key
documents were filed out of time: (a) the Aspinall Report; (b) the Gurnham
Responsive Report; and (c) the second witness statement of Chai Jisheng
(“Chai’s 2nd Witness Statement”), one of CMNC’s employees, whose
evidence was key to CMNC’s response to the material produced by Jaguar
on 5 June 2015. Of these, the Tribunal formally excluded the first, and
effectively precluded itself from giving any weight to the latter two by its
direction that Jaguar was not required to respond to those filings
(see [71] above).
83 The Judge, in holding that there was no breach of CMNC’s due
process rights, erred in the following respects:
(a) The Judge failed to assess the cumulative impact of the three
factors by analysing each in isolation.
(b) The Judge erred in characterising the Redaction Ruling and the
reset of hearing dates following PO 3 as having ameliorated or
removed the prejudice caused, and had thereby overstated the efficacy
of these orders and underestimated CMNC’s handicap.
(c) The Judge proceeded on the erroneous premise that the only
prejudice CMNC was complaining of was the lack of time; while time
was an issue, the Judge severely underestimated the irreparable
prejudice suffered by CMNC, in that he:
(i) wrongly dismissed CMNC’s very real difficulties in
reviewing Jaguar’s documents as mere “logistical difficulties”;
and
(ii) failed to appreciate the irremediable consequences that
followed when CMNC submitted witness statements and expert
reports that could not be prepared earlier due to the
dysfunctional arbitration process;
all of which resulted in CMNC’s inability to properly investigate and
challenge the reasonableness of Jaguar’s ETC Claim.
(d) The Judge erred in calibrating the balance between due process
and what he wrongly perceived as an agreement for an expedited
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 723 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
Respondents’ case
84 Jaguar’s position is that neither it nor the Tribunal, whether by their
action or inaction, had done anything to compromise CMNC’s right to be
heard. In response to the three factual bases upon which CMNC’s case on
natural justice rests (see [81] above), Jaguar submits that (a) the Tribunal
afforded adequate regard to due process in allowing Jaguar to refine its ETC
Claim; (b) the Tribunal adequately considered the parties’ competing
interests and properly granted the AEO Order; and (c) CMNC’s purported
lack of access to the Construction Documents is not corroborated by the
arbitration record.
85 In any case, CMNC suffered no prejudice from the points complained
of above. CMNC’s delayed filing of the Aspinall Report, the Gurnham
Responsive Report and Chai’s 2nd Witness Statement is solely attributable
to its own deficient preparation, and not to any alleged lack of proper
disclosure on Jaguar’s part. The arbitration record is replete with examples
of CMNC’s own defective case management (such as in appointing its
experts late, and effecting disruptive changes to its team of external counsel
and experts) and its failure to comply with the Tribunal’s timelines –
timelines which, as often was the case, CMNC had itself agreed to. What the
record shows is that the Tribunal had treated both parties fairly without any
failure of due process, and had in fact indulged many of CMNC’s requests
for extensions of time.
is only in exceptional cases that a court will find that threshold crossed: Soh
Beng Tee at [54].
90 Article 18 of the Model Law provides that the parties shall be treated
equally and that each shall be given a full opportunity of presenting its case.
These requirements are, in essence, an embodiment of basic notions of
fairness and fair process which underpin the legitimacy of all forms of
binding dispute resolution. Thus, in the Analytical Commentary on Draft
Text of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(A/CN.9/264, 25 March 1985) (“Analytical Commentary”) on (what is now)
Art 18 of the Model Law, it is stated as follows (Art 19 at para 7):
Paragraph (3) [ie, the due process requirements in what is now Art 18 of the
Model Law] adopts basic notions of fairness in requiring that the parties be
treated with equality and each party be given a full opportunity of presenting
his case. [emphasis added in italics and bold italics]
93 Returning to Art 18, that provides that “each party shall be given a full
opportunity of presenting his case”. The present appeal raises interesting
questions as to what exactly that entails and, in particular, how the word
“full” should be interpreted. While a plain reading of the word “full” may at
first blush appear to suggest an expansive and uncurtailed right, the weight
of authority and opinion suggests otherwise.
94 The starting point of the analysis is the travaux preparatoires of Art 18
of the Model Law. The travaux show that the drafters of Art 18 were, in fact,
primarily concerned with placing limits on the right to be heard so as to
prevent its abuse by unscrupulous parties who might otherwise seek
extension after extension of any applicable timeline on the basis that each
would be necessary to ensure that party’s “full” opportunity of presenting
its case.
(a) While initial drafts of the due process provision provided that
“at any stage of the proceedings each party [should be] given a full
opportunity of presenting his case”, it was decided that the phrase “at
any stage of the proceedings” should be deleted as “[i]t was felt that
the words ‘at any stage’ … might be relied upon by a party who
wished to prolong the proceedings or to make unnecessary
submissions” (Report of the Working Group on International Contract
Practices on the Work of its Fourth Session (A/CN.9/232,
10 November 1982) at para 104; Report of the Working Group on
International Contract Practices on the Work of its Sixth Session
(A/CN.9/245, 22 September 1983) at para 73).
