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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 184315               November 28, 2011

ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, Petitioner,

vs.
THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION, NOEL CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, DONNA
GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO, THELMA SAN JUAN and ROBERT COYIUTO, JR.,
Respondents.

R E S O L U T I ON

PERALTA, J.:

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration1 dated January 15, 2010, filed by the respondents, and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration2 of respondent Robert Coyiuto, Jr., dated March 17, 2010, from the
Decision rendered in favor of petitioner Alfonso T. Yuchengco, dated November 25, 2009.

At the outset, a brief narration of the factual and procedural antecedents that transpired and led to the filing of the
motions is in order.

The present controversy arose when in the last quarter of 1993, several allegedly defamatory articles against
petitioner were published in The Manila Chronicle by Chronicle Publishing Corporation. Consequently, petitioner
filed a complaint against respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 136, docketed as
Civil Case No. 94-1114, under three separate causes of action, namely: (1) for damages due to libelous publication
against Neal H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul
Valino, Rodney P. Diola, all members of the editorial staff and writers of The Manila Chronicle, and Chronicle
Publishing; (2) for damages due to abuse of right against Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing; and (3) for
attorney’s fees and costs against all the respondents.

On November 8, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision3 in favor of petitioner.

Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse before the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 18, 2008, the CA rendered a
Decision4 affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.

Respondents then filed a Motion for Reconsideration5 praying that the CA reconsider its earlier decision and reverse
the decision of the trial court. On August 28, 2008, the CA rendered an Amended Decision6 reversing the earlier
Decision.

Subsequently, petitioner filed the present recourse before this Court which puts forth the following assignment of
errors:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

RULING THAT THE CASE OF ARTURO BORJAL, ET AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., CITED BY
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, WARRANTED THE REVERSAL OF
THE CA DECISION DATED MARCH 18, 2008.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

RULING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLES IN THE COMPLAINT FALL WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION.

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

RULING THAT PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR PUBLIC FIGURE.7

On November 25, 2009, this Court rendered a Decision partially granting the petition.

Respondents later filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 15, 2010, which the Court denied in the
Resolution8 dated March 3, 2010.
Meanwhile, respondent Coyiuto, Jr. also filed a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
with Attached Supplemental Motion, both dated March 17, 2010.

On April 21, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution9 resolving to recall the Resolution dated March 3, 2010; grant
Coyiuto, Jr.’s motion for leave to file supplemental motion for reconsideration; note the supplemental motion for
reconsideration; and require petitioner to comment on the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration.

On June 22, 2010, petitioner filed his Comment on the Motion for Reconsideration10 dated January 15, 2010 and
Comment on respondent Coyiuto, Jr.’s Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration11 dated 17 March 2010.

In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondents moved for a reconsideration of the earlier decision on the following
grounds:

1. MALICE-IN-FACT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN.

2. PETITIONER IS A "PUBLIC FIGURE."

3. THE SUBJECT OF THE PUBLICATIONS CONSTITUTES FAIR COMMENTS, ON PUBLIC ISSUES, ON

MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST AND NATIONAL CONCERN.

4. RESPONDENTS DID NOT ACT IN A RECKLESS MANNER OR IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE

TRUTH OF THE MATTERS COVERED BY THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.

5. THE PROTECTIVE MANTLE OF QUALIFIED PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTS THE

SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.

6. THERE IS NO LEGAL OR EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO HOLD DONNA GATDULA, JOINTLY AND

SEVERALLY, LIABLE FOR THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS, TOGETHER WITH THE EDITORS AND STAFF
OF THE NEWSPAPER.

7. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO HOLD THELMA SAN JUAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUBJECT
PUBLICATIONS.

8. THE "QUICK NOTES" COLUMN OF MR. RAUL VALINO ARE BASED ON FACTS; THUS, NOT
LIBELOUS.

9. ROBERT COYIUTO, JR. IS NOT IMPLEADED WITH THE EDITORS AND STAFF MEMBERS OF THE
MANILA CHRONICLE, BUT IS SUED IN "HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY" FOR AN "ABUSE OF RIGHT" AND
NO EVIDENCE LINKS HIM TO THE SUBJECT PUBLICATIONS.

10. THE AWARDED DAMAGES ARE EXCESSIVE, EQUITABLE AND UNJUSTIFIED.12

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Coyiuto, Jr. raises the following arguments:

I.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THIS HONORABLE COURT OBVIOUSLY OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT IN
PETITIONER’S AMENDED COMPLAINT (DATED OCTOBER 17, 1994), RESPONDENT ROBERT
COYIUTO, JR. WAS NOT SUED FOR DAMAGES ALLEGEDLY DUE TO "LIBELOUS PUBLICATIONS"
(FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION). HE WAS SUED, HOWEVER, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY FOR "ABUSE
OF RIGHT" (SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION) ALLEGEDLY, AS "CHAIRMAN" OF THE BOARD, "OFFICER,"
"PRINCIPAL OWNER," OF THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION UNDER ARTICLES
19 AND 20 OF THE CIVIL CODE. AS SUCH, THE IMPOSITION OF MORAL (₱25 MILLION PESOS) AND
EXEMPLARY (₱10 MILLION PESOS) DAMAGES AGAINST RESPONDENT COYIUTO, JR. HAS NO BASIS
IN LAW AND CONTRARY TO THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF ARTICLES 2219 AND 2229, IN RELATION
TO ARTICLE 2233, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE CIVIL CODE AS WILL BE ELUCIDATED HEREUNDER.

