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ACADEMIC PROGRAMS
ORIENTATION SEMINAR-WORKSHOP FOR NEWLY APPOINTED CLERKS OF COURT
This quarter, PHILJA conducted the 2 and 3rd Orientation Seminar-Workshops for Newly Appointed Clerks of Court, on July 12 to 14, 2006, at the PHILJA Development Center, Tagaytay City, and August 15 to 17, 2006, at the Cebu Grand Hotel, Cebu City, respectively. Twenty-nine (29) newly appointed clerks of court of Regions I to V received their certificate of completion at Tagaytay City. REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS REGION I Linda B. Gumabol RTC Br. 9, La Trinidad, Benguet REGION II Marvin P. Aniceto RTC Br. 15, Alfonso Lista, Ifugao Remelyn A. Dalafu-Tagao RTC Br. 1, Tuguegarao City Voltaire B. Garcia RTC Br. 30, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya Maria Vida M. Guillermo RTC Br. 25, Tabuk, Kalinga REGION III Esmeralda D. Balderas-David RTC Br. 71, Iba, Zambales Maricar P. Dela Cruz RTC Br. 35, Gapan, Nueva Ecija Maria Belinda C. Rama RTC Br. 79, Malolos, Bulacan REGION IV Russel B. Dalisay RTC Br. 84, Batangas City Ma. Rosenne Flores-Avila RTC Br. 73, Antipolo, Rizal Erwin M. Fortunato RTC Br. 82, Odiongan, Romblon Venus I. Gapuz RTC Br. 47, Puerto Princesa City Joan C. Mosatalla RTC Br. 71, Antipolo, Rizal Lita M. Tenorio RTC Br. 11, Balayan, Batangas
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REGION V Camilo A. Oliva RTC Br. 48, Masbate City Alexander A. Tordilla RTC Br. 33, Pili, Camarines Sur MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS REGION II Ronald L. Mamauag MTC Rizal, Cagayan REGION IV Nathaniel A. Adap MTC Roxas, Oriental Mindoro Ruben B. Albaytar MTC OCC, San Pedro, Laguna Asuncion G. Fabella MTC Bongabon, Oriental Mindoro Socorro G. Gorospe MTC San Jose, Occidental Mindoro Venus R. Pando MTC San Pedro, Laguna Susana B. Villena MTC Dasmarias, Cavite MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
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REGION I Jowel J. Vecino MTCC Br. 1, San Fernando City, La Union OFFICE
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REGION I Diosdado L. Doctolero OCC, Agoo, La Union REGION II Edelweiss Feliza G. Gardon OCC, Tuguegarao City Jane S. Paga OCC, Aparri, Cagayan REGION IV Bernadette P. Platon OCC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna REGION V Candice Guada Cresilda C. Almodovar OCC, Ligao, Albay On the other hand, thirty-one (31) newly appointed clerks of court of Regions VI to XII received their certificate of completion at Cebu City.
July-September 2006
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS REGION VI Tisha Diane A. Alipao RTC Br. 35, Iloilo City REGION VII Denis D. Pacas RTC Br. 54, Lapu-Lapu City Chevin Vasques RTC Br. 9, Cebu City Maila L. Maisog RTC Br. 51, Carmen, Bohol REGION VIII Esterlita D. Cupat-Demiao MTC Br. 26, San Juan, Southern Leyte Ma. Janice B. Latoja-Irasga RTC Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar Josephine A. Mejia-Romero RTC OCC, Ormoc City, Leyte REGION IX Briethner G. Amelda RTC Br. 16, Zamboanga City Eva Aireen N. Monteza RTC Br. 15, Zamboanga City REGION X Noweh Meca E. Pacamalan RTC Br. 1, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte
PHILJA NEWS
REGION IX Ivy May E. Carpio MTC Alicia, Zamboanga Sibugay REGION X Emma Flor O. Orillaneda MTC Tandag, Surigao del Norte Anita C. Pupos MTC Medina, Misamis Oriental MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
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REGION VI Evelyn C. Coronel MTCC, La Carlota City, Negros Occidental REGION VII Rogelio C. Cubelo MTCC Br. 1, Tagbilaran City, Bohol REGION VIII Edwin S. Vilbar MTCC Maasin City, Southern Leyte REGION X Jovelyn J. Patoc MTCC Br. 1, Oroquieta City REGION XI Melchor A. Borres MTCC Br. 2, Island Garden City of Samal Restituto A. Madrazo MTCC Br. 7, Davao City METROPOLITAN CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS REGION VI Mary Rose A. Miclat 9th MCTC Zariaga-New Lucena-Leganes, Zariaga, Iloilo REGION VII Yolanda A. Aton 7th MCTC, Alicia-Mabini, Bohol REGION IX Chinita V. Elcamel MCTC, Rizal-Sibutad, Zamboanga del Norte REGION X Glenda A. Santos 3rd MCTC, Kinoguitan-Sugbungcongon, Misamis Oriental Neil S. Legaspi MCTC Tubod-Alegria, Surigao del Norte
REGION XI Abdul S. Buayan RTC OCC, Cotabato City Rucel C. Cayetano RTC Br. 31, Tagum City Marivic E. Fillalan RTC Br. 22, General Santos City, South Cotabato Joynalyn A. Nemenzo-Agno RTC Br. 3, Compostela Valley, Davao del Norte REGION XII Rakimah B. Macaraya RTC Br. 1, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS REGION VI Ma. Lorda M. Santizo MTC San Joaquin, Iloilo City REGION VII Ryan S. Plaza MTC Argao, Cebu
PHILJA NEWS
PHILJA
ACADEMIC PROGRAMS
42ND ORIENTATION SEMINAR-WORKSHOP FOR NEWLY APPOINTED JUDGES
PHILJA conducted the 42nd Orientation SeminarWorkshop for Newly Appointed Judges at the PHILJA Development Center Tagaytay City, on August 21 to September 1, 2006. Among the thirty-three (33) judges who completed this two-week orientation program, twenty-six (26) judges were newly appointed while seven (7) judges were promoted from the first level court to the second level court. The two-week orientation program was designed to clarify between acceptable and unacceptable behavior and conduct of judges in court and out of court; to apply the skills of research, reasoning, and decision writing to the discharge of their duties; and to resolve normally expected issues of substantive and procedural law, which may come before them in the first two (2) or three (3) years of their tenure on the Bench. A. NEW APPOINTMENTS REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS REGION II Hon. Joseph P. Baguilat RTC Br. 14, Lagawe, Ifugao REGION IV Hon. Matias M. Garcia II RTC Br. 19, Bacoor, Cavite Hon. Marino E. Rubia RTC Br. 24, Bian, Laguna REGION VII Hon. Estela Alma A. Singco RTC Br. 12, Cebu City
REGION XI Hon. Panambulan M. Mimbisa RTC Br. 37, General Santos City METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS NATIONAL JUDICIAL CAPITAL REGION Hon. Josephus Joannes H. Asis MeTC Br. 40, Quezon City Hon. Caridad M. Walse-Lutero MeTC Br. 34, Quezon City Hon. Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay MeTC Br. 78, Paraaque City MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS REGION II Hon. Eufren F. Changale MTC Cabarroquis, Quirino Hon. Cresencio I. Maliwat MTC Cordon, Isabela REGION III Hon. Rixon M. Garong MTC San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija Hon. Sheila Marie Geronimo-Orquillas MTC Plaridel, Bulacan Hon. Liza Marie R. Picardal-Tecson MTC Hagonoy, Bulacan REGION IV Hon. Rosalie Ang Lui MTC Pinamalayan, Mindoro Oriental REGION VII Hon. Jaena T. Laguda MTC Sibulan, Negros Oriental REGION VIII Hon. Wenifredo C. Cuaton MTC Pastrana, Leyte
Participants to the 42 nd Orientation SeminarWorkshop for Newly Appointed Judges with Sandiganbayan Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and Diosdado M. Peralta and PHILJAs Atty. Amelia T. Guillamun.
July-September 2006
REGION IX Hon. Jimmynador J. Mijares, Jr. MTC Alicia, Zamboanga Sibugay REGION X Hon. Rainelda H. Estacio-Montesa MTC Alubijid, Misamis Oriental MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS
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PHILJA NEWS
RJCEP
The Academy conducted the 13th Regional Judicial Career Enhancement Program (Level 4) for Judges, Clerks of Court, and Branch Clerks of Court of the Regional Trial Courts and First Level Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR) (Batch 2) last July 4 to 6, 2006, at the Hyatt Regency Hotel Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Ninety-two (92) RTC judges and twenty-three (23) First Level Trial Court judges attended the program from July 4 to 6, while one hundred forty-four (144) clerks of court attended on July 5 to 6, 2006. The participants were from the Regional Trial Courts and First Level Courts of Quezon City, Marikina, Pasig, San Juan, Taguig, Pateros, Caloocan, Mandaluyong, Malabon, Navotas and Valenzuela. The discussion on the New Judicial Code of Conduct and International Covenants in Domestic Cases elicited the active participation of the judges. Just as interesting to the judges was the presentation of jurisprudence illustrating the Courts interpretation of related concepts, such as the difference between gross, simple and unbecoming conduct.
CITIES
REGION X Hon. Nora B. Montejo MTCC Br. 2, Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS REGION II Hon. Bill D. Bucuyan 1st MCTC Bagabag-Diadi, Nueva Vizcaya Hon. Ferdinand E. Dalpig MCTC Naguillan-Reina, Isabela Hon. Andrew P. Dulnuan 2nd MCTC Madella-Nagtipunan, Quirino REGION III Hon. Antonio M. Pangan 2nd MCTC Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, Tarlac REGION VIII Hon. Ethel V. Mercado-Gutay 8th MCTC Victoria-San Antonio, Northern Samar Hon. Chona Apostol-Octa 13th MCTC MacArthur-Mayorga, Leyte REGION IX Hon. Vittorio Dante D. Dalman 1st MCTC Riza-Sibutad, Zamboanga del Norte B. PROMOTIONS REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION Hon. Paz Esperanza Martelino-Cortes RTC Br. 271, Pasig City Hon. Reynaldo M. Laigo RTC Br. 56, Makati City Hon. Nicanor A. Manalo, Jr. RTC Br. 161, Pasig City Hon. Cesar Pabel D. Sulit RTC Br. 162, Pasig City Hon. Dina P. Teves RTC Br. 142, Makati City REGION III Hon. Belen B. Ortiz RTC Br. 25, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija Hon. Maria Concepcion Yumang-Pangan RTC Br. 53, Guagua, Pampanga
PHILJA NEWS
NATIONAL ACADEMIC FORUM ON LIBERTY AND PROSPERITY : A PROGRAM FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY
The Supreme Court through PHILJA, conducted the National Academic Forum on Liberty and Prosperity: A Program for the Philippine Judiciary, on July 20, 2006, at San Beda College, Manila. This forum brought together a total of one hundred seventy-seven (177) attendees incumbent and retired Supreme Court justices; deans, professors and students of the different graduate schools of law, governance and business, nationwide; and lawyers of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and Sandiganbayan. In his keynote address, Chief Justice Panganiban related the concepts of liberty and prosperity to the functioning of Philippine courts, in the hope of igniting and inspiring discussions on issues that may need to be addressed in espousing the judicial philosophy in the courts.
July-September 2006
PHILJA NEWS
A total of twenty-five (25) participants attended the activity comprising representatives from Supreme Court, PHILJA, Office of the Court Administrator, Regional Trial Courts, Alternative Law Groups (ALG), Asian Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Network (AECEN), Ateneo School of Government, Batas Kalikasan, Department of Justice (DOJ), Environmental Legal Assistance Center-Palawan (ELAC), Haribon Foundation, Paglilingkod Batas Pangkapatiran Foundation, Philippine Tropical Forest Conservation Network, Tanggol Kalikasan and the United Nations Development Programme-Global Environment Facility-Small Grants Programme (UNDP-GEF-SGP). Current issues and options to improve environmental adjudication, including the possibility of establishing or designating green benches; and developing a continuing training program for judges on handling environmental cases, were among the topics discussed. Judge Gabriel T. Ingles reported on the Workshop on Environment which he attended along with Supreme Court Justice Minita V. ChicoNazario and PHILJA Chancellor Ameurfina Melencio Herrera, on April 26 to 27, 2006 in Bangkok, Thailand.
STRENGTHENING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES
PHILJA, in cooperation with The Asia Foundation (TAF) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), conducted the Strengthening the Implementation of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, on July 24 to 27, 2006, at the Garden Orchid Hotel, Zamboanga City. A total of forty-two (42) participants attended the program. Dr. Steven Rood, Country Representative of The Asia Foundation, in his Opening Remarks, addressed the need for drafting new rules and codes for Sharia Courts. He emphasized the need for peace, justice, prosperity and democracy not only in Muslim Mindanao but for the country as a whole and that the need for justice to be accessible to all is paramount. He capsulized his speech in a phrase he quoted from the Quran, saying All are obliged to seek justice.
Participants to the Strengthening the Implementation of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
PHILJA NEWS
This activity marked a historic event for the Supreme Court. It was the first time that the Courts own video conferencing equipment was used for the live multiple site video conferencing. It was likewise very fitting that such equipment be first used in the landmark legislation of 2006, that is, R.A. No. 9344. This legislation was expected to have a tremendous impact in our justice system, particularly in cases involving juveniles in conflict with the law.
Participants of the 9 th Regional Multi-Sectoral Seminar-Workshop on Juvenile and Domestic Relations Justice (Advanced Level) with Justice Alicia V. Sempio Diy and Professor Sedfrey M. Candelaria.
VIDEO CONFERENCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006 (R.A. NO. 9344)
The Academy, in partnership with The Asia Foundation, conducted the Video Conference on the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R.A. No. 9344) in cooperation with the Supreme CourtManagement Information Systems Office (SCMISO), on July 27, 2006, held in Pan Pacific Hotel, Manila, Oasis Hotel, Clark, Pampanga, Crown Regency Suites, Mactan, Cebu, and in Royal Mandaya Hotel, Davao. The video conferencing seminar was attended by a total of seventy-eight (78) participants from all the sites. Senator and Majority Floor Leader Francis N. Pangilinan, delivered the Closing Remarks at Pan Pacific Hotel, Manila.
July-September 2006
PHILJA NEWS
CONVENTIONS
8TH METCJAP
The Supreme Court, through PHILJA, and the Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the Philippines (MeTCJAP) conducted the 8 th National Convention-Seminar of the Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the Philippines, on September 5 to 8, 2006, at the East Asia Royale Hotel, General Santos City. A total of one hundred eight (108) participants attended the convention-seminar. With the theme Justice Secured, Justice Assured, it was aimed that the judges be encouraged to remain and appear strong and committed to the public good by instilling democratic values as well as to uphold their role as front liners in the administration of justice. Lectures delivered were on Judicial Ethics, Ejectment, Summary Procedure, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 Cases, Criminal Procedure, Judicial Personality Development, GSIS benefits, and Judicial Security. As an added activity to the session on Judicial Security, the participants were made to experience actual target shooting.
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PHILJA NEWS
ON MEDIATION
BASIC MEDIATION COURSE
This quarter, the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC), conducted two (2) Basic Mediation Courses. The first was conducted in coordination with United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and The Asia Foundation (TAF), held at the Pongos Hotel, Ormoc City, Leyte, on July 31 to August 3, 2006 and attended by thirtyfive (35) participants. The second was conducted at the Sea and Sky Hotel & Restaurant, San Fernando City, La Union, on August 22 to 25, 2006 and attended by forty-nine (49) participants.
We consider also significant the Academys leadership in the conduct of the Academic and National Forums on liberty and prosperity which were borne out of Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganibans articulation of his judicial philosophy to safeguard liberty and nurture prosperity. The National Forum, in particular, featured representative voices from different sectors of the society (Affected Constituencies, Branches of Government) and the presentation of the Experiences of the Bench, Bar, Business Sector, Cultural Minorities, and the Disadvantaged Sector. Most remarkable, and commendable, were the panel resolutions capping the sessions that emphasized the importance of the nexus between liberty and prosperity and how each individual could help in making it happen. The resolutions called for collaborative efforts between the different sectors to achieve and sustain the shared vision of prosperity. We likewise find good reason to share the courses of action advocated after the discussion of the topic Access to Justice to Implement Liberty and Prosperity by the Third Panel chaired by Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing. These courses of action are: the initiation of a national campaign to inform the marginalized sector and cultural minorities of their fundamental rights and liberties; the restructuring of the formal justice system to interface with informal and indigenous justice systems; the sponsorship of a law mandating lawyers acceptance of pro bono cases and a bigger appropriation for the judiciary so as to reduce filing fees; and the adaptation of the language of the law to the common people through translation of court decisions and proceedings into Filipino to enhance greater access to justice. PHILJA continues to be in the thick of the action for the implementation of judicial reforms. Indeed, this quarter tested our resources and resolve and yet found us standing up to the challenge. This is PHILJAs manifest commitment to the judiciary that we serve.
July-September 2006
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Dual citizens may vote as absentee voters under R.A. No. 9189. There is no need to actually establish residence and physical stay in the Philippines before they can exercise their right to vote. As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. No. 9225 - requiring duals to actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary, R.A. No. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. No. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. No. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote. x x x xxx Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and Re Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. According to the poll body: 1.05 With the passage of R.A. No. 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9225; disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections; While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A. No. 9189 extends also to what might be tagged as the next generation of duals. This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. No. 9225 which reads: SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines. It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of duals may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day duals, provided they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. No. 9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd situation. (Garcia, J., Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et al., v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 162759, August 4, 2006) The President, as the Commander-in-Chief has the power to prevent a member of the Armed Forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry. The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. Thus, we have to consider the question: may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry? We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-inchief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. No. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that duals may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. No. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise: Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote; Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise
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chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. Explication of these principles is in order. As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate [Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 3] that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commanderin-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces.
The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures functions the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize. We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executives prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts. (Tinga, J., Gen. (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani and Lt. Col. Alexander F. Balutan v. Lt./Gen. Generoso S. Senga, et. al., G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006)
CIVIL LAW
Psychological Incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncracies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the
July-September 2006
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human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate. xxx We find respondents alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving the house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx While petitioner s marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state. Thus, in determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, it must read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from, Articles 35, 37, 38, and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. (Ynares-Santiago, J., Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006)
A patient cannot be detained in a hospital for nonpayment of the hospital bill. Hospitals remedy is to file the necessary suit in court for the recovery of such bill. Instances when hospital may legally detain a patient against his will. Authorities, including those of common law origin, explicitly declare that a patient cannot be detained in a hospital for non-payment of the hospital bill. If the patient cannot pay the hospital or physicians bill, the law provides a remedy for them to pursue, that is, by filing the necessary suit in court for the recovery of such fee or bill. If the patient is prevented from leaving the hospital for his inability to pay the bill, any person who can act on his behalf can apply in court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The form of restraint must be total; movement must be restrained in all directions. If restraint is partial, e.g., in a particular direction with freedom to proceed in another, the restraint on the persons liberty is not total. However, the hospital may legally detain a patient against his will when he is a detained or convicted prisoner, or when the patient is suffering from a very contagious disease where his release will be prejudicial to public health, or when the patient is mentally ill such that his release will endanger public safety, or in other exigent cases as may be provided by law. Moreover, under the common law doctrines on tort, it does not constitute a trespass to the person to momentarily prevent him from leaving the premises or any part thereof because he refuses to comply with some reasonable condition subject to which he entered them. In all cases, the condition of this kind of restraint must be reasonable in the light of the circumstances. At any rate, as stated above, the patient is free to live the premises, even in the ostensible violation of these conditions, after being momentarily interrupted by the hospital staff for purposes of informing him of those reasonable conditions, such as the assessment of whether the patient is fit to leave, insane, or suffering from a contagious disease, etc., or simply for purposes of making a demand to settle the bill. If the patient chooses to abscond or leave without the consent of the hospital in violation of any of the conditions deemed to be reasonable under the circumstances, the hospital may nonetheless register its protest and may choose to pursue the legal remedies available under law, provided that the the hospital may not physically detain the patient, unless the case falls under the exceptions abovestated. (Austria-Martinez, J., Manila Doctors Hospital v. So Un Chua and Vicky Ty, G.R. No. 150355, July 31, 2006)
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DOCTRINAL REMINDERS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
There is no right test to determine whether particular information is a matter of public concern. It is for the courts to determine on a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance as it relates or affect the public. In determining whether a particular information is of public concern, there is no right test. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance as it relates to or affect the public. It bears emphasis that the interest of the public hinges on its right to transparency in the administration of justice, to the end that will serve to enhance the basic fairness of the judicial proceedings, safeguard the integrity of the factfinding process, and foster an informed public discussion of governmental affairs. x x x Decisions and opinions of a court are of course matters of public concern or interest for these are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, binding upon all citizens, of which every citizen is charged with knowledge. Justice thus requires that all should have free access to the opinions of judges and justices, and it would be against sound public policy to prevent, suppress or keep the earliest knowledge of these from the public. Thus, in Lantaco Sr. et. al., v. Judge Llamas (195 Phil. 325), this Court found a judge to have committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to furnish Lantaco et. al., a copy of his decision in a criminal case of which they were even the therein private complainants, the decision being already part of the public record which the citizen has a right to scrutinize. Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed by the parties to a case need not be matters of public concern or interest. For they are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests. In thus determining which part of the records of a case may be accessed to, the purpose for which the parties filed them is to be considered. (Carpio-Morales, J., Alfredo Hilado, et. al., v. Judge Amor A. Reyes, et. al., G.R. No. 163155, July 21, 2006)
LABOR LAW
To warrant dismissal of an employee, the misconduct must be serious and must have been performed with wrongful intent. Misconduct is defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the act must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must nevertheless be in connection with the work of the employee to constitute just cause from his separation. In order to constitute serious misconduct which will warrant the dismissal of an employee under paragraph (a) of Article 282 of the Labor Code, it is not sufficient that the act or conduct complained of has violated some established rules or policies. It is equally important and required that the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent. (Chico-Nazario, J., National Labor Relations Commission, et. al., v. Ma. Bernadette S. Salgarino, G.R. No. 164376, July 31, 2006)
CRIMINAL LAW
Entrapment and Instigation, distinguished. There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. (Carpio-Morales, J., Roberto E. Chang and Pacifico D. San Mateo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165111, July 21, 2006)
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CIVIL LAW
Certificate of Title cannot be subject to collateral attack. Settled is the rule that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack and can be altered, modified, or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. In Malilin, Jr. v. Castillo (389 Phil. 153), the Court held that the action is considered as an attack on the title when the object of the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when the object of an action or proceeding is to annul, or set aside such judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof. In the present case, the attack on respondents title is definitely merely collateral as the relief sought by respondent in his action was recovery of ownership and possession. Petitioners attack on the validity of respondents certificate of title was merely raised as a defense in their Answer filed with the trial court. (Austria-Martinez, J., Pedro Tagabi and Demetrio Tabaniag v. Margarito Tanque, G.R. No. 144024, July 27, 2006)
reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration which constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. This fresh 15-day period within which to file notice of appeal counted from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration may be applied to petitioners case inasmuch as rules of procedure may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Thus, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 399 SCRA 277, 282 (2003) involving A.M. No. 002-03-SC, which provided for the rule that the 60day period within which to file a petition for certiorari shall be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, the Court stated that rules of procedure may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of procedure. (Austria-Martinez, J., Donato Sumaway, et. al., v. Urban Bank, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 142534, June 27, 2006)
REMEDIAL LAW
The party has fresh period of fifteen (15) days from denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal. Fortunately, however, for petitioners, the Court recently modified the rule on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. In the precedent-setting case of Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), the Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling
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DOCTRINAL REMINDERS
Presentation of the check in evidence is not a condition sine qua non for conviction under B.P. 22. Best Evidence Rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Petitioners insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for conviction under B.P. 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However, the rule applies only where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its content. (Corona, J., Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 142641, July 17, 2006) An injunction or restraining order which is not void must be obeyed while it remains in full force and effect, and has not been overturned. The willful disobedience of an injunction order may constitute a criminal, as well as a civil, contempt. However, it has been held that the violation of an injunction is not direct criminal contempt within the contemplation of a statute pertaining to conduct summarily punishable as direct criminal contempt. Such violation is an indirect contempt where it does not occur in the immediate presence of the court or so close as to interrupt or disturb court proceedings. An injunction or restraining order which is not void must be obeyed while it remains in full force and effect, and has not been overturned, that is, in general, until the injunction or restraining order has been set aside, vacated, or modified by the court which granted it, or until the order or decree awarding it has been reversed on appeal or error. The injunction must be obeyed irrespective of the ultimate validity of the order, and no matter how unreasonable and unjust the injunction may be in its terms. Defendant cannot avoid compliance
with the commands, or excuse his violation, of the injunction by simply moving to dissolve it, or by the pendency of a motion to modify it. The fact that an injunction or restraining order has been dissolved or terminated, or has expired, does not necessarily protect a person in a proceeding against him for a violation of the injunction or order while it was in force, as by acts between granting of the injunction and its termination, at least where the proceeding is one to punish for a criminal contempt. xxx Courts, however, have a limited inherent power to void acts done in violation of an injunction. Transfers in violation of an injunction are invalid as to the person seeking the injunction or those claiming under that person, and may be set aside if attacked in a proper manner. However, because an injunction operates in personam, an act done in violation of an injunction is not a nullity as to third persons. If an injunction prohibits the defendant from transferring property, but the defendant transfers the property to an innocent third person, the transferee obtains good title and the injunction does not affect the transferees right. (Chico-Nazario, J., Spouses Manuel and Luisa Tan Lee, Renwick Warren Lee and Janssen Thaddeus Lee v. Hon. Court of Appeals and China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 147191, July 27, 2006) In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court, if the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function. Administrative agencies possess quasilegislative or rule-making powers and quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle,
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however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. (Tinga, J., Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. et. al., v. Secretary Michael Defensor et. al., G.R. NO. 163980, August 3, 2006) Petition for Prohibition, when proper. A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate
an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. (Tinga, J., Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. et. al., v. Secretary Michael Defensor et. al., G.R. NO. 163980, August 3, 2006) Preliminary Investigation distinguished from Inquest. A preliminary investigation should have been conducted before the filing of the Amended Information. A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an inquest. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. An inquest is a summary inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of determining whether the warrantless arrest of a person was based on probable cause. Where the penalty prescribed by law for an offense is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of imprisonment without regard to the fine, a preliminary investigation must be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for such offense. The conduct of an inquest investigation does not fulfill the requirement for the conduct of a preliminary investigation before the filing of an information or complaint involving any such offenses, except when the accused was lawfully arrested without a warrant. In the case at bar, the accused was not even arrested. He reported to the CIDGU on its invitation. He should thus have been subjected to a preliminary investigation, not a mere inquest investigation. (Carpio-Morales, J., Imelda S. Enriquez v. Judge Olegario Sarmiento, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011, August 7, 2006)
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DOCTRINAL REMINDERS
Substantial
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the information regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, provides that an amendment after the plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not permitted after the accused had already been arraigned. In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, (G.R. No. 103102, March 6, 1992), we had the occasion to distinguish between substantial and formal amendments:
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.
substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or sex. Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived (Ynares-Santiago, J., People of the Philippines v. Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, G.R. No. 171271, August 31, 2006) Summary Judgment, when proper. Thus, it has been held that a summary judgment is proper where, upon a motion filed after the issues had been joined and on the basis of the pleadings and papers filed, the court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, except as to the amount of damages. A genuine issue has been defined as an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguished from an issue which is sham, fictitious, contrived and patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. A court may grant summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of fact are involved, except the amount of damages. Rule 35, Section 3, of the Rules of Court provides two (2) requisites for summary judgment to be proper: (1) there must be no genuine issues as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (2) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Certainly, when the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then theres no real genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. (Chico-Nazario, J., Equitable PCI Bank v. Rowena Ong, G.R. No. 156207, September 15, 2006)
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a
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SUPREME COURT
EN BANC Bar Matter No. 1645 RE: AMENDMENT OF RULE 139-B The Court Resolved to AMEND the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, clarified by Circular No. 3-89 dated February 6, 1989, as follows: xxx The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate disposition all complaints for disbarment, suspension and discipline filed against incumbent Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and judges of lower courts, whether or not they are charged singly or jointly with other respondents, and whether or not such complaint deals with acts unrelated to the discharge of their official functions. The same procedure shall be observed with respect to complaints filed against retired justices and judges. All similar complaints against lawyers still in the government service, whether filed directly with the IBP or transmitted to the IBP by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall first be referred to the Court for appropriate action. xxx This amendment shall take effect on October 2, 2006 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than September 15, 2006. September 5, 2006. (Sgd.) PANGANIBAN, CJ, PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIOMORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICONAZARIO, GARCIA, VELASCO, JJ. concur. WHEREAS, pursuant to this mandate and the transitory provisions of the Family Courts Act of 1997, the Supreme Court, in A.M. No. 99-11-07-SC, designated certain Regional Trial Courts in the Philippines as special courts to exclusively try and decide family and youth cases enumerated and described in Section 5 of the said Act, pending the establishment of regular Family Courts; WHEREAS, the number of these temporarily designated Family Courts has steadily increased from sixty-nine (69) in 2000 to ninety-four (94) in May 2006, with an average docket of 444 per month; in addition, there are approximately one hundred thirty four (134) Regional Trial Courts handling family and youth cases in areas where no courts have been designated as Family Courts; WHEREAS, the current docket overload in designated Family Courts can be traced primarily to two principal causes, namely: a) The increase in rights, duties and obligations due to the enactment of new laws such as Republic Act No. 8552 or the new Domestic Adoption Act of 1998; Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004; and Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006; and the promulgation by the Supreme Court of Rules of Procedure before the Family Courts such as the Rules on Examination of a Child Witness, Juveniles in Conflict With the Law, Nullity of Void Marriages, Annulment of Voidable Marriages, Legal Separation, Adoption, Voluntary and Involuntary Commitment of Children, Custody and Habeas Corpus in relation to Minors, Guardianship of Minors, and Anti-Violence Against Women and Children; and, b) The lack of a specific specialized philosophy and policy in the management and supervision of Family Courts. WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act which took effect on May 20, 2006 established a comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System to be implemented by a Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council (JJWC) which shall ensure full implementation of the law and oversee the coordination among different government agencies and non-government child institution. Significantly, the law requires the JJWC to coordinate with the Office of the Court Administrator and the Philippine Judicial Academy to ensure the realization of its mandate and the proper discharge of its duties and functions; WHEREAS, to respond to the legal mandate of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act and address specifically the increasing
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ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR 71-2006 DESIGNATION OF A FOCAL PERSON AND AN ASSISTANT FOCAL PERSON FOR DESIGNATED FAMILY COURTS AND OTHER REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HANDLING FAMILY AND YOUTH CASES WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as the Family Courts Act of 1997, requires the Supreme Court to establish Family Courts in the Philippines and provide the necessary mechanisms for the effective and efficient operation of such courts;
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needs and special concerns of our Family Courts in the effective implementation of all laws and rules involving family and children, it is necessary that a Focal Person for Family Courts be designated to design and develop policies, standards and strategies for the Family Courts, work for the regularization of these courts and assist the Office of the Court Administrator in the effective and specialized management and supervision thereof. The FOCAL PERSON will: (a) Handle the administrative supervision of all courts handling family and youth cases in coordination with the Office of the Court Administrator; (b) Propose and, in coordination with and through the Office of the Court Administrator, establish definite policies and standards for the internal operations of Family Courts to ensure that these are implemented effectively, efficiently and economically; (c) Recommend to the Supreme Court, in coordination with and through the Office of the Court Administrator, rules and regulations for the management and operations of Family Courts and direct the implementation of said rules and regulation; (d) With the Office of the Court Administrator, assist the Supreme Court in the exercise of administrative disciplinary authority over Family Court judges and personnel in accordance with existing rules and regulations; (e) Conduct liaison and coordination activities youth Executive and Legislative Departments concerning Family Courts; and (f) Exercise such other functions and duties as may be assigned by the Supreme Court to carry out the provisions of the Family Courts Act of 1997. An Assistant Focal Person shall be designated to assist the Focal Person: (a) In the development of policies, rules and regulations for Family Courts; and (b) Whenever necessary, in liaisoning and coordinating with the Executive and Legislative Departments and other government or non-government agencies in all matters concerning Family Court.
The Focal Person and the Assistant Focal Person shall prepare: (l) an operations manual for Family Court judges and personnel in accordance with Republic Act No. 8369 incorporating therein, whenever appropriate and feasible, best practices of Family Courts in other jurisdictions; and (2) a medium-term plan for the operations and regularization of Family Courts, to be submitted to the Supreme Court not later than July 25, 2007. NOW, THEREFORE, in the interest of expeditious, effective and efficient administration of justice in Family Courts, the Court hereby designates, effective immediately, Deputy Court Administrator ZENAIDA N. ELEPAO as Focal Person for Family Courts and JUDGE ROSALINA L. PISON, Presiding Judge, Branch 107, Quezon City as Assistant Focal Person. Issued this 7th day of September 2006. (Sgd.) ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 82-2006 TO: ALL JUSTICES, JUDGES, AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY Subject : Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 2005 (USE OF NONSEXIST LANGUAGE IN ALL OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS, COMMUNICATIONS AND ISSUANCES) Quoted hereunder is Memorandum Circular No. 12, s. 2005 of the CSC. Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 050433 dated March 30, 2005, government officials and employees are encouraged to use non-sexist language in all official documents, communications, and issuances. In line with the governments efforts to integrate womens concerns in its plans and programs through the years, the Civil Service Commission continuously undertakes gender mainstreaming activities, taking extra efforts in promoting gender-sensitivity in the bureaucracy. Beginning June 2000, gender and development (GAD) perspectives have been integrated in the conduct of civil service examinations partly through the use of non-sexist language in the test items. This has led to the Commissions active campaign on the use of gender-fair language.
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A.C. NO. 82-2006 (continued)
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Language is a very essential tool in communication. It articulates consciousness, reflects culture, and affects socialization. Hence, the need to recognize the importance of transforming language from traditional usage to a more liberating one, that which is gender-sensitive. Since government employees and officials encounter gender issues everyday, the use of non-sexist language in preparing letters, memoranda, and other issuances, will encourage them to make a conscious effort to avoid implicit and explicit discriminatory language against women or men. This, in turn, will help promote gender-sensitivity in the bureaucracy. Attached are some suggestions on how to use nonsexist language. Please be guided accordingly. (Sgd.) KATRINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID Chairperson 31 March 2005. SOME SUGGESTIONS ON HOW TO USE NON-SEXIST LANGUAGE 1. Eliminate the generic use of he, his, or him unless the antecedent is obviously male by: a. using plural nouns TRADITIONAL: The lawyer uses his brief to guide him. SUGGESTED: The lawyers use their brief to guide them. b. deleting he, his, and him altogether, rewording if necessary TRADITIONAL: The architect uses his blueprint to guide him. SUGGESTED: The architect uses a blueprint as a guide. c. substituting articles (a, an, the) for his; using who instead of he TRADITIONAL: The writer should know his readers well. SUGGESTED: The writer should know the readers well. d. using one, we, or you TRADITIONAL: As one grows older, he becomes more reflective. SUGGESTED: As one grows older, one becomes more reflective.
e. using the passive voice TRADITIONAL: The manager must submit his proposal today. SUGGESTED: The proposal must be submitted by the manager today. 2. Eliminate the generic use of MAN. Instead, use people, person(s), human(s), human being(s), humankind, humanity, the human race. TRADITIONAL: ordinary man, mankind, the brotherhood of man SUGGESTED: ordinary people, humanity, the human family 3. Eliminate sexism in symbolic representations of gender in words, sentences, and texts by: a. taking the context of the word, analyzing its meaning, and eliminating sexism in the concept TRADITIONAL: feelings of brotherhood, feelings of fraternity SUGGESTED: feelings of kinship, solidarity TRADITIONAL: the founding fathers SUGGESTED: the founders, the founding leaders TRADITIONAL: the Father of relativity theory SUGGESTED: the founder of relativity theory, the initiator of relativity theory b. finding precise words to delineate the thing itself from supposedly sex-linked characteristics TRADITIONAL: Titanic was a great ship, but she now rests at the bottom of the sea. SUGGESTED: Titanic was a great ship, but it now rests at the bottom of the sea. TRADITIONAL: Dont let Mother Nature rip you off! Shes out to kill your cars new finish... Stop her... SUGGESTED: Dont let Nature rip you off Its out to kill your cars finish... Stop it...
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4. Eliminate sexual stereotyping of roles by: a. using the same term for both genders when it comes to profession or employment TRADITIONAL: salesman, stewardess SUGGESTED: sales agent, flight attendant b. using gender fair terms in lexical terms TRADITIONAL: sportsmanship SUGGESTED: highest ideals of fair play c. treating men and women in a parallel manner TRADITIONAL: I now pronounce you man and wife. SUGGESTED: I now pronounce you husband and wife. d. avoiding language stereotyping images that reinforces
d. using the title of the job or group in letters to unknown persons TRADITIONAL: Dear Sir SUGGESTED: Dear Editor, Dear Credit Manager, Dear Colleague For the information and guidance of all concerned. September 19, 2006. (Sgd.) ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice
TRADITIONAL: a mans job, the directors girl Friday SUGGESTED: a big job, the director s assistant e. avoiding language that catches attention to the sex role of men and women TRADITIONAL: working mothers, spinsters or old maids SUGGESTED: wage-earning mothers, unmarried women TRADITIONAL: busboys, chauvinist pigs SUGGESTED: waiter s assistants, male chauvinists 5. Eliminate sexism when addressing persons formally by: a. using Ms. Instead of Mrs. TRADITIONAL: Mrs. dela Cruz SUGGESTED: Ms. dela Cruz b. using a married womans first name instead of her husbands TRADITIONAL: Mrs. Juan dela Cruz SUGGESTED: Ms. Maria Santos-dela Cruz c. using the corresponding titles for females TRADITIONAL: Dra. Concepcion Reyes SUGGESTED: Dr. Concepcion Reyes
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4) If the Official Receipts and/or cash book are to be delivered, the same shall be forwarded by LRA thru its cargo forwarding contractor; and 5) Consumption of Official Receipts shall be reported semi-annually to the Land Registration Authority thru its Property and Supply Section using the attached form, for monitoring and auditing purposes. For strict compliance. 12 July 2006. (Sgd.) CHRISTOPHER O. LOCK Court Administrator
3.
An Order granting or denying a motion for reconsideration from an Order of Forfeiture must state clearly the reason for its grant or denial and specifying therein the facts and the law on which it is based. Corollarily, all Judges shall furnish the Office of the Court Administrator a copy of their Order of Forfeiture and the motions for reconsideration submitted by the parties.
4.
Strict compliance is hereby enjoined. 19 July 2006. (Sgd.) CHRISTOPHER O. LOCK Court Administrator
OCA CIRCULAR NO. 100-2006 TO: ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARIA DISTRICT COURTS, AND SHARIA CIRCUIT COURTS. SUBJECT: GUIDELINES ON THE REDUCTION OF BOND LIABILITY In line with the policy of the Court to ensure the efficient and effective collection of liabilities under surety bonds and expedite the administration of justice, the Court sets forth hereunder the following guidelines: 1. REDUCTION OF BOND LIABILITY Following an Order of Forfeiture, the Court may reduce or otherwise mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, PROVIDED, the accused has been surrendered or is acquitted. Only in these two instances may Judges reduce or mitigate the liability of the bondsmen. (RULE 114, SEC. 2) All Judges shall resolve all motions for reconsideration filed by the bondsmen from an Order of Forfeiture within thirty (30) days from the time it is submitted for resolution. (RULE 37, SEC. 4) OCA CIRCULAR NO. 103-2006 TO : ALL JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND JUDGES OF THE FIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS SUBJECT: REVISED PROVISION OF CANON 4, SECTION 9 OF THE NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT The Supreme Court En Banc in its Resolution dated 6 June 2006 in A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC, Re: New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary-Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Philippine Judicial Academy, to REVISE the provision of Canon 4, Section 9 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, as distributed to judges and court personnel, so as to read as follows: Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose NOT related to their judicial duties. For your information and guidance. 28 July 2006. 2. (Sgd.) CHRISTOPHER O. LOCK Court Administrator
3rd Floor, Supreme Court Centennial Building Padre Faura St. cor. Taft Ave., Manila, Philippines 1000