Capitalism and modern

social theory
An analysis of the writings of
Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber
ANTHONY GIDDENS
professor of Sociology and Fellow of King's College, Cambridge

_CAMBRIDGE
" , UNIVERSITY PRESS
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© Cambridge University Press 1971

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First published 1971

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Contents

Preface page vii

Introduction xi

list of abbreviations used xvii

Part 1: Marx
1 Marx's early writings 1
2 Historical materialism 18
3 The relations of production and class structure 35
4 The theory of capitalist development 46

Part 1: Durkheim
5 Durkheim's early works 65
6 Durkheim's conception of sociological method 82
7 Individualism, socialism and the • occupational groups ' 95
8 Religion. and moral discipline 105

Part 3: Max Weber

9 Max Weber: Protestantism and capitalism 119
10 Weber's methodological essays 133
11 Fundamental concepts of sociology 145
12 Rationalisation. the • world religions t, and western capitalism 169

Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and sodal theory

] 3 Marx's influence ] 85
14 Religion, ideology and society 205
15 Social differentiation and the division of labour 224

Postscript: Marx and modern sociology 243

Bibliography of works cited in text 248

Index 255
v
Acknowledgements

I wish to express my indebtedness to the following persons.

all of whom have either read or commented verbally upon
papers which I have drawn upon for parts of this book: John
Barnes. Basil Bernstein. John Carroll. Percy Cohen. Norbert
Elias. Geoffrey Ingbam. Terry Johnson. Gavin Mackenzie. Ilya
Neustadt and Irving Zeitlin. I sbould like to thank in partie
cular those who have looked at tbe manuscript as a whole:
Martin Albrow. Tom Bottomore. David Lockwood. Steven
Lukes. and John Rex. My gratitude is also due to Barbara
Leonard. Laurette Mackenzie and Brigitte Prentice; and to my
wife. Jane Giddens.
Preface
Die Vernunft hal immer existiert. nur
niehl immer in der verntinftigen Form
Marx

This book is wriuen in the belief that there is a widespread feeling among
sociologists that contemporary social theory stands in need of a radical
revision. Such a revision must begin from a reconsideration of the works of
those writers who established the principal frames of reference of modern
sociology. In this connection. three names rank above all others: Marx,
Durkheim and Max Weber. My objectives in this work are twofold: firstly,
to set out a precise, yet comprehensive, analysis of the sociological ideas of
each of these three authors; and secondly. to examine some of the main
points of divergence between Marx's characteristic views on the one hand,
and those of the two later writers on the other. I do not pretend to provide
any sort of overall evaluation of the relationship between • Marxist' and
• bourgeois' sociology, but I hope that this book may help to accomplish
the preparatory task of clearing a way through the profuse tangle of asser-
tions and counter-assertions which have surrounded the debate on this
issue. I have. inevitably. covered a great deal of familiar ground. However,
recent scholarship has illuminated basic aspects of the writings of all three
authors. and I believe that my analysis departs considerably from some of
the established works in the field.
I do not, of course. wish to argue that the writings of the authors discussed
in this book represent the only significant streams of social thought which
have become embodied into sociology. On the contrary. the most striking
characteristic of social thought over the hundred years from 1820 to 1920 is
the very plethora of diverse forms of theory which were developed over that
period. The works of Marx's contemporaries. such as Tocqueville. Comte
and Spencer. continue to have a definite relevance to the problems of modern
sociology. and it would perhaps have been more logical to have included
these authors as the subject of detailed discussion in this volume. I decided
against this. partly from reasons of space, and partly because the influence
of Marx today is so much greater than any of these writers (and rightly so.
in terms of the more profound intellectual content of Marx's works). More-
over. most of the dominant branches of modern social theory can be traced.
although with numerous intermediate modifications and extensions. to the
three authors upon whom I have concentrated in this book. Marx's works.
obviously, are the primary source of the various forms of contemporary neo-
Marxism; Durkheim's writings may be identified as the dominant inspiration
vii
vui Preface
lying behind 'structural-functionalism '; and at least some of the modern
variants of phenomenology derive, directly or indirectly, from the writings of
Max Weber. Moreover. within more specific fields of sociology, such as in
the study of social stratification, religion, and so on, the influence of Marx.
Durkheim and Weber has been fundamental.
As Durkheim himself pointed out in a preface to a book on Kant by his
friend and colleague Hamelin. anyone who wishes to portray the thought of
men of a different time to his own, faces a certain dilemma. Either he pre-
serves the original terminology in which the author couched his works. in
which case he runs the risk that his exposition appears outdated. and hence
irrelevant to modem times; or he consciously modernises his terms, and faces
the danger that his analysis will be untrue to the ideas of the writer con-
cerned. It says much for the contemporary relevance of the social thought of
the three authors discussed in this book that. in analysing their work, this
dilemma does not offer difficulties of an acute kind. Where there are problems
of this sort, I have opted to preserve the original phraseology. But in the case
of the writers whose works are analysed in this volume. the main difficulties
which are posed concern the rendition of culturally specific German or
French terms into English. Terms such as Geist or representation collective
have no satisfactory English equivalents. and themselves express some of the
differences in social development between Britain. Germany and France
which are touched upon in the book. I have attempted to meet such problems.
as far as is possible. by paying attention to the particular shades of meaning
contained in the original texts, and in making quotations I have frequently
modified the existing English translations.
This is not a critical. but an expository and comparative work. By using
the present tense wherever possible, I have tried to emphasise the contem-
porary relevance of these authors. I have not sought to identify the weak-
nesses or ambiguities in the works of Marx, Durkheim or Weber. but rather
have attempted to demonstrate the internal coherence which can be
discerned in the writings of each author. I have also avoided, as far as
possible, the scholarly travail of identifying the sources of the ideas com-
prised in the writings of the three figures. But inevitably. because all three
wrote in a polemical vein. reference to other authors and traditions of thought
cannot be eschewed altogether. I have given some degree of prominence to
the social and historical' rooting • of the three writers whose work is analysed
here, since this is essential to the adequate interpretation of their writings.
In various ways, of course, the personalities of the three men present dramatic
contrasts, and are also no doubt relevant to the explication of the social
theories which they formulated. I have ignored this. because it is not my
objective to analyse in any amount of detail the' causal' origins of the
writings examined in the book. My concern is directed at disentangling some
of the complex intellectual relationships among the three.
 Preface ix
I have not attempted, in the concluding chapters, to compare the works of
Durkheim and Weber directly. but instead have used Marx's writings as the
point of reference. Assessment of the convergences llnd discrepancies be-
tween the writings of Marx on the one hand. and Durkheim and Weber on
the other. is complicated by the fact of the retarded publication of Marx's
early works. It is only relatively recently. since something like a decade after
the death of Durkheim (1917) and Weber (1920). that it has become possible
to assess the intellectual content of Marx's writings in the light of these
works which. while they are of extreme importance to the evaluation of
Marx's thought. were published for the first time almost a century after they
were originally written. In my account of Marx's writings. I have tried to
break away from the dichotomy between the works of the • young • and the
• mature' Marx which has tyrannised most Marxist scholarship since the
last war. Close scrutiny of the notes which Marx originally wrote as the basis
of Capital in 1857-8 (Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen lJkonomie).
leaves no doubt that Marx did not abandon the perspective which guided
him in his early writings. But. in practice. those who have granted the truth
of this. in analysing Marx's thought. have still tended to concentrate upon
one part of Marx's writings to the exclusion of the other. I have attempted
to provide a more balanced and integrated analysis, which preserves the
basic place of Capital in Marx's life's work.
Apart from Marx himself. there can be few social thinkers whose fate it
has been to be so persistently misunderstood as Durkheim. In his own day,
Durkheim's theoretical writings were regarded by most critics as embodying
an unacceptable metaphysical notion of the • group mind '. More recent
sympathetic accounts have largely dispelled this sort of misinterpretation.
but have supplanted it with one which places virtually the whole emphasis
upon Durkheim's functionalism. In this book. I have sought to rescue
Durkheim as an historical thinker. Durkheim always emphasised the crucial
significance of the historical dimension in sociology, and I believe that an
appreciation of this leads to quite a different assessment of Durkheim's
thought from that which is ordinarily given. Durkheim was not primarily con-
cerned with • the problem of order '. but with the problem of • the changing
nature of 9rder ' in the context of a definite conception of social development.
Weber's writings are perhaps the most complex of those analysed in this
book. and they defy easy treatment upon a general level. This fact has led. I
think. to a failure in some secondary accounts to grasp the essential con-
sistency in Weber's work. It is only an apparent paradox to say that the very
diversity of Weber's contributions expresses the epistemological principles
which unify them as a single corpus of writings. Weber's radical neo-Kantia-
nism constitutes the underlying standpoint which combines his various
essays in different fields within a coherent framework. It is this which.
in certain important respects. creates irremediable divergences, some of which
x Preface
I have analysed in the concluding chapters, between Weber's social theory
and tbat-of both Durkheim and Marx.
One final point should perhaps be made. I believe that sociologists must
always be conscious of the social context within which theories are formu-
lated. But to stress this does not entail acceptance of a wholly relativistic
position. according to which the • validity' of a given conception is only
limited to the circumstances which gave rise to it. The fortunes of Marx's
writings bear witness to this. I have argued that Marx's theory was formu-
lated at an early stage of capitalist development, and tbat the subsequent
experience of the leading countries of western Europe helped to fashion a
version of • Marxism' which differed substantially from that originally
framed by Marx. Every form of practical theory has its Saint Paul. and
within certain limits this may be regarded as inevitable. But to admit this is
not to accept the stock view that the subsequent development of capitalism
has • falsified' Marx. Marx's writings today still offer a conception of society
and history which it is valuable to contrast with those of other. later, authors.
I do not believe that these divergences can be settled in the conventional
sense in which scientific theories are • confirmed' or • invalidated' by em-
pirical test. But neither are they refractory to empirical reference in the sense
in which philosophical theories are. If the borderline between sociology and
social philosophy is difficult to draw. it exists nonetheless. It is mistaken. I
am certain. for sociologists to seek to restrict the scope of their discipline
to those areas in which the empirical te'sting of propositions is easily applied.
This is the way to a sterile formalism in which sociology becomes lebens-
fremd. and thus irrelevant to the very issues to which the sociological per-
spective has most of all to contribute.
Anthony Giddens

