Borrett2018 - Review of OPCW Capabilities
Borrett2018 - Review of OPCW Capabilities
Borrett2018 - Review of OPCW Capabilities
To cite this article: Veronica Borrett, Christopher M. Timperley, Jonathan E. Forman &
Cheng Tang (2018): Investigative science and technology supporting the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences, DOI:
10.1080/00450618.2018.1559356
Article views: 30
Introduction
The Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter ‘the Convention’) is an international dis-
armament and non-proliferation treaty that entered into force in 1997.1 It prohibits the
development, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Currently, 193 States
Parties (nation States) are members of the Convention, representing over 98% of the world’s
population. These make up the Conference of the States Parties. The Organization for the
CONTACT Veronica Borrett veronica.borrett@baiscientific.com BAI Scientific, Level 17, 31 Queen Street,
Melbourne 3000, Australia
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 V. BORRETT ET AL.
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in The Hague, is the implementing body of the
Convention.2
The Convention is significant for the extent of its verification provisions that require
States Parties to declare certain industry and military activities, sites and facilities, and
imposes an inspection regime involving routine inspections with the provision for ‘chal-
lenge inspections’ (CIs) and ‘investigations of alleged use’ (IAUs) of chemical weapons (CWs)
and chemical warfare agents (CWAs) by the OPCW. Possessor States are required to declare
and destroy stockpiles of CWs and since entry-into-force of the Convention, the OPCW has
overseen the destruction of more than 96.5% of the declared stockpiles, over 72,304 tonnes
of CWAs (by 31 October 2018). The OPCW’s efforts in implementing the Convention were
recognized in 2013 with a Nobel Peace Prize.3 The Convention also includes provisions for
protection and assistance to States Parties and capacity building programmes to facilitate
greater international cooperation through the peaceful uses of chemistry.
Recent events4 demonstrate that the international community must remain vigilant;
consequently the OPCW must identify and be prepared for challenges to ensure it has
the tools to prevent the re-emergence of CWs. The OPCW and the international com-
munity continue to work towards the elimination of CWs and the prevention of their re-
emergence. However, in an uncertain security environment with increasingly blurred
lines between warfare, insurgency, terrorism and crime, and considering the impacts of
rapid advances in technology, the OPCW must also have fit-for-purpose investigative
tools to support its mandate.
OPCW inspections
The verification provisions of the Convention include mechanisms for the monitoring of
chemicals contained in its Annex on Chemicals (referred to as the ‘Schedules’)5 and the
inspection of sites and facilities relevant to the Convention. The Convention provides for
OPCW inspectors to access CW storage sites, production and destruction facilities and other
declared facilities. The Schedules comprise CWAs and their precursors, arranged in three
schedules according to the risks they pose to the object and purpose of the Convention. The
Schedules include both individual chemicals and ‘families of chemicals’, intended to act as
‘catch-all’ chemical structures, representing compounds that could theoretically be
expected to have sufficient toxicity for use as CWs. Key precursors of scheduled CWAs are
also included. Many scheduled chemicals and precursors monitored under the Convention
are dual-use chemicals commonly used in industry, often in large quantities, for legitimate
purposes.6
OPCW inspections may include the collection and analysis of samples. For routine
inspections that include on-site analysis, screening techniques are employed that are
designed to detect ambiguities, but not to reveal confidential business information unre-
lated to the inspection. There is provision for off-site analysis for a sample, by at least two of
the OPCW’s network of Designated Laboratories,7,8 after sample splitting at the OPCW
Laboratory. Off-site analysis could involve the verification of ambiguities detected in the on-
site analysis or in IAUs, involving unambiguous identification using two independent
analysis techniques by two independent laboratories (which are blinded from one another).
From April 1997 to October 2017, the OPCW has undertaken routine inspections of
declared industrial facilities, on the territories of over 86 States Parties, and monitored
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 3
the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles within those States possessing them. 9
While chemicals in the Schedules are monitored under the Convention, the Convention’s
General Purpose Criterion ensures that any chemical intended for use as a chemical
weapon (defined under Article II of the Convention) would be prohibited; this includes
toxic chemicals not specifically listed in the Schedules.
undertook to strengthen the OPCW’s capabilities for investigative work,18 which has
resulted in the planning for, and progress towards, the establishment of an attribution
team within its Technical Secretariat.
National capability
The investigation by jurisdictional authorities of possible terrorist, or other criminal
use, of CWs would also involve hazard assessment of relevant sites, and the analysis of
samples and other materials associated with an alleged incident. Under these circum-
stances, these authorities would sample suspected sites and items, to assist in the local
investigation and prosecution of the alleged offence(s). The investigation of such
incidents may involve witness accounts, the collection of biomedical samples, or the
sampling of materials from a dispersion device or dispersed materials and objects;
confiscated or intercepted materials; environmental samples; or materials sampled at
a suspected clandestine laboratory. Any casualties would most likely be treated on the
basis of their symptoms, as even with rapid detection and screening techniques there
may be some delay before the agent is identified. However, rapid characterization of
the chemical agent is important to guide operational decision making, and to assist
a criminal investigation that would be associated with the deliberate use of CWs.
In 2016, the Director-General announced the OPCW’s readiness to assist
States Parties affected by an incident of alleged use of toxic chemicals by a non-
State actor, with the establishment of the Rapid Response and Assistance Mission
(RRAM).27 The RRAM is intended to deploy at short notice, at the request of a State
Party, to provide assistance. In addition, the establishment of the RRAM enhances the
OPCW’s capacity and readiness to undertake investigations of alleged use of CWs,
consistent with its mission.
the Convention. As such, the TWG is strengthening links and expanding engagement with the
forensic community to support the development of recommendations and advice to the
Director-General, and the development of capability within the OPCW. The TWG is working
closely with the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW (in particular, inspectors and staff of the
OPCW Laboratory) to understand the challenges and requirements the OPCW faces within an
operational context (such that the TWG can provide meaningful and actionable advice for the
Director-General to consider). The TWG is also undertaking a review of best-practices, ROPs,
and approaches for the integration of multiple information streams.
The TWG has been tasked to address a series of questions through its terms of
reference (TOR),49 for which it has established the following subgroups.15
Subgroup E. Provenance
(1) Which technologies and methodologies (whether established or new) can be used in
the provenancing of chemical and/or material samples collected in an investigation?
(2) Do collections of physical objects, samples and other information for chemical
weapons-related analysis exist and can they be made available to investigators for
retrospective review? How might these collections be used to support
investigations?
The TWG held its second meeting in November 2018,16 where it reviewed its intersessional
work programme, received briefings from the Technical Secretariat and from international
forensic and related experts, and articulated the work programme going forward. The report
for that meeting will be considered by the SAB at its Twenty-Eighth Session in 2019; it will
provide a detailed update on the work of the subgroups.
To date, the TWG has identified capabilities related to traditional forensic techniques that
may be considered and how experts and laboratories relevant to investigative science and
technology might be engaged. It has explored the authentication and validation of data;
information and data analysis; cross-referencing of information; chain of custody and the
reconstruction of past events. The considerable expertise of TWG members in the analysis and
characterization of traditional CWAs, toxic chemicals and toxins, has been utilized to compile
information on relevant detection systems and point-of-care devices. Furthermore, the TWG is
considering the approaches used by other disciplines that employ provenancing and is work-
ing closely with the Chemical Forensics International Technical Working Group (CFITWG)50 and
its programmes on the provenancing of CWAs using chemical and impurity profiling. It is also
addressing non-traditional means for collecting and authenticating information, for example
using remote sensing, and exploring opportunities presented by digitalization.
Additionally, the TWG recognizes that site assessment, documentation, sampling and
analysis, and chain of custody may benefit from the application of technology solutions,
such as unmanned ground vehicles/aerial vehicles (UGVs/UAVs), remote and satellite imaging,
3D laser-scanning technologies, and inclusion of radiofrequency identification tags for mon-
itoring, tracking and chain of custody, and intends to provide recommendations to the OPCW
for how its Technical Secretariat could most usefully evaluate such technologies in support of
OPCW contingency operations. The TWG has a two-year term of reference and will complete
its work by February 2020.