(b) In the course of discussions on Art 19 of the draft Model Law
(the present Art 18), one member expressed concern that “the
provision may also be a basis for delaying tactics”, and proposed that
the word “full” be replaced by the word “adequate” (Analytical
Compilation of comments by Governments and international
organizations on the draft text of a model law on international
commercial arbitration (A/CN.9/263, 19 March 1985) (“Analytical
Compilation”), Art 19(3) at para 7).
(c) In a similar vein, the International Bar Association proposed
replacing the word “full” with the phrase “full and proper”, as the
word “full”, on its own, was “relatively imprecise” and “might be
capable of being interpreted in an unduly restrictive sense”
(Analytical Compilation, Art 19(3) at para 8).
95 While the latter two proposals were not eventually implemented (and
the word “full” was retained), that was only because the Working Group
ultimately considered it sufficiently clear that concerns of due process must
be balanced against concerns for the efficiency and expediency, and so this
would not entitle a party to obstruct or delay the proceedings (Analytical
Commentary, Art 19 at para 8):
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 726 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
96 The point that the travaux make tolerably clear is that the word “full”
in Art 18 of the Model Law was not intended to create a right of unlimited
scope. On the contrary, and as mentioned, the drafters were clearly
conscious of the need to limit the scope of Art 18, so that it would not be
abused by parties seeking to delay and prolong proceedings.
97 In this regard, it has been suggested – rightly, in our view – that the
parties’ right to be heard is impliedly limited by considerations of
reasonableness and fairness. This has especial relevance in cases such as the
present one, where the complaint is that the failure to grant some sort of
procedural accommodation to a party adversely impacted that party’s due
process rights.
(a) As was explained by this court in Soh Beng Tee ([86] supra,
at [65(a)]), while the parties have, in general, a right to be heard
effectively on every relevant issue, the ‘overriding concern… is
fairness’, and the ‘best rule of thumb to adopt is to treat the parties
equally and allow them reasonable opportunities to present their cases
as well as to respond’ [emphasis added].
(b) In a similar vein, the Singapore High Court in Triulzi Cesare
SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 114 (“Triulzi Cesare”)
observed (at [151]) that “the right of each party to be heard does not
mean that the Tribunal must ‘sacrifice all efficiency in order to
accommodate unreasonable procedural demands by a party’”.
(c) The same view holds in non-Model Law jurisdictions. In
England, s 33 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 expresses the right
to be heard as a requirement that parties be given a “reasonable”
opportunity of presenting their case. In ASM Shipping Ltd of India v
TTMI Ltd of England [2005] EWHC 2238 (Comm) (“ASM Shipping”),
one of the bases on which the applicant sought to set aside the arbitral
award was the tribunal’s refusal of an adjournment of the proceedings
requested after the requesting party’s lead counsel had become
unavailable for personal reasons. In refusing to set aside the award,
the English High Court held that the test was whether the decision to
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 727 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
101 This is a material point because it guards against the danger of the
court conducting an analysis after the fact without due appreciation of just
what the tribunal was confronted with. The nature of the arbitral process is
inevitably a dynamic one. Timelines may be short; arrangements may need
to be made well ahead of time to accommodate multiple schedules; and
each party has an interest in a reasonably expeditious process. In these
circumstances, the contours of what constitutes fair and proper procedure
cannot be found in any one rulebook, but will be shaped by the grunts of
assent and the cries of protestation from the parties during the course of the
proceedings. The fairness of that procedure can only be judged against what
the parties themselves may be taken as having agreed to and expected, by
what they contemporaneously communicated to the tribunal.
102 In practical terms, what this means is that the alleged unfairness upon
which the complaining party seeks to found its claim of breach of natural
justice must have been brought to the attention of the tribunal. While this
analysis might appear at first blush to shade into the doctrine of waiver
under Art 4 of the Model Law, the two are, in our judgment, analytically
and conceptually distinct. The doctrine of waiver only becomes relevant
after the relevant non-compliance has been established; the question then is
whether the complainant has waived its right to complain about the non-
compliance. The point being made here, however, goes to the anterior
question of breach. The fundamental point is that, in the context of a
challenge directed at the exercise of a tribunal’s procedural discretion, there
can be no non-compliance to speak of if the complaining party had not
informed the tribunal of what, in its view, such compliance required.
