GR No. 95367, May 23, 1995

COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE v. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ +
Facts
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C. Perez is Chief of the
EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division.  The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the
Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing
savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.  Almonte and Perez denied the
anomalous activities. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a
concerned citizen, was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government
offices, including the Office of the Ombudsman.

The letter reads in pertinent parts:

1. These are the things that I have been observing.  During the implementation of E.O. 127 on May 1,
1988, one hundred ninety (190) personnel were dismissed.  Before that implementation, we had a
monthly savings of P500,000.00 from unfilled plantilla position plus the implementation of RA 6683
wherein seventy (70) regular employees availed a total amount of P1,400,000.00 was saved from
the government monthly.  The question is, how do they used or disbursed this savings?  The EIIB
has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the
brain of the so called "ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA).  The
Commissioner of EIIB has a biggest share on this.  Among his activities are:

Supporting RAM wherein he is involved. He gives big amount especially during the Dec. Failed
a)
coup.
b) Payment for thirty five (30) mini UZI's.
c) Payment for the purchased of Maxima '87 for personal used of the Commissioner.
Another observation was the agents under the Director of NCR EIIB is the sole operating unit
within Metro Manila which was approved by no less than the Commissioner due to anomalous
activities of almost all agents assigned at the central office directly under the Commissioner.
d)
Retired Brig. Gen. Almonte as one of the Anti-Graft board member of the Department of Finance
should not tolerate this. However, the Commissioner did not investigate his own men instead, he
placed them under the 15-30 payroll.
e) Many more which are personal.
2. Sir, my question is this.  Can your good office investigate Ell intelligence funds particularly Personal
Services (01) Funds?  I wonder why the Dep't of Budget & Mgmt. cannot compel EllB to submit an
actual filled up position because almost half of it are vacant and still they are releasing it.  Are EIIB
plantilla position classified?  It is included in the Personal Services Itemization (PSI) and I believe it
 is not classified and a ruling from Civil Service Commission that EIIB is not exempted from Civil
Service.  Another info, when we had salary differential last Oct `88 all money for the whole plantilla
were released and from that alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost agents of EIA.

3. Another thing that I have observed was the Chief Budget Division possesses high caliber firearms
such as a mini UZI, Armalite rifle and two (2) 45 cal. pistol issued to him by the Assistant
Commissioner wherein he is not an agent of EIIB and authorized as such according to
memorandum order number 283 signed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines
effective 9 Jan. 1990.

Another observation was when EIIB agents apprehended a certain civilian who possesses
numerous assorted high powered firearms.  Agents plus one personnel from the legal proclaimed
only five (5) firearms and the remaining was pilfered by them.

Another observation is almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler syndicate
monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.

Another observation is the commissioner allocates funds coming from the intelligence funds to the
media to sustain their good image of the bureau.
Issue
I. WHETHER OR NOT A CASE BROUGHT ABOUT BY AN UNSIGNED AND UNVERIFIED LETTER
COMPLAINT IS AN "APPROPRIATE CASE"?
II. WHETHER OR NOT "ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PERSONAL SERVICES FUNDS FOR
THE YEAR 1988 AND ALL EVIDENCES, SUCH AS VOUCHERS (SALARY) FOR THE WHOLE
PLANTILLA OF EIIB FOR 1988" ARE CLASSIFIED AND, THEREFORE, BEYOND THE REACH
OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT'S SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM.
Ruling
I.
Ombudsman and his Deputies are designated by the Constitution "protectors of the people" and as such
they are required by it "to act promptly on complaints in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, § 13(4) the Ombudsman can act only "in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" and that because the complaint in this case is
unsigned and unverified, the case is not an appropriate one.  This contention lacks merit.  As already
stated, the Constitution expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in any form or
manner" concerning official acts or omissions.  Thus, Art. XI, § 12 provides:

The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations and shall in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.

Similarly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Rep. Act No. 6770) provides in § 26(2):

The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form concerning an
official act or omission.  It shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it
shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the reasons therefor.  If it finds a
reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish the respondent public officer or employee with
a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two hours from
receipt thereof.  If the answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case. 
In the first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution
itself.  In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a
manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which
keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings.  As this Court had occasion to point out, the
Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the
government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and
influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.
II.
At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters.  This privilege is based upon public interest of such
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even
though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence, like the claim
of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for
the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in
candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those
who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions
and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.  These are the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.  The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of the government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. . . .