Conclusions
The Convention is the first multilateral treaty that bans an entire class of weapons of
mass destruction and is significant in the extent and measures of its verification provi-
sions, which include on-site inspections. The Convention also contains provisions for
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 9
assistance and protection to State Parties. Despite the success of the Convention in the
destruction of more than 96.5% of the world’s declared CW stockpiles, the OPCW and
global community must remain vigilant and work towards a world free of CWs. The
verification regime should continue to be supported by new tools and capabilities to
meet new challenges. This mandate is provided for in the text of the Convention
through paragraph 6 of its Article VIII, which states that ‘in undertaking its verification
activities the Organization [OPCW] shall consider measures to make use of advances in
science and technology’. The continued development of investigative science and
technology approaches that provide robust, independent and expert capability, consis-
tent with the mission of the OPCW, requires close cooperation and engagement with
operational experts and the broader scientific community and, in particular, the inter-
national forensic community.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the members of the TWG on Investigative Science and Technology: Ed van Zalen,
Crister Åstot, Augustin Baulig, Christophe Curty, Brigette Dorner, Carlos Fraga, David Gonzalez,
Robert Mikulak, Daan Noort, Syed Raza, Valentin Rubaylo, Francois van Straten, Paula Vanninen
and Farhat Waqar; as well as the OPCW Technical Secretariat and the interns in the OPCW’s Office of
Strategy and Policy (Nadine Gürer, Maria Hemme, Sofia Sola, Siqing Sun and Pei Yang) for valuable
support provided to the first two meetings of the TWG.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
References
1. Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of
chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 1997. [accessed 2018 Dec 21].Available from: www.
opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention
2. Further information on the OPCW. [accessed 2018 Dec 21]. Available from: www.opcw.org.
3. Further information on the award of the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW. [accessed
2018 Dec 21]. Available from: https://www.opcw.org/about-us/nobel-peace-prize.
4. Chairperson’s report of the proceedings of the fourth special session of the Conference of
States Parties to review the operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (fourth review
conference), RC-4/3, The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons; 2018. Available from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/
2018/11/rc403%28e%29.pdf
5. See Annex on Chemicals in: the convention on the prohibition of the development, production,
stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Hague (The Netherlands):
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 1997. Available from: www.opcw.org/
chemical-weapons-convention/annexes/annex-chemicals/annex-chemicals. An infographic
guide to Scheduled Chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Convention Available from: www.
opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/07/Guide_to_Schedules.pdf.
6. 50 most traded scheduled chemicals. The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2017. Available from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/
documents/VER/List_of_Most_Traded_Scheduled_Chemicals_ordered_by_CAS_RN.pdf
10 V. BORRETT ET AL.
7. Status of the designated laboratories for authentic environmental sample analysis, S/1666/
2018. The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
2018. Available from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/08/s-1666-2018%
28e%29.pdf.
8. Status of laboratories designated for the analysis of authentic biomedical samples, S/1661/2018.
The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2018.
Available from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2018/en/s-1661-2018_e_.
pdf
9. OPCW fact sheet number 5 on the three types of inspections. The Hague (The Netherlands):
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2017. Available from: www.opcw.
org/sites/default/files/documents/Fact_Sheets/English/Fact_Sheet_5_-_Inspections.pdf
10. For an overview of developments at the OPCW from 2013 to 2018, see: Review of the operation
of the Chemical Weapons Convention since the third review conference, RC-4/S/1. The Hague
(The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2018. Available from:
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/11/rc4s01%28e%29.pdf
11. Summary of the report on activities carried out in support of a request for technical
assistance by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Technical
Assistance Visit TAV/02/18), S/1612/2018. The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2018. Available from: www.opcw.org/fileadmin/
OPCW/S_series/2018/en/s-1612-2018_e___1_.pdf
12. Summary of the report on activities carried out in support of a request for technical
assistance by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Technical
Assistance Visit TAV/03/18 and TAV/03B/18 ‘Amesbury Incident’), S/1671/2018. The Hague
(The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2018. Available
from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/09/s-1671-2018%28e%29_0.pdf
13. Further information on the fact finding mission Available from: www.opcw.org/fact-finding-
mission (accessed 2018 Dec 21).
14. Report of the scientific advisory board’s workshop on emerging technologies, SAB-26/WP.1.
The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2017.
Available from www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/sab26wp01_SAB.pdf
15. Summary of the first meeting of the scientific advisory board’s temporary working group on
investigative science and technology, SAB-27/WP.1. The Hague (The Netherlands):
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2018. Available from: www.opcw.
org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/sab-27-wp01_e_.pdf
16. Summary of the second meeting of the scientific advisory board’s temporary working group
on investigative science and technology, SAB-28/WP.2. The Hague (The Netherlands):
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2018, under review.
17. Report of the fourth special session of the Conference of States Parties, C-SS-4/3. The Hague
(The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2018. Available
from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CSP/C-SS-4/en/css403_e_.pdf
18. Note by the director-general. Report pursuant to paragraph 20 of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3
(dated 27 June 2018) on addressing the threat from chemical weapons use, C-23/DG.17. The
Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2018.
Available from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2018/11/c23dg17%28e%29.
pdf
19. For a brief history of the United Nations Disarmament Committee in Geneva, see: Mathews RJ.
Central nervous system-acting chemicals and the Chemical Weapons Convention: a former
scientific adviser’s perspective. Pure Appl Chem. 2018;90(10):1559–1575. doi:10.1015/pac-
2018-0502.
20. The Paris resolution, a resolution establishing the Preparatory Commission for the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. [accessed 2018 Dec 21]. Available
from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/CWC/disarm_negotiat_history/Paris_
resolution.pdf
AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 11
21. Further information on VERIFIN and the ‘blue books’ can be found. Available from: http://
www.helsinki.fi/verifin/bluebook/
22. Recommended operating procedures for analysis in the verification of chemical disarmament:
Blue Book, Parts I and II, 2017. Vanninen P, editor. Helsinki (Finland): University of Helsinki;
2017. ISBN 978-951-51-3916-0 (paperback), ISBN 978-951-51-3917-7 (pdf).
23. Mogl S, Siegenthaler P, Schmidt B. 2013. Chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict, in annual
report 2013 Spiez Laboratory. 26–33. [accessed 2018 Dec 21]. Available from: https://www.
labor-spiez.ch/pdf/en/dok/jab/88_003_e_laborspiez_jahresbericht_2013_web.pdf
24. Needs statement for upgrading the OPCW chemical laboratory to a centre for chemistry and
technology, S/1564/2017. The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons; 2017. Available from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_
series/2017/en/s-1564-2017_e_.pdf
25. Upgrading the OPCW chemical laboratory to a centre for chemistry and technology, S/1512/
2017. The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
2017. Available from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2017/en/s-1512-
2017_e_.pdf
26. Request from the director-general to states parties for voluntary contributions to a new
trust fund for upgrading the OPCW chemical laboratory to a centre for chemistry and
technology, S/1561/2017. The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons; 2017. Available from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/
S_series/2017/en/s-1561-2017_e_.pdf
27. Establishment of a rapid response assistance team, S/1381/2016. The Hague (The
Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2016. Available from:
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/S_series/2016/en/s-1381-2016_e_.pdf
28. Forman JE, Timperley CM, Aas P, Abdollahi M, Alonso IP, Baulig A, Becker-Arnold R, Borrett V,
Cariño FA, Curty C, et al. Innovative technologies for chemical security. Pure Appl Chem.
2018;90(10):1527–1557. doi:10.1515/pac-2018-0908.
29. Report of the scientific advisory board on developments in science and technology for the
fourth special session of the Conference of the States Parties to review the operation of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-4/DG.1. The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2018. Available from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/
files/documents/CSP/RC-4/en/rc4dg01_e_.pdf
30. Documents from the special session of the Conference of the States Parties to review the
operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Hague (The Netherlands): OPCW
Review Conference, Fourth Session; 2018 Nov 21–30. Available from: www.opcw.org/
resources/documents/conference-states-parties/fourth-review-conference.
31. Further information on the SAB and its terms of reference. Available from: www.opcw.org/
about-opcw/subsidiary-bodies/scientific-advisory-board/
32. OPCW. The scientific advisory board, OPCW fact sheet number 11. The Hague (The
Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2017. Available
from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/Fact_Sheets/English/Fact_Sheet_
11_-_SAB.pdf.
33. Report of the scientific advisory board’s workshop on chemical forensics, SAB-24/WP.1. The
Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2016.
Available from: www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/sab24wp01_e_.pdf
34. Report of the scientific advisory board’s workshop on chemical warfare agent toxicity,
emergency response and medical countermeasures, SAB-24/WP.2. The Hague (The
Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2016. Available from:
www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/SAB/en/sab-24-wp02_e_.pdf
35. Cesa MC, Ferreira VF, Forman JE, Tang C, Timperley CM, Tran C, West B. OPCW-IUPAC
workshop on innovative technologies for chemical security. Pure Appl Chem. 2018;90
(10):1501–1506. doi:10.1515/pac-2018-0701.
36. Report of the scientific advisory board’s workshop on trends in chemical production, SAB-
26/WP.2. The Hague (The Netherlands): Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
12 V. BORRETT ET AL.