103 Second, the court should accord a margin of deference to the tribunal
in its exercise of procedural discretion. Deference is accorded in
recognition of the fact that (a) the tribunal possesses a wide discretion to
determine the arbitral procedure, and (b) that discretion is exercised within
a highly specific and fact-intensive contextual milieu, the finer points of
which the court may not be privy to. It has therefore been said that the
court ought not to micromanage the tribunal’s procedural decision-
making, and will instead give “substantial deference” to procedural
decisions of the tribunal (On Call Internet Services Ltd v Telus
Communications Co [2013] BCAA 366 at [18]). This means that the court
will not intervene simply because it might have done things differently
(Soh Beng Tee ([86] supra) at [58], citing ABB AG v Hochtief Airport GmbH
[2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 1 at [67]). Overall, the threshold for intervention is a
relatively high one: there must be a real basis for alleging that the tribunal
has conducted the arbitral process “either irrationally or capriciously” (Soh
Beng Tee at [65(d)]), or where the tribunal’s conduct of the proceedings is
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 730 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
“so far removed from what could reasonably be expected of the arbitral
process that it must be rectified” (ASM Shipping ([97(c)] supra) at [38]).
104 The foregoing discussion of the applicable principles may be
summarised as follows:
(a) The parties’ right to be heard in arbitral proceedings finds
expression in Art 18 of the Model Law, which provides that each party
shall have a “full opportunity” of presenting its case. An award
obtained in proceedings conducted in breach of Art 18 is susceptible
to annulment under Art 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law and/or s 24(b)
of the IAA.
(b) The Art 18 right to a “full opportunity” of presenting one’s case
is not an unlimited one. It is impliedly limited by considerations of
reasonableness and fairness.
(c) What constitutes a “full opportunity” is a contextual inquiry
that can only be meaningfully answered within the specific context of
the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The overarching
inquiry is whether the proceedings were conducted in a manner
which was fair, and the proper approach a court should take is to ask
itself if what the tribunal did (or decided not to do) falls within the
range of what a reasonable and fair-minded tribunal in those
circumstances might have done.
(d) In undertaking this exercise, the court must put itself in the
shoes of the tribunal. This means that (i) the tribunal’s decisions can
only be assessed by reference to what was known to the tribunal at the
time, and it follows from this that the alleged breach of natural justice
must have been brought to the attention of the tribunal at the material
time; and (ii) the court will accord a margin of deference to the
tribunal in matters of procedure and will not intervene simply
because it might have done things differently.
that the AEO Order in this case was improperly made for the following
reasons:
(a) First, the AEO Order was not made on any justifiable basis,
because it rested on a preliminary and inconclusive assessment of the
risk that CMNC would use those documents to interfere with the
completion of the Project.
(b) Second, the AEO Order operated unfairly against CMNC
because it was unlimited in scope:
(i) The AEO Order conferred blanket authority on Jaguar to
withhold documents at will.
(ii) The effect of the second stage of the AEO Regime was to
improperly shift the burden of applying for discovery onto
CMNC by forcing CMNC to apply for access to individual
documents.
110 CMNC’s first point – that there was no justifiable basis for the
Tribunal to have made the AEO Order because it did not come to any
conclusive view on Jaguar’s allegations that CMNC would misuse the
documents – ignores the fact that the proceedings were, at that time, still at
an early stage. In those circumstances, the Tribunal could not have been
expected to make a conclusive finding as to Jaguar’s allegations. Indeed, had
the Tribunal done so, that might have exposed it to accusations that it had
pre-judged issues that ought to be reserved to the main evidentiary
hearing – a point CMNC itself made when resisting the imposition of the
AEO Order (see [22] above).
111 For the purposes of determining Jaguar’s application for an AEO
Order, the Tribunal had to be satisfied that there was a sufficient basis for
the making of such an order. In this regard, Jaguar had provided sworn
testimony that, both immediately prior to and subsequent to the
termination of the EPC Contract, CMNC had engaged in conduct
calculated to interfere with Jaguar’s completion of the Project, such as
(a) offering payments to contractors and suppliers in exchange for their
refusing to work with Jaguar; (b) physical intimidation of Jaguar’s
contractors and suppliers and their employees; and (c) vexatious litigation
and threats of litigation against Jaguar’s contractors and suppliers should
they continue to work on the Project. CMNC denied these allegations,
stating that “CMNC’s actions post-termination were lawfully taken to
protect CMNC’s own legitimate interests following the unlawful
termination”. Having considered the parties’ respective positions, the
Tribunal explained, in fairly detailed written grounds, that while it had not
reached any concluded view on the allegations of misuse, it nevertheless
considered the possibility of misuse to be of “serious concern” which needed
to be addressed prophylactically (see [23]–[24] above). In our judgment,
this was a reasonable view for the Tribunal to have taken. In some respects,
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 733 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
112 CMNC’s second point pertains to the effect of the AEO Regime on its
preparations; in particular, that it operated asymmetrically and unfairly by
shifting the burden of obtaining disclosure of documents on to CMNC.
With respect, this submission misses the point. The question is not whether
the AEO Order had adversely impacted CMNC’s preparation of its case – it
almost certainly did, to some extent. The question is whether the balance
struck by the Tribunal in making the AEO Order as a whole – between
Jaguar’s interest in safeguarding the confidentiality of the documents in
order to prevent harm, and CMNC’s interest in being able to prepare its
case unhindered in any way – is one which was so unfair or unreasonable as
to fall outside the range of what a reasonable and fair-minded tribunal
might have done in the circumstances.
