AD-AO98 323 NAVAL MATERIAL COMMAND WASHINGTON D C F/6 15/5

ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT EFFECTS SUMMARY REPORT To THE CHIEF--ETC (U)

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ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT EFFECTS
SUMMARY REPORT
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*DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

I NAVAL MATERIAL COMMAND
iTACTICAL ELECTROMAGNETIC SYSTEMS STUDY
ACTION COUNCIL

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ELECTROMAGNETIC ENVIRONMENT EFFECTS

SUMMARY REPORT

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THE CHIEF OF NAVAL.MaATERIAL

TACTICAL ELECTROMAGNETIC SYSTEMS STUDY (TESS)

ACTION COUNCIL

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CONTENTS

J SECTION PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vii

1. INTRODUCTION 1-1
1.1 PURPOSE 1-1
1.2 APPROACH 1-1
1.3 TERMINOLOGY 1-2
1.4 CONTENTS 1-2
* -;1.5 BACKGROUND 1-2

2. MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS 2-1

2.1 EME EFFORTS TO THE PRESENT 2-1
2.1.1 AWARENESS OF THE PROBLEM 2-1
2.1.2 POLICY DECLARATIONS 2-1
2.1.3 OSD AND OPNAV INITIATIVES 2-2
2.1.4 NAVMAT EFFORTS 2-2
2.2 EXISTING EME EFFECTS MANAGEMENT 2-3
2.2.1 THE CNM TEMP OFFICE 2-3
4
2.2.2 EME EFFECTS MANAGEMENT THROUGH-
OUT THE NMC 2-3
2.3 MANAGEMENT SUMMARY 2-4
3. ASSESSMENT 3-1

3.1 INTRODUCTION 3-1

3.1.1 GENERAL 3-1
3.1.2 DESCRIPTION OF EM DISCIPLINES 3-1
i 3.2 STATE OF EME EFFECTS TECHNOLOGY 3-4
3.2.1 INTRODUCTION 3-4
3.2.2 ANALYSIS TECHNOLOGY 3-4

....
 CONTENTS (Continued)

SECTION PAGE

3.2.3 TEST TECHNOLOGY 3-5

3.2.4 HARDWARE AND COMPONENTS
TECHNOLOGY 3-6
3.2.5 TECHNIQUES TECHNOLOGY 3-6
3.2.6 DATA 3-6
3.2.7 SUMMARY 3-7
3.3 EM CAPABILITIES 3-9
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 3-9
3.3.2 ANALYSIS CAPABILITY 3-9
3.3.3 TEST CAPABILITY 3-10
3.3.4 PERSONNEL 3-10
3.3.5 FLEET SUPPORT 3-11
3.3.6 SUMMARY 3-12
3.4 STATE OF EM STANDARDS AND SPECIFICATIONS 3-14
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION 3-14
3.4.2 DEFINITIONS 3-14
3.4.3 CRITERIA 3-14
3.4.4 FINDINGS 3-15
3.4.5 SUMMARY 3-17

4. PROJECTED DOCUMENTATION 4-1

4.1 BACKGROUND 4-1
4.2 NAVY EME EFFECTS GUIDE 4-1
4.3 PLAN FOR ENSURING EME EFFECTS CONTROLS
IN ACQUISITIONS 4-4
4.4 IN-SERVICE SUPPORT PLAN FOR EME EFFECTS 4-4
4.5 PROGRAM PLAN FOR EME EFFECTS RDT&E 4-4

5. CONCLUSIONS 5-1
5.1 GENERAL 5-1
5.2 DEFICIENCIES IN TECHNOLOGY 5-1
5.3 DEFICIENCIES IN CAPABILITIES 5-2
5.4 DEFICIENCIES IN SPECIFICATIONS AND
STANDARDS 5-2

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 CONTENTS (Continued)

J SECTION PAGE

6. RECOMMENDATIONS 6-1

APPENDIX
A GLOSSARY A-i
B REFERENCES B-I

FIGURE
3-1 SUMMARY OF EM DISCIPLINE TECHNICAL TEAM
REPORTS - STATE OF TECHNOLOGY 3-8
3-2 SUMMARY OF EM DISCIPLINE TECHNICAL TEAM
REPORTS - CAPABILITIES 3-13
* 3-3 SUMMARY OF EM DISCIPLINE TECHNICAL TEAM
REPORTS - SPECIFICATIONS/STANDARDS 3-19
4-1 TESSAC DOCUMENTS RELATIONSHIPS 4-2
4-2 MASTER DOCUMENT SCHEDULE 4-3

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I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides an assessment of the status of the state-of-technology in

the electromagnetic environment (EME) relative to Navy ships and aircraft, the
capabilities of Navy laboratories to address EME and the adequacy of specifications
3 and standards relative to EME, in response to tasking by the Chief of Naval
* Material of 12 April 1976. Both management and technical aspects have been
examined and are assessed.
* I This document is derived primarily from the reports of six Tactical Electromag-
netic Systems Study (TESS) Action Council sponsored "technical teams", in the
I areas of Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC), Electromagnetic Vulnerability
(EMV), Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), Electronic Counter-Counter-Measures
!I (ECCM), Electromagnetic Safety (EM Safety) and Electromagnetic Power (EM
Power). Major additional sources drawn upon are NAVSEA, NAVAIR and NAVELEX
I analyses of causes of EM deficiencies in selected systems and Fleet Commanders
assessments of the operational impact of EM problems.
The various sections of this report have been designed and arranged to present a
I logical development of data flow. Section 1 provides introductory and background
material, including the Action Council approach to its analyses and an indication of
the ever-increasing impact of EM effects on fleet capabilities. In Section 2,
implications of EME effects management are treated, the initiatives taken in the
j past OSD, SECNAV, CNO and CNM are reviewed and past and present policy
iterations highlighted.
1 comprising the core of the report, provides the Action Council
Section 3,
assessment of EME state-of-technology, capabilities, and adequacy of controlling
documentation as existing in the Navy. The detailed findings are set forth in
I summary form, in each subsection for all of the EM "disciplines".
Section 4 describes the interrelated set of documents under preparation by the
IAction Council; an EM Guide in the form of a Military Handbook, a comprehensive
plan for applying EME effects control measures during acquisition, an in-service
support plan for EME effects and a program plan for EME effects RDT&E.

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Conclusions based on the assessments are presented in Section 5 in detail.

summary the conclusions state that electromagnetic
technology is generally adequate, but is insufficiently applied.
environmental
In
effects K
Recommendations are provided in Section 6. It is to be noted that this report
does not include the detailed recommendations for effecting needed management
and application of technology. Rather it provides the broad precepts which will be
the base for specific implementing recommendations which will be made in the four

documents which will follow this report.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1 1.1 Purpose
-0 The purpose of this report is to provide the Chief of Naval Material with
assessments of:
a. The state-of-technology in Electromagnetic Environmental Effects
(EME) relative to Navy aircraft and ship platforms. (This includes electromagnetic
interference (EMI), electromagnetic compatibility (EMC), electromagnetic vulner-
ability (EMV) including resistance to countermeasures, and electromagnetic pulse
j (EMP) including high energy effects.)
3 b. SYSCOMs and Navy laboratory technical capabilities to calculate, mea-
" sure, analyze and correct equipment, system and platform EME deficiencies, and
- c. The adequacy of current Navy specifications and standards in EME, and
4
4,similarly U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force progress in this area.
These asse-smenrts are in response- to the tasking of subparagraphs 2.a, 2.b,
and 2.c of CNM letter MAT-034/RBB:ELEX-095/RCW of 12 April 1976. Conclu-
sions and recommendations derived from the assessments are presented for such
actions as deemed appropriate.
In addition, plans for responding to two additional rasks assigned by the
same letter are summarized.

1.2 Approach
Following receipt of the CNM letter of 12 April 1976, the Tactical
Electromagnetic Systems Study Action Council (TESSAC) developed a plan of

action, a modus operandi and a working organization to be employed in developing

the responses. Representatives of the cognizant Systems Commands participated
in the initial planning of the Action Council activities and also undertook
preparatory actions to accomplish the tasks assigned them by paragraph 3 of the
letter.
Six discipline areas of EME were identified to conduct the studies and
prepare individual reports. These were EMC/EMI, EMV, EMP, ECM/ECCM.
electromagnetic power, and electromagnetic safety. Teams of engineers/tech-
nologists were assembled from the Navy laboratories and centers. Under TESSAC
supervision, the teams developed the six resulting Technical Team Reports which
serve as the basis for this summary report.

1l 1-1

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 NAVAIR, NAVSEA and NAVELEX investigated representative equipments
under their cognizance to determine causes of electromagnetic environment (EME)
problems. Highlights of the SYSCOM reports have been incorporated in this report.
Fleet ship electromagnetic environment problems were verified at the Fleet CINC
level and EME deficiencies in a Pacific Fleet Exercise, RIMPAC-77, were analyzed.
Results are included herein.

1.3 Terminology
The term "electromagnetic compatibility" (EMC) is widely employed in the
generic sense to encompass the various facets of electromagnetic effects. It be-
Al came apparent that EMC terminology was nebulous, requiring frequent clarification
when addressing generic EM areas. Accordingly, "electromagnetic environment"
(EME) was adopted as a term signifying that "umbrella" encompassing all electro-
*magnetic environment disciplines: EMC/EMI, EMV, EMP, ECM/ECCM, HERO,
RADHAZ and special areas involving electro-optics and natural phenomena. As a
convenient way of referring to electromagnetic environment effects, the abbrevia-

1.4 Contents

A determined effort has been made to preserve the principal findings and
the sense of source materials, while retaining some of the substantiating detail.
The nature and thrust of the underlying Technical Team Reports are encapsulated
in the charts in Section 3. They and the SYSCOM reports constitute the principal
basis for the text of Section 3.
I

1.5 Background
The effects of electromagnetic incompatibilities and vulnerabilities on
fleet operations have gradually become more severe and more debilitating as the
numbers and complexity of electromagnetic systems and equipments in the fleet
have increased. By the late 1960's, in the Viet-Nam conflict, it became necessary
to occasionally shut down certain equipments in combatant ships to prevent
disruptions of or by other operating equipments, degrading operational effective- o.
ness. Recognition of the degree of this problem and the potential combat system
degradation has led to a series of OPNAV/NAVMAT management actions and
studies.

1-2
 JThe Tactical Electromagnetic Systems Study (TESS) Action Council was
established in August 1975 by the CNM as a follow-up-effort to further examine
* and update problem statements and to propose solutions.

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 2. MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

* 2.1 EME Efforts to the Present

2.1.1 Awareness of the Problem
This section provides a brief overview of EM management Navy-
wide and presents management highlights derived from Technical Team Reports
and SYSCOM reports prepared in response to the CNM letter of 12 April 1976.
3 There is a recurrent theme throughout the Technical Team Reports
that management is constrained in effecting the use of available expertise and cap-
abilities to the extent appropriate for 'material acquisition and operational
problems. For example, Section 2.2.1 of the TESSAC Electromagnetic Compati-
bility Survey (Technical Team Report) states in part, "The most significant factor

Stechnology
I' contributing to the lack of EMC consideration in Navy programs is not a lack of
but a lack of application of existing technology by management." The

transfer of technology from the laboratory technologists to the users, i.e., the
program managers and the system/equipment development engineers, is not being
accomplished when and as it should, and is one of the primary causes of present
material deficiencies. This is evidenced in the majority of Technical Teams
Reports by the conclusions on the inadequacies of specifications and standards and
their application to acquisitions. A corollary cause is a lack of sufficiently wide
spread knowledge of awareness on the part of engineers both at the headquarters
and field activity level as to available EM technology and capability. A more
mundane but equally important reason is the lack of a systematic storage/retrieval
base for supporting management and engineering. An ancillary factor contributing
to uncorrected EME deficiencies is the shortfall in reporting and identification of
electromagnetic problems, either in developmental or operational phases of life
cycles. This problem, too, has significant management implications.
It is clear that management, and the degree of emphasis manage-
ment elects to apply to EM, play major roles in the Navy's mixed success to date in
eliminating and/or avoiding EM problems.
2.1.2 Policy Declarations
There have been many iterations of Navy "policy" concerning EME
or its subdisciplines originated in the past two decades. TESSAC concludes that
Navy policy regarding EME is adequate. The shortcomings are in policy
implementation, enforcement and assignment of resources.