II.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, APART FROM THE SELF-SERVING/UNILATERAL ALLEGATION IN

PARAGRAPH 3.11 OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT (ANNEX "C" OF PETITION FOR REVIEW), NO IOTA
OF EVIDENCE WAS ADDUCED ON TRIAL IN SUPPORT OF THE ALLEGATION THAT RESPONDENT
COYIUTO, JR. WAS "CHAIRMAN", "PRINCIPAL OWNER" AND "OFFICER" OF RESPONDENT MANILA
CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION. SEC DOCUMENTS SHOW THE CONTRARY, AS WILL BE
DISCUSSED HEREUNDER. SO HOW COULD RESPONDENT COYIUTO, JR. BE IMPLEADED TO HAVE
"ABUSED HIS RIGHT AS A NON-CHAIRMAN, NON-STOCKHOLDER, NON-OFFICER OF RESPONDENT
MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION? IT IS FUNDAMENTAL THAT THE BURDEN OF
PROOF RESTS ON THE PARTY ASSERTING A FACT OR ESTABLISHING A CLAIM (RULE 131, REVISED
RULES OF COURT).13

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the motion for reconsideration generally restates and reiterates the
arguments, which were previously advanced by respondents and does not present any substantial reasons, which
were not formerly invoked and passed upon by the Court.
However, from the supplemental motion for reconsideration, it is apparent that Coyiuto, Jr. raises a new matter
which has not been raised in the proceedings below. This notwithstanding, basic equity dictates that Coyiuto, Jr.
should be given all the opportunity to ventilate his arguments in the present action, but more importantly, in order to
write finis to the present controversy. It should be noted that the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration
was later recalled by this Court in the Resolution dated March 3, 2010, and therein, petitioner was given the
opportunity to refute Coyiuto, Jr.’s arguments by filing his comment on the motion for reconsideration and the
supplemental motion for reconsideration, which petitioner complied with.

From these Comments and contrary to Coyiuto, Jr.’s contention, it was substantially established that he was the
Chairman of Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation when the subject articles were published. Coyiuto, Jr. even
admitted this fact in his Reply and Comment on Request for Admission,14 to wit:

4. Defendant Robert Coyiuto Jr. ADMITS that he was the Chairman of the Board but not President of the Manila
Chronicle during the period Novemeber (sic) to December 1993.

5. Defendant Robert Coyiuto Jr. DENIES paragraph 11. He has already conveyed such denial to plaintiff in the
course of the pre-trial. It was The Manila Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation, of which he is, admittedly
Chairman of the Board, that published the items marked as plaintiff’s Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, and G.

xxxx

12. This case, based on plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, is limited to the publications in The Manila Chronicle marked
plaintiff’s Exhibits "A" to "G", consecutively, published by defendant Manila Chronicle. Thus, only the question of
whether Mr. Robert Coyiuto, Jr. was Chairman and President of defendant Manila Chronicle, during these
publications and whether he caused these publications, among all of plaintiffs’ queries, are relevant and material to
this case. And defendant Robert Coyiuto, Jr. has answered that: "Yes", he was Chairman of the Board. "No", he was
never President of The Manila Chronicle. "No", he did not cause the publications in The Manila Chronicle: it was the
Manila Chronicle that published the news items adverted to.15

Both the trial court and the CA affirmed this fact. We reiterate that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted
and confirmed by the CA, are binding and conclusive on this Court and will generally not be reviewed on appeal.
While this Court has recognized several exceptions16 to this rule, none of these exceptions exists in the present
case. Accordingly, this Court finds no reason to depart from the findings of fact of the trial court and the CA.

More importantly and contrary again to Coyiuto, Jr.’s contention, the cause of action of petitioner based on "abuse of
rights," or Article 19, in relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code, warrants the award of damages.

The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as in the
performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.17

In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals,18 it was elucidated that while Article 19 "lays
down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not
provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper." The Court said:

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to
be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT
ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of
the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw
out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring
from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that]
should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway
and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The
law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set
forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.19
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law
which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
to the standards set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.20 Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an
action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.

The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article
20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. In the present case, it was
found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed abused his rights as Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which led to the publication of
the libelous articles in the said newspaper, thus, entitling petitioner to damages under Article 19, in relation to Article
20.

Consequently, the trial court and the CA correctly awarded moral damages to petitioner. Such damages may be
awarded when the transgression is the cause of petitioner’s anguish.21 Further, converse to Coyiuto, Jr.’s argument,
although petitioner is claiming damages for violation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, still such violations
directly resulted in the publication of the libelous articles in the newspaper, which, by analogy, is one of the ground
for the recovery of moral damages under (7) of Article 2219.22

However, despite the foregoing, the damages awarded to petitioner appear to be too excessive and warrants a
second hard look by the Court.