113 In respect of the latter question, and having reviewed the AEO Order
and the circumstances under which it was made, we do not see any basis on
which to impeach the Tribunal’s decision. In establishing the AEO Regime,
the Tribunal was clearly conscious of the need to strike a balance between
the competing interests of the parties. The Tribunal’s chosen approach was
to craft a two-stage process, with the first stage satisfying Jaguar’s concern
for confidentiality by restricting CMNC’s access to these documents by
confining such access to CMNC’s counsel and experts; and the second
acting as a safeguard of CMNC’s interest in direct access by expressly
providing that CMNC could apply to the Tribunal for this (see [25] above).
That the AEO Order would, to some extent, adversely affect CMNC is not
fatal to its legality, because the AEO Order necessarily represented a
compromise between Jaguar’s and CMNC’s interests. The point is that the
Tribunal had, in imposing the AEO Order, weighed the adverse effect that
such an Order would have on CMNC’s ability to prepare its case against
(a) Jaguar’s “serious concern” as to the risk of CMNC misusing the
documents; and (b) the fact that at the second stage, CMNC could seek and
get unrestricted access once their experts and counsel had seen the
documents and assessed that this was necessary. That approach, in our
judgment, fell well within the bounds of what a reasonable and fair-minded
tribunal might have done for the reasons we have outlined at [111] above.
(a) We do not accept CMNC’s submission that the AEO Order was
unlimited in scope. In our judgment, the AEO Order must be read as
having been limited to the three categories of documents stated in
Jaguar’s request for the AEO Order (see [21] above). While we
appreciate that this might have formed a rather wide category of
documents, the precise scope of the Order is a matter for the Tribunal
in the exercise of its broad powers over the procedure of the
Arbitration.
(b) We also do not accept CMNC’s submission that the AEO
Regime improperly shifted the burden of applying for disclosure onto
CMNC. A key plank of CMNC’s submission is that the mechanism
for application under the second stage was onerous and impractical
because it required applications for disclosure to be made on a
document-by-document basis. That view is not borne out on the
evidence. Paragraph 36 of TC No 51, which we have reproduced
at [26] above, is material because it gives a clear insight into what was
contemplated. In short, it was anticipated that CMNC’s counsel and
experts would have initial access and they would then be able to assess
whether access had to be given to CMNC for proper instructions to be
taken. It is most unfortunate that CMNC, for whatever reason, chose
not to avail itself of this option. In this regard, we are inclined to agree
with the Judge that the second stage would likely have entailed a
“relatively straightforward exercise”. There is nothing to suggest that
this exercise could not have been done in relation to categories of
documents, instead of individual documents. For these reasons, we do
not think it can be said that CMNC’s burden under the second stage
of the AEO Regime was so imbalanced as to amount to a de facto shift
of the burden of disclosure. To so conclude would require us to find
that disclosure to CMNC’s experts and counsel on terms that they
could then apply for unrestricted access was pointless. We are unable
to so conclude when CMNC never made any such application.
115 We therefore reject CMNC’s submission that the AEO Order was
unfairly imposed in breach of Art 18 of the Model Law. On the contrary,
given the risk or threat of prejudice raised by Jaguar, we are satisfied that
the Order fell within the boundaries of what a reasonable and fair-minded
tribunal might have done in the circumstances.
116 In any case, and as was noted by the Judge, any unfairness occasioned
by the AEO Regime was substantially mitigated following the Redaction
Ruling, which was made just four weeks after the imposition of the AEO
Regime (see [76(c)] above). Against this, CMNC submits that the Redaction
Ruling did little to ameliorate the unfairness caused by the AEO Regime, for
two reasons.
117 First, CMNC submits that the little relief CMNC enjoyed by the lifting
of the AEO Regime by the Redaction Ruling was short-lived, because PO 3
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 735 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
119 In the circumstances, we do not accept that CMNC has shown that
the Tribunal’s management of the disclosure of the documents in question
was unacceptable or amounted to a breach of natural justice. On the
contrary, on our assessment of the procedural history of the arbitration, the
Tribunal was simply doing the best it could in the circumstances to strike a
fair balance between the parties’ interests.
Prejudice
120 In any case, we do not see how CMNC could have been prejudiced by
any alleged breach. The AEO Regime, in its most restrictive form (meaning
when these documents were presumptively not subject to disclosure to
CMNC’s employees at all), lasted less than a month. Thereafter, CMNC’s
employees received access to redacted documents, and although the AEO
Regime was later reinstated for the smaller claim documents, this was an
arrangement that CMNC, as we have noted, had initially agreed to. In any
case, all restrictions were lifted by 18 March 2015 – almost four months
before the main evidentiary hearing in July 2015. While CMNC now argues
that Mr Gurnham’s preparations had been seriously affected by the AEO
Regime (amongst other factors), we note that Mr Gurnham, in the course of
a teleconference held on 14 April 2015, had informed the Tribunal that the
deadlines set for the filing of his expert reports would be met
(see [53] above). It must also be noted that the parties had agreed to certain
timelines in PO 3 on 18 December 2014 (see [36] above). In other words,
these timelines were agreed in the context of the AEO Regime, and
therefore must be taken as having accounted for whatever adverse impact
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 737 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
the AEO Regime would have had on CMNC’s ability to meet those
timelines.