2-1
 2.1.3 OSD and OPNAV Initiatives
The department of Defense initiated an electromagnetic compati-
bility program in 1960. The program was given impetus and specific direction by
the issuance of DoD Directive 3222.3 in 5 July 1967. Implementing directives were
duly issued by OPNAV.
By CNO decision, the Office of Tactical Electromagnetic Coordina-
tor (OP-03E) was established under the DCNO Fleet Operations and Readiness by
OPNAV Notice 5430 of 24 November 1969. This office was upgraded and retitled
to that of Director, Tactical Electromagnetic Programs (OP-093), by OPNAV
Notice 5430 of 24 January 1971. OP-093 was eliminated as a "major staff office"
and the functions transferred to OP-095, under the Director, Antisubmarine
Warfare and Tactical Electromagnetic Programs, wherein a Tactical Electromag-
netic Programs Division (OP-054) was established. Again, by OPNAV Notice 5430
-. of 30 May 1974, the OP-095 mission and functions were transferred to the DCNO
(Surface Warfare). Nominally, the Surface Weapons Systems Division (OP-35) was

responsible for tactical electromagnetic system and subsystem integration and

coordination; however, by April 1975, TEMP, as such, had disappeared from OP-35
functions, leaving no identifiable sponsor in OPNAV. Most recently, by OPNAV-
INST 2410.31C, of 19 May 1977, the Director, Command and Control Communica-
tions (C 3 ) Programs, OP-094, has been assigned the overall responsibility for
providing policy guidance and management direction of EMC program matters
within the Department of the Navy. The Naval Communications Division (OP-941)
is now the cognizant office for EMC matters in OPNAV. In this connection, it is to
be noted that EMC is used in the generic sense. This parallels frequency allocation
management, a necessary adjunct to EMC, also assigned OP-941.
2.1.4 NAVMAT Efforts
OPNAV Notice 5430 of 23 January 1971, v-hich established OP-093.
required the Chief of Naval Material to establish a counterpart organization. The
CNM designated the Manager, REWSON Systems Project (PM-7) to be the Director,
TEMP (PM-7T) within the NMC, as a collateral responsibility. NAVMATINST
5430.46 of 21 June 1971 promulgated this assignment, issued the Charter for the
TEMP office, and assigned administrative support to the Commander, Naval Air
Systems Command.

2-2
 Executive management of TEMP was reassigned, to the Commander.
Naval Electronic Systems Command, by NAVMATNOTE 5430 of 19 June 1973. The
Charter for the TEMP Office, (ELEX-095), was issued as Enclosure (1) to
NAVELEXINST 5430.19 of 18 April 1974, and is currently in effect.

2.2 Existing EME Effects Management

2.2.1 The CNM TEMP Office
The mission statement of the CNM Director TEMP (ELEX-095) pre-
scribes that he shall:
" Exercise for the CNM centralized program management.
assessment and planning for the NCM TEMP program in support of CNO
requirements and policies in order to provide the Navy with balanced, compatible,
effective and countermeasures resistant electromagnetic equipment...
A combination of factors has militated against successful execution
of the Director TEMP mission. These factors have been reviewed by the TESS
Action Council, in its report of 1 March 1976, which recommended that the CNM
Director TEMP (to be renamed CNM Director TECS (Tactical Electromagnetic
Coordination and Support)) be placed on the headquarters staff of the CNM, and
that NAVAIR, NAVSEA and NAVELEX have clearly identifiable TECS offices.
2.2.2 EME Effects Management Throughout the NMC
By Charter, regulation and established procedure, the Systems
Commands have considerable semi-autonomous authority in systems and equipment
acquisitions. The results of a lack of joint action in EME matters is evidenced by
electromagnetic incompatibilities, vulnerabilities and other discrepancies among
and between equipments and systems. This is documented and verified by
supporting documentation, particularly the SYSCOM and fleet reports.
The Fleet Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM) system provides
an example of lack of EME consideration, wherein major electromagnetic
interference problems were confronted when the system was placed in an
j operational environment. Shipboard UHF air search radars seriously interfere with
FLTSATCOM terminals. Examination of the development of the system shows that
"consideration" was given to EMC during design, but technical and cost constraints
and a lack of adequate detailed information on shipboard EM environment resulted
in the EM incompatibilities. A mandatory, consistent management-engineering
emphasis on EMC was not applied.

2-3
 In the Naval Material Command, considerable EM research, technol-
ogy, and engineering expertise in certain disciplinary areas are located in the
various laboratories and centers. These activities are under direction of the CNM
or SYSCOMs according to their technological capabilities and specialties; however,
the available expertise is '-zt adequate'.- developed nor is it applied to systems
development to the extent necessary for ensuring avoidance/elimination of
electromagnetic effects deficiencies. Also, prior to recent initiatives there has
*been no central data bank, or corporate memory, available to assist engineering and
management by providing comprehensive information on EME.
Although reasonably adequate technology and capabilities are avail-
able in all EME disciplines, standards by which to apply them in procurement
specifications by management are outdated. This is borne out by the assessments
of Section 3 of this report. Budget limitations have had the effect of causing
specifications to become inadequate, by delaying updates. Procedures for
developing and updating standards require a formal and time-consuming process.
The condition produced is one which seriously cripples the acquisition process. The
lag of up-to-date EMC requirements being incorporated into applicable standards
results in either obsolete specification requirements or intensive efforts to tailor
the requirements on a case by case basis.
An additional problem dssociated with the currency of the specifica-
tions and standards is the long life span of many of the electronic systems. EM!
problems caused delays in certification of the SPN-42 air craft carrier landing
system on board USS NIMITZ. The SPN-42 was designed to what were inadequate
but perceived valid EMI requirements many years ago, thus it is not surprising that
there are problems in today's more complex environment.

?.3 Management Summary

3
There is an underlying recurrent thread throughout the reports of the E
Technical Teams that, although EM technology and capabilities are in general ade-
quate for Navy needs, that which is available is not being systematically employed
or applied. This can be attributed only to either a lack of priority or a lack of
systematic procedures and controls, which are management attributable.
Under existing conditions, engineering managers at both headquarters and
field activities are unaware of the available EME technology and capability which
can be applied to the development of EM-compatible systems.

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IMilitary specifications and standards are outdated. Therefore, ac-
quisition managers cannot rely on them as stated, to control EM design.
1There is a lack of systematic storage and retrieval for an EM data
base to support management and engineering to bridge the gap between technology
development and system design. Lack of identification and reporting of EM
problems, both in development and operational phases of life cycles, contribute to
EME deficiencies. Communications between technologists, users, i.e., between
design engineers and fleet operators, and managers is essential to EM planning and
the direction of research and development to correct existing and future EM
problems.

The issuance of directives, dictating that "EME be considered in all

phases of all acquisitions" is patently not a solution. A realistic, coordinated, con-
sistent EME effort is indicated. The effort should be carried out by a systems
engineering-oriented organization, established at the CNM and SYSCOM headquar-
!, ters levels, and spearheaded by an identifiable sponsor at the OPNAV level.

* 2-5
 3. ASSESSMENT

1 3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 General

The tasks assigned to the TESS Action Council by the CNM are
Idescribed in Section 1.1. The main thrust of the tasking is the assessment of the
disciplines of EM toward reducing harmful electromagnetic effects on Naval
systems and equipments. In performing the necessary assessments TESSAC grouped
the disciplines of EM to reflect the orientation of technology and organizations
j within the Navy technical community. Thus, the grouping of EM disciplines in this
section is EMC, EMV, EMP, ECCM, EM-Safety and EM-Power. Each term is
I defined, and a brief description of the problems and threats addressed within each
* discipline is provided.
The assessments of EM disciplines by TESSAC provided in this
Ssection represent the core of this report. Generalizations representative of all EM
disciplines are used as much as possible to highlight the integrated aspects of the
jdisciplines, but where capabilities, tools or deficiencies are peculiar to a single
discipline, these individual cases are highlighted in the text. Supportive material is
(contained in Figures 3.1 through 3.3, which describe the state-of-technology, state-
of-capabilities, and the state-of-specifications and standards. The foldout charts
give an overview (what can be done), deficiencies (what cannot be done), and
conclusions and recommendations from the six reports on EM disciplines. They are

formatted to be read vertically under these column headings. The material

Ifurnished by the SYSCOMs and the fleet contain numerous examples of EMC/EMI
problems covering a broad range of material. Examples of these problems used in
this report are few in number--for purposes of illustrations only--and should not be
construed as unique or isolated problems.
j3.1.2 Description of EM Disciplines
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) is the ability of electri-

cal/electronic/electromechanical systems, subsystems and equipment to operate in

an intended operational environment without suffering unacceptable performance
degradation or causing the same to occur in other systems. EMC includes self-
Icompatibility, compatibility among systems on the same platform, and multi-
systemimulti-platform compatibility.

13-1
 Electromagnetic vulnerability (EMV) as used in the EMV Technical
Team Report is the term employed to denote those problems of EMC which involve
a performance degradation or an incapability to function due to undesirable
reactions of an equipment to energy in the electromagnetic environment which
enters the system through paths other than intended receptors. The EM energy is
able to enter these items on unshielded or improperly shielded cables, through slots
or holes, through non-shielded sections or the mating joints of shielded sections and
numerous other apertures. Depending on the magnitude and nature of the EME, as

well as the characteristics of the equipment/systems, the energy may damage solid
state components, initiate electro-explosive devices (i.e., HERO), or produce
spurious responses in active systems.
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) is an intense single-pulse transient
electromagnetic wave which is usually generated when a nuclear weapon is
detonated in or near the atmosphere. EMP can also be generated by nonnuclear
means. Electromagnetic field strengths as great as 50,000 volts/meter can be
experienced over a 2500nm diameter area from a one megaton burst at 500km
altitude. Because EMP illuminates such broad areas, a system/platform does not
have to be targeted to be affected. The nuclear burst can be from an attacking
enemy weapon, from our own defensive weapons, from nuclear engagements of
satellites, or from third parties' nuclear engagements. Exposure to EMP, especially
from a burst occurring above the atmosphere, can degrade the combat effective-
ness of air, land, and sea-based Navy electronic equipment if they are not hardened
to the EMP environment. System degradation, even to the extent of mission or
system failure, can result because of burn-out of components in the system or
because of an interruption of system operation, sometimes serious enough to
require reset and restart of the system.
Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) is that division of EW
involving actions taken to insure own forces' effective use of the electromagnetic
spectrum despite the enemy's use of EW. It has two aspects--anti-ESM anti-ECM.
Anti-ESM includes reducing the risk of discovery by enemy electronic detection and
tracking equipment and preventing the enemy from gaining any exploitable elec-
tronic information. Anti-ECM includes the recognition and analysis of the enemy's
ECM, preferably prior to employment in combat, and minimizing their effects.

3-2
 EM-Safety for TESSAC purposes encompasses four areas: HERP
(Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Personnel), HERF (Hazards of Electro-
I magnetic Radiation to Fuels), lightning and P-static (Triboelectricity). HERO, al-
though included with EMV in the Technical Team Report, is part of EM-Safety.
HERP consists of the direct effects of RADHAZ (radiation hazards) to personnel,
which causes heating of body tissues and the indirect effects of radiation, where
currents and voltages are induced in metallic structures which, when touched,
I-cause painful burns. HERF considers the possible ignition of fuel by a spark
induced by RF energy. Since the advent of metal ships, lightning has ceased being

a hazard for ships and their personnel. Destruction by lightning is no longer a

major threat to all-metal aircraft, although lightning effects have proved to be
1 dangerous to flight crews and onboard personnel. Aircraft using the new composite
materials are more susceptible to lightning hazards than all-metal aircraft. P-
static (Precipitation-static) is the phenomenon associated with the development of
J high electrical potentials on the outer surface of aircraft and other fast-moving
*objects. P-static differs from conventional static electricity (which is also covered
I by EM-Safety) both in its method of production and its magnitude. P-static charges
exhibit potentials of several thousand volts (up to 2 Megavolts) and they have been
Sknown to cause serious degradation of airborne equipment, rendering radar and
computer systems inoperative, and are a potentially lethal personnel hazard.
IEM-Power is the TESSAC term applied to the subset of EMC, EMV,
EMP and EM-Safety disciplines related to the platform power system and the inter-
face between the power system and other electrical and electronic systems and
equipment. Power is essential to all fifteen mission areas of the Fleet as defined in
the Naval Combat Readiness Criteria. The performance of these missions can be
jjeopardized by a long-term or momentary loss of power or a degradation in the
quality of the electrical power brought about by electromagnetic environmental
Ieffects. For instance, a survey of 37 Pacific fleet ships on the impact of a momen-
tary loss of power (power restored in less than 3 to 30 seconds) indicated 65 equip-
I ments were affected with recovery times ranging from minutes to hours. Mission
capabilities affected included aircraft identification, detection and tracking, fire
control coordination, ECM coordination, CIC data link, loss of precision landing and
control, and ability to marshall aircraft. EM environmental effects can produce
this type loss-of-power. The signal ground of electronic systems, which is also the
secondary ground of electronic equipment power-conversion circuitry, can also be a

3-3

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mechanism for causing degradation of performance of electronic systems in the
electromagnetic environment.
The various EM disciplines have evolved separately due to the
different sources of EM energy, causitive effects and knowledge involved in each
discipline, the specialized test facilities used, and command/management assign-
ment of organizational responsibility. These disciplines need to achieve the mutual
understanding, technical collaboration, coordination and information exchange.
The description of the various disciplines reflects broad areas of
technical commonality and areas of required interfaces between separate technol-
ogies. More coordination and correlation of this nature will be necessary in order
for the Navy to design and integrate components within equipments, equipments
within systems, and systems within or on platforms, all of which are becoming
increasingly complex.
Technology and capability are assessed separately. The technical

method of achieving a practical purpose, i.e., technology, may be known in various

segments of the technical community but not to the Navy community needing it.
Even if the existence of an acceptable technology is known, a capability in terms of
tools, facilities and trained people to use the technology may not in turn be ade-
quate to Navy needs.

3.2 State of EM Effects Technology

3.2.1 Introduction
To assess the state-of-EM Effects technology the Technical Team
reports and SYSCOM reports were examined relative to: analysis, test, devices and
hardware, techniques and data. The Technical Team Reports also included
comparisons of Navy technology with the prevailing national state-of-the-art.
Figure 3- I summarizes the contents of the individual reports. The text summarizes
the integrated assessment of the various EM disciplines.
3.2.2 Analysis Technology
Present technology permits limited basic EM analysis. It can
support modeling of the natural environment (lightning and some P-static), and
small, conventional systems and platforms and their individual environments, and
aids in the selection of alternative concepts.

3-4
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Present technology is poor or marginal in certain areas. Analysis of
the effects of out-of-desired-frequency-band emissions or receptions cannot be
accomplished because of lack of data or equipment and system characteristics.
Ability to handle nonlinear EMI effects exists only in selected cases.
Large or complex systems or combinations of the same, for all EM
Idisciplines, cannot be analyzed. Equipment/system arrangement on a platform or
structure remains a difficulty.
- !EM Power analysis continues to lag ability to design. Better
solutions for pulse load and harmonic current problems are needed.
3 Full scale mission scenario simulations to measure system effective-
I ness in their operational environment are not available, but are needs during
concept selection, particularly for the ECCM scenarios. Analysis technology has
only a limited capability to develop and utilize computer codes in prediction, and
many of the existing codes are not validated.
I Confidence in the adequacy of the results from complex analysis is
attained only by toleration of wide engineering design margins, and by investing
( disproportionately in testing to verify results. Analysis and automated analysis is a
cost-effective guide to testing when properly applied. Methodologies and criteria
for the use of models in the various stages of the acquisition process are lacking.
3.2.3 Test Technology
Test technology can support extensive system tailoring, overcome
-I some of the inadequacies of analysis and devise alternatives for some predictions
not otherwise available. Aircraft and missile test facilities reflect fewer test
1 technology limitations than those for ship platforms.
Among the test deficiencies reported are inadequate standardization
of tests and their data. Performance verification and acceptance tests (for EMC,
EMP and ECCM, in particular) are lacking.
gThere is also a lack of testing capacity to accommodate large or
distributed systems and structures (particularly for EMP testing). Existing MILSTD
filter tests requirements are not adequate to select off-the-shelf filters. Lab-
I oratory free-space measurements cannot be related to applicable specifications and
standards (MIL-STD 462 and 1377). Lack of practical, realistic test requirements in
I specifications and standards was one of the general criticisms in the technology
team reports.

13-5
 The frequency range of testing technology will have to be extended
outside current frequency limits as technology begins to exploit these new
frequencies.
3.2.4 Hardware and Components Technology
Mitigation devices1 are reported to be adequate for metal structures
but work is needed in the area of composites. In EMP, special hardening devices
are available but lack performance data and certification. Until these devices are
tested and their parameters characterized, EMP protection design and analysis will
remain on a case by case basis. Certain requirements are dependent upon further
research in such areas as new semiconductor' devices, IR/visible shielded windows
and coatings, and a variety of composite materials.
3,,5 Techniques Technology
The technology of interference reduction and other techniques such
-4i
as blazkiog required to prevent or solve EM problems are assessed as adequate for
present ds. Techniques are available for most linear and some nonlinear
phciomena. The technology would be improved by more precise guidance/require-
nments --"nd a selectively stronger research and analysis base.
Biological effects which cover a wide range of variables, are only
imprecisely understood, and carry potentially heavy implications for personnel,
some materials, costs, and conduct of operations.
The EM community needs to achieve a higher order of information
exchange and cooperative engineering effort to ensure optimum selection of
mitigation techniques to accommodate all EM environments. Meanwhile, programs
underway to enhance EM engineering techniques should maintain their momentum.
3.2.6 Data
Lack of "adequate" data and an absence of data planning and control
are pervasive problems. Existing data bases can be used to predict many EM envi-
ronments but not large or complex ones such as multi-platform and interplatform
environments. There is a lack of some data on specific characteristics of both USN
and potential enemy systems and platforms. Most individual EM disciplines vary
from marginal to poor in data quality, quantity and availability. In a large part
because of data limitations, extrapolation from known to unknown situations is con-
strained and risky. Computer analysis, cost predictions, performance and trade-off

IMitigation Devices - (shields, filters) and techniques (blanking, frequency reassign-

ment) are used to supress the pick-up or rediation or undesired EM signals.

3-6
 analyses, and many other normal engineering processes are operating at reduced
efficiency. There is nothing approaching a systematic or distributed/centralized
data bank or corporate memory which would allow efficient transfer of known
technology to system developers and redesigners.
"More data" of itself is not the solution, nor is a sudden tightening of
controls.Data support may well be one of the pacing factors in EM engineering. A
number of specific needs are contained in the source materials and in Figure 3-1.
A more thorough effort is required in the near future to find some feasible,
economical way to serve both management and engineering information/data needs
in the EM area.
3.2.7 Summary

The state-of-EM-technology is assessed as staying marginally ade-

quate to meet the demands now placed on it in some but not all areas, yet these
4demands do not effectively represent either the known or formal EM requirements
as contained in DoD/DoN documentation section nor those growing out of Fleet EM
problems of record.
Among the prime causes of the current situation are:
o Inadequate application of EM engineering skills and technology.
o Some imbalance among technology functions, especially in the lagging
ability of analysis as compared to test technology.
o Weaknesses in technical support, particularly in information/data.

i4

3-7
 OVERVIEW
DISCIPLI NE (WHAT WE CAN DO)

0 Analysis is good for in-band Io-gain systems, HF shipboard environments and is usable for * Anal
in-band hi-gain systems and UHF simple shipboard environments and
* IEMCAP antenna/cable and cable/cable coupling models are being improved and validated * Systm
* Performance degradation analysis is provided by several codes and a handbook 0 No -
* SOT in test methods can support tailored operational interference controls • Vari_
EMC 0 Optical fibers are beginning to replace critical conventional cable runs * Existi-
REPORT 0 Mitigation devices and interference reduction techniques are varied, adequate, up-to-date, and
improving
** Ability
Nop
* Signal processing techniques for EMC are beginning to be applied to complex systems * Present
* Shielding techniques are good for simple geometries * D!
* Bonding and grounding techniques are adequate for conventional systems centrl
0 EME definition and simulation adequate for simple intra-system problems * Most
* Extensive data base and computer models exist for EME prediction

* EMV environmental levels (partially described in MIL-HOBK 235) are being updated s MIL-H
* IEMCAP available for internal EMV analysis 0 Ope
* Thin-wire models of missiles useful for susceptibility prediction S Cannot
EMV * Can partially generate hostile and friendly EME 0 Anal *
REPORT • Can simulate performance degradation for missiles 0 Cannot
0 Lower level EME for testing specified in MIL-STD 461 o IEMC
* Shielding, bonding, grounding, filtering interface techniques in use 0 Thin
* Fiber optics being developed as immunizing technique in critical circuits S Some
* EMV technology generally well-developed and not lacking S Need
* Analy-
* Analysis can predict the EMP field for a nuclear event S EMP
* Analysis can identify problem areas, provide design assurance, and guide testing Need_
* Full threat level certification testing can be made on smaller systems Stand
EMP 0 Subthreat level testing results can often be scaled to threat level 0 Present
REPORT 0 Damage or upset can be determined by direct injection test techniques * There
0 Adequate bonding, gounding, and shielding technology isavailable * Comm
0 Special hardening techniques are available but little data available on performance 0 Most
0 Good Tri-service data base on components vulnerability isavailable 0 Chan
0 Most needed design information is condensed to handbooks and guidelines * Engi.
0 Extensive Navy data bases at NSWC/WO (computer programs, guides, and reports) * Present
* No data

* Current ECCM technology in radar, RF guided weapons, electro-optical and communication

systems is adequate 0 Analy
ECCM 0 Naval intelligence can provide EM threat definition and operational scenarios * Comp
REPORT S ONI is planning a common set of RDT&E documents defining ECCM threats o ECM
* Can partially generate ahostile ECM environment (primarily for radars) trade--

* EM-Safety can be aided by antenna pointing limitations siting and training

E Adequate surveys are performed for HERF problems 0 Noo_
EM SAFETY 0 Technology exists to model P-static phenomena 0 No o
REPORT 0 Most currently operational aircraft are well protected against lightning S Need ta
* Lightning hazards to ships/shipboard personnel essentially nonexistent ** Ship
Safety-

* Recently developed analysis techniques are just beginning to meet needs 0 Ability
EM POWER 0 Approaches are available to mitigate against loss-of-power, common-mode noise, structure 0 Avail
REPORT *• currents
Testing and signal ground
technology loops
is generally
Bna
Increasing use is being made of adequate
switching for
modeneeds
power processing circuits 0
0 An&
EM-.
 DEFICIENCIES CONCLUSIONS AND REC
(WHAT WE CAN'T ORI DON'T DO)_________ _____________

* Analysis isvery marginal for out-of-band situations because of unavailability of component 0 Existing technology can provide prediction of, testing for, ai
and equipment characteristics design safety margins have to be used
" System arrangement is difficult to carry out and no methodology currently exists 0 Maximum benefits will occur when technology is applied thr-
* No common intra-system analysis code, with all desired features, exists 0 Inadequate technology transfer (6.2 to user); 6.2 output must
* Variability of equipment characteristics and coupling paths not treated statistically design
* Existing MIL-STO filter test requirements not adequate to select off-shelf filters 0 Continuing technology development programs may decrease
* Ability to handle non-linear EMI effects exists only in selected cases 0 Present emphasis on analysis program development, test tedh
* No prediction capability for grounding systems in complex systems mitigation devices/techniques isadequate
" Present shielding techniques marginal for non-ideal cases (with apertures, etc.) 0 Current/planned composite material efforts will provide req""
* Dissemination of data, necessary for supporting computer-aided analysis, hampered by lack of 0 Analysis developments now in planning will support S/S tail
central data bank 0 Cost-effective programs needed in: applying statistics in a
* Most handbooks available are for hardware design, not inter-system EMC information exchange; out-of-band performance; complex
establishment
" MIL-HOBK 235 gives only maximum EME levels; not sufficient criteria 0 Upgrade and improve MIL-HDBK 235 periodically via frien
* Operational factors which vary EME are difficult to determine 0 Develop test improvement for 1-200 MHz
* Cannot directly input EME data into simulation test computer 0 Characterize shielding effectiveness of composite materials,
* Analytical techniques for shielding prediction are insufficiently rigorous adhesives
* Cannot relate EMV/SEMI free space measurements to those of MIL-STD-462 and 1377 0 Develop IR/Visible spectrum shielded RF windows and c
* IEMCAP lacks high frequency capability * Determine EM susceptibiltiy of charge-coupled and other n
0 Thin-wire models can't handle interior configurations 0 Develop multiple signal effect techniques
0 Some present shielding measurement methods do not yield true shielding values 0 Extend component susceptibility research to include lifeti
* Need shielding characterization for composite and other new materials 0 Optimize system level RF hardening techniques

* Analysis cannot determine the vulnerability of complex systems without testing

0 EMP effects on power, steering, and propulsion systems are little understood
" Need better methodology for optimizing EMP protection and estimating costs EMP proutetio eine eistte ,dchnoial nwd
SO fr
fesibenne-
hardness assurance
" Standard methods or equipment are not adequate for life cycleverification tests
*
• SOT
hrcmnsi predict, test for, and control EMP effects
isadequate tonlssadtsigrsl
EMP hardness
uniformly
standard
simulators cannot performance
illuminate large or distributed systems 9 EMP protection engineering combines analysis and testing
• areEMP
Present
There no enforceable
* Common ground and ground loop problems exist insystem cabling design margins and
Improvements in SOT can narrow result aid
eistlopn sytemcablng
groud pobles Maximum benefits of technology if applied in conet
Most hardening devices are not certified and some are not available shuld
be aport i fapplied inconcept
* Changes of system layout on parts can degrade EMP protection already engineered * ThrningNavy E e pr ong platforms, a
* Engineering characterizations of EMP protective methods and devices are inadequate the SOT and should be continued
0 Present interaction and coupling data bases are not adequate for extrapolation
* No data base exists for system failure caused by operational transient upset

0 Threat should be better defined

o Develop technology
a Mtcnlg oa on
guDeine and analysistotechniques for more
correct existing cost
deficien
ECM versus
forhostile ECCMsystems
ESM/ECM n developed
not
criteria Establish a prioritized program
" Completeis
SAnalysis marginal of
duplicate
systems, 1
" ECM threat and ECCM requirements in threat definition/operational Increase emphasis on ECCM for communications
guidelines
ddresed ot flly effectiveness/cost 5 Designate an ECCM technology focal point
trad-offanalsis vulnerability
trade-off analysis not fully addressed vuneablt
Tendency to address overall systems performance including

B Determine biological interactions for low power level ema

N Biomedical research should be expanded to below 10 MHz
" Biological interactions are unknown especially for low power level
emanations Need for personnel EM radiation monitor for Navy use shd
No off-axis power density computations exist o No additional HERF work required unless fuels are altered
protectionrpasvdicrgsfofxeand
" "Need to evaluate
Shipboard requirement
EM radiation fortraining
hazards EM monitor
needed
personnel * Conduct R&D on composite materials to determine EM
Safety technology applications are lacking for aircraft composite materials 0 Develop P.static active or passive dischargers for fixed and

0 Develop a uniform grounding method to eliminate refueliq

A EF (electrostatic field) antenna should be tested/evaluated
0 Ability to anlayze continues to lag ability to design b Navy relies heavily on testing since analysis has been
0 Available technology poorly understood and underutilized by Navy and Contractors Newer technology requires better analytical tools to avoid
0 Better solutions for pulse load and harmonic current problems are needed Transfer of SOT knowledge into the Navy should be
0 testtechniques for certain stability problems are not available Efforts to get
0 Mitigation forand
pulse load harmonic current solutions
EM-Powerand
Analysis technology often lags other technology where both are needed 0 techniques Navy EM-Power problems shoid

FIGURE 3-1 SUMMARY OF EM DISCIPLINE

STATE OF TECHNOLOGY (SO
1- ~ 3-8
--IENCIES CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
WRNT OR DON'T DO)____________________________ _______

se of unavailability of component * Existing technology can provide prediction of, testing for, and control of EMI, although wide
design safety margins have to be used
odology currently exists 0 Maximum benefits will occur when technology is applied throughout entire AP
features, exists * Inadequate technology transfer (6.2 to user); 6.2 output must be in usable form for system
s not treated statistically design
to select off-shelf filters 0 Continuing technology development programs may decrease design margins/costs
gselected cases * Present emphasis on analysis program development, test technology modernization and
lex systems mitigation devices/techniques is adequate
(with apertures, etc.) 0 Current/planned composite material efforts will provide required EMC design capability
r-aided analysis, hampered by lack of 0 Analysis developments now in planning will support S/S tailoring process
* Cost-effective programs needed in: applying statistics in analysis and prediction; technology
inter-system EMC information exchange; out-of-band performance; complex systems techniques; data base
establishment
mfficient criteria 0 Upgrade and improve MIL-HDBK 235 periodically via friendly/hostile EME inputs
rmine 0 Develop test improvement for 1-200 MHz
puter 0 Characterize shielding effectiveness of composite materials, gaskets, conductive coatings and
iently rigorous adhesives
those of MIL-STO-462 and 1377 * Develop IR/Visible spectrum shielded RF windows and coatings
* Determine EM susceptibiltiy of charge-coupled and other new micro circuit devices
0 Develop multiple signal effect techniques
Id true shielding values 0 Extend component susceptibility research to include lifetime/reliability effects
new materials 0 Optimize system level RF hardening techniques
systems without testing
are
andlittle understood
estimating costs * EMP protection engineering is technologically feasible for tactical Navy systems
cycle hardness assurance 0 SOT is adequate to predict, test for, and control EMP effects on electronics
or distributed systems * EMP protection engineering combines analysis and testing iteratively
._nce verification tests 0 Shortcomings in analysis and testing result in wide engineering design margins
orn cabling * Improvements in SOT can narrow design margins and aid cost/performance trade-offs
itaviable 4 Maximum benefits of technology result ifapplied in concept phase and throughout AP
tion already engineered 0 EMP hardening should be apportioned among platforms, equipments, and interconnections
Isand devices are inadequate 0 The ongoing Navy EMP technology program is basic to addressing deficiencies and advancing
te for extrapolation the SOT and should be continued
I transent upset
* Threat should be better defined
• Develop technology and analysis techniques for more cost-effective ECCM equipment
* Establish a prioritized program to correct existing deficiencies with respect to redesign
loped guidelines
,/operational effectiveness/cost 0 Designate an ECCM technology focal point
Increase emphasis on ECCM for communications systems, data links, TACAN and IFF
vulnerability
0 Tendency to address overall systems performance including ECCM aspects

0 Determine biological interactions for low power level emanations

9 Biomedical research should be expanded to below 10 MHz
o rlevel emanations • Need for personnel EM radiation monitor for Navy use should be determined
p No additional HERF work required unless fuels are altered
* Conduct R&D on composite materials to determine EM characteristics, lightning/P-static
protection
posite materials 0 Develop P-static active or passive dischargers for fixed and rotary wing aircraft
* Develop auniform grounding method to eliminate refueling hazards
0 EF (electrostatic field) antenna should be tested/evaluated
* Navy relies heavily on testing since analysis has been awkward or nonexistent
Wby Navy and Contractors * Newer technology requires better analytical tools to avoid problems
":-.s are needed 0 Transfer of SOT knowledge into the Navy should be accelerated
_are not available * Efforts to get pulse load and harmonic current solutions should be accelerated
both are needed S Mitigation techniques for Navy EM-Power problems should be cataloged

FIGURE 3-1 SUMMARY OF EM DISCIPLINE TECHNICAL TEAM REPORTS -

STATE OF TECHNOLOGY (SOT)

3-8

............- ,-'---.-- -
I
3.3 EM Capabilities
3.3.1 Introduction
I The SYSCOM and Navy Laboratory technical capabilities to correct
EME deficiencies were assessed as tasked in paragraph 2.b of the CNM letter of 12
August 1976. Analysis capability, testing capability, availability of skilled per-
I sonnel and the capability to correct fleet problems, i.e., fleet support, were assess-
ed. The results of these findings are set forth below, highlighting strengths and
deficiencies. The findings relative to capabilities are summarized in Figure 3-2.
Navy capabilities to design EM-compatible platforms/systems/equipments/compo-
nents exist. However, EM problems conti'nue to proliferate in the fleet because
there is no systematic methodology, incluing enforcement, to apply, manage and
I monitor tlese capabilities in a timely, efficient manner.
3.3.2 Analysis Capability
The capability to analyze, model and predict the electromagnetic
I environment exists. Most sources of electromagnetic energy, including friendly and
hostile radiating sources, electromLgnetic pulse, and natural sources can be
I analytically defined. In the ECCM specialty, the projected threat environment is
difficult to pre-determine, but DNI is developing a publication to attempt to more
I clearly provide this information to the ECCM community. For EM power, analysis
techniques are poor and continue to lag the capability to design. Recently
I developed analysis techniques are just beginning to approach needs.
Component susceptibility to the EM environment is well understood
and can be modeled adequately. At the system/platform level, it is difficult to ac-
curately analyze system interactions. In the EMC specialty, ship coupling
mechanisms are well defined, however aircraft and missile interactions cannot be
Iaccurately specified. Analytical models are needed to determine the intra-system
interactions of both ships and aircraft. The Intra-System Electromagnetic Compati-
j bility Analysis Program (IEMCAP) is a promising tool for aircraft analysis and is
being validated by.
Techniques are required to model ship's complex structures and
optimal equipment arrangement on the platforms. In EMV, missile system
susceptibility/vulnerability analysis is adequate. Models do exist, but development
of thin-wire models and adaptation of IEMCAP should continue to upgrade the

I
13-9
 analysis capability. Good EMP environmental models and ship coupling models are
available, however, analysis alone cannot determine the EMP vulnerability of
complex systems without supplemental testing. ECCM performance models are
needed to evaluate system performance in terms of their mission. Except for P-
static, the EM Safety phenomena are well understood. Computer models and aids
exist and are used as needed.
3.3.4 Test Capability
Test and evaluation methods, instrumentation and facilities exist, at
" minimum levels, for partial testing of system s/s ubsyste ms in all EM disciplines.
There are extensive missile and aircraft test facilities for EMC and EMV. Full

EMP threat level testing capability for aircraft/missiles/small ships is currently

available.
Ships can only be EMP tested to subthreat levels; vulnerability is

determined by extrapolation to full threat conditions. EMP simulators and test

facilities cannot accommodate large ships. procedures of
Very few test
instrumentation or equipment are available to perform EMI in-place testing for
fleet maintenance.
EM test facilities are fair to good overall, but need upgrading.
Automated analysis and test facilities are needed to reduce test time and cost.
Data bases are needed to unify and transfer EM knowledge within and among
Navy/Tri-Services/industry/academic communities.
3.3.4 Personnel
Expertise, in the form of personnel, exists in all EM disciplines. The
number of available skilled personnel is very limited, as little as 1-3 personnel in
some disciplines in some organizations, leavirz lr .le ma,gig beyond current
workloads.
If the EM community were utilized properly by PM/AM's, including
greater use of EM-Programs, during system life cycles, present EM personnel
resources would be strained heavily. To augment and complement existing Navy
EM capabilities, new personnel must be trained and/or experienced personnel drawn
from the other sources.
Outside the EM engineering community, training is needed to
educate in the broad range of skills--from maintenance personnel through
managers--in EM matters to increase their knowledge and awareness of potential

3-10
 I
problems, their symptoms and sources of technical assistance. That this training is
essential is illustrated by the EMI problems occurring on CG-26 class ships and the
USS NIMITZ, and which could have been avoided or limited by knowledge of
standard EM engineering practices. On the CG-26 class interference to the HF
communications system, including Link II, was due to the interaction of multiple
radio emitters with the ship's hull, superstructure and especially appendages to the
hull, such as metallic ladders and armored cables. Had EM technology been
utilized, the preferred EM practice of fabricating top-side appendages from non-
Kmetallic materials could have been incorporated into topside ship design. Aboard
NIMITZ there is indication that the arcing problem with the AN/SPS-37/43 is
related to installation and/or maintenance problems.
The ECCM source document reports that approximately 45% of
I ECCM related system problems experienced to date are purported to be a
consequence of the lack of proper training of personnel in the ECCM discipline.
TESSAC judges that this condition exists, to varying degrees, in other EM areas as
• well.

3.3.5 Fleet Support

Capabilities, resources, facilities and skilled personnel exist al-
though in austere numbers in places. These capabilities are assessed as inadequate
to effectively control EM problems in the fleet. The methodology and machinery
for insuring that EMC is implemented into the full life cycle from system design
and through deployment are also not available. There is little utilized capability
for interaction amor , the SYSCOMs, the EM technical community and the fleet to
correct EM problems.
For ships, the SEMCIP program provides teams to perform ship
surveys on a planned basis and when individual problem arise. SEMCIP has a
systematic approach to their work, its major constraints are in the availability of
skilled personnel and budgetary resources.
In the aircraft community, there is no dedicated team or reporting
procedure to service their types of EM problems and ensure resolution. Such teams
should be established and utilized.
Force level, multiship/air EME are seldom reported and even less
often measured. TESSAC in conjunction with NAVSEA has sponsored efforts to
look beyond present single-ship EME in an attempt to measure and document more
complex EM environments. The two efforts to date have been conducted by

3-11

.. A
SEMCIP personnel under the direction of COMTHIRDFLT in exercise RIMPAC 77
and COMSECONDFLT in MSR 77. Initial results have indicated that the magnitude
of intrasystem/intraship EMC problems have not been understood and require
increased attention.
To provide a timely response to the fleet, an EM communica-
tions/reporting link should be established among the fleet, SYSCOMs and the
laboratories using existing lines of communication if possible. The existing
reporting systems indicate problems by system or equipment and were designated
for different purposes. It is essential that a reporting system which can readily
accommodate EM problems in terms suitable for diagnosis and corrective action be
set up. Feedback, analysis and utilization of fleet problem experience in improving
acquisition should also be provided for. An existing system, such as
AWCAP/SMSDCAP, possibly could be adapted for this purpose.
3.3.6 Summary
In summary, Navy EM capabilities do exist, with deficiencies as
noted above. To optimize the usage of these capabilities, EM disciplines must
impact at the conceptual and early design phases of systems/platforms and follow
through the process as required. Fleet reporting procedures which more correctly
identify EM problems must be investigated. Personnel should be trained within the
EM community and outside it to recognize both the consequences of ignoring EM
and the actual EM problems when they occur. When its resources of instrumenta-
tion, procedures, and people have been strengthened and applied properly, the Navy
will gradually become able to operate its systems in the fleet environment with
minimal EM environmental effects and their resulting degradation in operational
performance.

3-12
DISCIPLINE OVERVIEW
(WHAT WE CAN DO)

* EMC design capability is usable for current needs: "scientific" at component level; "artistic"m
at system level
0 SEMCIP program provides successful Fleet problem support, shipboard EMC and maintenance
procedure training .
EMC 0 Analytical capabilities in coupling are good for simple intrasystem cases (IEMCAP
EPOT validation on aircraft just beginning); performance prediction capability is being developed
REPORT and has proven cost effective
* Testing facilities are widespread and provide adequate support except for ship platforms 0
0 Qualified personnel are available in limited numbers to support EM programs 0
* Existing frequency management capabilities are adequate for today's needs 0
0 Capability exists to support specification tailoring 0

0 Capability to produice HERO-free weapons and EM problem-free GSE iscomplete

0 SEMCIP improved EM posture of every ship investigated 0
EMV 0 High intensity EMEs can be generated at some Navy facilities
REPORT 0 Most EMEs can be fairly well defined for vulnerability 0
0 Personnel and equipment are available to conduct needed EMV testing and analysis
0 Expertise exists to impart EMV technology to system design efforts, to provide fixes, and to
support EM programs

0 The Navy capability to analyze components/circuits is current with SOT

0 The Navy shares ability to analyze aircraft/missiles with other services
0 Computer codes are available for survivability/vulnerability analysis 0
EMP 0 The Navy can use SOT to predict isolated cable/antenna coupling interactions
REPORT 0 Aircraft fly-by test capability is unique to Navy (EMPRESS, EMPSAC)
* Aircraft and missiles can be tested fo full threat level -
0 Small and medium ships can be tested to subthreat level 0
0 Navy specialists are available to support EM programs

0 Navy Intelligence (ONI) has a partial capability to provide EW threat definition and 0
operational scenarios •
0 Navy has the capability to design ECCM system features and analyze/calculate individual 0
ECCM
REPORT system ECCM performance and costs
0 Navy has the capability to measure/test system ECCM performance through the labs,
OPTEVFOR/OTD and TAC D&E 0
0 Navy has the capability to correct system and platform ECCM deficiencies

0 Safety capabilities are adequate

EM SAFETY 0 Current capability can handle all HERF-related problems
E E TY 0 Aircraft P-static problems can be dealt with in field activities and EM programs
REPORT 0 Non-ionizing radiation effects research capability exists in Gov't/industry/academia
0 Navy/industry conducting studies (analysis & tests) on lightning problems
* Shipboard EM safety problems handled through Navy survey teams

" Navy capability to test is good but becoming less cost-effective insome areas
EM POWER " Capability exists to solve classical EM-Power problems 0
REPORT 0 Power processing circuits in Navy systems are rapidly increasing in complexity -
" Several Navy facilities are upgrading SOT knowledge with ad hoc short courses

(I)_ _
 DEFICIENCIES CONCLUSIONS AND RECO*
(WHAT WE CAN'T OR DON'T DO) ,.

* Many available analysis codes do not represent a capability because alack of assessment
prevents users from making optimum choices * Navy EMC capabilities are generally not adequately utilized bI
* System performance determination capabilities inadequate for engineering design 0 More use of EMCABs early in the AP will better utilize EMC a
" No support program equivalent to SEMCIP exists for aircraft 0 A technology exchange program can overcome compartmenlil
" Problem reporting is difficult; problem identification iseven harder 0 Continue present efforts to reduce analysis codes to acapa&
* Future frequency management will require more scientific and analytical techniques 0 Reduced cost of measurements could come via combining and
* Spectrum signatures and characteristics for recent equipment are scattered throughout Navy standards and from automated test facilities in development
or not available 0 Develop frequency management capability, incorporating leu
" Very limited capability to perform tailoring of standards and specifications S Developing the short courses, tailored to users, and presentinl
" Large platform test capabilities are nonexistent and help make PM/AM aware of available EMC capabilities s
0 Participationof EW personnel inEMCABs will help communi
* Present cost of performing measurements is quite high
" Poor coordination between EMC and EW personnel prevents EW's use of EMC analytic and the burden of attaining EMC
design capabilities

" Existing design expertise not being applied in timely manner in either design or
rework/overhaul areas * Validate IEMCAP for ships
* Need readily available, low cost testing techniques e Develop standard tests in composite material technology ares
* Standard tests for composite material technology not yet available * Support ongoing efforts to find cost-effective test techniques

* SOT inadequate for analysis of shipboard antenna and cable EMP interactions * EMP capabilities inthe Navy and elsewhere combine to pried
* Large ships cannot be tested at EMPRESS facility * Adequate consideration of EMP is necessary in early and _*
" Subthreat illumination levels for hardened ships is marginal for testing * An EMP simulation for large ships and higher illumination l
" Navy is not equipped for automated acquisition of EMP test data * For efficiency, automated data collection for testing shoul I
* Ability to verify hardness in factory or in place is minimal * Life cycle hardness assurance methodology should be dev-."

* Present EW threat definition is not sufficiently detailed, future oriented, nor mission related
* Analyses capabilities are inadequate for systems and mission * Develop an EW threat definition by joint technical and in-
* There is alack of data bases or Navy system characteristics for ECCM 0 Ensure financial support is available and appropriate for EC
* Navy EW assets have generally not been well utilized in support of total weapons system * Develop an automated data base for ECCM systems
ECCM 0 Dee an ted Pata Ofo mncM sym
• Lack of ED CCM test coordination with OTO USN/USMC ED efforts * Increase ECCM testing, particularly of communication se
* Lack of capability to perform ED CCM testing in a marine environment * Emphasize ECCM training requirements in system develop1
* Shortfalls in ECCM training

* Safety capabilities not effectively utilized * implement approved Nov training program for SEMCIP
" Comprehensive NAVMAT/SYSCOM directives on safety are not complete 0 Inclemen a rdiati n r o gram
* Insufficient knowledge exists to resolve problems posed by advanced materials/equipments * Include HERF in a radiation hazards educationalprogram
" P-static phenomena for rotary wing aircraft not adequately understood o Continue developmentin advanced materials, phenonmv.4
" Little product-oriented research is being conducted on phenomena for EM safety

* Navy EM-Power capability issparse 0 Navy capability ison par with other DOD but greatly laP
* Navy capability to analyze is poor * Seven of ten Navy facilities capability is limited to 1-3 P
* Testing is rarely supported by analysis o Only one facility istrying to regain its capability
* Poor knowledge of SOT by Navy and Contractors hampers capability to solve problems * Navy EM-Power capability should be upgraded and su- _
* Data bases are inadequate for system integration and other needs 0 Automated techniques should be developed for cost-f-

TECHNICAL
FIGURE 3-2 SUMMARY OF EM DISCIPLINE
/3-13
 DON'T DO) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
because alack of assessment
a Navy EMC capabilities are generally not adequately utilized by management
for engineering design * More use of EMCABs early in the AP will better utilize EMC capabilities
_ A technology exchange program can overcome compartmentalization of technology
harder 0 Continue present efforts to reduce analysis codes to a capability
and analytical techniques 0 Reduced cost of measurements could come via combining and simplifying appropriate
t are scattered throughout Navy standards and from automated test facilities in development
a Develop frequency management capability, incorporating newest technology
d specifications 0 Developing the short courses, tailored to users, and presenting them on-site will share technology
and help make PM/AM aware of available EMC capabilities and timely need for same
0 Participation of EW personnel in EMCABs will help communications/electronics and EW share
IM EW's use of EMC analytic and the burden of attaining EMC

ineither design o
in ethe deignor Validate IEMCAP for ships
0 Develop standard tests in composite material technology area
amailable 0 Support ongoing efforts to find cost-effective test techniques

EMP interactions 0 EMP capabilities in the Navy and elsewhere combine to provide astrong technology capability

for testing 0 Adequate consideration of EMP is necessary in early and subsequent stages of the AP
data 0 An EMP simulation for large ships and higher illumination levels should be built
0 For efficiency, automated data collection for testing should be developed
0 Life cycle hardness assurance methodology should be developed

re oriented, nor mission rtlated

for ECCM 0 Develop an EW threat definition by joint technical and intelligence input
Ort Of total weapons system 0 Ensure financial support is available and appropriate for ECCM test equipment
0 Develop an automated data base for ECCM systems
EO efforts o Increase ECCM testing, particularly of communication systems, data links, TACAN, and IFF
environment 0 Emphasize ECCM training requirements in system development

Pe not complete o Implement approved Navy training program for SEMCIP

advanced materials/equipments 0 Include HERF in a radiation hazards educational program
I understood 6 Continue development in advanced materials, phenomena, and equipment
h-uomena for EM safety

0 Navy capability is on par with other DOD but greatly lags NASA, SOT, and Navy needs
o Seven of ten Navy facilities capability is limited to 1-3 people
Iapability to solve problems 0
0 only
Navy one is trying toshould
facilitycapability
EM-Power regainbeitsupgraded
capability
and sustained at level needed
reds Automated techniques should be developed for cost-effective testing and data bases

FIGURE 3-2 SUMMARY OF EM DISCIPLINE TECHNICAL TEAM REPORTS - EM CAPABILITIES

3-13
I
3.4 State of EM Standards and Specifications
3.4.1 Introduction
This section describes the adequacy of current general specifications
and standards and related documents in EME effects. The emphasis is on Navy
status with reference to U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force status only where they are
I different and significant in terms of the Navy. No attempt was made to review
individual system/equipment procurement specifications although an excellent
II review is to be found in references, and are set forth tabularly in Figure 3-3.
3.4.2 Definitions
I- The Armed Service Procurement Regulation (ASPR) states that
items to be procured shall be described by reference to applicable specifications or
3 by a description containing the necessary requirements. A specification is a
document used primarily for procurement which clearly and accurately describes
the essential technical requirements for the procured item and the procedures to
I determine that the requirements are met. A standard is a document created
primarily to serve the needs of designers and to control variety. In equipment
*specifications, standards are referenced to prescribe those design and testing
requirements which are essential to interchangeability, compatibility, reliability,
and maintainability. Military handbooks are documents containing reference data
or guidance for use in design, engineering, production, procurement, and supply
I management operations. They are used for the preparation of specifications and
standards. Recent (21 May 1976) changes in the Armed Service Procurement
Regulation (ASPR) require referenced specifications and standards to be tailored in
I their application, thus formalizing an existing practice. ASPR defines tailoring as
the exclusion of those sections, paragraphs or sentences of individual specifications
and standards not required for a specific procurement. Tailoring as used in this
report is a somewhat broader concept in that it includes adding and changing
I specification content as well as deletion of content.
Specifications and standards in the text and in the tables are used in
this report to mean either general specifications or standards or both, or related
documents such as handbooks and directives that serve similar purposes.
3.4.3 Criteria
The criteria used in this report for determining the adequacy of
specifications and standards and related documents are: Do they exist? Do they

3
* 3-14$
specify both the technical requirements and the procedures to determine the
requirements are met? Are they in consonance with the expected EME and
operational requirements? Are they compatible with joint specifications and
standards? Are they compatible with the technology and engineering practices
expected to be used? Are they compatible with data needs? Are they reasonably
easy to tailor? And, when the individual specifications and standards are
collectively viewed, do they cost-effectively state the Navy technical requirements
for systems/platforms that meet operational requirements in a real-life EME and
cost-effectively state the procedures to determine the technical requirements are
met?
3.4.4 Findings
It was commonly acknowledged in all Technical Team and SYSCOM
reports that most EM specifications and standards are outdated and need revision.
A time lag between the issuance of specifications and standards and new
technology exists which is the source of many problems.
Equipments such as the AN/SPN-41 aircraft approach control system
and AN/SPN-42 aircraft carrier landing system were fleet problems because
radiated susceptibility requirements were not included in the EM specifications.
Other fleet problems have occurred because requirements in existing specifications
and standards were waived, deviations authorized, or the EM requirements ignored.
Numerous examples can be cited in current or recent aircraft procurement, such as
the S-3A, F-14A and the EA-6B. EM specifications and standards have also been
cited as being too lax, such as the radiated E-field susceptibility limit (RS03) of one
volt/meter in MIL-STD 461 when equipment is used above decks and too stringent
such as the conducted power line conducted emission limit (CE0I) when this limit is
applied to high power equipment.
Tailoring of specifications and standards for each individual applica-
tion is initially an appealing solution to many of the above problems, such as
specifications and standards lagging the technology and being too lax or too
stringent for a given purpose; however, successful tailoring requires highly
experienced personnel, of which the Navy has a limited number in the EM field, or
personnel with lesser experience using adequate tailoring guidelines. These
guidelines are mostly non-existent. The problems caused by uninformed tailoring
can be expected to be as severe or worse than those caused by uninformed waivers

3-1
 I
and deviations. For example, the power line conducted susceptibility test (CS0I),
of MIL-STD 461 is often tailored out because the person performing the tailoring is
unaware that it can detect a common power supply design fault not uncovered by
* any other test that the equipment is normally subjected to in the acquisition
process.
The non-existence of specifications and standards is another
problem. There are no specifications and standards for the EM disciplines of EMV,
EMP, or ECCM. No Navy specifications and standards provide requirements or
* assurance procedures for P-static or lightning. There is no specification or
standard harmonizing the grounding system to minimize EM from the EME-related
to EMC, EMV, EMP, EM Safety and EM Power and their requirements. There is no
equivalent of MIL-E-6051 for ships that specifies general EMC. However, there are
I documents that can be used as data sources for tailoring existing specifications and
standards for some of these purposes. These include MIL-HNDBK 235, which
defines free space EME in the vicinity of friendly and hostile platforms; MIL-
.. 1 HNDBK 237, which gives guidelines for management and control of EMC; and a
~I proposed SAE standard that defines standard testing wave forms for lightning.
I Even where specifications and standards exist, joint specifications
and standards are often incompatible. Overlaying the documents controlling a
tcommon interface may indicate negative design margins. The requirements in the
joint specifications give no assurance that the equipments can operate with each
jother. Accommodation of contradictory EMC and ECM needs is a similar problem.
Along with many other EMC worries, requirements and testing for both friendly and
hostile ECM must be defined. The EM environment can be, and occasionally has
been, described in requirements, analyses and design for conventional engineering
g purposes for platform EME (EMV/EMC, etc.) interactions--e.g., radars and
communications operating simultaneously; however, our analysis capability, as
discussed earlier, is weak. Unfortunately, EW equipment operations, both friendly
jand hostile are seldom addressed or defined in contractual documents. Own forces
ECM for example, poses a special problem. One of its purposes is to modify the
EME in the vicinity of the platform. Own forces equipment must operate in the
environment. Additionally, hostile ECM can be expected to be specifically aimed

at degrading system, platform or force EM capabilities by creating an incompatible

environment. Definition of our ECM is possible, but definition of hostile ECM will
be a foreign intelligence-based estimate. Both must be considered for effective
naval operations.

3-16
 The use of specifications and standards for assuring technical
requirements are met is generally poor. Standards contain no quality assurance
provisions. They either state standard limits, such as MIL-STD 461, or standard
test procedures, such as MIL-STD 462. Assuring technical requirements are met is
left to the generalized detailed specifications. This is as it is supposed to be.
However, general assurance provisions are omitted from general specification
placing the total burden on the detailed specification. For example, the general
electronic equipment specification for avionics, MIL-E-5400, references MIL-STD
704, the aircraft electrical power standard for the technical requirements for
electrical power. MIL-STD 704 contains no assurance provisions and MIL-E-5400
provides none except the notation it is to be provided in the detailed specification.
The full assurance burden falls on the author of the detailed specification, an
inefficient and potentially risky approach.
ASPR states data requirements are to be controlled by the contract,
not specifications and standards. However, the procedures and formats for data
and classes of data can be controlled by standards. EM engineering is less effective
than it could be because of the fact that data needed in the analysis and design pro-
* cesses is unavailable or unuseable. In some cases, such as EMP effects on ships, the
data is sparse and difficult to obtain, in other cases, such as MIL-STD 461 test
data, the amount of data collected is extensive but of little use in system
integration because of the accept-not accept format of some of tne data and the
lack of standard acquisition, storage, and retrieval of the data. The creation of
standards to control EM data formats can be used to greatly improve the data
acquisition, storage, and retrieval situation and make the data more useful.
3.4.5 Summary
Specifications and standards are one of the most important tools
available for controlling EME effects in the fleet and have made possible many of
the successful EM equipments and systems now being employed. It is because of
this importance that any shortcomings in specifications and standards are of direct
and immediate interest. By the very nature of their scope and content.
specifications and standards tend to lag Service requirements and the state of
technology by as much as two or three years. Effective control of EME effects
requires shortening this time as much as possible while concurrently using tailoring
as a method of overcoming whatever shortcomings there may be in the existing
specifications and standards.

3-17
 I
j It was commonly acknowledged in all the Technical Team and
SYSCOM reports that many specifications and standards are outdatred and in need
J of revision, are non-existent in some cases, and need uniform tailoriig guidelines.
The vital role of specifications and standards in controlling EME demands that this
situation be improved.

I
I
~I

~I

~I

I
I
I
I
I
I3-18
DISCIPLINE OVERVIEW
(WHAT WE CAN DO)
0 Ine

0 S/S properly utilized can avoid later expensive modifications to achieve EMC iequ
* Limited provision now exists in S/S for (1) management guidance in concept development, 0 Lag of
(2) integration/installation guidance, (3) frequency management guidance for radar systems, 0 Exi t
EMC and (4) requirements for documentation of test and analysis results 0 S/S oi
E Current S/S can support an EMI program, but only via experienced engineering personnel need
REPORT 0 Tailoring S/S is a viable compromise between rigid standards and costly "hand-cafted" 0 S/S do
systems and avoids the need for a large engineering effort wavef
* Current standards are generally usable as starting points for development of revised or aging
"tailorable" standards 0 Newer
0 Current technology can support tailored specifications pro
* Present
tailo

M MIL.HDBK 235 undergoing revision and update * Very

EMV * HERO/GSE have upgraded specs/stds which are adequate 0 MIL
REPORT 0 When modified, EMC specs/stds may be used for EMV * M
0 Properly tailored, existing specs/stds can adequately define EMV periormarce Existi
•MI L-STi

0 Two S/S approaches are feasible

- Critical system approach (ad hoc S/S)
EMP - Mil-spec approach (tailored general S/S) 0 S/S are
REPORT 0 A few existing EME S/S reinforce EMP survivability to some extent * The
* Current efforts to develop handbooks, data bases, design guidelines and S/S are systems
supportive of a consistent approach

* There
ECCM * ECCM requirements which are integral to overall system specifications ard standards pro
REPORT can be developed * There
0 Intell'
ESM/E

• BUMED publishes EM radiation exposure limits which SYSCOMsimplement * Certein

EMREPORT
SAFETY *0 Revision
HERF is of RADHAZ standards in the microwave region is being investigated
adequately documented * No NA
R 0 Noc
NAVORD 00-44811 Vol. Iand 00-10773 aaequately specify static electricity requirements 0 Some
* Current lightning specs are utilized only for new aircraft * Wave

* Exis
0 S/S controlling EM-Power vary individually from adequate to very poor, They are generally S S/S-
Exi
EM POWER used in Navy *
REPORT inadequate in relationship to each other and to the emerging technology being
systems 0 Ship
• S/S-5
 DEFICIENCIES
(WHAI WE CAN'T DO DR DON'T DO) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDI

* Ineffective implementation and excessive waiving of S/S yields unreliable operation and 0 A revised/unified standardization process can reduce lag between SS
requires costly fix-ups 6 Concise waiver requirements will reduce engineering costs
* Lag of S/S behind technology isendemic to DoD standardization system 0 A management guidance handbook covering early acquisition phasui
* Existing S/S are inadequate in needed out-of-band component performance 0 Computer information retrieval can provide interrelationships for
" SIS on filter testing, shielded enclosures, lightning effects, gounding and spectrum signatures 0 Standards evolvement should be oriented toward system problem
need specific revisions mitigation equipment
* S/S do not cover large platform tests, hull penetration, unified grounding, lightning test 0 Modify and use some DNA, IEEE and SAE standards to cover areas
waveforms, cable pick-up, shielding gaskets, conduit, arrangement and decoupling and gasket MIL-STDS
aging and corrosion 0 Standardization of installation and integration practices requires N
* Newer technologies of composites, fiber optics, phased arrays, spread spectrum and micro. payoff isoptimized platform configurations
processors not considered in S/S * Tailoring can be achieved by doing systems engineering using current
* Present standards are written in a general way which requires tailoring but are not readily techniques
tailorable, and tailoring guidelines/approach does not exist • Development of concise tailoring guidelines will make tailoring pr

Very few system/platform specs/stds provide EMV requirements 0 Need adequate set of specs/stds which address EME and T&E requi
*
of application
are
feL-st emplformit
Very s d rovfrcitica EMV eviroments
* MLST-461 limits are 4 dB too low for critical EMV environments * Establish
During S/Seffective
revision,interface
emphasisbetween
should specs/stds efforts EM
be on integrated andconsider
technol
* Existing specs/stds overlap, conflict, and are obsolete insome areas * Extend MIL-STD-1377 techniques for shielding effectiveness to
MIL-STD-1377 and 285 data can differ by 10-20 dB for shielding effectiveness

tac
0 The mil-spec approach is better suited and recommended for
effort is required throughout NAVMAT to develop
0 A concentrated subsystem, system, and platform
at the equipment,
requirementsndcates
Experience specifying performance s at the component
SIS are very meager Or nonexistent for all aspects of EMP protection systems level are the best
design procedures atatthe
fabrication androetion
• The data base for writing S/S for hardening ships is meager because few ships or ship S/fabra ae edes th se ,susystem arebs
th
and should
have been hardened available on EMP hardening
systems s Considerable information is

* S/S for EMP protection are needed at t ystem, subsystem, and

* There are no specifications or standards prescribing ECCM susceptibility tests and test ment susceptibility tests
* • Develop
evelspeideins standardsonfor ECCM
specifications and standar
procedures environment
* There are no guidelines for specifying an ECM * Establish guidelines for ECM environment
a wholly accurate definition of an
• Intelligence exploitation limitations will preclude * 5 to define the EME environment for ECCM
ESM/ECCM hostile environment

Effort should be expended to fill the gaps and revise safety SS

* * NortNASEA o instructions
ruAR tinrnot are not consistent
osstndardwith latest BU
exitast
B Instructions
I o* Each SYSCOM should be directed to write safety guidance and i
Certain SYSCOM
lightning/P.static standards exist 0 Future safety criteria should be based on current scientific data
* No NAVSEA or NAVAIR and Board of In
S/S to assist
should providewaveform
Navy MIL-6-50876
New manufacturer
should be developed
Wo av saetilize foretstaled
s Ou nM•
*• Some Navy safety specs are outdated for EM
on aircraft designers/manufacturers
Develop MILE-6051D
WWiImpose S/S for safety operating requirements and test instrumefi

0 Existing conjoint S/S are mismatched on the common interface they control
* Existing general S/S are inadequate to assure operation inare
exp
* Existing SIS and the technology being used are incompatible 3 0 Consistent S/S tailoring procedures S/S
are needed white knowedge im
sensitivity to get SOT
0 SIS ignore signal ground or encourage practices that increase Eseveral times a day * Better management methods are needed
transients occurring
* Ship S/S don't require operation through performance in expected EME
to demonstrate
0 S/S test requirements not adequate

TE
FIGURE 3-3 SUMMARY OF EM DISCIPLINE
EM SPECIFICATIONS AND STAND
3-19
 XCIES
o OR DON'T DO) CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
of S/S yields unreliable operation and 0 A revised/unified standardization process can reduce lag between S/S and technology
0 Concise waiver requirements will reduce engineering costs
standaidization system 0 A management guidance handbook covering early acquisition phases is required
component performance 0 Computer information retrieval can provide interrelationships for standards
effects, gounding and spectrum signatures 0 Standards evolvement should be oriented toward system problem solutions vice EMI
mitigation equipment
tion, unified grounding, lightning test 0 Modify and use some DNA, IEEE and SAE standards to cover areas now ignored by
it, arrangement and decoupling and gasket MIL-STOS
* Standardization of installation and integration practices requires Navy-wide cooperation, but
phased arrays, spread spectrum and micro. payoff isoptimized platform configurations
0 Tailoring can be achieved by doing systems engineering using current EMC tools and
ich requires tailoring but are not readily techniques
not exist # Development of concise tailoring guidelines will make tailoring process cost effective

requirements 0 Need adequate set of specs/stds which address EME and T&E requirements for all levels
EMV environments of application
lete in sonie areas 0 Establish effective interface between specs/stds efforts and technology effort
dB for shielding effectiveness 0 During S/S revision, emphasis should be on integrated EM considerations
0 Extend MIL-STD-1377 techniques for shielding effectiveness to below I GHz

0 The mil-spec approach is better suited and recommended for tactical systems
0 A concentrated effort is required throughout NAVMAT to develop common hardening
of EMP protection requirements at the equipment, subsystem, system, and platform levels
is meager because few ships or ship * Experience designspecifying
indicates
fabrication and performance at the component level and specifying
procedures at the systems level are the best approaches
* Considerable information is available on EMP hardening and should go into S/S
• S/S for EMP protection are needed at the system, subsystem, and component levels

g ECCM susceptibility tests and test

* Develop specifications and standards for ECCM susceptibility tests and test procedur s
ronment o Establish guidelines for ECM environment
a wholly accurate definition of an o Update MIL-HOBK 235 to define the EME environment for ECCM system design

0 Effort should be expended to fill the gaps and revise safety S/S
w sth BUMED Instr0ctions
latest 0 Each SYSCOM should be directed to write safety guidance and implementing Instructions
rds exist 0 Future safety criteria should be based on current scientific data and updated regularly
Survey
* Navy should provide S/S to assist manufacturer and Board of Inspection and
i New MIL-B-5087B waveform should be developed
toproduce in Labs
difficult
6087B is Impose MIL-E-6051D on aircraft designers/manufacturers for EM safety
* Develop S/S for safety operating requirements and test instrumentation

E on interface they control

inrpatble
ptincrease
E3 sensitvty
• Existing general S/S are inadeqtiate to assure operation in expected EME
Consistent S/S tailoring procedures are needed while S/S are improved
;t occurring several times aday 0 Better management methods are needed to get SOT knowledge into S/S
performance in expected EME

FIGURE 3.3 SUMMARY OF EM DISCIPLINE TECHNICAL TEAM REPORTS -

EM SPECIFICATIONS AND STANDARDS (S/S)

3-19
 I
j4. PROJECTED DOCUMENTATION

1 4.1 Background
In order to determine the optimal manner in which to make responses to
the CNM tasking of 12 April 1976 (Section 1.1), a workshop was held in which highly
qualified Electromagnetic En.!ronment Effects EME management and engineering
personnel from OPNAV, NAVMAT, three SYSCOMs and the laboratories partici-
I[ pated. TESSAC's approach to the desired documents is based upon the workshop
recommendations. Five interrelated documents are projected (Figure 4-1).
"I Document writing teams have been identified and a "Master Document Schedule"
was developed (Figure 4-2). This report constitutes TESSAC's summarized response
to the CNM Tasks assigned in paragraphs 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c of CNM's letter. The
remaining four documents will be:
. Navy EME Guide
i| Plan for Ensuring EME Controls in Acquisitions
In-Service Support Plan for EME Effects
I Program Plan for EME Effects RDT&E

1 4.2 Navy EME Guide

This guide, projected as a military handbook, "Navy-Only" its initial issue,
3 will contain primarily management guidance for those who are required to address
the effects of the electromagnetic environment on or from a platform, system or
* equipment throughout its life cycle. It will describe process to be followed,
pertinent other military and government documents, management, contracting,
planning, technical considerations and related disciplines and programs. The basic
1 document will be management oriented, with specific guidance tailored for
individual groups (e.g., managers, engineers, users) provided. It is intended that
this guide will be a continuing, evolving document with periodic reviews and
updates as necessary. Although the guide was not assigned as a specific task by the
CNM, it is believed by TESSAC to be very necessary. This guide is expected to
make a valuable contribution to fleet EM effectiveness. A draft copy is scheduled
for review by early November 1977 and final preparation for introduction into the
MILHANDBOOK approval cycle is anticipated in December 1977.

4
S4-1
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 4.3 Plan for Ensuring EME Effects Controls In Acquisitions
This plan will be the vehicle to develop and implement a recommended
management for the acquisition, deployment and support of platforms, systems and
equipment, and propose the means for its implementation. The plan will include
recommended policies and procedure overviews covering requirements for re-
sources, contractual documents and their review, management control and review,
and test and evaluation requirements. This plan will discuss procurement planning

- -
documentation requirements and the division of responsibilities and functions of
Program/Project Managers, Acquisition Managers, and reviewing/approving eche-
Ions. Recommended changes to existing instructions and directives, required for
consistency and to ensure that requirements will be fulfilled, will be coordinated
with the concerned SYSCOMs or other offices of origination and attached as
appendices. This is envisaged as a one-time document, having served its purpose
when its recommendations are implemented and the EME provisions are factored
-into pertinent documents and procedures.
This plan responds in part to paragraph 2.d of CNM's 12 April 1976 letter
and is scheduled for publication in November 1977.

4.4 In-Service Support Plan for EME Effects

The In-Service Support Plan will develop a program of fleet EME support
actions so designated and scheduled as to assure acceptable effectiveness of
electronic/electrical systems and equipments during the in-service phase of their
life cycle. The proposed actions would implement a technical-management closed-
loop system whereby EM incidents would be observed, analyzed and resolved, and
provide inputs for EME effects RDT&E. Emphasis will be placed upon the high-
priority requirements for consolidating the best techniques for auditing and
managing the EME effectiveness status of fleet forces. This plan may interact
with other existing documents of specific programs, e.g., FEMR (Fleet EM
Readiness), SEMCIP, and the NMC Five Year EMC Plan.
This plan responds in part to paragraph 2.d of CNM's 12 April 1976 letter.
Publication is scheduled for November 1977.

4.5 Program Plan for EME Effects RDT&E

This plan will develop a comprehensive RDT&E program designed to
provide the technical capabilities and tools to solve and in the future prevent or

4-4
 I
I reduce to acceptable levels the EM problems currently degrading fleet operations.
Deficiencies noted will be compared with on-going RDT&E tasks to
Idetermine possible additional EME Effects RDT&E needs. A program to achieve
these needs will be included in the plan. This will be a continuing document with
jperiodic review and revision, as judged appropriate. The plan will be coordinated
with documents with which it interacts, and is intended to replace the NMC Five
i Year EMC Plan FY-78-FY-82.
U IThis plan responds to paragraph 2.e of the CNM letter of 12 April 1976 and
is scheduled for publication in December 1977.

"; I

I A

!II
~I

I
* I
I '4-

I
I
I
14-5
 5. CONCLUSIONS

1 5.1 General
The principal conclusions of the state-of-electromagnetic effects relative
to system acquisition and in-service support are:
o The State-of-EM technology within the Navy is marginally keeping
pace with the state-of-the-art. This technology is adequate to prevent or reduce
most of the Navy's EM problems. However, resources are fragmented throughout
various activities and are unwieldy to coordinate.
o The lack of supporting data bases are a major inhibition to EM
technology development and application such that technology transfer to users is
I not being accomplished efficiently.
o Technology is not being utilized in a timely and efficient manner
* during system conceptual, early development and design phases.
o Technical capabilities to apply technology are not uniform in all EM
*disciplines at all levels from analysis and test tools through managerial application.
o Specifications and standards lag technology and are not supportive
of EM engineering efforts. Of all the CNM task areas studied, the specifications
and standards area was most seriously faulted by Technical Teams. Both
specifications and standards content and revision procedures are in need of
improvement. Specifications and standards require tailoring to systems in order to
be used most advantageously.
o Interfaces between acquisition managers (PM/AMs), the Fleet and
the EM engineering community are weak.
o There are too few knowledgable personnel in the SYSCOMs charged
with the responsibility for ensuring that EM is incorporated into system acquisition
and in-service actions. Unless and until the strength and quality of line engineering
S manager support is increased to levels commensurate with the importance and
priority of EM technology, current deficiencies will persist.

I 5.2 Deficiencies in Technology

0 The technology base is sufficiently developed to design deficiency-
free equipment and to correct existing deficiencies in EMC.

I
j 5-I

".... l
 5.3 Deficiencies in Capabilities
The EM analysis capability lags testing capability--testing being used as a
substitute for analysis. Specific deficiencies in EM analysis include:
o Gaps in threat definition and analysis.
o Limited modeling/prediction models and validation criteria for
computer codes/programs now in use.
o Performance prediction testing, and platform placement has been
limited to component/equipment/simple systems, single small platforms and non-
sophisticated environments.
o System level analysis and testing is limited or " ble for complex
systems, multiple systems, large structures and complex en. mments, except by
employing wide parameter margins. (Existing analysis and test facilities and
designed for missiles and aircraft rather than ships.)
o Instrumentation is needed to accommodate newest technologies.
o Manpower and facilities allocated to the EM community are
insufficient for the responsibilities and workload now carried. The Navy's pool of
experienced EM personnel is sparse and additional resources will have to be
developed or sought in industry to complement the Navy's capabilities.
o Within the fleet, many EM problems are not properly identified and
reported as such, resulting in improper application of EM engineering to resolve
fleet EMI problems.
o There are limited programs for reporting fleet EMI problems
(excepting SEMCIP for ships problems) and only insufficient and non-systematic
methods for correcting such deficiencies.
o There are limited fleet EMC training programs for EM maintenance
procedures, on-site instructions/aids, information exchange and feedback.