3 March 1971
Introduction

In his inaugural lecture. delivered at Cambridge in 1895. Lord Acton ex-

pressed the conviction that there is 'an evident and intelligible line • which
marks off the modem age in Europe from that which preceded it. The modem
epoch did not succeed the mediaeval era 'by normal succession. with out-
ward tokens of legitimate descent ':
Unheralded, it founded a new order of things, under a law of inpovation, sapping
the ancient reign of continuity. In those days Columbus subverted the notions of
the world, and reversed the conditions of production, wealth, and power; in
those days Machiavelli released government from the restraint of law; Erasmus
diverted the current of ancient learning from profane into Christian channels;
Luther broke the chain of authority and tradition at the strongest link; and
Copernicus erected an invincible power that set for ever the mark of progress
upon the time that was to come ... It was an awakening of new life: the world
revolved in a different orbit, determined by influences unknown before. I
This shattering of the traditional order in Europe, Acton goes on to say.
was the source of the_ d~velopm~nt of historical sci~n~e. Traditional society,
by definition. continually looks back into the past. and the past is its present.
But it is exactly because this is the case that there is no concern with' history •
as such; the continuity of yesterday and today minimises the clarity with
which distinctions are drawn between what 'was' and what 'is '. The
existence of a science of history. therefore. presupposes a world in which
change is ubiquitous, and. more especially. one in which the past has become.
in some degree, a burden from which men seek to be freed. In the modern
era. men no longer accept the conditions of life into which they are born as
necessarily given for all time. but attempt to impose their will upon reality in
order to bend the future into a shape which conforms to their desires.
If Renaissance Europe gave rise to a concern with history. i! was industrial
~~~~~_ whic_~ J~royid~d the co~ditions for the emergence of sociology,It
could be said that the French Revolution of 1789 was the catalyst between
these two enormously complex sets of events. Britain was, according to the
usual measures. the first country to acquire some degree of democratic
government; but. in spite of the fact that this was not obtained without
political revolution. the process of social and economic change which trans-
formed society in Britain from the seventeenth century onwards was rela-
tively progressive in character. The Revolution in France. by contrast.
dramatically set off the privileged. aristocratic order of the ancien regime

) Lord Acton: Lectures on Modern History (London, 1960), p. 19.

xii Introduction
against the vision of a new society which would realise general principles of
justice and freedom. The Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1789, pro-
posed that 'ignorance, disregard or contempt of the rights of man is the
~ole cause of public misfortune '. Thus the French Revolution. or so it
seemed. finally extended the secular rationalism of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries into the sphere of human society itself. But the political
changes instituted by the 1789 Revolution in fact both expressed and sig-
nalled the occurrence of a more deeply-rooted reorganisation of society. and
in this Britain again assumed the leading role: The transition from agrarian.
handicraft production to an industrial economy founded upon the factory
and the machine was one which began in Britain towards the end of the
eighteenth century, The full effects of these changes were felt in the nineteenth
century. both in Britain and in the other major countries of western EuroI?C.
It has often been pointed out. of course, that the conjunction of events
linking the political climate of the French Revolution and the economic
changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution provided the context from
within which sociology was formed. It is necessary to remember, however,
how divergent were the experiences of the various countries in western
Europe from the late eighteenth century onwards, because it is in the frame-
work of these differences that the main traditions of social thought were
created in the nineteenth century. Sociologists today talk blandly of the
emergence of • industrial society' in nineteenth-century Europe. ignoring the
complexities which this process involved.
For each of the three major countries of western Europe - Britain. France
and Germany - the closing decades of the eighteenth century were years of
advancing economic prosperity. The pace of economic development in
Britain in the late eighteenth century far outstripped that of the others; and
during these years a number of profound technological innovations effected
a metamorphosis in the organisation of cotton manufacture and thereby
initiated the rapid spread of mechanisation and factory production. But at
the turn of the nineteenth century. only a relatively confined sector of the
British economy had been directly affected by the Industrial Revolution,
Even two decades later. the picture was little different. save that cotton - fifty
years before of minor significance in the economy as a whole - had assumed
the role of Britain's leading manufacturing industry,2 Not until the mid-point
of the nineteenth century could Britain adequately be described as an
'industrial society'. The situation in France and Germany was very
different from this. It would be quite wrong to call these countries. as in the
common parlance of today, 'under-developed ',3 In some respects, as for
instance in standards of cultural achievement, especially in literature, art,

2 Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole: British Economic Croll·th (Cambridge. 1969). pp.
182-92.
l cf. David S. Lande;: The Ullhollnd PromC!theus (C:lmbridge. 1969). p. 125.
 Introduction xiii

and philosophy. both continental countries could lay claim to outstripping

comparable British attainments. But. from the middle of the eighteenth
century. each country clearly lagged behind Britain io its level of economic
development. and it was oot until well over a century later that either France
or Germany succeeded in recapturing in substantial degree the lead which
had been ceded to the former country. 4
Moreover. regarding Britain as the measure. neither Germany nor France
in th~~a.rlY-p'~rt of the nineteenth century could match the i~mal political
stabi1i!y_ of a state in which the liberal bourgeoisie had achievea-a:-sfrong
position in government. The Restoration in France gave material expression
to the heavy retrenchment of reactionary interests which dispelled the extra-
vagant progressive hopes that had guided the Jacobins twenty-five years
earlier. The social and political cleavages which had been exposed by the
Revolution were aggriiVated rather than resolved by the events of 1789 and
their immediate aftenna-ih; in fact, not until after 1870 did any regime in
France manage to continue in power for more than two decades. Germany.
as Marx noted early in his intellectual career. 'shared in the restorations of
modem nations without ever sharing in their revolutions '.5 The country. in
fact, was not a nation at all. in the modern sense, at the opening of the nine-
teenth century. but was composed of a loose aggregate of sovereign states;
this situation was not remedied until, under Bismarck. Prussia was able to
use her dominant position to secure the full political unification of Germany.
The problem of the 'backwardness' of Germany stands at the root of
Marx's early formulations of historical materialism. As a . Young Hegelian '
Marx initially shared the view that the rational criticism of existing institu-
tions was sufficient to provoke the radical changes necessary to allow
Germany to match. and to overtake. the two other leading western European
countries. But. as Marx soon perceived. this radical--critical posture merely
preserved the typical German concern with 'theory' to the exclusion of
, practice '. 'In politics '. Marx wrote. ' the Germans have thought what other
nations have done." Hegers system represented the most perfect philo-
sophical example of this. transforming the whole of human history into the
history of the mind or spirit. If Germany was to advance further. Marx con-
cluded. philosophical criticism would have to be complemented by know-
ledge of the material forces which are always at work in change which does
not remain merely on the level of ideas.
Many writers have laid great stress, quite correctly. upon the threefold

& Differences in level of economic advancement between Britain and the other two
countries can, of course, be traced back well beyond the eighteenth century. cf..
for example, F. Cronzet: • England and France in the eighteenth century: a com·
parative analysis of two economic growths " in R. M. Hartwell: The Causes 0/ th~
Industrial R~~'olutiot/ ill Ellg/and (London, 1967 •. pp. 139-74.
sEW. p. 45.
• EW, p. 51.
xiv Introduction
set of influences which were combined in Marx's writings.' Marx effected a
powerful synthesis of the streams of thought which had developed in con·
junction with the social. economic and political differences between the three
leading western European countries. Political economy. closely intercon·
nected with the philosophy of utilitarianism, remained effectively the only
significant form of social theory in Britain throughout most of the nineteenth
century. Marx accepted several of the key propositions developed by Adam
Smith and Ricardo. but merged them with certain of the perspectives upon
the finite character of bourgeois society contained in the various currents of
French socialism. The latter were the proximate source of the society of the
future first envisaged by Marx in the Economic and Philosophical Manu-
scripts of 1844, written in Paris. The historical dimension integrating political
economy and socialism was provided by the Hegelian dialectic. In this way.
Marx's works reunited. in a coherent fashion. the intelleCtual consciousness
of the diverse experience of Britain, France and Germany, and yet at the
same time offered a basis for the theoretical interpretation of these differences
in social. economic, and political structure.
When Marx died. in 1883. Durkheim and Weber were young men stand·
ing at the threshold of their academic careers. But already by this date. the
social structures of all of the three major countries of western Europe had
changed considerably from the time at which Marx had developed his basic
views. In both France and Germany - in contrast to Britain - working-class
movements of a potentially revolutionary nature came to playa leading role
in the political system. However. the influ~nce of these movements was
counterbalanced by a growing surge of iia1!gnalism: and. especially, in
Germany. which did not experience a successful bourgeois revolution. the
bourgeoisie was kept ~llbordinate to a powerful autocratic order, operating
through control Of the state--bureaucracy. the army. and the established
hierarchy.) Inside Germany. in spite of the anti-socialist laws. the Social
Democratic Party - an explicitly' Marxist' party after 1875 - swelled in
size. but towards the end of the century found its revolutionary posture in-
creasingly out of alignment with its real position in a society which had
largely become transformed into an industrial society' from the top '.
It was in this context, beginning shortly before Marx's death. that Engels
began to publish a set of writings furnishing a defence and an exposition
of Marxism as a systematic doctrine - the most important and influential of
these being Anti-Duhring. In emphasising the 'scientific' character of
Marxist socialism as against utopian and voluntarist forms of socialist theory.
Anti-Diihring prepared the ground for the positivistic interpretation of
Marxism which ruled in Marxist circles until after the First World War. and

, cr. Lenin: • The three IOurcea and three component parts of Marxism'. V. I. Lenin.
Selected Works (London, 1969), pp. 20-32.
 Introduction xv
which has become the official philosophy in the Soviet Union. s The decade
foIlowing Marx's death - that is, the time at which both Durkheim and Weber
were each consolidating the views which informed their life's work - was the
crucial period during which Marxism became a really important force, both
politically and intellectually. The philosophical materialism that, under the
influence of Engels, came to be universally identified as ' Marxism " offered
a theoretical framework for Social Democracy which allowed a substantial
divergence between theory and practice: the Social Democrats became more
and more a reformist party in substance. while remaining a revolutionary
party in name. But by this very token. their leading spokesmen failed to
appreciate the significance of the changes which had made it possible to
rapidly cut back the lead in industrialisation which Britain had previously
enjoyed.
The problem of the influence of ' ideas' in social development, which so
dominated the polemical interchanges between Marxists and their critics at
around the turn of the present century. has to be understood against this
backdrop. Both Durkheim and Weber accepted the philosophical materia-
lism disseminated by Engels. Kautsky, Labriola. and others as the object of
their critical evaluations of the claims of Marxism. Liberals and Marxists
alike thus structured their debate around the classical dichotomy between
idealism and materialism. The controversy over the validity of Marx's writ-
ings, then, became concerned primarily with the question of whether or not
ideas are mere' epiphenomena' which have no ' independent' part to play
in social development. One of my concerns in this book is to demonstrate the
essential irrelevance of this debate. in so far as Marx's writings may be com-
pared with those of Durkheim and Weber as contrasting forms of social
theory. Marx, no less than the latter two writers, sought to break through the
traditional philosophical division between idealism and materialism. and it
is the confusion between this time-honoured dichotomy and Marx's own
• materialistic' critique of idealism which has obscured the sources of the
real divergences between Marx and' academic' or ' bourgeois' sociology.
This is a matter which has only fairly recently become apparent, in the
Course of the tremendous revival of western Marxist scholarship since the last
World War. The appearance. in Rjazanov's Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe.
of various previously unpublished writings of Marx and Engels. has, of course.
played a major role in stimulating this revival. The publication of such works
as the 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, however. has given
rise to as many new interpretative problems as it has helped to resolve. These
concern both the • internal' nature and coherence of Marx's own writings.
and the intellectual connections between Marx's theoretical position and that
of other social thinkers. The intricate difficulties which are posed by this

• George Lichtheim: Marxism. all Historic,,/ and Critical Study (londl)n. 1964).
pp.238-43.
xvi Introduction
situation have largely dictated the structure of this book. In evaluating some
of the sources of the contemporary debate between Marxism and' academic'
sociology it seemed necessary, as a prior task, to reconstruct the principal
themes in the writings of the major thinkers whose works are at the origins
of modern social theory. The first two-thirds of the book, therefore. are taken
up with separate treatments of the forms of social theory established by Marx,
Durkheim and Weber respectively (Chapters 1-12). The need to formulate,
in as precise and coherent a manner, the leading themes in the writings of
each author has precluded any attempt at the critical analysis of either the
, logic' or the factual' validity' of their thought.
The first of the three concluding chapters (Chapter 13) sets out an analysis
of the principal ways in which Durkheim and Weber themselves sought to
separate their views from those they attributed to Marx. But these views can-
not simply be accepted at their' face value '. Chapters' 14 and 15 abstract
from the stated positions of Durkheim and Weber in this respect. and provide
a new assessment of some of the main parallels and divergencies between
their writings and those of Marx. It should also be stressed that there are
several important lines of comparison between Marx, Durkheim and Weber
which have been neglected, or ignored altogether. in the three concluding
chapters. The most obvious omission here concerns the question of the diver-
gent methodological views espoused by the three writers: prima facie. the
most basic comparative issues might seem to lie here. In some senses this is
indeed the case; but it is a basic contention of this book that the overwhelm-
ing interest of each of these authors was in the delineation of the characteristic
structure of modern' capitalism' as contrasted with prior forms of society.
The typical emphasis in sociology over the past few decades has been direc-
ted towards the search for a formal • general theory'. Laudable as such an
objective may be, it diverges from the main focus of the works of the men
who established the foundations of modem social thought. and has had im-
portant consequences in obscuring the significance of problems which they
placed at the forefront of social theory. I do not believe that any of the three
authors discussed in this book sought to create all-embracing' systems' of
thought in the sense in which such an intention is ordinarly attributed to
them: indeed. each categorically denied this. Thus while I have accentuated
the integral unity of the works of each writer. I have at the same time endea-
voured to convey the partial and incomplete character which each stressed
as qualifying the perspectives which he established and the conclusions which
he reached.
List of abbreviations used

Abbreviations. as listed below. have been used for titles which are frequently
cited in the references. The particular editions of these works which have been
employed are given in the bibliography. at the end of the book. Where a double
reference is given. this indicates that a quotation in the text is my own translation.
or that I have in some way amended the existing English translation. The first
reference always relates to the English edition, the second to the original.

Works by Marx and Engels

Cap Capital
CM The Communist Manifesto
EW Karl Marx. Early Writings
GI The German Ideology
Gru Grundrisse der Kritik der polilischen 6kollomie
SW Selected Works
We Werke
WY M Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society

Works by Durkbeim
DL The Division of LAbour in Society
DTS De la division du travail social
EF The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life
FE us formes eJemelltaires de la vie religieuse
PECM Professional Ethics and Civic Morals
RMS Lt's rigles de Ja methode sociologique
RSM The Rules of Sociological Method
Soc Socialism
Su Suicide
L5 Le Suicide

.Journals
AS Annee sociologique
RP Revue philosophique

Works by Max Weber

E5 Economy and Society
FMW From Max Weber,' Essays in Sociology
GAR Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie
GASS Gesammelte Aufsalze zur SoZiologie und Sozialpolitik
GAW Gesammelte Aufsiitze zur Wissenschaftslehre
GPS Gesammelte politische Schriften
MSS Methodology of the Social Sciences
PE The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
RC The Religion of China
RI Religion of India
WuG Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft
For M. C. G.
Part 1: Marx
-
1. Marx's early writings
There is a sense in which Marx's writings span three centuries. Although
Marx was born nearly two decades after the opening of the nineteenth cen-
tury. and died well before the end of it, his writings have had their greatest in-
fluence - certainly in the political sphere. and possibly even in the intellectual
world - in the twentieth century, But they have their roots in the late eigh-
teenth century, in the outburst of social and political changes stemming from
the Revolution of 1789 in France. Marx's works thus draw the shattering
effects of the French Revolution into the modern age, and express a line of
direct continuity between 1789 and the October Revolution in Russia of
almost one hundred and thirty years later.
While rather little is known of Marx's early childhood. various fragments
and letters survive from his adolescent pen. The earliest of these are three
shon essays which Marx wrote during the course of his final school examina-
tions. Inevitably enough, these are of little intrinsic interest or originality, but
they do give an indication of the enthusiastic grandiosity which inspired many
of Marx's subsequent adult works.1 The most novel of the three is called
• Reflections of a young man on choosing a career', and discusses the moral
obligations and the range of freedoms open to an individual who is choosing
which vocation to follow in his life, • The main principle', Marx concludes•
. . , which must guide us in the selection of a vocation is the welfare of humanity.
our own perfection. One should not think that these two interests combat each
other, that one must destroy the other. Rather, man's nature makes it possible for
him to reach his fulfilment only 'by working for the perfection and welfare of his
society... History calls those the greatest men who ennobled themselves by
working for the universaJ.2
Such an outlook eventually led Marx, as a university student, to close study
of Hegel, in whose philosophy we find precisely this: a theory of the self-ful-
filment, of the culmination of • our own perfection " A letter which Marx
wrote to his father in 1837 describes how, finding the philosophy of Kant and
Fichte unsatisfactory, and finally rejecting his youthful love of lyrical poetry,
Marx • dived into the ocean' of Hegel. 3 But even while he was first under the

I It might be no led that some commentators have attempted to discern in these essays
a number of themes which were fundamental to Marx's later writings (cf. A. Cornu:
Kart Marx el Friedrich Engels (Paris, 1955), vol. 1, pp. 65-6). But the most strikins
cbaracteristic of the essays is their conventional adolescent idealism.
2 WYM, p. 39.
3 WYM. pp. 40-50.
2 Part J.' Marx
spell of Hegel's philosophical system as a student, it is clear that Marx was
at no point a blindly orthodox Hegelian. The genesis of Marx's initial attrac-
tion to Hegelianism is revealed in his description of the notes which, as a
student in Berlin, he made of his readings in philosophy and law.· The Kan-
tian dualism of what' is ' and what' ought to be " seems to Marx - and this
view he continued to maintain throughout the rest of his life - totally irrecon-
cilable with the demands of the individual who wishes to apply philosophy to
the pursuit of his objectives. The philosophy of Fichte is subject to the same
objection: it separates the properties of logic and truth (such as is involved
in mathematics and empirical science respectively) from the intervention of
the human subject in a continuously developing world. This standpoint, there-
fore, has to be supplanted by one which recognises that' the object itself must
be studied in its development; there must be no arbitrary divisions; the
rationale (Vernunft) of the thing itself must be disclosed in its contradictori-
ness and find its unity in itself'. 5
Marx discovered himself unable to resolve these issues alone, and was thus
unavoidably led to pursue in his own thought the process of evolution
followed by German idealist philosophy as a whole - moving from Kant to
Fichte and thence on to Hege!.' However, what first drew Marx to Hegel was
neither the impressive comprehensiveness of the latter's philosophy, nor the
specific content of his philosophical premises as such, but the closure which
Hegel effected bet ween the dichotomous strands of classical German philo-
sophy which formed the principal legacy of Kant. The impact of Hegel upon
Marx was mediated by two partially separate sources, each of which involved
the conjunction of Hegelianism to political standpoints at variance with the
conservatism of Hege!. T One of these influences is to be found in the teachings
of Eduard Gans, whose lectures at Berlin made some considerable impression
upon Marx. Gans seasoned Hegel with a strong element of Saint-Simonian-
ism.' However, Marx had almost certainly been exposed to contact with
Saint-Simonian ideas earlier on in his youth, and a case can be made for the
view that the influence of Saint-Simon's writings over Marx in his formative
years was in some respects almost as great as that of Hegel.'
The second factor conditioning Marx's acceptance of Hegel was Marx's
membership of the' Doctor's Club' in Berlin University. In this circle, Marx

" WYM, pp. 42-7.

a WYM, p. 43; We, Erg(inzungsband (Ergti), vol. I, p. 5.
, cf. Robert C. Tucker: Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx (Cambridge, 1965), pp.
31-69.
, On the views of the • young Hegel " cf. the analysis given in Georg LuUcs: Der
junge Hegel (Zurich and Vienna, 1948), pp. 27-130.
• See Hanns Gunther Reissner: Eduard Gans (TUbingen, 1965).
• This view is stated forcefully in Georges Gurvitch: • La sociologie du jeune Marx '.
in La Vocation actllelle de 10 sociologie (paris, 1950). pp. 568-80. This chapter is
replaced in the second edition (1963) by a more general discussion entitled' La
sociologie de Karl Marx '.
 Marx's early writings 3
made the acquaintance of a heterogeneous assortment of young followers of
Hegel, of whom Bruno Bauer was the outstanding figure. lo The immediate
problems which concerned Bauer, and the group of' Young Hegelians 'which
formed around him, preserved the concern with Christian theology which was
intrinsic to Hegel's own writings. Marx's doctoral dissertation, which is con-
cerned with a comparative discussion of the philosophies of Democritus and
Epicurus, shows the strong imprint of Bauer's ideas. But at about the same
time as Marx submitted his doctoral thesis. Feuerbach's The Essence of
Christianity (1841) was published. l l Engels later wrote of the impact of the
book upon the Young Hegelians: • The spell was broken: the" system" was
shattered and thrown aside ... Enthusiasm was general: we all became at
once" Feuerbachians ".' 12 The immediate influence of the work upon Marx's
developing thought was almost certainly, in fact. more diffuse and less imme-
diate than is described in Engels' account, written over forty years later. 13
Marx no more adopted Feuerbach's position in a wholesale fashion than he
had that of Hegel. a Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that the influence of
Feuerbach among the Young Hegelians was dominant by the end of 1842.
Marx's critical discussion of Hegel's philosophy of the state. written in 1843.
is heavily influenced by Feuerbach: and the standpoint of the latter is basic
to the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.
In The Essence of Christianity, and other subsequent publications. Feuer-
bach seeks to reverse the idealistic premises of Hegel's philosophy, stating
bluntly that the starting-point of the study of humanity must be • real man '.
living in • the real, material world '. Whereas Hegel sees the • real • as emana·
ting from the • divine " Feuerbach argues that the divine is an illusory product
of the real; being. existence. precede thought in the sense in that men do not
reflect upon the world prior to acting in it: • thOUght proceeds from being. not
being from thought.' 15 Hegel viewed the development of mankind in terms of
God having been divided against himself. In Feuerbach's philosophy, God
can only exist in so far as man is divided against himself. in so far as man is
alienated from himself. God is a fantasied being upon whom man has pro·

10 For a recent discussion of the influence of Bauer upon Marx, see David McClellan:
The Youn, He,elians and Karl Marx (London, 1969), pp. 48ff and passim; see also
the same author's Marx before Marxism (London, 1970).
11 Ludwig Feuerbach: The Essence of Christianity (New York, 1957).
12 SW, vol. 2, p. 368.
IS cf. McClellan: The YOllng Hegelians and Karl Marx, pp. 92-7. McClellan's claim
that' Engels' description of the effect of the book is completely at variance with the
facts' (p. 93), however, is exaggerated. cf. Marx's well-known statement, written in
the early part of 1842, that' there i8 no other way to truth and freedom but throup
the .. river of fire" , (Feuer-Bach: lit., • brook of fire '). WYM. p. 95.
l~ It might be remarked that Feuerbach's own views were characterised by a number of
deep-rooted ambiguities. and underwent some de&nite changes, over the period
from 1834 to 1843. cf. Feuerbach: Siimmtliclle Werke. vols. 1-3. (There are some
errors, however, in the allocation of writings to particular years in this collection.)
11 Ibid. vol. 2, p. 239.
4 ParI 1: Marx
jected his own highest powers and faculties. who thus is seen as perfect and
all-powerful, and in contrast to whom man himself appears as limited and
imperfect.
But at the same time, according to Feuerbach, the depth of the comparison
between God and man can be a positive source of inspiration to the realisa-
tion of human capabilities. The task of philosophy is to enable man to recover
his alienated self through transformative criticism, by reversing the Hegelian
perspective, and thus asserting the primacy of the material world. Religion
must be replaced by humanism, whereby the love formerly directed towards
God will become focused upon man. leading to a recovery of the unity of
mankind, man for himself. 'Whereas the old philosophy said: what is not
thought, has no existence, so the new philosophy says. on the contrary: that
which is not loved. which cannot be loved. has no existence.' Ie
The effect of assimilating the ideas of Feuerbach was to tum Marx back to
Hegel, in an attempt to draw out the implications of the new perspective. and
especially to apply it to the sphere of politics. The aspects of Feuerbach's
philosophy which attracted Marx were essentially the same as those which
originally drew him to Hegel: the possibilities which seemed to be offered of
fusing analysis and criticism, and thereby of • realising' philosophy. It is
usually held that Marx's early writings on alienation in politics and industry
represent little more than an extension of Feuerbach's 'materialism' to
spheres of society not dealt with by the latter. This is misleading, however:
Marx does not accept. at any point, what Feuerbach considers to be the pri-
mary significance of his philosophy - that it provides an ' alternative' to. and
thereby a replacement of. Hegel. Even when most imbibed with enthusiasm
for Feuerbach. Marx seeks to juxtapose him to Hegel. Marx thus succeeds in
retaining the historical perspective which, while central to Hegel's philosophy.
is. in effect if not in intention. largely abandoned by Feuerbach. 17

The state and ' true democracy ,

Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy of the state, written in 1843. is the first
publication in which Marx's nascent conception of historical materialism 18
can be discerned, and forms the starting-point of the treatment of alienation
which Marx set out at greater length in Economic and Philosophical Manu-
scripts one year later. Marx proceeds via a close textual analysis of Hegel.
, inverting' Hegel in the manner of Feuerbach. ' Hegel" Marx says, ' subjec-
lilies the predicates. the objects, but he subjectifies them in separation from

II Siimmlliche Werke. vol. 2. p. 299.

11 In a letter to Ruge of ]843, Marx also states that Feuerbach • concerns himself too
much with nature and too little with politics. But the laller is the only means
whereby contemporary philosophy can be realised '. We. vol. 27, p. 417.
18 As is well known. the phrase' historical materialism' is not used by Marx, but first
appears in the writings of Engels. It is used here with the qualification that the term
perhaps 'suggests a greater degree of theoretical closure than Marx would be willing
to admit of his studies of history.
 Marx's early writings 5
their true subjectivity, the subject '.19 The point of Marx's analysis. therefore.
is to reidentify tbe true subject (the acting individual, living in the • real "
o material' world), and to trace the process of his 0 objectification' in the

political institutions of the state. 20 The real world is not to be inferred from
the study of the ideal; on the contrary, it is the ideal which has to be under-
stood as a historical outcome of the real. For Hegel, civil society (biirgerliche
Gesellschafl), which includes aU those economic and familial relationships
which are outside the political and juridical structure of the state, is intrin-
sically a sphere of unrestrained egoism, where each man is pitted against
every other. Men are rational, orderly beings to the degree that they accept the
order inherent in the state, which is a universal sphere cutting across the
egoistic interests of human actions in civil society. In Hegel's account, there-
fore, the state is not only presented as severed from the lives of individuals in
civil society, but as logically prior to the individual. The acting individual,
the real creator of history, is subordinated to the ideals of political participa-
tion embodied in. the state, which thus appear as the motive-power of social
development.
Feuerbach has shown, Marx continues, that in religion men participate
vicariously in an unreal, fantasy world of harmony, beauty and contentment,
while living in a practical everyday world of pain and misery. The state is,
similarly, an alienated form of political activity, embodying universal • rights'
wbich are as ephemeral as is the idealised world of religion. The basis of
Hegel's view is that political rights of representation mediate between the
egoistic individualism of civil society and the universalism of the state. Bul,
Marx emphasises, there is no existing form of political constitution where this
connection exists in actuality; in extant states, general participation in politi-
cal Ufe is the ideal. but the pursuance of sectional interests is the reality. Thus
what appears in Hegel's account to be separate from and superordinate to the
particular interests of individuals in civil society is, in fact, derivative of them .
• Up to now the political constitution has been the religious sphere, the
religion of the people's life, the heaven of their universality in contrast to the
particular mundane existence of their actuality.' 21
In the Greek polis every man - that is, every free citizen - was a zoon politi-
kon: the social and political were inextricably fused, and there was no separ-
ate sphere of the • political '. Private and public life was not distinct, and the
only • private individuals' were those who, as slaves, lacked public status as
citizens altogether. Mediaeval Europe contrasts with this. In the Middle
Ages, the various strata of civil society themselves became political agencies :
political power was directly contingent upon and expressive of the division

II WYM, p. 166; We, vol. I, p. 224.

20 For a perceptive discussion of the Critique', see Jean Hyppolite: • La conception
0

hegelienne do l'Etat et sa critique par Karl Marx', in Etudes sur Marx et He,d
(Paris, 1955). pp. 120-41.
2t WYM, p. 176.
6 Part 1 : Marx
of society into stable socio-economic orders.22 • Each private spbere bas a
political character. is a political sphere .. .' 23 In this form of society, the
various strata become politicised. but there is still no separation between the
, private' or the 'individual'. and the 'political '. The very notion of the
, state' as separable from civil' society' is a modem one because it is only
in the post-mediaeval period that the sphere of interests in civil society,
especially economic interests. have become part of the' private rights' of the
individual, and as such separable from the ' public' sphere of politics. The
distribution of property is now presumed to lie outside the constitution of
political power. In reality. however. the ownership of property still largely
determines political power - no longer in the legalised manner of medi-
aeval society. however, but under the cloak of universal panicipation in
government. 2 '
The realisation of what Marx calls ' true democracy • entails. according to
his analysis. overcoming the alienation between the individual and the poli-
tical community. through resolving the dichotomy between the • egoistic'
interests of individuals in civil society and the • social' character of political
life. This can only be achieved by effecting concrete changes in the relations
between state and society. such that what is at present only ideal (universal
political participation) becomes actual. 'Hegel proceeds from the state and
makes man into the state subjectivised. Democracy proceeds from man and
makes the state into man objectivised. , . In democracy the formal principle
is at the same time the material principle.' 25 The attainment of universal
suffrage. Marx says. is the means whereby this can be brought about. Uni-
versal suffrage gives all the members of civil society a political existence and.
therefore. ipso facto eliminates the 'political' as a separate category. 'In
universal franchise. active as well as passive, does civil society first raise
itself in reality to an abstraction of itself. to political existence as its true
universal and essential existence.' 28

Revolatioaary Praxis
There has been some considerable dispute concerning the relevance of the
views set out by Marx in the 'Critique·', to the writings which he produced
subsequently in 1844. 21 It is evident that the • Critique' represents only a
prefatory analysis of the state and politics; the manuscript is not complete.
and Marx states his intention to develop cenain points without in fact doing
so. Moreover. the tenor of Marx's analysis is in the direction of a radical

22 cf. Marx's discussion of the transformation of the feudal Stiinde. We, vol. 1. pp. 273f1.
23 WYM, p. 176; We, vol. I, p. 232.
2. WYM, pp. 187-8.
U WYM, pp. 173-4.
.. WYM, p. 202; We. vol. I, p. 326.
27 For divergent views on this question, see Lichtbeim, pp. 38-40; Sblomo Avineri:
TIre Sodal and Political Thought 0/ Karl Marx (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 33--40.
 Marx's early writings 7
Jacobinism; what is needed in order to progress beyond the contemporary
form of the state is to realise the abstract ideals embodied in the 1789 Revo-
lution. But it cannot be doubted that the' Critique' embodies notions which
Marx did not subsequently relinquish. Indeed, it supplies the key to the
understanding of the theory of the state. and of the possibility of its abolition.
and thus the conceptions contained within it underlie the whole of Marx's
mature writings. But at this stage Marx was. in common with the other Young
Hegelians. still thinking in terms of the necessity for the • reform of con-
sciousness '. as posited by Feuerbach. Immediately priorto leaving Germany
for France in September 1843, Marx wrote to Ruge expressing his conviction
that all • dogmas' must be questioned, whether they be religious or political:
Our slogan, therefore, must be: Reform of consciousness, not through dogmas,
but through analysis of the mystical consciousness that is unclear about itself,
whether in religion or politics. It will be evident, then, that the world has long
dreamed of something of which it only has to become conscious in order to
possess it in actuality ... To have its sins forgiven, mankind has only to declare
tbem for what they are. 2t
The effects of Marx's direct contact with French socialism in Paris are
evident in • An introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law',
written at the end of 1843. 21 Most of the points in the article are elaborations
of themes already established in Marx's previous • Critique', but Marx
abandons the stress upon • demystificatiOD '. such as urged by Bauer, which
informs his earlier critical analysis of Hegel. • The criticism of religion',
Marx admits. • is the premise of all criticism '; but this is a task which has
been largely accomplished, and the immediate and necessary task is to move
directly to the field of politics.
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the demand
for their real happiness. The demand to abandon illusions about their real
condition is a demand to abandon a condition which requires illusions. The
criticism of religion is thus the germ of the criticism 0/ the vale 0/ tears of which
religion is the halo. 30
But • criticism' in itself, Marx now goes on to say. is not enough. This is no-
where more obvious, he asserts, than in Germany, which is so retarded in its
development. The abstract. philosophical • negation' of the German political
structure is irrelevant to the real demands which have to be met jf Germany
is to be transformed: • Even the negation of our political present is already a

2a WYM, pp. 214-15.

2. Originally published in Ruge's Deutsch-/ranzosische Jahrbucher, in February 1844.
WYM, pp. 249-64. Similar ideas are also developed in Marx's other contribution to
the same issue, • On the Jewish Question', WYM. pp. 216-48. An alternative
translation of the latter article is available in EW, pp. 3-31.
30 EW, p. 44; We. vol. 1. p. 379. All of Marx's statements, throughout his writings,
upon the' abolition' (A II/llebung) of religion, the state, alienation, or capitalism as
a whole, have to be understood in the light of the threefold conn.otation of the verb
~ul"eben (to abolish. to preserve, to raise up). Thus the • abolition' of religion
IDvolves, not its eradication in any simple sense, but its dialectical transcendence.
8 Purl J: Marx
dusty fact in the historical lumber room of modem nations.' 31 The contribu-
tions of Germany to the social advancement of the European nations are
limited to the realm of ideas. The Germans are 'philosophical contem-
poraries of the present' in lieu of being its' historical contemporaries '. To
seek, therefore. to abolish this state of affairs through philosophical criticism
is futile, since this merely preserves the existing dislocation between ideas
and reality. The exposure of contradictions on the intellectual level does not
thereby remove them. It is necessary to proceed 'to tasks the solution of
which admits of only one means - practice (Praxis) '.32
If Germany is to experience {eform. it cannot be brought about by slow
progressive advancement, but must take the form of a radical revolution: in
this way. Germany can attain' not only to the official level of modem nations,
but to the human level which will be the immediate future of those nations'.33
The very backwardness of the social composition of Germany can provide
the circumstances whereby the country can leap ahead of the other European
states. This cannot be attained. however. unless the' theoretical' criticism of
politics is conjoined to the experience of a definite social grouping whose
position in society renders them revolutionary. It is here that Marx first
makes mention of the proletariat. As yet. the low level of economic develop-
ment of Germany. Marx points out. means that the industrial proletariat is
only beginning to appear. But its further expansion. in combination with the
peculiarly retarded form of social and political structure extant in Germany.
will provide the requisite combination of circumstances which can propel
Germany beyond the other European countries. 34
Marx finds in the proletariat the' universal character' which Hegel sought
in the ideals embodied in the rational state. The proletariat is ' a class which
has radical chains '; it is 'a sphere of society having a universal character
because of its universal suffering and claiming no particular right because no
particular wrong. but unqualified wrong, is perpetrated upon it '. The pro-
letariat localises within itself all of the worst evils of society. It lives in con-
ditions of poverty which is not the natural poverty resulting from lack of
material resources, but is the 'artificial' outcome of the contemporary
organisation of industrial production. Since the proletariat is the recipient of
the concentrated irrationality of society, it follows that its emancipation is at
the same time the emancipation of society as a wh01e :
lotal loss of humanity ... can only redeem itself by a 10101 redempiion oj
humanity ... When the proletariat announces the dissolution of the hitherlO
exisling order 0/ things. it merely announces the secret of ils own existence
because it is the effective (faktisch) dissolution of this order ... As philosophy
finds its material weapons in the proletariat, the proletariat finds its intellectual
weapons in philosophy.35

31 EW. p. 45. l2 ElY, p. 52; We, vol. I. p. 385.

33 EW. p. 52.
34 EW, pp. 'i7-9. :.:. £W. pp. 58-9; We. vol I, p. 391.
 Marx's early writings 9
During the early part of 1844. Marx began an intensive study of political
economy, the preliminary results of which are recorded in a set of fragments
which were first published only in 1932, under the title Economic and Philo-
sophical Manuscripts. The direction of movement of Marx's thought which
this stimulated led to a further divergence from the other Young Hegelians,
with the notable exception of Engels. whose influence was important in
directing Marx's energies towards economics. There are several reasons why
the Manuscripts are of decisive importance for the whole of Marx's work.
They form, in substance, the earliest of several drafts of Capital which Marx
made prior to the publication of the latter work itself. The preface which
Marx prepared for the Manuscripts outlines the framework of an ambitious
project which he originally planned, but which he was never destined to com-
plete. These plans which Marx sketched out at this relatively early stage of
his intellectual career show beyond any question that Capital. lengthy and
detailed as it eventually turned out to be, forms only one element in what
Marx conceived as a much broader critique of capitalism. Marx originally
intended to publish • a number of independent brochures' covering the
• critique of law, morals. politics' separately. These diverse treatments were
then to be connected together in a concluding work of synthesis. 31 In the
Manuscripts, Marx set out only to cover these institutional spheres in so far
as they are directly influenced by economic relationships. The work is. there-
fore. Marx's earliest attempt at a critique of that discipline which claims to
deal with this field: political economy.
The Manuscripts are also of great intrinsic interest in that in them Marx
deals explicitly with problems which, for varying reasons, occupied his
attention less directly in his subsequent writings. Some of these issues drop-
ped out of Marx's later works because he considered them to have been satis-
factorily dealt with, given his over-riding aim of providing a theoretical
critique of modern capitalism. The analysis of religion is one of these. The
Manuscripts is the last place where Marx stiIl devotes some considerable
attention to religion. But certain of the topics which are prominent in the
Manuscripts disappear from Marx's ensuing writings for other reasons. The
most significant of these is that of the analysis of alienation, which occupies a
central place in the Manuscripts. There can be no doubt at all that the notion
of alienation continues to be at the root of Marx's mature works in spite of
the fact that the term itself appears only rarely in his writings after 1844. In
his subsequent writings. Marx disentangles the various threads comprised
generically within the concept of alienation as used in the Manuscripts. Thus
