Profiling Small Arms Ammunition Handbook - Final

HANDBOOK
PROFILING
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS
Alfredo Malaret Baldo

Manuel Martinez Miralles
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all the Institute’s activities. This
research area of the Conventional Arms Programme is supported by the Government of Germany.
The Handbook owes gratitude to the participants of the UNIDIR Expert Review Meeting, carried out
in Chatham House, London, in December 2019, who provided valuable direction and feedback and
have themselves previously conducted the ammunition profiling studies on which this Handbook
is grounded. In particular, this Handbook recognizes the important work of Conflict Armament
Research; the Small Arms Survey; the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean; and Sou da Paz Institute. The Handbook owes
gratitude to the experts who helped review it, namely, Ana Pamela Romero, Andre Desmarais, Andres
Perez, Bob Seddon, Bruno Langeani, Cleveland Crooks, Daniel Mack, Gene Gesite Navarra Jr., Glenn
Lawrence, Hardy Giezendanner, Ivaylo Stefanov, James Bevan, Jonathan Rickell, Lenka Filipova,
Leonardo Lara, Marie-Jacques Cantinelli, Miguel Bernard, Natalia Pollachi, Natalie Briggs, Nicholas
Florquin, Nils Holger Anders, Rachel Bolton-King, Renata Dalaqua, Robert Kondor, Rodolfo Gamboa,
Roland Martial, Santiago Boggione, and numerous serving officials who wish to remain anonymous.
The Handbook also owes gratitude to the Small Arms Survey for making figures available and to
Olivia Denonville for her guidance. The authors also thank UNIDIR staff who supported and guided
this research, in particular Renata Dwan, Himayu Shiotani, and Eric Schulz.
NOTE ABOUT UNIDIR
The designations employed and the The United Nations Institute for
presentation of the material in this Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a
publication do not imply the expression voluntarily funded, autonomous institute
of any opinion whatsoever on the part within the United Nations. One of the few
of the Secretariat of the United Nations policy institutes worldwide focusing on
concerning the legal status of any country, disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge
territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or and promotes dialogue and action on
concerning the delimitation of its frontiers disarmament and security. Based in Geneva,
or boundaries. The views expressed in the UNIDIR assists the international community
publication are the sole responsibility of the to develop the practical, innovative ideas
individual authors. They do not necessary needed to find solutions to critical security
reflect the views or opinions of the United problems.
Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or www.unidir.org | © UNIDIR 2020
sponsors.
ii UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

HANDBOOK
PROFILING SMALL
ARMS AMMUNITION
IN ARMED
VIOLENCE SETTINGS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................... 1
PART 1. INTRODUCTION................................................................... 5
1.1 Why small arms ammunition?.........................................................5
1.2 What is ammunition profiling?...................................................... 12
1.3 Objectives of this Handbook........................................................ 13
1.4 Who can benefit from this Handbook?....................................... 14
1.5 Guiding principles........................................................................... 15
1.6 Scope of small arms ammunition................................................ 17
1.7 Technical overview of small arms ammunition..........................19
1.8 How to use this Handbook........................................................... 20
PART 2. METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES...................................... 23

2.1 Defining the evidence target.........................................................25
2.2 A step-by-step guide, per database...........................................27
DATABASE 1: EVIDENCE.......................................................... 29
Section A: Data collection................................................................... 31
Section B: Data analysis..................................................................... 58
DATABASE 2: RECORDS............................................................71
Section A: Data collection...................................................................73
Section B: Data analysis......................................................................79
DATABASE 3: ILLICIT MANUFACTURE..................................... 85
DATABASE 4: INTERVIEWS WITH AFFECTED COMMUNITIES.. 95
PART 3. INTERPRETING RESULTS................................................ 107

3.1 Distilling findings...........................................................................107
3.2 A word of caution......................................................................... 112
3.3 Transforming findings into actionable information: A pipeline
to transform knowledge into action................................................ 115
3.4 Leveraging knowledge to reduce violence............................... 119
3.5 Recommendations.......................................................................122
3.6 Moving forward.............................................................................126
PART 4. ANNEXES........................................................................ 129

Glossary................................................................................................129
References........................................................................................... 131
iv UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

ABOUT THE LEAD AUTHORS
Alfredo Malaret Baldo is a Researcher with UNIDIR’s
Conventional Arms Programme. He coordinates the
Urban Violence research portfolio. Alfredo specializes in
public policy analysis, urban violence reduction strategies,
and linkages between security and development efforts.
Alfredo joined UNIDIR after working for the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, the United
Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, and for Ret. US Ambassador
Dennis Jett. He has a bachelor’s degree in Political Science and masters’
degrees in Public Affairs from Brown University and International Affairs and
Economic Development from The Pennsylvania State University.
Manuel Martinez Miralles is a Researcher with UNIDIR’s

Conventional Arms Programme. He coordinates the
conventional ammunition research portfolio. Manuel
joined UNIDIR after five years of working on peace and
disarmament issues at the United Nations Regional
Centre for Peace, Disarmament, and Development in
Latin America and the Caribbean. He has spearheaded
more than 40 arms control trainings, awareness and
implementation initiatives in 15 Latin American and Caribbean countries,
training more than 300 government officials. Manuel is part of the pool of
experts for the Arms Trade Treaty Outreach Project funded by the European
Union and the United Nations SaferGuard Quick-Response Mechanism for
Ammunition Management. He holds a master’s degree in Public Administration
from the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
ABOUT THE RESEARCH TEAM

Adam Baird is a UNIDIR Non-Resident Fellow. Adam is a
trained researcher and gender expert with a background
in peace and conflict studies, international cooperation,
and human rights. His focus is on urban violence, using
masculinities as a lens to understand gangs and crime
in the Global South, particularly Latin America and the
Caribbean. His research is impact oriented with the aim
of fostering policy and practice to promote sustainable
violence reduction. In the last two decades Adam has directed research
projects in Belize, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica, and Trinidad and
Tobago, and has been funded by the ESRC, AHRC, OSF, IDRC, SSRC, UNDP,
British Academy, the Leverhulme Trust, and Coventry University.
HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS v

vi UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH
A NOTE FROM THE AUTHORS
This Handbook should be understood as a technical guide, yet one with profound
human implications. While we have strived to be as accurate as possible regarding
the technical aspects of ammunition and data gathering, we have also strived to avoid
losing sight of the motivation behind this work.
It is our position that aggregated data on ammunition can contribute to the

understanding of the conflating factors that enable armed violence, but it is also our
view that every round of ammunition represents the potential to cut a life short —
putting dreams to an end and families through the nightmare of losing a loved one. And,
in terms of lives lost, armed violence is an irreversible injustice. So, as we aggregate
data and seek for solutions, we must never forget that each data point represents a
preventable injustice.
Big-data should never obscure the human stories behind the statistics –in fact, we
understand them as complementary. Public security must be understood as people-
centred security. And our efforts to profile ammunition, should be understood as
efforts to prevent the further loss of life and promote the socioeconomic wellbeing of
affected communities.
We are releasing this Handbook with a call to work together and generate a multiplier
effect –and doing so urgently. This Handbook recognizes that the success of our
endeavour, cutting illicit ammunition flows with a view to reduce armed violence,
requires coordinated action by UN System partners, Member States, the entire
national security sector, mayors, academics, practitioners and local organizations.
The solutions to ending armed violence are within reach, but we must reach together.
We can do this. We must do this.
HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS vii

EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
viii UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Worldwide, more than half a million people die

violently every year, with the vast majority of violent More than 500,000
deaths (82%) occurring in non-conflict settings,
people die violently
every year, with
mostly in towns and cities (Hideg and Mc Evoy,
the vast majority
Global Violent Deaths 2017: Time to Decide, 2017).
of violent deaths
Furthermore, more than half of the homicides occurring in non-
worldwide are caused by firearms or, more precisely, conflict settings.
by their ammunition (United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicide, 2019). The scale and impact
of armed violence means that it is consistently a leading policy concern
for governments and international organizations. Armed violence causes
an ocean of human suffering, hinders economic development and traps
communities in vicious cycles.
Focusing on ammunition flows and misuse can help reduce armed violence.
There are several potential advantages to focusing on ammunition: Unlike
firearms, ammunition must be replenished once used, and restricting its
flow can therefore “starve firearms of oxygen”. Also, ammunition supply
chains tend to be shorter from transfer to use, increasing the scope for
domestic policy to have an immediate effect in reducing armed violence. In
short, improved research into ammunition flows and the dynamics enabling
lethal outcomes can inform policy responses, with the potential to reduce
the impact of firearms-related violence.
The purpose of
The purpose of this Handbook is to offer users a
this Handbook is
to offer users a step-by-step guide for ammunition profiling. This
step-by-step guide means generating an overview of the small arms
for ammunition ammunition that have been diverted, trafficked or
profiling. misused in settings affected by armed violence. The
HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS 1

main benefit of using this Handbook is that it helps build an evidence base to
inform downstream policies aimed at curbing the flow of ammunition that
would otherwise be destined for unauthorized hands or unauthorized use.
Afterwards, the aggregated evidence and lessons learned collected from
settings affected by armed violence can be channelled upstream to inform
multilateral and global processes. Therefore, this Handbook presents two
distinct contributions to the field:
i. it codifies a method for any interested user to utilize it and yield results
in a standardized manner, and
ii. it presents the ammunition profiling methodology with an armed
violence lens, for replication studies to follow suit.
This Handbook is structured in three broad sections: Part 1 provides a brief

introduction and sets the context of the problem. Part 2 is the core of the
Handbook as it presents the step-by-step guide for ammunition profiling.
Part 2 introduces each of four databases in turn.
The databases that ought to be constructed for a comprehensive profile of

ammunition are the following:
• Database 1: Evidence (ammunition recovered from crime scenes,
ammunition seized in domestic operations, and ammunition seized at
entry-exit points);
• Database 2: Records (ammunition imports, ammunition manufactured
in-country, and ammunition stocks);
• Database 3: Illicit manufacture; and
• Database 4: Interviews with affected communities.
For Databases 1 and 2, the guidelines in are separated into two main actions:
(Section A) data collection and (Section B) data analysis. Part 3 concludes
the Handbook by presenting options for a more refined distillation of
ammunition-specific findings.
2 UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

Using this Handbook is voluntary and carries no reporting requirements.
Further, all data generated belongs to the utilizing entity. Should technical
support be requested, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research stands ready to provide guidance on using the methodology.

PART ONE:
INTRODUCTION

PART 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Why small arms ammunition?

More than half
Worldwide, more than half a million people die violently
of the homicides
worldwide
every year, with most violent deaths (82%) occurring
are caused by
in non-conflict settings, mostly in towns and cities
firearms or, more
(Hideg and Mc Evoy 2017). The scale and impact of precisely, by their
global armed violence means that it is consistently a ammunition.
leading policy concern for governments and armed
and security forces worldwide. This violence is a result of complex drivers,
requiring institutions worldwide to continually seek effective and novel
approaches to reduce it. Focusing on ammunition flows and misuse can
inform this effort. Focusing on ammunition does not mean ignoring firearms;
rather, it means studying ammunition flows as an indispensable accomplice
in firearms-related violence. Firearms and ammunition do not operate
independently, rather they are inextricably tied and interdependent when
deployed. As such, in the efforts to reduce armed violence, ammunition
should be studied and analysed with the same urgency as firearms.
More than half of the homicides worldwide are caused by firearms or, more
precisely, by their ammunition (UNODC 2019). Although armed violence
evolves, there are cycles and trends in violence that, if identified, can help
inform policy responses. Armed violence tends to occur in concentrated
spaces, mostly in urban areas where resources and opportunities are
scarce. It is particularly high and widespread across Latin America and the
Caribbean, in certain cities in the United States, and in parts of western
and southern Africa. Policies in chronically violent contexts have, however,
often struggled to sustainably reduce violence (Adams 2012), hence
the importance of fresh thinking and approaches to promote effective
interventions and combat policy inertia.

So, why focus on ammunition? Research suggests that increases in
homicides may be connected to increased firearms and ammunition
use (UNODC 2019, 19). If 2017 figures are compared with 2012 figures,
firearms-related homicides accounted for 61,804 additional victims in
2017, representing an increase of around 35% from the earlier figure in just
five years (UNODC 2014, 2019).1 When firearms infiltrate spaces, such as
urban peripheries, they tend to stay there, creating a weapons sink (Baird,
Bishop, and Kerrigan 2018). Beyond the coercive and menacing effect of
artisanal and replica weapons designed to resemble modern ones (with
little – if any – intent to discharge), firearms only fire when serviced by a
flow of ammunition. And as demonstrated by the global ammunition trade,
this flow is vast (UN Comtrade 2019). Additionally, diversion and trafficking
dynamics allow ammunition flows to reach unauthorized hands (Conflict
Armament Research 2016, 2017a, 2017b; PRIO 2013; UNODC 2019; WCO
2019).
Table 1: Reported value of ammunition imports & exports, 2015–2018,

UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database2
Year Total imports trade val- Total exports trade
ue (in billions) value (in billions)
2018 $10.121 $14.407
2017 $10.167 $15.228
2016 $10.048 $14.366
2015 $8.704 $13.139
1 The 2013 Global Study on Homicide showed that the number of firearms-related homicides in
2012 was 177,000 (UNODC 2014, 65). The 2019 Global Study establishes that number, five years
later, in 2017, at 238,804 (UNODC 2019, 19).
2 See: https://comtrade.un.org/data

Although access to ammunition enables and accelerates lethal outcomes
in armed violence, ammunition remains understudied. In spite of this,
some notable technical and methodological context-specific studies have
paved the way for this Handbook. For example, studies led by the United
Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin
America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC) in the Dominican Republic (2018),
the Small Arms Survey 2006 primer on ammunition
(Pézard and Anders 2006), the Small Arms Survey Improved research
Ammunition Tracing Kit (Bevan 2008a), and Conflict into flows and
Armament Research guides on Warsaw Pact- effective control
of ammunition can
calibre ammunition quantity tables and box marking
generate improved
(2014a, 2014b) have laid the foundations in the field
and coherent
of small arms ammunition research. Both Conflict
policy and reduce
Armament Research and the Small Arms Survey the incidence of
have applied these profiling efforts to the field, such firearms-related
as in nine countries in Africa (Conflict Armament violence.
Research 2012); in northern Mali (Conflict Armament
Research and Small Arms Survey 2013); in the Niger (de Tessières 2018); in
Kenya (Bevan 2008b); in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia (Diehl and Jenzen-
Jones 2014); in Côte d’Ivoire (Anders 2014); in Libya and the Syrian Arab
Republic (Jenzen-Jones 2014b, 2014a); in the Central African Republic on
cross-border weapon transfers in the Sahel; in the Sudan; in a three-year
investigation across Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic; in South Sudan
(Conflict Armament Research 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2017b, 2019; LeBrun and
Leff 2014); and across seven countries and territories (Florquin and Leff
2014).
The collection and analysis of spent casings in Rio de Janeiro for the 2014–
2017 period (Sou da Paz Institute 2017) and in 2018 (Olliveira and Demori
2019) have also offered significant methodological insights on which this
Handbooks seeks to build. Finally, this Handbook owes gratitude to the

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Global Study on Homicide
(UNODC 2019) for providing a comprehensive analysis of international
homicide figures and improving our collective understanding of the drivers,
mechanisms and contributors to violence.
Nonetheless, gaps in understanding remain, particularly regarding how

ammunition flows influence rates of armed violence and how the issue
compares in different cities. Furthermore, while there are generally robust
policies to control drugs or arms flows, these do not consistently respond
to the particularities of ammunition flows, hence the need for research to
shine a light on their importance.
There are several potential advantages to focusing on ammunition

control: Unlike firearms, ammunition must be replenished once used,
and restricting its flow can therefore “starve firearms of oxygen”.
Also, anecdotal evidence suggests that in scenarios with elevated
rates of armed violence, the time frame from transfer to use in the
ammunition supply chain tends to be short, increasing the scope for
local and national policy to have an immediate impact on reducing lethal
outcomes. In short, improved research into flows and effective control of
ammunition can generate improved and coherent policy and programming
responses with significant potential to reduce the lethality and incidence of
firearms-related violence.
Although this Handbook is intended to serve as a how-to guide for

ammunition profiling, it is important to recognize the broader socioeconomic
and political implications of conducting such work. Inadequately regulated
arms and ammunition enable and sustain armed violence and perpetuate
socioeconomic injustices.

As the Secretary-General has emphasized:
“Armed violence aggravates poverty, inhibits access to social services

and diverts energy and resources away from efforts to improve human
development. Armed conflict and high levels of armed violence represent
a grave impediment to economic growth. There is nothing more damaging
to an investment climate as armed insecurity. Its detrimental effect on
poverty and on access to social services, development and economic
growth has a profound impact on fundamental economic and social
rights”
(United Nations Security Council 2017).
It is clear that progress on virtually all security and development goals

is severely hampered, if not outright reversed, in contexts awash with
poorly regulated arms and ammunition and high levels of violence. And
although the manifestations of armed violence can be profoundly local in
their undercurrents, they affect global peace and security and the well-being
of all peoples. Therefore, conducting ammunition profiling research, with a
view to helping reduce armed violence, can also be considered as an effort
to strengthen the foundations of sustainable development processes.
Although the undercurrents of armed violence might be local, and

immediate reduction strategies might need to be context-specific, the
problem is truly a global one. As such, ammunition profiling efforts and the
ensuing lessons learned ought to be shared in multilateral forums in pursuit
of global improvements. That is, multilateral processes and global action can
be leveraged to mobilize political will and resources at the regional, national
and local levels and thus facilitate the establishment of adequate country-
level and localized systems. For example, there are several international
negotiations and multilateral processes that would benefit from monitoring
flows of ammunition and channelling insights upstream; these could, in turn,

jump-start political will and resource mobilization to support programmes
at the local level. Profiling and monitoring ammunition flows can inform and
improve armed violence reduction efforts, including the following:
• The United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 72/55 and

74/65 on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional
ammunition stockpiles in surplus, which called for a Group of
Governmental Experts to convene and explore possibilities for better
ammunition management
• The Arms Trade Treaty, especially as the Conferences of States Parties
hold thematic discussions on specialized topics such as gender-based
violence and diversion
• The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and the United
Nations SaferGuard Programme, as the authoritative international
body tasked with improving national stockpile management capacity
and addressing risk mitigation on ammunition
• The Sustainable Development Goals, specifically target 16.1, which
seeks to “reduce all forms of violence and related deaths everywhere”,
and target 16.4, which seeks to, inter alia, significantly reduce illicit arms
flows
All these processes, with their different legal strengths and memberships,
benefit from an upstream flow of new evidence regarding the source, supply
chain pathways, dynamics facilitating unauthorized use, and overall impact
of ammunition flows.
So, what is the added value of this Handbook? This Handbook seeks
to generate a catalytic effect, to the extent that anyone interested in
conducting ammunition profiling can do so by using this how-to guide as
a starting point. In addition, this Handbook aims to codify an ammunition
profiling methodology into a tool that extracts useful insights to reduce

armed violence, which mostly occurs in urban environments. Most of
the previous ammunition profiling studies have focused on conflict-
affected settings or actual battlefields, yet most global casualties
occur outside of conflict settings. As such, this Handbook offers not
only a how-to guide for conducting ammunition profiling studies but
also an armed violence lens for doing so. Therefore, this Handbook
presents itself as a novel product with two distinct contributions to the
field:
• Codifying a methodology for any interested user to use and yield results
in a standardized manner
• Presenting the ammunition profiling methodology with an armed
violence lens, for replication studies to follow suit across different
cities and towns
This Handbook acknowledges that the criminal use of ammunition in some

areas may be dependent on diversion from conflicts to feed a certain demand
in armed violence settings. As such, research into conflict-related material
could provide information on ammunition diversion and its use elsewhere.
Hence, this Handbook underscores the importance of sharing research
findings across conflict settings and regional partners, in addition to other
locations affected by criminal violence, to gain a deeper understanding of
supply chains and the dynamics surrounding illicit trafficking networks.
Finally, while some practices described in this Handbook may already

exist at the national level, they might not be harmonized or aggregated
(e.g. different elements are collected by difference national authorities
or experts, and hence the output might not be comparable), and in most
cases, this data is not collected with the intent to monitor and profile small
arms ammunition. As such, one further added value of using this Handbook
is that it will yield results in a standardized format, which facilitates internal
and international documentation comparison and time series analyses.