121 In sum, CMNC has not shown that the restrictions on document
production imposed as a result of the AEO Regime (and its successors) had
any direct impact on CMNC’s preparations in the critical period leading to
the submission of the Gurnham Responsive Report and the other quantum
evidence.
for the continued production of documents. It was not until 30 May 2015
(in RC No 219) that CMNC requested, for the first time, that the Tribunal
exclude from consideration all documents produced after 3 April 2015, that
being the date that Mr McGeehin filed his report setting out Jaguar’s
positive case on the ETC Claim. CMNC argued that it must follow that
documents produced after that date would not be admitted.
130 Before us, CMNC submits that it was “highly irregular” for the
Tribunal to have permitted Jaguar’s continual amendments of its ETC
Claim with no consideration of whether CMNC would have adequate time
to respond to the amended claim and the new evidence in support of the
amendments. The Tribunal, CMNC says, should have considered whether
CMNC would have the opportunity to respond to the amended claim
before allowing Jaguar to amend its claim. This the Tribunal failed to do, by
refusing to impose a cut-off date of 3 April 2015 for Jaguar to amend its
ETC Claim in the terms CMNC had requested in RC No 219
(see [57] above).
131 However, what CMNC omits to mention is that its request for relief in
RC No 219 presented the Tribunal with two alternatives: either a cut-off of
3 April 2015 should be imposed, or, “[i]f the Tribunal [was] minded to allow
[the production of documents] after 3 April 2015”, that an extension of the
deadline for the Gurnham Responsive Report should be granted to 18 June
2015 (see [57] above). When the Tribunal allowed Jaguar to produce
documents beyond 3 April 2015 (setting the cut-off date as 5 June 2015
instead), it allowed CMNC’s request for an extension to 18 June 2015 for
the filing of the Gurnham Responsive Report. In other words, the Tribunal
had given CMNC the very relief it had sought, albeit in the form of the
alternative option that CMNC itself had presented. That being the case, we
do not see how CMNC can conceivably argue that the Tribunal’s failure to
cut off document production on 3 April 2015 was unfair, let alone so unfair
as to constitute a breach of natural justice.
132 Further, having read the Tribunal’s reasons (see [60] above) for its
decision to grant the extension and impose a later cut-off date, it is clear to
us that the Tribunal was balancing Jaguar’s interest in presenting material
relevant to its claim, and CMNC’s interest in having a reasonable
opportunity to meet Jaguar’s case. In our view, the course which the
Tribunal chose was an entirely reasonable one in the circumstances.
133 It is also significant that CMNC did not then object to the Tribunal’s
decision to set the cut-off date of 5 June 2015 (see [61] above). Instead,
CMNC simply got on with its preparations. It was not until 27 June 2015,
when CMNC was already in breach of the extended deadlines it had itself
requested that it then asserted that it was never in a position to meet those
deadlines due to, amongst other things, the Tribunal’s failure to stop the
rolling production of Costs Documents earlier (see [67] above). As we have
emphasised at [99] above, the Tribunal can only operate on the basis of
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 741 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
what the parties tell it. Since CMNC told the Tribunal that it would be able
to proceed either if a cut-off date were imposed or if an extension were
granted, that must mean that CMNC considered either of those courses of
action to be fair. If intervening events or circumstances subsequently
changed that calculus, then it was incumbent on CMNC to promptly seek
further relief on that basis. On the facts, CMNC did not subsequently
request that the Tribunal change its decision on the 5 June 2015 cut-off
date – instead, it asked for further extensions for the filing of the Gurnham
Responsive Report, which we address at [137] below.
134 For these reasons, we see no basis to impeach the Tribunal’s decision
to grant CMNC the extension it sought in lieu of the imposition of a 3 April
2015 cut-off date for the rolling production of documents.
141 Second, this was not a case where documents had been held back and
sprung on CMNC. As Jaguar pointed out, the bulk of the invoices
evidencing Jaguar’s actual costs had already been incrementally disclosed
prior to 5 June 2015, pursuant to the three previous updates (ie, C-669,
C-773 and C-840). Whether one looks at the monetary value of the claims
evidenced by the documents, or at the raw volume of the documents
themselves, there is no basis to suggest that the volume of documents
disclosed on 5 June 2015 was unusually large.