While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages,
the same should not be palpably and scandalously excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty
to the wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant.23

Even petitioner, in his Comment24 dated June 21, 2010, agree that moral damages "are not awarded in order to
punish the respondents or to make the petitioner any richer than he already is, but to enable the latter to find some
cure for the moral anguish and distress he has undergone by reason of the defamatory and damaging articles which
the respondents wrote and published."25 Further, petitioner cites as sufficient basis for the award of damages the
plain reason that he had to "go through the ordeal of defending himself everytime someone approached him to ask
whether or not the statements in the defamatory article are true."

In Philippine Journalists, Inc. (People’s Journal) v. Thoenen,26 citing Guevarra v. Almario,27 We noted that the
damages in a libel case must depend upon the facts of the particular case and the sound discretion of the court,
although appellate courts were "more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them." So it must be in this
case.

Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering. Moral damages
should be reasonably approximate to the extent of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.28 The Court,
therefore, finds the award of moral damages in the first and second cause of action in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00
and ₱25,000,000.00, respectively, to be too excessive and holds that an award of ₱1,000,000.00 and
₱10,000,000.00, respectively, as moral damages are more reasonable.

As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish
another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.29 On this
basis, the award of exemplary damages in the first and second cause of action in the amount of ₱500,000.00 and
₱10,000,000.00, respectively, is reduced to ₱200,000.00 and ₱1,000,000.00, respectively.

On the matter of attorney’s fees and costs of suit, Article 2208 of the same Code provides, among others, that
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation may be recovered in cases when exemplary damages are awarded and
where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In
any event, however, such award must be reasonable, just and equitable.30 Thus, the award of attorney’s fees and
costs is reduced from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱200,000.00.

One final note, the case against respondent was one for damages based on the publication of libelous articles
against petitioner; hence, only civil in nature. The rule is that a party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must
establish his cause of action by a preponderance of evidence. Thus, respondents’ liability was proven only on the
basis of preponderance of evidence, which is quite different from a criminal case for libel where proof beyond
reasonable doubt must be established.

Corollarilly, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the person who "caused the publication" of a defamatory
article shall be responsible for the same. Hence, Coyiuto, Jr. should have been held jointly and solidarily liable with
the other respondents in the first cause of action under this article and not on the basis of violation of the principle of
abuse of rights founded on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Because of the exclusion of Coyiuto, Jr. in the first
cause of action for libel, he cannot be held solidarily liable with the other respondents in the first cause of action.
Nonetheless, since damage to petitioner was in fact established warranting the award of moral and exemplary
damages, the same could only be awarded based on petitioner’s second cause of action impleading Coyiuto, Jr. for
violation of the principle of abuse of right.
It did not escape the attention of the Court that in filing two different causes of action based on the same published
articles, petitioner intended the liability of Coyiuto, Jr. to be different from the other respondents. It can be inferred
that if Coyiuto, Jr. was impleaded in the first cause of action for recovery of the civil liability in libel, petitioner could
not have prayed for higher damages, considering that the other respondents, who are jointly and severally liable
with one another, are not in the same financial standing as Coyiuto, Jr. Petitioner, in effect, had spared the other
respondents from paying such steep amount of damages, while at the same time prayed that Coyiuto, Jr. pay
millions of pesos by way of moral and exemplary damages in the second cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision of this Court, dated November 25, 2009, is MODIFIED to read as follows:
1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino,
Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola, to pay
plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

a. the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and

b. the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) as exemplary damages;

2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Robert Coyiuto, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing to pay
plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:

a. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) as moral damages; and

b. the amount of One Million Pesos (₱1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages;

3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱200,000.00) as attorney’s fee and legal costs.

Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

C E RTI F I CATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 428-459.

2
Id. at 470-481.
3 Id. at 174-194.

4 Id. at195-248.

5
Id. at 249-256.
6 Id. at 53-62.

7 Id. at 348-349.
 8 Id. at 464-464

9
Id. at 511-512.
10 Id. at 625-659.

11 Id. at 522-574.

12
Id. at 428-429.
13 Id. at 470-471.

14 Records, Vol. II, pp. 731-734.

15
Id. at 732-733.
16 See Montecillo v. Pama, G.R. No. 158557, February 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 512.

17 GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona, G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 466, 478.

18
257 Phil. 783 (1989).
19 Id. at 783-784.

20 Manuel v. People, 512 Phil. 818, 847 (2005) .

21
Civil Code, Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act for omission.

22 Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

xxxx

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

x x x x.

23 Cebu Country Club, Inc. v. Elizagaque, G.R. No. 160273, January 18, 2008, 542 SCRA 65, 75.

24
Rollo, pp. 625-659.
25 Id. at 655-656.

26
513 Phil. 607, 625 (2005).
27 56 Phil. 477 (1932).

28 Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Alejandro, G.R. No. 175587, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA
738, 757-758.
29
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc.,
425 Phil. 511, 524 (2002).

30 Cebu Country Club, Inc. v. Elizagaque, supra note 23, at 76.

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