1.2 What is ammunition profiling?
This Handbook offers a road map for ammunition profiling, which is

different from ammunition tracing. The key difference is that tracing efforts
generally intend to determine the exact origin and recreate the supply
chain of documented ammunition, when packaging or markings permit and
confirmation is received from the relevant entities, whereas ammunition
profiling is better understood as a data generation tool to gain a baseline of
information regarding volumes and origins, variations (trends and patterns),
and dates of production. Ammunition profiling generates baseline data
for subsequent efforts to build on. As such, ammunition profiling
contributes to understanding of the problems of diversion, trafficking
and misuse but, in isolation, will not present definitive answers. That
is, ammunition profiling needs to be complemented with additional
layers of data and followed by the analysis of context-specific policies
and their implementation.
In the case of this Handbook, ammunition profiling is intended to shed

light on the general source of ammunition recovered from unauthorized
hands or from unauthorized use in armed violence settings and variations
therein, without necessarily being able to recreate the entire supply chain.
Ammunition profiling, contextualized with the undercurrents of armed
violence in specific environments, can be useful to inform ammunition control
and tailor armed violence reduction strategies. In other words, ammunition
profiling contributes to building a novel evidence base. At its core, this
Handbook understands ammunition profiling as the systematization and
analysis of data, built by documenting, at a minimum, the calibres, markings,
manufacturers and manufacturing years of the ammunition recovered
from scenes of armed violence, as well as accompanying law enforcement
reports. To facilitate the data systematization, aggregation and analyses,
this Handbook breaks down the effort into separate databases (see Part 2).

1.3 Objectives of this Handbook
• The objective of this Handbook is to contribute to the generation

of new data on ammunition, since baseline data on ammunition is
a global shortcoming.
• This Handbook offers users a codified how-to guide to creating a
profile of small arms ammunition in armed violence settings.
» The main benefit of using this Handbook is that is helps strengthen
domestic capacity to build an evidence base that could be
subsequently leveraged to inform policies aimed at curbing the
flow of ammunition reaching unauthorized hands or unauthorized
use in armed violence settings.

1.4 Who can benefit from this Handbook?
This Handbook is written with multiple readers in mind:

• Practitioners working at the operational level, such as authorities
working in forensic ballistics and crime laboratories, criminologists,
law enforcement, intelligence, and police and military officers on the
ground who seek to explore aggregated dynamics of ammunition flows
and armed violence in their respective environments
• National policymakers interested in leveraging an evidence base of the
ammunition flowing in, out and within a particular setting for better
management and regulation of ammunition flows
• Members of regional and international organizations, including
specialized United Nations agencies, who, in partnerships with national
authorities, seek collaborative pathways to understand flows of
ammunition, limit illicit ones, and reduce their impacts
• Field users, academics and members of non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), who may find this Handbook a useful guide to
capture, analyse and shed light on dynamics enabling armed violence in
affected communities
• All other users, including journalists, who are interested in identifying
and uncovering trends in ammunition misuse, diversion and trafficking
This Handbook will refer to readers and users as “users”, since following the
guidelines below is, at its core, a research effort.

1.5 Guiding principles
The methodology presented in this Handbook has been designed with

six guiding principles in mind. These principles underpin the value of this
Handbook. The six principles are the following: piloting and iteration
learning, national ownership, readiness, affordability, informativeness, and
impact. Each of these guiding principles is described as follows:
1. Piloting and iteration learning: The methodology outlined in this

Handbook is intended to act as a set of working guidelines that need
to be updated to reflect lessons learned from piloting and iterated
uses in different context and regions. It is to be understood as a living
document intended to shed light on the global problem of ammunition,
and it will evolve as the community universalizes its use.
2. National ownership: The methodology seeks to be sustainable,

recognizing that national ownership is the key to sustainability. To
spur national ownership, political will and operational support must be
present. One way to ensure consistent and standardized operational
support is to use this research methodology to inform or update
national standardized operating procedures (SOPs), within the context
of defined national legislation and regulations. To facilitate this, the
methodology is designed to be practical and accessible without
representing a significant additional burden on operational national
authorities and existing procedures.
3. Readiness: The methodology is also designed to be adopted and

implemented immediately. This means that it has been designed
around data that is readily available to most national authorities. That
is, data that has already been collected but is sometimes overlooked,
scattered or not systematized. Therefore, the methodology can be

best understood as a road map to systematize information that national
authorities have under their jurisdiction.
4. Affordability: The methodology is also designed with simplicity

in mind. This means that collecting the required data does not
require substantial financial investment or recurrent expenses. The
methodology attempts to rely on equipment that is affordable for most
national actors or likely to be already in their possession. Further, it is
a methodology that will not require licences or fees. A certain degree
of technical knowledge is needed, but this could already exist at the
national or local level or could be easily learned. The United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) stands ready to provide
technical guidance when applying this Handbook, upon request.
5. Informativeness: The methodology is designed to produce an

overview of small arms ammunition flows, which is informative for the
national control and management of small-calibre ammunition. It is
not designed to solve individual firearms-related cases, but rather to
shed light on larger patterns and produce actionable information that
might have previously gone unnoticed. The overview will be generated
by aggregating case-by-case information and distilling the patterns and
trends affecting the determined territory.
6. Impact: The methodology aims to produce actionable information that

leads to effective policy prescriptions to reduce armed violence. As
such, it seeks to uncover trends that are both informative and impactful.
In this vein, the methodology revolves around diversion, trafficking and
misuse, as well as the dynamics and conflating factors that facilitate
lethal outcomes in firearms-related incidents.

1.6 Scope of small arms ammunition
For the purposes of this Handbook, small arms ammunition will be

considered those rounds designed to be fired through firearms with rifled
barrels up to a bore diameter of 14.5 mm and cartridges designed for use
in smooth bore weapons up to 10 gauge (19.7 mm). For ease of reference,
this Handbook uses the terms “small arms ammunition” and “small-calibre
ammunition” interchangeably.
Small-calibre ammunition, as referred to in the Handbook, mostly services

small arms, which include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and
carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns, and
shotguns. These are the most common weapon systems used in incidents
of armed violence in urban environments. Nonetheless, some heavy
machine guns (usually called “light weapons”, as opposed to “small arms”)
can also use small arms ammunition.
Figure 1: Small arms ammunition threshold (letter Y)3
3 Source: Bevan 2008a (Small Arms Survey).

Figure 2: Common pistol, rifle and shotgun cartridges4
Explosives and explosive ammunition and munitions are outside of the

scope of this Handbook. Manipulating explosives and explosive ammunition
and munitions requires specialized safety protocols that are not addressed
in this Handbook. In addition, manipulating ammunition should always be
done under the guidance or supervision of specialized officers, in some
contexts referred to as Ammunition Technical Officers (ATO). For safety
reasons, this Handbook warns against approaching or manipulating
ammunition outside the scope of small arms ammunition, encompassed by
the area with the letter Y in Figure 1.
4 Source: Bobbfwed. This image is intended to serve as an illustration of commonly recovered small
arms ammunition and to illustrate the scope of this Handbook. The image serves an illustrative,
rather than a comprehensive or technical purpose.

1.7 Technical overview of small arms ammunition
For those requiring a technical overview of the nuances of identifying small

arms ammunition, the Small Arms Survey has an easy-to-use open access
handbook on weapons identification, with a chapter dedicated to the
identification of small-calibre ammunition, with open access.
For those interested in ammunition tracing and protocols and procedures

for recording small-calibre ammunition, including examples of templates to
record and report relevant information from the ammunition samples, the
Small Arms Survey also has an easy-to-use Ammunition Tracing Kit, with
open access. This Ammunition Tracing Kit also includes fully completed
examples that could be used as reference.
Further, in conducting ammunition profiling, This Handbook

specialized personnel might need to be consulted. advises users to
As such, this Handbook advises users to consult consult with small
with small arms ammunition or weapons intelligence
arms ammunition
or weapons
experts to verify the inputting of data and analysis to
intelligence
avoid misidentification.
experts to verify
the inputting
of data and
analysis to avoid
misidentification.

1.8 How to use this Handbook
Users requiring a refresher on identifying small-calibre ammunition should

consult the sources mentioned in section 1.7.
Users ready to begin the process of profiling small-calibre ammunition

should jump straight into the guidelines in Part 2.
Users interested in options for a refined distillation of ammunition-specific

findings should use Part 3.
Part 2 is the core of the Handbook as it presents a step-by-step guide for

ammunition profiling. Part 2 introduces the four databases in turn.
The guidelines for Databases 1 and 2 are separated into two main
actions: (Section A) data collection and (Section B) data analysis. These
guidelines are designed to assist users who are building an ammunition
profile from scratch by presenting self-contained, per database, instructions
on how to collect the data and then analyse it. Completing this effort will
yield a comprehensive profile of ammunition recovered in armed violence
settings.
The databases are discussed separately because the end users might be
different, and the information might be stored in different departments or
collected by different personnel or agencies. For example:
• Database 1: Evidence might be built by crime scene or forensic

laboratory officials, tactical law enforcement, or customs officials,
working independently or as a multi-agency task force.
• Database 2: Records might be built by the national agency tasked with
approving and allocating the ammunition supply or, in cases where no
central agency controls national distribution, it will have to be built in
partnership with the ammunition end users, manufacturers and holders,
including armed and security forces.
• In the cases of Database 3: Illicit manufacture and Database 4:
Interviews with affected communities, it is recommended that
a trained user in qualitative methods takes the lead. Although the
databases might be constructed independently, legislative officials and
policymakers might be interested only in a final report, as opposed to
stand-alone databases. As such, it is important that the information
collected is thoroughly analysed and presented in the form of a briefing

that details the main findings, the implications of these findings, and
the recommended next steps.
This Handbook also acknowledges that the collection of data concerning

ammunition from crime scenes, seizure from domestic operations,
and seizure at entry-exit points may not be the responsibility of one
single department or agency. As a result, a certain level of inter-agency
coordination may be required at the local and/or national levels in the
construction of the databases.
That being said, practitioners may use only the information that
is available to them and still gain valuable insights concerning
ammunition flows that can help inform policy at either the municipal or
national levels. UNIDIR stands ready to provide guidance on inter-agency
coordination when applying this Handbook, upon request.

PART TWO:
METHODOLOGICAL
GUIDELINES

PART 2. METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES
To shed light on trends regarding ammunition misuse, trafficking and

diversion, this Handbook suggests building four databases, which can be
cross-referenced against one another. By organizing the methodology
around databases, the data-collection effort is divided into achievable
milestones. These guidelines offer a road map to creating the four
databases, which encompass three broad types of information:
1. Primary evidence:
Database 1: Evidence
• Built from the following information points: (a) ammunition
recovered from crime scenes, (b) ammunition seized in domestic
operations and (c) ammunition seized at entry-exit points. When
the ammunition recovered from any of these information points is
accompanied by a law enforcement report, contextual information
from that report should also be included in the spreadsheet.
2. Records of information:
Database 2: Records
• Built from the following information points: (a) records of ammunition
imports, (b) records of ammunition manufactured in-country and (c)
records of ammunition stockpiled in the country.
3. Contextual information:
Database 3: Illicit manufacture
Database 4: Interviews with affected communities

Database 1 will be, most likely, constructed from unprocessed or semi-
processed evidence. To build this database, users will have to extract
data from pieces of ammunition and law enforcement reports and input
it into spreadsheets. Database 1 will represent the primary evidence of
ammunition misused, illicitly held or trafficked. The “information points”
can be understood as the source or event where the data originates from,
meaning crime scenes, seizures in domestic operations, or seizures at
entry-exit points.
Database 2 will be, most likely, already partially documented in records by

the responsible national agencies. To build this database, users will have
to systematize information from records into a format that facilitates its
analysis. Database 2 can be considered the benchmark of information to
potentially contrast against Database 1.
Finally, Databases 3 and 4 will be qualitative research based on interviews,

exchanges, group discussion and community knowledge. The importance
of these two databases is that they will help contextualize findings from
the primary evidence (Database 1) and records of information (Database 2).

2.1 Defining the evidence target
In an ideal scenario, a study focusing on monitoring and diagnosing small

arms ammunition diversion, trafficking and misuse would document the
entire universe of ammunition in circulation across a determined territory.
However, this is often not possible. As such, the second-best option is to
document a representative sample. The evidence target defines the sample
that will be analysed.
When defining the evidence target, it is important to ensure that the sample
is representative of the universe (also referred to as the “population”).5
To make such a determination, the scale of the universe must be known,
at least roughly. For example, if a territory has had 100,000 documented
incidents of ammunition discharge in the time frame under examination,
then users must use that number as a benchmark to determine what
percentage of those cases would constitute a representative sample. A
representative sample allows findings to be generalizable. In addition, the
documentation of the sample must be achievable within the limits of the
available resources. As such, it is a balance between “representation” and
“achievability”.
A representative sample can be defined as a subset of a population that

accurately reflects, on average, the characteristics of the universe.6 To limit
biases, random sample selection is crucial, as it offers the best chance
of generating a sample with the same characteristics, on average, as the
universe. In other words, it minimizes potential biases that could yield
skewed results. Finally, when defining the evidence target, it is crucial to do
so by addressing the following: What research questions are the authorities
trying to answer?
5 For a definition of “universe” in statistics, see: https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.

asp?ID=2087#:~:text=Definition%3A,and%20coverage%20of%20the%20study.
6 For more on representative samples and sampling, see: https://link.springer.com/
referenceworkentry/10.1007%2F978-94-007-0753-5_2476.

The combination of the four databases discussed
The combination of
in Part 2 aims to paint a comprehensive picture
the four databases
aims to paint a of the ammunition circulating in, out and within
comprehensive a determined territory. Simply put, the more
picture of the comprehensive the data, the more robust the
ammunition analysis to draw from to answer the research
circulating in, question. Nonetheless, users should not be
out and within discouraged if constructing all the databases or
a determined
collecting all the data entry points is not possible, since
territory.
some information, even by itself, can be informative,
and the full picture can be built progressively. For
example, collecting five years of information would be very informative but
might not be immediately achievable. As such, an acceptable compromise
can be to start with the latest year and extract initial findings from only the
most recent cases, while clearly stating so when drawing conclusions. In
addition, not all databases will necessarily be relevant to every study, since
a user might decide to focus only on ammunition diversion or trafficking or
misuse or to study a particular point in time to assess the impact of a new
regulation, as opposed to studying the three activities at once or studying
a longer period of time.
The main takeaway from this discussion is that users should feel free to
define their own evidence target, which needs to answer the question
identified by national authorities and be based on a representative sample.

2.2 A step-by-step guide, per database
This section is an illustrated step-by-step guide of how to construct

each database, with suggestions for their analysis. Moving forward,
note that Databases 1 and 2 will need to be systematized into different
spreadsheets, with drop-down menus or tabs to input data arising from
different information points, whereas Databases 3 and 4 will be recorded
as qualitative information. Also note that data inputting should be done
at the smallest level of disaggregation possible, yet without doubling the
entries for identical samples. For example, should two boxes of ammunition
contain identical cartridges, then one entry in the spreadsheet summing
the total number of boxes and cartridges recovered will suffice. However,
should the two boxes contain different calibres or markings, a separate
entry will be needed for each separate calibre or marking identified.
Afterwards, to thoroughly analyse the information
and create a comprehensive ammunition profile, the
This Handbook
encourages
analysis section will propose cross-referencing fields
users to avoid
among the different databases.
duplicating any
data that is already
Finally, this Handbook encourages users to avoid being collected
duplicating any data that is already being collected and to attempt
and to attempt to source data, where possible, from to source data,
existing mechanisms. where possible,
from existing
mechanisms.

DATABASE ONE:
EVIDENCE

DATABASE 1: EVIDENCE
Justification: Database 1: Evidence with its three information points will

generate overviews of:
(a) the ammunition used in firearms-related scenes of violence, which can
generally be characterized as ammunition misuse;
(b) the ammunition circulating illegally or as unauthorized possession and
seized within national borders; and
(c) the ammunition trafficked illicitly and seized at border controls.7
Information points: This database will be built from the following

information points: (a) ammunition recovered from crime scenes, (b)
ammunition seized in domestic operations and (c) ammunition seized at
entry-exit points.
7 To differentiate between illicit possession and illicit trafficking, the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime defined the terms as follows in its latest study on firearms:
Illicit possession: The unlawful possession of regulated or prohibited firearms, their parts
and components or ammunition. Carrying a handgun without a licence is an example of illicit
possession.
Illicit trafficking: The import, export, trans-shipment, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or
transfer of arms, their parts and components, and ammunition from or across the territory of
one State to that of another State if any one of the States concerned does not authorize it in
accordance with national law of one of the countries involved or if the arms are not uniquely
marked upon manufacture and marked upon import. Arms that were not properly deactivated
according to the national legislation of the destination country can also be illicitly trafficked or
smuggled.