(a) In terms of the monetary value of the claims evidenced by the
documents produced, the documents relating to the C-900 update
evidenced an increase of US$33m in the actual sum paid by Jaguar in
respect of the cost of completion. This is comparable to the increase of
US$32m evidenced by the documents relating to the C-840 update
before it, and is in fact smaller than the increase of US$58m evidenced
by the documents relating to the C-773 update. Overall, and as can be
seen from the table below, the increase in the monetary value of the
claims evidenced by the documents relating to the C-900 update
constituted just 13% of the total sum paid.
extremely late stage at which the application was being made, the threat to
the hearing dates that had been fixed many months earlier, the interests of
fairness applicable to both parties, and the duty to conduct the arbitration
on an expedited basis.
143 In that latter regard, it is trite that what natural justice demands turns
in part on the parties’ particular agreement to arbitrate: Trustees of Rotoaira
Forest Trust v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 452 at 463, cited in Soh
Beng Tee ([86] supra) at [55]. Of course, parties do not relinquish their due
process rights simply by dint of agreeing to an expedited arbitration. That
said, the fact that parties agreed to an expedited arbitration will inevitably
have a bearing on the expectations that parties may reasonably and fairly
have as to the extent of the procedural accommodation that may be
afforded to them. On its part, CMNC submits that limited weight should be
given to cl 20.2 (which provided for expedited arbitration) given that the
parties had waived strict compliance with cl 20.2 by agreeing to timelines
that were well in excess of the 180-day limit stipulated. This submission
does not take CMNC very far because while parties had indeed waived strict
compliance with the timelines stipulated in cl 20.2, it was clear that both
parties intended that the arbitration was nonetheless to be expedited. This
is clear from the fact that CMNC itself had, on 6 May 2014, requested that
the Tribunal move forward the evidentiary hearing to October 2014 on the
basis of “the parties’ strong original intention and desire that the matter
should be completed at the earliest possible moment and under the shortest
possible timetable”. We note that CMNC held this view notwithstanding
that by that time (6 May 2014), strict compliance with cl 20.2 had already
been waived as reflected in the timelines set out in PO 2 (see [17] above).
144 Besides the point that there was really no basis for CMNC’s request
for a further extension of time, the Tribunal noted several of the points we
have highlighted above in its response as follows (see [64] above).
145 Taking all these factors into consideration, it was, in our judgment,
well within the Tribunal’s rights to have refused CMNC’s request for the
further extension. The Tribunal’s decision to grant CMNC’s first extension
request reflected a balance between the parties’ rights, and, for the reasons
we have outlined above, especially considering the effect that an extension
would have on Jaguar’s ability to adequately consider and respond to that
material, it seems to us entirely fair and reasonable for the Tribunal to have
found that CMNC had not “made out a case for disturbing the balance
which the Tribunal struck in [TC No 208]”.
146 After the Tribunal’s refusal to grant CMNC the extension sought, the
Gurnham Responsive Report and Chai’s 2nd Witness Statement were
nevertheless filed out of time on 22 June 2015 and 26 June 2015
respectively. CMNC formally applied to have both the Gurnham
Responsive Report and Chai’s 2nd Witness Statement admitted into
evidence, and Jaguar objected (see [67] above). On 3 July 2015, the Tribunal
gave its decision on the admissibility of CMNC’s belatedly-filed evidence. It
made no order as to the admissibility of the Gurnham Responsive Report,
but stated that Jaguar did not need to respond to the material therein
(see [71] above).
147 At the hearings before us, counsel for CMNC, Mr Toby Landau QC
(“Mr Landau”) argued that the Tribunal’s direction to Jaguar that it need
not respond to the Gurnham Responsive Report amounted to a de facto
exclusion of that evidence, because, having told Jaguar that it need not
respond, any reliance placed on that evidence by the Tribunal would subject
the award to challenge by Jaguar on grounds of breach of its right to
respond.
149 We deal first with the supposed exclusion of the evidence. First, we
are satisfied that it would have been well within the competence of the
Tribunal to make such an order – see Waincymer at pp 822–823:
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 746 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
150 We turn to consider the reasons the Tribunal gave for its decision to
direct that Jaguar need not respond to CMNC’s belatedly-filed evidence. In
this regard, it is clear from the Tribunal’s reasons that the Tribunal was
acutely aware of the time pressure that counsel were under in their
preparations for the main evidentiary hearing, which was, at that point, just
days away:
The Tribunal appreciates that counsel continue to undertake very significant
work leading up to the Main Evidentiary Hearing that is to commence next
week. It is understood that the pressures associated with this work is behind
the recent submissions and materials received by the Tribunal in relation to
the Disputed Materials [which included the Gurnham Responsive Report].
There is a very real concern that [Jaguar] are put to procedural disadvantage
since they are not just attempting to respond to materials which have been
provided contrary to the Tribunal’s directions, but they have a dilemma as to
whether to attempt to do so in which, what [Jaguar] submit[s], is an impossible
timeframe. Some guidance needs to be given to [Jaguar] in this regard.