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB.  Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but
not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting. Consequently, while in cases
which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the case that there
is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without compelling
production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
The other statutes and regulations invoked by petitioners in support of their contention that the documents
sought in the subpoena duces tecum of the Ombudsman are classified merely indicate the confidential
nature of the ElIB's functions, but they do not exempt the EIIB from the duty to account for its funds to the
proper authorities.  Indeed by denying that there were savings made from certain items in the agency and
alleging that the DBM had released to the EIIB only the allocations needed for the 947 personnel retained
after its reorganization, petitioners in effect invited inquiry into the veracity of their claim.  If, as petitioners
claim, the subpoenaed records have been examined by the COA and found by it to be regular in all
respects, there is no reason why they cannot be shown to another agency of the government which by
constitutional mandate is required to look into any complaint concerning public office.
The petition is dismissed, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed documents be made
personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.
G.R. No. 180643             September 4, 2008
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE
AND SECURITY, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Neri, then Director General of the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA), was invited by the respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on
the alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project. This project was contracted by
the Philippine Government with the Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), which
involved the amount of US$329,481,290. When he testified before the Senate Committees, he disclosed
that then Commission on Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him P200 million
in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege.” In particular, he refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether or not the President
followed up the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she
directed him to approve it.
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to
appear and testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter
dated 15 November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s testimony on the ground of
executive privilege. Ermita invoked the privilege on the ground that “the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China,” and given
the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, Neri “cannot provide the
Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is
designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear before the respondent Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29
November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not intend to snub the Senate
hearing, and requested that if there be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first appearance,
he be informed in advance so he can prepare himself. He added that his non-appearance was upon the
order of the President, and that his conversation with her dealt with delicate and sensitive national
security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government
officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.
Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and
consequently ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he
appears and gives his testimony.
Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause Letter and the Contempt Order for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and stressed
that his refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim to executive privilege in
accordance with the ruling in the landmark case of Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006). For
its part, the Senate Committees argued that they did not exceed their authority in issuing the assailed
orders because there is no valid justification for Neri’s claim to executive privilege. In addition, they claimed
that the refusal of petitioner to answer the three questions violates the people’s right to public information,
and that the executive is using the concept of executive privilege as a means to conceal the criminal
act of bribery in the highest levels of government.
Issue:
Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by executive
privilege, making the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate Committees void.
RULING
Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid out the three elements needed to
be complied with in order for the claim to executive privilege to be valid. These are:
1.) the protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power;
2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself.
The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President; and,
3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence,” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that the
communications elicited by the three questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy decision-making process,” and that
“the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China.” It is clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President. Under
the “operational proximity” test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of the
President’s Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptive privilege and that the presumption
can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to such
conversations. In the present case, respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need for
the answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the
questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As
ruled in Senate vs. Ermita, “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.”
Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not violate the people’s right to
information on matters of public concern simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself provides
that this right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
Supreme Court (voting 9-6) was convinced that the three questions are covered by presidential
communications privilege, and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive department,
enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him for not answering
such questions.
The petition was granted. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing petitioner in contempt of the
Senate Committee and directing his arrest and detention was nullified.
G.R. No. 169777*             April 20, 2006
Senate of the Philippines, petitioner
Eduardo R. Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondent
On September 28, 2005, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued E.O. No. 464[1]. Effective on the
date of its issuance, the said order aims to (a) ensure the observance of the principle of the separation of
powers; (b) ensure adherence to the rule on executive privilege; and (c) respect the rights of public officials
appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by
the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. – In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on separation of powers
between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. –
(a) Nature and Scope. – The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution. Further, Republic
Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides
that public officials and employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially
known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public
officers covered by this executive order, including:
(i) Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public officials
covered by this executive
(ii) (ii) Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of
national security should not be divulged
(iii) (iii) Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties
and executive
(iv) (iv) Discussion in closed-door Cabinet meetings
(v) (v) Matters affecting national security and public order
(b) Who are covered. – The following are covered by this executive order:
(i) Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by
the executive privilege;
(ii) Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
(iii) Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
(iv) Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by
the executive privilege; and
(v) Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. – All public officials enumerated in
Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of
Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on
executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Curiously, E.O. 464 was issued at a time when both the Senate and the House of Representatives were
conducting congressional inquiries, to wit:
(a) the North Rail Project;
(b) the "Hello Garci" wiretapping scandal;
(c) Ginintuang Masaganang Ani fertilizer fund scam;
(d) the Venable contract.
With the issuance of E.O. 464, the public officials invited to attend said inquiries were effectively barred
from attending without consent from the President.
ISSUES

1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;

2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and

3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior
to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

RULING
 E.O. 464 frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. But the assailed order is not entirely unconstitutional.
In fact, Section 1 is valid on the ground that it merely stresses the voluntary nature of the "question hour" as
found in Section 22, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, as opposed to "inquiries in aid of legislation" in Section
21, Art. VI, which are mandatory in nature.