Where to find this information: This information might be located in
forensic ballistics units, law enforcement evidence storage and case files,
firearms focal points, gun crime intelligence centres, crime departments,
or the judiciary, if the ammunition is presented as evidence in judicial
proceedings. In addition, this data may be stored in depots held by law
enforcement agencies, by the armed forces, or by customs, coast guard,
port and airport authorities.

SECTION A: DATA COLLECTION
To start the process of monitoring and diagnosing small arms ammunition

diversion, trafficking and misuse,8 the most important effort is to document
the various types of ammunition recovered from circumstances that could
be characterized as misuse, illicit possession or trafficking. The difference
between illicit possession and illicit trafficking is that the latter involves
unauthorized cross-border movement, whereas the former is defined
by confiscations within national borders. This data-collection effort
can be considered a systematization of information extracted from the
ammunition recovered from crime scenes and from seizures in domestic
operations and at entry-exit points. Constructing this database relies
on documenting, at a minimum, the different characteristics observed
on the ammunition headstamps, the packaging and the accompanying
law enforcement reports, when available. The ammunition cartridges
and packaging will represent the hard evidence, whereas the reports will
contextualize the ammunition-specific findings. These two sources of data
are mutually reinforcing and deepen understanding of the relationship
between ammunition and armed violence.
8 Monitoring and diagnosing small arms ammunition diversion, trafficking and misuse is part
of a project undertaken by UNIDIR’s Urban Violence work stream. For more information on
the project, see: https://unidir.org/projects/urban-violence-adapting-arms-control-new-
environments-1.

Step 1.1: Ascertain safety risk in the place of data collection 9
When planning to handle small arms ammunition as physical evidence,

it is imperative to follow all necessary safety prevention procedures, in
accordance with the specific conditions of the location. Before entering
the place of collection, the first step is to conduct a full risk assessment
of the site or storage facility and secure supervision and clearance from a
competent specialized officer or Ammunition Technical Officer. Small arms
ammunition might be stored in locations or storage facilities that may also
contain explosive conventional ammunition, explosives (whether military,
commercial, or homemade), explosive stores (detonators and detonating
cord), improvised explosive device components, or toxic industrial
chemicals and other elements that pose a safety risk, both for the persons
and the surroundings. Items beyond small arms ammunition fall outside the
scope of this Handbook. Thus, items beyond small arms ammunition should
not be sampled or manipulated following the methodology outlined in this
document. As such, there should be no interaction with the working site
until a full risk assessment has been carried out by a competent Ammunition
Technical Officer, the appropriate mitigation measures have been taken, and
the site has been cleared for tasks outlined in this methodology to begin. In
addition, users are strongly advised to refrain from manipulating any firearm
and should leave all clearance of firearms to qualified individuals.
9 This section should not be considered an exhaustive manual of safe operating practices, but
rather illustrative of the minimum measures that should be considered before entering a scene
that could contain firearms, ammunition or explosives. To ensure the safety of users and the
surroundings, a full thorough risk assessment of the location must be completed by a competent
Ammunition Technical Officer.

More detailed guidance on safety in storage facilities is available in the
following publications:
• United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, International
Ammunition Technical Guidelines
• UNIDIR, Utilizing the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines in
Conflict-Affected and Low-Capacity Environments
It is highly encouraged to handle all evidence with nitrile gloves. Nitrile

gloves serve two purposes: they prevent the transfer of material to the
evidence, and they provide protection to the wearer from contamination
with hazardous materials such as body fluids, lead, gunshot residue and
propellant compositions. Users need to be particularly cautious when
handling projectiles since, after impacting, recovered projectiles may be
contaminated with body fluids or have exposed lead cores.
Additional safety measures:

• Users should take special precautions with biological residue from
evidence that might have been extracted from a deceased or injured
person.
• Gloves are sound measures to protect against biological residue, but
users should also consider wearing a mask and lenses.
• If the research takes place inside an evidence storage locker or shooting
range where lead residue is prevalent, users should wear a mask to
avoid inhaling lead.
• When possible, users should use tweezers to manipulate the evidence,
as this adds another layer of separation between the user and the
evidence.

» Users must use plastic tweezers (as opposed to metallic ones
or metallic ones covered with plastic tips) to avoid adding
individualizing marks to the ammunition cartridges recovered
as evidence, since the contact and movement between metallic
tweezers and ammunition can leave toolmarks and jeopardize
forensic ballistics analyses.
• Any unfired ammunition which, on examination, is found to be
corroded or otherwise damaged should be set aside for inspection
by a specialized officer or Ammunition Technical Officer. Cracked
cartridge cases or rounds with loose projectiles may cause the
spillage of propellant, which is sensitive to flame, friction and
electrostatic discharge.

Step 1.2: Collect the working materials
• The ammunition samples and the reports10 from which to extract the
raw data
• Nitrile gloves to offer some protection to users
• Magnifying glasses to enhance the view of headstamp markings
• Chalk to enhance worn or erased markings for observation and
photography
• Plastic tweezers to hold ammunition without leaving individualizing
marks on the cartridges
• A magnet to help determine the composition or coating of ammunition
cartridge cases and bullets or determine the projectile type11
• A computer with spreadsheet access through which to input and
systematize the information
• A digital photographic camera and photo scales (a suitable ammunition
gauge or ruler could also be used in lieu of photo scales)
• Callipers (or ammunition gauges) for measuring cartridge case length
and cartridge case head diameter to ensure correct calibre identification
• Record-keeping paper forms to document any and all physical evidence
manipulated (for more on chain of custody, see Box 4)
10 In other words, recovered ammunition and the accompanying law enforcement reports.
11 The magnet attracts ferrous materials.

Step 1.3: Build the first spreadsheet
This step is crucial as it can be considered the research design. It will define
what characteristics will be extracted from the ammunition sample and
accompanying reports, and which ones will not. It is recommended that
this process undergoes a thorough national review to ensure all the desired
fields are considered. The first spreadsheet will have two parts, each
corresponding to a different source of information: small arms ammunition
evidence and accompanying law enforcement reports. These sources of
information, once systematized into a spreadsheet, will represent Database
1: Evidence. To collect the desired information, a sample spreadsheet
template can be downloaded here.12 Alternatively, for users interested
in building an organic spreadsheet, some recommended data-collection
fields are as follows:
Information from recovered small arms ammunition (part 1 of

spreadsheet)
• Unique identifying number (assigned by the users)
• Case number (assigned by law enforcement)
• Number of identical ammunition cartridges, cases or complete rounds13
• Information point (crime scene, seizure in domestic operations, seizure
at entry-exit point)
• Type of evidence (projectile,14 fired or spent cartridge, live ammunition,
or ammunition in manufacturers’ packaging)
• Lot number
• All headstamp alphanumerical and monogram markings15, following
clockwise order documentation
12 The template can be downloaded at www.unidir.org/Profiling-Template

13 The number of cartridges recorded in the spreadsheet should reflect the actual number in the
package or box and not just the nominal number printed on the packaging.
14 For ease of reference, this Handbook uses “projectiles” and “bullets” interchangeably. For more
detailed guidance, see Jenzen-Jones (2018).
15 This Handbook encourages users to note the alphabet type in the ‘Additional comments’ field, if
more than one alphabets are documented

• Import code, if any16
• Year of manufacture, if known
• Headstamp symbols,17 if any
• Country of manufacture, if known
• Manufacturer, if identifiable18
• Factory, if identifiable
• Exporter, if identifiable
• Importer, if identifiable
• Calibre19
• Length of cartridge case20
• Markings stamped on the body or groove of the cartridge case, if any21
• Composition or coating of the cartridge case (brass, steel, copper,
aluminium, iron, nickel, plastic, etc.)22
• Colour of primer annulus sealant, if any
• Projectile lacquer colour23
• Projectile shape (blunt nose, conical nose, hemispherical nose,
parabolic nose, ogive nose, sphere, pellet, etc.)
• Projectile type, purpose or function (ball, lead round nose, wad cutter,
semi-wad cutter, semi-jacketed, full metal jacket, semi-jacketed hollow
point, jacketed hollow point, BB, BBB, etc.)
16 This Handbook refers to import codes as the markings added at the point of manufacture, upon
request of the importer. Import codes are usually unique to the importing entity and would offer
important information, when available, to map the life cycle of the ammunition.
17 For data inputting purposes, when there is no possibility to include a visual representation of the
headstamp symbols, a written description should be defined, included and used consistently, for
example “NATO four-pointed star”.
18 The name of the manufacturer could, at times, be confused with the brand (seller or distributor)
of the ammunition; for example, ammunition headstamps may indicate manufacturer, whereas
the packaging may correspond to the seller or distributor. When recording this field, keep in mind
that this Handbook is interested in the manufacturer, defined as the producer of the ammunition,
as opposed to the commercial brand. Should this information be unclear or not available, users
are advised to consult with an expert or review the resources available in Part 3.
19 As a reference for a calibre homologation framework, see: https://bobp.cip-bobp.org/fr/
homologation_public.
20 To assess the case length, it is advisable to use a specialized ammunition gauge. In addition,
should there be any doubt regarding the exact calibre, measuring and recording the exact
cartridge case mouth internal diameter would assist in making a determination.
21 Markings stamped on the body of the cartridge are mostly present in shotgun cartridges (and
shotgun waddings might also present useful information), but some manufacturers can, upon
request, also mark the side or groove of all small arms ammunition cases with codes.
22 To discriminate between brass and steel, a magnet is necessary. Some ammunition gauges
already incorporate a magnet for this purpose.
23 This is not the colour of the bullet per se, but the code colour, which is usually painted or
lacquered on the tip of the bullet. This code depends on the country or organization for which it
was manufactured (if applicable). For more detailed guidance, see Jenzen-Jones (2018).

• Notes on firing pin impressions, if any
• Fired by a registered firearm (yes/no)
» If yes, firearm identified and type of licence to be added to
additional comments
• Reloaded (yes/no)
» If yes, observations added to additional comments
• Photography digital file number24
• Additional comments
Contextual information from accompanying law enforcement reports

(part 2 of spreadsheet)
• Report case number (assigned by law enforcement)
• Date of the crime or seizure (dd/mm/yyyy)
• Time of the crime or seizure (recommended time format is 24:00)
• Location of the crime or seizure
» Household
» Public space (port, airport, postal office, public road, building, etc.)
• Address or coordinates of the crime or seizure
• Situational context (if available)25
» Organized crime related
» Gang-related
» Corporate crime-related
» Intimate partner/family-related
» Inter-communal violence
» Terrorism related
» Civil unrest
» Other crime
» Not applicable
» Not known
24 For general guidance on photographing ammunition, see Box 3.

25 Typology retrieved verbatim from the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes
(ICCS) prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2015, p 99), see:
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/doc15/BG-ICCS-UNODC.pdf

• Outcome of the crime (harm caused in the crime scene)26
» Intentional homicide
» Femicide
» Attempted intentional homicide
» Non-intentional homicide
» Robbery
» Assault
» Destruction or damage to property
» Sexual violence
» Domestic violence or intimate partner violence
» Coercion
» Kidnapping
» Illicit discharge
• Gender of the victim (only for crime scenes)
• Sex of the victim (only for crime scenes)
• Age of the victim (only for crime scenes)
• Gender of the perpetrator
• Sex of the perpetrator
• Age of the perpetrator
• Perpetrator’s relationship to the victim (if applicable and only for crime
scenes)
» Current intimate partner or spouse
» Former intimate partner or spouse
» Blood relative
» Other household member
» Friend
» Acquaintance
» Colleague or work relationship
» Authority or care relationship (doctor, nurse, police, etc.)
26 Typology informed by the International Classification of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS)
prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2015), but not retrieved
verbatim. This typology is intended to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive. Users should
tailor this field to the national context and definitions stipulated in national legislation.

» Offender known to victim
» Offender unknown to victim
» Relationship not known
• Incitement-related factors
» Alcohol
» Illicit drugs
» Gender related
» Other
» Not applicable
» Unknown
• Reason for intervention or detection method
» Combination with other detected illicit activity
» X-ray
» Intelligence-led search
» Canine inspection
» Random control
» Behaviour unit
» Emergency services
» Gunshot detection systems
» Tip-lines or hotlines
• Concealment method (only for seizures)
• Outcome of intervention (only for seizures)
» Arrest for presumed illicit possession or illicit trafficking (only for
seizures)
» Charges filed, but person freed (only for seizures)
» Confiscation of ammunition (only for seizures)
» Pending further law enforcement investigation (only for seizures)
» Returned to owner
• Direction of flow (only for seizures)
» Inbound: entering the country
» Outbound: leaving the country

• Country of origin or destination (only for seizures)
• Any available police intelligence generated from the scene of the crime
or seizure
• Additional comments
Box 1: Gender-based violence and the importance of gender

disaggregated data collection
Gender-based violence (GBV) is a form of violence motivated by or

directed at victims solely because of their biological sex and/or gender
identity. Gender, in this case, is understood as a fluid continuum and
encompasses those who identify as non-binary. GBV may include
physical, sexual, verbal, emotional and psychological abuse against
non-binary persons, men, women, boys and girls. As evidenced by the
findings of the Small Arms Survey, lethal violence, including firearms-
related violence, is highly gendered. The majority of both victims and
perpetrators of firearm violence are male, with most of the female victims
being killed as a result of GBV committed by men.1 The possession and
use of firearms and ammunition have been linked to both GBV and
gender inequalities entrenched in society. Firearms and ammunition
may also exacerbate patriarchal conceptions of toxic masculinity, which
associates the use of firearms and ammunition with cultural norms of
power and control.
Addressing GBV and, more specifically, the link between GBV and firearms
and ammunition, requires gender disaggregated data on victimization,
perpetration and other roles played in the facilitation of armed violence.
For this reason, it is important to include gender disaggregated indicators
in all aspects of data collection. These indicators include those that may
be found in crime scene reports when profiling ammunition, including
gender of the perpetrator, gender of the victim, relationship between
perpetrator and victim, and any incitement-related or exacerbating
factors identified. It is also important to keep in mind that outcomes of
crimes such as femicide or sexual violence can be indicative of GBV.
Gender disaggregated data collection provides a more nuanced

and refined understanding concerning the impact of firearms and
ammunition on gender equality. This information could also help
determine the levels of GBV committed both with and without firearms
and ammunition. Through the collection of gender disaggregated data
in ammunition profiling, we can better understand the role that firearms
and ammunition play in GBV. With this new evidence base, policymakers
and practitioners can better address the gendered aspects of armed
violence and ammunition proliferation and improve corresponding
national policies and programmes.
1 Alvazzi del Frate, Hideg and LeBrun (2020)

Step 1.4: Design the research production line
Once the fields of information to be documented have been selected,

the primary evidence located, the workplace cleared following safety
protocols, and the sample defined and approved by national authorities,
users should organize their work to input the ammunition data in the most
efficient manner. A clear organization will allow users to document large
amounts of evidence in a short period of time and respect safety protocols.
However, should users prefer to integrate ammunition-specific data-
collection practices into SOPs, authorities will generate this database over
time and facilitate time series analyses. In either case, users will likely need
to accomplish a combination of the following tasks:
• Determine the universe of information, to define the evidence target.

• Access loose ammunition, ammunition recovered in manufacturers’
packaging, and the law enforcement reports.
• Photograph the ammunition sample.
• Extract ammunition-related data and information from the reports.
• Enter the data into the database.
• If applicable, repackage evidence in line with chain of custody
requirements.
To accomplish these tasks, users could organize their profiling method in

a research production line. For example, if the ammunition profiling effort
will be carried out at once, as opposed to integrated into national SOPs,
users could define specific roles for each one of the members of the team
and repeat them throughout the entire data-collection process, following
the principles of division of labour and specialization. As a preliminary
step, it is crucial to first count the total number of packages or
evidence available (and confirm that none of the packages is empty) to
determine the scale of the universe of information. Such a benchmark

is then used to define a representative sample, otherwise referred to
as the “evidence target”. This way, the user will be able to claim that
the documented sample represented “X percent” of the entire pool of
all existent evidence (for more on sampling and defining the evidence
target, see section 2.1. Defining the Evidence Target).
After determining the universe of information and evidence target, and if a

team is working together to develop the ammunition profile, one user could
start the research production line by selecting the evidence and opening
the packaging, then the next user could photograph the ammunition (both
headstamps and side-profile shots) and evaluate the cartridge and markings
to extract relevant information; a third user could input the raw data into
a spreadsheet. It is essential that one user is tasked with photographing
each individual piece of physical evidence, using photo scales (or a suitable
ammunition gauge or ruler) to capture the exact dimensions of the cartridge.
That user must also ensure that the photographic digital file numbers are
recorded next to the corresponding ammunition entry in the database, in
order to verify the data entered afterwards (for more detailed guidance on
photographic ammunition, see Box 3).
Once the documentation process is completed, each piece of evidence, if

applicable, must be re-stored safely in keeping with national requirements
for maintaining the integrity of the chain of custody (for more detailed
guidance on chain of custody, see Box 4). Afterwards, a new entry in the
database would begin with all users repeating the same task, but with a
different ammunition exhibit. This repetition will allow the team to process
information rapidly and develop dexterity in their respective tasks. It is
recommended that only one piece of evidence or report should be open at
a time to avoid misplacing evidence or mixing cases. Orderly operations are
key to the safety of users and the location.