5.4 Deficiencies in Specifications and Standards

Existing military specifications and standards do not satisfy the need for
specific, current, yet feasible, requirements and controls, nor do they effectively
capitalize upon the EM state of technology. With few exceptions, they are
reported to be overlapping, contradictory, out-dated, impractical to implement and
lacking in pertinent EM provisions.

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MMilo
 unanimously cited by
o Specifications and standards in current use are
the Technical Teams as an area of multiple deficiencies, which they documented,
* I discipline by discipline, item by item. The sole exceptions are specifications and
standards relating to HERO (Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance),
H-ERF (Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuel) and perhaps HERP (Hazards
I of Electromagnetic Radiation to Personnel).
0 There are no specifications and standards which explicitly call out
I ECCM, EMP, or EMV requirements.
0 There are no specifications and standards to cover advanced
I technology (e.g., fiber optics, composite materials), large platform test procedures,
hull penetration, and various other ship and aircraft requirements.I
0 Handbooks are of limited aid to EME engineers; however, their

U deficiencies do far less harm than do those of specifications and standards.

U hr r niain htprs ftegnrlseiiain n
I standards have been derived from basic OPNAV and supportive NAYMAT
documentation (such as OR's, DP's) which in turn lack specific EM parameters in
I defining and identifying specifications and standards in equipment/systems or
platform procurement contracts.
1 Along time lag between technological development and publication
of military specifications and standards is endemic to the DoD standardization

sytm o Procurement specifications and standards properly prepared and

applied can avoid many expensive engineering modifications and delays in

I system/platform acceptance as well as periods of unreliable operation and costly
retrof its.
0 Tailoring of procurement specifications and standards is a viable
compromise between rigid, detailed guidelines (prone to become obsolete quickly)
and expensive custom-built designs. Coordinated tailoring likewise conserves
engineering personnel and tacilitates realistic trade-of fs.

5-
 I
I 6. RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations as set forth below are derived from the conclusions
presented in the preceding section. Amplifying plans for their implementation will
Jbe provided in the TESS Action Council documents under development separately.
Recommendations are as follow:
The Chief of Naval Material
o Take actions, through regular reviews of formal planning documents,
to ensure that policies for inclusion of EM requirements throughout equipment life
|I cycles are complied with. (To be addressed in the Plan for Ensuring EME Effects
Controls in Acquisitions).
o Ensure that adequate funding is provided for EM technology develop-
ment and technology management, in RDT&E funding planning and allocation. (To
4 |be addressed in the Program Plan for EME Effects RDT&E).
Uo Cause allocation of engineering personnel to staff additional
NAVMAT/SYSCOM/field activity EM billets sufficient for recommended additional
U emphasis.
o Ensure through routine review, that EM requirements are contained
in development proposals, and elsewhere in conceptual phases of acquisition. (To
be addressed in Plan for Ensuring EME Effects Controls in Acquisitions).
The Commanders, Systems Commands
o Establish and support EM organizations adequate to perform
necessary EM functions effectively on a continuing basis.
o Develop procedures for graduated levels and types of EM engineer-
- |ing assistance to acquisition managers ensuring early and continuing participation
I throughout acquisition. (To be addressed in the Plan for Ensuring EME EFFECTS
Controls in Acquisitions).
o Expand EMCAB concept to include engineering personnel in all EM
disciplines, supporting acquisitions managers from system conceptual phase through
1 acquisition.
o Increase scope of training programs to integrate all EM disciplines
with particular er phasis on on-the-job fleet training in EM maintenance proce-
dures. (To be addressed in the In-Service Support Plan for EME Effects).

I
1 6..1
 o Issue or modify directives to implement and enforce CNM policies
on EME. (To be addressed in the Plan for Ensuring EME Effects Controls in
Acquiisi t ions).
o Define EM requirements for ship, aircraft and missile technical
characteristics down to appropriate levels of detail.
o Initiate collection, maintenance and retrieval of EM data in compat-
ible format on current basis for easy access by potential users.
o Initiate early review of EM-related military specifications, stan-
dards and handbooks; bring current with technology, and cxpand for broad life cycle
zapplication.
o Develop and issue tailoring procedures and guidance for preparation
of procurement specifications complementing military specifications and standards.
o Develop specifications and standards in the areas of new technology
(composites, phased arrays and digital processors) and EM disciplines (EMV, EMP),
not now included.
o Ensure that RDT&E programs provide the EM technology and
facilities required to support SYSCOM material development and Fleet support
programs.
o Implement program similar to SEMCIP for ships to identify and cor-
rect airborne weapons systems in-service EM problems, obtaining sponsorship
support in OPNAV.
o Modify existing reporting and management information systems to
categorize and report fleet EM problems and improve dissemination of information.
(To be addressed in the In-Service Support Plan for EME Effects).
o Develop system level acceptance testing capability.
The Chief of Naval Material Recommend to the Chief of Naval Operations
that He
o Ensure by appropriate review that EM requirements are incorporated
into the Mission Element Needs Statements, Operational Requirements and Naval
Decision Coordination Papers.

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 - -~ - - -~

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APPENDIX A

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4. I
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I 9

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 I
I
GLOSSARY

i AM - Acquisition Manager
AP - Acquisition Process
j A.PR - Armed Service Procurement Regulation
AWCAP - Airborne Weapons Corrective Action Program
[NIS - Bureau of Inspection & Survey
RUMED - Bureau of Medi-ine
i ('CM - Counter-Counter Measures
DCAP - Deficiency Corrective Action Program
DCII - D'ecision Coordinating Paper
i DNA - Defense Nuclear Agency
DNI - Director of Naval Intelligence
DP - Development Proposal
E('A( - Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center
ECCM - Electronic Counter-Counter Measures
ECM - Electronic Counter Measures
E3 - Electromagnetic Environment Effects
EF - Electrostatic Field
EM - ElectromAgnetic
I EMC - Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMCAB - Electromagnetic Compatibilty Advisory Board
EMCPP - Electromagnetic Compatibility Program Plan
E[ME - Electromagnetic Environment
EMI - Electromagnetic Interference
EMP - [Ile' trornagnetic Pulse
I EM-Power - Electromagnetic Power
EMPRESS EMP Radiation Environment Simulator for Ships
EMPSA - EMP Simulator for Aircraft

I
I A-I
GLOSSARY (Continued)

EM-Safety - Electromagnetic Safety

EMV - Electromagnetic Vulnerability
E-O - Electro-Optics
ESM - Electronic Warfare Support Measures
EW - Electronic Warfare
FEMR - Fleet Electromagnetic Readiness
GSE - Ground Support Equipment
HERF - Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation'to Fuels
HERO - Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance
HER P - Hazards of Elect romagneti c Radiation to Personnel
IEEE - Institute of Electrical/Electronic Engineers

IEMCAP - Intrasystem Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Program

IMI - Intermodulation Interference
MAPPS - Modeling and Analysis of Power Processing Systems
MENS - Mission Essential Needs Statement
NDCP - Navy Decision Coordinating Paper
OPEVAL - Operational Evaluation
OPTEVFOR - Operational Test and Evaluation Force
OR - Operational Requirement
OTD - Office of Test Direction
PM - Project/Program Manager
POA&M - Plan of Action & Milestones
P-Static - Precipitation Static (Triboelectricity)
RADHAZ - Radiation Hazards
RDT&E - Research, Development, Test & Evaluation
REWSON - Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare and Naval Intelligence Processing
Systems
RIMPAC - Pacific Fleet Surface-to-Air Missile Exercise
SAE - Society of Automotive Engineers
SEMCA - Shipboard Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis
SEMCAP - System Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Program

A-2
 I GLOSSARY (Continued)

I SEMCIP - Shipboard Electromagnetic Compatibility Improvement Program

SEMI - Special Electromagnetic Interference
SHIPALT - Ship's Alteration
SOT - State of Technology
S/S - Specifications and Standards
TECHEVAL - Technical Evaluation
TECS - Tactical Electromagnetic Coordination and Support
TEMP - Tactical Electromagnetic Programs also;
TEMP - Test and Evaluation Mast Plan
I TESSAC - Tactical Electromagnetic Systems Study Action Council

I A
Ir ,

A- 3
I
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I APPENDIX B

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 REFERENCES

I. OPNAV Notice 5430 of 24 November 1969, Subj: Office of Tactical Electro-

magnetic Coordinator (OP-03), Establishment of

2. OPNAV Notice 5430 of 24 January 1971, Subj: Director, Tactical Electromag-

netic Programs (OP-093), Establishment of

3. NAVMATINST 5430.46 of 21 June 1971, Subj: Director of Tactical Electro-

magnetic Programs (TEMP; charter for

4. OPNAVINST 5430.46 of 8 June 1972, Subj: Electromagnetic Systems, equip-

ments and tactical programs, designation of

I 5. NAVMAT Note 5430 of 19 June 1973, Subj: REWSON Project and TEMP
Office, PM-7; revisions to NMC Management of

j 6. NAVELEXINST 5430.16 of 18 July 1973, Subj: TEMP (Tactical Electromag-

netic Program) Office, Establishment of

I 7. COMNAVELEXINST 5430.19 of 18 April 1974, Subj: TEMP (Tactical Electro-

magnetic Programs) Office (ELEX-095)

8.
I NAVMAT Notice 5430 of 29 August 1975, Subj: CNM Tactical Electromag-
netic Systems Study (TESS) Action Council; establishment of

9. CNO Ltr Ser 987P6/69884 of 25 November 1975, Subj: System Mission Surviv-
I ability/Operability in the Electromagnetic (EM) Environment; policy statement
for

10. TESS Action Council Report of 1 March 1976, CONFIDENTIAL

1I. CNM Ltr MAT-034/RBB:ELEX-095/RCW of 12 April 1976, Subj: TESS Action

I Council Report

12. Response to Task 3b. of CNM ltr of 12 April 1976, NAVELEX (ELEX-51024),
undated

13. EW Vulnerability Analysis and ECCM Evaluation Methodology for Application

to Fleet EM Systems, NELC, 27 August 1976

1 14. NELC Ltr Q246/JWO: Ser 2100-597, (SECRET), 20 December 1976

B
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REFER ENCES (Continued)

15. NMC Five Year EMC Plan FY-78-82, NAVELEX (ELEX-095), 22 December
1976

16. Intermodulation Interference to the CG-26 Class HF Communications System;

A Discussion of Problem Related Factors, NAVSEA (SEA-06T), February 1977

17. TESSAC Electromagnetic Safety Study Group Final Report, NAVSEC, 31 May
1977

18. TESSAC Final Report for EM Vulnerability, NSWC, 2 June 1977

19. TESSAC Report on Electronic Counter-Countermeasures, SECRET, NRL,

10 June 1977

20. TESSAC Electromagnetic Compatibility Survey, NPGS, June 1977

21. Basic Point Defense Surface Missile System (BPDSMS), EMC Problems, A Dis-
cussion of Problem Related Factors, NAVSEA (SEA-06T), June 1977

22. COMTHIRDFLT Exercise RIMPAC-77 Final Report (U), CONFIDENTIAL,

I July 1977

23. TESSAC EMP Protection Engineering Study Final Report, NSWC, 1 July 1977

24. TESSAC EM Power Task Technology Capabilities Specifications, Interim Final

Report, 12 July 1977

25. Report on Naval Aircraft Mission Systems EMI Problems, NAVPIR (AIR-533D),
July 1977

26. AN/SPS-37/43 Air Search Radar Interference to AN/SPN-43 Marshalling

Radar, NAVSEA (SEA-06T), July 1977

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