The Tribunal has previously observed [in TC No 208] that one of the criteria
to be taken into account in considering whether to place any reliance upon
the materials provided, to which objection is taken, is that a judgement needs
to be made as to whether a party has the capacity to respond to the material. It
must be noted that the later in time and closer to the hearing that material is
provided, the less realistic the possibility there is for a response. For this reason,
the Tribunal wishes to make it clear that it does not require [Jaguar] to
attempt to respond to material, which on any view has been provided too late
for any meaningful response to be formulated. Accordingly, the Parties
should be aware that the Tribunal does not expect [Jaguar] to undertake what
can be fairly regarded as a futile exercise, and that judgements as to the
reliance if any to which the Tribunal will have on such material will be made
by the Tribunal in this context. No assumptions can be made at this stage as to
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 747 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
whether any of the Disputed Material (other than the expert statement of
Mr Adam Aspinall) will be admitted.
[emphasis added in italics and bold italics]
taken this into account in its case management in the crucial final weeks
leading up to the main evidentiary hearing. CMNC’s main complaint was
that Jaguar had not provided any index to the uploaded documents, which,
according to CMNC, significantly slowed its review of the documents and
therefore its ability to present its case responsive to Jaguar’s ETC Claim.
The parties attempted to resolve this issues between themselves: Jaguar’s
counsel provided step-by-step instructions on how a transaction log may be
used as an index, and also offered teleconferences (with Mr McGeehin) to
walk CMNC and/or Mr Gurnham through the production, which CMNC
did not take up. However, the parties were ultimately unable to resolve
CMNC’s concerns (see [44]–[47] above).
158 We note that CMNC’s case does not appear to be that the Tribunal
should have granted it some sort of relief in respect of the document
production, and rightly so, for (as noted at [47] above) CMNC never asked
the Tribunal for any such relief. Despite the fact that (a) parties remained
unable to resolve CMNC’s issues over a substantial period of
correspondence and the extension of multiple offers of assistance
(by Jaguar’s counsel and its quantum expert); (b) the date of the main
evidentiary hearing, which was known to both parties by this time, was
looming ever closer; and (c) Jaguar’s counsel had repeatedly stated in their
correspondence with CMNC’s counsel that Jaguar would proceed as
directed by the Tribunal should CMNC decide to bring the matter to the
Tribunal’s attention (see [47] above), CMNC never brought these concerns
to the Tribunal’s attention in a request for relief.
159 CMNC’s case on the allegedly disorganised and haphazard
production of the Costs Documents is that the Tribunal should have taken
the resulting difficulties into account in its case management decisions
leading up to the main evidentiary hearing. Again, in assessing whether the
Tribunal had acted unfairly, it is of crucial importance that we examine
what exactly the Tribunal had been told about the alleged difficulties that
CMNC now relies on. In this regard, CMNC did not mention Jaguar’s
allegedly disorganised and haphazard production of documents in its two
requests to the Tribunal for an extension of time for the filing of the
Gurnham Responsive Report – all it said was that the “extraordinary size”
of the incoming material necessitated the extensions sought (see [56] and
[63] above). It was not until 27 June 2015, long after its extended deadlines
had lapsed, that CMNC informed the Tribunal of its difficulties with the
uploaded documents in its application to formally admit the various
witness statements and expert reports it had belatedly filed and/or filed
without leave.
160 In the circumstances, we see no basis at all for this complaint.
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 750 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
161 CMNC further argues that the three planks of its case – the AEO
Regime, CMNC’s lack of access to the Construction Documents and
Jaguar’s rolling production of the Costs Documents – should not be
assessed individually in isolation, but that their cumulative effect must be
assessed together, as a whole. Before us, Mr Landau explained that the
thrust of this submission was that the impact that each event had consisted
not just of how that individual event affected CMNC’s ability to prepare its
case, but also how each event exacerbated the effects of other events, which,
as a whole, resulted in a thoroughly defective arbitral procedure which put
CMNC on the back foot in the Arbitration and never afforded it a chance to
recover.
162 Thus, it was said, CMNC had been forced to start with a “pre-existing
handicap” – its lack of access to the Construction Documents. Even if this
alone did not found a claim for breach of natural justice, it formed part of
the backdrop that any reasonable and fair-minded tribunal would have
taken notice of, and taken into consideration in the conduct of the
proceedings. Yet, what the Tribunal did was to “aggravate” this existing
handicap by imposing the AEO Regime. In turn, the AEO Regime, although
lifted in March 2015, had concertinaed the timelines for CMNC’s
preparations into the four months before the main evidentiary hearing
(whereas Jaguar’s ability to prepare had been unhampered since the
commencement of the Arbitration). CMNC was not, however, given any
chance to recover during this four-month window, as the Tribunal failed to
control Jaguar’s rolling production of Costs Documents, and thereby
allowed the proceedings to descend into a free-for-all under which Jaguar
was free to amend its case at will.