Alternative research production options
An alternative method for sustainable data collection is integrating some of

these considerations into the SOPs of national authorities, for example at
the forensic ballistics or crime laboratories. If the above-mentioned data is
collected from a database at the same time as the ballistic information is
processed, authorities will generate this database over time and facilitate
time series analyses. This option may be the most practical approach in
countries where the volume of evidence is high. This approach, however,
requires inter-agency coordination and data sharing, as usually no single
entity, including the crime labs, would have access all data points.
To counter the often-siloed nature of public security efforts, the
establishment of a Firearms Focal Point (FFP) or gun crime intelligence
centre, can be leveraged to centralize ammunition data and build a common
framework for inter-agency collaboration. An FFP can streamline data
collection and provide enhanced intelligence to tackle armed violence.
Where an FFP exists, this entity could be well-positioned to lead and
consolidate ammunition profiling efforts. In jurisdictions where no FFP
exists, but there is interest in creating one, starting an ammunition
profiling Task Force could inexpensively set the foundations for the
future establishment of a more comprehensive FFP, while moving the
issue of inter-agency collaboration and ammunition profiling forward.27
The Small Arms Survey has been piloting the feasibility of performing
ammunition profiling by extracting relevant data contained in the Automatic
Ballistics Identification System used by some countries. The profiling
method pioneered by the Small Arms Survey consists of extracting the
“ammunition profiling-relevant data” from these automated systems, which
the system acquires automatically when running ballistics correlations,
and then offloading the data into a database. It is a method designed to
27 For an example of a Firearms Focal Point initiative, provided by Arquebus Solutions, see: https://
arquebus.uk/firearms-focal-points/

avoid the labour-intensive task of inputting data, cartridge by cartridge,
into a spreadsheet. This method is potentially applicable for jurisdictions
that systematically upload all their cartridges into an Automatic Ballistics
Identification System.
Box 2: Automatic Ballistics Identification Systems

industry cooperation
Ammunition profiling can be labour intensive and represent additional

work for jurisdictions that already upload all fired cartridge cases and
projectiles into the Automatic Ballistics Identification Systems (ABIS) of
different technological suppliers. Thus, to avoid duplicating efforts, it is
important to extract ammunition information where it is already avail-
able–such as, potentially, extracting data from the different ballistics
identification systems, when available and in jurisdictions where all re-
covered exhibits are systematically uploaded into these systems. None-
theless, to streamline this work even further, it is important that
commercially available ABIS embrace the ability to automatically
acquire and systematize, using standardized lists to avoid inconsis-
tencies or misidentifications, all fields necessary to generate base-
line data on recovered ammunition and/or the ammunition profiling
database. To achieve this, engaging with private industry and clearly ex-
pressing the needs emerging from public security, with a view to finding
practical solutions, is of utmost importance.
In addition, another important opportunity to cooperate with the ABIS

industry is to explore ways to make the different technological systems
communicate and exchange information among themselves, with en-
hanced agility; since, to date, proprietary data and non-interchangeable
formatting can represent a barrier to information sharing. This solve this
challenge it is important to engage with the ABIS industry to promote the
uptake of a shared file format, allow for cross-platform intelligence-led
searches, and communicate emerging needs as the field of ammunition
evolves.

Step 1.5: Document the sample of ammunition
Step 1.5.1: Document information from recovered small arms

ammunition
Example 1: Loose ammunition
This step consists of inputting the observed characteristics of ammunition
from the sample into the spreadsheet. This is precisely what the Handbook
refers to as “constructing a database from raw unprocessed data”. At this
point, the users have designed the spreadsheet and can begin inputting
raw data from ammunition. For example, consider the photographs of
the headstamps in Figure 3 as the first pieces of evidence that will be
documented.
Figure 3. Selected examples of small arms ammunition headstamps28
1 2
3 4
All the information in these headstamps can be distilled into precise data
entries and inputted into the spreadsheet (see Tables 2–6). These would
28 Sources: The two headstamp photos on the top have been provided by Rodolfo Gamboa,
Senior Technical Officer at UNLIREC, and the two headstamp photos at the bottom by © Hardy
Giezendanner, UNIDIR Researcher.

be considered the first four entries in Database 1: Evidence. In Table 2, the
headstamps have been identified as follows: top-left with ID number 1, top-
right ID number 2, bottom-left ID number 3, and bottom-right ID number 4.
In Table 6, the associated digital photography file numbers 122, 123, 124 and
125 have been added.
Table 2: Selected example of data input from case information
Case information
ID Case Number Number of rounds Information Point Type of Evidence
1 EXAMPLE 1 Crime Scene Spent Cartridge
2 EXAMPLE 1 Crime Scene Live ammunition
3 EXAMPLE 1 Crime Scene Spent Cartridge
4 EXAMPLE 1 Crime Scene Live ammunition
Tables 3–6: Selected examples of data input from loose ammunition
Lot number All alphanumerical marking Import code Year Symbols Country
N/A EP 00 9mm PARA N/A 2000 N/A Brazil
N/A G 00 5.56 N/A 2000 N/A Guatemala
N/A BOF 83 7.62x39 N/A 1983 N/A Bangladesh
N/A 10 00 N/A 2000 N/A Bulgaria
Manufacturer Exporter Importer Factory Calibre
CBC Brazil Peruvian Army CBC 9 x 19 mm PARA
G Unknown Unknown Unknown 5.56 x 45 mm
BOF Unknown Unknown Bangladesh Ordnance 7.62 x 39 mm

Factory
Arsenal Unknown Unknown Unknown 7.62 x 39 mm
Length of cartridge Markings on the body Composition/coating Colour of primer
19 mm N/A Brass N/A
45 mm N/A Brass Green
39 mm N/A Unknown Red
39 mm N/A Unknown Red

Projectile Projectile Notes Registered Photo digital Reloaded Additional
Shape Type/Purpose firearm file number comments
N/A N/A N/A Unknown 122 N Manufactured
for the Armed
Forces
Ball FMJ N/A N/A 123 N N/A
N/A N/A N/A Unknown 124 N N/A
Ball FMJ N/A N/A 125 N N/A
From the sample data outlined above, users can see how an overview of
small arms ammunition flows begins to take shape. For example, three out
of the four documented exhibits were, most likely, manufactured in the year
2000. The more information that is entered into this database, the more
reliable and informative the observed trends will be.29
Additionally, some loose ammunition samples might have identifying

markings stamped on the body or groove of the cartridge case, as Figure
4 shows. Although body or groove markings may be present in a minority
of cases, it is important for users to consider and document such markings
in the spreadsheet in its corresponding field, as this might facilitate cross-
referencing and shed light on the origin of such rounds. It is also a good
marking practice that ought to be replicated, when possible.
29 This Handbook recognizes that users might encounter ammunition markings that may need to be
documented and recorded using Cyrillic, Hebraic, Chinese and other characters and symbols that
are not included in the example above. The characters encountered will depend on the context
and the type of ammunition circulating in that environment or region.

Figure 4: Markings stamped on the body or groove of the cartridge case30
Example 2: Ammunition in manufacturers’ packaging

In some cases, the ammunition will not be recovered as loose exhibits, but in
the presumed original packaging (boxes or crates) from the manufacturer.
While these cases might be the minority, original boxes or crates usually
contain significantly more information than loose ammunition. For example,
lot-numbered boxes or packaging are, in principle, traceable, and they
expedite the inputting of data since all the ammunition cartridges contained
tend to be identical. To illustrate this point, consider the photographs of the
boxes in Figure 5 as additional pieces of evidence that will be documented
in the spreadsheet. The first image corresponds to photography digital file
number 133 in the spreadsheet example shown in Table 10, and the second
one has photography digital file number 134.
30 Source: Andre Desmarais, forensic ballistics experts at the Small Arms Survey. Note: (a) Example
of markings stamped on the body of a cartridge case. First digits: calibre. Second digits: code of
the merchant. (b) Example of individual marking in the groove of a cartridge case.

Figure 5: Selected example of ammunition recovered in manufacturers’ packaging31
The information in these ammunition packaging boxes can be distilled into

precise data entries and inputted into the spreadsheet as shown in Tables
7–10. These would be considered the fifth and sixth entries into Database
1: Evidence.32
31 Sources: The photos on the top have been provided by the United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo Arms Embargo Cell (MONUSCO
AEC), and the two photos at the bottom have been provided by Manuel Martinez Miralles, UNIDIR
Researcher.
32 For shotgun cartridges, the lot or batch number is, on occasions, printed on the inside of the
packaging rather than the outside.

Table 7: Selected example of data input from case information

Case information
ID Case Number Number of rounds Information Point Type of Evidence
5 EXAMPLE 720 Seizure at entry-exit point Packaging
6 EXAMPLE 25 Crime Scene Packaging
Tables 8–10: Selected examples of data input from ammunition seized in

manufacturers’ packaging
Lot All alphanumerical Import Year Symbols Country Manufacturer Exporter

number marking code
68 N/A N/A 1971 N/A China China - 964 Bulgaria
N/A ARMUSA 16 N/A 2012 N/A Spain CARMUSA Spain
Importer Factory Calibre Length of Markings Composition Colour of Projectile

Cartride on the Body /coating primer Colour
DRC MoD 964 7.62 x 39 mm 39 mm N/A Iron Red No colour
Unknown CARMUSA 16GA 67 mm ARMUSA 16 Plastic Red N/A
Projectile Projectile Notes Regis- Photo Reloaded Additional com-

Shape Type/Purpose tered digital file ments
firearm number
Ball FMJ N/A N.A 133 N Type 56 assault rifle
Pellets BB N/A N/A 134 N Hunting

Box 3: Guidance on photographing ammunition
Capturing the ammunition recovered as evidence in a photograph will leave an

enduring record for subsequent analysis and verification. It is of utmost im-
portance to photograph all unique cartridges since this represents the main
quality assurance mechanism built into the methodology. If photographed
correctly, the related data entered can then be verified (or even deciphered
when in doubt) by an individual expert or group of experts, as long as there is a
photographic record linked to the ammunition data. The ability to corroborate
the data collected from the physical ammunition exhibits will be dependent on
the quality of the photos taken and the use of measuring equipment such as
photo scales (or a ruler) to demonstrate the measurements of the cartridge.
Photos showing case length against a scale are imperative to confirm calibre.
Therefore, each unique cartridge ought to be photographed at least twice, with
one image capturing the headstamp and the second capturing the side-pro-
file of the cartridge positioned against a scale or ruler (or an alternative unit
of measurement). In addition, a clear electronic photo can be enlarged on a
computer afterwards and be used to identify particularities such as character
spacing, curving or effaced markings. As such, it is crucial to imbed a step into
the methodology for taking good quality photographs. Some general pointers
on photographing ammunition are as follows:
• Ensure that the photography area is well lit and that the item is in focus.
• Photograph each unique ammunition sample individually and try to remove
all other objects from the background.
• For each unique ammunition sample, capture the entire headstamp, keep-
ing around 150 mm of distance between the camera lens and the head-
stamp.
• For each unique ammunition sample, capture the cartridge on its side
against a ruler or photo scale, with the rim of the cartridge placed at the 0
cm mark of the unit of measurement.
» Ensure the photo captures all the markings on the side of the cartridge
case, when available.
• Ensure that each photograph’s digital file number is integrated or linked to
the corresponding ammunition entry in the spreadsheet.
Detailed guidance on photographing small arms ammunition can be found in

the following open sources:
• James Bevan (Small Arms Survey), Ammunition Tracing Kit, p. 20.
• United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Effective Weap-
ons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobi-
lization and Reintegration Context: A Handbook for United Nations DDR
Practitioners, annex 6.

Figure 6: How to photograph headstamps33
Figure 7: How to photograph cartridge length34


Step 1.5.2: Document contextual information from the accompanying
law enforcement reports
Example 1: Crime scene reports

The headstamps presented in example 1 of Step 1.5.1, if recovered from a
crime scene, will most likely be accompanied by a report prepared by law
enforcement. Such a report, if it exists, will contain valuable information since
it will contextualize the crime scene and offer a glimpse into the conflating
factors that enable lethal outcomes in incidents of armed violence. If the
report is available, the users should also attempt to systematize information
in the spreadsheet. For example, consider the fictitious report below.
Crime scene report: Fictitious example

On Monday, 17 March 2020, a 22-year-old male was found dead-on-
arrival at 45 Excel Street in the Sugar District. The body presents
entry and exit bullet wounds and was found lying near the porch of
residence 43. One spent cartridge casing was recovered from the
scene, which was submitted for forensic analysis under voucher
number Ev-A-500. No projectiles were recovered. Neighbours
claim to have heard the victim arguing with another male and then
a single gunshot at 23:00. No firearm was found in the surrounding
areas. The neighbour of the victim who alerted the police had
called earlier in the night to file a noise complaint. The initial report
indicated the presence of two males and a woman outside the
residence. Empty alcohol containers were found in the vicinity of
the presumed scene of the crime.
The information from the extract can be systematized as follows in Tables

11 and 12.

Tables 11 and 12: Example of data input from a crime scene report
Date of crime/ Time Location Address/ Situational Outcome of the Gender of Sex of
seizure coordinates Context crime/intervention Victim Victim
3/17/2020 23:00 Public 45 Excel St. Community Homicide Male Male
related
Age of Gender of Sex of Age of Perpetrator’s relation Incitement

Victim perpetrator perpetrator perpetrator to the victim related factor
22 Unknown Male Unknown Known to victim Alcohol
The information recorded maintains the anonymity of the victim, the

perpetrator and the reporting officer yet documents important information
to contextualize the recovery of the spent cartridge casings. Please note
that this research methodology is designed to uncover patterns and trends,
not to solve specific criminal cases. The same process of imputing data from
law enforcement reports also applies to reports from seizures in domestic
operations and reports from seizures at entry-exit points.
Example 2: Seizure in domestic operations reports

Similarly, the boxes of ammunition presented in Figure 5, if recovered from
a seizure, would most likely be accompanied by a report prepared by the
national authorities that conducted the interception. Such a report, if it
exists, will contain valuable information since it will contextualize the law
enforcement intervention and offer a glimpse into the conflating factors
that enabled unauthorized possession and potential lethal outcomes. If
the report is available, the users should also attempt to systematize its
information into the spreadsheet. For example, consider the fictitious report
below. Please note, in some contexts, due to pressing circumstances, limited
capacity or practices, or incomplete understanding of the information at
hand, there will not be a report accompanying the evidence (or it will not be
made available), or it could contain inaccurate information or information
that was corrected in the subsequent stages of the investigation. In such

contexts, users might only have access to a depot with the recovered or
seized ammunition. When faced with this limitation, users should still
document the primary evidence and continue with the other databases.
Law enforcement report: Fictitious example

On Monday, 17 March 2020, at 04:00, a 21-year-old female and a
22-year-old male were stopped for driving a motorcycle without
a vehicle licence. The police stopped the motorcycle when
passing through the checkpoint located on Lemon Avenue in
the Sugar District. During a routine examination, the female was
found in possession of a box of ammunition, without appropriate
documentation. The ammunition was found in her purse. The
female argued she was carrying the ammunition for her uncle, who
is a hunter. The male denied any knowledge. The female was taken
into custody for presumed illicit possession and the evidence
submitted for processing under voucher number H-1-ma-2020.
The information from the extract can be systematized as follows in Tables

13 and 14.
Tables 13 and 14: Excel example of data input from a law enforcement seizure
report
Date of crime Time Location Address/ Situational Outcome of the Gender Sex of Age of
/seizure coordinates Context crime/intervention of Victim Victim Victim
17/03/2020 4:00 Public Av. El Limon, Unknown Illicit poessession N/A N/A N/A
Sugar Distric
Gender of Sex of Age of Perpetrator’s relation Incitement Concealment

perpetrator perpetrator perpetrator to the victim related factor Method
Female Female 21 N/A N/A Purse

The information recorded maintains the anonymity of both the presumed
unauthorized user and the reporting officer yet documents the necessary
information to contextualize the seized boxes of ammunition presented.
Please note that this research methodology is designed to uncover patterns
and trends, not to solve specific criminal cases. By building the database,
case by case, patterns and trends in how ammunition moves within
national borders or across national borders will start to form.
Box 4: Continuity and integrity of the chain of custody
All evidence must be managed in accordance with national processes

and procedures, as determined by the competent national authority.
Following guidelines from national authorities in terms of record-keeping
as well as examining, resealing, re-stamping and signing evidence
packages from criminal procedures will protect the continuity of the
chain of custody. It is also recommended that users have a parallel
system of record-keeping, ensuring that every piece of physical evidence
retrieved and examined from an evidence package is re-stored in the
same conditions. At the end of the working session, these records
ought to be signed by everyone involved, confirming the integrity of
the evidence packages as witnessed by the active participants. The
entire process ought to be photographically documented, starting
with the evidence itself and including the packaging and its handling. A
good quality photographic record can make evidence available to more
enhanced analysis from other subject matter experts and act as credible
documentation to corroborate findings. As a general rule, to protect the
integrity of evidence collected and the chain of custody, it is advisable
to only open one evidence package at a time, thus preventing evidence
from one case mixing with that from another.
The precautions outlined above follow the prerequisite of obtaining

the necessary clearances from the competent national authorities to
examine the evidence collected from crime scenes. Such clearances may
also need to clarify whether other work related to the cartridge cases
has already been done and that the evidence in question is “free” for the
profiling documentation. In other words, users should not manipulate,
handle or interfere with cartridges that are currently earmarked for
fingerprinting and/or DNA lifting or otherwise jeopardize the value of
physical evidence, since this could interfere with ongoing crime scene
and forensic examinations in open cases. For more detailed guidance on
preserving the chain of custody and the value of physical evidence, the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has made the “Crime scene
and physical evidence awareness for non-forensic personnel” e-book
freely available here.

SECTION B: DATA ANALYSIS
Step 1.6: Analyse the data
After inputting primary information from crime scenes, seizures in domestic

operations and seizures at entry-exit points into the database, users should
proceed with analysing the data. The question here becomes: What
should users look for? This section is intended to act as a guide to the
different analyses and summary statistics that could be extracted from the
database. The following guide is not comprehensive, but rather illustrative
of the findings that might be possible to extract. This section also limits
its scope to the more accessible statistical methodologies using standard
spreadsheet options. The discussion explores field by field what useful
information could be extracted to build a profile of ammunition.
Time series analyses, when possible, offer a more comprehensive and
dynamic picture, as opposed to a static reflection of one particular point in
time. That is, for any and all fields to be analysed, should the data represent
a sizeable time period, then a separate breakdown per natural year, fiscal
year, quarter or month would shed light on chronological trends and
patterns.
Step 1.6.1: Analyse information from recovered small arms

ammunition
• Number of identical ammunition cartridges: At a minimum, this
column should be summed in its entirety to compute the total number
of ammunition rounds documented.
CROSS-REFERENCE ALERT!
The total number of pieces of evidence collected cross-referenced
against, and divided by, the total number of cases documented, will
yield the ratio of ammunition-related evidence per case. This figure can
be further disaggregated by information point (see below).

