Electromagnetic Mitigation

Transtector | PolyPhaser
Electromagnetic Effects (E3)
1. EMC Analysis
2. Electromagnetic Compatibility
(EMC)
3. Electromagnetic Interference
(EMI)
4. Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
5. Electromagnetic Vulnerability
(EMV)
6. Lightning
7. Radiation Hazards (RADHAZ)
8. P-static
9. Electrostatic Discharge (ESD)
10. Radio Frequency Identification
(RFID)
11. Ultra-Wideband (UWB)
Filtering and Suppression

Surge Protection – Surge, Lightning & Transients

EMI Filters – Radiated or conducted Electromagnetic Interference or Noise

EMP Filters – Electromagnetic Pulse from nuclear detonation ground or

atmosphere, Man-made weapons, or Solar Flares.
Surges
Lightning – Mother nature is about 8% of all transients. Transients can reach up to 100kA in
energy, but most common is under 30kA.

Surges –Man-made events from switching equipment, motors or utility are some examples of
equipment that generate surges. Switching equipment located on the load side like motors,
AC units, generators, switch mode power supplies and almost anything that turns on or off
generates a transient. These events account for the remaining 92% of transients with 12%
generated by the utilities and the remaining 80% take place internal on load side equipment.
Transient Occurrence Rate

Transients
Undervoltages, Harmonics, & Overvoltages
Voltage Outages

80%
19.5%

0.5%
What is a Transient?
 High frequency events that range from 5 kHz to 100
kHz, can reach the GHz level.
 Short duration in microsecond (Fast rise time)
 Most common transients are under 30kA and can
exceed over 100kA.
Surge waveforms 8x20 and 10x1000
Transient Damaged
EMI
 EMI sometimes seems to be the general catch-all term. In fact, it is a generic term for unwanted
interference energies conducted as currents or radiated as electromagnetic fields. An EMI source can be
any device that transmits, distributes, processes, or utilizes any form of electrical energy where some
aspect of its operation generates conducted or radiated signals that can cause equipment performance
degradation or failure.

 Every tool or instrument that uses electricity generates associated electromagnetic fields. Voltage causes
electric fields and currents cause magnetic fields. It is normal to expect presence of electromagnetic fields
in any environment. Not all electromagnetic fields are a problem. Wireless communication is possible solely
due to electromagnetic fields, for instance. Electromagnetic fields generate voltages and currents in any
conductive object just like they do in mobile phone, radio, or TV antennas. Similarly, electromagnetic fields
generate voltages and currents in electric circuits of process equipment, which act just like an antenna.

 When these induced voltages and currents reach the level that can cause undesirable operation of
equipment, it is called EMI, or electromagnetic interference. EMI can manifest itself in the following forms:
 Outright equipment lock-up
 Tools do things they weren’t supposed to do
 Software errors
 Erratic response
 Parametric errors
 Sensor misreading
 Component damage
 Test Equipment having to be recalculated
 All of that causes equipment downtime, loss of productivity and product defects.
EMP Source
EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse)
 EMP from a nuclear explosion high above the atmosphere.
 HEMP / NEMP (High Altitude EMP) -A nuclear bomb detonated hundreds of kilometers above the
Earth's surface is known as a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) device.
 Operation Starfish Prime (1962) Johnston Islands in the Pacific

 EMP from a nuclear explosion on the ground

 Surface Region EMP (SREMP)

 EMP generated by man-made weapons

 Briefcase Bomb
 Flux Compression Bomb
 High Power Microwave (HPM)
 Directed Energy Weapons (DEW)

 EMP from a solar storm

 A solar storm that produces an E3 pulse could be even more dangerous to the power grid than a
nuclear EMP due to the longer duration of the event that would give transformers more time to overheat
to destruction. The risk of large scale failure due to solar storms is especially great in the northern
United States and Canada.
 March 1989 (Quebec) – Solar flare takes down Quebec utility.

 EMP for Outer Space

 System Generated EMP (SGEMP)
- Applies to Satellites (X-Ray)
Operation Starfish Prime - EMP

On July 9, 1962, a high-altitude nuclear test named Starfish Prime was conducted by the United States military above Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean. Its
unexpected electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects caused disruptions in electrical systems and equipment in Honolulu 700 miles away. The EMP shut down long-
distance telephone calls and disabled three satellites in low earth orbit. It was later learned a total of seven satellites were damaged by knocking out their solar arrays or
electronics.
Operation Starfish - EMP
EMP - Pulse and wave shape
• E1 (20/550ns, 300kV, 5kA) fast pulse that must be attenuated down to allow only 10A past the
filter into a 10ohm load.

• E2 (1.5us / 3000us, 2500V, 250A) pulses which are much like the IEEE C62.45 8/20us and
10/1000us surge pulses.

• E3 pulse is defined more like a continuous overvoltage condition like the UL1449 Overvoltage
Fault Tests and is a much longer pulse. The .2 second rise by 20 second duration E3 pulse is
only applicable to exposed connections from long power line and telephone wire lines.
HEMP - Detonated over the US
SREMP

Air Return Compton

Current Current

Fireball

Ground Return Current

Lightning Arrestor
Grounds

LF Ground Current

Unclassified
Solar Flares
 According to a report of the National Academy of Sciences, a severe geomagnetic storm could cause
economic damage of $1 to $2 trillion (10 to 20 times that of Hurricane Katrina) in the first year, with 4 to
10 years until full recovery.

 One hundred fifty years ago the world’s only electrical system – the telegraph network – was destroyed,
after British astronomer Richard Carrington observed an unusually severe solar flare.

 In a recently published NASA study on severe space weather, scientists concluded that such
Carrington-class solar flares occur about once per century. The report warns that a severe flare could
occur any time, causing long duration, catastrophic failure of our vital electric infrastructures.

 March 1989 (Quebec) – Solar flare takes down Quebec utility.

 Knocked out power to 6 million people in 92 seconds.
EMP
“EMP Effects the utility grids, anything that use power, cars, banking
industry and any microprocessor based equipment. This would be a
complete shut down of our infrastructure.”

“Should the electrical power system be lost for any substantial period of time
… the consequences are likely to be catastrophic … machines will stop;
transportation and communication will be severely restricted; heating,
cooling and lighting will cease; food and water supplies will be interrupted;
and many people may die”
2008 EMP Commission
Hardening Guidelines & Design Considerations
 Threat Environment
 Applicable Requirements/Flow downs
 Threat/Coupling Analysis
 Equipment Immunity Characteristics

 Hardening Measures
 Grounding
 Shielding
 Filtering
 Transient Suppression
EMP filtering goal

HEMP Transient
Signal

• Grounding – TPM Mounted Directly to Faraday Cage Ground Structure

• Shielding – Mounting Method Maintains Integrity of Faraday Cage
• Filtering – Designed to Minimize Impact on Differential Operating
• Signals while Maximizing Attenuation of Common Mode Threats
• Transient Suppression – GDTs, MOVs & SASDs
EMP Protection
Surge Protection
E1 & E2 Mitigation

Distribution panel /
Load Center

Dual ATS
Switches with
voltage monitor
PCDS Physical Layout
Low Power Module

Side view; MPM on left, LPM on

right

LPM Low Power Module

MPM
Medium Power Module

LPM
Medium Power Module (MPM)
Lightning Protection
Rods

Receptacle
Output Panels

120/208VAC 4160 V
480VAC
Transformers Contactors
Transformer

Medium Voltage Cable

Connection/Contactor Cabinet
Low Power Module (LPM)

Uninterruptable
Power Supply (UPS)

Frequency
Generator
400Hz

Receptacle
Output Panels
STANDARDS
Standards
 MIL-STD-2169B (classified) - HEMP Environment (classified)

 MIL-STD-188-125-1 - HEMP Hardening (Fixed Facilities)

 MIL-STD-188-125-2 - HEMP Hardening (Transportable Systems)

 MIL-STD-461 - EMI Requirements (Subsystems)

 MIL-STD-464 - EMI Requirements (Systems)

 MIL-STD-810F - Shock & Vibe

 RTCA DO-160E - Aircraft EMI & Surge

 UL, NEC, IEC, IEEE, NEMA - Commercial Standards

Mil-STD-188-125
EMP
Mil-STD-188-125
• The 188-125 Family of Standards Define all Aspects of the Construction and
Validation of HEMP Hardened C4I Facilities

 Appendix A – Shielding Effectiveness (SE)

 Appendix B – Pulse Current Injection (PCI)

 Early Time HEMP (E1) Waveform – 20/500ns
 Intermediate Time HEMP (E2) Waveform – 1.5/3000µs
 Late Time HEMP (E3) Waveform – 1000A for 60s

Appendix C – Continuous Wave Immersion (CWI)

Qualification and Validation Testing
•Per MIL-STD-188-125-1 appendix A, SE
“These procedures shall be used for shielding
effectiveness acceptance testing of the facility
HEMP shield and aperture POE protective
treatments. The procedures shall also be
performed for acceptance of repairs or
installations of new POE protective devices
after construction acceptance, except that
only areas affected by the repair or installation
are required to be tested. Shielding
effectiveness measurements may also be
conducted as part of the verification test
program.”
MIL-STD-188-125 Appendix A, SE

FO CPU Signal
Generator Amplifier
Bulkhead N-Type Input Output
Waveguide

Clean Side Dirty Side

40 dB
RX
Shielded
FO
Cart
Spectrum
LNA In
Analyzer Out Pwr

Test Equipment Cu Jac Cabinet Under Test

Enclosure
TX
MIL-STD-188-125 Appendix B, PCI Testing
● Early Time HEMP Waveform (E1), 20/500ns
● 60Ω Generator Impedance
● Maximum Drive Current (Per Pin) = 2500A
● Very High Voltage is Required !
● Pass/Fail Determined by Analysis of Residual Norms Measured
Across a Resistive Test Load
● Peak Current (10A Max for Power, 0.1A Max for Data)
● Peak Rate of Rise (1E7 A/s)
● Peak Root Action (1.6E-1 A*s^0.5 for Power, 1.6E-3 A*s^0.5
for Data)
 MIL-STD-188-125 Appendix B, PCI (Cont’d)
Current Probes
Screen Room

Filter

Load (0.7Ω / 0.3 Ω)

HEMP Pulser
F400-120-E1-Neutral Calibration-E1

6000
Calibration-E1-5000Amp A10066-070509.dat
Calibration-E1-2500Amp A10005-070508.dat
0 Calibration-E1-1750Amp A10003-070508.dat
Calibration-E1-1000Amp A10001-070508.dat
4000 Calibration-E1-700Amp A10031-070509.dat
Current (A)

Current (A)
Calibration-E1-500Amp A10007-070508.dat
Calibration-E1-350Amp A10028-070509.dat
Calibration-E1-250Amp A10008-070508.dat

-15
2000
F400-120-E1-5000Amp B20072-070509.dat
F400-120-E1-2500Amp B20089-070509.dat
-30 F400-120-E1-1750Amp B20088-070509.dat
F400-120-E1-1000Amp B20087-070509.dat
F400-120-E1-500Amp B20091-070509.dat
F400-120-E1-250Amp B20090-070509.dat
0
Max Residual: 4.18E+1
Max Derivative: 6.50E+7
-45 Max Root Action: 9.30E-2

-2000
0 -4 -4 -4 -4 -6 0 -6 -6 -6 -6
0.25x10 0.50x10 0.75x10 1.00x10 -1x10 1x10 2x10 3x10 4x10

Time (s) Time (s)

Qualification and Validation Testing

•Per MIL-STD-188-125-1 appendix B, PCI

“These procedures shall be used for
acceptance testing after construction of the
HEMP protection subsystem and for verification
testing of electrical POE protective treatments
after the facility is completed and operational.”
MIL-STD-188-125 Appendix B PCI Testing (Cont’d)
HEMP E1 Testing @ SARA Inc. - Colorado Springs
 Mil-STD- 461
EMI Subsystems
Mil-STD- 461
• MIL-STD-461 Establishes the Interface and Verification Requirements for the EMI
Characteristics of Electronic Equipment and Subsystems Procured by the DoD