the term itself, which possesses an abstract, philosophical character from
which Marx wished to dissociate himself, became redundant. But the explicit
diScussion of alienation which appears in the Manuscripts offers an invalu-

~. EW, p. 63.
10 Part I : Marx
able source of insight into the principal underlying themes of Marx's later
thought.

AlieuatiOD IIDd the theory of potitical economy

The main suppositions informing the critique of political economy which
Marx develops in the Manuscripts are the following. There are two principal
criticisms which have to be made of the writings of the political economists.
The first is in reference to their assumption that the conditions of production
characteristic of capitalism can be attributed to all forms of economy. The
econQpUsts begin .frQPUJt~Ilf!:IDise of the excbange economy and the_exis-
tence of private property. ~lf-seekin.&_ru:tJl1b_eIrnrsuit of WQfit an: s_een~~ the
na.turaLcharacteristics of man. In fact, Marx points out,Jh.e1ormatjon .of an
exchange economy is_ the outcome of ~ hi§tQrj~lproc~s, and capitali~m is
~llis~c system of production. It is only one type of productive
system amongst others which have preceded it in history, and it is no more
the final form than the others which went before it. The second fallacious as-
sumption of the economists is that purely • economic' relations can be treated
in abstracto. Economists speak of • capital " 'commodities " • prices', and
so on, as if these had life independently of the mediation of human beings.
This is plainly not so. While for example, a coin is a physical object which in
this sense has an existence independent of men, it is only • money' in so far
as it forms an element within a definite set of social relationships. The econo-
mists. however. attempt to reduce everything to the • economic " and eschew
whatever cannot be treated in these terms.
Political economy thus does not recognise the unemployed worker, the working
man so far as he is outside this work relationship. Thieves, tricksters, beggars, the
unemployed, the starving, wretched and criminal working-man, are forms which
do not exist for political eco'lOmy, but only for other eyes, for doctors, judges,
grave-diggers and beadles, etc.; they are ghostly figures outside its domain.!?
Any and every • economic' phenomenon is at the same time always a social
phenomenon, and the existence of a particular kind of • economy' presup-
poses a definite kind of society. 38
It is symptomatic of these misconceptions that the economists treat
workers as • costs' to the capitalist, and hence as equivalent to any other sort
of capital expenditure. Political economy declares it to be irrelevant that the
real • objects' of analysis are men in society. It is for this reason that the
economists are able to obscure what is in fact intrinsic to their interpretation
of the capitalist mode of production: that capitalism is founded upon a class
division between proletariat, or working class. on the one hand. and bour-
geoisie, or capitalist class, on the other. These classes are in endemic conflict
as regards the distribution of the fruits of industrial production. Wages on the

31 EW, pp. 137-8; We, Ergd. vol. ), pp. 523-4 .

.,. EW, pp. 120-1.
 Marx's early writings 11
one side, and profits on the other, are determined' by the bitter struggle be-
tween capitalist and worker', a relation in which those who own capital are
easily dominant.3I
Marx's analysis of alienation in capitalist production starts from a • con-
temporary economic fact " which is again an early statement of a theme later
developed in detail in Capital: the fact that the more capitalism advances,
tbe more impoverished the workers become. The enormous wealth which
the capitalist mode of production makes possible is appropriated by the
owners of land and capital. This separation between the work~r_,!!!~ th_e
P!-oc:Juc::~_of hi~ I~Qour is not, however, simply a matter o~ the e~P!Qpriation
oLgQQclLWhich rightfully belong to the worker. The ~ain po~tof Mll!X:~
discussion is that, in capitalism, the material objects which are produced be-
come treated on a par with the worker himself =Iust as iheyare~ on pUrely a
theoretical level. in the discipline of political economy. '"Dte_w!>!~~r ~.Qmes
811 ev~1:Jilieaper-eemmoditythemore goods he creates. The devaluation of the
human world increases in direct relation with the increo.se in value of the
world of things.' 60 This involves a distortion of what Marx calls ' objectifi-
cation' (Vergegenstiindlichung). Through his labour, the worker aots to~
modify the world of nature; his production is the result of this interaction
with the external world, in so far as he fashions it. But under capitalism, th ,
worker (the subject, the creator) has become assimilated to his product (the{
object). '1 I
The process of production, objectification, thus takes the form. of • a loss
and servitude to the object '; the worker • becomes a slave of the object.. .'.£2
The alienation of the worker in the capitalist economy is founded upon this
disparity between the productive power of labour, which becomes increas-
ingly great with the expansion of capitalism, and the lack of control which
the worker is able to exert over the p_bjec~hi~bJl~produces. As in the case
of alienation in the sphere of politics, this offers a parallel to alienation in
religion. The qualities which are attributed to God in the Christian ethic are
thereby removed from the control of men, and become as if imposed by an
external agency. In a similar fashion, the product of the worker is • alien to
him, and ... stands opposed to him as an autonomous power. The life which
he has given to the object sets itself against him as an alien and hostile

~9 EW, p. 69.
co EW, p. 121.
<I £W, p. 123. On a broader epistemological level, Marx criticises Hegel for having
mista{(en the nature of the connection between objectification and alienation. Funda-
mental to Hegel's idealism, Marx points out. is the premise that ' thinghood ' is the
same as • alienated self-consciousness' and consequently that objectification is only
I

made possible by human self-alienation. The truth of the matter, Marx avers, i~ the
other way around: the existence of alienation presupposes objectification, and is
(in Marx's use of the concept) consequent upon the specific distorted form of
objectification characteristic of capitalism. Many secondary writers have. unfortu-
4_ nately, failed to grasp this essential distinction between objectification and alienation.
- EW, pp. 122 & 123.
12 Pari I: Marx
force: .3 Obje..f1ificali!m. therefore. wh~~.hls a nec!=_s~!y_~h¥~~eri!!j~ ot~l
labour (involving the transference of labour power to the object which is
created by it) becomes, in_glpitaijsm.J,Q.~Iltic;aLwHlll!l!~~ation. The product of
labour is. in other words. '.J:xt~rnal ' to the wor:ker not only in an ontological
sense but also in the much more profound yet more specific sense that' What
!$_embodied in_the pr<!<Jl!ot of his labour is no longer his own.' U
The alienation of the worker from his product takes a number of distinct
forms. In discussing these. Marx uses terminology which draws heavily upon
Feuerbach; but it is clear that he is thinking in concrete terms of the effects of
capitalism as a particular. historical mode of production. The main dimen·
sions of Marx's discussion of alienation are as follows:
1. The worker lacks control over the disposal of his products, since what
he produces is appropriated by other_sf so that he does not benefit from it.
It is the core principle of the market economy that goods are produced for
exchange; in capitalist production. the exchange and distribution of goods
are controlled by the operations of the free market. The worker himself,
who is treated as a commodity to be bought and sold on the market. thus
has no power to deteJmi!!~t!t~ f~t~~.l what he produces. The workings of
the market act in suchawl!Y as to promote tbei1Uerests Qlth_e_~...n.ilalist at
u

the expense of those __of_ tJ~~....!'Lorker.. Thus • the more the worker produces
the less he has to consume; the more value he creates the more worthless
he becomes '.
2. The worker is alienated in the work task itself: • if the product of
labour is alienation. production itself must be active alienation - the aliena-
tion of~~vity and the activity of alienation.' U The ~ork task does not
_offer jnlrinsk satisla_c.tions which ~~l<~Jt P9ssible lQ~_~he worker • to de-
~19P freely llis__JJlel!tal ~ncl physical ene.rgies '. since it is labour which is
imposed by force of external circumstances alone. Work becomes a means
to an end rather than an end in itself: this is shown by the fact that • as
soon as there is no physic:al or other compulsion. men ftee from labour like
the plague ....
3. Since all economic relationships are also social relatipnships. it follows
that the alienation of labour has directly social ramifications. This takes
Marx back to his starting-point: b_uman relations, in capitalism •.!_end to be·
~jfu.eed to _operations of the market. This is directly manifest in the
significance of money in human relationships. Money promotes the rationa-
lisation of social relationships. since it provides an abstract standard in
terms of which the most heterogeneous qualities can be compared. and re-

U EW, p. 123. In discussing alienation in this context, Marx uses two terms: Entlrem-
dung (estrangement) and Entiillsserung (externalisation). The two are used more or
less interchangeably in Marx's analysis.
U EW. p. 122.
<s EW. pp. 123-4. 46 EW. p. 125; We. Ergd. vol. I. p. 514.
 Marx's early writings 13
duced. to one another.• He who can purchase bravery is brave, though a
coward ... Thus, from the standpoint of its possessor, iLexcb.an~sevm
qu!lljt.Yand object1_QL~yery other, ~ven though they are contradictory.' 41
4. Men live in an active inter-relationship with the natural world.
Technology and culture are both the expression and the outcome of this
inter-relationship, and are the chief qualities distinguishing man from the
animals. Some animals do produce. of course. but only in a mechanical.
adaptive fashion. Aliena~abour reduces huma1!J>~o~!!ctive _actiyity to the
le.Yel of ~.daptation to, .rnW~IJhan actjY.LmasteI.Y~f,J!!!!ure. This detaches
the human individual from his 'species-being' (Gattungswesen). from
what makes the life of the human species distinct from that of the animals. U
Marx's discussion at this point closely echoes Feuerbach. But the import of
what Marx says is quite different. Many secondary accounts of Marx's
analysis of alienation in the 1844 Manuscripts, through assimilating Marx's
position to that of Feuerbach, give Marx's discussion a more' utopian'
connotation than in fact it has.· 1 Marx uses Feuerbachian terms in holding
that man is a 'universal producer', in contrast to the animals, who only
produce 'partially' and in limited contexts established by the instinctual
components of their biological makeup: but his analysis is far more
concrete and specific than this terminology suggests.
What c:Jj~tln.8Jlithes hum!lJ1 life Jr.Qmthaj~Llh.e. ..anim~Js, according to
Marx. is that human facutti~.Lc;a~cities_aJldta.Sl~--.S.ba~J~y_s.Qciety.
The ' isolated individual' is a fiction of utilitarian theory: no human being
exists who has not been born into, and thus shaped by, an on-going society.
Each individual is thus the recipient of the accumulated culture of the
generations which have preceded him and, in his own interaction with the
natural and social world in which he lives, is a contributor to the further
modification of that world as experienced by others. 'Individual human
life and species-life are not different things', Marx asserts ' ... Though a
man is a unique individual ... he is equally the whole, the ideal whole.
the subjective existence of society as thought and experienced.' so It is, then,
man's membership of society. together with the technological and cultural
apparatus which supports that society and which makes it possible, which
serves to differentiate the human individual from the animal. which confers
his • humanity' upon him. Some animals have similar sense-organs to man:
but th~ ~t~pjj.9n of ~1,l!Y in _sight. or:$Qund.ilt ~rt or JP1,Isjc. is a huma!)
J~~ty. a creation of society. Sexual activity. or eating and drinking, are
!1QtJQr_men the simple satisfa~JiolL.Q.f bjQ].Qgica] driy~._ Q.ut bave be~QO'1e
HEW ,p. 193.
u
Feuerbach: Es.renu 01 Christianity, pp. 1-12. Marx also makes liberal use of the
., term GauulIgs!eben, literaUy meaning' species-life '.
For two different instances of this, see H. Popit2.: Der ent/remdete Mensch (Frank
.0 fUrt, 1967); also Tucker .
• £W, p. 1S8; We. Ergd. vol. I, p. 539.
14 ParI I : Marx
transformed, during the course of the development of society. in creative
interplay with the natural world, into actions which provide manifold satis-
factions. ~ I • The cultivation of the five senses is the work of all previous
history'; but' it is nOl simply the five senses, but also the so-called spiritual
senses, the practical senses (desiring. loving, etc.), in brief, human sensibi-
lity and the human character of the senses. which can only come into being
through the existence of its object, through humanised nature: 5~
In bourgeois society, men are estranged, in specifiable ways, from the ties
to society which alone confer their' humanity • upon them. Firstly, aliena-
ted labour 'alienates species-life and individual life', and. secondly, • it
turns the latter, as an abstraction, into the purpose of the former. also in
its abstract and alienated form '_~3 In capitalism, both in theory and in prac-
tice, the life and the needs of the individual appear as 'given' indepen-
dently of his membership of society. This finds clear theoretical expression
in political economy (and. in a somewhat different way. in the Hegelian
theory of civil society which Marx previously criticised). which founds its
theory of society upon the self-seeking of the isolated individual. Political
economy in this way' incorporates private property into the very essence
of man '.54 But not only does the' individual' become separated from
the' social '. the latter becomes subordinated to the former. The productive
resources of the community are applied - in the case of the majority of the
population who live in penury - to support the minimal conditions neces-
sary for the survival of the organism. The mass of wage-labourers exist in
conditions where their productive activity is governed solely by the most
rudimentary needs of physical existence:
man is regressing to the cave dwelling, but in an alienated malignant form. The
savage in his cave (a natural element which is freely offered for his use and pro-
tection) does not feel himself a stranger; on the contrary he feels as much at
home as a fish in water. But the cellar dwelling of the poor man is a hostile
dwelling, 'an alien, constricting power which only surrenders itself to him in
exchange for blood and sweat'. 55
As Marx presents it. therefore. the alienation of man from his ' species-
being' is couched in terms of his analysis of capitalism. and is. in consider-
able degree, assymetrical: in other words, the effects of alienation are
focused through the class structure. and are experienced in concentrated
fashion by the proletariat. The transfer of the notion of alienation from a
general ontological category. which is how it is used both by Hegel and by
Feuerbach, to a specific social and historical context, is the main theme of
Marx's approach in the Manuscripts. Marx does not hold, however, that
alienation is wholly confined to the position of the wage-labourer. The

51 ct. below. pp. 21-2.

52 EW, p. 161; We. Ergd. vol. I. p. 541. For rurther discussion of this point. in relation
to Durkheim. see below. pp. 224-8. '3 EW. p. I:!" .
.'4 EW. p. 148. ;'.' EW. p. 177.
 Marx's early writings 15
capitalist is himself subservient to capital in the sense that the rule of pri-
vate property and of money dominates his own existence. The industrialist
has to be ' hard-working. sober. economical, prosaic':
his enjoyment is only a secondary matter; it is recreation subordinated to pro-
duction and thus a calculated. economic enjoyment, for he charges his pleasures
as an expense of capital and what he squanders must not be more than can be
replaced with profit by the reduction of capital. Thus enjoyment is subordinated
to capital and the pleasure· loving individual is subordinated to the capital-
accumulating individual, whereas formerly (in feudal society) the contrary was
tbecase. S6
The Manuscripts are a set of preliminary notes rather than a finished
work. The discussion of alienated labour which they contain gives ample
evidence of the fact that Marx was still, in 1844, groping towards the clear
formulation of a distinctive perspective of his own. While the main themes
of his treatment of alienation are not difficult to identify. Marx's account of
them is frequently cryptic and elliptical. Where Marx is analysing the
works of the economists. he writes in the language of political economy;
where he discusses alienation directly. he uses the terminology of Feuer-
bach. It is unquestionably true that. at this stage. Marx had not suocessfully
integrated the conceptions which he derived from these two diverse sources.
and in the Manuscripts the two rest in uneasy relationship with each other.
Nonetheless. the Manuscripts provide the framework of a general critical
analysis of capitalism. and these fragmentary notes contain the germ of
virtually all of the important ideas which Marx developed with greater
precision in later writings.
It is usually assumed that. in speaking. in the 1844 Manuscripts. of man's
, being reduced to the level of the animals'. and of man's alienation from
his ' species-being' under the conditions of capitalist production, Marx is
thinking in terms of an abstract conception of 'man • as being alienated
from his biological characteristics as a species. So. it is presumed. at this
initial stage in the evolution of his thought. Marx believed that man is essen-
tially a creative being whose 'natural' propensities are denied by the
restrictive character of capitalism. Actually, Marx holds. on the contrary.
that the enonnous productive power of capitalism generates possibilities for
the future development of man which could not have been possible under
Prior forms of productive system. The organisation of social relationships
within which capitalist production is carried on in fact leads to the failure
to realise these historically generated possibilities. The character of alienated
labour does not express a tension between • man in nature' (non-alienated)
and' man in society' (alienated), but between the potential generated by a

ae EW, p. 179. My parenthesis. Elsewhere Marx echoes Moses Hess, remarking:

• Private property has made us so stupid and partial that an object is only ours
When we have it, when it exists for us as capital or when it is directly eaten, drunk,
worn. inhabited, etc., in short, utilised in some way' (p. IS9).
16 ParI 1: Marx
specific form of society - capitalism - and the frustrated realisation of that
potential. What separates man from the animals is not the mere existence of
biological differences between mankind and other species, but the cultural
achievements of men, which are the outcome of a very long process of social
development. While the biological attributes of man are a necessary condi-
tion of these achievements, the sufficient condition is the evolution of society
itself. The alienation of men from their' species-being' is a social separation
from socially generated characteristics ana propensities. ~7

Early (:ooceptioo of (:ommunism

The Manuscripts also contain Marx's first extensive discussion of communism.
The continuity is evident between this exposition and the earlier analysis of
, true democracy' in Marx's critique of Hegel's philosophy of the state. But
in the discussion in the Manuscripts, the influence of French socialism is un-
mistakable, and Marx drops the term 'democracy' in favour of 'com-
munism '.68 The overcoming of alienation, Marx declares, hinges upon tbe
supersession of private property. It follows from tbe fact that alienation in
production is basic to other forms of alienation, such as in religion or the state,
tbat the establishment of 'true democracy' is not enough; what is demanded
is a more thorough-going reorganisation of society, based upon the eradication
of tbe contemporary relationship between private property and wage-labour.
Marx separates his own conception of communism from that of 'crude
communism '. n The main form of crude communism is based upon emotional
antipathy towards private properly, and asserts that all men should be re-
duced to a similar level. so that everyone has an equal share of property.
This is not genuine communism, Marx asserts, since it rests upon the same
sort of distorted objectification of labour as is found in the theory of political
economy. Crude communism of this sort becomes impelled towards a primi-
tive asceticism, in which the community has become the capitalist instead of
the individual. In crude communism, the rule of property is still dominant,
but negatively;
Universal envy setting itself up as a power is only a camouflaged fann of
cupidity which re-establishes itself and satisfies itself in a different way..• How

~, Statements such as Meyer's that Marx • posited a noble and intelligent human
species, whose goodness and intelligence are frustrated by the process of civilisation'
(AHred G. Meyer: Marxism. the Unity of Theory tmd Prw:tice (Ann Arbor, 1963).
p. 57) are plainly inadequate. As Meszaros remarks: . There is no trace of a senti-
mental or romantic nostalgia for nature in (Marx's) conception. His programme ...
does not advocate a return to .. nature ", to a .. natural" set of primitive, or
.. simple" needs .. .' Istvan Meszaros: Marx's Theory of A Iienalion (London, 1970).
51 Marx mentions the infiuence of the German socialists; but argues that • the origillal
and important German works on this subject' are limited to certain of the writinl:~
of Hess, Weitling and Engels. EW, p. 64.
n It is not wholly clear whom Marx has in mind here. but the reference is probably
to the followers of Babeuf and Cabet. Engels discusses these groups in his • The
progress of social reform on the Continent', We, vol. I, pp. 480-96.
 Marx's early writings 17
little this abolition of private property represents a genuine appropriation is
shown by the abstract negation of the whole world of culture and civilisation,
and the regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor, crude and wantless
individual who has not only surpassed private property but has not yet even
attained to it.eo
Crude communism, Marx continues. has not grasped the possibility of the
positive transcendence of private property. The destruction of private pro-
perty is certainly a necessary condition for the transition to a new form of
society. But the organising principle of the future socialist society must be
centred upon • the positive abolition of private property. of human self-
alienation. and thus the real appropriation of human nature through and for
man '; it will involve • the return of man himself as a social. i.e., really human,
being (als eines gesellscha/tlichen, d.h. menschlichen Menschen) a complete
and conscious return which assimilates all the wealth of previous develop-
ment.' 11 The recovery of the social character of human existence is integral
to Marx's conception of communism, as stated in the Manuscripts. Com-
munist society will be based, not upon the egoistic self-seeking which the
economists assume to be characteristic of human nature in general, but upon
the conscious awareness of the reciprocal dependence of the individual and
the social community. The social nature of man, Marx stresses, penetrates
to the roots of his being. and is by no means simply manifest in those activities
which are conducted in direct association with others. Communism will not,
however, deny the individuality of each person. On the contrary, the whole
import of Marx's discussion is that communist society will allow, in a way
which is impossible under prior systems of production. the expansion of the
particular potentialities and capabilities of individuals. For Marx, there is no
paradox in this. It is only through the social communitY that man becomes
individualised, via the utilisation of the resources which are collective
products.
This exciting and brilliant formula is integrated with a reiteration of the
limitations of the • critical philosophy' of the Young Hegelians. It is not
enough to supersede private property in theory, to replace the • idea' of pri-
vate property with the • idea' of communism. The actual attainment of
communism • will in reality involve a very severe and protracted process '.12

:; EW, p. 154; We, Ergd, vol. 1. pp. 534-5 •

• 2 EW. p. 1S5; We, Ergd, vol. I, p. 536.
EW. p. 176; We, Ergd, vol. 1. p. 553.
2. Historical materialism

The first fruit of Marx's association with Engels was the heavily polemical
The Holy Family. which was begun in the latter Jfart of 1844. and was pub-
lished towards the end of 1845. The bulk of the book is the work of Marx.
and it documents Marx's final break with the rest of the Young Hegelians.
It was followed shortly afterwards by The German Ideology. written in
1845-6. also primarily a critical work. but one in which Marx for the first
time outlines a general statement of the tenets of historical materialism.
From this time onwards. Marx's general outlook changed little, and the rest
of his life was devoted to the theoretical exploration and the practical applica-
tion of the views set out in this latter work.
The full text of The German Ideology was not published in the lifetime of
Marx or Engels. In 1859. looking back to the period at which The German
Ideology was written. 'Marx wrote that he and Engels were not disappointed
that they could not get the work published: they • abandoned the work to
the gnawing criticism of the mice all the morc willingly', since the main pur-
pose - • self-clarification • - had been achieved. 1 Nonetheless, Marx explicitly
refers to his • Critique' of Hegel. and to the year 1844, as marking the most
significant line of demarcation in his intellectual career. It was the analysis
of Hegel's philosophy of the state, Marx wrote in his preface to A Contribu-
tion to the Critique of Political Economy, which led him to the conclusion
• that legal relations as well as forms of State arc to be grasped neither from
themselves nor from the so-called general development of the human mind
(Geist), but rather are rooted in the material conditions of life '.2
Engels later remarked of The German Ideology that the exposition of the
materialistic conception of history presented therein 'proves only how in-
complete our knowledge of economic history still was at that time ',' But,
although Marx's knowledge of economic history was indeed thin at this
period - the scheme of • stages • of the development of productive systems
set out there was subsequently considerably overhauled - the account of his-
torical materialism which is given in the work accords closely with that later
portrayed by Marx on other occasions. All precise dividing lines are arbit-
rary; but while The German Ideology is sometimes regarded as part of Marx's

1 SW, vol. I, p. 364. For Engels' subsequent appraisal of the significance of the early
writings, up to and including The GErman Ideology, see A. Voden: 'Talks with
Engels', in Reminiscences of Marx and Engels (Moscow, n.d.), pp. 3301f.
2 SW, vol. 1, p. 362; We, vol. 13, p. S.
3 SW, vol. 2. p. 359.

18
 Historical materialism 19

• early' period. it is more appropriate to regard it as the first important work

representing Marx's mature position.
Debate over the relevance of Marx's writings of 1843 and 1844 to his
mature conception of historical materialism has simmered continuously
since their publication in 1929-32. The controversy has obvious rarnifica-
tions of a directly political nature. and it is difficult to suppose that the points
at issue are likely to be resolved to the satisfaction of all parties involved.
But in fact the main lines of continuity between the • Critique' of Hegel. the
1844 Manuscripts. and Marx's mature thought. are evident enough. The most
important themes which Marx developed in the early writings and embodied
within his later works, are the following:
1. The conception, for which Marx was heavily indebted to Hegel, of the
progressive • self-creation ' of man. As Marx expresses it in the 1844 Manu-
scripts. • the whole of what is called world history is nothing but the creation
of man by human labour... '. 4
2. The notion' of alienation. One reason why Marx largely dropped the
term • alienation' from his writings after 1844 was certainly his desire to
separate his own position decisively from abstract philosophy. Thus in The
Communist Manifesto (1848). Marx writes derisively of the • philosophical
nonsense' of the German philosophers who write of the • alienation of the
human essence '.a The main implication of the views which. although they
were substantially present in the Manuscripts. were nol fully worked out
until the writing of The German Ideology, is that alienation must be studied
as an historical phenomenon. which can only be understood in terms of the
development of specific social formations. Marx's studies of the stages of
historical development trace the growth of the division of labour and the
emergence of private property. culminating in the process of the alienation
of the peasantry from control of tlieir means of prodUction with the dis-
integration of European feudalism. This latter process. the creation of a
large mass of propertyless wage-labourers, is portrayed in Capital as a
necessary precondition for the rise of capitalism.'
3. The kernel of the theory of the state. and its supersession in the future
form of society. as set out in Marx's • Critique' of Hegel's philosophy of the
state. While Marx had. at the time of the writing of the • Critique '. only a
rudimentary conception of the sort of social order which he hoped and

, EW, p. 166. On Marx's concept of 'labour', see Helmut Klages: Technischer

HlDn4nismus (Stuttgart, 1964), pp. 11-128.
a eM, p.168; We. vol. 4, p. 486.
• The view that Marx eliminated the concept of ' alienation' from his later writings,
and therefore that there is a major break in continuity between Marx's early and
Iater works, is expressed by Louis Feuer: 'What is alienation? The career of a
concept', New Politics, 1962, pp. 116-34; and by Daniel BeD: 'The debate on
alienation " in Leopold Labedz: Revisionism (London, 1963), pp. 195-211. For a
comparable statement, but from an opposed political perspective, d. Louis
Altbusser: For Marx (London. 1969), pp. 51-86 and passim.
20 Part I: Marx
expected would replace capitalism, the thesis that the abolition of the state
can be achieved through the elimination of the separate sphere of the
, political' remains intrinsic to his later views upon this issue.
4. The main rudiments of historical materialism as a perspective for the
analysis of social development. In spite of the fact that Marx frequently
writes in the language of Hegel and Feuerbach in his early works. it is very
clear that Marx's emergent standpoint constitutes a decisive epistemological
break with these writers. and especially with Hegel. It is not a new philosophy
which Marx seeks to substitute for the older views; Marx repudiates philo-
sophy in favour of an approach which is social and historical. Thus Marx
already stresses in the 1844 Manuscripts that capitalism is rooted in a definite
fonn of society. the main structural characteristic of which is a dichotomous
class relation between capital and wage-labour.
5. A summary conception of the theory of revolutionary Praxis. Marx's
comments on Strauss and Bauer (that they substitute • the" self-conscious-
ness" of abstract man for the substance of .. abstract nature" ') f anticipate
the views stated at length in The Hoiy Family and The German Ideology,
that critical philosophy is irrelevant to anything but the very early stages of
a revolutionary movement. Only by the union of theory and practice, by the
conjunction of theoretical understanding and practical political activity. can
social change be effected. This means integrating the study of the emergent
transformations potential in history with a programme of practical action
which can actualise these changes.
The crux of the transition between the 1844 Manuscripts and The German
Ideology is to be found in the short set of critical propositions on Feuerbach
which Marx wrote in March 1845, and which have since become famous as
the Theses on Feuerbach. 8 Marx makes several criticisms of Feuerbach. In
the first place. Feuerbach's approach is unhistorical. Feuerbach conceives of
an abstract • man ' prior to society: he not only reduces man to religious
man. but fails to see ' that .. religious feeling" is itself a social product and
that the abstract individual he analyses belongs to a particular form of
society'.' Secondly. Feuerbach's materialism remains at the level of a philo-
sophical doctrine. which simply regards ideas as • reflections ' of material
reality. There is. in fact, a constant reciprocity between the consciousness and
human Praxis. Feuerbach, in common with all previous materialist philo-
sophers. treats' material reality' as the determinant of human activity. and
does not analyse the modification of the ' objective' world by the ' subject',
i.e., by the activity of men. Marx also makes this extremely important point

f EW. p. 195.
• The Theses on Feue,bach were first published in 1888 by Engels, who remarks that
they contain' the brilliant germ of a new world outlook' (SW. vol. 2. p. 3S9). Here
1 quote from the translation in WYM, pp. 400-2.
, WYM. p. 402.
 Historical materialism 21
in another way. Feuerbach's materialistic doctrine, he states, is unable to
deal with the fact that revolutionary activity is the outcome of the conscious,
willed acts of men, but instead portrays the world in terms of the • one-way'
jnfluence of material reality over ideas. However, Marx points out, 'cir-
cumstances are changed by men and... the educator must himself be
educated .. .'.10
In Marx's eyes, Feuerbach has made a contribution of decisive importance
in showing tbat • philosophy [i.e., Hegel's pbilosophy] is nothing more than
religion brought into thought and developed by thought, and that it is equally
to be condemned as another form and mode of existence of human aliena-
tion '.Il But, in so doing, Feuerbach sets out a 'contemplative' or passive
materialism, neglecting Hegel's emphasis upon • the dialectic of negativity
as the moving and creating principle .. .'.12 It is this dialectic between the
subject (man in society) and object (the material world), in which men pro-
gressively subordinate the material world to their purposes, and thereby
transform those- purposes and generate new needs, which becomes focal to
Marx's thought.

The materialist thesis

The general conception of historical materialism which is established in The
German Ideology and subsequent writings is hence very different from that
of Feuerbach, and from earlier traditions of philosophical materialism. As
Marx employs it, 'materialism' does not refer to the assumption of any
logically argued ontological position. IS Marx undoubtedly accepts a ' realist'
standpoint, according to which ideas are the product of the human brain in
sensory transaction with a knowable material world; ideas are not founded
in immanent categories given in the human mind independently of experience.
But this definitely does not involve the application of a deterministic philo-
sophical materialism to the interpretation of the development of society.
Human consciousness is conditioned in dialectical interplay between sub-
ject and object, Un which man actively shapes the world he lives in at the
same time as it shapes him\ This can be illustrated by Marx's observation,
developing a point made in the Theses on Feuerbach, that even our percep-
tion of the material world is conditioned by society. Feuerbach does not see
that sensory perception is not fixed and immutable for all time, but is
integrated within a phenomenal world which is :

:: WYM, p. 401. 11 EW, p. 197, my parenthesi!.

EW, p. 202. For an expanded treatment of the significance of this point, see below,
13 PP .. 403-6.
Which is not to say, of course, that Marx's position does not imply definite onto-
logical assumptions. ct. H. B. Acton: The Illusion of the Epoch (London, 1955).
~or a convincing refutation of the view that Marx is a • materialist' in the tradi-
honal sense, see Alfred Schmidt: Der BegriD der Natur in der Lehre von Marx
(Frankfurt, 1962); also Z. A. Jordan: The Evolution of Dialectical Materialism
(London, 1967).
22 Part 1: Marx
an historical product. the result of the activity of a whole succession of genera-
tions. each standing on the shoulders of the pr«eding one. developing further its
industry and its intercourse. modifying its social order according to the changed
needs. Even the objects of the simplest' sensuous certainty' are only given him
through social ceveloprnent, industry and commercial intercourse. u
For Marx. his~. of th~continuous cre~atisfaction and
r~~~!!mulf...humanJ)e..eds. This is what distinguishes men from the animals.
whose needs are fixed and unchanging. This is why labour, the creative inter-
change between men and their natural environment. is the foundation of
human society. The relation of the individual to his material environment is
mediated by the particular characteristics of the society of which he is a
member. In studying the development of human society. we must start from
an empirical examination of the concrete processes of social life which are
the sine qua non of human existence. As Marx expresse~ it in a passage worth
quoting at length:
This method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real
premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not
in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible
process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this active Iife-
process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with
the materialists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined
subjects, as with the idealists.
Where speculation ends - in real life - there real, positive science 'begins: the
representation of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of
men. Talk about consciousness ceases, and real knowledge has to take its place.
When reality is depicted. philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge
loses its medium of existence. At most its place can be taken by a synthesis of the
most general results. that may be abstracted from observation of the historical
development of men. Separated from actual history, these abstractions have in
themselves no value whatsoever. They can only serve to facilitate the orderiog of
historical materials, to indicate the sequence of its separate layers. But they by
no means provide a recipe or scheme, as does philosophy, for neatly trimming
the epochs of history. On the contrary, the difficulties only first begin when we
set about the observation and the arrangement - the real depiction - of the
materials, whether it be of a past epoch or of the present. 15
In this resonant phraseology, Marx proclaims the need for an empirical
science of society which will be founded upon the study of the creative and
dynamic interaction between man and nature, the generative process whereby
man makes himself.
Marx's conception of the main' stages' in the development of society, in
common with several other basic areas within his works, has to be recon-
structed from fragmentary materials. Apart from the scheme given in The
German Ideology, Marx nowhere makes an integrated exposition of the
main types of society which he distinguished. Nevertheless the general

a Gr. p. 57; We, vol. 3. p. 43.

IS Gr. pp. 38-9; We. vol. 3, p. 27.
 Historical materialism 23
principles which inform Marx's interpretation of social development are
clear. Each of the various types of society which Marx identifies has its own
characteristic internal dynamics or 'logic' of development. But these can
only be discovered and analysed by ex post facto empirical analysis. This is
emphasised both as a broad theoretical principle and more specifically in
tracing the process of development from one type of society to another.
• History is nothing', Marx affirms, 'but the succession of the separate
generations, each of which exploits the materials, the capital funds, the pro-
ductive forces handed down to it by all preceding generations, and thus, on
the one hand, continues the traditional activity in completely changed cir-
cumstances and, on the other, modifies the old circumstances with a com-
pletely cbanged activity.' 11 It is simply a teleological distortion to attribute
'goals' to history, such that 'later history is made the goal of earlier
history '.17 ,
Marx expresses the same views when, ~ommenting upon the assertion that
a capitalist stage is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of com-
munism in every modem societyJ he rejects a unilinear standpoint. Taking an
earlier period of history as illustrative. he cites the case of Rome. Certain of
the conditions which were to play an essential role in the formation of capi-
talism in western Europe at a later period already existed in Rome. but
instead giving rise to capitalist production. the Roman economy disintegrated
intema1ly.This shows' that events of a striking similarity, but occurring in
different historical contexts, produced quite different results'. This can be
understood, Marx continues, if one studies these situations separately, • but
we shall never succeed in understanding them if we rely upon the passe par-
tout of a historical-philosophical theory whose chief quality is that of being
supra-historical '.18
Marx's typology of society is based upon tracing the progressive differentia-
tion of the division of labour. As he states in the 1844 M(lnuscripts, the
expansion of the division of labour is synonymous with the growth of aliena-
tion and private property. The formation of class society out of the original
undifferentiated system of communal property is, of course, contingent upon
specialisation in the division of labour; and it is the division of labour which
by identifying men with their particular occupational specialisation (e.g.,

18 GT, p. 60. cf. also The Holy Family, 01' Critique 01 Critical Critique (Moscow, 1956),
p.I25.
17 GJ, p. 60. Marx makes the same criticism in reference to Proudhon's use of Hegel's
dialectic. Proudhon simply substitutes economic categories for the Hegelian succes-
sion of ideas, and thus is absolved from studying historical development in detail .
• M. Proudhon considers economic relations as so many social phases engendering
Doe another, resultiog from one another like antithesis from thesis, and realising in
their logical sequence the impersonal reason of humanity,' The Poverty 01 Philo-
sophy (London, n.d.), p. 93.
18 Letter to the editor of Otyecestvenniye Zapisky, translation after T. B. Bottomore
and Maximilien Rubel: Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social
Philosophy (London, 1963), p. 38.
24 Part 1: Marx
'wage-labourer') negates their range of capacities as • universal' producers.
Thus: 'The various stages of development in the division of labour are just
so many different fonns of ownership; i.e., the existing stage in the division
of labour determines also the relations of individuals to one another with
reference to the material, instrument, and product of labour: "

Pre-da.ss systems
Every form of human society presupposes some rudimentary division of
labour. But in the simplest type of society, tribal society, this is minimal,
involving a broad division between the sexes: women, being largely occupied
with tbe rearing of children. playa lesser productive role than men. Man is at
first a wholly communal being; (individualisation is a historical product,
associated with an increasingly complex and specialised division of labour.
A progressively more complicated division of labour goes hand in hand with
the capacity to produce a surplus over and above what is necessary to satisfy
basic wants. This in tum entails the exchange of goods; exchange in its turn
produces the progressive individualisation of men - a process which reaches
its apex under capitalism. with the development of a highly specialised divi-
sion of labour. a money economy. and commodity produ~tion.\M"en thus only
become individualised through the process of history:)' [Man] originally
appears as a species-being. a tribal being, a herd animal. .. Exchange itself
is a major agent of this individuali~ation.' 20 Property is also at first com-
munal; private property does not derive from a state of nature, but is the
outcome of later social development. It is nonsense. Marx asserts, to con-
ceive of human society as originally existing in conditions where separate
individuals, each owning his little piece of private property. at some date
came together to form a community through some kind of contractual agree-
ment. ' An isolated individual could no more possess property in land than
he could speak. At most he could live off it as a source of supply. like the
animals.' 11 An individual's relation to the land he works, Marx emphasises,
is mediated through the community. 'The producer exists as part of a family,
a tribe. a grouping of his people. etc. - which assumes historicalJy differing
forms as the result of mixture with, and opposition to, others.' 22
The simplest form of tribal society is that which follows a migratory ex-
istence, involving either hunting and gathering, or pastoralism. The tribe is
not settled in anyone fixed area, and exhausts the resources in one place
before moving on to another. Men are not settled as part of their nature; they
only become so when at a certain stage the nomadic group becomes a stable
agricultural community. Once this transition has occurred, there are many

II GI, p. 33.
20 PreoCapita/ist Economic Formations (London, 1964), p. 96; arll, pp. 395-6.
~I Economic Formations. p. 81.
22 Ibid. p. 87; am, p. 389.
 Historical materialism 25
factors which influence how the community henceforth develops, including
both the physical conditions of the environment, and the internal structure of
the tribe, the • tribal character '. Further differentiation in the division of
labour develops through the related processes of population increase, con-
flicts between tribes thus forced into contact, and the subjugation of one tribe
by. another.~3 This tends to produce an ethnicaUy-based slavery system, part
of a differentiated stratification system involving' patriarchal family chief-
tains; below them the members of the tribe; finally slaves'.24 Contact between
societies stimulates trade as well as war. Since • different communities find
different means of production, and different means of subsistence in their
natural environment ',25 exchange of products develops, stimulating further
specialisation in the occupational sphere, and providing the first origin of the
production of commodities: that is, products intended for sale on an ex-
change market. The first commodities include such things as slaves, cattle,
metals, which are originally exchanged in direct barter. As such exchanges
proliferate, and as they encompass a wider variety of commodities, the use of
some form of money begins to occur. Exchange relations thus set up promote
the interdependence of larger units, and thus make for societies of an ex-
panded size.
While in Marx's earlier works a single line of development is portrayed,
simply using historical materials from Europe, from tribal society to ancient
society (Greece and Rome), Marx later distinguishes more than one line of
development out of tribalism. This includes particularly oriental society
(India and China), but Marx also distinguishes a specific type of tribal society,
the Germanic. which in conjunction with the disintegrating Ronuu:t Empire
formed the nexus out of which feudalism developed in western Europe.
Marx's views on the nature of the' Asiatic mode of production' (oriental
society) underwent some change. In his articles in the New York Daily
Tribune, beginning in 1853, Marx places considerable stress upon factors of
climate and geography which made centralised irrigation important in agri-
culture, and thus led to strong central government, or' oriental despotism '.21
However, Marx's later view is that this is rooted in more integral character-
istics of this type of society, generic to the local community itself. Qriental
s~ety l!-Jt!ghly resistanl_19 _cb_~,Se~_ th!s te!l~e!1c}' to stagqa_tion does pot
deqve-solely from the rigid despotic control of the centralised agency of
govemmenC but also (and primarily) from the internally self-sufficient
character of the village commun.e. The small village community is ' entirely
self-sustaIning and contams within itse1f aU conditions of production and
surplus production '.27 The historical origins of this phenomenon are not at

23 cf. Cap, vol. I, pp. 87-9. The similarity to Durkheim may be noted.
~. Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, pp. 122-3. 25 Cap, vol. I, p. 35l.
" The American Journalism of Marx and Engels (New York, 1966); Articles on lndiQ
(Bombay, 19SI); Marx on China 1853--60 (London, 1968).
~7 Pre-Capitalist Ecollomic For/llatiolls, p. 70..
26 Part 1: Marx
all clear. but however this came about originally. the result is a • self-sustain-
ing unity of manufactures and agriculture'. which leads to no impetus to
further differentiation.
Population increase in oriental society tends only to produce • a new com-
munity ... on the pattern of the old one. on unoccupied land '.28 An essential
factor in this is the lack of private property in land. Where private ownership
of landed property does develop. as in parts of Europe and particularly in
Rome. population growth leads to increasing pressure for proprietorship
and consequently a constant tendency to expansion. However. in oriental
society the individual • never becomes an owner but only a possessor '. This
type of society is not necessarily despotic; small village communes may exist
as a segmentalised loosely associated grouping. However. the communities
may devote part of their surplus product. often under the inspiration of
religion. the • imagined tribal entity of the god '. as tribute to a despot. But the
unity of the ruler with his subjects is not based upon an integrated society
bound together by extensive economic interdependence; it remains a society
composed basically of segmental units connected by a religious affiliation to
the person of the despot.
The self-sufficient character of the local village communities definitely
limits the growth of cities. and the latter never came to playa dominant role
in either India or China. 2 ' In the type of society represented by Greece and
Rome. on the other hand. the city becomes of central importance. Marx lays
considerable stress upon the growth of urbanisation generally as marking the
clearest index of differentiation within the division of labour. • The opposi-
tion between town and country begins with the transition from barbarism to
civilisation. from tribe to state. from locality to nation. and runs through the
whole history of civilisation up to the present day .. .'.30 The division of city
and country provides the historical conditions for the growth of capital.
which first begins in the city. and its separation from landed property. In the
cities we find the • beginning of property having its basis only in labour and
excbange '.31
Ancient society. a city-based civilisation. is the first definite form of class
society. Although the Asiatic societies show a certain development of state
organisation. they are not regarded by Marx as involving a developed class
system. since property remains wholly communal at the 10calleveI. 32 Classes

2' Cap. vol. 1. p. 358. The structure of the Asian mode of production is eventually
undermined by the impact of western colonialism.
29 This is a point later made by Weber. with reference to both India and China.
30 GI, p. 65; We. vol. 3. p. 50.
31 GI. p. 66.
32 Wittfogel has argued that Marx' failed to draw a conclusion, which from the stand-
point of his own theory seemed inescapable-namely. that under conditions of the
Asiatic mode of production the agro-managerial bureaucracy constituted the ruling
class '. Karl A. WittfogeI: Oriental Despotism (New Haven, 1957), p. 6. Since
Marx refers to Russia as a • semi-Asiatic' society. the class character of the' Asian
 Historical materialism 27
only come into existence when the surplus of privately appropriated wealth
becomes sufficient for an internally self-recruiting grouping to be clearly set
off from the mass of the producers. Even in ancient society - and particularly
in Greece - private property is still overshadowed by' communal and public
property'.

The ancient world

Ancient society results 'from the union of several tribes into a city.
either by agreement or conquest '. ~3 Unlike in the East, the city is an
economic whole. The original tribes composing the city-states were
aggressive and warlike. The cities were first organised around the military,
and throughout their history both Greece and Rome preserved an expan-
sionist character. Marx's analysis of ancient society concentrates upon the
case of Rome. While Rome is an urban society, it is by no means completely
separated from the infiuence of landed property. The private landed pro-
prietor is at the same time an urban citizen. Marx describes this as ' a form
in which the agriculturalist lives in a city'. 3. The ruling class is founded.
during all periods of Roman history. upon ownership of landed property.
Precisely because of this. population growth produces pressure for territorial
expansion; and this is the main source of change in Roman society. the main
, contradiction' built into its structure: 'While ... this is an essential part of
tbe economic conditions of the community itself. it breaks the real bond on
which the community rests.' U Population expansion. and the militaristic
adventures which this promotes. serve to produce an extension of slavery
and an increasing concentration of landed property. The wars of conquest
and colonisation lead to the emergence of more sharply drawn lines of social
differentiation. causing a swelling of the ranks of the slaves. 3 & The slaves
come to bear the full brunt of the- productive labour. while the patrician
landlords emerge as an increasingly separate ruling class monopolising public
funds and the organisation of warfare. 'The whole system ... was founded
on certain limits of the numbers in the population, which could not be sur-
passed without endangering the conditions of antique civilisation itself.' This
caused the pressure to what Marx calls • compulsory emigration', in the
shape of the periodical setting-up of colonies. which ' formed a regular link
in the structure of society'. 31
The pressure deriving from shortage of land is so strong because there is

mode of production' has considerable political ramifications. Wittfogel gives an

(unsympathetic) account of the debate on Asian society among Russian scholars
(ibid. chapter 9). cf. George Lichtheim: 'Marx and the" Asiatic mode of produc-
tion .. ', St Anthony's Papers, No. 14, 1963, pp. 86-112.
U GI, p. 33.
3, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, pp. 79-80.
35 Ibid. p. 83.
3a Ibid. pp 92-3. 31 American Journalism of Marx and Engels, p. 77.
28 Part 1: Mar~

no motivation to increase productivity from existing resources. There exists

no ideology which would • push • toward an interest in maximising profits:
Wealth does not appear as the aim of production, although Cato may well
investigate the most profitable cultivation of fields, or Brutus may even lend
money at the most favourable rate of interest The enquiry is always about what
kind of property creates the best citizens. Wealth as an end in itself appears only
among a few trading peoples ...31
Wealth is not valued for its own sake, but the • private enjoyment' it
brings; commerce and manufacture are thus looked upon by the ruling class
with suspicion and even scorn. Moreover, labour in general is regarded with
contempt, and as not worthy of free men.
By the end of the Republic, the Roman state is already founded on • the
ruthless exploitation of the conquered provinces ',3' a process which is regu-
larised openly under the emperors. Class conflict inside Roman society
centres around a struggle between patricians and plebeians. The former ex-
ploit the plebeians shamelessly, primarily through usury, which reaches a
high development in Rome although never forming part of a general process
of capital accumulation. In discussing the role of usury, in the third volume
of Capital, Marx indicates that while usurers' capital plays an important part
in the development of capitalism in combination with other conditions, with-
out these conditions it serves only as a debilitating influence in the economy.
This is what happens in Rome; usury exerts an undermining influence upon
the small peasantry, since. instead of replenishing the real needs of the ple-
beians who are continually facing ruin through being forced to serve in wars.
the patricians lend money at exorbitant rates of interest. • As soon as the
usury of the Roman patricians had completely ruined the Roman plebeians.
the small peasants. this form of exploitation came to an end and a pure slave
economy replaced the small peasant economy.' 40
Slavery as an institution passes through various stages in Roman history.
Beginning as a patriarchal system where slaves assist the small producers. the
increasing depression of the plebeians themselves into slavery leads to the
growth of large estates. the latifundiae. where agricultural production for a
market is practised on a large scale. But the failure of commerce and industry
to develop beyond a certain point. combined with the exploitative depression

~. Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. p. 84. Marx notes that the outlook prevailing
in the ancient world, although existing in alienated form - in terms of a • narrowly
national, religious, or political' world-view - still places man very much at the
centre of things as compared to bourgeois society, where human ends become
subordinated to production and the ac.:umulation of wealth. But Marx continues:
, In fact, however, when the narrow bourgeois form has been peeled away. what is
wealth, if not the universality of needs, capacities, enjoyments, productive powers,
etc., of individuals, produced in universal exchange? ' Thus while the • childish
world of the Ancients' is in one aspect superior to the modem world, it is so only in
terms of a relatively narrow range of human potentialities. Ibid. pp. 84-5.
3' The phrase is Engels', SW, vol. 2, p. 299.
40 Cap, vol. 3, p. 582.
 Historical materialism 29
of the majority of the population into poverty, means that the latifundiae
eventually themselves become uneconomical. A further decline in trade sets
in. together with the decay of the towns. What commerce survives is reduced
to ruin by the taxation imposed by state officials seeking to prop up a dis-
integrating state. Slavery itself begins to be abolished. and the large planta-
tions are broken up and leased to hereditary tenants in small farms.
Small-scale farming against becomes predominant.
Thus Rome, at its height a great empire producing a concentration of
enormous we:alth. eventually decays; while a considerable development of
productive forces is attained, the internal composition of the society pre-
vents growth beyond a certain point. The expropriation of large numbers of
peasants from their means of production - a process upon which Marx lays
great stress in discussing the origins of capitalism - does not lead to the
development of capitalist production. but instead to a system based on
slavery. which eventually disintegrates from within.

Feudalism and the origins of capitalist developmeut

The barbarian onslaught upon Rome. therefore. was only the precipitating
condition of the fall of the ancient world: the: real causes derive from the
internal development of Rome itself. Marx apparently does not regard
ancient society as a necessary stage in the development of feudalism;·1 but in
western Europe at any rate the disintegration of the Roman Empire forms
the basis for the emergence of feudal society. Marie nowhere discusses tbe
early phases of feudalism in any detail. But it is probable that he would
accept the substance of the views set out by Engels in his Origin of the
Family. Private Property and the State. according to which the barbarians.
faced with the task of administering the territories they have acquired, are
forced to modify their own system of government and adopt elements of the
Roman legacy. This new social order centres upon the dominant position of
the military commander. and eventuates in the transformation of military
leadership into monarchy.u A new nobility thus forms itself around a
personal retinue of military retainers, and supplemented by an educated
elite drawn from Romanised officials and scholars. Several centuries of
continual warfare and civil disorder in western Europe lead to the permanent
impoverishment of the free peasant farmers, who make up tbe core of the
barbarian armies. and to their consequent enserfment to local noble land-
lords. By the ninth century selfdom becomes predominant. Marx does say in
one place. however, that throughout the feudal period a substructure of the
old barbarian (Germanic) form of social organisation remains. evinced

(\ PI'e-Capilalist Economic Formations. p. 70.

(2 Marx does in one place refer briefty to the system following Rome in Europe as a
• synthesis' in which • two systems mutually modified each other '. If Contribution
to the Critique of Political Economy (Chicago, 1904), p. 288.
30 Part 1: Marx
concretely in the survival of communal property on the local leve1. This sub-
structure • remained throughout the Middle Ages the unique stronghold of
popular liberty and popular life '.43
Marx has no great interest in delineating the characteristics of feudal
society, concentrating more of his attention upon the process of transition
from feudalism to capitalism - although even here there are large gaps and
obscurities in his treatment. What can be gleaned of Marx's view of the
mature period of feudal society in Europe follows the standard conceptions
in the economic history of his day. The basis of feudal economy consists in
small-scale peasant agriculture involving the bonded serf; this is supple-
mented by domestic industry and by handicraft production in the towns.
But the feudal system is basically a rural one: 'If Antiquity started out from
the town and its little territory. the Middle Ages started out from the
country.' " In serfdom, although the worker must surrender a certain amount
of his produce to the lord. there is only a low degree of alienation between
the producer and his product. The serf is his own proprietor, by and large
producing for the needs of himself and his family. 'The lord does not try to
extract the maximum profit from his estate. He rather consumes what is
there. and tranquilly leaves the care of producing it to the serfs and tenant
farmers: 45 The history of the early stages of capitalism is. for Marx. very
largely a history of the progressively increasing alienation of the small pro-
ducer from control of his product: in other words. of his expropriation from
his means of production. and his consequent dependence upon the sale of
his labour on the market.
The disintegration of feudalism, and the early development of capitalism.
is bound up with the growth of towns. Marx emphasises the importance of the
emergence of the municipal movements in the twelfth century. which had a
• revolutionary character'. and as a result of which the urban communities
eventually secure a high degree of administrative autonomy.u As in Anti-
quity. the development of urban centres goes hand in hand with the forma-
tion of mercantile and usurers' capital. and a monetary system in terms of
which they operate. which act as a force undermining the system based upon
agricultural production. U While a few towns probably did persist from the
period of the Roman Empire. the development of urban centres into wealthy

43 Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, pp. 144-5. (From the third draft of Marx's
letter to Zasulich.)
44 GJ, p. 35.
U EW, p. 115.
48 Marx quotes Thierry to the effect that the word capitalia first appears with the rise
of the autonomous urban communes. Letter from Marx to Engels, July 1854,
Selected Correspondence (London, 1934), p. 72.
47 Dobb has arg\led that the primary factor prodUCing the decay of feudalism' was the
inefficiency of feudalism as a system of production, coupled with the growing needs
of the ruling class for revenue .. .'. Maurice Dobb: Studies in the DeveJop/71J!nt of
Capitalism (London, 1963), p. 42. For a discussion of Dobb's book, see Paul M.
Sweezy: The Trallsition from Feudalism to Capitalism (London, 1954).
 Historical materialism 31
commercial and manufacturing centres omy really begins in the twelfth
century; these are populated mainly by freed serfs. The growth of com-
merce stimulates an ever-widening extension of the use of money. and conse-
quently of commodity exchange. into the formerly self-sufficient rural feudal
economy. This facilitates the growth of usury in the towns. stimulates a
decline in the fortunes of the land-owning aristocracy and allows the more
prosperous peasant to discharge his obligations to the lord in monetary form.
or to free himself from the latter's control altogether. In England. by the
conclusion of the fourteenth century, serfdom has virtually disappeared.
Whatever their feudal title, the vast mass of the labouring population in that
country are by that date free peasant proprietors. The fate of serfdom, of
course, varies greatly in different parts of Europe, and in some areas serfdom
undergoes periods of • revival ',.. __
Although as early as the fourteenth century we find • the beginnings of
capitalist production' in Italy,...• and in the fifteenth century in England, these
are very restricted in scope. The towns are dominated by strong guild organi-
sations which strictly limit the number of journeymen and apprentices whom
a master may employ. and the guilds keep themselves separate from mer-
cantile capital, • the only form of free capital with which they came into
contact '.60 Moreover, there is no possibility of capitalism developing while
the majority of the labouring population consists of independent peasantry.
The process of • primary accumulation' 51 - that is. the initial formation of
the capitalist mode of production - involves, as Marx stresses many times,
the expropriation of the peasant from his means of production, a set of events
which • is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire '.
This process occurs at divergent periods, and in various ways, in different
countries, and Marx concentrates upon the example of England. where it
appears in • classic form '. In England, the transformation of independent
peasant into wage-labourer begins in earnest in the late fifteenth century.u
By this time, the great feudal wars Have sapped the resources of the nobility.
The first • mass of free proletarians' is thrown onto the market through the
disbanding of retainers by the impoverished aristocracy, and the declining
position of the feudal aristocracy is hastened by the growing power of the
monarchy. The land-owning aristocracy is increasingly drawn into an ex-

•• A phenomenon to which Engels gives some attention, speaking of the rise of a

• second serfdom' in eastern parts of Europe in the fifteenth century. Letter to Marx,
December 1882, Selected Correspondence, pp. 407-8.
" Marx mentions that, in Italy, where the earliest development of capitalist production
occurs, 'the dissolution of serfdom also took place earlier than elsewbere '. Cap,
vol. I, p. 716 .
.'0 Cap, vol. I, p. 358.

$1 Tbe phrase is usually rendered' primitive accumulation '. Here I follow Sweezy
(p. 17) and others in translating urspriinglich as • primary', which avoids the
POtentially misleisding implications of the usual rendering.
~~ Cap, vol. I. pp. 718ff.
32 Part 1: Marx
change economy. The result is the enclosure movement, to which the rise of
Flemish wool manufacture, leading to a sharp rise in the price of wool in
England, gives a further impetus. In 'defiant opposition to King and Par-
liament' the feudal lords uproot large numbers of the peasantry, forcibly
driving them from their land. Arable land is turned into pasture, which only
requires a few herdsmen. This whole process of expropriation receives in the
sixteenth century' a new and frightening impulse' from the Reformation;
the extensive church lands are handed out to royal favourites or sold cheaply
to speculators who drive out the hereditary tenants and consolidate their
holdings into large units. The expropriated peasantry are ' turned en masse
into beggars, vagabonds, partly from inclination, in most cases from stress of
circumstances '.u This is met with fierce legislation against vagrancy, by
which means the vagabond population is subjected to' the discipline neces-
sary for the wage system '.54
By the early period of the sixteenth century then, there exists in England
the beginnings of a proletariat - a stratum of dispossessed peasants who are
a 'floating', mobile group, separated from their means of production. and
thrown onto the market as 'free' wage-labourers. Marx notes scornfully that
political economists interpret this in a purely positive light, speaking of the
liberation of men from feudal ties and restrictions, neglecting altogether the
fact that this freedom entails 'the most shameless violation of the " sacred
rights of property" and the grossest acts of violence to persons '.55
In themselves, however, these events cannot, Marx indicates, be regarded
as sufficient conditions for the rise of capitalism. At the tum of the sixteenth
century, the decaying remnants of feudalism are poised between further dis-
integration and a movement into a more advanced productive form: capita-
lism. A factor of some importance in stimulating the latter development is
the rapid and vast expansion of overseas commerce which develops as a
result of the startling geographical discoveries made in the last part of the
fifteenth century. These include principally the discovery of America and the
rounding of the Cape, which' gave to commerce. to navigation, to industry,
an impulse never before known, and thereby, to the revolutionary element in
the tottering feudal society, a rapid development '.58 The rapid influx of
capital deriving from this mushrooming trade, plus the flood of precious
metals coming into the country following the discovery of gold and silver in
America, cuts through the existing social and economic arrangements in
England. New manufacturers become established at the sea-ports, and at
inland centres outside the control of the older corporate towns and their
guild organisations. The former undergo rapid growth. in spite of 'an em·
bittered struggle of the corporate towns against these new industrial nur·

5~ Cap. vol. I, pp. 718. 721 &: 734; We, vol. 23, pp. 746. 748 &: 762.
54 Cap. vol. I. p. 737.
"., Cap. vol. I. p. 727.
56 CM. p. 133; GI. p. 73.
 Historical materialism 33
series '.IT Modem capitalism thus begins away from the older centres of
manufacture, 'on the basis of large-scale maritime and overland trade'.iii
Organised manufacture does not originate in the craft industries controlled
by tbe guilds, but in what Marx calls the • rural subsidiary operations • of
spinning and weaving. which need little technical training. While rural society
is the last place where capitalism develops in its • purest and most logical
form " the initial impetus is located there. I I Not before this stage is reached
is capital a revolutionary force. While the previous development of mercanti-
lism beginning in the eleventh century acts as a major factor in dissolving
feudal structures, the towns which develop are essentially dependent upon
the old syst.cm. and play an essentially conservative role once they attain a
certain level of power.
The ascendency of those who control capital, the emergent bourgeoisie,
develops progressively from the opening of the sixteenth century onwards.
Tbe in1Iux of gold and silver produces a sharp increase in prices. This acts to
oller large profits in trade and manufacturing, but is a source of ruination to
the great landlords. and swells the number of wage-labourers. The fruit of all
this in the political sphere is the first English revolution, which is one moment
in a rapid extension of state power. The developing mechanisms of centralised
administration and consolidated political power are used • to hasten, hot-
house fashion. the process of transformation of the feudal mode of pro-
duction into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition '.10
Not a great deal is known, even today. of the specific origins of the first
capitalists. and Marx has little in the way of concrete historical material to
oller on this matter. He does indicate. however, that there are two contrast-
ing historical modes of progression into capitalist production. The first is
where a segment of the merchant class moves over from purely trading
operations to take a direct hand in production. This occurred in the early
development of capitalism in Italy, and is the main source of recruitment of
capitalists in England in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. How-
ever. this form of capitalist formation soon becomes • an obstacle to a real
capitalist mode of production and declines with tbe development of the
latter '.11 The second avenue of capitalist development is, according to Marx.
I the really revolutionary way'. Here individual producers themselves accu-

mulate capital. and move from production to expand the sphere of their
activities to include trade. They therefore from the very beginning operate
Outside the guilds and in conflict with them. While Marx gives only a few
hints of how this second mode of development occurs in manufacture. he

51 Cap. vol. 1. p. 751.

:: Pre-Capitalisl Economic Formations. p. 116.
Ibid. p. 116. Marx adds: • Hence the ancients, who never advanced beyond specifi-
~al1y urban craft skill and application, were never able to achieve large-scale
• IndUStry' (p. 117).
G Cap. vol. 1. p. 751. 61 Cap, vol. 3. p. 329.
34 Part I: Marx
does specify some aspects of the process as it occurs in farming in England.
By the middle of the seventeenth century much of the land is owned by
capitalist farmers employing wage-labour and producing for a commodity
market. Their property is considerably augmented by their forcible usurpa-
tion of those common lands which still survive from the feudal period. But
this latter process is an extended one. not completed until the second half of
the eighteenth century. Its completion is contemporaneous with the final dis-
appearance of the independent peasantry. • incorporating land as capital'
and creating for the industries of the town • the necessary supply of an out-
lawed proletariat '.13
Marx distinguishes two broad stages of productive organisation in the
capitalist period. The first stage is dominated by manufacture. The distinctive
characteristic of this form is that it involves the breaking-down of craft skills
into various specialised tasks carried out by a number of workers. who
accomplish collectively what one skilled man would do under the guild
system. Manufacture is more efficient than handicraft production. not because
of any technical advances, but because the division of labour it involves
makes it possible to produce more units per man-hour. This form of pro-
duction, which is predominant from the sixteenth century until the con-
cluding part of the eighteenth in England, has definite limitations. The ex-
pansion of markets by the end of the eighteenth century is so great that
manufacture is insufficiently productive to meet the demands placed upon
it. As a consequence, a strong pressure builds up to create technically more
efficient means of production; • the development of machinery was a neces-
sary consequence of the needs of the market '.83 The result is the 'industrial
revolution '." Mechanisation henceforth dominates the capitalist mode of
production. There is set in motion the constant impetus towards techno-
logical modification which becomes a hallmark of capitalism. The develop-
ment of increasingly more complicated and expensive machinery is a primary
factor in the centralisation of the capitalist economy upon which Marx lays
so much stress in Capital in discussing the predicted dissolution of capitalism.

n Cap, vol. 1, p. 733; We, vol. 23, p. 761.

" Letter to Annenkov, quoted in Poverty of Philosophy, p. 156.
" Engels used this term before Marx. See the former's Condilion of Ihe Working Class
in England in 1844 (Oxford, 1968), pp. 9-26. There is some dispute over the origin
of the term' industrial revolution'. cf. Dobb. p. 258.
3. The relations of production and class structure

According to Marx. the development of society is the result of the continual

productive interaction between men and nature. Men • begin to distinguish
themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of
subsistence...'.l The 'production and reproduction of life' is both an exi-
gency dictated by the biological needs of the human organism and. more im-
portantly. the creative source of new needs and capabilities. Thus productive
activity is at the root of society in both an historical and an analytical sense.
Production is' the first historical act '; and • the production of material life ...
is .•. a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of
years ago. must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human
life ',2 Every individual. in his day-to-day actions, recreates and reproduces
society at every moment: this is both the source of what is stable in social
organisation and the origin of endless modification.
Every kind of production system entails a definite set of social relation-
ships existing between individuals involved in the productive process. This is
at the root of one of Marx's most important criticisms of political economy
and of utilitarianism generally. The conception of the • isolated individual •
is a construction of the bol!f~ philosoph)'_~f individ~alism,\and serves to
conceal the social character which production always manifest~ Marx refers
to Adam Smith as the ' Luther of political economy • because he. and after
him the other economists. have correctly identified labour as the source of
man's own self-creation. 3 But what the economists have obscured is that the
self-creation of man through production entails a process of social develop-
ment. Human beings never produce simply as individuals. but only as mem-
bers of a definite form of society. There is no type cf society, therefore, which
is not founded upon a definite set of relations of production.'
In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce
only by cooperating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities.
In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one
another and only within these social connections and relations does their action
on nature, does production. take place.s

I G/, p. 31. 2 G/, p. 39.

3 EW, p. 147.
C The term usulllly employed by Marx (Produktionsllerhiiltnisse) has, in fact, a double
meaning in English, and can refer both to • conditions' and to 'relations' of
produc~on. On the use of ~e term '~elations of production' in Marx's writings,
$ see Lows Althusser et al.: LITe Ie Capital (Paris, 1967), vol 2, pp. 149-59.
SW, vol. I, p. 89.

35
36 Part 1: Marx

In every form of society there exists' a sum of productive forces. an histori-

cally created relation of individuals to nature and to one another. which is
handed down to each generation from its predecessor.. .'.6 Marx does not
attempt to construct any sort of general theory of what brings about ex-
pansion in the forces of production (Produktionskrii/te). This can only be
explained by concrete social and historical analysis. Thus the modifications
of the productive forces involved in the transition from feudalism. to capi-
talism can be explained in terms of a convergent set of historical events.
Moreover, there are cases of societies where the forces of production become
quite highly evolved. but where other elements of the social organisation
retard any further advance. Marx quotes the instance of Peru. which in cer-
tain respects had a developed economy. but was held back by the lack of a
monetary system. The failure to develop a monetary system was largely
contingent upon the isolated geographical position of the country. which
inhibited the expansion of trade. 7

Class domination =tlWl'll

According to Marx. classes emergq'where the relations of production involve
a differentiated division of labourlwhich allows for the ~~ulation of sur-
plus production that can be apprCJl>riated by a minority grouping. which thus
stands in an exploitative relations1!!P to the mass of producers. In disC\lssing
the relationships between classes in society. Marx usually employs the terms
He"schaft and Klassenhe"SChafJ-. In English versions ~f Marx's writings. it
is customary to translate these ~s 'rule' and 'class ~e '. But these terms
suggest rather more of a deliberate imposition of power than is necessarily
implied in the German terminology. Consequently it is more appropriate to
use the term 'domination' rather than • rule '.'
Marx's various analyses of class domination are all primarily directed
towards the end of explicating the characteristic structure and dynamics of
bourgeois society. and conceptual precision is secondary in importance to
this overriding focus of attention. Consequently. Marx often uses the term
Klasse in a somewhat cavalier fashion. and he did not feel compelled, until
quite near the end of his intellectual career, to confront the problem of spell-
ing out the concept of class in a precise fashion.' As with the concept of
• rationalisation' in Max Weber's thought, the notion of class is so funda-
mental to Marx's writings that. in his most important works. he takes its

6 GI, p. 51.
7 Gru, p. 22.
s ct. W. Wesolowski: • Marx's theory of class domination: an attempt at systematisa-
tion', in Nicholas Lobkowicz: Marx and the Western World (Notre Dame, 1967),
pp. 54-5. On the problem of He"schaft in Weber's writings, see below, p. 156.
9 • no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modem society. nor
yet the struggle between them.' Letter to Weydemeyer. March 1852, Selected
Correspondellce. p. 57. cf. Stanislaw Ossowski: Class and C/tJSS Structure in the
Social Consciouslless. London, ]963, pp. 69-88 and pas;im.
 The relotions of production and class structure 37
meaniog for granted. It is an irony which has frequently been noted that the
manuscripts which Marx left at his death should have broken off at the point
at which he was entering upon a systematic analysis of the concept of class. 10
Here. for the first time in his writings. he explicitly poses the question. • what
constitutes a class? ' But what Marx says, before the manuscript ends. is
mainly negative. Class must not be identified with either source of income or
functional position in the division of labour. These criteria would yield a
large plurality of classes: doctors, who receive their income from treatment
of the sick. would be a separate class from farmers. who derive theirs from
cultivation of land. etc. Moreover. use of such criteria would cut across the
position of groupings of individuals in the productive process: two men may.
for instance. both be builders, but one may be the propertyless employee of
a large finn. while the other owns a small business of his own.
Marx's emphasis that clas~es are not income groups is a particular as~t
of his FDeraJ premise. stated in Capital. that the distribution of economic
goods is not a sphere separate to and independent of production, but is
determined by tbe mode of production. Marx rejects as • absurd' the con-
tention made by John Stuart Mill. and many of the political economists, that
while production is governed by definite laws, distribution is controlled by
(malleable) human institutions.1J Such a view underlies the assumption that
classes are merely inequalities in the distribution of income. and therefore
tbat class conflict can be alleviated or even eliminated altogether by the
introduction of measures which minimise discrepancies between incomes.
For Mm. then, 51~sses are an as~t Q{ ~~ relations otproduction. The
substance of Marx's conception of class is, in spite of the variability of his
terminology. relatively easy to infer from the many scattered references which
Marx makes in the course of different works. Classes are constituted by the
relationship of groupings of individuals to the ownership of private property
in the means of production. This yields a model of class relations which is
basica])y dichotomous: all class societies are built around a primary line of
division between two antagonistic classes, Q.ne dominant and the other sub-
ordinate. 12 In Marx's usage, class of necessity involves a conftict relation.
On more than one occasion. Marx makes this point by linguistic emphasis.
Thus. discussing the position of the peasantry in nineteenth-century France,
Marx comments :
Tho small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar
conditions but without entering into manifold relations with one another. Their
mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them
into mutual intercourse... In so far as millions of families live under economic
COnditions of existence that separate their mode of life. their interests and their
10 The section on • The classes'. placed at the end of the third volume of Capital
(edited by Engels) (Cap. vol. 3, pp. 862-3). is a mere fragment.
1\ Gru. p. 717.
12 ct. R.alf Dahrendorf: Class and Class Conflict in lUI Industrial Society (Stanford.
1965), pp. 18-27.
38 Part 1: Marx
culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile owosition to the
latter, they fonn a class. In 80 far as there is merely a local interconnection among
these small-holding peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no com-
munity, no national bond and no political organisation among them, they do not
form a class. n
In another context. Marx makes a similar point with reference to the
bourgeoisie: capitalists form a class only to the degree that they are forced
to carry on a struggle against another class. Otherwise capitalists -;re. in
economic competition with each other in the pursuit of profit in the market. 14

Class structure and ID8Iket relatioasblps

It is important to emphasise that the dichotomous class conception appears
in Marx's writings as a theoretical construct. Only bourgeois society - as
Marx projects its future development - approximates closely to this picture.
All historical class societies show a more complicated system of relationships
which overlaps with the dichotomous axis of class structure. Thus in
bourgeois society, these complicating groupings are of three sorts :
1. Classes which. although they play an important economic and political
role in the extant form of society. are marginal in the sense that they derive
from a set of relations of production which are either being superseded or,
conversely. are in the ascendant.18 An instance of the first is the case of the
free peasantry. which although still strong in France and Germany. is
becoming drawn into dependence upon capitalistic farmers. or is being
forced to join the urban proletariat.11
2. Strata which stand in a relationship of functional dependence upon one
of the classes. and which consequently tend to identify politically with that
class. Those whom Marx calls the • officers' among administrative workers
in industry - the higher managerial sta1f - fall into this category. IT
3. Fmally. there are heterogeneous clusters of individuals in the Lumpen-
proletariat who stand on the margins of the class system because they are
not wholly integrated into the division of labour. These are composed of
• thieves and criminals of all kinds. living OIl the crumbs of society. people
without a definite trade. vagabonds. people without a hearth or home '.11
The degree to which a class constitutes a homogeneous entity is historically
variable: • subordinate gradations' exist in all classes. 1t In The Class
Struggles in France Marx analyses the conftict between financial and in-

13 SW, vol. I, p. 334.

14 GI, p. 69.
11 d. Donald Hodges: • The .. iDtermediate classes" in Marxian theory', Social
Research, vol. 28, 1961, pp. 241-52.
11 SW, vol. I, p. 217.
If ct. Cap, vol. 3. pp. 376ft. Marx also refers to • savants, lawyers, doctors, etc.', as the
• ideolOgical representatives and spokesmen' of classes. SW, vol. I, p. 140.
11 SW, vol. I, p. ISS.
11 CM, p. 132.
 The relations of production and class structure 39
dustrial capitalists between 1848 and 1850. This is an empirical example of
a persistent subdivision within the bourgeoisie as a whole; like other sub-
divisions of the same sort. it is founded upon divergent interests of a definite
kind: • it is because profit can be divided into two sorts of revenue. These
tWO sorts of capitalists express nothing other than this fact.' 20 According to
Marx. the ordering of classes and the nature of class conflict change con-
siderably with the emergence of successive forms of society. Pre-capitalist
societies are overwhelmingly localised in their organisation. To generalise
from a metaphor Marx applies to the French peasantry. it can be said that
every pre-capitalist society • is formed by the simple admixture of homo-
logous magnitudes. much as potatoes in a sack form a sack of potatoes '.21
Economic relationships do not. in such forms of society. manifest themselves
as purely market relationships; economic domination or subordination is
fused with personal ties between individuals. Thus the domination of the
feudal landowner operates through personal connections of bondage and the
direct payment of tithes. Moreover, the serf preserves a large measure of
control over his means of production in spite of the fact that he has to cede
a part of his product as tribute to a master. It is only with the advent of
capitalismL which d~nds upon thc_ ~xprop.ri.~ti91L9.LL1lla.SL011abourers
who_havc.nothing.save..theirlahoJl{-RQw.er tQJ)~r.iJLexchange for _the means
of ob~i~tnK.tUi~lih.QQd. that naked market relationships appear as the
determinant of human productive activity. Bourgeois society • has piti-
lessly tom asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his .. natural
superiors ". and has left no other nexus between man and man than naked
self·interest. than callous II cash payment t, ••• In one woId, for exploitation.
veiled by religious and political illusions. it has substituted naked. shameless.
direct, brutal exploitation.' 22 In bourgeois society. therefore, class relation-
sbips become simplified and universalised. The progressive development of
capitalism. once it is established, more and more tends toward the creation
of two great classes in direct opposition on the market: bourgeoisie and pro-
letariat. The other classes - landowners. petty bourgeoisie, and peasantry -
are transitional classes. which are increasingly swallowed up by one or other
of these two major class groupings.
In Marx's conception. classes form the main linkage between the relations
of production and the rest of society, or social • superstructure' (Oberbau).
Class relationships are the main axis around which political power is distri-
buted, and upon which political organisation depends. For Marx. economic
andpolitiaU power are closeh'-.-althougb not inseparably. linked. Again. how-
ever. this theorem has to be placed in an historical dimension. The form of
the political agency is closely related to the mode of production. and hence
to the degree to which market relationships are of primary sjgnificance in

2D Gru, p. 735.
11 SW, vol. 1. p. 334. 22 eM, p. 135.
40 Part J: Marx
the economy. Private property as such first emerges in the ancient world, but
remains confined to restricted segments of economic life. In the Middle Ages,
property moves through several stages. from feudal landed property, to
corporative moveable property. eventually giving rise to capital invested in
manufacture in the towns. In both ancient society and in the Middle Ages,
property continues to be bound largely to the community. and thus so also
do relationships of class domination. This means that the operations of
political power are still primarily conducted in a diffuse fashion in the
communitas. Modern capitalism, however, is determined by big industry
I

and universal competition. which has cast off all semblance of a communal
institution '.n
The modem state emerges in conjunction with the struggle of the bour-
geoisie against the remnants of feudalism. but is also stimulated by the
demands of the capitalist economy.
To this modern private property corresponds the modern state, which, purchased
gradually by the owners of property by means of taxation, has fallen entirely into
their hands through the national debt, and its existence has become wholly
dependent OD the commercial credit which the owners of property, the bourgeois,
extend to it. as reflected in the rise and fall of state funds OD the stock exchange.~4
The particular form of the state in bourgeois society varies according to
the circumstances in which the bourgeoisie has gained the ascendancy. In
France. for example. the alliance of the bourgeoisie with the absolute
monarchy has stimulated the development of a strongly established official-
dom. In Britain, by contrast. the state represents • an archaic. timeworn and
antiquated compromise between the landed aristocracy. which rules officially,
and the bourgeoisie. which in fact domiruJtes in all the various spheres of civil
society. but not officially '.2S The specific process which has given rise to this
political order in Britain has minimised the importance of bureaucratic
elements in the state.

Ideology and consclODllle&S

The dissipation of the community. and the expansion of private property
which brings this about. underlies the origins of civil law. The codification
of such a body of law occurs for the first time in Rome. but has no lasting
consequences because of the internal disintegration of manufacture and com-
merce in Roman society. With the emergence of modem capitalism. a new
phase in the formation of law occurs: Roman law was, taken over in the
early centres of capitalism in Italy and elsewhere. and made the source of
civil law. In civil law. authority is based upon rationalised norms rather than
upon the religious prescriptions which are predominant in traditional com-
munities. 21 The modem legal system and judiciary is a principal ideological
23 G1, p. 79. 26 G1, p. 79.
IS We, vol. 11, p. 9S.
21 For Weber's treatment of this issue, see ES, vol. 2; cf. also Durkheim: DL, pp. 142ff.
 The relations of production and class structure 41
support of the bourgeois state. But it is only the contemporary expression
of the fact that. in all class societies, the dominant class develops or takes
over ideological forms which legitiJnjse ils domination. • The class which has