• Information point: The information points of crime scene, seizure in
domestic operations and seizure at entry-exit point should be placed
in a drop-down menu (see screenshot) to isolate entries from each of
these sources of data. For example, authorities might be interested
in isolating data from crime scenes only and treating the other two
information points (ammunition seized in domestic operations and at
entry-exit points) as separate units of analyses. This field will allow for
such separation.
• Type of evidence: This field should be grouped by the type of evidence
collected – that is, projectile, spent cartridge, live ammunition, or
ammunition in manufacturers’ packaging. A percentage distribution will
suffice. This field will yield the distribution of the type of ammunition-
related evidence recovered and could be informative of local dynamics
surrounding crimes committed with firearms and unauthorized
possession.
• Lot number: This field should be grouped by the different lot numbers
or batch numbers documented. Lot-numbered boxes or packaging are,
in principle, traceable and researchers should leverage the lot numbers
documented to recreate, as much as possible, the supply chain by
requesting confirmation from the relevant authorities. This field can
shed light on the legal origin, supply chain, and intended end-user of
the documented ammunition.
To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal origin and/
or intended end user, the findings from this column should be cross-
referenced to the findings from the same column in Database 2: Records.
• All headstamp alphanumerical and monogram markings: This

field will serve as the baseline of information from the headstamp
markings, which will be disaggregated in the fields that follow. In case
of uncertainty, this field will act as the reference for double-checking
correct identification of the desired fields, including manufacturer,

codes and symbols. Not all recovered evidence will have alphanumerical
or monogram markings.
• Import code: This field should be grouped by the different import
codes documented. A percentage distribution will shed light on the
origin and/or intended end user of recovered ammunition that was
legally imported into the country. Not all recovered evidence will have
an identifiable import code.
• Year of manufacture: This field should be grouped by year of

manufacture. A percentage distribution will shed light on the age of the
marked ammunition. This field will showcase the lifespan of some of
the ammunition recovered and could be useful in developing a “time
from manufacture to crime” indicator for small arms ammunition use.
Not all recovered evidence will have an identifiable year of manufacture.
In the absence of year of manufacture markings, age can be estimated
by contacting the ammunition manufacturer or by cross-referencing
batch or lot numbers (if identified) against records.
To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal origin
and/or intended end user, the findings from this column should be
cross-referenced to the findings from the same column in Database 2:
Records.
• Headstamp symbols: This field should be grouped by symbols. This field

will support identification of the legal origin and/or original intended end
user (and possibly the supply structure) of the ammunition documented.
To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal origin and/or
original intended end user, the findings from this column should be cross-

• Country of manufacture: This column should be grouped by the
different countries of manufacture documented. A percentage
distribution will shed light on the origin of the ammunition documented.
To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal
origin, the findings from this column should be cross-referenced
to the findings from the same column in Database 2: Records.
• Manufacturer: This field should be grouped by the different

manufacturers’ markings identified. On most occasions, this field
will be populated with the interpreted name of the manufacturer,
yet confirmation will require additional research, cross-referencing
and outreach to the presumed manufacturers. In some cases, these
markings can also help indicate the brand of the ammunition, which
is sometimes different for commercial purposes. A percentage
distribution will shed light on the more prevalent manufacturers (and
associated brands) of the ammunition documented.
• Factory: This column should be grouped by the different factories

documented. A percentage distribution will shed light on the origin
and/or intended end user of the ammunition documented.
• Exporter: This field should be grouped by the different exporters

documented. A percentage distribution will shed light on the origin of
the documented ammunition that was legally imported into the country.

To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the legal
origin, findings from this column should be cross-referenced
• Importer: This field should be grouped by the different importers

documented. A percentage distribution will shed light on the intended
end user of the documented ammunition that was legally imported into
the country. If the jurisdiction under observation is not a producer of
ammunition, the absence of import references or documentation could
be an indication of illicit trafficking. As such, it is important to closely
monitor the “unknowns” documented in this field and cross-reference
them with Database 2: Records.
To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the intended
end user, the findings from this column should be cross-referenced
• Calibre: This field should be grouped by the calibres documented. A

percentage distribution will shed light on the more prevalent calibres
documented in the different information points. For a more detailed
analysis, each calibre may be analysed by itself and cross-referenced
against likely manufacturers and relevant data from law enforcement
reports.
To develop a more comprehensive understanding of the
relationship between firearms-related crime and calibres, the
findings from this column should be cross-referenced to the
crime scene reports: address or coordinates, situational context,
outcome of the crime, perpetrator’s relationship to the victim,
and any available police intelligence, among other information.

NOTE
To assist in correct and consistent calibre identification, a frame of
reference can be useful, whether that is a local frame of reference or an
international one. Such a frame of reference can include the dimensions,
specificities, glossary and exact name of the calibres, detailing how to
input them into the spreadsheet. It is recommended that this field,
given its importance, is identified in coordination with a specialist in
forensic ballistics or a competent individual with specialized knowledge.
• Length of cartridge case: This field will inform the calibre determination
of a particular ammunition sample, when in doubt.
» Similarly, if the cartridge case head diameter is measured and
recorded, it would also confirm correct calibre identification.
• Markings stamped on the body or groove of the cartridge case: This
field will serve as complementary information from available markings
on the body or groove of a cartridge case. In case of uncertainty, this
field will act to provide additional information and correct identification
of the available fields, including manufacturer, codes and calibre. Not all
recovered evidence will have alphanumerical or monogram markings.
• Composition or coating of the cartridge case: This field can inform
the origin (some materials are characteristic of manufacturing regions)
and the purpose of the cartridge and/or calibre of a particular evidence
sample, when in doubt.
• Colour of primer annulus sealant: This column should be grouped by
the different colour rings identified. The colour of the primer annulus
sealant can, on certain occasions, shed light on the authorized end user
and end use of the ammunition, as some authorized end users and uses
are assigned particular colours.
• Projectile lacquer colour: This field should be grouped by the different
projectile colours documented. Projectile colours are important as
they might be an indication of the cartridge load and the organization
for which it was produced, and, potentially, shed light on the purpose of
the ammunition round.

• Projectile shape: This field should be grouped by the different projectile
shapes documented. A percentage distribution will shed light on the
more prevalent projectile shapes of the ammunition documented.
Projectile shapes are important as they might be an indication of the
cartridge type and could shed light on the purpose of the ammunition
round.
Figure 8: Examples of projectile shapes35
• Projectile type, purpose or function: This field should be grouped

by the different projectile types, purposes or functions identified. A
percentage distribution will shed light on the more prevalent projectile
types, purposes or functions from the ammunition documented.
Projectile types are important as they might be an indication of the
cartridge function, thus assisting determination of the purpose of the
ammunition round. Please note that unless the ammunition is recovered
in its packaging, it is difficult to determine projectile type (load) without
cutting it or x-raying it.
35 Graphic provided by Rodolfo Gamboa, Senior Technical Officer at UNLIREC.

• Notes on firing pin impressions: The notes of the firing pin impressions
can be used for identifying class characteristics (rectangular, circular,
etc.) on specific samples of evidence. For example, a Glock pistol may
leave rectangular firing pin impressions. After systematically recoding
notes on the firing pin impressions, specific patterns might emerge
from the qualitative observations. This observation requires training
in forensic ballistics or specialized knowledge. As such, competent
ballistics examiners should provide guidance when recording this field
and could, for example, point to cases of misfires.
• Fired by a registered firearm: This field should be grouped by “yes”
or “no” responses. This field will shed light on the licensing dynamics
of crimes committed with firearms, highlighting the proportion of
crimes committed with registered or with unregistered firearms from
the documented sample. Every jurisdiction defines “registered firearm”
differently, and when completing this field, the national definition of the
jurisdiction under observation should prevail. The term is used here as
an indication of a legally acquired and appropriately licensed firearm.
Any remarks related to this field should be included in the “additional
comments” column.
» For example, ballistics reports can, on occasion, link fired
ammunition from crime scenes to test fired cartridge cases
or bullets that are stored in national firearms registries. This is
possible in jurisdictions where every firearm that is legally imported
or acquired and licensed is test fired and imaged onto a database
that is later cross-checked against any fired casings or bullets
recovered from shooting incidents.
• Reloaded: This field should be grouped by “yes” or “no” responses. If
a large percentage of the ammunition recovered from a crime scene
suggests that the sample has been reloaded, this could be indicative
of a challenge with illicit manufacture. Notes from this field should
be systematically documented under “additional comments”. This

observation requires specific training in forensic ballistics. Some fields
to keep in mind while collecting the data or performing the analysis
could be:
» Original or new cartridge
» Sophisticated or rudimentary reloading work (e.g. made with a
press, versus basic work made with a hammer)
» Perfectly suitable (industrial-made) projectile or home-made bullet
» Any new or secondary markings on the reloaded round
• Photography digital file number: The digital file numbers of the
photos taken from the cartridges and ammunition in manufacturers’
packaging should be recorded in the database next to the information
extracted from the sample. This way, the photos will act as a record
documentation and as the main quality assurance mechanism of the
sample and will clarify any questions that might arise when cleaning
and analysing the data.
• Additional comments: The additional comments should be used
for contextual information on specific samples of evidence. Specific
noteworthy patterns might emerge from the qualitative observations.

Step 1.6.2: Analyse contextual information from the accompanying
law enforcement reports
• Date of the crime: This column should be organized in chronological

order. This column will shed light on the temporal dynamics of crimes
committed with firearms or seizures in either domestic operations or
at entry-exit points.
• Time of the crime: This column should be organized by time distribution.
This distribution will shed light on the temporal dynamics of crimes
committed with firearms or seizures in either domestic operations or
at entry-exit points.
• Geographical location of the crime: This column should be organized
by either “household” or “public” space. This will shed light on the spatial
dynamics of crimes committed with firearms and of illicit possession or
trafficking.
• Address or coordinates: This field should be geo-localized to enable
identification of spatial hotspots of crimes committed with firearms or
of illicit possession or trafficking.
• Situational context: This field should be grouped by the different
circumstances identified. This field will shed light on the environmental
and societal factors that facilitate or drive crimes committed with
firearms, as well as illicit possession and trafficking.
• Outcome of the crime: This column should be organized by the
physical harm caused to the victim. This distribution will shed light on
the more recurrent outcomes after an incident involving a firearm.
• Gender of the victim: This column should be organized by the gender
identification of the victim. This column will shed light on the gendered
dynamics behind victims of crimes committed with firearms.
• Sex of the victim: This column should be organized by the sex of the
victims. This column will shed light on the sex dynamics of victims of
crimes committed with firearms.

• Age of the victim: This column should be grouped by the age
distribution of the victim. This column will shed light on the age
distribution of victims of crimes committed with firearms.
• Gender of the perpetrator: This column should be organized by the
gender identification of the perpetrator. This column will shed light on
the gendered dynamics behind perpetrators of crimes committed with
firearms.
• Sex of the perpetrator: This column should be organized by the sex
of the perpetrator. This column will shed light on the sex dynamics of
perpetrators of crimes committed with firearms.
• Age of the perpetrator: This column should be grouped by the age
distribution of the perpetrator. This column will shed light on the age
distribution of perpetrators of crimes committed with firearms.
• Perpetrator’s relationship to the victim: The relationship of the
perpetrator to the victim should be used for contextual information.
Specific noteworthy patterns might emerge from the
qualitative observations in Databases 3: Illicit manufacture
and Databases 4: Interviews with affected communities.
• Incitement-related factors: This field should be grouped by the

different incitement-related factors identified. This field will shed light
on the environmental and societal factors that provoke, facilitate or co-
occur with crimes committed with firearms or with illicit possession or
trafficking.
• Reason for intervention or detection methods: This column should
be organized by a typology of law enforcement or border control
actions that concluded in the discovery of the crime scene or the
seizure of ammunition. This distribution will shed light on the different
dynamics behind discovering crime scenes and illicit trafficking and
behind controls at entry-exit points and other approaches that have
resulted in seizures.

• Concealment method: This column should be organized by the
different concealment methods identified. This distribution will shed
light on the dynamics and concealment modalities surrounding illicit
possession or trafficking.
• Outcome of interception: This column should be organized according
to the resulting consequences faced by the presumed unauthorized
holder or trafficker. This distribution will shed light on the more recurrent
outcomes after a seizure of ammunition in domestic operations or at
entry-exit points.
• Direction of flow (inbound/outbound): This column should be
organized by the intended flow of the seized ammunition, either
inbound (attempting to enter the country) or outbound (attempting
to leave the country). A percentage distribution will shed light on the
dynamics behind unauthorized movement of ammunition.
• Country of origin or destination: This column should be organized
by the different countries identified. For inbound flows, the country of
origin should be documented. For outbound flows, the intended country
of destination should be documented. A percentage distribution of the
countries identified will shed light on the dynamics behind unauthorized
movement of ammunition. Please note that, for inflows, this field refers
to the country of ‘immediate’ origin, not necessarily the country of
production.
• Any available police intelligence generated from the scene of the
crime: This field should be used for contextual information. Specific
noteworthy patterns might emerge from the qualitative observations.

DATABASE TWO:
RECORDS

DATABASE 2: RECORDS
Justification: Database 2: Records will generate a picture of the ammunition

legally imported, manufactured in-country and stockpiled in the country,
which will serve as a benchmark for comparison against Database 1:
Evidence, with its information regarding misuse, illicit possession and
trafficking.
Information points: This database will be built from the following

information points: (a) records of ammunition imports, (b) records of
ammunition manufactured in-country and (c) records of ammunition
stocks.36 In contexts with a documented history of diversion from
ammunition stored or earmarked for destruction, it might be important to
document those holdings in addition to the active stocks.
Where to find this information: These records might be stored by different

national agencies. For example, the records of ammunition imports might
be stored in the offices that regulate international trade of ammunition
or in the records departments of the armed forces or law enforcement
supply units. When available from the Arms Trade Treaty reports, focal
points can provide information on which entities issue national control lists,

authorize imports or keep records of ammunition imports (e.g. it could be
the ministry of interior, the ministry of defence, or the ministry of trade
or commerce). Records of ammunition manufactured in-country might
be stored by the offices that authorize domestic production, the records
department of the armed forces, or State-owned or private ammunition
manufacturers. Records of ammunition stocks might be kept by private
security companies, law enforcement, or armed forces logistical corps or
records departments; if these records are not available or are insufficiently
detailed, then the characteristics of ammunition in the authorized civilian
and nationally owned stockpiles may need to be physically documented.

SECTION A: DATA COLLECTION
To continue the process of monitoring and diagnosing small arms ammunition

diversion, trafficking and misuse,37 it is important to document the various
types of ammunition legally imported, manufactured and stockpiled in the
country. It is important to document the supply of legal ammunition since
it will provide a benchmark of information to compare against findings from
other databases. It is crucial to have this benchmark of legal ammunition
because the overwhelming majority of ammunition involved in
firearms-related incidents and of ammunition that is illegally held or
trafficked had a legal origin and was diverted to unauthorized users at
some point during its life cycle. As such, it is important to understand the
types of ammunition that are legally available in the area of interest. This
step can also be considered a systematization of information available from
the records of ammunition imports, ammunition manufactured in-country,
and existent stocks. Constructing this database relies on documenting the
different characteristics of the ammunition, the information relevant to its
approval process, and the different entities to which the ammunition was
allocated. This database will consist of a systematization of records, and
each entry will constitute a separate line in the spreadsheet, as detailed
in Step 2.1. The more disaggregated and individualized the entries, the
richer the data set.
37 Monitoring and diagnosing small arms ammunition diversion, trafficking and misuse is part
of a project undertaken by UNIDIR’s Urban Violence work stream. For more information on
the project, see: https://unidir.org/projects/urban-violence-adapting-arms-control-new-
environments-1.

Step 2.1: Build the second spreadsheet
This step is crucial as it can be considered the research design for the second
spreadsheet. It will define which characteristics will be extracted from the
records of ammunition and which ones will not. It is recommended that this
process undergoes a thorough national review process to ensure all the
desired fields are considered. This database could require three information
points: (a) records of ammunition imports, (b) records of ammunition
manufactured in-country and (c) records of ammunition stocks. However,
keep in mind that these records might not all be held by one agency and that
the records themselves might not be standardized. These compilations
of all the records, once systematized into a spreadsheet, will represent
Database 2: Records. To enable collection of the desired information, some
recommended spreadsheets fields follow:
• Unique identifying number (assigned by the users)
• Record or file number (assigned by the national authorities)38
• Number of live ammunition rounds
• Information point
» Records of ammunition imports
» Records of ammunition manufactured in-country
» Records of ammunition stocks
• Country of manufacture
• Manufacturer
• Factory
• Exporting country
• Exporter
• Transit country
• Importing country
• Importer
38 Record or file number assigned by national authorities should be documented by the users and
included in the spreadsheet for referencing and record-keeping, quality assurance, and future
verification purposes. This number identifies the record or document under examination. The
record of file number will only be used to referencing research purposes.

• Point of entry (for imports only)
• Lot number or batch number
• Calibre
• All headstamp alphanumerical and monogram markings
• Symbols
• Import code
• Year of manufacture
• Year of import
• Date of receipt
• Licensing entity
• Authorized end user
• Stockholder
• End-use additional information

Step 2.2: Document the sample of ammunition records
Example 1: Records of ammunition imports

The records of ammunition imports might have different formats but will
most likely contain most of the information suggested below. If the records
are made available, users should attempt to systematize information into a
spreadsheet. For example, consider the fictitious report below.
Ammunition import record: Fictitious Example - file AA0001

Under authority granted by Law XX, the Homeland National Office
for Trade Control, Department of Sensitive Defence Materiel,
hereby authorizes the request from the National Police, Northern
Department, to procure and import ammunition, as requested in
international tender #34-AM-2017, from the selected bidder. This
approval should be communicated to Customs Authorities at
Port Victoria for coordination of the importation of the controlled
materiel as expressed in the memorandum reference #688-2017,
with notice of transit authorization through Middleland.
International tender #34-AM-2017 was awarded to Distantland–
Central Factory through Ammo Group 6 to produce five lots of
10,000 rounds of 5.56 x 45 mm (STANAG 4172) with an action date
of 16 October 2017. The ammunition shall be marked with the year
and “PNP”.
While the extract presented above might seem vague, it presents significant
information. The information from the extract can be systematized as
suggested in Tables 15–17.

Tables 15–17: Example of data input from ammunition import records
File Number of live Information Country of Manufacturer Factory Exporting
Number ammunition rounds Point Manufacture Country
AA0001 50,000 Import Distantland N/A Central Distantland
Exporting Transit Importing Importer Point of Lot/Batch Calibre Alphanumerical Symbols

Entity Country Country Entry Number Markings
Ammo Middle- Homeland National Port Unknown 5.56 x PNP 17 N/A
Group 6 land Office for Victoria 45 mm
Trade
Import Year of Year of Date of Licensing Authorized Stockholder End-use

Code Manufacture Import Reciept Entity additional information
PNP 2017 2017 Unknown National PNP Police N/A
Office for Northern
Trade
Example 2: Records of ammunition manufactured in-country

The records of ammunition production approvals might have different
formats but will most likely contain most of the information outlined below.
If the records are made available, users should attempt to systematize
information into the spreadsheet created with the fields outlined below. For
example, consider the fictitious report below.
Records of ammunition manufactured in-country: Fictitious

Example - file AA0002
Under authority granted by Law XX, the Office of Defence Materiel
of the Armed Forces hereby extends the Military Industries
Manufacturing Plant the instruction to produce 9 x 19mm
ammunition, as outlined in strategic reference document #07-
AMB-15. This order grants authorization for the manufacturing of
12 lots of 1,000,000 rounds, with the corresponding Armed Forces
(AF) marking in the headstamp, plus the year of manufacture. This
approval should be executed immediately and delivered to the
National Strategic Stockpile as envisioned in the five-year supply
plan for calendar year 2015.

The information from the extract can be systematized as suggested
in Tables 18–20.
Tables 18–20: Example of data input from records of ammunition manufactured
in-country
File Number of live Information Country of Manufacturer Factory Exporting

Number ammunition rounds Point Manufacture Country
AA0002 12,000,000 Manufacture Domestic Military Military N/A
in country Industries Industries
Exporting Transit Importing Importer Point of Lot/Batch Calibre Alphanumerical Symbols

Entity Country Country Entry Number Markings
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Unknown 9x AF 15 N/A
19 mm
Import Year of Year of Date of Licensing Authorized Stockholder End-use

Code Manufac- Import Reciept Entity additional information
ture
N/A 2015 N/A N/A Office of Armed Armed National Strategic
Defence Forces Forces Stockpile
The information recorded paints a picture of the supply of ammunition

that has entered the country or been manufactured in-country legally. By
building this database record by record, users are building a baseline
of information (or a statistical benchmark) of what exists in the
country legally, which can be used to compare against findings from
ammunition recovered from firearms-related incidents or seizures.
The comparison between this baseline and findings from Database 1:
Evidence will shed light on the potential supply sources of ammunition
that is misused, ammunition illicitly held or trafficked, and ammunition
that has been diverted.

SECTION B: DATA ANALYSIS
Step 2.3: Analyse the data and cross-reference
After inputting primary information into the database, users should analyse
the data. The question here becomes: What should users look for? This
section is intended to act as a guide of the different analyses and summary
statistics that could be extracted from the database. The following guide
is not comprehensive, but rather illustrative of the findings that might be
possible to extract. This section also limits its scope to the more accessible
statistical methodologies using standard spreadsheet options. The
discussion explores field by field what useful information could be extracted
to build a profile of ammunition.
• Number of live ammunition rounds: At a minimum, this column
should be summed in its entirety to compute the total number of live
ammunition rounds documented with a legal origin.
• Information point: The information points should be placed in a drop-
down menu to isolate entries from each of the sources of data (records
of ammunition imports, of ammunition manufactured in-country and
of ammunition stocks). For example, authorities might be interested
in isolating data from ammunition imports and treating the other two
information points as separate units of analysis. This field will allow for
such a separation.
• Country of manufacture: This column should be grouped according
to the different countries of manufacture documented. A percentage
distribution will offer a baseline of information or a benchmark for
cross-referencing to assist in determining the origin of the ammunition
with a legal presence in the country that was documented in Database
1: Evidence.

• Manufacturer: This column should be grouped according to the
different manufacturers or manufacturers’ markings documented.
A percentage distribution will offer a baseline of information or a
benchmark for cross-refencing to assist in determining the origin of the
ammunition with a legal presence in the country that was documented
in Database 1: Evidence.
• Factory: This column should be grouped according to the different
factories documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baseline
of information or a benchmark for cross-referencing to assist in
determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presence in the
country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.
• Exporting country: This column should be grouped according to the
different exporting countries documented. A percentage distribution
will offer a baseline of information or a benchmark for cross-referencing
to assist in determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal
presence in the country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.
• Exporter: This column should be grouped according to the different
exporters documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baseline
• Transit country: This column should be grouped according to the
transit countries documented. A percentage distribution will shed
light on the life cycle of ammunition that was legally procured and
transferred. This information may be helpful to the countries through
which the ammunition transited, or their neighbouring countries,
should they desire to pursue an ammunition profiling exercise.
• Importing country: This column should be grouped according to the
different importing countries documented. A percentage distribution
will shed light on the life cycle of ammunition that was legally procured
and transferred. This information could be helpful to the countries

through which the ammunition transited, or their neighbouring
countries, should they desire to pursue an ammunition profiling
exercise.
• Importer: This column should be grouped according to the different
importers documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baseline
country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence. If the jurisdiction
under observation is not a producer of ammunition, the absence of
import references or documentation could be an indication of illicit
trafficking. As such, it is important to closely monitor the “unknowns”
documented in this field.
• Point of entry: This column should be grouped according to the
different points of entry documented. This field will be categorized
by the names of the ports, airports or land crossings documented.
Together with information on ammunition diverted, trafficked and
misused, this field could shed light on the points of entry at higher risk.
• Lot number or batch number: This column should be grouped
according to the different lot numbers or batch numbers documented.
benchmark for cross-referencing to assist in determining the likely
origin of the ammunition with a legal presence in the country that was
documented in Database 1: Evidence.
• Calibre: This column should be grouped according to the different
calibres documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baseline
country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence. It could also be
used to imply the types of small arms for which the ammunition was
intended.

• All headstamp alphanumerical and monogram markings: This field
should be grouped according to the different markings documented.
benchmark for cross-referencing to assist in determining the origin
of the ammunition with a legal presence in the country that was
documented in Database 1: Evidence.
» This field can also be indicative of time points within the
manufacturing process where key changes may have been made
to the ammunition being assembled or manufactured.
» If the jurisdiction under investigation has no requirement for end-
user or import-specific markings, then this field could overlap with
the manufacturer’s markings. Nonetheless, this parameter is still
worth exploring on its own and having as a full reference field.
• Symbols: This field should be grouped according to the different
symbols documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baseline
• Import code: This column should be grouped according to the different
import codes documented, if any. A percentage distribution will offer a
baseline of information or a benchmark for cross-referencing to assist
in determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presence in the
• Year of manufacture: This column should be grouped according to the
different years of manufacture documented. A percentage distribution
will offer a baseline of information or a benchmark for cross-referencing
to assist in determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal
presence in the country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.
• Year of import: This column should be grouped according to the
different years of import documented. A percentage distribution will
offer a baseline of information or a benchmark for cross-referencing to
assist in determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presence
in the country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence.

• Date of receipt: This column should be grouped according to the
different dates of receipt documented. A temporal distribution will
shed light on the life cycle of ammunition that was legally procured and
transferred, demarcating the responsibilities of the different parties
involved.
• Licensing entity: This column should be grouped according to
the different licensing entities, if more than one national approving
entity is documented. A percentage distribution will offer a baseline
• Authorized end user: This column should be grouped by the different
authorized end users or allocated entities documented, including
law enforcement, armed forces, private security companies, private
dealers or shops, or commercial importers or distributors. A percentage
distribution will offer a baseline of information or a benchmark for
cross-referencing to assist in determining the origin of the ammunition
with a legal presence in the country that was documented in Database
1: Evidence.
• Stockholder: This column should be grouped according to the different
“holders” of the ammunition documented, including law enforcement,
armed forces, private security companies, private dealers or shops, or
commercial importers or distributors. A percentage distribution will
offer a baseline of information or a benchmark for cross-referencing to
assist in determining the origin of the ammunition with a legal presence
in the country that was documented in Database 1: Evidence. It is
probable that the stockholder documented will be the same as the
authorized end user.
• End-use additional information: This field should be used for
contextual information on end-use justifications. Specific patterns
might emerge from the qualitative observations from end-use
information.

DATABASE THREE:
ILLICIT
MANUFACTURE

DATABASE 3: ILLICIT MANUFACTURE
Justification: Database 3: Illicit manufacture will generate a picture of the

ammunition produced illegally in the country, which is often done through
unauthorized reassembly or in cottage or artisanal industries.
Where to find this information: This information can be obtained by

conducting interviews with law enforcement and forensic ballistics
departments, legal ammunition manufacturers and sellers, community
leaders and outreach organizations, users involved in black or grey market
dynamics, shooting sports enthusiasts, and managers of shooting ranges.
In addition, users are encouraged to explore and analyse online sources
(visible and dark or deep web markets).
Flexibility: This database involves different research methods and is

the most flexible of the four as the problem of illicit manufacture varies
considerably, in both nature and impact, across different countries. Illicit
manufacture ranges from the use of simple home loading equipment
and repurposed fired cartridge cases to unauthorized factory-scale
manufacturing processes, whether as an instance of overproduction or a
completely illicit large-scale operation. At the small scale it may be a single
person with a reloading press producing 50 rounds; at the larger scale, it
may involve industrial-type processes. As such, this database will be deeply
context specific and require extensive local knowledge.
Ethics, safety and danger: Users are bound to respect ethical standards
of practice as per national directives or institutional bodies. Here, it is
important to highlight that some interviews with individuals or groups
connected to the supply, storage and use of ammunition – such as gang
members, criminals, prison populations or vulnerable individuals – should
be approved by the relevant authorities before taking place, given the
potential for danger.

Who: Each institution or organization building the ammunition profile should
consider whether they have a user trained in qualitative methods or should
consider hiring one when developing this database. This person (or team)
should have a strong research background with peer-reviewed publications
and postgraduate qualifications in a related field. Such users are often
academics from universities or professionals with significant experience
from research institutes or NGOs and can be hired as consultants, either
nationally or internationally.

Step 3.1: Define the research questions and research methods
This step is crucial as it can be considered the research design of the

spreadsheet. The lead research question and secondary research
questions, once the latter have been defined, will determine which
dynamics and conflating factors are explored. Once the research questions
have been identified and agreed on, users should find the best possible
research strategy or methodology to answer these questions.
LEAD RESEARCH QUESTION
What is the effect of illicitly produced ammunition on armed violence in

urban environments?
Qualitative approaches are interpretive, and therefore flexible, but should

maintain focus on the data sought. This is how the lead research question
shapes the overall objective.
Secondary research questions

Semi-structured interviews allow for both control and flexibility. Secondary,
more precise and detailed questions can also be numbered or coded for later
analysis (e.g. questions 1–13 below). This is particularly useful when multiple
users collect data, as coding makes the comparison of data easier. “Semi-
structured” means that a list of questions is used to direct the interviews
or focus groups without rigidly controlling them. This allows respondents
to provide insights users may not have been aware of beforehand and
provides a better flow to the interview process. This strategy functions
best using open (as opposed to closed) questions. It is also useful to ask
concluding questions such as “What have I missed?” or “What else
do you think is important that we have not yet discussed?” to capture
the maximum amount of significant data specific to each setting. These
secondary questions act as guides, and each user or team should tailor
them according to their circumstances to gain the best results possible.

For Database 3, such questions could include:
1. Do forensic ballistics laboratories or any other law enforcement
agency keep records of ammunition that seem to have been illicitly
manufactured? If so, do these samples seem to have a pattern? Can
you show us an example?
2. Where do the projectiles, cartridge cases, propellent charges or live
primers (also known as “percussion caps”) come from? Are these
components industrially manufactured?
3. Where do the raw materials come from, if not industrially manufactured?
4. What machinery or equipment is used to manufacture the ammunition,
and where is this equipment (i.e. press) coming from?
5. Are any specific types of crime being committed with illicitly
manufactured ammunition? If so, how?
6. Is the illicit manufacture or unauthorized reloading of ammunition more
or less costly than acquiring industrially produced ammunition?
7. Can you explain the relationship between illicit manufacturers of
ammunition and users of illegal ammunition? Who do these people
tend to be (without naming individuals)? Are the end users of illicitly
manufactured ammunition sports aficionados, criminals, gang
members or others?
8. In shooting ranges, what happens to the fired cartridge cases that are
left after practice shooting?
9. In training, at either armed forces or police ranges, what happens to the
fired cartridge cases that are left after practice shootings?
10. Is there a culture of sports shooting that involves the reloading of
cartridges? If so, why?
11. Is any geographical region known for the illicit production of ammunition?
If so, why?
12. Is there substantial know-how in ammunition manufacturing in a region
or area? If so, why?
13. What have we missed? What else is important to know about the illicit
production of ammunition?

The user or research team should carefully plan the qualitative methods
to be used and carefully consider the ethical considerations involved. The
methods need to be tailored to each context to produce the best results.
This section outlines some recommended methods:
• Semi-structured interviews with a range of key actors
• Focus groups with key populations or groups of key actors
• Field observation of commercial dynamics, whether grey or black
market
• Field observation of affected areas, sites and regions associated with
illicit ammunition manufacture
• Evidence from crime scenes and notes from Database 1: Evidence
The user can use some or all of these methods.39 As a minimum, interviews
with key actors should be sought to provide additional background
information or context. Field observation means that the user will visit
various sites where ammunition is presumed to be illicitly manufactured.
This will help the user better understand the specific contexts surrounding
the unauthorized manufacture of ammunition and can also help identify key
stakeholders for the interviews. Institutional managers should be aware
that any fieldwork, particularly involving criminal or potentially dangerous
subjects or vulnerable individuals, should adhere to legal ethical standards
(see the Ethics, Safety and Danger section above).
39 The method of data collection (e.g. audio recordings, summary notes, field notes) needs careful
consideration as it is important to be consistent in the approach because different data-
collection methods yield different levels of data quality, and making notes can unconsciously or
consciously incorporate observer or interviewer bias.

Step 3.2: Apply the research methods
Identifying a range of key actors and sources of information is essential to

generating valid qualitative data. This range should cover State, government
and civil society stakeholders, from national to local levels, to provide a broad
and therefore balanced range of responses to the research questions. Users
should avoid collecting data from just one sector of the State, government
or society. The methodology can be applied by structuring the qualitative
research around the following forms of research and key actors:
• Semi-structured interviews with a range of key actors
» Interviews with legal ammunition producers and legal ammunition
retailers
» Interviews with reloading sports enthusiasts or commercially
oriented reloaders
» Interviews with police, intelligence officers, crime scene
investigators and crime analysts
» Interviews with forensic ballistics specialists and firearms experts
» Interviews with managers of shooting ranges, either State-owned
or private
» If possible, interviews with end users convicted of misuse
• Focus groups with key populations or groups of key actors
» Focus groups with members of a region or community associated
with illicit ammunition manufacture
• Field observation of affected areas, sites and regions associated with
illicit ammunition manufacture
» Notes from observing the commercial dynamics of surrounding
areas, sites and regions associated with illicit ammunition
manufacture
» Notes from observing shooting ranges, either State-owned or
private

• Field observation of commercial dynamics, whether grey or black
market
• Evidence from crime scenes and notes from Database 1: Evidence
» Notes on ammunition recovered from crime scenes or seizures,
possibly held by forensic ballistics laboratories
The notes from applying the qualitative research methods will be used in
the final report to contextualize the findings from Databases 1 and 2 and as
stand-alone findings and indications for future research.

Step 3.3: Review and analyse the data
When carrying out qualitative data analysis, always bear in mind that the
overall aim is to respond to the lead research question: “What is the effect
of illicitly produced ammunition on armed violence in urban environments?”
The analysis can be done systematically by following the secondary
questions and assessing to what extent they have been answered by the
qualitative data collected. The analysis write-up can then be organized
according to which insights or main themes and tendencies emerge.
It is important to review the qualitative data set to gain an overall “feel”

for what is taking place. This is an “inductive” approach, where the users
ask themselves, “What is the data showing?” Users should be open to
counter-intuitive or unexpected patterns and activities. For example,
illicit manufacture of ammunition may have little effect on armed violence
in urban environments, or it may only lead to firearms-related accidents
and not homicides. Users should also be aware that unlike quantitative
methods, qualitative data is often contradictory and messy as it depicts
the “real world”, and they will not necessarily get clean, definitive answers
to all research questions. Users should expect unanswered questions and
unknown processes occurring (good research should actually come up
with new questions). When analysing the data, it is important to recognize
the research limitations and reflect on the aspects that need further
clarification.
With these caveats in mind, when analysing the qualitative data, users
should be looking for:
• Trends, patterns and tendencies that provide answers to the secondary
research questions.
• Who is involved, and how, why, where and when? What are the key
intersections between illicit ammunition manufacturing and violence,

if any? Are there regional dynamics? Are there cultural dynamics?
Does any group perceive an advantage in manufacturing their own
ammunition?
• How clear is the qualitative data in providing answers to the secondary
research questions? How strong are these patterns? How confident
can we be in our claims? For example, did all the interviewees agree
that stopping illicit ammunition manufacture would reduce violence? If
not, what else is going on, why, and what does this tell us?
• What can users learn by analysing the qualitative data together
with the other databases? This could provide researchers with the
opportunity to identify any differences between information provided
by communities and the documented or recovered (seizures, domestic
or criminal operations) occurrences of illicit manufacture.

DATABASE FOUR:
INTERVIEWS WITH
AFFECTED
COMMUNITIES

DATABASE 4: INTERVIEWS WITH AFFECTED
COMMUNITIES
Justification: Quantitative databases provide statistics around illicit

ammunition flows and misuse, creating key insights. Analysing these
databases may give some key insights but will tend to only provide a
partial understanding of each case study and leave remaining questions
for further research. The better the specific context and the actors
involved in trafficking and criminal misuse are understood, the better the
analysis will be. Hence, it is important to contextualize quantitative findings
with qualitative contextual information. Adding qualitative methods, by
interviewing individuals ranging from national experts to local residents, can
strengthen research by incorporating “the stories behind the statistics”.
This approach will allow users to generate context-specific analysis and
interrogate the data more effectively; tailor the design of intervention
policies to each specific context; and compare different case studies
across the globe effectively.
Where to find this information: This information can be obtained by

conducting interviews with law enforcement; forensic ballistics experts;
prosecutors; experts such as academics and researchers; policymakers
at governmental and State institutions; civil society representatives from
both national and international NGOs; multilateral, development or aid
organizations such as in-country United Nations programmes; community
leaders; and convicted felons.
Ethics, safety and danger: Users are bound to respect ethical standards
of practice as per national directives or institutional bodies. Here, it is
important to highlight that some interviews with individuals or groups
connected to the supply, storage and use of ammunition – such as gang
members, criminals, prison populations or vulnerable individuals –should

be approved by the relevant authorities before taking place, given the
potential for danger.
Who: Each institution or organization building the ammunition profile should

consider whether they have a user trained in qualitative methods or should
consider hiring one when developing this database. This person (or team)
should have a strong research background with peer-reviewed publications
and postgraduate qualifications in a related field. Such users are often
academics from universities or professionals with significant experience
from research institutes or NGOs and can be hired as consultants, either
nationally or internationally.

Step 4.1: Define the research questions and research methods
LEAD RESEARCH QUESTION
How do changing flows of ammunition impact levels of armed violence

in urban environments?
Qualitative approaches are interpretive, and therefore flexible, but should

maintain focus on the data sought. This is how the lead research question
shapes the overall objective.
Secondary research questions

• Secondary, more precise and detailed research questions should be
developed for interviews and focus groups. Semi-structured interviews
and focus groups both allow for control and flexibility when probing
key interviewees, but interviews are potentially more valuable, open
and honest than focus groups. This process is “more of an art than a
science” and depends on the skill of the individual user. It is useful to
take into account the following:
• The user should develop the secondary questions carefully (sample
questions 1–11 below) so that they provide access to the data the user
seeks.
• The questions may have to be modified or rearranged to suit different
respondents. For example, questions for a customs official may differ
slightly from those for a police officer, a community leader or a prison
inmate. The overall focus, however, should remain on answering the
lead research question.
• The user should attempt to commit secondary questions to memory
or write them down on a brief “cheat sheet”. This helps the flow of the
conversation. The better the flow, the better the insights tend to be.
• Questions may have to be asked more than once and/or reworded
at different times during the interview to gain useful responses. For

example, sensitive issues are best asked later in an interview, when
respondents are likely to be more relaxed.
• Whenever possible, the user should voice-record the interviews, after
seeking informed consent from the participant, and transcribe the
recordings afterwards. Each interview or focus group should be coded
or numbered, with real names anonymized according to required
ethical standards.
» Voice-recording allows the interviewer to concentrate on following
the conversation and asking follow-up questions. Subsequent
transcription means that no key information will be missed and the
potential for biased interpretation will be reduced.
• It is vital that users are responsive during interviews, anticipating that
there will be new and interesting insights emerging that require further
exploration. This is where the skill and experience of the interviewer is
invaluable, and why a trained user is recommended to produce the best
results.
• There is substantial literature available on interview techniques with
potentially difficult or dangerous respondents (Baird 2017; Crawford et
al. 2017; Koonings, Kruijt and Rodgers 2019).
Secondary questions (e.g. questions 1–11 below) can also be numbered

or coded for later analysis; see the Coding and Organizing the Responses
section in Step 4.2. This is particularly useful when multiple users collect
data, as coding makes the comparison of data easier. Simply agree on the
questions to be used, and then the responses to these questions can be
organized into corresponding codes for later comparative analysis. “Semi-
structured” means that a list of questions is used to direct the interviews
or focus groups without rigidly controlling them. This allows respondents
to provide insights that users may not have been aware of beforehand and
provides a better flow to the interview process. This strategy functions
best using open (as opposed to closed) questions. For example, “What is

your opinion of…?” or “What do you think about…?” It is also useful to ask
concluding questions such as “What have I missed?” or “What else
do you think is important that we have not yet discussed?” to capture
the maximum amount of significant data specific to each setting. These
secondary questions act as guides, and each user or team should tailor
them according to their circumstances to gain the best results possible.
For Database 4, here are some questions that could be asked:
1. Do you think changing flows of ammunition affect levels of armed

violence in urban environments? Why or why not?
2. Which areas of the city have the most crime scenes involving the firing
of ammunition or recovery of live ammunition? When do these crimes
tend to take place?
3. If the supply of ammunition goes up or down, does this have an impact
on gun use and, more broadly, armed violence in urban environments?
4. Where does ammunition come from? Is it bought legally, or does it
come from the black market, smuggling or some other way? Can you
explain how legal and illegal ammunition enters communities? How is it
stored, sold, distributed, etc.?
5. Can you explain the relationship between suppliers and users of
illegal ammunition? Who do these people tend to be (without naming
individuals)? Do these users tend to be criminals, gang members or
others?
6. How does the role of men and women differ in these processes (i.e.
what is the role of gender in supplying and storing ammunition)? Who
tends to hide the ammunition? Who pulls the trigger? Who tend to be
the victims? What else is going on in your view regarding gender and
ammunition that we are missing?
7. What is the role of youth in these processes; for example, are younger
people in gangs the end users, and older people suppliers, or is
something else happening?

8. Would stopping the flow of ammunition into communities cause a
significant change in violence? In your view, what is the best way
to interrupt the supply of illegal ammunition into communities and
ultimately to end users?
9. What proportion of ammunition discharge do you think is reported
to law enforcement in your country or local region, and what is your
opinion based on?
10. How well do you think illicit ammunition is intercepted in your region,
and what is your opinion based on?
11. What have we missed? What else is important for us to know about
the role of illegal ammunition in armed violence in urban environments?
The user or research team should carefully plan the qualitative methods
to be used and carefully consider the ethical considerations involved. The
methods need to be tailored to each context to produce the best results.
This section outlines some recommended methods:
• Semi-structured interviews with a range of key interviewees
• Focus groups with key populations or groups of key interviewees
• Field observation
The user can use some or all of these methods.40 As a minimum, interviews
with key interviewees (outlined below) should be sought to provide
additional background information or context. Field observation means that
the user will visit various sites where ammunition is presumed to have been
trafficked or misused, for example crime scenes. This will help the user
better understand the specific contexts surrounding the use of ammunition
and can also help identify key stakeholders for the interviews. Institutional
managers should be aware that any fieldwork, particularly involving criminal
or potentially dangerous subjects or vulnerable individuals, should adhere
to legal ethical standards (see the Ethics, Safety and Danger section above).
40 The method of data collection (e.g. audio recordings, summary notes, field notes) needs careful
consideration as it is important to be consistent in the approach because different data-
collection methods yield different levels of data quality, and making notes can unconsciously or
consciously incorporate observer or interviewer bias.

Step 4.2: Apply the research methods
Coding and organizing the responses

Agreed-on questions can be used by one or more interviewers as “codes”
to group the responses afterwards. The responses can be collated under
codes from a number of interviews or focus groups, which will create a
qualitative database that can then be analysed systematically. This data can
be compared and analysed in conjunction with the other databases. The
overall aim of this analysis is to respond to the overarching research question
that the other databases cannot answer alone: How do changing flows of
ammunition impact the levels of armed violence in urban environments?
Key interviews and focus groups

Identifying a range of key interviewees is essential to generating valid
qualitative data. This range should cover State, government and civil society
stakeholders, from local to national levels, to provide a broad and balanced
range of responses to the research questions. Users should avoid collecting
data from just one sector of State, government or society. Interviews and
focus groups could include:
• Expert interviews with individuals from:
» State and government institutions, particularly those linked to
national security
» International organizations
» Academia and research institutes
» Civil society organizations or NGOs at a national level
» Community organizations, including women’s and youth
organizations
• Focus groups with members of communities affected by gun violence
• Interviews with individuals who are involved in supply, storage and end
use of illicit ammunition:
» Local community members, via community visits accompanied by
NGOs, community organizations, or women’s or youth groups

» Smugglers, traffickers, gang members, criminals and – potentially –
imprisoned populations
» Others engaged in the use of illicit ammunition, depending on the
specific urban context (e.g. private security, mercenaries, militias,
self-defence groups)

Step 4.3: Review and analyse the data
When carrying out qualitative data analysis, always bear in mind that
the overall aim is to respond to the lead research question: “How do
changing flows of ammunition impact levels of armed violence in urban
environments?” The analysis can be done systematically by following
the secondary questions and assessing to what extent they have been
answered by the qualitative data collected. The analysis write-up can then
be organized according to which insights or main themes and tendencies
emerge.
It is important to review the qualitative data set to gain an overall “feel”

for what is taking place. This is an “inductive” approach, where the users
ask themselves, “What is the data showing?” Users should be open to
counter-intuitive or unexpected patterns and activities. For example,
reducing ammunition flows may have little effect on armed violence in
urban environments, or it may lead to increasing numbers of homicides
without firearms. Users should also be aware that unlike quantitative
methods, qualitative data is often contradictory and messy as it depicts
the “real world”, and they will not necessarily get clean, definitive answers
to all research questions. Users should expect unanswered questions and
unknown processes occurring (good research should actually come up
with new questions). When analysing the data, it is important to recognize
the research limitations and reflect on the aspects that need further
clarification.
With these caveats in mind, when analysing the qualitative data, users
should be looking for:
• Trends, patterns and tendencies that provide answers to the secondary
research questions.
• Who is involved, and how, why, where and when? Particularly, what do
the key intersections of age, gender, race and socioeconomic strata tell

us about ammunition flows and violence?
• How clear is the qualitative data in providing answers to the secondary
research questions? How strong are these patterns? How confident
can we be in our claims? For example, did all the interviewees agree
that reducing ammunition flows reduces violence? If not, what else is
going on, why, and what does this tell us?
• What can users learn by analysing the qualitative data together
with the other databases? This could provide researchers with the
opportunity to identify any differences between information provided
by communities and the information documented in law enforcement
reports.

PART THREE:
INTERPRETING
RESULTS

PART 3. INTERPRETING RESULTS
3.1 Distilling findings
3.1.1 Tools to corroborate ammunition-specific observations
In conducting ammunition profiling efforts, users will, at times, encounter

unknown headstamps or find certain characteristics of the ammunition
markings to be beyond their immediate knowledge. To corroborate
ammunition-specific observations and increase knowledge of the
documented characteristics, several tools and resources are available. The
following list is neither comprehensive nor an endorsement, but rather an
illustrative compilation of existing tools and resources that may help users
when encountering unknown ammunition. Some of these resources require
a subscription, with monetary implications. This Handbook presents the list
to provide options for users’ consideration.

Table 21: Tools to assist with ammunition identification and associated management
Name Category Description Website

Association of Organization AFTE is an international professional orga- Accessible
Firearm and Tool nization for practitioners of firearms and Here
Mark Examiners toolmark identification. Among the useful
(AFTE) resources of the AFTE are an ammunition
headstamp guide, glossaries, training sem-
inars and the AFTE Journal.
CartWinPro Global CartWinPro is commercial software used Accessible

database to identify ammunition. With over 26,800 Here
headstamps recorded, it features calibre
measurements, colour code references,
cartridge records, manufacturer infor-
mation and specimen photos of various
projectiles. It is currently available in seven
languages.
Cranfield Univer- Library Cranfield University compiles an authorita- Accessible

sity Ammunition tive list of academic resources for Ammu- Here
Library nition Technical Officers.
International Informal The IAA is an informal association primarily Accessible

Ammunition association organized for cartridge collectors and has Here
Association (IAA) an active forum community that holds
dynamic discussions on a diverse set of
headstamps. The IAA also hosts its own
bimonthly magazine, the International
Ammunition Journal.
Electronic North Database The eNADB is a web-based ammunition Accessible

Atlantic Treaty database with over 435,000 items held in Here
Organization NATO inventories, as well as information
(NATO) on NATO and non-NATO nations. Subscrip-
tions are offered on a yearly basis.
Ammunition Data
Base (eNADB)
Firearms Guide Database Now in its 11th edition, the Firearms Accessible
Guide allows the user to filter ammunition Here
through a web-based database, featuring
producers, ballistic specifications and
pictures. Subscriptions run yearly.

Name Category Description Website
Small Arms Handbook This guide explains the process by which Accessible
Survey, An Intro- weapons and ammunition are identified and Here
ductory Guide to arms flows are tracked, giving the reader “a
the Identification basic understanding of how to identify and
of Small Arms, analyse small arms and light weapons, and to
Light Weapons, track their proliferation”.
and Associated
Ammunition
International Technical The IATGs form a frame of reference to Accessible

Ammunition guidelines achieve and demonstrate effective levels of Here
Technical Guide- safety and security of ammunition stockpiles.
lines (IATGs) by
the UN Office for
Disarmament
Affairs
iTrace by Conflict Global The iTrace project is a global data set that Accessible
Armament Re- database presents verified information required to Here
search understand weapons transfers. The project
combines an extensive programme of in-con-
flict field investigations with the world’s most
powerful public access weapon tracking
database.
INTERPOL Ballistics While not necessarily a resource to identify Accessible

Ballistics network ammunition, the IBIN has an important role to Here
Information play in ammunition-related efforts. Member
Network (IBIN) States using the IBIN can share ballistics
data (extracted from ammunition recovered
as evidence) from crime scenes and link
gun-related incidents using the same firearm,
regardless of physical distance, providing
valuable investigative leads.
Individual Experts Ballistics experts are a vital resource when

ballistics experts confirming ammunition-specific observa-
tions, especially local experts. Local ballistics
experts are generally well acquainted with the
specifics of ammunition reaching unautho-
rized users or involved in unauthorized use.
On most occasions, these experts will work
in forensic laboratories (or universities) and
have years of experience documenting and
analysing ammunition used in crime scenes
and testifying in court. It is recommended
that ammunition profiling efforts are revised
by ballistics experts and the evidence collec-
tion effort is done in close consultation with
local experts.
3.1.2 Cases of uncertainty
Some headstamps will be of uncertain origin or present unclear markings;

thus, making a determination will require expertise and a baseline of
information for guidance. While the uncertain cases will likely be a minority
in the documented sample, categorizing these exhibits is specialized
work that should be done by technical experts. When uncertainty
arises, it is important to look for indicators that could point towards a
previously documented case or lead to a probable identification. From
past ammunition profiling efforts, in one continent, the following roughly
estimated distribution of uncertain cases has been gathered:41
• Absence of markings (~3%)

• Incomplete or partially effaced markings (~1%)
• Fake markings (>1%)
The cases of uncertainty will require expertise and knowledge-sharing

within the community of practice. This situation highlights, once again, the
utmost importance of good photographic documentation. Photos will be
essential for later verification and for cross-checks from other recoveries.
In addition, a clear electronic photo can be enlarged on a computer to
enable particularities such as alphanumerical character spacing, curving or
effaced markings to be identified.
As deciphering the meaning of markings can lead to mistakes, building

baseline documentation will be a key component for correct identification.
For example, after an initial documentation of ammunition cartridges, the
user may consider establishing a baseline document or “drive storage”
with all the photographic documentation (noting the correct identification
of country of manufacture, producer and year of manufacture) to help
41 Estimates based on interviews conducted by the authors with Nils Holger Anders, a leading expert
and practitioner in the field of ammunition profiling and tracing.

others in the system with the data entry or for cross-comparisons when
uncertainty arises. For example, baseline documentation could include
a legend noting what specific codes represent, such as “10 = producer
code for Arsenal, Bulgaria”. Not only would baseline documentation reduce
uncertainty, it would expedite decision-making processes. In addition,
baseline documentation will assist in identifying cartridge samples that were
not previously documented or were otherwise unseen in that jurisdiction,
thus serving as an early warning system to flag newly introduced inflows of
ammunition.

3.2 A word of caution
3.2.1 Data limitations
This Handbook offers a road map for ammunition profiling, which is

different from ammunition tracing. The key difference is that tracing efforts
generally intend to determine the exact origin and recreate the supply
chain of documented ammunition, when packaging or markings permit and
confirmation is received from the relevant entities, whereas ammunition
profiling is better understood as a data generation tool to gain a baseline of
information regarding volumes and origins, variations (trends and patterns),
and dates of production. Ammunition profiling generates baseline data
for subsequent efforts to build on. As such, ammunition profiling
contributes to understanding of the problems of diversion, trafficking
and misuse but, in isolation, will not present definitive answers. That
is, ammunition profiling needs to be complemented with additional
layers of data and followed by the analysis of context-specific policies
and their implementation.
This methodology aims to contextualize ammunition profiling in a way

that provides insight into incidents of armed violence. Nonetheless, the
Handbook promotes caution when interpreting conclusions, as these would
be based on a sample of the universe of ammunition recovered as evidence,
and anecdotal evidence suggests that only a fraction of ammunition
discharges are reported to or detected by authorities. As such, the universe
of ammunition discharges documented is likely an underestimate of the
“true” or “full” universe of ammunition discharges.
Analysing reports from crime scenes or from seizures in domestic

operations or at entry-exit points will require judgement calls and a degree
of subjectivity. To reduce subjective interpretations, it is important to define

beforehand the possible categories that will be documented in fields such
as, for example, situational context, incitement-related factor, outcome of
the crime, outcome of the intervention, in line with domestic regulations.
In addition, having clear definitions will discipline the research effort into
analysable categories. In practice, this means that the information extracted
from the reports should be used to contextualize findings and provide a
degree of situational awareness to the ammunition recovered. It should not
be understood, however, as sufficient to solve particular cases or serve, in
isolation, as leverage to make overarching claims about the public security
of the jurisdiction under consideration.
A baseline ammunition data set provides valuable, but limited,

analytical utility. When drawing conclusions, users ought to be extremely
cautious, especially when it comes to drawing conclusions about the supply
chain. For example, ammunition might be produced in a particular year and
marked with that year, but the transfer might not happen until two years
later, or a particular lot of ammunition might have been retransferred but
left with import markings from the original intended end user. Additionally,
manufacturers might produce different brands, or the packaging might
not correspond to the ammunition inside the box. Also, the assembling
processes vary, affecting how the casings are being produced. Therefore, it
is not advisable to make claims about the supply chain unless all States and
entities involved in a particular transfer have been consulted and presented
with the data and, consequently, that information has been duly confirmed
and verified by the appropriate national authorities and entities. It is thus
recommended to argue on the basis of “known” or “interpreted/inferred”
information for fields such as ammunition manufacturer, where “known”
would imply obtained confirmation and validation from all involved parties
and “interpreted/inferred” would imply that headstamp or packaging
markings were visible but no confirmation was requested or received.

3.2.2 Vocabulary: Degrees of likelihood
In profiling efforts, claiming certainty and making assurances about,

for example, country of origin, manufacturer, manufacturing facility, or
other fields of data extracted from the recovered ammunition sample
is often beyond the scope of the research effort. As such, ammunition
profiling operates in degrees of likelihood. In practice, this means that it
is often not possible to “assure”, but it may be possible to argue on the
basis of “ammunition with characteristics similar to manufacture in X”
or “ammunition with characteristics similar to a production in Y”. Some
other language options include “possibly”, “likely” or “very likely” in order
to operate in degrees of uncertainty and unverified data by the relevant
national authorities.
To claim complete certainty and make assurances, the information

regarding the supply chain should be verified and confirmed by all States
involved in the suspected transfer. As such, it is recommended that users
of this Handbook leverage findings from the research effort to improve
human security, while respecting the uncertainty of operating in a greyscale
of likelihood.

3.3 Transforming findings into actionable information: A pipeline to
transform knowledge into action
The main objective of this Handbook is to offer users a guide to create a

profile of small arms ammunition diverted, trafficked or misused in a specific
environment. The profile created will provide actionable information about
the ammunition in circulation and its misuse. This information could be
used to develop targeted policies and strategies to reduce armed violence
and curb illicit trafficking. As such, it is an action-oriented Handbook, with
the final goal of linking findings to actionable prescriptions. To reach this
goal, this section suggests a series of steps.

First step: Understand what the data says and ask the right questions
It is crucial to understand what the data says and the limitations of what it
does not say. That is, the data collected should be analysed in its context,
with attention given to the time period under scrutiny and policy changes
that could have led to variations. The analysis sections provide a road map
of what to look for with each database. To understand what the data is
trying to say, it is crucial to draw the suggested cross-references and seek
to shed light on complex dynamics regarding possible origins, lethality
rates and conflating factors enabling armed violence. It is also important
to look for big picture trends and understand the databases not as isolated
silos, but as pieces of a larger puzzle. In practice, this means that many
findings will require follow-up research to unveil a more disaggregated
picture. As such, understanding what the data says can also be considered
as finding the right questions to ask.
Second step: Use the data to define actions
Once it is clear what trends emerge from the data and what questions remain
unanswered, it is important to define a road map of actions. While some
findings might be mature enough to be turned into policy prescriptions,
others might be indications that further disaggregated research is
needed. As such, this Handbook recommends a vigorous discussion on
the implications of each finding, with a view to defining the right ensuing
actions. In practice, this means that if the first step identified the right
questions to ask, this second step identifies the right actions to take.
Third step: Monitor the data, seeking patterns
Some of the defined actions will involve policy suggestions; others will
be more research oriented. In either case, it is crucial to remain vigilant

in monitoring the data and continue building the evidence base. An ever-
expanding evidence base will facilitate the observation of clearer patterns
and time series analysis.42 The basic premise of this step is that the more
comprehensive the data, the better. To achieve such comprehensive
data, it is important to consider this Handbook as a living guide for
ongoing research. In practice, this means that, as much as possible,
ammunition profiling data-collection efforts should be integrated into
national practices. The better the planning of the data collection from the
database generation point, the more complete the data set will be. That
is, a version of this methodology, or parts of it, should be integrated into,
for example, SOPs and other data recording and collection methods used
by the different entities involved. Integrating data collection into SOPs will
yield an ever-expanding evidence base that will facilitate clearer monitoring
efforts to observe variations in trends across time and across different
policy interventions.
Fourth step: Channel prescriptions both downstream and upstream
An evidence base will help bring policy prescriptions into light. For example,
if over a five-year period, half of the ammunition recovered from crime
scenes had the same import code, while that code only represented 10% of
total imports, then officials should recreate the distribution pattern of that
imported lot of ammunition. Officials should recreate the life cycle of that
ammunition, as much as possible, to evaluate why that import code was
recovered from crime scenes at a disproportionate rate compared to its
market share. If applicable, and once provided with appropriate evidence,
policymakers should tighten the controls that were found ill-suited in
keeping legally imported ammunition from unauthorized use.
42 It is worth cross-referencing peaks and dips with other associated factors or even crimes. For
example, when fired ammunition figures are decreasing, is knife crime rising?

It is important to act on the policy suggestions aimed at reducing armed
violence at the local level. It is equally important to elevate lessons learned
from the local level to multilateral efforts. While solutions to firearms-related
violence might be local, the approach to finding these solutions might be
globally applicable. In practice, this means channelling prescriptions
downstream to the local level of government office in charge of
public security and then sharing the results and methods upstream
to institutions engaged in multilateral efforts. For those working on
multilateral negotiations, it means actively listening to the local level, and
for those working at the local level, it means documenting and sharing the
lessons learned.43
43 Changes in policy or legislation may also cause divergence within regions, so the potential risk
and impact for any change needs to be well explored and considered prior to its implementation.
Sometimes, local laws do reduce violence in their immediate jurisdiction but then create demand,
diversion or effects that increase violence in neighbouring areas as an unintended consequence.
Hence, a collaborative and holistic input is required to minimize unintended consequences.

3.4 Leveraging knowledge to reduce violence
This Handbook recognizes that analysing data, asking the right questions,
acting on the findings, monitoring patterns and channelling lessons learned
are easier to do conceptually than operationally. As such, this Handbook
provides an example of how the knowledge generated through the pipeline
of analysis can lead to reductions in armed violence.
Illustrative case
FINDING
Data shows that 25% of ammunition recovered from
crime scenes in the current year are marked with
manufacturer markings consistent with those from an
importation that took place the previous calendar year.
First step: Asking the right questions

At least two follow-up questions seem appropriate. First, it is
important to determine the intended end user of the legally imported
ammunition, as well as the end uses for which it was authorized.
This will begin to shed light on the supply chain and identify the
last documented users. Second, it is important to determine the
comparative size of that importation against the overall inflow of
ammunition. This is important because the importation in question
might have accounted for 25% of all ammunition imported in the
last year or it may have only accounted for a miniscule proportion of
the overall inflow of ammunition. The latter would indicate that the
distribution patterns of that importation are causing that particular
ammunition to end up in crime scenes at a disproportionate rate
compared with its relative market size.

Second step: Defining the right actions
For example, if the last documented user is identified as a private
security company (first question) and the imported lot turns out to
be minimal in comparison with the total yearly inflow of ammunition
(second question), then the most appropriate actions would be to
recreate and investigate the distribution patterns and uses of that
particular private security company.
Third step: Monitoring the data and conducting time series

analysis
The current finding highlights what happened in crime scenes in
the current year, but it would also be important to look back at
all the ammunition distributed to that private security company
and maintain the monitoring effort, at a minimum, throughout the
rest of the year. These efforts will determine if the current finding
is an abnormality or if it is part of a pattern of behaviour within a
distribution network that appears to be negatively affecting public
security.
Fourth step: Channelling prescriptions downstream and

upstream
Should it be determined that the distribution pattern of private
security company X is affecting public security, then the data,
analysis and implications must be shared with all governmental
offices in charge of regulating trade in ammunition and overseeing
armed private security and home affairs, for example. This could
result in tighter acquisition regulations and oversight, enhanced
stockpiling and reporting controls, requirements for secondary
markings, removal of licensing privileges, or other policies that
the State could choose to pursue. At the same time, the course of
action and results should be shared regionally and internationally,

since neighbours and other interested States could be suffering
from similar challenges to their public security and could benefit
from the strategy taken.
This is just an example of how following-up from a finding can lead

to changes in policy for the benefit of public security. Nonetheless,
the potential scope of action based on the findings is both
widespread and context specific.

3.5 Recommendations
From previous studies of ammunition control practices and profiling

efforts, some recommendations have been repeatedly highlighted. This
Handbook presents them for national authorities to consider as options
when interpreting findings and considering follow-up actions.
• Establish an inter-agency governmental task force to facilitate
information exchanges and address armed violence. Governmental
institutional design is often dispersed and lacks fluid exchange of
information. To reduce armed violence and the threat of armed
violence, public responses must be agile. Therefore, building bridges
across agencies could be a sound structural response, should a
determination be made that policy and implementation lag owing to
siloed agency action. One option to enhance inter-agency collaboration
would be to establish a Firearms Focal Point or a gun crime intelligence
centre. These entities can streamline information flows, generate data
on ammunition, and produce actionable intelligence to reduce armed
violence.
• Standardize national reporting templates for documentation and
record-keeping of ammunition recovered from crime scenes, seized in
domestic operations, and confiscated at border controls. If adopted,
this recommendation will streamline domestic processes and facilitate
data gathering.
• Establish a national ballistics database of registered firearms, with test
fires of ammunition of different materials. This will provide a benchmark
of information than can be used to compare the ballistics data from
ammunition recovered from crime scenes against the repository of
legally acquired and licensed firearms. This will aid criminal investigations
and inform national policies regarding the firearms involved in shooting
incidents.

» For example, if all firearms in country X were test fired and
registered in a national database, should these firearms be used
in a shooting incident, the fired evidence from that scene can be
forensically linked to the test fires in the registration database.
Such documentation when analysing the data could shed light on
the frequency with which crimes may be occurring with the same
firearm or different firearms within the country. If forensic ballistics
experts can draw correlations between the individualized markings
from ammunition recovered as evidence and ammunition registered
in the national database, and thus identify the responsible firearm,
then the exercise of studying ammunition can be elevated to linking
the movement of firearms involved in different shooting incidents.
• Request that all ammunition, imported or produced domestically, be
marked, per lot, at the point of production with a unique alphanumerical
code in either the headstamp or the groove of the ammunition cartridge.
This demand-side request will enable tracing of small arms ammunition
and facilitate accountability in cases of diversion.
• Establish monitoring mechanisms to observe trends and patterns in
ammunition flows. Should an ammunition profiling methodology be
imbedded in national SOPs, time series data can be generated with
minimal additional work for national authorities.
» To facilitate monitoring mechanisms and safeguard the
sustainability of the efforts, seek to create or establish baseline
documentation for guidance and cross-referencing. In addition,
seek to create or establish a text-based standardized coding list to
support consistent reporting of alphanumerical characteristics and
symbols in future ammunition profiling efforts, such as the different
markings of particular factories, manufacturers or symbols (dot,
five-point star, triangle, NATO, company logo, etc.).
• Share findings from an ammunition profiling effort with regional partners
and organizations. It is important to pursue a regionally collaborative

strategy, since local or national efforts alone will be unable to shed light
on regional or global patterns of trafficking or diversion.
• Share ballistics information with neighbouring countries and/or the
subregion. This will enable authorities to connect crimes committed
with the same firearm by linking the ballistics fingerprint to the
responsible firearm; they can use the evidence to inform strategies to
disrupt regional armed violence and illicit trafficking networks.
» Share ballistics information in bulk, and for every recovery
possible, to correlate ballistics data as frequently as possible
and not only compare ballistics data in a case-by-case manner
at the international level. To facilitate sharing in bulk, if possible
and equipped with the Integrated Ballistics Identification System,
explore becoming a member of the INTERPOL Ballistic Information
Network.
» Explore and encourage, where possible, methods for information-
sharing of ballistics data across different manufacturing
companies of ballistics information systems, as propriety data
formats represent a current barrier. For example, for countries
using different Automatic Ballistics Identification Systems, explore
alternative options for sharing information, such as double-casting
or working through existent networks such as CARICOM, Europol
or INTERPOL.
• Consider regulating the number of ammunition rounds that can be
legally purchased in the private market, particularly in places affected by
high levels of armed violence and with diversion (leakages) from private
actors identified as a main source feeding the unauthorized supply. This
policy could reduce the overall pool of available ammunition, thereby
reducing a source of diversion to unauthorized users.
• Consider restrictions on identified conflating dynamics, such as the
simultaneous presence of firearms, alcohol, drugs, young men and late-
night hours.

• Consider adopting technology that detects and notifies authorities of
all ammunition discharges in urban environments. This could take the
form of gunshot detection technology, such as ShotSpotter. Adding
this technological advance to the toolbox available to law enforcement
would provide two crucial advantages: first, immediate notification of
a shooting event, and second, a full understanding of the number of
ammunition discharges that occur in an urban environment. The former
advantage facilitates immediate emergency responses to shooting
events; the latter advancement would provide a more accurate estimate
of the universe of ammunition discharged in an urban environment. For
ammunition profiling efforts, the latter area of improvement would
provide a more comprehensive understanding of the full extent of
shooting incidents and thus a better grasp of the sample observed.
• Consider creating and contributing to a freely available depository of
ammunition with headstamp pictures and information from recovered
samples. The shared depository can help future efforts to learn, verify,
build on and test the feasibility of technological advances in ammunition
monitoring.

3.6 Moving forward
This Handbook is a proposal to facilitate efforts to profile small arms

ammunition in settings affected by armed violence. This Handbook also
encourages users to use the guidelines as a starting point to think differently
about ammunition and to continue building on this approach to find what
works best at the local level. As such, this Handbook should be understood
as a living document, open to any and all editions and additions as the field
of small arms ammunition research advances and different case studies
build a comparable and systematic evidence base. While this Handbook
carries no reporting requirements, UNIDIR encourages users to share their
experience and results. Feedback on the Handbook itself will allow UNIDIR
to update the product and results from the case studies, and this will
inform the Institute’s work on armed violence and in advising multilateral
processes moving forward.
This Handbook also presents an opportunity to take a step back and rethink
armed violence and reconsider the role of ammunition – a role that is central
to lethal outcomes in incidents of armed violence and often understudied.
It is the final message of this Handbook that to move forward, on some
occasions, it is crucial to take a step back to analyse the full picture. And
since the challenge of armed violence in is urgent, this analytical step back
ought to be taken without delay. The right solutions to armed violence
are within reach, but to find the right solutions, it is crucial to ask the
right questions. The ultimate purpose of this Handbook is to lead users to
the right questions.
The Conventional Arms Programme of UNIDIR stands ready to support

users of this Handbook in developing an ammunition profile and exploring
ways to prevent armed violence.

PART FOUR:
ANNEXES

GLOSSARY
Calibre: Generally, but not always, the nominal projectile
diameter, typically based on the bore of a weapon, as
measured across the features of the weapon’s rifling.
(Definition per Small Arms Survey.)
Cartridge: A cased quantity of explosives (excluding rocket

motors) complete with its own means of ignition.
(Definition per International Ammunition Technical Guidelines [IATG].)
Diversion: Movement – either physical, administrative or

otherwise – of ammunition from the legal to the illicit
realm, in defiance of national and/or international law,
to an unauthorized end user or for unlawful end use.
Diversion could entail appropriation and/or physical
rerouting leading to a potential change in the effective
control or ownership of ammunition to actors, groups
or entities that have not been authorized by competent
national authorities. Diversion could occur at any of the
stages of the ammunition life cycle.
• Diverting ammunition to an “unauthorized end
user” could refer to a sale, gift, lease, loan or barter
exchange of ammunition throughout any of the stages
of the life cycle to the armed forces, law enforcement
agencies or other security forces of a particular
State that has not been specifically authorized by
a competent national authority of an exporting and
importing State, through licensing arrangements and
end-use undertakings. It could also refer to a natural or
legal person (an individual, group or corporate entity)
not authorized by such an authority.
• Diverting ammunition for an “unlawful end use”
could imply that the end-use assurances will not be
observed. (Definition per GGE/PACAS/2020/3.)
End user: The individual or organization that will operate the

equipment or facility.
(Definition per IATG.)

Headstamp: Alphanumeric characters and/or symbols applied to the
base of cartridge cases.
(Definition per Small Arms Survey.)
Live ammunition: Ammunition that has not been fired or rendered

unserviceable.
Lot: Predetermined quantity of ammunition or components

that is as homogeneous as possible and, under
similar conditions, may be expected to give uniform
performance. (Definition per IATG.)
Marking: The application of marks – including colours, descriptive

text and symbols – to munitions, parts and components
thereof, and associated packaging, for the purposes of
identifying, among other things, their role, operational
features, and age, and the potential hazards posed by
those munitions.
Import marking: The application of markings, at the request of the

importer, to identify country of import, authorized end
user, importer, lot, year of manufacture, among other
characteristics of the importation.
Tracing: The systematic tracking of illicit ammunition from the

point of its manufacture or import, through the lines of
supply, to the point at which it became illicit.
Transit: Movement of goods across the territory of a State

as part of a transfer between two other States,
including the transloading of the goods at the
points of entry into and exit from the transit State.
(Definition per Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium.)

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———. 2014b. Warsaw Pact-Calibre Ammunition Box Marking. www.conflictarm.
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airdropped-to-spla-io-forces-in-south-sudan/
———. 2016. Investigating Cross-Border Weapon Transfers in The Sahel. www.

conflictarm.com/reports/investigating-cross-border-weapon-transfers-in-the-
sahel.
———. 2017a. Sudanese Stockpiles and Regional Weapon Diversion. www.

conflictarm.com/reports/sudanese-stockpiles-and-regional-weapon-diversion.
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Dispatch no. 2. www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/R-SANA/SANA-
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of Crime for Statistical Purposes (ICCS), Version 1.0. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/
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HANDBOOK
PROFILING
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION
IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS

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HANDBOOK

Alfredo Malaret Baldo

NOTE ABOUT UNIDIR

ii UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................... 1

PART 2. METHODOLOGICAL GUIDELINES...................................... 23

DATABASE 3: ILLICIT MANUFACTURE..................................... 85

DATABASE 4: INTERVIEWS WITH AFFECTED COMMUNITIES.. 95

PART 3. INTERPRETING RESULTS................................................ 107

PART 4. ANNEXES........................................................................ 129

iv UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

Manuel Martinez Miralles is a Researcher with UNIDIR’s

ABOUT THE RESEARCH TEAM

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS v

It is our position that aggregated data on ammunition can contribute to the

We can do this. We must do this.

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS vii

Worldwide, more than half a million people die

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS 1

This Handbook is structured in three broad sections: Part 1 provides a brief

The databases that ought to be constructed for a comprehensive profile of

2 UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS 3

4 UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

1.1 Why small arms ammunition?

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS 5

Table 1: Reported value of ammunition imports & exports, 2015–2018,

6 UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS 7

Nonetheless, gaps in understanding remain, particularly regarding how

There are several potential advantages to focusing on ammunition

Although this Handbook is intended to serve as a how-to guide for

8 UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

“Armed violence aggravates poverty, inhibits access to social services

It is clear that progress on virtually all security and development goals

Although the undercurrents of armed violence might be local, and

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS 9

• The United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 72/55 and

10 UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

This Handbook acknowledges that the criminal use of ammunition in some

Finally, while some practices described in this Handbook may already

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS 11

This Handbook offers a road map for ammunition profiling, which is

In the case of this Handbook, ammunition profiling is intended to shed

12 UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

• The objective of this Handbook is to contribute to the generation

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS 13

This Handbook is written with multiple readers in mind:

14 UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

The methodology presented in this Handbook has been designed with

1. Piloting and iteration learning: The methodology outlined in this

2. National ownership: The methodology seeks to be sustainable,

3. Readiness: The methodology is also designed to be adopted and

HANDBOOK | PROFILING SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION IN ARMED VIOLENCE SETTINGS 15

4. Affordability: The methodology is also designed with simplicity

5. Informativeness: The methodology is designed to produce an

6. Impact: The methodology aims to produce actionable information that

16 UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

For the purposes of this Handbook, small arms ammunition will be

Small-calibre ammunition, as referred to in the Handbook, mostly services