Section 2(a) of E.O. 464 is likewise valid, it being merely an enumeration of information covered by
executive privilege.
Section 2(b) is unconstitutional because it allows the President to invoke executive privilege based on the
classifications or categories of persons, when in fact such categorization should only apply to information.
The unconstitutionality of Section 3, on the other hand, is due to the fact that it merely invokes executive
privilege without asserting why. Congress has the right to know why an information is subject to executive
privilege, such that an "implied claim" of executive privilege not accompanied by any specific allegation of
the basis thereof is insufficient.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the
public, the courts, and the Congress.
But not all information covered by executive privilege are considered privileged in all cases (see US v.
Nixon re: Watergate scandal). The Court ruled that while executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a
claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made. Given this, the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Given that congressional hearings are generally held in public, any executive issuance that tends to unduly
limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which,
being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are
thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their opinions on the matter before
Congress -- opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government
officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.
Laws, including presidential issuances, must be first published either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation prior to their implementation. In the instant case, E.O. 464 was
immediately invoked even if the requirement of prior publication has not been satisfied yet.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public
Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.
G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002
RANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.
President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the
development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president
also transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and
transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight
hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of
the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name
of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern
portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of
One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441) square
meters or 157.841 hectares.
Years later, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI for the development of the Freedom
Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in the absence of any public bidding.
Then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and denounced the
JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Among the conclusions of their report are:
(1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain
which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands
(2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void and;
(3) the JVA itself is illegal.
Issue
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC
BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;

II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE
GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION
ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE
TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE
GOVERNMENT.
Ruling:
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-going negotiations for a
new agreement." The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting
and/or executing any new agreement with AMARI." Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid
the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the
Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it
from the ambit of judicial review. Petitioner's principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its
violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of
the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty
of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to annul the effects of such
unconstitutional contract.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The
principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of
facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises
constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. The Court can resolve this case without
determining any factual issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which
falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve
to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely
legal or constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to acquire
lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands of the public domain
to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply in
the instant case.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to
comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of
citizens to information on matters of public concern. to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the
sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory law
mandate PEA to disclose.
Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of
alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply
with a constitutional duty to the nation.
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights
- to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public
importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.
That the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a
final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and public order. Congress has also prescribed other limitations
on the right to information in several legislations.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the State, in
lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the
foundation of the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
The Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of
the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
The government can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no
longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to
AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) and MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO
(in his capacity as chairman of the PCGG), respondents, GLORIA A. JOPSON, CELNAN A. JOPSON,
SCARLET A. JOPSON, and TERESA A. JOPSON, petitioners-in-intervention.

FACTS: Petitioner Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former gov’t official, impelled to bring this action
regarding several news reports on:

(1) the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in
Swiss banks and

(2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos
heirs, on how to split or share these assets.

Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information, demands that respondents make public any
negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of recovering the Marcos’s’ ill-gotten wealth.
He claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of
paramount public interest, since it has a “debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be
greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino People. Hence, they have the right to know the
transactions effected by the Government. Respondents, on the other hand, contended that petitioner’s
action is premature, because there is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the
negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has ,PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any
disclosure, since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and
binding. Further, Pres. Ramos, in his Memorandum, commanded the PCGG Chairman NOT to approve
the Compromise Agreements. Embodied in the covenant that

(a) the Marcos’s shall provide the gov’t assistance by way of testimony or disposition on any information
that may shed light on the cases;

(b) the assets determined to belong to the Marcos’s shall be net of and exempt from, any form of taxes
due the Republic of the Philippines;

(c) that all disclosures of assets shall not used as evidence by the Gov’t in any criminal, civil, tax or
administrative case against the former.

ISSUES:

(A) Procedural:

1) Whether or not the petitioner has the personality or legal standing to file the instant petition; and
2) Whether or not this Court is the proper court before which this action may be filed.