• Primary Intent of Standard is to Ensure EMC/Interoperability of Subsystems Being Integrated

into a System

• Standard is Divided into 4 Categories of Tests

 Conducted Emissions (CE)
 Conducted Susceptibility (CS)
 Radiated Emissions (RE)
 Radiated Susceptibility (RS)

• Our Products Cannot Guarantee Subsystem Compliance to this Standard, but they can
Contribute to the Equipment’s Ability to Comply!
Mil-STD- 461
Requirement Description

CE101 Conducted Emissions, Power Leads, 30 Hz to 10 kHz

CE102 Conducted Emissions, Power Leads, 10 kHz to 10 MHz

CE106 Conducted Emissions, Antenna Terminal, 10 kHz to 40 GHz

CS101 Conducted Susceptibility, Power Leads, 30 Hz to 150 kHz

CS103 Conducted Susceptibility, Antenna Port, Intermodulation, 15 kHz to 10 GHz

CS104 Conducted Susceptibility, Antenna Port, Rejection of Undesired Signals, 30 Hz to 20 GHz

CS105 Conducted Susceptibility, Antenna Port, Cross-Modulation, 30 Hz to 20 GHz

CS106 Conducted Susceptibility, Transients, Power Leads

CS109 Conducted Susceptibility, Structure Current, 60 Hz to 100 kHz

CS114 Conducted Susceptibility, Bulk Cable Injection, 10 kHz to 200 MHz

CS115 Conducted Susceptibility, Bulk Cable Injection, Impulse Excitation

CS116 Conducted Susceptibility, Damped Sinusoidal Transients, Cables and Power Leads, 10 kHz to 100 MHz

RE101 Radiated Emissions, Magnetic Field, 30 Hz to 100 kHz

RE102 Radiated Emissions, Electric Field, 10 kHz to 18 GHz

RE103 Radiated Emissions, Antenna Spurious and Harmonic Outputs, 10 kHz to 40 GHz

RS101 Radiated Susceptibility, Magnetic Field, 30 Hz to 100 kHz

RS103 Radiated Susceptibility, Electric Field, 2 MHz to 40 GHz

RS105 Radiated Susceptibility, Transient Electromagnetic Field

Mil-STD- 464
EMI System
Mil-STD- 464
• MIL-STD-464 Provides Basic Requirements for Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3)
Considerations for DoD Systems

• Primary Intent of Standard is to Provide Guidance and Test Methods for Electromagnetic
Threats at the System Level

• E3 Definitions that are addressed in the Standard Include:

 Lightning
 EMP
 EMI/EMC
 HERP/HERO/HERF

• Contribution of Compliance by our Products is Twice Removed at the System Level, Therefore
Compliance Analysis must be Qualitative
Ancillary Requirements, Military
• TEMPEST (Classified)
 100dB Insertion Loss 14kHz – 1GHz for AC Power Feeds

• Power Quality Requirements

 Voltage Drop, Typically 1% Maximum
 Shunt Current, Varies by Service Current
 Harmonic Distortion, Typically 5% THD Maximum

• Environmental Requirements
 MIL-STD-202 – Component Level
 MIL-STD-810 – Box Level
 Operating Temp, Shock, Vibration, Humidity, Salt Fog Vary by Program
Shock & Vibration Consideration

Using ANSYS FEA modeling, this image shows the levels of stress over the surface
of a steel housing. This modeling provides considerable insight towards qualifying
assemblies to meet various shock and vibration requirements.
Thermal Effects

Using ANSYS FEA

modeling, this image
shows the thermal
stress and operating
temperature heat rise
for a set of inductors in
an AC HEMP service
panel.
EMP Protection
 Thank you for your time

Jason Koshy
E3 Program/Channel Partners Manager
Office: 813.890.3309
Mobile: 813.597.7471
Email: [email protected]