163 When looked at in this light, Mr Landau argues, the Judge had erred
in finding that the prejudice caused could have been cured by, for example,
the lifting of the AEO Regime, or the Tribunal’s grant of the first extension
for the filing of the Gurnham Responsive Report. According to CMNC, the
problems were far more deep-seated, and had begun almost from the start
of the Arbitration. Although CMNC attempted, as a cooperative party, to
carry on with the Arbitration despite these handicaps by requesting
extensions of time, this should not be seen as an acknowledgment that those
extensions, if granted, would have cured the prejudice caused to CMNC.
When viewed in its proper context, the prejudice caused was irreparable,
and the arbitral proceedings were in fact irretrievably lost. In short, it had
become impossible to have a fair hearing in July 2015 given the massive
influx of new supporting documents, coupled with the disorganised
manner of production and the effect of the AEO Order in concertinaing the
timelines for preparation. We emphasise the last point because it brings
home the real thrust of Mr Landau’s submission, which is that by this stage
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 751 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
and
(c) RC No 119 (dated 17 February 2015), CMNC’s request that the
AEO Regime be lifted, which led to negotiations ultimately resulting
in the lifting of all restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive
documents by consent:
4. [CMNC] is gravely prejudiced by the AOE [sic] Order…
…
6. … by allowing [Jaguar] to subjectively and unilaterally redact
documents, [the AEO Order] offends against the rules of natural
justice and the fair and efficient conduct of the arbitration proceedings.
7. It is procedurally unfair for [CMNC] and its employees to be
unable to inspect the documents relied upon by [Jaguar] … Their
inability to do so is depriving them of the reasonable opportunity to
present their case and answer [Jaguar’s] case.
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 752 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
165 It is undoubtedly the case that CMNC did raise several of these
objections at various times especially in the context of the many exchanges
when these issues were being raised to and dealt with by the Tribunal. But
as we have emphasised, the inevitable consequence of this final submission
that Mr Landau made to us, as to the cumulative effects of these various
complaints, is that by the time the Tribunal came to deal in June 2015 with
those cumulative effects of all the issues that had been raised earlier, the
prospects of a fair arbitration had been irretrievably lost as a result of the
Tribunal’s mismanagement of its procedure (or alternatively, and at the
very least, that the scheduled evidentiary hearings could not proceed). In
his words, he said the arbitration process had become “dysfunctional”. Yet,
in none of these communications did CMNC make that point. On the
contrary, CMNC had, by its continued engagement as a party in the
arbitration, consistently expressed its intention to forge ahead with the
main evidentiary hearing and to see the arbitration through to its
conclusion at the scheduled time right up to the end of June 2015, even as
matters came to a head:
(a) On 6 March 2015, in the weeks before the parties agreed to lift
the AEO Regime, CMNC confirmed, in a separate and unrelated
application to amend its case, that it wished to proceed with the July
2015 main evidentiary hearing (see [51] above).
(b) On 14 April 2015, about a month after the AEO Regime had
been lifted, CMNC’s quantum expert, Mr Gurnham, confirmed in a
teleconference with the Tribunal that he was on track to meet the
deadlines set for the filing of his reports. Mr Gurnham gave no
indication that the effects of the AEO Regime during its operation had
affected his preparations at all, much less that they had irretrievably
compromised his ability to prepare the report (see [53] above).
(c) On 30 May 2015, when CMNC had assessed that it would not be
able to submit the Gurnham Responsive Report on time, it requested
a cut-off date to be imposed on Jaguar’s production, or, in the
alternative, for a substantial extension of time. CMNC never
requested an adjournment of the July 2015 hearing dates
(see [57]–[58] above).
(d) On 17 June 2015, on the eve of the extended deadline for the
filing of the Gurnham Responsive Report, all that CMNC requested
was a one-week extension of time (see [63] above). But that seems a
wholly inadequate remedy for what CMNC claims were proceedings
which had by then allegedly fallen into total disarray. If CMNC had
truly considered the proceedings irreparably compromised by breach
of natural justice, one would have expected CMNC to have said so,
instead of simply seeking a one-week extension of time.
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 753 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM
Conclusion
173 In final analysis, we find that CMNC has not discharged its burden of
showing that the Tribunal’s conduct of the proceedings fell outside the
realm of what a reasonable and fair-minded tribunal might have done.
Accordingly, CMNC has not proved that the award was made in breach of
the rules of natural justice. We see no basis upon which to interfere with the
Judge’s decision to dismiss the application to set aside, and therefore
dismiss the appeal.
174 It remains for us to note, for good order, that it was, on 10 October
2019, announced that Prof Douglas Jones (“Prof Jones”) (who was the
chairman of the Tribunal) would be appointed an International Judge of the
Singapore International Commercial Court (a division of the Singapore
High Court) with effect from 1 November 2019. We directed that the
parties be notified of this by way of a case management conference held on
11 October 2019, and invited parties to convey any concerns they might
have arising from this development to us in writing within 14 days of the
case management conference. On 17 October 2019, Jaguar responded,
[2020] 1 SLR 0695.fm Page 756 Friday, May 15, 2020 1:31 PM