(B) Substantive:

1) Whether or not this Court could require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any
agreement, perfected or not, with the Marcos’s; and

2) Whether or not there exist any legal restraints against a compromise agreement between the
Marcos’s and the PCGG relative to the Marcos’s’ ill-gotten wealth.

HELD:

First Procedural Issue

The Petitioner has the legal standing to file the instant petition. In Legaspi vs. CSC, the Court declared
that “when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general public
which possesses the right.

The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official records
and documents which guaranteed under Sec. 7, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution. Due to the satisfaction
of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner’s legal standing, i.e.

1) the enforcement of a public right;

2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, the Court ruled that the petition at bar should be allowed.

Second Procedural Issue

Section 5, Art. VIII of the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. The Court ruled
that this petition is not confined to the Agreements that have already been drawn, but likewise to any
other ongoing or future undertaking towards any settlement on the alleged Marcos loot. Ineluctably,
the core issue boils down to the precise interpretation, in terms of scope, of the twin constitutional
provisions on “public transaction.” This broad and prospective relief sought by the instant petition
brings it out of the realm of Civil Case .

First Substantive Issue

The Court can require the PCGG to disclose to the public the details of any agreement, whether
perfected or not. Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, as well as to gov’t research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.

Such recognized restrictions are as follows:

a) national security matters and intelligence information;

b) trade secrets and banking transactions;

c) criminal matters and;

d) other confidential information.

The Court emphasized that ill-gotten wealth assumes a public character which refers to assets and
properties acquired, directly or indirectly, by former Pres. Marcos, his family and relatives through or as
a result of improper of illegal use of government funds or properties; or their having taken undue
advantage of their public office; or their use of powers or influences resulting in their unjust enrichment
and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino People and the Republic of the Philippines.
Thus, the Court can require the PCGG to disclose sufficient public information on any agreement that
may arrived at and any proposed settlement concerning the Marcos’s’ purported ill-gotten wealth.

Second Substantive Issue

There are Legal Restraints existed against the compromise agreement between the PCGG and the
Marcos heirs. Generally, law encourages compromises in civil cases, except with regard to the following
matters:

1)the civil status of persons,

2) the validity of a marriage of a legal separation,

3) any ground for legal separation,

4) future support,

5) the jurisdiction of courts, and

6) future legitimate.

A Compromise must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order

In Republic & Campos Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, the power to grant criminal immunity was conferred on
PCGG by Section 5 of EO No. 14, as amended by EO No. 14-A, which provides:

Section 5. The PCGG is authorized to grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person who
provides information or testifies in an investigation conducted by the Commission to establish the
unlawful manner in which any respondent, defendant or accused has acquired the properties in
question in any case where such information or testimony is necessary to ascertain or prove the latter’s
guilt or his civil liability. The immunity thereby granted shall be continued to protect the witness who
repeats such testimony before the Sandiganbayan when required to do so by the latter or by the
Commission. In the case at bar, the compromise agreements revealed serious flaws.

First, the agreements did not conform to the requirements of EO 14 and 14-A. Criminal immunity under
section 5 cannot be granted to the Marcos’s, who are the principal defendants in the ill-gotten wealth
cases. The provision is applicable mainly to witnesses who provide information against a respondent,
defendant or accused in an ill-gotten wealth case.

Second, under the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all forms of taxes the
properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear violation of the Constitution. Sec. 28(4),
Art. VI of the Constitution specifically provides: “No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the Member of the Congress.” The PCGG has absolutely no
power to grant such exemptions.

Third, under the Agreement, the government binds itself to cause the dismissal of all cases against the
Marcos heirs, pending before the Sandiganbayan and other court. This is a direct encroachment on
judicial powers of the court which has the jurisdiction on dismissal. Hence, PCGG cannot guarantee the
dismissal of all such criminal cases against the Marcos’s.

Fourth, the government also waives all claims and counterclaims, whether past, present, or future
against the Marcos’s. This stipulation is contrary to the Civil Code which states that “an action for future
fraud may not be waived.” Further, the Agreements do not provide for a definite or determinable
period within which the parties shall fulfill their respective prestation’s. Based on the foregoing
discussion, it is crystal clear that the Agreements which PCGG entered into with the Marcos heirs
violated the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28,
1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being
contrary to law and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all government functionaries
and officials who are or may be directly ot indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcos’s and their associates are DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any
proposed compromise settlement, as well as the final agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten
wealth, in accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision.