The London Blitz

The London Blitz
The Blitz was a German bombing campaign against the United Kingdom, in 1940 and 1941,
during the Second World War. The term was first used by the British press and originated
from the term Blitzkrieg, the German word meaning 'lightning war.
he Germans conducted mass air attacks against industrial targets, towns, and cities,
beginning with raids on London towards the end of the Battle of Britain in 1940 (a battle for
daylight air superiority between the Luftwaffe and the Royal Air Force over the United
Kingdom). By September 1940, the Luftwaffe had lost the Battle of Britain and the German
air fleets (Luftflotten) were ordered to attack London, to draw RAF Fighter Command into a
battle of annihilation Adolf Hitler and Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, commander-in-chief
of the Luftwaffe, ordered the new policy on 6 September 1940. From 7 September 1940,
London was systematically bombed by the Luftwaffe for 56 of the following 57 days and
nights.Notable attacks included a large daylight attack against London on 15 September, a
large raid on December 29 1940 against London resulting in a firestorm known as the
Second Great Fire of London and a large raid on the night of 10-11 May 1941.
The Luftwaffe gradually decreased daylight operations in favour of night attacks to evade
attacks by the RAF, and the Blitz became a night bombing campaign after October 1940. The
Luftwaffe attacked the main Atlantic seaport of Liverpool in the Liverpool Blitz. The North
Sea port of Hull, a convenient and easily found target or secondary target for bombers
unable to locate their primary targets, suffered the Hull Blitz. The port cities of Bristol,
Cardiff, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Southampton, Swansea, Belfast, and Glasgow were also
bombed, as were the industrial centres of Birmingham, Coventry, Manchester, and
Sheffield. More than 40,000 civilians were killed by Luftwaffe bombing during the war,
almost half of them in the capital, where more than a million houses were destroyed or
damaged.
In early July 1940, the German High Command began planning Operation Barbarossa, the
invasion of the Soviet Union. Bombing failed to demoralise the British into surrender or do
much damage to the war economy; eight months of bombing never seriously hampered
British war production, which continued to increase. The greatest effect was to force the
British to disperse the production of aircraft and spare parts. British wartime studies
concluded that most cities took 10 to 15 days to recover when hit severely, but some, such
as Birmingham, took three months
The German air offensive failed because the Luftwaffe High Command (Oberkommando der
Luftwaffe, OKL) did not develop a methodical strategy for destroying British war industry.
Poor intelligence about British industry and economic efficiency led to OKL concentrating on
tactics rather than strategy. The bombing effort was diluted by attacks against several sets
of industries instead of constant pressure on the most vital.
In the 1920s and 1930s, airpower theorists such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell claimed
that air forces could win wars, obviating the need for land and sea combat. It was thought
that "the bomber will always get through" and could not be resisted, particularly at night.
Industry, seats of government and communications could be destroyed, depriving an
opponent of the means to make war. Bombing civilians would cause a collapse of morale
and a loss of production in the remaining factories. Democracies, where public opinion was
allowed, were thought particularly vulnerable. The RAF and the United States Army Air
Corps (USAAC) adopted much of this apocalyptic thinking. The policy of RAF Bomber
Command became an attempt to achieve victory through the destruction of civilian will,
communications and industry.
The Luftwaffe took a cautious view of strategic bombing but the OKL did not oppose the
strategic bombardment of industries or cities. It believed it could greatly affect the balance
of power on the battlefield by disrupting production and damaging civilian morale. OKL did
not believe air power alone could be decisive and the Luftwaffe did not adopt an official
policy of the deliberate bombing of civilians until 1942
From the beginning of the National Socialist regime until 1939, there was a debate in
German military journals over the role of strategic bombardment, with some contributors
arguing along the lines of the British and Americans.[19] General Walther Wever (Chief of
the Luftwaffe General Staff 1 March 1935 – 3 June 1936) championed strategic bombing and
the building of suitable aircraft, although he emphasised the importance of aviation in
operational and tactical terms. Wever outlined five points of air strategy:
 To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories and defeat
enemy air forces attacking German targets.
 To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas, by
destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are
indispensable for the movement and supply of forces
 To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e.,
armoured forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy's advance and
participating directly in ground operations.
 To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting German naval bases
and participating directly in naval battles
 To paralyse the enemy armed forces by stopping production in armaments factories

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