the means of material production at its disposal. has control at the same time
over the means of intellectual (geistig) production. so that thereby. generally
speaking. the ideas of those who lack the means of intellectual production
are subject to it.' 2T
According to Marx. consciousness is rooted in human Praxis. which is in
tum social. This is the sense of the statement that' It is not the consciousness
of men that determines their being. but, on the contrary, their social being
that determines their consciousness '.28 Much calumny has been heaped
upon Marx for this observation. But the operative term here is social being.
and there can be little objection to the generalisation that consciousness is
governed by human activity in society. The case of language, Marx points
out, gives a concrete example of this. Language, Marx says, 'is as old as
consciousness. language is practical consciousness that exists also for other
men. and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well... '.21
The expression of ideas, and indeed the very existence of anything beyond
mere sensation. is conditional upon the existence of language. But language
is a social product, and it is only in virtue of his membership of society that
the individual acquires tbe linguistic categories which oonstitute the para-
meters of his consciousness.
Marx's conception of the role of particular forms of ideology in class
societies follows directly from these more general considerations. The main
defect of idealism in philosophy and history is that it attempts to analyse the
properties of societies by inference from the content of the dominant systems
of ideas in those societies. But this neglects altogether the fact that there is not
a unilateral relationship between values and power: the dominant class is
able to disseminate ideas which are the legitimations of its position of
dominance. Thus the ideas of freedom and equality which come to the fore
in bourgeois society cannot be taken at their • face value '. as directly sum-
ming up social reality; on the contrary. the legal freedoms which exist in
bourgeois society actually serve to legitimise the reality of contractual obli-
gations in which propertyless wage-labour is heavily disadvantaged as com-
pared to the owners of capital. The import of this is that ideology must be
studied in relation to the social relationships in which it is embedded: we
must study both the concrete processes which give rise to various types of
ideas, together with the factors which determine which ideas come into
prOminence within a given society. While ideologies obviously show con·
tinuity over time. neither this continuity. nor any changes which occur. can
:1 GI. p. 61; We, vol. 3, p.46.
•8 SW, vol. I, p. 363. See below. pp. 208-223ff. for further treatment of this matter
in relation to Weber and Durkheim. •
21 GI, p. 42.
42 Part 1: Marx
be explained purely in terms of their internal content. Ideas do not evolve on
their own accotmt; they do so as elements of the consciousness of men living
in society. following a definite Praxis: • Whilst in ordinary life every shop-
keeper is very well able to distinguish between what somebody professes to
be and what he really is. our historians have not yet won even this trivial
insight. They take every epoch at its word concerning what it says and
imagines about itself.' 30
There are two related emphases in Marx's treatment of ideology which it
is important to distinguish: both have already been mentioned above. The
first is that the social circumstances in which the activity of individuals
occurs condition their perception of the world in which they live. This is the
sense in which language forms the 'practical consciousness' of men. The
second theorem concerns the diffusion. as well as the creation, of ideas: this
is Marx's generalisation that. in class societies. the ruling ideas of any epoch
are the ideas of the ruling class. It follows from this latter proposition that
the dissemination of ideas is heavily dependent upon the distribution of
economic power in society. It is in this latter sense that ideology constitutes
part of the social ' superstructure': the prevalent ethos at any given time is
one which provides legitimation of the interests of the dominant class. Thus
the relations of production. via the mediation of the class system. compose
• the real fotmdation. on which rises a legal and political superstructure and
to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness '.11 Marx does not
postulate an tmvarying connection between these two modes in which con-
sciousness is moulded by social Praxis. An individual or group may develop
ideas which are partially at variance with the prevalent views of his age: but
these ideas will not come into prominence unless they articulate with interests
held by the dominant class, or with those of a class which comes in a position
to challenge the existing authority structure.a2 Thus many of the ideas which
were used in constructing machines in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries had been known for many years: but their rapid application
and spread only occurred when the expansion of capitalism generated the
need for capitalists to augment production over and beyond what was
possible through handcraft manufacture.
Acceptance of the role of class domination against the backgrotmd of
a dialectical conception of the relationship between social activity and
consciousness resolves some of the apparent dilemmas concerning the
connections between the relations of production and the ideological ' super-
structure' in any given society.83 The productive activity of individuals, in
inter-relationship with one another and with nature. involves a continual

3D GI. p. 64; We. vol. 3, p. 49.

31 SW, vol. 1, p. 363.
32 cf. GI. pp. 472-3.
a3 ct., for example, John Plamenatz: Man and Society (London, 1968), vol. 2, pp.
279-93.
 The reiatioflS of production and class structure 43
and reciprocal interaction between social behaviour and consciousness: the
ideas which are thus generated are conditioned in their di1fusion or accep-
tance by the structure of class domination. Hence the dominant ideology
always comprises • partly ... an elaboration or consciousness of domination,
partly ... a moral means for this domination '.36 The • real foundation' of
society, upon which the • superstructure' arises, is always constituted of the
relationships of active, willing individuals, and thus always involves both
the creation and application of ideas. The main point about the • super-
strueturc ' is not that it embodies ideas. whereas the relations of production
do not. but that it is comprised of a system of social relationships (especially
in the shape of politics. law and religion) which order and sanction a system
of class domination.
The problem of the relativity of historical knowledge is disposed of by
Marx without much difficulty. It is certainly the case that all forms of human
consciousness, including the most highly complex kinds of ideologies, are
rooted in definite sets of social conditions. But this does not preclude the
retrospective understanding of history in terms of rational principles. Thus
there are certain characteristics which are shared by all class societies: but
these could not be until the advent of the conditions for the emergence of
scientific knowledge of society, generated by capitalism. Marx illustrates this
by analogy. The anatomy of man, the more developed creature, supplies us
with the key to the understanding of the anatomy of the ape: similarly, under-
standing the structure and process of development of bourgeois society
allows us to use the same categories to explain the social development of the
ancient world. Using the concepts formulated by the political economists, it
is possible to apply notions such as • labour' and 'production' in a very
general way, to apply to characteristics shared by societies at all levels of
complexity. But these concepts have only emerged with the rise of capitalist
production. • Production in general is an abstraction, but a justified abstrac-
tion....' at
The theories developed by the political economists contain very important
elements of truth which can be applied to all societies; but the fact that the
writings of the economists are heavily linked to the structure of bourgeois
class domination means that they are unable to discern the limited and one-
sided character of their formulations. Like the German historians and philo-
sophers. they share the • illusion of the epoch ';31 but this in no way implies
that the whole of their ideas are • illusory' in an epistemological senSe. The
dOminant modes of thought will not wholly shed their ideological character

:Ie GI, p. 473; We, vol. 3, p. 405. See Karl Korsch: Marxismus und Philosophie
(Leipzia. 1930), pp. Ss-67.
3S G,u, p. 7. This, of course, is basically a transmuted Hegelian standpoint. As LuUcs
remarks, for Marx • the present must be correctly undentood in order for the
31 history of previous times to be adequately grasped .. .o, De, juftge Hegel, p. 130.
GI, p. 52.
44 Part 1: Marx
until • class domination in general ceases to be the form in which the social
order is organised, that is to say, as soon as it is no longer necessary to
represent a particular interest as general or the .. general interest as It

ruling ',If
Every dominant class lays claim to the universality of the ideology which
legitimates its position of domination. But, aocording to Marx. this does not
entail that the social changes effected by the rise of a new revolutionary class
to dominance are equivalent in different types of society, While Marx does
set out an overall schema in terms of which every process of revolutionary
changes shares common characteristics, he also holds that the forms of
revolutionary transformation found in history differ in certain crucially
important respects. The overall schema which Marx employs in the analysis
of revolutionary social change runs as follows. In any relatively stable society,
there exists an equilibrium between the mode of production, the social rela-
tions which are integral to that mode of production. and the • superstructure '
which, through the medium of class domination. is tied in with it. When pro-
gressive changes occur in the sphere of productive activity - such as happened
in Rome with the emergence of manufacture and commerce within a pre-
dominantly agrarian economy - a tension is set up between these new pro-
ductive forces and the existing relations of production. The existing relations
of production then increasingly form barriers to the emergent forces of pro-
duction. These • contradictions' become expressed as overt class confiicts,
terminating in revolutionary struggles fought out in the political sphere. and
manifest ideologically as a clash between competing • principles '. The out-
come of these struggles is either • the common ruin of the contending classes "
as in Rome, or • a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large', as
occurred in the supersession of feudalism by capitalism. ae The class engaging
in a revolutionary struggle for power fights in the name of absolute human
rights, presenting its ideas as 'the only rational, universally valid ones '.31
While only one subordinate class stands to gain from the revolutionary over-
throw of the existing dominant class, it may invoke the aid of others to assist
its movement to power: the French bourgeoisie, for instance, made its revolu-
tion in 1789 with the aid of the peasantry, Once the revolutionary class has
acceded to power, its erstwhile revolutionary character becomes transposed
into a defence of the existing order, i.e., of its own hegemony:
it is in the interest of the ruling section of society to sanction the existing order
as law and to perpetuate its habitually and traditionally fixed limits as legal ones.
Aside from all other matters, this comes about of itself in proportion as the con-
tinuous reproduction of the foundation of the existing order of the relations
corresponding to it gradually assumes a regulated and orderly form. And such
regulation and order are themselves indispensable elements of any mode of pro-

af GI, p. 63; We, vol. 3, p. 48.

3t eM, p. 132.
3t GI, p. 62.
 The relations of production and closs structure 45
duction, provided that it ,is to assume social firmness and an independence from
mere ac:c:ident and arbitrariness.40
Thus the ascendance of the new class to power inaugurateS another period
of relative stability, eventually generating a repetition of the same pattern of
change.
This general conception would be a wholly positivistic one were it not for
the fact that Marx relates the occurrence of revolutionary change to the his-
torical process as a whole. 'Every new class '. Marx stales. 'achieves its
domination only on a broader basis than that of the previously dominant
class, whereas the opposition of the non-dominant class against the new ruling
class later develops all the more sharply and profoundly.' ~ The effect of the
rise to power of the bourgeoisie is to introduce profound changes in the
character of class relationships as compared to those extant in feudalism.
Bourgeois society makes for a far broader realisation of human pfClductive
capacities than was feasible in previous periods of history. But this is only
rendered possible by the formation of an increasingly numerous class of pro-
pertyless wage-labourers: bourgeois society universalises class relationships
around a single class division. between bourgeoisie and proletariat. It is this
which. in fact, provides for the fundamental difference between bourgeois
society and the other forms of class society which have preceded it. Whereas
previous revolutionary classes, once they have acquired power, have' sought
to protect the position they have acquired by subjecting society at large to
their conditions of appropriation " the proletariat cannot come to a position
of domination' except by abolishing [its] own previous mode of appropriation,
and thereby also every other previous mode of appropriation '.~
According to Marx. the rise to power of the working-class culminates the
historical changes wrought by bourgeois society. The development of bour-
geois society fosters an extreme dislocation between the accomplishments of
human productive powers and the alienation of the mass of the population
from the control of the wealth which'they have thus created. The supersession
of capitalism. on the other hand, provides the circumstances in which it will
be possible for man to recover his alienated self within a rational order which
has freed itself from class domination. The economic presuppositions of this
process are detailed in Capital.

40 Cap, vol. 3, pp. 773-4; We, vol. 25. p, 801.

-. GI, p. 63; We, vol. 3, p. 48.
fa CM, p. 147.
4. The theory of capitalist development

The theory of surplus value

Although much of Capital is concerned with economic analysis, Marx's over-
riding interest in the work is always in the dynamics of bourgeois society:
the primary object of Capital is to disclose the • economic law of motion' of
this society, through an examination of the dynamics of the productive
foundation upon which it rests. 1
Capitalism, as Marx emphasises on the first page of Capital, is a system of
commodity production. In the capitalist system producers do not simply pro-
duce for their own needs, or for the needs of individuals with whom they are
in personal contact; capitalism involves a nation-wide, and often an interna-
tional, ex,~t"!k.t. Every commodity. Marx s,tat",' has a • two-fold' as-
pe~ ,,-v ue 'on the one hand, and i~Change:~~' on the other.
-Use-value. ~realiSed only in the process of consUmption '. has refer-
'ence to the needs which the properties ora -commoc:fity as a phYSICal artifact
can be employed to cater to. 2 An object can have use-value whether or not it
is a commodity; while to be a commodity a product must have use-value. the
reverse does not hold. • ~hange-val~' refers to !.h~,,:~ue ~ J'r~l!ct _has
,,!,Jl¢Q"ffered in exchan~.Wr ~erp~~~;:m contra,st to use-value.
~-crumgC-V31ue presuppOses' a definite economic relation ',and is inseparable
from a market on which goodS- areeichanged; it -only 'has meaning in refer-
ence to commodities.
Now any object. whether it is a commodity or not, can only have value in so
far as human labour power has been expanded to produce it: this is the core
proposition of the labour theory of value which Marx takes over from Adam
Smith and Ricardo." It follows from this that both exchange-value and use-
value must be directly related to the amount of labour embodied in the pro-
duction of a commodity. It is clear, Marx says, that exchange-value cannot be

1 Only the first volume of Capital was published in Marx's life-time. but Marx worked
on all three volumes simultaneously. Volumes 2 and 3 were edited and published
by Engels in ]1185 and 1894 respectively. In the preface to the first volume, Marx
speaks of a projected fourth volume. to deal with • the history of theory '. Notes
for this work were published by Kautsky between 19()5 and 1910, as Theorien jiber
den Mehrwen. Sections from this have been translated into English as Theories of
Surplus Value. ed. Bonner &. Bums (London. 1951). Two volumes of a fuIJ English
translation have appeared (London. vol. 1. 1964; vol. 2. 1969).
2 Contribution to the Critique of Political Econtmry, p. 20.
3 Whenever Marx speaks of • value' without qualification. he means' exchange-value'.
• For an account of the development of the labour theory of value, see Ronald L.
Meek: Studies in the Labour Theory of Value (London. 1956).
46
 The theory of capitalist development 47
derived from use-value. This can be shown by the example of the exchange-
value of two commodities such as com and iron. A given quantity of corn is
worth a specifiable quantity of iron. The fact that we can express the worth of
these two products in terms of each other, and in quantified form. shows that
we are using some common standard which is applicable to both. This com-
mon measure of value has nothing to do with the physical properties of com
or iron, which are incommensurate. Exchange-value must then rest upon
some quantifiable characteristic of labour. There are obviously many differ-
ences between specific kinds of labour: the actual tasks involved in the work
of growing corn are very different from those involved in manufacturing iron.
lust as exchange-value abstracts from the specific characteristics of com-
modities. and treats them in abstract quantitative ratio. in the derivation of
exchange-value we have to consider only , abstract general labour'. which
can be measured in terms of the amount of time expended by the worker in
the production of a commodity.
Abstract labour is the basis of exchange-value. while 'useful labour' is
the basis of use-value. The two aspects of commodities are simply an expres-
sion of the dual character of labour itself - as labour power. the physical ex-
penditure of the energy of the human organism. something common to all
forms of productive activity; and as a definite kind of labour, a specific set of
operations into which this energy is channelled, something peculiar to the
production of particular commodities for specific uses.
On the one hand all labour is, speaking physiologically, an expenditure of human
labour power, and in its character as similar or as abstract human labour it creates
the value of commodities. On the other hand, all labour is the expenditure of
human labour power in a special form and with a definite aim, and in this, its
character of concrete usefulla;bour, it produces use·valu~?
• Abstract labour' is an historical category, since it is only applicable to com-
modity production. Its existence is predicated upon what are, for Marx. some
of the intrinsic characteristics of capitalism. Capitalism is a far more fluid
system than any which preceded it, demanding that the labour force should
be highly mobile. and adaptable to different kinds of work; as Marx puts it,
• "labour in general ", labour sans phrase. the starting-point of modern poli-
tical economy. becomes realised in practice '.6
There is an obvious problem which presents itself if abstract labour is to
be measured in terms of units of time as the mode of calculating exchange-
value. It would appear to follow from this that an idle worker, who takes a
long while to produce a given item, would produce a more valuable commo-
dity than an industrious man completing the same task in a shorter time. T

~ Cap. vol. 1. p. 47; We. vol. 23. p. 61.

~ COlllributiOIl to the Critiqlle of Political Ecollomy. p. 299.
, Skilled labour also offers a source of difficulty. Marx holds. however, that all skilled
labour can be reduced to time unils of unskilled or' simple' labour. A skill normally
represents the resulls of a certain period of lraining; to eGnvert skilled labour
48 Part J: Marx
Marx stresses. however. that the concept applies not to any particular indivi-
dual worker. but to the ' socially necessary' labour time. This is the amount
of time required for the production of a commodity under the normal condi-
tions of production. and with the' average degree of skill and intensity' pre-
valent at a given time in a particular industry. The socially necessary labour
time can be fairly readily determined. according to Marx, through empirical
study. A sudden technological improvement can reduce the amount of socially
necessary labour time required to produce a particular commodity. and will
therefore lead to a corresponding diminution in its value.'
This whole analysis, including Marx's discussion of surplus value described
below, is set out in the first volume of Capital.' It should be emphasised thal
Marx's treatment of value and surplus value at this point is deliberately
phrased on a highly abstract level. Marx sets out to ' disregard all phenomena
that hide the play' of the ' inner mechanism' of capitalism. Failure to appre-
ciate this has given rise to numerous misconceptions. including the one that
Marx allows no role at all to demand. For most of his discussion in volume
1 Marx assumes a situation in which supply and demand are in equilibrium.
Marx does not ignore the importance of demand; but it follows from the la-
bour theory of value that demand does not determine value, although it can
affect prices. IO For Marx, demand is most significant in relation to the alloca-
tion of the labour force to different sectors of the economy. If the demand for
a certain commodity becomes particularly high, then producers of other goods
will be stimulated to move into the production of that commodity. The in-
crease in price following the heightened demand will then become reduced in
the direction of its value. II But demand is not the independent variable some
economists make of it: 'supply and demand presuppose the existence of
different classes and sections of classes which divide the ·total revenue of a
society and consume it among themselves as revenue, and, therefore. make up
the demand created by revenue.' 12
It follows from the analysis of exchange-value discussed_above that pro-
ducts exchange at their values: that is. according to the amount of socially

into simple labour. it is necessary to assess the amount of labour (expended on his
own part and by those who train him) which goes into the training procedure. But,
in Marx's view. capitalism eventually tends to do away with skilled labour in any
case, through progressive mechanisation. cf. Paul M. Sweezy: T"~ T"~ory 0/
Capitalist D~l'elopmenl (New York, 1954), pp. 42-4.
, As an example of the impact of techr.ological change in this direction, Marx cites
the case of the English clothing industry. Here the introduction of power looms
reduced by something like fifty per cent the labour time necessary to weave yarn
into cloth. Of course a hand weaver still needed the same amount oC time as before .
• but the product of one hour of his individual labour represented aftcr the change
only one-half an hour's social labour, and consequently fell to one-half its former
value '. Cap. vol. I. p. 39: W~. vol. 23. p. 53.
• Cup. vol. I. pp. 50811.
10 SW. vol. I. pp. 84ff.
II Ca". vol. J. pp. \8195. d. Mt!ck. p. 178. I~ Cup. ve.l .. p. 191.
 The theory of capitalist development 49
necessary labour lime embodied in them.13 Marx rejects the notion that capi-
talists derive their profits from any sort of dishonesty or deliberate underhand
dealing. Although in actual buying or selling transactions a particular capita-
list might make money by taking advantage of the vagaries of the market.
such as a sudden increase in demand for his product. the existence of profit
in tbe economy as a whole cannot be explained in this way. On the average.
Marx holds. the capitalist buys labour. and sells commodities, at their real
value. As he puts it. the capitalist' must buy his commodities at their value.
must sell them at their value, and yet at the end of the process must withdraw
more value from circulation than he threw into it at starting '.14
This apparent paradox is resolved by Marx with reference to that historical
condition which is the necessary basis of capitalism, the fact that workers are
• free' to sell their labour on the open market. What this signifies is that lao
bour power is itself a commodity. which is bought and sold on the market.
Thus ltS value is determined like that of any other commodity. by the labour
lime socially necessary for its production. Human labour power involves the
expenditure of physical energy. which must be replenished. To renew the
energy expended in labour. the worker must be provided with the require-
ments of his existence as a functioning organism - food. clothing. and shelter
for himself and his family. The labour time socially necessary to produce the
necessities of life of the worker is the value of the worker's labour power. The
latter's value is. therefore. reducible to a specifiable quantity of commodities:
those which the worker requires to be able to subsist and reproduce. • The
worker exchanges with capital his labour itself ... he aliellates it. The price he
receives is the value of this alienation.' 1.1
The conditions of modem manufacturing and industrial production allow
the worker to produce considerably more, in an average working day. than is
necessary to cover the cost of his subsistence. Only a proportion of the work-
ingday. that is, needs to be expended to produce the equivalent of the worker's
own value. Whatever the worker produces over and above this is surplus
value. If. say, the length of the working day is ten hours. and if the worker pro-
duces the equivalent of his own value in half that time. then the remaining five
hours' work is surplus production. which may be appropriated by the capita-
list. Marx calls the ratio between necessary and surplus labour the' rate of
surplus value' or the' rate of exploitation '. The rate of surplus value. as with
all of Marx's concepts. has a social rather than a biological reference. The
labour time necessary to • produce labour power' cannot be defined in purely
physical terms. but has to be ascertained by reference to culturally expected
standards of living in a society. 'Climalic and physical conditions' have an

I~ This statement is only true given the simplified model Marx employs in volume 1 of
Capital; in the real world there is often considerable divergence between values and
prices.
14 Cap, vol. I. p. 166.
I .. Grn. pp. 27(}--1.
50 Part J: Marx
influence. but only in conjunction with' the conditions under which, and con-
sequently on the habits and degree of comfort in which. the class of ·free la-
bourers has been formed ' '6
Surplus value is the source of profit. Profit is. so to speak, the visible' sur-
face' manifestation of surplus value; it is • a converted form of surplus value.
a form in which its origin and the secret of its existence are observed and ex-
tinguished '.11 The analysis which Marx offers in the first volume of Capital
sets out to remove this disguise, and does not discuss the actual relationship
between surplus value and profit. which in the empirical world is a compli-
cated one. The amount the capitalist has to spend on hiring labour is only one
part of the capital outlay he has to make in the productive process. The other
part consists in the machinery, raw materials. maintenance of factory fittings.
etc.• necessary for production. That segment of capital laid out on such mat-
ters is 'constant capital " while that spent on wages is' variable capital '. Only
variable capital creates value; constant capital' does not. in the process of
production. undergo any quantitative alteration of value·. 18 In contrast to the
rate of surplus value. which is the ratio of surplus value to variable capital
(s/v). the rate of profit can only be calculated with reference to both variable
and constant capital. The ratio of constant to variable capital constitutes the
• organic composition' of capital; since the rate of profit depends upon the
organic composition of capital, it is lower than the rate of surplus value. The
rate of profit is given by the formula p=s/c+v: the lower the ratio of expen-
diture on constant capital to that on variable capital. the higher the rate of
profit. 11
In the third volume of Capital. Marx relates the simplified theory of surplus
value presented in volume I to actual prices. It is clear that, in the real world.
the organic composition of capital varies widely from industry to industry. In
some sectors of production. the amount of constant capital involved is far
higher in relation to variable capital than in other sectors: for example. an-
nual capital outlay on machinery and plant equipment in the iron and steel
industry is much greater than it is in the clothing industry. Following the sim-
plified model advanced in the first volume of Capital. this would lead to
widely divergent rates of surplus value. and if profit were directly correlative
to surplus value. would lead to marked variations in profits between different
sectors of the economy. But such a state of affairs. except on a short-term
basis. would be incompatible with the organisation of the capitalist economy
in which capital always tends to flow into those channels which offer the
highest levels of profit.

II Cap, vol. I, p. 171.

11 Cap. vol. 3. p. 47.
II Cap, vol. 1. p. 209.
11 Marx assumes here that no rent is being paid by the capitalist 10 a landlord. As Marx
puts it: • landed property is laken as =0: Marx moves on 10 the problem (\f ground-
reDI in the third volume of Capital.
 The theory of capitalist develQpment 51
Setting aside the assumptions made for analytic purposes in volume 1.
therefore. Marx concludes that commodities do not generally sell at their
values, but according to what he calls their • prices of production ',20 The total
amount of profit in the economy is determined by the amount of surplus value
created within it, but the share which each individual capitalist takes from
this total is not proportionate to the rate of surplus value realised within his
own enterprise, Capitalists share the total surplus value in proportion to their
capital invested. not in ratio to the organic composition of that capital. • Prices
of production '. in other words. the real prices of commodities, can be calcu-
lated on the basis of a division of the total social capital into the total surplus
value, The price of production is equal to the ' cost price '. or sum of expen-
diture actually incurred in production (the amount of constant capital used up
in producing a commodity. together with capital expended on wages), plus the
average rate of profit on the capital employed,
What are the influences which make commodities sell at their prices of
production, and not at their values? Marx devotes a substantial part of volume
3 of Capital to discussion of this problem. Before the advent of capitalism.
commodities do tend to sell at their values, but the competitive structure of
capitalism breaks this down. • Average profit' develops historically with the
development of capitalism itself. If one sector of production. having a higher
rate of variabl~ to constant capital, creates a very high rate of surplus value
and profit. then
... capital withdraws from spheres with low rates of profit and invades others
which yield a higher profit. By means of this incessant outflow and inflow, in
short, by its distribution among the various spheres in relation to a rise of the rate
of profit here. and its fall there. it brings about a ratio of supply to demand such
that the average profit in the various spheres of production becomes the same:
values are converted into prices of production. This equilibration is accomplished
by capital more or less perfectly to the degree that capitalist development is ad-
vanced in a certain nation: in other words. to the extent that conditions in the
respective countries are adapted to the capitalist mode of production.: 1
There are two conditions which facilitate this process: fluidity of capital.
and labour mobility. The first demands • complete freedom of trade in the in-
terior of society', and the eradication of feudal monopolistic privilege. It is
further stimulated by the development of the credit system. which serves to
concentrate capital instead of allowing it to remain in the hands of individual
capitalists. The second condition, involving mobility of labour, rests upon a
familiar set of circumstances: the • freeing' of labour from proprietory and
localised relations to the means of production, and the reduction of craft

20 It is upon the relationship between values and prices that most criticism of Marx's
economics has centred. cf Paul Sweezy: BiJhm-Bawerk's Criticism of Marx (New
York. 1949). Two recent discussions of Marx's economics are Murray Wolfson:
A RC'(/ppraisal 01 M(/rximl Ecorlomics (New York. 1964); anJ Fred M. GOllheil:
Marx's Ecorlomic PH'die/iurlS (Evanston, 19(j6).
21 Cap. vol. ~, p. 192; WI', vul. 25. p. 206.
52 Pari J: Marx

skills to unskilled work which allows workers to move from job to job with-
out difficulty. The development of the average rate of profit is thus intrinsi-
cally bound up with the economic structure of capitalist production.
Marx continues to stress that the theory of surplus value presented in the
first volume of Capital underlies the analysis given in volume 3. However
complicated the relationship between prices and value may be, the former
nevertheless rest upon the latter, and any increase or decrease in the total
surplus value will affect prices of production. Most of the subsequent criticism
of Marx's position offered by economists has centred upon the fact that pre-
diction of prices is extremely difficult u!iing Marx's theory, since the connec-
tion between values and prices is so convoluted. But it must be emphasised
that, from Marx's standpoint, such prediction is of secondary importance:
the whole weight of his theory is towards setting out the principles which
underlie the operation of the capitalist economy. Marx's analysis moves upon
the level of an attempt to undercut the influence which physical categories
such as prices, rents, or rates of interest have in the theory of political
economy, in order to expose the social relationships which lie at the root of
them. As he expresses it,
The social character of activity, the social form of the product, and of the parti-
cipation of the individual in production, appear as alienated, reified (sachlich) in
relation to the individual .. Universal exchange of actiyities and products, which
has become the condition of existence of, and the mutual connection between,
particular individuals. take the form of a thing, alienated from and independent
of themselves.22
Marx's theory of capitalist development is founded upon the nature of
capitalist expropriation as set out in the theory of surplus value. The general
tenor of Marx's argument is that, while capitalism is originally structured
around a free-market system in which commodities are allowed to ' find their
own values' on the basis of individual entrepreneurial initiative, the im-
manent tendency of capitalist production undermines the empirical condi-
tions upon which the capitalist economy is based.

The economic' contradictions' of capitalist production

In Marx's view, the search for profit is intrinsic to capitalism: 'the aim of
capital is not to minister to certain wants, but to produce profit. . .'.23 But at
the same time there is rooted in the capitalist economy a structural tendency
for the rate of profit to decline. Most of the classical economists accepted this
notion; Marx's contribution, as expressed in his formulation of the' law of
the falling tendency of the rate of profit " derives from the integration of this
theory with his analysis of the organic composition of capital, and the relation
of the larter to surplus value. The total amount of profit in the capitalist

," (;'11. p. 75. See helow. pp. 228-9.

23 Cap. vol. 3, p. 251.
 The theory of capitalist development 53
economy depends upon the surplus value created within it: the ratio of con-
stant to variable capital in the economy as a whole determines the average
rate of profit. The rate of profit thus stands in inverse proportion to the organic
composition of capital.
Since capitalism is founded upon the competitive search for profit, techno-
logical improvement, including above .all the increasing mechanisation of
production, is a major weapon of each capitalist in the battle for survival on
the market, whereby an individual entrepreneur can increase his share of the
available profit by producing at a cheaper rate than his competitors. But his
success in obtaining increased profits leads other capitalists to follow suit by
introducing similar technical improvements, thus producing a new (although
equally temporary) equilibrium where. however. each capitalist has a higher
ratio of capital expenditure on constant capital than before. Hence the over-
all consequence is a rise in the organic composition of capital. and a fall in
the average rate of profit.
Of course, this does not necessarily entail a decline in the absolute total of
profit in the economy; this may increase even though the rate of return falls.
Moreover, there are various factors which Marx distinguishes as countering
the tendency of the rate of profit to decline. These are those which either re-
tard the relative increase of constant capital or. what is the other side of the
coin, increase the rate of surplus value. A rise in expenditure on constant
capital frequently goes along with an increase in the productivity of labour,
which therefore effectively reduces tbe proportionate unit value of the coo-
stant capital, and thereby may keep the rate of profit stable or even raise it:
• with respect to the total capital, the value of the constant capital does not
increase in the same proportion as its material volume .. :.'4 Another mode
of offsetting the declining rate of profit is via the feeding in of cheap materials
through foreign trade, the result of which is to increase the rate of surplus
value if these are used to supply the subsistence needs of workers, and to
lower the value of constant capital. But Marx lays most stress upon those
countervailing forces to the falling rate of profit which involve the intensified
exploitation of labour. These include the expansion of the working-day. and
the depression of wages below their value. Other things being equal the
lengthening of the working-day, which was a definite empirical pheoomenon
during the early years of the nineteenth century, raises the rate of surplus
value. The productivity of labour relative to constant capital can also be aug-
mented. and the rate of surplus value increased, through making more inten-
sive use of existing machinery - by. for example, speeding up its operation.
or by utilising it for twenty-four hours a day through some kind of shift-work
system. Enforced depreciation of wages is normally only a temporary expe-
dient, and has no long-term effects upon the rate of profit. While employers
treat wages as part of their costs, and will tend to pare them whenever pos-

24 Cap, vol. 3, p. 230. d. also Sweezy: Theory of Capitalist Development, pp. 98ff.
54 Pari J: Marx

!>ible, it follows from Marx's general analysis that wages are basically deter-
mined by marked forces, not by coercive restrictions on the part of capitalists.
The periodic crises which regularly occur in capitalism are, for Marx, the
most evident manifestation of the internal 'contradictions' of the capitalist
system. Marx did not. however. write a systematic discussion of the nature of
crises. taking the view that crises are the end-result of various possible com-
binations of factors, and ar~ not to be explained in terms of any simple causa-
tive process. He makes no attempt to trace the multiple chains of causation
which actually precipitate crises: such a task could only be accomplished
against the background of the general movements of capitalist production. 23
Marx's analysis is thus limited to an account of the basic factors in the capi-
talist economy which underlie its propensity to regular crises.
Where commodity production exists in forms of society prior to capitalism.
particularly before the widespread use of money. it involves fairly direct bar-
tering between individuals or groups who were generally aware of each other's
needs, and who produced for those needs. In primitive forms of commodity
production. in other words. exchange is controlled in the interests of use-
values. and knowledge of wants furnishes a source of regulation connecting
supply and demand. But as commodity production becomes more and more
widespread, that is, as capitalism develops. this regulative tie is broken. The
use of money plays an important part in this, allowing the parties to exchange
transactions to act autonomously to a far greater degree than is possible in
barter. Capitalism is thus in an important sense an ' anarchic' system,26 be-
cause the market is not regulated by any definite agency relating production
to consumption. It is also an intrinskally expanding system. the basic motor
of which is the restless search for profit. Since the profit motive is dominant,
any state of affairs involving a pronounced imbalance between the volume of
commodities produced and their saleability at the average rate of profit, con-
stitutes a crisis for the system. Capitalism is the first system in human history
where a large volume of overproduction is possible. This is, of course, only
overproduction in terms of the requisites of the capitalist economy, overpro-
duction in terms of exchange-values and not use-values: the commodities
which are' unsaleable ' could normally be made use of. But whenever a suffi-
cient level of return on investment is not made, the modus operandi of capi-
talism is undermined. Production becomes restricted to a fraction of its
potential in spite of the fact that' not enough is produced to satisfy. in a
decent and humane fashion, the wants of the great mass '.2:
25 Theorit's 0/ Surplus Value, cd. Bonner & Burns, pp. 376-91.
26 This does not mean there is r;ot • order' in the operations of the market, but simply
that the principles which govern the market operate outside of men's own conscious
control. as if regulated by, in Adam Smith's famous phrase, • an invisible hand '.
21 Cap, vol. 3, p. 252; see also Marx's note on the • contradictions' between the worker's
position as producer, and his position as consumer. Cap, vol. 2, p. 316. Marx rejects
the more naive • underconsumptionist' theories of his day. See his remarks on
Rodbertus. cap. vol. 2, pp. 410-11.
 The theory of capitalist development SS
A crisis is simply an expansion of production beyond what the market can
absorb and still return an adequate rate of profit. Once overproduction occurs,
even only in one segment of the economy, it can set into motion a vicious circle
of reactions. As the rate of profit falls, investment declines, part of the labour
force has to be laid off, which further diminishes consumer purchasing power,
producing another decline in the rate of.profit, and so on. The spiral continues
until unemployment has increased to such a degree, and the wages of those
still in work has been forced down to such a level. that there exist new condi-
tions for the creation of an increased rate of surplus value, and thereby a
stimulus to the resumption of investment. During the crisis, some of the less
efficient enterprises will have gone out of business; those remaining can there-
fore take over their share of the market, and are in a position to begin a new
period of expansion. Thus the cycle is renewed, and another upward phase
gets under way.
Crises therefore do not represent a • break-down • of the capitalist system.
but on the contrary form the regulating mechanism which enables the system
to survive the periodic fluctuations to which capitalism is subject. The effect
of a crisis is to restore equilibrium. and make further growth possible. As
Marx expresses it, crises are' momentary and forcible solutions of the existing
contradictions. They are violent eruptions which for a time restore the dis-
turbed equilibrium.' 28 Since the tendency of the rate of profit to decline is
ever present, there is in any case a pressure upon profits at all stages of capi-
ta'list development. The effect of a crisis is to further the centralisation of
capital, temporarily consolidating the system. 2 ' Crises are endemic in capi-
talism, because while the whole impetus of capitalist production is towards
• an unconditioned development of the productive forces of society', the
relations of production, founded upon an exploitative class relationship, are
organised around the expansion of capital alone. Thus Marx reaches his
famous conclusion:
The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself. It is that capital and its
self-extension appear as the starting and closing point, as the motive and the pur-
pose of production; that production is merely production for capital, and not V«:e
versa, the means of production the means for a constant expansion of the Iife-
process of the society of producers. 30

The ' pauperisatioD ' thesis

It has sometimes been assumed that Marx conceives the final dissolution of
capitalism as taking the shape of an enormous crisis from which the system
cannQt recover. While Marx notes in The Communi.yt Manifesto that crises' in
their periodic recurrence ever more threateningly place the existence of the
Whole of bourgeois society in question " a final ruinous crisis is nowhere

21 Cap, vol. 3. p. 244.

2' Cap, vol. 2, pp. 75-7.
30 Cap, vol. 3, p. 245; We, vol. 25, p. 260.
S6 Part I: Marx
specifically predicted in his writings. 31 Moreover, such a prediction is difficult
to reconcile with the conception of the re-equilibrating function of crises.
While Marx certainly believed that capitalism could not perpetuate itself in-
definitely, the nature of its dissolution depends both upon the laws which
govern its development and upon specific historical circumstances which can-
not themselves be known beforehand. Crises do, however. play an important
role in fostering revolutionary consciousness, because they make dramatically
evident the common class situation of the proletariat, the more so because
they tend to occur as a sharp recession following a period of relative pros-
perity for the working class during which unemployment is low and wages
are high. 32
It is only rarely in the capitalist economy that conditions of near full em-
ployment prevail. The existence of a group of chronically unemployed, the
industrial • reserve army', is necessary to capitalism. Marx has shown that
it is an essential feature of capitalism that labour-power is itself a commodity;
but labour-power clearly differs from other commodities in that there is no
obvious factor which prevenls a wide divergence of its price from its value.
If the price of a commodity of the ordinary kind goes up, then capital will
tend to flow into the production of that commodity, and will bring it down
in the direction of its value. 33 But no one can • produce' more la'bour if its
price goes up. It is here that Marx introduces the concept of the reserve anny,
or as he sometimes calls it, the 'relative surplus population '. The industrial
reserve army, whose ranks are filled mainly by workers who become redun-
dant through mechanisation. acts as a constant depressant upon wages. Dur-
ing periods of prosperity. when the demand for labour increases, part of the
reserve army becomes absorbed into the labour force. and thus holds wages
down; in other times. it provides a potential source of cheap labour which
inhibits any attempt of the working class to improve their lot The reserve
army is • the lever of capitalistic accumulation " and is • a condition of exis-
tence of the capitalist mode of production '."
The analysis of the position of the reserve army of surplus labour is closely
related to Marx's discussion of the physical poverty in which a considerable
segment of the working cla,ss is condemned to exist in capitalism. Much con·
troversy has centred round the so-called • pauperisation ' or 'emiseration '
thesis. and this has formed the focus of many critical attacks upon Marx's
prognosis of the future of capitalism. u In analysing this question, there are

31 CM. p. 33; We. vol. 4. pp. 467-8. The nearest Marx comes to this is in Gru. p. 636.
32 Cap. vol. 2. p. 411.
33 This analysis, given in volume 1 of Capital. is in terms of the simplified model of

s.
35
value.
Cap, vol. I, p. 632.
It is an undeniable fact that living standards {or the great majority of the working
population have risen in the capitalist societies of western Europe and the USA
over the past one hundred years. There is a theoretical point here of some im·
portance, which bas been noted by various critics. According to Marx's own theory,
 The theory of capitalist development 57
tWO themes in Marx's discussion which have to be distinguished, and it is the
tenaency to assimilate these into a single 'prediction' concerning the living
standards of the working class which underlies the common misreading of
Marx on this matter. One of these themes concerns the theory that the course
of capitalist development is characterised by increasing relative disparily be-
tween the earnings of the working class and the income of the capitalist
class; the second is that the development of capitalism produces a Jarger and
larger reserve army, the majority of which are forced to live in extreme
poverty. These two trends are bound up with one another, since it is the
existence of the' relative surplus population' which prevents wages from ris-
ing far above their value. But the confusion of the two has led to the quite un-
warranted conclusion that Marx believed that the whole body of the working
class would increasingly become depressed into increasingly severe physical
poverty. Marx speaks of the ' increasing exploitation' of the worker as capi-
talism proceeds, but it is clear that the rate of eltploitation (rate of surplus
value) can increase without necessarily entailing any change in the rea! wages
of the majority of the working class." With regard to the increasing relative
disparity between the earnings of labour and capital, Marx's main thesis is
simply, jn accord with the general theory of surplus value advanced in Capi-
tal, that while the capitalist class accumulates more and more wealth, the
wages of the working class can never rise far above subsistence levePT What
Marx does specify as the consequences of capitalism for the working class as
a whole in Capital involves reference to the alienating effects of the division
of labour, which serve to • mutilate the worker into a fragment of a man, de-
grade him to the level of an appendage of a machine. destroy the content of
work by his agony, and alienate (entfremden) him from the spiritual potentia-
lities of the labour-process .. .'.31
It is, however, the increase in the' relative mass of the industrial reserve
army' which produces an extension of chronic pauperism; Marx calls this the
• absolute general law of capitalist accumulation " noting that' like all other
laws it is modified in its working by many circumstances '. Pauperism is the
• hospital of the active labour-army and the dead weight of the industrial re-

profits show a tendency to decline; now if it happens that the ratc of surplus value
remains the same, rising productivity must produce an increase in the real wages of
labour. Robinson argues: • Marx can only demonstrate a falling tendency in profits
by abandoning his argument that real wages tend to be constant,' Joan Robinson:
An Essay on Marxian Economics (London, 1966), p. 36.
3& If prOductivity increases. But see note 35, above.
37 Marx makes the point that, even under those conditions of rapid capitalist expansion
which are most favourable to the working class, increases in wages never do more
than parallel increased profits; thus even when standards of living of the working
class rise during a period of boom in the economy, those of the capitalist class rise
equally, maintaining the differential. SW, vol. I, pp. !l4-8.
31 Cap, vol. I, p. 645; We, vol. 23, p. 674.
58 Part 1: Marx
serve army'. 3' Most of the worst forms of material exploitation are concen-
trated in this latter group, among whom there develops an • accumulation of
misery, agony of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutality, moral degradation .. .'.•0
Thus the contrawctory character of capitalism manifests itself in the accumu-
lation of wealth' at one pole " and of poverty and misery at the other.

Concentration and ceDtralisatioo

The rising organic composition of capital which takes place as capitalism pro-
ceeds is intimately connected with a trend towards the centralisation and
concentration of capital. • Concentration' refers to the process whereby, as
capital accumulates, individual capitalists succeed in expanding the amount
of capital under their control. Centralisation. on the other hand. refers to the
merging of existing capitals, ' a change in the distribution of capital already
to hand '.u The effect of both is to lead to larger and larger productive
units. The competitive character of capitalism entails that producers must
constantly strive to undercut the prices of their rivals. Those capitalists con-
trolling the larger organisations enjoy various advantages over the small pro-
ducer which allow them. by and large, to triumph over the latter. The greater
the resources at the command of an individual entrepreneur, the more effi-
ciently he can produce, since he can introduce economies of scale, and can
more easily withstand set-backs such as those which follow from temporary
contractions of the market. Thus as a general rule. the larger units tend to
drive smaller ones out of business and to absorb their capital.
Centralisation is further promoted by the credit system, the most impor-
tant sector of which is banking. A bank both centralises the money-capital
of the lenders and also makes for centralisation of the borrowers, while the
banks themselves also tend to become linked to form a single financial system.
This whole process ' is finally transformed into an enormous social mecha-
nism for the centralisation of capitals ':\2 The expansion of the crewt system.
while forming' one of the most effective vehicles of crises and swindle' within
the capitalist system, at the same time removes the wstribution of capital from
the hands of individual capitalists. The credit system • does away with the
private character of capital and thus contains in itself, but only in itself, the
abolition of capital itself '. By introducing various forms of circulating credit
which serve instead of money, the banking system shows that' money is in
reality nothing but a particular expression of the social character of labour
and its products .. .'. As it exists, the credit system is itself a capitalistic enter-
prise, since it is organised on the basis of private profit. which comes from

39 Cap, vol. 1. p. 644. Capitalism' overworks a part of the labouring population and
keeps the other part as a reserve army, half or entirely pauperised '. Theories of
SlIrpllls Value. ed. Bonner & Bums, p. 352.
40 Cap, vol. 1. p. 645; We, vol. 23. p. 675.
41 Cap, vol. 1. p. 625 .
• , Cap. vol. 1. p. 626.
 The theory of capitalist development S9
interest levied on loans; but because it develops the ground for the centralised
co-ordination of the economy. the credit system' will serve as a powerful lever
during the transition from the capitalist mode of production to the mode of
production of associated labour.• : .•3
The expansion of the credit system goes hand in hand with a particular
fonn of centralisation of corporate capital: that represented in the develop-
ment of joint-stock companies. This is the type of industrial organisation, ac-
cording to Marx. which is most compatible with large-scale centralisation,
and it represents • the ultimate development of capitalist production '. The
joint-stock company, which serves to effect a separation between the in-
dividual capitalist and the productive organisation, represents' the abolition
of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production
itself '.u The separation between the owners of capital and the managers de-
monstrates the superfluousness of the former group, who now play no direct
part in the productive process. In the joint-stock company, the social charac-
ter of production has become apparent, and hence exposes as a • contradic-
tion' the fact that a few individuals are able, through their Own ownership of
capital, to appropriate much of the wealth that is produced. Nevertheless, the
joint-stock company is only a transitional fonn since, as it is still connected
with interest-bearing capital, it continues to be . ensnared in the boundaries
of capitalism '. Moreover, the development of very large companies of this
sort can lead to monopoly control of particular sectors of industry, creating a
basis for various kinds of new exploitative relationships.45
Capital shows in detail that, as in the case of the society which preceded it
in western European history, capitalism is an inherently unstable system.
built upon antagonisms than can only be resolved through changes which
eventually undermine it. These contradictions derive first of all from its class
character: from the asymmetrical relation!;hip between wage-labour and
capital. The operation of the capitalist mode of production inevitably drives
the system towards its dissolution. Here again Marx speaks of the Aufhebung
of capitalism; the historical tendency towards the' abolition' of the capitalist
mode of production must not be thought of as the wholesale destruction of
capitalism. so that socialism has to 'stllrt anew'. On the contrary, the immi-
nent trend of movement of the capitalist system generates the social condi-
tions which provide for its dialectical transcendence.
In these terms, the question of the' inevitability' of the revolution poses
no • epistemological' (as opposed to • practical,) problems. The process of

C3 The preceding four quolc"\lions arc all from Cap, vol. 3. p. S93.
44 Cap, vol. 3, p. 429.
U In the shape of • a new financial aristocracy, a new variety of parasites in the shape
of promoters. speculators and simply nominal directors; a whole system of swindling
lind cheating by means of corporation promotion, stock issuan.:e, and stock specula-
tion '. This is 'private production without the control of private property'. Cap.
vol. 3. p.429.
60 Part J: Marx
development of capitalism engenders the objective social changes which, in
inter-relationship with the growing class-awareness of the proletariat, creates
tbe active consciousness necessary to transform society through revolutionary
Praxis." The relative poverty of tbe mass of the working class, the physical
misery of the' reserve army'. and the rapid diminution in wages and upsurge
of unemployment which occur in crises. all provide a growing reservoir of
revolutionary potential. The industrial system itself provides a source of per-
ception of community of interest, and a basis for collective organisation. since
tbe factory concentrates large numbers of workers together in one place,
Workers' organisations begin on a local level. but eventually merge to form
national units. The self-consciousness of the proletariat expands progres-
sively along with the undermining of the position of the entrepreneurial capi-
talist by the centralisation and concentration of capital. The conjunction of
these circumstances makes possible the achievement of socialist society.
The whole corpus of Marx's writings contains no mOre than fragmentary
or passing references to the nature of the society which will supplant capita-
lism. In separating his own position from that of ' utopian' socialism, Marx
refuses to offer a comprehensive plan for the society of the future. The new
social order. as the dialectical transcendence of capitalism. will be organised
according to principles which can only be vaguely glimpsed by tbose who live
in the present form of society. The construction of detailed plans of the future
society is an enterprise which relapses into philosophical idealism, because
such schemes have no reality save in the mind of the thinker. Consequently,
most of what Marx does have to say about the new society concerns the stage
of its initial formation. in which it is ' still stamped with the birth marks of the
old society from whose womb it emerges '.4T

The transcendence of capitalism

The main sources from which insight into Marx's views on socialist society
may be derived. embrace two widely separated points in his career. The first
occurs in the 1844 ManuscriplS. the second in the' Critique of the Gotha Pro-
gramme', written in 1875. The terminology of the second is more direct
and down to earth, but in outline the views expressed in tbe two writings are
similar. 48 The first stage of socialism, Marx emphasises, is one in which the
latent characteristics of bourgeois society are made manifest: in other words.
in which the emergent properties of capitalism detailed in Capital are brought
to their fullest development. Thus the socialisation of production, already

46 See Georg Lukacs: Geschichre WId Klasullhe","sstsein (Berlin, 1932), pp. 229ff.
t' SW. vol. 2. p. 23.
4R cr. Avineri, pp. 22(}-39. However. it is a mistake to identify too closely, as Avineri
does. Marx's early di;cussioD of . crude communism' with the later treatment of the
transitional stage in the abolition of bourgeois society. Marx's discussion of the
transitional stage is prospective, whereas • crude communism' is identified in a
retrospective fashion as characteristic of the early stages of socialist theory. Crude
communism is not the theory of the transitional stage.
 The theory of capitalist development 61
implicit in capitalism in the shape of the growing centralisation of the market,
is completed by putting an end to private property. In this phase. property
becomes collectively owned. and wages are distributed according to a fixed
principle. Out of the total social product, certain amounts are allocated to
cover collective needs of the administration of production, the running of
schools, health facilities, and so on; while each worker
receives back from society - after the deductions have been made - exactly what
he gives to it ... He receives a certificate from society that he has furnished such
and such an amount of labour (after deducting from his labour for the common
funds), and with this certificate he draws from the social stock of means of con-
sumption as much as costs the same amount of labour.· 9
Such a social reorganisation, however, still preserves the underlying prin-
ciples of bourgeois society. since it continues to assess human relationships in
terms of an objective standard. In other words, it preserves the treatment of
labour as an exchange value, but instead of this being confined to a class
group (the proletariat), this now becomes universalised. At this stage, men
are still • regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in them, every-
thing else being ignored' ,n: • The role of worker is not abolished. but is ex-
tended to all men. The relation of private property remains the relation of
the community to the world of things.' 51 This stage preserves a society in
which the subject is dominated by the object, in which alienation is still con-
fused with objectification.
What is true of production also holds for the sphere of politics. Here again,
Marx's most important discussions span the whole length of his career: the
analysis given in the' Critique of the Gotha Programme' complements that
developed in the early critical evaluation of Hegel's treatment of the state.
That the substance of Marx's views is the same in both of these sources is
indicated by his attack upon the call for the • freeing of the basis of the State'
embodied in the Gotha Programme. Marx's criticism here takes the form of a
repetition of the main point made over thirty years earlier in relation to Hegel.
The state is already almost perfectly' free' in Germany, Marx points out:
the objective of the workers' movement must not be to • free' the state from
society, but on the contrary to convert the state' from an organ superimposed
upon society into one completely subordinate to it. . .'."2 However, the tran-
Sitionill phase following the initial abolition 0f capitalism will again involve
the full realisation of the principles only partially or imperfectly developed in
hourgeois society itself. The ' dictatorship of the proletariat' constitutes this
intermediate stage, and represents a concentration of the political power
Which already exists in a more diffuse manner in bourgeois society. This
makes possible the implementation of the programme of the centralisation of
Production and distribution outlined previously: 'The proletariat will use

~~ sw. vol. 2. 1'. 23. ~. SW. vol. 2. p. 24.

- EW. p. t53. ,., SW. V(ll. 2. p. 32.
62 ParI 1: Marx
its political domination to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie.
to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the
proletariat organised as the dominant class, and to increase the total of pro-
ductive forces as rapidly as possible.' U
'Political' power only disappears when this stage has been completed.
The abolition of the state, for Marx, does not, of course, involve a sudden' re-
versal' in social organisation whereby the concentrated form of the state
described above is subsequently eradicated. Rather, the dialectical transfor-
mation of the state is accomplished by the subordination of state to society
in such a way that the administration of public affairs is mediated through
the organisation of society as a whole. Marx discerns a framework for this
process in the optative structure of the Paris Commune. The relevant features
are several: the Commune was to be composed of councillors selected on the
basis of universal suffrage, and' was to be a working, not a parliamentary
body, executive and legislative at the same time '; police, judiciary and other
officials were similarly' to be elective, responsible, and revocable '.u Such a
form of social organisation is predicated upon the disappearance of the class
character of the state, which in turn makes possible the disappearance of the
state itself as an entity separate to civil society. It should be evident how far
removed this viewpoint is from anarchism, with which, quid pro quo. it is
frequently identified. In anarchist theory, the state as such is evil, and is to be
literally dismantled, since it expresses the coercive authority of some men over
others. Marx's attitude towards the state is integrated with his views upon
capitalist society generally; the bourgeois state, in spite of its coercive charac-
ter. is a necessary element in providing the social foundation for the realisa-
tion of the form of society which will transcend capitalism. Nor is Marx's
standpoint to be equated with the utilitarian theory of the state, according to
which the state has no function except for the regulation of economic con-
tracts. 55 According to Marx, such a conception simply perpetuates the' war
of all against all' in civil society. For him, the abolition of the state is only
one aspect of a broad, and extended, transformation of society.
The transitional phase of the new society, since it involves the universalisa-
tion of the inherent tendencies of bourgeois society, can be prospectively
described in at least some degree of detail. The same does not apply to the
society which has fully transcended capitalism, and consequently Marx only
sketches in broad strokes the characteristics of the second stage of commu-
nism. In ils transitional stage, the society which replaces the bourgeois form
is already a classless society, since private property is eliminated. But the rule
of material goods over human life as a whole, and thus the overcoming of
alienation. can only be achieved by the abolition of the division of hOOur as

,. eM, p. 160; We. vol. 4, p. 481.

H SW. vol. I, pp. 519-20.
•,:. d. lJurkhcim's treatment of this matter in Soc. pp. 52ft
 The theory of capitalist development 63
it exists in bourgeois society. The society of the future, Marx says in Capital,
will replace the worker of today • by the fully developed individual, fit for a
variety of labours '. aa This will overcome the various dualities which, accord-
ing to Marx, are the outcome of the differentiation entailed by the division of
labour: between town and country, and between intellectual and manual
labour. This is the background to the famous passage in The German
Ideology:
for as soon as the division of labour begins to come into being, each man has a
particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which
he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and
must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; while in com-
munist society, where nobody has one exclusive spbere of activity but each can
be accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production
and thus makes it possible for one to do one thing today and another tomorrow,
to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise
after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman,
shepherd or critic. 57
The predominantly agrarian occupations which Marx uses by means of
illustration appear to give this vision a wholly unrealistic connotation when
juxtaposed with the facts of industrial production. But Marx retains the
notion of the Aufhebung of the division of labour in all of his writings which
mention the future society, and, in fact, conceives this to be possible through
the expansion of mechanised production. Again, this represents a transposi-
tion of tendencies already extant in capitalism, in the shape of automated
production, which releases men from the present requisites of the division of
labour:
In proportion to the development of large-scale industry, the creation of real
wealth depends less upon labour-time and the quantity of labour expended than
upon the power of the technique employed during the la:bour-tiroe... Human
Ia:bour then no longer appears as circumscribed by the production process;
rather, man relates himself to this process merely as a supervisor and controller. 5~
The abolition of the division of labour is both the prerequisite to and the
expression of the transcendence of alienation. In socialist society, social re-
lationships are no longer held under the sway of the objects which are the
result of human creation. 19
In this most basic aspect as in others, socialist society is predicated upon
the historical development of capitalism. This vital aspect of Marx's thought
has often been obscured. The paeans which The Communist Manifesto offers

$6 Cap. vol. 1. p. 488.

57 GI, p. 45; We, vol. 3. p. 33.
$8 Gru, p. 592; cf. also Poverty of Philosophy, p. 121: 'What characterises the division
of labour in the automatic workshop is that labour has there completely lost its
specialised character. But the moment every special development stops, the need
for universality, the tendency towards an integral development of the individual
begins to be felt.' .. EW. p. 155.
64 Part J: Marx
to the bourgeoisie are well known: • It has accomplished wonders far surpas-
liing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts. and Gothic cathedrals.. .' eo The
point of this. however. is not the sheerly technological accomplishment of
capitalism: rather. the technological expansion of capitalism is symptomatic
of the' universal tendency' 61 of bourgeois society which distinguishes it from
all previous social formations. Bourgeois society replaces the relatively auto-
nomous local communities characteristic of prior types of society by a divi-
sion of labour which draws the disparate cultural and even national groupings
which formerly existed into the same social and economic system. At the
same time as it expands the range of human interdependence, the spread of
bourgeois society sweeps away the particular cultural myths and traditions
under which men have lived from the beginning of time. Ultimately. bour-
geois society brings the whole of mankind. for the first time in history. within
the purview of a single social order. and is genuinely' world-historical '.
But this is only achieved through the action of the market and the trans·
formation of all personal ties of dependence (such as existed in feudal bonds
of fea' .) into exchange-value. Seen in this light. it is easy to understand why
much of the controversy over the value-price problem between volumes 1 and
a of Capital is essentially irrelevant to the objectives of the work as a whole.
which are to document this metamorphosis of human relationships into
phenomena of the market. The analysis given in the three volumes of Capital
examines in detail the alienatiye effects of the progressive development of
capitalism. and shows how the universalisation of social relationships
achieved by bourgeois society is only accomplished by their transmutation
into class relationships: • The limitation of capital is that this whole develop-
ment takes place in a contradictory manner. and that the elaboration of the
productive forces. of universal wealth. science. etc.• appears as the alienation
of the individual worker from himself.. .' 62
Since its very core is founded upon an antagonistic relationship. between
capital and wage-labour. which by its very operation universalises the
worker only in a condition 0/ alienation. capitalism contains within it forces
which both propel it towards its own demise and prepare the way for its
transcendence.

&0 eM. p. 135.

61 Gru. pp. 438-41. A~ Mandel remarks: • The socialisation of production under tbe
capitalist system is the mo~t important aDd progressive effect of the generalisation
of the capitalist mode of production.' Ernest Mandel: Marxist Economic T/J~ory
(London. 1968), vol. I, p. t70.
12 Gflt. p. 440.
Part 2: Durkheim
-
5. Durkheim's early works
To move from Marx to Durkheim is not only to move from an earlier to a
later generation of social thinkers; it i~ also to effect a major change in
institutional context and intellectual tradition. Of the three writers discussed
in this book, Durkheim was the least directly involved on a personal level in
the great political events of his time: virtually all of his works are wholly
academic in character, and consequently are far less scattered - and less
propagandist - than many of those of Marx or Weber.' Moreover, the intel·
lectual influences which were most important in contributing to Durkheim's
theoretical outlook are more homogeneous and easy to specify than those
moulding the work of the other two authors.
The significant influences over Durkheim's mature intellectual position
come from within distinctly French intellectual traditions. The overlapping
interpretations which Saint-Simon and Comte offered of the decline of
feudalism and the emergence of the modem form of society constitute the
principal foundation for the whole of Durkheim's writings. Indeed, it could
be said that the main theme in Durkheim's life's work is concerned with the
reconciliation of Comte's conception of the • positive' stage of society with
Saint·Simon's partly variant exposition of the characteristics of ' industrial·
ism '. 2 Other inftuences from an earlier generation are those of Montesquieu
and Rousseau; to these, Durkheim conjoined the contemporary teachings of
Renouvier, and at the Ecole Normale where Durkheim studied from 1879 to
1882. those of his professors Boutroux and Fustel de Coulanges.3
Durkheim's earliest writings. however, were concerned with the ideas of a
groUP of contemporary German authors. There are some sorts of social theory
which, although as recent in formulation as those which are very familiar in

J This judgement cannot be made too sweepingly, however. Durkheim's important

article: 'L'lndividualisme et les intellectuels', Rel'ue bfeue, vol. 10, 1898. pp. 7-·13.
is directly related to the Dreyfus case. although it is hardly a wholly' polilical '
statement. During the First World War, Durkheim worked on the preparation of
various propaganda documents, including Qui a voulu fa guerre ?, with E. Denis
(Paris. 1915), and • L'Allemagne Qu·dessus de 10UI' (Paris, 1915).
2 cf. Alvin W. Gouldner: • Introduction' to Soc, pp. 13-18.
3 Further documentation of the sources of Durkheim's thought would be tedious and
irrelevant to this work. The inftuence of German and English authors is obviously
!lot completely absent. Renouvier mediated the interest which Durkheim maintained
In Kant; as is indicated below in the text, Durkheim was marginally influenced by
a number of contemporary Gennan authors; the English inOuence is evident in
Durkheim's early interest in Herbert SpeI:eer and later in the writings or the English
anthropologists (Frazer. Tylor and Robertson-Smith).

65
66 Part 2: Durkheim

modern-day sociology. have rapidly become almost completely forgotten.

One such type of theory is organicism. such as represented in the latter part
of the nineteenth century by writings of Fouillee and Worms in France. and
Schatfte and Lilitnfeld in Germany. The notion that society forms an inte-
grated unity which is in some sense comparable to that of a living organism
is. of course. one which can be traced back to classical social philosophy. But
the publication of Darwin's theory of biological evolution gave an entirely
new stimulus to the elaboration of organicist theories. 4 It is difficult from the
perspective of the modern age to recapture the extraordinary impact which
Darwin's writings had upon social thought in the concluding decades of the
nineteenth century. The century as a whole witnessed many considerable
advances in biology: the properties of the cell were identified through micro-
scopic analysis. and the thesis that all organisms are composed of combina-
tions of similar cellular structures became a firmly established principle. In
Darwin's work these notions are placed within the context of an empirically
grounded dynamic theory; and nothing was more guaranteed to fire the
imagination of his contemporaries than this powerful combination of positiv-
ism and a perspective of evolutionary progress. The writings of Schliffie and
the others thus differ considerably from those of their many precursors who
employed organic analogies. in that these later authors proceed from the
premise that the established laws governing the functioning and evolution of
animal organisms provide a model upon which 'the framework of a natural
science of society may be based.

Sociology and the • science of moral life '

Between 1885 and 1887. Durkheim published a number of critical discussions
of the work of Schliffie. Lilienfeld and other German social thinkers. Durk-
helm's review of Schatfte's Bau und Leben des Socialen Korpers was his first
publication, but it gives ample indication of the trend of Durkheim's early
thought.& Durkheim's discussion of Schliffie's book makes it plain that he is
sympathetic to some of the chief points of argument presented by that author.
One of Schaffle's most important contributions. according to Durkheim. is to
have outlined a useful morphological analysis of the principal structural
components of different forms of society. In achieving this. Schliffie makes
extensive use of organic analogies. comparing various parts of society to the
organs and tissues of the body. This is not, in Durkheim's view. an il1egitimate

~ The publication of The Origin of Species was also regarded by Marx and Engels a~
an event of major significance, offering a direct parallel to their own interpretation
of social development. Marx wrote to Darwin offering to dedicate the first volume of
Capital to him. (Darwin declined the offer.)
S Durkheim: review of Albert Schaff!e: Bau und Leben des Socialen Korpers (2nd.
ed.); (the review covers only vol. 1 (If Schiiff!e's work). RP, vol. 19, 1885, pp. 84-101.
ct. my article: • Durkheim as a review critic " Sociological Review, vol. 18, 1970.
pp. 171-96. which I have drawn upon for part of this chapter.
 Durkheim's early works 67
procedure, because SchafHe does not attempt in a direct sense to deduce the
properties of social organisation from those of organic life. On the CO:ltrary.
Scbidle insists that the use of biological concepts represents nothing more
than a • metaphor' which can facilitate sociological analysis.
In fact, Durkheim points out approvingly. SchafHe insists that there exists
a radical and highly significant discrepancy between the life of the organism
and that of society. Whereas the life of the animal organism is governed
'mechanically'. society is bound together' not by a material relation, but by
the ties of ideas '.' The notion of ' society as the ideal '. Durkheim stresses,
occupies a focal place in Schaffle's thought. and is entirely consistent with
the latter's emphasis that society has its own specific properties which are
separable from those of its individual members. For Schaffie, , Society is not
simply an aggregate of individuals, but is a being which has existed prior to
those who today compose it, and which will survive them; which influences
them more than they influence it, and which has its own life, consciousness
(ccmscience), its own interests and destiny '.7 Schaffle thus rejects the concep-
tion of the individual and society given primacy by Rousseau, in which the
hypothetical 'isolated individual' in a state of nature is freer and happier
than when bonded to society. On the contrary, everything that makes human
life higher than the level of animal existence is deri ved from the accumulated
cultural and technological wealth of society. If this be removed from man,
• then you will have removed at the same time. all that makes us truly
human'.'
The ideals and sentiments which constitute the cultural inheritance of the
members of a society are • impersonal " that is, they are socially evolved, and
are neither the product nor the property of any specific individuals. This is
easily shown by reference to the example of language: • each of us speaks a
language which he did not create '. t Schaffie shows, Durkheim continues, that
to treat the conscience collective as having properties which are not the same
as those of the individual consciousness does not imply anything meta-
physical. lo The conscience collective is simply' a composite, the elements of
which are individual minds'. 11
SchafHe's work, together with that of other German authors, according to
Durkheim. manifests the important advances being made in social thought in
Germany - a state of affairs contrasting heavily with the retarded develop-

, Review of Schiffie, p. 85. Quotations are from Durkheim. For Durkheim's views OD
the usefulness of organic analogies in sociology, see my article quoted above, pp.
179-80.
7 Review of Schaffie, p. 84. • Ibid. p. 87.
• Ibid. p. 87.
10 Ibid. pp. 99ft. I have followed the usual practice of leaving Durkbeim's phrase
conscience collective un translated. There is a definite ambiguity in the term which
overlaps with both the English words, • consciousness' and • conscience '.
11 Review of SchafHe. p. 92. Durkheim nevertheless criticises Schaffie for sometimes
relapsing into idealism.
68 Part 2: Durkheim
ment of sociology in France .• Thus sociology. which is French by origin, is
becoming more and more a German science.' 12
In his long survey of • positive moral science' in Germany. published in
1887. Durkheim reiterates some of these points. 13 But the main concern of
this article is to examine the contributions which leading German authors
have made towards founding a science of moral life. 14 In France. Durkheim
asserts. only two broad forms of ethical theory are known - Kantian idealism
on the one hand. and utilitarianism on the other. The recent works of the
German social thinkers. however. have begun to establish - or rather, to
re-establish, since some of their notions were previously stated by Comte -
ethics on a scientific footing. This approach. Durkheim states, has been
worked out primarily by economists and jurists, among whom the most
important are Wagner and Schmoller. 15 The work of these two authors, as
Durkheim describes it, differs considerably from that of orthodox economists.
Orthodox economic theory is built upon individualistic utilitarianism, and is
ahistorical: • In other words, the major laws of economics would be exactly
the same even if neither nations nor states had existed in the world: they
suppose only the presence of individuals who exchange their products.' 16
But Wagner and Schmoller depart substantially from this standpoint. For
them (as for Scbaffle), society is a unity having its own specific characteristics
which cannot be inferred from those of its individual members. It is false to
suppose 'that a whole is equal to the sum of itS parts t: in so far as these
parts are organised in a definite fashion, then this organisation of relationships
has properties of its own. 17 This principle has to be applied also to the moral

12 Durkheim: review of Ludwig Gumplowicz: Grundriss der Sozioiogie, RP, vol. 20,
1885, p. 627.
U • La science positive de la morale en Allemagne', RP, vd!. 24, 1887, pp. 33··58,
113-42 & 275-84. cf. also' Les etude.; de science sociale', RP, vol. 22, 1886, pp.
61-80.
14 Durkheim usually employs the term • la morale' which is ambiguous in English in
that it can mean either' morality' or • ethics' (i.e. the study of morality). I have
rendered the term variably according to context in quoting from Durkheim.
IS This establishes one of the few points of direct connection between the writings of
Durkheim and Max Weber. Adolf Wagrier and Gustav Schmoller were among the
founders of the Yerein fur Sozialpolitik. of which Weber became a prominent
member. But Weber never accepted that aspect of .the views of Wagner and
SchmoUer which appealed most to Durkheim - their attempt to found a • scientific'
ethics. Weber also questioned the policy of state intervention in the economy, as
advocated by Schmoller in particular.
IS • Science positive de la morale', part I, p. 37.
17 This principle was already well known to Durkheim, through Renouvier. Durkheim
applies it frequently in his writings. As he remarks in a review published much later,
• it is from Renouvier that we took the axiom that a whole is not equal to the sum
of its parts' (Review of Simon Dcploige: Le confl;, de la mQraie et de IQ socioiogie.
AS, vol. 12, 1909-]2, p. 326). Deploigc's work is a scathing attack upon Durkheim's
school from a ThomiSl standpoint. It has been translated into English as Tilt
Conflict between Ethics and Sociology (St Louis. 1938); see esp, pp. IS-18S. Some
of the more important reviews written by Durkheim in the AS have been collected
together as Journal .mciologique (Paris, 1969).
 Durkheim's early works 69
rules which men live by in society: morality is a collective property and
l11ust be studied as such. In the theory of orthodox political economy. on the
other hand. ' the collective interest is only a form of personal interest " and
, altrUism is merely a concealed egoism'.18
Schmoller has shown, Durkheim states, that economic phenomena cannot
be adequately studied in the manner of classical economic theory, as if these
were separate from the moral norms and beliefs which govern the life of
individuals in society. There is no society (nor could there conceivably be a
society) where economic relationships are not subject to customary and legal
regulation. That is to say, as Durkheim was later to express the matter in
The Division of Labour, 'a contract is not sufficient unto itself '.IQ If it were
not for the existence of social norms which provide the framework within
which contracts are made, then 'incoherent chaos' would reign in the
economic world. 20 The regulations which control economic life cannot be
explained purely in economic terms: 'One can understand nothing of the
rules of morality which govern property, contract, work, etc., if one does not
know the economic causes which underlie them; and, conversely, one would
arrive at a completely false notion of economic development if one neglected
the moral causes which influenced it.' 21
It is a major achievement of the German thinkers to have shown that moral
rules and actions can and must be studied scientifically, as properties of social
organisation. Here Durkheim sets out a precept which was to form a main
connecting thread of his subsequent writings. Up to the present, philosophers
have assumed that ethics can be based upon a deductive system of abstract
principles. But the work of the German authors has shown that it is funda-
mentally mistaken to proceed in this way, as if human social life could be
reduced to a few intellectually formulated maxims. Rather, we must begin
with reality. which means the study of concrete forms of moral rules com-
prised within definite societies. Here Durkheim again quotes Schlif6.e appre-
ciatively: it is precisely Schaffie's major achievement to have shown that
moral rules are shaped by society. under the pressure of collective needs.
There can be no question. therefore. of assuming that such rules, as they
really operate empirically, can be reduced to a few a priori principles of
which all specific beliefs and actions are merely an expression. Moral facts
are actually • of prodigious complexity': the empirical study of different
Societies shows that there exists a ' steadily increasing multitude of beliefs,
Customs and legal provisions '.22 This diversity is not refractory to analysis;
but only the sociologist, through observation and description, can hope to
classify and to interpret it.
Durkheim devotes a large part of his article on the German thinkers to

\I • Science positive de la morale '. part I, p. 38. t9 DL, p. 215.

20 • Science positive de la morale', pan I, p. 40.
21 Ibid. p. 41!' 22 Ibid. part 3, p. 276.
70 Part 2: Durkheim
analysing Wundt's Ethik, regarding this work as one of the most significant
fruits of the perspectives outlined above. One of WundCs primary contribu-
tions which Durkheim singles out, is to have shown the basic significance of
religious institutions in society. Wundt has shown that primitive religions
contain two sorts of interrelated phenomena: a set of • metaphysical specula-
tions on the nature and order of things' on the one hand, and rules of conduct
and moral discipline on the other. 23 Moreover, through providing ideals to
be striven for, religion is a force making for social unity. Durkheim accepts
this as a general postulate: these ideals may vary between different societies,
• but one can be confident that there have never been men who have com-
pletely lacked an ideal, however humble it may be; for this corresponds to a
need which is deeply rooted in our nature I.U In primitive societies, religion
is a strong source of altruism: religious beliefs and practices have the effect
• of restraining egoism. of inclining man towards sacrifice and disinterested-
ness '. Religious sentiments • attach man to something other than himself, and
make him dependent upon superior powers which symbolise the ideal '.25
Individualism, Wundt has shown. is a product of social development: • far
from individuality being the primitive fact. and society the derived fact. the
first only slowly emerges from the second.' 26
One of Durkheim's criticisms of Wundt is that the latter does not fully
perceive the dual character of the regulative effect of religious and other
moral rules. All moral actions, Durkheim says. have two sides: the positive
attraction. the attraction to an ideal or set of ideals, is one side. But moral
rules also have characteristics of obligation or constraint, since the pursuit
of moral ends is not always inevitably founded upon the positive valence of
ideals. Both aspects of moral rules are essential to their functioning.

Durkheim's concerns in ' The Division of Labour '

Durkheim's early discussions of the works of the German social thinkers
indicate that several of his characteristic views were established at the very
outset of his career.27 It is difficult to assess precisely how far Durkheim was

2S Ibid. part 2, pp. 116-17. Weber's critical discussion of Wundt appears in GAW,
pp.521f.
24 Ibid. p. 117.
25 Ibid. p. 120.
26 Ibid. p. 129. For another source of information upon Durkheim's earlr views on
religion, ct. his review of Guyau's L'irreligion de I'avenir, RP, vol. 23. IS87, pp.
299-311.
21 It is important to emphasise this point, because most secondary interpreters ha\e
concentrated heavily upon the changes which are presumed to have occurred in
Durkheim's thought over the course of his writings. The most influential analysis of
this sort is given in Talcott Parsons: The Structure of Social Actioll (Glencoe. 1949),
pp. 301-450. For a recent, more simplified statement of the same position, see Jean
Duvignaud: Durklzeim, sa vie, son oeuvre (Paris, 1965), pp. 39-50. A similar theme
is reiterated by Nisbet: Robert A. Nisbet: Emile Dllrkheim (Englewood Cliffs.
1965), esp. p. 37. The effect of this is to minimise the importance of Tire Dj~·jsioll of
 Durkheim's early works 71

directly influenced by their writings, and how far alternatively these simply
reinforced conclusions which he had already reached from other sources. The
lauer is the most lik~ly. When criticised, much later on in his life, for having
, imported his ideas wholesale from Germany', Durkheim bluntly denied the
assertion, stating that the influence of Comte was much more profound, and
formed the position from which he evaluated the contributions of the German
authors. 2I The important point is that Durkheim's discussions in the early
writings show that he was conscious, at the outset of his career, of notions
which sometimes have been supposed to have appeared only much later."
Of course, these are only stated in a rudimentary way, or have to be inferred
from Durkheirn's presentation of the views of others. But they include a
consciousness of the following elements: the importance of 'ideals' and
moral unity in the continuity of society 30; the significance of the individual
as an active agent as well as a passive recipient of social influences 31; the
dual nature of the attachment of the individual to society, as involving both
obligation and positive commitment to ideals; the conception that an organ-
isation of units (i.e., individuals as the units of organised societies) has
properties which cannot be directly inferred from the characteristics of the
component units considered in isolation from one another; the essential
foundations of what was to become the theory of anomie u; and the rudiments
of the later theory of religion.
It is important to bear these considerations in mind when evaluating the

LobolU in relation to Durkheim's later writings, and thereby to make Durkheim

appear as much more of a 'conservative' theorist than is actuaUy the case. d. my
• Durkheim as a review critic', pp. 188-91.
21 Review of Deploige, p. 326. It should be remembered, however, that Durkheim's
comments were written in the shadow of the imminent World War. For an earlier
exchange of critical letters between Durkheim and Deploige, see the Revue MO-
o scolaslique, vol. 14, 1907, pp. 606-21.
.9 See esp. Parsons, pp. 303-7; also Alessandro Pizzomo: 'Lecture actueUe de Durk-
heim " Archives europiennes de sociologie, vol. 4,1963, pp. 3-4.
30 In reviewing Tonnies' Gemeinschajl und Gesellsch4/t, Durkheim makes the point
that, when primitive society is replaced by more modem forms, the moral basis of
unity does not whoUy disappear. Tonnies assumes, according to Durkheim, that in
Gesellschaft all 'collective life resulting from internal spontaneity' has been lost.
But we must recognise, Durkheim states, that the differentiated type of social order
has not ceased to be a society: that is, it preserves a collective unity and identity.
. RP, vol. 27, 1889, p. 421.
'" This emerges clearly in Durkheim's discussion of Gumplowicz's Grundriss der
S01.iologie (RP, vol. 20, 1885, pp. 627-34), where Durkheim says, in criticism of
Gumplowicz's • objectivism " that' we are at the same time actors and acted upon,
and each of us contributes to forming this irresistible current which sweeps him
along' (p. 632).
32 d. Durkheim's early article on suicide, where the point is made that, contrary to the
thesis of the utilitarians, there is no direct and universal relationship between
Increasing prosperity and the advance of human happiness. If the effect of satisfying
wants is simply to stimulate further wants, then the disparity between desires and
their satisfaction may become actually broadened .• Suicide et natalit~. 6tude de
statistique morale ',RP. vol. 26, 1888, pp. 446-7.
72 ParI 2: Durkheim
content of The Division of lAbour (1893), which is a highly polemical work.
Durkheim concentrates his critical attack in such a way that certain of the
underlying themes of the work tend to become obscured. One main arm of
the polemic in the book is directed against the utilitarian individualism of the
political economists and English philosophers. 33 But there is also another,
rather less evident. critical objective in the book. This concerns the stream of
thought deriving from Comte, and adopted by such authors as Schame, which
stresses the salience of strongly defined moral consensus to the perpetuation
of social order. 3• Durkheim accepts this as appropriate to the analysis of
traditional types of society. But the main proposition developed in The
Division of lAbour is that modem complex society is not, in spite of the
declining significance of traditional moral beliefs, inevitably tending towards
disintegration. Instead. the • normal' state of the differentiated division of
labour is one of organic stability. This does not mean, however (as Durkheim
considers ToDDies's analysis in Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft to imply), that
the integrating effect of the specialised division of labour can be satisfactorily
interpreted in the mode of utilitarianism. as the result of multifarious indi-
vidual contracts. On the contrary. the existence of contract presupposes
norms which are not themselves the outcome of contractual ties, but which
constitute general moral commitments without which the formation of such
ties could not proceed in an orderly fashion. The • cult of the individual " a
notion which Durkbeim takes over from Renouvier - basic consensual beliefs
concerning the dignity and worth of the human individual, such as were
formulated by the philosophes of the eighteenth century and underlay the
French Revolution - is the counterpart to the individualisation produced by
the expansion of the division of labour, and is the main moral support upon
which it rests. 35
The standpoint from which Durkheim approaches his subject-matter in
The Division of Labour is identical to that set out in his discussions of the
German social thinkers. • This book', Durkheim states at the outset, • is above
all an attempt to treat the facts of moral life according to the method of the
positive sciences.' U Such a method has to be clearly separated from that of
ethical philosophy: the moral philosophers begin either from some a priori
postulate about the essential characteristics of human nature, or from propo-
sitions taken from psychology. and thence proceed by a process of logica I
deduction to work out a scheme of ethics. Durkheim sets out, on the other
hand. not to • extract ethics from science, but to establish a science of morality.
which is quite different '.31 Moral rules develop in society, and are integrally

U It is this which is given sole prominence by Parsons; see pp. 308-17.

34 cf. Gouldner, pp. 28-9.
35 DL, pp. 399-402.
31 DL, p. 32. DTS, p. xxxvii. See 1. A. Barnes: • Durkheim's Division 01 Labour ill
Society', Man (New Series), vol. 1, 1966, pp. 158ff.
31 DL, p. 32; DTS, p. xxxvii.
 Durkheim's early works 73
bound up with the conditions of social life pertaining in a given time and
place. The science of moral phenomena thus sets out to analyse how cbang-
ing forms of society effect transformations in the character of moral norms.
and to ' observe. describe and classify' these.
The main substantive problem which is at the root of Durkheim's concem
in The Division 01 Labour stems from an apparent moral ambiguity concern-
ing the relationship between the individual and society in the contemporary
world. On the one hand, the development of the modem form of society is
associated with the expansion of 'individualism '. This is a phenomenon
clearly associated with the growth of the division of labour, which produces
specialisation of occupational function. and therefore fosters the development
of specific talents. capacities and attitudes which are not shared by everyone
in society. but are possessed only by particular groups. It is not difficult,
Durkheim states. to show that there are strong currents of moral ideals in
the present age which express the viewpoint that the individual personality
should be developed according to the specific qualities which the person
has. and hence that not everyone should receive a uniform education. 38 On
the other hand, there are other contradictory moral trends which are also
strong. and which praise the • universally developed individual '. ' In a general
way, the precept (maxime) which commands us to specialise appears every-
where to be contradicted by the precept which commands us all to follow
the same ideal.' 31
An understanding of sources of these apparently contradictory moral ideals.
according to Durkheim. can be achieved only through a historical and sociolo-
gical analysis of the causes and effects of the expansion of the division of
labour. The division of labour. Durkbeim points out. is not wholly a modem
phenomenon; but in the more traditional sorts of society. it is rudimentary.
and usually confined to a sexual division. A high degree of specialisation in
the division of labour is particularly consequent upon modem industrial pro-
duction. It is fallacious, however. to suppose. as many economists are prone
to do, that it is only in the strictly 'economic' sphere that the division of
labour is becoming more diversified. or that this diversification is the result of
industrialism alone. The same process can be observed in all sectors of con-
temporary societies - in government. law. science and the arts. In all of these
areas of social life, specialisation is becoming increasingly evident. This can
be illustrated by the example of science: whereas once there existed a general
discipline of 'philosophy' which took as its subject-matter the whole of
natural and social reality. it has long since become split into numerous
separate disciplines.
The increase in social differentiation which is characteristic of the process

31 Durkheim quotes Secretant: • To perfect oneself is to leam one's role, to become

capable of fulfilling one's function .. .' DL, pp. 42-3.
39 DL, p. 44; DTS, p. 6.
74 Part 2: Durkheim
of development from traditional to modem forms of society can be compared
to certain biological principles. In the evolutionary scale, the first organisms
to appear are simple in structure; but these cede place to organisms which
show a higher degree of internal functional specialisation: • the more
specialised the functions of the organism, the higher its level on the evolu-
tionary scale '.'0 This is paralleled in Durkheim's analysis of the development
of the division of labour and its relationship to the moral order. In order to
analyse the significance of differentiation in the division of labour, we have
to compare and contrast the principles according to which the less developed
societies are organised with those which govern the organisation of the
• advanced • societies.
This entails attempting to measure changes in the nature of social solid-
arity.41 Since social solidarity is, according to Durkheim - as in the case of
every moral phenomenon - not directly measurable, it follows that in order
to chart the changing form of moral solidarity • we must substitute for the
internal fact which escapes us an external index (jait exrerieur) which
symbolises it '.42 Such an index can be found in legal codes. Whenever a
stable form of social life exists, moral rules eventually come to be codified
in the shape of laws. While on occasion there may be conflict between
customary modes of behaviour and law. this is. according to Durkheim,
exceptional. and occurs only when law • no longer corresponds to the state of
existing society. but maintains itself, without reason for so doing. by the
force of habit '.'1
A legal precept can be defined as a rule of conduct which is sanctioned; and
sanctions can be divided into two major types. • Repressive' sanctions are
characteristic of penal law. and consist in the imposition of some kind of
suffering upon the individual as a punishment for his transgression. Such
sanctions include the deprivation of liberty. the inflicting of pain, loss of
honour, etc. • Restitutive' sanctions, on the other hand, involve restoration,
the re-establishment of relationships as they were before the law was violated.
Thus if one man claims damages from another. the object of the legal process
is to recompense the claimant, if his claim is upheld, for some sort of loss
which he has incurred as an individual. There is little or no social disgrace
attaching to the individual who loses a case of this sort. This is typical of
most areas of civil, commercial and constitutional law.
Repressive law is characteristic of that sort of transgression which is a
• crime '. A crime is an act which violates sentiments which are • universally
approved of' by the members of society. The diffuse moral basis of penal
law is evidenced by its generalised character. In the case of restitutive law.

40 DL. p. 41; DTS, p. 3.

41 See J. E. S. Hayward: • SoJidarist syndicalism: Durkheim and Duguit " Soci%gic(Ji
Review, vol. 8, 1960, parts I & 2, pp. 17-36 and 185-202.
'2 DL, p. 64.
" DL, p. 65.
 Durkheim's early works 75
both sides of the legal commitment are typically precisely defined - both the
obligation, and the penalty for transgression.
Penal Jaw, on the contrary. sets forth only sanctions. but says nothing of the
obligations to which they correspond. It does not command respect for the life
of another, but kills the assassin. It does not say to begin with, as does civil
law: here is the duty; but rather, here is the punishment."
The reason why the nature of the moral obligation does not have to be
specified in repressive law, Durkheim says, is evident: because everyone
knows of it and accepts it.
The predominance of penal law within the juridical system of a given
society thus necessarily presupposes the existence of a strongly defined
conscience collective, of beliefs and sentiments shared in common by the
members of the society. Punishment consists above all in an emotive response
to a transgression. This is shown by the fact that it is nOl always confined to
tho guilty: often those who are themselves entirely innocent. but closely
connected to the guilty party - such as relatives or friends - also suffer,
because they are • tainted • by their association with the culpable agent.
Especially in primitive societies. punishment tends to have a blind, reflexive
character; but the principle underlying penal law remains the same in the
more developed types of society. In contemporary societies, the rationale
which is frequently offered for the continuance of repressive sanctions con-
ceives of punishment only as a deterrent. But if this were really so, Durkheim
argues. the law would not punish according to the gravity of the crime itself,
but in relation to the strength of the motivation of the criminal to commit
the crime. • Robbers are as strongly inclined to rob as murderers are to
murder ... ; but murder is nevertheless subject to more severe sanctions than
robbery.' (5 Punishment thus retains its expiatory character (as regards the
perpetrator of the criminal act), and remains an act of vengeance (on the part
of society). • What we avenge. what the criminal expiates, is the outrage to
morality.' 4G
The primary function of punishment, therefore. is to protect and reaffirm
the conscience collective in the face of acts which question its sanctity. In the
simpler societies, there is a unitary religious system which is the prime em-
bOdiment of the common beliefs and sentiments of the conscience collective.
Religion • comprises all, extends to all " and contains an intermingled set of
beliefs and practices regulating not only strictly religious phenomena, but also

.~ DL. p. 75; DTS. p. 41.

'. DL. p. 89. Durkheim makes an important qualification. however. to tbe main trend
of his argument. There are moral sentiments which, in certain societies. are as
deeply rooted as those punished under pEnal law - Durkbeim gives the example of
filial piety. Thus it is not a wholly sufficient condition for the existence of' crime'
that collective sentiments should be stroDg; • they must also be precise ..• relative to a
very definite practice ... peDal laws are remarkable for their neatness and precision.
While purely moral rules are generally somewhat nebulous' (p. 79).
.. DL. p. 89.
76 Pari 2: Durkheim
• ethics, law, the principles of political organisation, and even science... .' &7
All penal law is originally contained within a religious framework; conversely,
in the most primitive forms of society all law is repressive. u
Societies in which the principal bonds of cohesion are based upon' mech-
anical solidarity' have an aggregate or segmental structure: that is, they
consist of juxtaposed politico-familial groups (clan groups) which are very
similar to each other in their internal organisation. The tribe as a whole forms
a • society' because it is a cultural unity: because the members of the various
clan groups all adhere to the same set of common beliefs and sentiments.
Thus any part of such a society can break away without much loss to the
others - rather in the same way as simple biological organisms can split up
into several bodies which are nonetheless unitary and self-sufficient. In
primitive, segmental societies, property is communal, a phenomenon which is
only one specific aspect of the low level of individualisation generally. Since.
in mechanical solidarity, the society is dominated by the existence of a
strongly formed set of sentiments and beliefs shared by all members of the
community, it follows that there is little scope for differentiation between
indiViduals; each individual is a microcosm of the whole. • Property is in fact
simply the extension of the person over things. Thus wherevt:r the collective
personality is the only one which exists, property itself can be nothing other
than collective.' n

The growth of orgauic solidarity

The progressive displacement of repressive by restitutive law is an historical
trend which is correlated with the degree of development of a society: the
higher the level of social development, the greater the relative proportion of
restitutive laws within the juridical structure. };!o;,!! the fundamental element
found in repressive law - the conception of ex~hltion through punishment -
is absent in restitutive law. The form of social solidarity indexed by the
existence of the latter type of law consequently must be distinct from that
expressed by penal law. The very existence of restitutive law, in fact, pre-
supposes the prevalence of a differentiated division of labour, since it covers
the rights of individuals either over private property, or over other individuals
who are in a different social position from themselves.

4' DL, p. 135; DTS, p. 105. &8 DL, p. 138.

&, DL, p. 179; DTS, pp. 154-5. Durkheim stresses, in a subsequent publication, that
the development of the state is not necessarily parallel to the level of general
evolution of a given society. A relatively primitive society may have a fairly highly
developed state. Durkheim's analysis here is similar to Marx's discussion of • oriental
despotism'. Durkheim says that in such societies: • the right of property which the
community exercises over things in an undivided way passes intact into the superior
personality who finds himself thus constituted' (DL, p. 180). This issue is analysed
in detail by Durkheim, and linked up with variations in intensity and quality of
penat sanctions, in • Deux lois de l'evolution penale', AS, vol. 4, 1899-1900, pp.
65-95.
 Durkheim's early works 77
society presents a different aspect in each case. In the first [mechanical solidarity]
what we call by that name is a more or less o~anjsed totality of beliefs and senti-
Ql!LntU<Q.mmon to all. !lt~_ m~bers ~f the group: it is the collective type. On the
other hand, the society which we are bounCfiO [donI nous somme.!" solidaires] in
the second case is a system of ,mf~~Ha_ted and special functions united in definite
~bim.sO

This second type of social cohesion is' organic solidarity'. Here solidarity
sIems not simply from acceptance of a common set of beliefs and sentimcnts,
but from functional interdependence in the division of labour. Where
mechanical solidarity is~ main basis of societal cohesion, the conscience
conective 'completely e~elops , the individual consciousness, and therefore
presumes identity between individuals. Organic solidarity. by contrast. pre-
supposes not identity but difference between individuals in their beliefs and
actions. The growth of organic solidarity and the expansion of the division of
labour are hence associated with increasing individualism.
The progression of organic solidarity is necessarily dependent upon the
declining significance of the conscience collective. But commonly held beliefs
and sentiments do not disappear~ogether in complex societ~e~~nor isjt--the,
case that the formation of contrlc1ttal relations becomes amoral and simply
the result of each individual following' his best interest '. Here Durkheim
reverts to the theme previously developed in his first writings. and applied
specifically in criticism of Tonnies' conception of Gesellschaft. Herbert
Spencer is Durkheim's target for critical attack in The Division of LAbour.
but the substance of his polemic is the same. A society in which each indi-
vidual solely pursues his own interest would disintegrate within a short space
of time. 'There is nothing less constant than interest. Today, it unites me to
you; tomorrow, it will make me your enemy.' n It is true, Durkheim admits.
that contractual relations generally multiply with the growth of the division
of labour. But the expansion of contractual relations presupposes the develop-
ment of norms which govern contract; all contracts are regulated by definite
prescriptions. However complex the division of labour. society does not
become reduced to a chaos of short-term contractual alliances. Durkheim here
reiterates the point first made in reference to Tonnies: 'It is thus mistaken to
oppose a society which derives from a community of beliefs to one based on
co-operation. according a moral character only to the first and seeing in the
~econd nothing more than an economic grouping. In reality. co-operation has
lls own intrinsic morality.' 52
Utilitarian theory is unable to account for the basis of moral solidarity in
contemporary societies; and it is also fal1acious as a theory of the causes for
the increase in the division of labour. In the latter form, it attributes the
increase in specialisation to the increase in material wealth which is made

'•0 D/.. p. 129; DTS, p. 99. My parenthesis.

'2
I DL • p.204.
DL. p. 228; DTS, p. 208.
78 Part 2: Durkheim
possible through diversification and exchange. According to this conception.
the more production increases, the more men's needs are met, and the greater
lhe increase in human happiness. Durkheim puts forward various arguments
against this position. The most important one. however. is that the thesis is
simply fallacious on the empirical level. While it is true that there are a variety
of pleasures open to modem man which were previously unknown. these are
more than counterbalanced by sources of suffering which do not exist in
previous forms of society. 53 The high incidence of suicide in contemporary
societies is indicative of this. Melancholy suicide is almost wholly absent in
the less developed societies; its importance in contemporary societies makes
manifest that societal differentiation does not inevitably produce an increase
in the general level of happiness."
The explanation for the growth of the division of labour thus has to be
sought elsewhere. We know that the development of the division of labour
goes hand in hand with the disintegration of the segmental type of social
structure. For this to occur, relationships must have formed where none
previously existed. bringing erstwhile separate groups into contact. The
differing modes of life and belief of such societies, once they are brought into
contact with each other. breaks down the isolated homogeneity of each group.
and stimulates economic and cultural exchange. Division of labour thus
increases 'as there are more individuals sufficiently in contact to be able to
act and react upon one-another '.51 Durkheim calls the frequency of such
contact moral or • dynamic' density. The growth of diversified contacts
between individuals obviously must derive from some sort of continuous
physical relationships. In other words, the growth of dynamic density is
mainly contingent upon an increase in the physical density of population. We
can then formulate the general proposition that: 'The division of labour
varies in direct ratio with the volume and density of societies, and. if it pro-
gresses in a continuous manner in the course of social development. it is
because societies become regularly denser and generally greater in volume.' 56
It has often been suggested that the interpretation offered by Durkheirn
here marks a relapse from the principle stated in The Rules of Sociological
Method, that social phenomena must not be explained reductively. Durkheirn
himself seems to have felt uneasy about this point, and later amended some-

53 Here Durkheim repeats the point made in his earlier article on suicide. See footnoU~
32, p. 71.
U DL, p. 249. In primitive societies•• a man kills himself, not because he judges life
bad, but because the ideal to which he is attached demands the sacrifice' (p. 246).
This is, of course, the type which Durkheim later calls altruistic suicide.
JIJI DL, p. 257.
61 DL. p. 262; DTS. p. 244. Durkheim admits that there are partial exceptions to this:
c.g.• traditional China or Russia. Here' the division of labour is not developed in
proportion to the social volume. In fact, increase in volume is Dot necessarily a
sign of superiority if density does not increase at the same time and in the same
degree .. .' (DL. p. 261; DTS. p. 243).
 Durkheim's early works 79
what his original assessment of the relation between physical and dynamic
density.1f But, in fact, it is clear in his statement of it in The Division 01
Labour, that the explanation Durkheim offers is a sociological one: physical
density is important only in so far as it becomes transformed into moral or
dynamiC density, and it is the frequency of social contact which is the
explanatory factor. A more convincing case could be made for the supposition
tbat Durkheim employs a ' biological' explanation in the mode in which he
seeks to analyse conflict as a mechanism, within a quasi-Darwinian frame-
work, which accelerates the progression of the division of labour. Darwin and
other biologists have demonstrated, according to Durkheim, that the struggle
for existence is most acute between organisms of the same type. The existence
of such conflict tends to generate complementary specialisation, such that
organisms can exist side by side without the one hampering the survival of
the other. Differentiation of function allows diverse types of organism to
survive. A similar principle, Durkheim concludes, can be applied to human
society:
Men submit to the same law. In tbe same city, different occupations can co-exist
without being obliged mutuaUy to destroy one another, for they pursue different
objects. The soldier seeks military glory, the priest moral authority, the statesman
power, the businessman riches, the scholar scientific renown.5I

IadMduaIism and anomie

Having set out both a functional and causal analysis of the division of labour,
Durkheim is now in a position to answer the questions which formed the
original stimulus to his work. We can be certain that the differentiation of
the division of labour inevitably produces a decline in the pervasiveness of the
conscience collective in society. The growth of individualism is an inevitable
concomitant of the expansion of the division of labour: and individualism
can only progress at the expense of the strength of common beliefs and
sentiments. Thus the conscience aolleclive • comes increasingly to be made up
of highly generalised and indeterminate modes of thOUght and sentiment.
which leave room open for an increasing multitude of individual differ-
ences '.61 Modem societies do not thereby collapse into disorder. as would
follow from the standpoint of those who assume that a strongly defined moral
consensus is requisite to social cohesion. In fact. in contemporary societies.
this form of cohesion (mechanical solidarity) is increasingly supplanted by a
new type of social cohesion (organic solidarity). But the functioning of
orsanic solidarity canDot be interpreted in the manner of utilitarian theory;
COD temporary society is still a moral order. There is, indeed. one area where
the conscience collective becomes • strengthened and made more precise':

s: See RSM, p. liS.

sa DL. p.267.
II DL, p. 172; DTS. pp. 146-7.
80 ParI 2.' Durkheim
in relation to the • cult of the individual '.10 The growth of the • cult of the
individual' is only possible because of the secularisation of most sectors cf
social life. It contrasts with the traditional forms of conscience collective in
that. while it consists of common beliefs and sentiments. these focus upon the
worth and dignity of the individual rather than of the collectivity. The • cult
of the individual' is the moral counterpart to the growth of the division of
labour. but is quite distinct in content from the traditional forms of moral
community. and cannot in itself provide the sole basis of solidarity in con-
temporary societies.
It is certainly what might be called a common faith; but, firstly. it is only made
possible by the ruin of the others. and consequently cannot produce the same
etIects as this multitude of extinguished beliefs. Nothing compensates for that.
Moreover, if it is common insofar as it is shared by the community, it is individual
in its object. 11
At this point, Durkheim's analysis runs into an obvious difficulty. If the
growth of the division of labour is not inevitably associated with disruption in
social cohesion. what explains the conflicts which are such an evident feature
of the modern economic world? Durkheim recognises that burgeoning chss
conflict between capital and wage.labour has accompanied the expansion of
the division of labour ensuing from industrialisation. It is. however. fallacious
to suppose that this conflict results directly from the division of labour. It is.
in reality. consequent upon the fact that the division of economic functions
bas temporarily outstripped the development of appropriate moral regulation.
The division of labour does not everywhere produce cohesion because it is in
an anomie state. 62 That is. the relationship between capital and wage.labour
really does approximate to the condition considered ethically ideal in utili-
tarian theory - where there is little or no regulation upon the formation of
contracts. Wbat this leads to, however. is a chronic state of class conflict. In
lieu of the requisite moral regulation. the formation of contractual relations
ten(ls to be determined by the imposition of coercive power. Durkheim calls
this the' forced division of labour' (La division du travail contrainte). While
tbe functioning of organic solidarity entails the existence of normative rules
wbich regularise the relationships between different occupations. this cannot
be achieved-if tbese rules are unilaterally imposed by one class upon another.
These conflicts can be obviated only if the division of labour is co-ordinated
with the distribution of talents and capacities. and if the higher occupational
positions are not monopolised by a privileged class. • If one class of society is
obliged. in order to live, to take any price for its services, while another can
abstain from such action thanks to resources at its disposal which. however.

~o DL. p. 172.
&I DL. p. 172; DTS. p. 147.
62 Durkheim seems to have adopted the term . anomie' from Guyau (see note 26.
p. 70). Guyau. however. uses the term • religious anomie' in a sense close to
Durkheim's • cult of the individual '.
 Durkheim's early works 81
are not necessarily due to any social superiority, the second has an unjust
advantage over the first at law.' 13
The present situation. in which this does still pertain, is a transitional one.
The progressive decline of inequality of opportunity (' external inequality')
is a definite historical tendency which accompanies the growth of the division
of labour. According to Durkheim. it is easy to see why this should be so. In
primitive society, where solidarity is based primarily upon community of
belief and sentiment, there is neither the means nor the need for the equalisa-
tion of talent and opportunity. But the individualising effects of the division
of labour mean that specific human faculties which previously remained
latent increasingly become capable of actualisation. and thus create a pressure
towards individual self-fulfilment:
we may thus say that the division of labour produces solidarity only if it is spon-
taneous and to the degree that it is spontaneous. But by spontaneity we must
understand not simply the absence of express and overt violence, but of anything
that might, even indirectly, shackle the free employment of the social force that
each person carries in himself. This not only supposes that individuals are not
relegated to particular functions by force, but also that no sort of obstacle what-
soever prevents them from occupying in the social framework the position which
accords with their capacities."

I~ DL, p. 384. For further discussion of Durkhejm's \·jews on this question. see below,
I Pp.229-31.
C DL, p. 377; DTS, p. 370.
6. Durkheim's conception of sociological method

The notions developed in The Division of LAbour constitute the foundations

of Durkheim's sociology. and the bulk of Durkheim's subsequent writings
represent elaborations of the themes originally set out in that work. This is
most obviously true of Durkheim's two major publications prior to the tum
of the century: The Rules of Sociological Method (1895) and Suicide (1897).
In The Rules. Durkheim explicates the methodological suppositions already
applied in The Division of Labour. While the subject-matter of Suicide
appears at first sight to be utterly different from The Division of Labour. the
themes of the former actually mesh very closely with the latter. both within
the context of Durkheim's own thought, and within the framework of
nineteenth-century writing upon questions of social ethics more generally.
Since the end of the eighteenth century. the study of suicide was used by a
variety of writers as a specific problem in terms of which general mora)
issues could be analysed. Durkheim's analysis in Suicide is based upon the
work of such authors. but also takes as its point of departure some of the
general conclusions concerning the moral order of different forms of society
established in The Division of Labour.

The problem 01 suicide

Durkheim's interest in suicide. and acquaintance with the large extant litera-
ture on the subject. was established some while prior to 1897. In 1888 he
already writes: 'it is quite certain that a consistent increase in suicides always
attests to a serious upheaval in the organic conditions of society '.1 The
attempt to document. through the precise analysis of a specific phenomenon.
the nature of this moral lacuna in contemporary societies is perhaps the most
basic of Durkheim's concerns in Suicide. But to this must be added a metho-
dological objective: the application of sociological method to the explanation
of what might prima facie appear to be a wholly' individual' phenomenon.
A basic standpoint set out by numerous previous writers on suicide. and
one which Durkheim adopts. is that a strict analytical separation must be
drawn between the explanation of the distribution of suicide rates. and the
aetiology of individual cases of suicide. Nineteenth-century statisticians pre·
viously showed that the rate of suicide for a society typically shows a stable
distribution from year to year. interspersed with specifically identifiable
periodic fluctuations. The patterns of suicide rates. they concluded, must

1 • Suicide et nataJit~, ~tude de statistique morale', p. 447.

82
 Durkheim's conception of sociological method 83
depend upon stably distributed phenomena of a geographical. biological. or
social kind. a In Suicide. Durkheim discusses these first two in some detail.
rejecting both as possible explanations for the distribution of suicide rates. 3
It is. therefore. to the third type of factor. the social. that we must look to
explain the patterns of suicide rates.
The distribution of suicide in the countries of western Europe shows a
close relationship between suicide rates and religious denomination: pre-
dominantly Catholic countries everywhere have lower suicide rates than those
which are mainly Protestant. This consistent differential in suicide rates
cannQt be explained by referent:e to variation in the degree to which suicide
is condemned in the credo of the two denominations; both prohibit suicide
with equal stringency. Its explanation must be sought in differences rooted
more generically in the social organisation of the two churches. The most
obvious dissimilarity between the two, according to Durkheim, is that Pro-
testantism is founded upon the promotion of a spirit of free enquiry. The
Catholic church is formed around the traditional hierarchy of the priesthood.
whose authority is binding in matters of religious dogma; but the Protestant
is alone before God: 'like the worshippers, the priest has no other source
but himself. and his conscience '." Protestantism is, in Durkheim's phrase. a
, less strongly integrated' church than Catholicism.
The inference can be drawn from this thai there is nothing specifically
bound up with religion as such which needs to be invoked to explain the
'preservative effect of Catholicism; in other words. that the degree of
t

integration in other sectors of society is related to suicide rdtes in a com-

parable way. Durkheim finds that this is in fact so. Unmarried individuals
generally show higher rates of suicide than married persons of comparable
age. and there is an inverse relation between suicide and size of the conjugal
unit - the greater the number of children in the family. the lower the suicide
rate. This parallels the case of the relationship between suicide and religious
denomination. supplying in this instance a measure of the relationship
between suicide and degree of integration in family structure. A similar
relationship between suicide rates and level of social integration can be
demonstrated in another quite different institutional context Suicide rates
decline in times of national political crisis, and in times of war: in the latter
case. not merely among those in the armed forces. but also among the civilian
POpulation of both sexes. S The reason is that political crises and wars. by

2 Virtually all of the statistical relationships between suicide and social phenomena
used by Durkheim in Suicide had been established by previous writen. See my
article, • The suicide problem in French sociology'. British Journal of Sociology.
vol. 16,1965. pp. 3-18. a Su, pp. 57-142.
c Suo pp. 160-1. Anglicanism. Durkheim &dmits, is a panial exception to this; but
England has a lower rate than the other Protestant countries.
~ ]n none of these cases. according to Durkheim. can the drop in suicide rates be
attributed to less precise official documentation of suicide in war-time (Su, pp. 206-8).
84 Part 2: Durklleim
stimulating an increased level of involvement within a definite set of events,
, at least for a time. bring about a stronger integration of society'.'
There is, consequently, a relationship between social integration and suicide
which holds regardless of the particular institutional sector of society which
is analysed: the proposition is established that 'suicide varies in inverse
ratio to the degree of integration of the social groups of which the individual
forms a part '.' Thus this type of suicide may be called' egoistic', and it is
the resultant of a state where' the individual self asserts itself to excess in the
face of the social self and at its expense .. :.- Egoistic suicide is particularly
characteristic of contemporary societies; but it is not the only type of suicide
found there. A second type of suicide springs from the phenomenon which
Durkheim discusses at some length in The Division of Labour: the anomie
state of moral deregulation characterising economic relationships. This is
indexed by the correlation which can be demonstrated between suicide rates
and the occupational structure. Suicide rates, Durkheim points out. are higher
in occupations in industry and commerce than in agricultural occupations.
Moreover, within non-agricultural occupations, suicide rates are inversely
related to socio-economic level, being lowest among the chronically poor, and
highest among the well-to-do and those in the liberal professions. This is
because poverty is in itself a source of moral restraint: it is the occupations
above the lowest levels which have become most freed from stable moral
regulation. The relationship between anomie and suicide can also be demon-
strated in reference to another phenomenon which Durkheim discusses in
The Division of Labour as an outcome of the anomic state of industry: the
occurrence of economic crises. In times of economic depression, suicide rates
show a marked increase. This is not explicable simply in terms of the eco-
nomic deprivation involved, since suicide rates increase to equivalent degree
in times of marked economic prosperity. What both upward and downward
fluctuations in the economic cycle share in common is that each has a dis-
ruptive effect upon accustomed modes of life. Those experiencing either a
sudden downswing or uplift in their material circumstances are placed in a
situation in which their habitual expectations come under strain. An anomie
condition of moral deregulation results.
Anomie is thus, like egoism, ' a constant and specific factor in suicide in
our modem societies; it is one of the sources upon which the annual con-
tingent is nourished '.' Durkheim's discussion of the differences between
egoistic and anomie suicide is not always unambiguous, and this has caused

6 Suo p. 208; LS. p. 222.

1 Suo p. 209; LS. p. 223.
• Suo p. 209: LS, p. 223.
t Suo p. 258; LS. p. 288. For a development of these ideas. considered in relation to
psychological theory. see my • A typology of suicide t, Archives europlennes de
mcio/cogie, vol. 7. 1966. pp. 276-95.
 Durkheim's conception 0/ sociological method 85
some commentators to suppose that the two types in fact cannot, from the
substance of Durkheim's analysis, be meaningfully distinguished. lo Careful
reading of Durkheim's account against the broader backdrop of The Division
0/ Labour. however, makes this position difficult to maintain. Egoistic suicide
is clearly linked by Durkheim to the growth of the • cult of the individual'
in contemporary societies. Protestantism is the religious forerunner and
primary source of modem moral individualism, which has in other areas of
social life become wholly secularised. I I Egoistic suicide is thus an offshoot
of the growth of the • cult of the personality'. Where' man is a God 10 man-
kind', a certain growth in egoism is unavoidable: • Individualism is un-
doubtedly not necessarily egoism, but it comes close to it; the one cannot be
stimulated without further spreading the other. Thus, egoistic suicide
arises.' 12 Anomie suicide, on the other hand, derives from the lack of moral
regulation particularly characteristic of major sectors of modem industry.
In so far as anomie is, according to Durkheim, a • pathological' phenomenon,
then anomie suicide is also pathological, and therefore not an inevitable
characteristic of contemporary societies.'3 EgOistic and anomie suicide arc
nevertheless closely related to one another, especially on the level of the
individual suicide. • It is, indeed, almost inevitable that the egoist should
have some tendency to deregulation: for, since he is detached from society,
it has not sufficient hold upon him to regulate him.' 14
Suicide in traditional societies takes a different form to the egoistic and
anomie types: this is directly traceable to the characteristics of social organi.
sation, specified in The Division 0/ Labour. whereby such societies differ
from the modem form. In one category of suicides found in traditional
societies. it is a duty for an individual, when placed in certain circumstances,
to kill himself. A person kills himself because he has an obligation to do so.
This is • obligatory a1truistil: suicide'. There are other sorts of altruistic
suicide which do not involve a definite obligation, but where suicide is
associated with the furtherance of definite codes of honour and prestige
(' optional' [jaculatif] allruistic suicide). Both kinds of altruistic suicide,
however, rest upon the er.istence of 3 strong conscience collective, which so
dominates the actions of the individual that he will sacrifice his liCe in
furtherance of a collective value.

10 Barclay Johnson: • Durkheim's one cause of suicide '. American Soc:i%llit'oi

Review, vol. 30,1965. pp. 87H6.
11 Durkheim makes this point explicit in his neglected but important work L'elloimiol!
pidagogique en France (Paris, 1969).
I~ SIl, p. 364; LS, p. 4]6.
13 Durltheim holds that a certain minimal level of anomie is a necessary element in
~ocieties which are committed to progressive change.• Every morality of improve-
ment, and progress thus presuppose~ a certain level of anomie: Suo p. 364; LS.
p.417.
14 Su, p. 288; LS, p. 3:!5.
86 Part 2: Durkheim
, Extemality , and 'coastraiDt'
The ideas presented in Suicide constitute a particularly forceful testimony to
the fruitfulness of Durkheim's conception of sociological method. Durkheim
expresses the fundamental standpoint underlying Suicide as follows:
At any given moment the moral constitution of society establishes the contingent
of voluntary deaths. There is, therefore, for each people a collective force of a
definite amount of energy, impelling men to self-destruction. The victim's acts
which at first seem to express only his personal temperament are really the supple-
ment and prolongation of a social condition which they express externally.15
This does not mean, Durkheim goes on to add, that psychology is irrelevant
to the explanation of suicide: the proper contribution of the psychologist is
to study the particular motives and circumstances which drive specific
individuals, when placed in the relevant social circumstances (e.g., in a con-
dition of anomie) to commit suicide. While Durkheim's methodological
views are set out most systematically in The Rules of Sociological Method,
he regards the approach documented in the work as stemming directly from
the substantive studies represented by The Division of Labour and Suicide.
'The method which we have described is simply a summary of our
practice.' 11
A primary theme of The Rules is that the nature of the subject-matter of
sociology must be clarified, and its field of investigation delimited. Durkheim
repeatedly emphasises in his writings that sociology remains largely a
, philosophical' discipline. consistiUg of a heterogeneous assortment of a11-
embracing generalisations which rest more upon logical derivation from
a priori precepts than upon systematic empirical study. Sociology, Durkheim
remarks in the beginning of Suicide, • is still in the stage of system-building
and philosophical syntheses. Instead of attempting to cast light upon a limited
portion of the social field. it prefers brilliant generalities .... 11 The discipline
is evidently in some way concerned with the study of man in society: but the
category of tJ1e • social ' is often employed in a very loose fashion. What are
the specific characteristics of the class of phenomena which may be delimited
as • social' and thereby separated from other categories such as the 'bio-
logical' and • psychological '1 11
Durkheim's attempt to define the specificity of the social is based upon the
use of the famous criteria of • exteriority' and • constraint' (contrainte). In
spite of the variety of differing interpretations which have been placed upon
Durkheim's argument at this point. the substance of Durkheim's position

15 Su, p. 299.
11 • La sociologie en France au XIXe si~c1e', Revue bleue, vol. 13, 1900, p. 649.
Durkheim also says in The Rules that the method stated therein is • of course,
contained by implication in the book which we published recently on The Division
of Labour '. RSM, p. ix.
]7 Su, p. 35.
II Parsons has pointed to an epistemological confusion involved in Durkheim's use
of the phrase social' fact' 35 equivalent t(l social' phenomenon' (Parsons, pp. 41-2).
 Durkheim's conception 0/ sociological method 87
here can be elucidated without difficulty. There are two related senses in
which social facts are • external' to the individual. Firstly, every man is born
into an on-going society which already has a definite organisation or struc-
ture, and which conditions his own personality: • the church-member finds
the beliefs and practices of his religious life ready-made at birth; their
existence prior to his own implies their existence outside of himself '.11
Secondly, social facts are • external' to the individual in the sense that any
one individual is only a single element within the totality of relationships
which constitutes a society. These relationships are not the creation of any
single individual, but are constituted of multiple interactions between indi-
viduals. • The system of signs I use to express my thought, the system of
currency I employ to pay my debts, the instruments of credit I utilise in my
commercial relations, the practices followed in my profession, etc., function
independently of my own use of them.' 20 It has often been pointed out that
Durkheim uses the term • individual' here in more than one sense. At times
the context makes it apparent that he is speaking of the (hypothetical)
'isolated individual', the asocial being which forms the starting-point of
utilitarian theory; at other times, Durkheim uses the word to refer to a given
'particular' individual- a flesh-and-blood member of an empirical society.21
But. in fact, for Durkheim's purposes, which are in part polemical, the
distinctions which may be drawn between the various senses of the term
'individual' are not important. The main burden of Durkheim's thesis is that
no theory or analysis which begins from the • individual " either in the two
senses mentioned above or in others, can successfully grasp the specific
properties of social phenomena.
Durkheim's point here, in other words, is a conceptual one. It is true that
this is to some extent obscured by Durkheim's insistence upon talking of
social' facts '; but it should be obvious that the criterion of ' exteriority , is
not an empirical one. If it were, it would lead directly to the ludicrous con-
clusion that society exists externally to all individuals: this is, Durkheim
says, • an obvious absurdity we might have been spared having attributed to
us ',22 Durkheim stresses many times that' society is composed only of
individuals '.21 But a parallel statement can be made of the relationship
between chemical elements and the substances which are composed of com-
binations of them:
What is so readily judged inadmissible in regard to social facts is freely admitted
in the other realms of nature. Whenever any elements combine and thereby pro-

19 RSM, p. 2. 20 RSM, p. 2.
21 d. Harry Alpert: Emile Durkheim and his Sociolog)' (New York, 1939), pp.
135-7; Parsons. pp. 367-8; Guy Aimard: Dllrkheim ella science konomique (paris.
1962). pp. 26-31.
22 Su, p. 320.
23 That is, individuals plus the artifacts which they construct; but physical objects only
have social relevance when there are men in society who attribute some kind of
significance 10 Ihem. RSM. pp. Iff.
88 ParI 2: Durkheim
duce, by the fact of their combination, new phenomena, it is plain that these new
phenomena reside not in the original elements but 'in the totality formed by their
union. The living cell contains nothing but mineral particles, as sooiety contains
nothing but individuals; and yet it is patently impossible for the phenomena
characteristic of life to reside in the atoms of hydrogen. oxygen. carbon and nit-
rogen ... Let us apply this principle to sociology. If, as we may say, this synthesis
sui generis which every society constitutes, yields new phenomena. diJfecing from
those which take place in individual minds, we must, indeed, admit that these
facts reside in the very society itself which produces them, and not in its parts, i.e.,
its members.24
The second criterion which Durkheim applies in specifying the nature of
social facts is an empirical one: the presence of moral.' constraint '. Here it
is best to proceed from an illustration which Durkheim himself offers, the
case of 'fatherhood '. Paternity is in one sense a biological relation: a man
, fathers' a child through the act of procreation. But paternity is also a social
phenomenon: a father is obliged, by convention and law, to act in various
definite ways vis-a-vis his offspring (and. of course, other members of his
family also). These modes of action are not created by the individual in
question, but form part of a system of moral duties in which he is enmeshed
with other men. While an individual might flout such obligations, in doing
so he feels their force and thereby confirms their constraining character:
, Even when I free myself from these rules and violate them successfully, I am
always compelled to struggle with them. When finally overcome, they make
their constraining power sufficiently· felt by the resistance they offer.' 25 This
is, of course, most obvious in the case of legal obligations, which are sanc-
tioned by a whole apparatus of coercive agencies: the police, the law courts,
etc. But a large variety of other sanctions exist which reinforce adherence to
obligations not expressed in law.
Durkheim frequently reiterates, however, that conformity to obligations
rarely rests upon fear of the sanctions which are applied against contraven-
tion. In most circumstances individuals accept the legitimacy of the obliga-
tion, and thus do not consciously feel its constraining character: 'when I
conform to them whole-heartedly, this constraint (coercilion) is felt only
slightly. if at all, since it is unnecessary. But it is, nonetheless, an intrinsic
characteristic of these facts, the proof thereof being that it asserts itself as
soon as I attempt to resist it.' 28 Durkheim's emphasis upon the importance
of constraint is evidently directed primarily against utilitarianism. But moral
obligation always has two aspects, the other being the acceptance of an ideal
(however partial that acceptance may be) underlying it. Durkheim later
remarked that he had consistently been misunderstood on this point:

'4 RSM, pp. xlvii-xlviii; RMS. pp. xvi-xvii .

• ;; RSM, p. 3. In applying this criterion. Durkheim moves what Weber calls· usage' -
behaviour which is habitual, but not nonnatively condoned or condemned - to the
borderline of socioiogy. thus actually reaching a rather similar conclusion to Weber.
cf. below, pp. 153-4. 28 RSM. p. 2; RMS. p. 4.
 Durkheim's conception 0/ sociological method 89
Since we have made constraint the outward sign by which social facts can be most
easily recognised and distinguished from the facts of individual psychology, it has
been assumed that according to our opinion. physical constraint is essential to
social life. In reality, we have never seen in it any more than the material and
evident expression of an internal and deep·rooted fact which is wholly ideal: tbis
is moral authority.27

'I1ae logic: of explaaatory generalisation

In the preface to the second edition of The Rules. Durkbeim takes up objec·
lions which were made to what became perbaps the most renowned proposi·
tion contained in the book: 'consider social facts as things '.21 This is
obviously a methodological postulate ratber than an ontological one. and
has to be understood in terms of the conception of the mode of development
of science which Durkheim takes over from Comte. All of the sciences. before
they emerge as disciplines which are conceptually precise and empirically
rigorous, are collections of crudely formed and highly generalised notions
originally grounded in religion: •... thOUght and reftection are prior to
science, which merely uses them methodically.' But these notions are never
tested in any systematic fashion; • facts intervene only secondarily as examples
or confirmatory proofs'. 2t lbis prescientific stage is broken through by the
introduction of empirical method, not by conceptual discussion alone. This
is perhaps even more important in social than in natural science. since here
the subject-matter relates to human activity itself, and consequently there is
a strong tendency to treat social phenomena as either lacking in substantive
reality (as creations of the individual will) or, on the contrary, as already
wholly known: thus words such as 'democracy', 'communism'. etc.• are
freely used as if they denoted precisely known facts. whereas the truth is that
, they awaken in us nothing but confused ideas, a tangle of vague impressions.
prejudices and emotions '. ~o The proposition that social facts must be treated
as • things' is advanced as a counter to these tendencies. Durkheim thus
assimilates social facts to the world of natural reality only in that, like objects
in nature, their properties cannot be immediately known by direct intuition.
and they are not plastic to the individual human will. • Indeed. the most
important characteristic of a " thing " is the impossibility of its modification
by a simple effort of the will. Not that the thing is refractory to all modifica·
tion, but a mere act of the will is insufficient to produce a change in it ... We
have already seen that social facts have this characteristic.' n
The maintenance of tbe principle of treating social facts as things. of
object-ivity. demands rigorous detachment on the part of the jnvestigator of
social reality. This does not mean that he should approach a given field of
study with a completely • open mind '. but rather that be must adopt an

21 EF, p. 239; FE. p. 298 (footnote). cf. Raymond Aron: Main Cunenls in Sociolo6ical
Thoug'" (London, 1967), vol. 2, pp. 63-4.
21 RSM. p. 14. ~. RSM. pp. 14-15.
30 RSM. p. 22. 31 MM, pp. 28-9.
90 Part 2: Durkheim

emotionally neutral attitude toward.. what he sets out to investigate. 32 This

in tum depends upon the establishment of precisely formulated concepts
which avoid the confused and shifting terminology of popular thought. It is
evident, however, that at the outset of research we are likely to have little
systematically derived knowledge of the phenomenon in question: thus we
must proceed by conceptualising our subject-matter in terms of those proper-
ties which are 'external enough to be immediately perceived '.33 In The
Division of Labour, for example. Durkheim seeks to delimit what constitutes
crime in terms of the • external characteristic' of the existence of punitive
sanctions; a crime is any action which evokes punishment. But this is a
means of elaborating a more satisfactory concept of crime: that it is an act
which contravenes collectively-held beliefs and sentiments. 3 • This approach
might be criticised as giving undue significance to the superficial attributes of
a phenomenon at the expense of its more fundamental underlying traits.
Durkheim counters this criticism by asserting that the definition based upon
, external ' characteristics is only a preliminary usage, set up in order • to
establish contact with things '.3S Such a concept provides an entree into a
field, by allowing research to begin from observable phenomena.
Durkheim's observations upon the logic of explanation and proof in socio-
logy are closely tied-in to his analysis of the principal characteristics of social
facts. There are two approaches which may be used in the explanation of
social phenomena, the functional and the historical. The functional analysis
of a social phenomenon involves establishing the • correspondence between
the fact under consideration and the general needs of the social organism.
and in what this correspondence consists ...'. 'Function' must be separated
from psychological 'end • or ' purpose'. • because social phenomena do not
generally exist for the useful results they produce'. sa The motivations or
sentiments which lead individuals to participate in social activities are not
in most cases coterminous with the functions of those activities. Society is not
simply an aggregate of individual motivations, but ' a specific reality which
has its own characteristics': it therefore follows that social facts cannot be
explained in terms of such motivations.
The identification of social function does not, according to Durkheim.
provide an explanation as to ' why • the social phenomenon in question exists.
The causes which produce a social fact are separable from the function which
it has in society. Any attempt to assume an explanatory closure between
function and cause, Durkheim points out, leads to a teleological explanation
of social development in terms of final causes. • Explanation • in terms of

32 Durkheim warns that • too great a detachment in relation to tested propositions has
the serious drawback of preventing continuity in effort and thought'. • Sur Ie
totemisme ',AS, vol. 5, 1900-1, p. 89.
33 RSM, p. 35. See the penetrating analysis given in Roger Lacombe: La methode
sociologique de Durkheim (Paris, 1926), pp. 67ff.
3. RSM, pp. 35-6. 35 RSM, p. 42. .. RSM, p. 95.
 Dltrkheim's conception of sociological method 91
final causes entails the sort of fallacious reasoning which Durkheim criticises
in both The Division of Labour and Suicide:
Thus Comte traces the entire progressive force of the human species to this fun-
damental tendency' which directly impels man constantly to ameliorate his con-
dition, whatever it may be, under all circumstances'; and Spencer relates this
force to the need for greater happiness ... But this method confuses two very
different questions ... The need we have of things cannot give them existence,
nor can it confer their specific nature upon them. 37
The causes which give rise to a given social fact must therefore be identified
separately from whatever social functions it may fulfil. It is appropriate
methodological procedure. moreover, to establish causes prior to the attempt
to specify functions. This is because knowledge of the causes which bring a
phenomenon into being can, under certain circumstances. allow us to derive
some insight into its possible functions. The separate character of cause and
function, according to Durkheim. does not prevent the existence of a reci-
procal relation between the two. • The effect can doubtless not exist without
its cause; but the latter, in tum, needs its effect. It is from the cause that the
effect draws its energy; but it also restores it to the cause on occasion, and
consequently it cannot disappear without the cause showing the effects of its
disappearance.' 31 Thus, in the illustration which Durkheim gives from The
Division 01 Labour, the existence of • punishment' is causally contingent
upon the prevalence of strongly held collective sentiments. The function of
punishment consists in the maintenance of these sentiments at the same
degree of intensity: if transgressions were not punished, the strength of
sentiment necessary to social unity would not be preserved.

NormaHty and pathology

A substantial section of The Rules is devoted to an attempt to establish
scientific criteria of social pathology. Durkheim's discussion here is a direct
development of his concerns in his early articles, and is indeed of pivotal
importance through the whole of his thought. Most social theorists, Durk-
heim points out, hold the view that there is an absolute logical gulf between
scientific propositions (statements of fact) and statements of value. In this
conception, scientific data can serve as a technical 'means' which can be
applied in order to facilitate the attainment of objectives. but these objectives
themselves cannot be validated through the use of scientific procedures.
Durkheim rejects this Kantian dualism on the basis of denying that the
division between • means' and 'ends' which it presupposes can in fact be
substantiated. For Durkheim. the abstract dichotomisation of means and ends
involves similar errors in the sphere of general philosophy to those embodied
in a more concrete way in the utilitarian model of society: namely, that both

31 RSM, pp. 89-90.

31 RSM. pp. 95-6.
92 Part 2: Durkheim
the' means' and the' ends' which men follow are empirically an outcome of
the form of society of which they are members.
Every means is from another point of view, itself an end; for in order to put it
into operation, it must be willed quite as much as the end whose realisation it
prepares. There are always several routes that lead 10 a given goal; a choice must
therefore be made between them. Now, if science cannot aid us in the choice of
the best goal, how can it inform us which is the best means to reach it? Why
should it recommend the most rapid in preference to the most economical,
the surest rather than the simplest, or vice versa? If science cannot guide us in the
determination of ultimate ends (fins super;eures), it is equally powerless in the
case of those secondary and subordinate ends which we call means.3S
The dichotomy between means and ends can be bridged. in Durkheim's
view, by application of similar principles to those which govern the separation
of 'normality' and 'pathology' in biology. Durkheim admits that the
identification of pathology in sociology poses peculiarly difficult problems.
He therefore seeks to apply the methodological precept employed earlier:
what is normal in the social realm can be identified by the 'external and
perceptible characteristic' of universality. Normality. in other words. can
be determined. in a preliminary way. with reference to the prevalence of a
social fact within societies of a given type. Where a social phenomenon is to
be found within all. or within the majority. of societies of the same societal
type. then it can be treated as' normal' for that type of society. except where
more detailed investigation shows that the criterion of universality has been
misapplied. A social fact. then. which is ' general' to a given type of society
is ' normal' when this generality is shown to be founded in the conditions of
lunctioning of that societal type. This may be illustrated by reference to the
main thesis of The Division of lAbour. Durkheim shows in that work that
the existence of a strongly defined conscience collective is incompatible with
the functioning of the type of society which has an advanced division of
labour. The increasing preponderance of organic solidarity leads to a decline
in the traditional forms of belief: but precisely because social solidarity
becomes more dependent upon functional interdependence in the division of
labour. the decline in collective beliefs is a normal characteristic of the
modern type of society. In this particular case. however. the preliminary
criterion of generality does not supply an applicable mode of determining
normality. Modem societies are still in a period of transition; traditional
beliefs continue to be important enough for some writers to claim that their
decline is a pathological phenomenon. The persisting generality of these
belit'fs js not. in this instance therefore. an accurate index of what is normal
and what is pathological. Thus in times of rapid social change. ' when the
entire type is in process of evolution. without having yet become stabilised in

SI RSM, p. 48; RMS, p. 48. As an implicit criticism of Weber's view on this matter,
this is a similar point 10 thaI made by Strauss. Leo Strauss: Natural Right and
History (Chicago, 1953), p. 41.
 Durklzeim's conception of sociological method 93
its new form " elements of what is normal for the type which is becoming
superseded still exist. It is necessary to analyse' the conditions which deter-
mined this generality in the past and ... then investigate whether these con-
ditions are still given in the present '.CO If these conditions do not pertain, the
phenomenon in question, although' general " cannot be called' normal '.
The calculation of criteria of normality in relation to specific societal types.
according to Durkheim. allows us to steer a course in ethical theory between
those who conceive history as a series of unique and unrepeated happenings,
and those who attempt to formulate transhistorical ethical principles. In the
first view, the possibility of any generalised ethics is excluded; in the second,
ethical rules are formulated' once and for all for the entire human species '.
An example can be taken which Durkheim himself uses on many occasions.
The sorts of moral ideas which pertained in the classical Greek po/is were
rooted in religious conceptions, and in a particular form of class structure
based upon slavery: hence many of the ethical ideas of this period are now
obsolete, and it is futile to try to resurrect them in the modem world. In
Greece, for example, the ideal of the fully-rounded • cultivated man " edu-
cated in all branches of scientific and literary knowledge, was integral to the
society. But it is an ideal which is out of accord with the demands of an order
based upon a high degree of specialisation in the division of labour.
An evident criticism which might be made against Durkheim's position
on this matter is tbat it induces compliance with the status quo, since it
appears to identify the morally desirable with whatever state of affairs is at
present in existence.u Durkheim denies that this is so; on the contrary, it is
only through definite knowledge of the potentially emergent trends in social
reality that active intervention to promote social change can have any success.
, The future is already written for him who knows how to read it. .. .' U The
scientific study of morality allows us to distinguish those ideals which are in
the process of becoming. but which are still largely hidden from the public
consciousness. By showing that these ideals are not merely aberrations. and
by analysing the changing social conditions that underlie them and which are
serving to promote their growth, we are able to show which tendencies should
be fostered and which need to be rejected as obsolete.·' Of course, science will
never be complete enough to allow us to escape altogether from the necessity
of acting without its guidance. 'We must live. and we must often anticipate
science. In such cases we must do as we can and make use of what scientific
observations are at our disposal .. .' 44

40 RSM, p. 61.
41 CritiCs were not slow to make this a~sertion. Durkheim replied to three of his early
critics in the AS, vol. 10, 1905-6, pp. 352-{)9 .
• ~ Ibid. p. 368.
U 'Tbe determination of moral {aCI, " in Sociology and Philosophy (London, 1965),
pp.60ff.
• , Ibid. p. 67.
94 Part 2.' Durkheim
It is not the case, Duckheim argues, that the adoption of his standpoint
renders all abstract • philosophical • attempts to create logically consistent
ethics completely futile. While it is true that • morality did not wait for the
theories of the philosophers in order to be formed and to function '. this does
not mean that, given empirical knowledge of the social framework within
which moral rules exist. philosophical reflection cannot playa part in intro-
ducing changes in existing moral rules. Philosophers, in fact, have often
played such a role in history - but usually without consciously being aware
of it. Such men have sought to enunciate universal moral principles. but have
in fact acted as the precursors and progenitors of changes immanent in their
society."

.. RSM, p. 71. Marx makes a somewhat comparable point, discussing the innovatory
character of criminal activity. Theories 0/ Surplus Value (ed. Bonner & Burns),
p.376.
7. Individualism, socialism and the 'occupational
groups'

De confrontation wida lIocialism

The theory developed in The Division of Labour. and Durkheim's subsequent
attempts to pursue themes originally set out therein. inevitably culminated in
bringing about a direct confrontation with socialist doctrines. According to
Mauss' testimony, while Durkheim was a student, he had already decided to
devote himself to study of' the relationship of individualism and socialism '.1
Durkheim was familiar with the doctrines of Saint-Simon and Proudhon at
this time, and had made an initial acquaintance with Marx's writings. But his
knowledge of socialist theory was, at the time of the writing of The Division
of Labour. fairly thin. The sort of socialism with which Durkheim was most
closely concerned in the early part of his career was the reformist social
democratic theory such as set out by SchafHe and the Kathedersozialisten. 2
In both The Division of Labour and Suicide, and in numerous other writ-
ings, Durkheim makes reference to the crisis which is being experienced in
contemporary societies. This is not, as The Division of Labour made clear,
primarily a crisis which has economic roots. nor one which can be solved by
economic measures. It follows from this that the sort of programmes offered
by most socialists - involving mainly the redistribution of wealth througb
centralised control of the economy - in Durkheim's view fail to grasp the most
significant problems which face the modem age. Socialism is an expression
of the malaise of contemporary society, but it is not itself an adequate basis
for the social reconstruction necessary to overcome it.
Durkheim's attitude towards socialism is founded upon the assumption
that socialist doctrines themselves should be subjected to the sort of analysis
Which guides their own approach to other idea-systems: that is, socialist
theories should be studied in relation to the social context from which they
spring. In attempting such an analysis, Durkheim begins by drawing an
elementary distinction between' socialism' and • communism '.3 Whereas
communist ideas, in Durkheim's sense of the term, have existed at many

1 Marcel Mauss: • Introduction' to the first edition of Soc, p. 32.

2 Durkheim reviews Schllffie's Der SOzialismus in 'Le programme c!conomique de
M. Sch1lme', Revue d'economie politique, vol. 2, 1888, pp. 3-7.
a Durkheim points out that there is some primQ facie linguistic support for this
distinction. The word· socialism " unlike' communism', is of recent origin, dating
from the early part of the nineteenth century. Soc, p. 65. This was, of course,
known to Marx, but he makes no consistent terminological distinction between
them.

95
96 Part 2: Durkheim
periods of history. socialism is uniquely a product of the very recent past.
Communist writings typically take the form of fictional utopias: diverse
examples are to be found in the works of Plato. Thomas More. and Cam.
panella. The main notion supporting these utopian constructions is that
private property is the ultimate source of all social evils. Consequently. com·
munist writers regard material wealth as a moral danger which must be
checked by the imposition of severe restrictions upon its accumulation. In
communist theory. economic life is separated from the political sphere: in
Plato's ideal community. for example. those who rule have no right to inter·
vene in the productive activity of the labourers and artisans. nor do the latter
groups have any right to influence the conduct of government.
The reason for this separation, ac:c:ording to Plato. is that wealth and an that
relates to it is the primary source of public corruptioo. It is the thing that, stimu.
lating individual egoisms, sets citizens to struggling and unleashes the internal
conflicts which ruin states... It is necessary therefore to place it outside of public
life, as far as possible from the state which it could only pervert.6
Socialism is a product of the social changes which transformed the Euro·
pean societies in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. While com·
munism is grounded in the notion that policy and economy must be separated,
the very essence of socialism. in Durkheim's use of the term. is that it supposes
that the two should be assimilated. The primary tenet of socialism is not
merely that production should be centralised in the hands of the state. but that
the role of the state should be a wholly economic one - in socialist society, the
management or administration of the economy is to be the basic task of the
state. While communism. which seeks to eschew wealth as far as possible,
usually has an ascetic character. socialist doctrines are built upon the premise
that modem industrial production offers the possibility of abundant wealth
for all. and the attainment of universal abundance is their principal aim.
Socialism advocates' the connection 0/ all economic 1unctions. or 0/ certain
0/ them. which are at the present time diffuse. to the directing and conscious
centres of society t. s
The aim of socialism, therefore, is the regulation and control of production
in the interests of all members of society. But there is no socialist doctrine, in
Durkheim's view, which considers that consumption should be regulated
centrally: on the contrary, socialists hold that each individual should be free
to use the fruits of production for his own individual fulfilment. In com-
munism by contrast, 'it is consumption that is communal and production
which remains private '. 'Without doubt', Durkheim adds, '- and this is
deceiving - in both lhere is to be regulation (reglementation). but it must be
noted that it operates in opposing ways. One aims to moralise industry by

4 Soc, p. 68; Le socialism#! (Paris, 1928), p. 44.

s Soc, pp. 54-5; Le socialism~, p. 25.
 Individualism. socialism and the . occupational groups' 97
binding it to the State. the other. to moralise the State by excluding it from
industry.' •
The connection of this analysis to that given in The Division of Labour
noW becomes apparent. Communism is a creed which is appropriate to. and
which originally emerges from within. societies which have a low development
of the division of labour. Communist theory retains the conception of each
individual, or each family, as universal producer; since everyone produces
from similar plots. and since their labour tasks are all similar, there is no sort
of general co-operative dependence in production. This is the sort of society
in which occupational specialisation has not advanced very far :
In Utopia each works in his own way, as he thinks proper, and is simply obliged
not to be idle ... As each one does the same thing - or almost the same - there is
no co-operation to regulate. Only, what each has produced does not belong to
bim. He cannot dispose of it at will. He brings it to the community and consumes
it only when society makes use of it collectively.'
Socialism. on the other hand, is a type of theory which could only have
arisen in societies where the division of labour is highly developed. It is a
response to the pathological condition of the division of labour in modern
societies. and calls for the introduction of economic regulation which will
reorganise the productive activity of the collectivity. We must understand.
Durkheim stresses. that socialist theory does not advance the conception that
the economy should be subordinated to the state; the economy and state are
to be merged with one another, and this integration eliminates the specifically
• political' character of the state.
In the doctrine of Marx, for example, the state such as it is - that is to say, inso-
far as it has a specific role, and represents interests which are superior, sui generis,
to those of 'commerce and industry, historical traditions, common beliefs and a
religious or other nature, etc. - would no longee exist. Purely political functions,
which today are its special sphere, would no longer have a raison d'etre, and
there would only be economic functions.'
Class conflict, according to Durkheim. is not intrinsic to the fundamental
doctrines of socialism. Durkheim recognises, of course, that most socialists -
and especially Marx - consider the attainment of their objectives to be
inseparably bound to the fate of the working class. But advocacy of the
interests of the working class as opposed to those of the bourgeoisie, Durkheim
Slates. is in fact secondary to the prime concern of socialism to realise the
centralised regulation of production. According to socialists, the principal
factor influencing the condition of the working class is that its productive
activity is not harnessed to the needs of society as a whole. but to the interests
of the capitalist class. It follows from this, in the view of the socialists. that
tbe only way to overcome the exploitative character of capitalist society is
thrOUgh the abolition of classes ahogether. But class conflict is simply the

: soc. pp. 71 " 70; Le socialism#!, pp. 48 " 47.

Soc, p. 71. • Soc, p. 57.
98 Part 2,' Durkheim
historical medium through which more basic goals are to be attained. • The
improvement of the workers' lot is thus not a special objective; it is but one
of the consequences that the attachment of economic activities to the managing
agents of society must necessarily produce.' ,
In most respects, then, communism and socialism present a definite COD-
trast. However. there is one important regard in which they are convergent:
both are concerned to remedy situations in which the interests of the individual
become preponderant over these of the collectivity. • Both are impelled by
this double feeling that the free play of egoism is not enough to automatically
produce social order and that, on the other hand, collective needs must out-
weigh individual convenience: 10 But even here the identity between the two
is far from complete. Communism seeks to expunge egoism completely, while
socialism • considers dangerous only the individual appropriation of the large
economic enterprises which are established at a specific moment in history '.'1
Historically. the upsurge of communist ideas in the eighteenth century pre-
saged the subsequent development of socialist theories and became partially
interwoven with them. • Thus socialism was exposed to communism; it
undertook to play a role in it at the same time as it pursued its own pro-
gramme. In this sense it was actually the heir of communism, and, without
being derived from it, absorbed it while remaining distinct.' 12 It is this COD'
fusion. Durkheim says. which causes socialists often to mistake • the seCOD'
dary for the essential '. That is. they' respond only to the generous inclinations
underlying communism'. and devote most of their efforts to the attempt' to
lighten the burden of the workers. to compensate by liberality and legal
favours what is depressed in their situation '. These are not, of course, com-
pletely undesirable endeavours; but they • stray from the aim we should keep
in sight. .. '.13 The mode in which they pose the problem bypasses the true
nature of the issues involved. a But socialism is a movement of primary signi-
ficance in the modem world, in Durkbeim's view, because not only are the
socialists - or at least, the more sophisticated among them, such as Saint-
Simon and Marx - conscious that contemporary society is distinctively
different from the traditional types of social order. but they have formulated
comprehensive programmes to effect the social reorganisation necessary 10
overcome the crisis which the transition from the old to the new has brought
about. But the policies which have been suggested by the socialists are inade-
quate to remedy the situation which, in part, they have accurately diagnosed.

The role of tbe state

While Durkheim explicitly rejects the necessity of reorganising contemporary
society on the basis of class revolution, he does foresee a definite trend

, Soc, p. 60; Le soc;alisme, p. 33.

10 Soc, p. 75. Il Soc, p. 75.
12 Soc, p. 91.
13 Soc, p. 92. a Soc, pp. 104-5.
 Individualism, socialism and the • occupational groups' 99
towards the disappearance of class divisions.16 The maintenance of rights of
inheritance is a basic factor supporting a class division between the 'two
main classes in society t, labour and capital: the hereditary transmission of
wealth allows the continuation of the concentration of capital in the hands
of a few. 11 Durkheim also accepts the need for the extension of welfare pro-
grammes and other measures which alleviate the material conditions of life
of the poor. AU this is only possible. Durkheim concedes. on the basis of the
regulation of the economy (which should not. however. in Durkheim's view
be placed solely in the bands of the State}.11
But economic reorganisation alone will exacerbate rather than resolve the
crisis facing the modem world, since this is a crisis which is moral rather than
economic. The increasing dominance of economic relationships. consequent
upon the destruction of the traditional religious institutions which were the
moral background of previous societal forms. is precisely the main source of
anomie in contemporary society. In failing to understand this. socialism pro-
vides no more adequate solutions to the modem crisis than those offered by
orthodox political economy. While being opposed on most issues. both the
socialists and the economic theorists share certain characteristics in common:
both take economic measures to be the avenue whereby modem society may
overcome its present difficulties. Both believe it possible and desirable to
reduce the role of government to a minimum. The economists propose that
the free play of the market should be given full scope, so that government .is
limited to the enforcement of contracts; socialists wish to confine government
to the ordering of the market via the centralised control of production. ' But
both deny it the capacity to subordinate other social organs to itself and to
make them converge upon an objective which surpasses them.' 11
In Durkheim's conception. the state must playa moral as well as an econo-
mic role; and the alleviation of the malaise of the modem world must be
sought in measures which are in general moral rather than economic. The
dominant position of the authority of religion in former types of society
provided all strata with a horizon for their aspirations, counselling the poor
to accept their lot and instructing the rich in their duty to care for the less
PriVileged. While this order was repressive, containing human actions and
POtentialities within narrow bounds, its nevertheless gave a firm moral unity
to society. The characteristic problem facing the modem age is to reconcile
the individual freedoms which have sprung from the dissolution of traditional
Society with the maintenance of the moral control upon which the very
existence of society depends.
. Durkheim's analysis of the state, and the nature of political participation
In a democratic polity, is at the core of his conception of the probable trend
IS See below, pp. 203--4. 11 PECM, p. 213.
17 • La famille conjugale ',RP. vol. 91, 1921, pp. IOff.
11 Su, p. 255; LS, p. 284.
100 Part 2: Durkheim
of development of contemporary societies. The notion of the • political'.
Durkheim points OUI. presupposes a division between government and the
governed. and is thus primarily characteristic of the more developed societies:
in the simpler societies, specialised organs of administration barely exist.
But the existence of authority as such cannot be t~en as the only criterion
for indicating the presence of political organisation. A kinship group. for
instance, while it might have a definite individual or group in authority. such
as a patriarch and a council of elders. is not thereby a political society.
Durkheim also rejects the notion (to which Weber gives considerable pro-
minence) that permanent occupation of a fixed territorial area is a necessary
characteristic for the existence of a state. The development of fixed and
clearly demarcated territories is a late occurrence in history: while it is
characteristic of the advanced societies, it cannot be taken of essential impor-
tance in defining whether or not a society is a political society. This would be
• to deny any political character to the great nomad societies whose structure
was sometimes very elaborate '.11 Conversely. families have often possessed
strictly demarcated territories of their own.
Some political thinkers have tried to establish size of population as an
index of the existence of a political society. This is not acceptable. Durkheim
states, but it does imply something which is a necessary characteristic of a
political society: that the society in question is not just a single kinship unit,
but is composed of an aggregate of families, or of secondary groups. 'We
should then define the political society as one formed by the union of a
greater or lesser number of secondary social groups, subject to the same one
authority which is not itself subject to any other superior authority duly
constituted.' 20 The term • state " Durkheim suggests. should not be made
coterminous with political society as a whole, but should be reserved to
designate the organisation of officials which is the instrument whereby
governmental authority is focussed.
The three components of Durkheim's analysis are thus the existence of
constituted authority. exercised within a society which has at least some
degree of structural differentiation. and applied by a distinct group of officials.
By reference to these characteristics, Durkheim attempts to separate his
standpoint from the mainstreams of thought which he sees as offering con-
trasting theories of state and society: Hegelian idealism on the one hand, and
utilitarianism and socialism on the other. The stale is neither • superior' to
society nor merely a parasitic encumbrance upon society if it regulates any-
thing more than purely economic relationships. According to Durkheim, the
state does, and must. fulfil moral functions (a conception he sees as distinct
from both socialism and utilitarianism). but this does not entail. on the other
hand. the subordination of the individual to the state, as (according to
Durkheim) is posited by Hegel.

II PECM, p. 43. :0 PECM. p. 45; Le~ons de snci,Jiogie (paris, 1950). p. 55.

 Individualism, socialism and the 'occllpational groups' 101
Democracy and the occupational groups
As Durkheim shows in The Division of LAbour, the main trend of develop-
ment. as societies become more complex, is towards the progressive emanci-
pation of the individual from subordination to the conscience collective.
Associated with this process, is the emergence of moral ideals which stress
the rights and dignity of the individual human being. This would at first sight
appear to create an impossible opposition to the expansion of the activities
of the state. It is plainly true, Durkheim says, that the state tends to grow in
importance with the increasing differentiation of the division of labour: the
growth of the state is a normal characteristic of societal development. 21 But
this seeming antinomy is resolved through appreciation of the fact that, in
modem societies, the state is the institution which is primarily responsible for
the provision and protection of these individual rights. The expansion of the
state is thus directly bound up with the progression of moral individualism
and with the growth of the division of labour. However, no modem state acts
solely as a guarantor and administrator of citizenship rights. The perpetuation
of international rivalries has stimulated the development of common beliefs
relating to the nation as a collectivity (patriotism, national pride). While
nationalism is, in Durkheim's view, only of secondary importance in modem
societies,n it nevertheless tends to generate conflict between affiliation to
national ideals and the pan-humanism which is intrinsic to the notions of
individual equality and freedom that have become so strongly rooted today.
It is not inconceivable, on the other hand, that national pride will in the future
become harnessed to the furtherance of the general ideals of humanity.13
Given this analysis, may it not be the case that the increasing expansion of
the activities of the state will eventually reach a point where it becomes a
bureaucratic tyranny? Durkheim admits this as a possibility. The state can
become a repressive agency, isolated from the interests of the mass of indivi-
duals in civil society. This can ocrur if secondary groups which intervene
between the individual and the state are not strongly developed: only if
these are vigorous enough to form a counterbalance to the state can the rights
of the individual be protected. It is this assertion of the need for pluralism
which draws the connection between Durkheim's theory of the state and his

~I As noted previously (p. 76. n. 49). Durkheim emphasises, however, that there is nol a
universal relationship between sociely and state: • Kinds of society should not be
confused with different types of stale ... a cbange in a nation's system of govern-
ment does not necessarily involve a change in the prevailing type of society.' This
forms one element in Durkbeim's critique of Montesquieu. See Montesquieu and
Rousseall (Ann Arbor, 1965), p. 33 and passim.
~, It may assume a pathological form, as in German militarism. cf. Durkheim's analysis
of Treitschke's Politik. in . L'Aliemaglie au-dessus de tout' (Paris, 1915).
,~ PECM, pp. 7)-S; cf. also Moral EducQtion (New York, 1961), pp. 80-1, where
Durkheim says that the nation may be . conceived of as a partial embodiment of
the idea of humanity'.
102 Part 2: Durkheim
conception of democracy, and from thence with his call for the resurgence of
occupational associations (corporations).
Durkheim rejects the traditional notion of democracy, in so far as this
entails that the mass of the population participate directly in government.
Except for the least advanced small tribes, there are no societies where govern-
ment is exercised directly by all in common: it is always in the bands of a minority
chosen either by birth or by election; its scope may be large or small. according
to circumstances. but it never comprises more than a limited circle of individuals. U
A society is more or less democratic, according to Durkheim's terminology,
to the degree that there is a two-way process of communication between the
state and other levels of society. According to Durkheim, there is an extremely
significant consequence which flows from the existence of a democratic system,
which is that the conduct of social life takes on a conscious and directed
character. Many aspects of social life formerly ruled by unthinking custom
or habit become the subject of intervention on the part of the state. The state
is involved in economic life, and the administration of justice, in education,
and even in the organisation of the arts and sciences.
The role of the state in democracy is thus not simply to summarise and
express the views and sentiments held in a diffuse and unreflective way by the
mass of the population. Durkheim calls the state the social ego (i.e., tbe
• consciousness '), while the conscience collective as a whole is the social
• mind ' (i.e., includes many habitual, reflexive modes of thought). The state
is thus often the origin of novel ideas, and leads society as much as being led
by it. In those societies where the state does not assume this directive role.
the result can be a stagnation almost as great as that in societies held in the
yoke of tradition. In modem societies, where the influence of restraining
traditions has been largely dispelled, there are many avenues open for the
display of critical spirit, and changes of opinion and mood among the mass
are frequent: if the government simply reflects these, the result is constant
uncertainty and vacillation in the political sphere, which leads to no concrete
change. Many superficial changes occur, but cancel each other out: • Those
societies that are so stormy on the surface are often bound to routine.' 28 It is
in circumstances where there is a dearth of secondary groups mediating
between the individual and the state that such a situation tends to pertain.
This same condition which, given a strong state, can lead to a tyrannical
despotism. can produce inconstant instability where the state is weak.
Even prior to the publication of The Division of Labour. Durkheim
reached the conclusion that occupational associations should play a larger

2tI PECM. p. 85; Lerons de soci%gie. p. ]03.

Ia PECM, p. 94. Durkheirn was not nearly as blind to the existence of social conflict as
is often asserted; cf., for example, his criticism of Montcsquieu. who fails to see
that • every society embodies conflicting factors. simply because it has gradually
emerged from a past form and is tending towards a future one '. Monlesquieu and
Rousseau. p. 59.
 Individualism, socialism and the 'occupational groups' 103
part in contemporary societies than is the case at present. 21 While this theme
is not developed at length in the book. it is not difficult to perceive the relation-
ship between this and the analysis of the anomic division of labour formulated
in the work.27 Anomie is present in the occupational system in so far as moral
integration is lacking at the • nodal points' of the division of labour - the
points of conjunction and exchange between different occupational strata. A
primary function of the occupational associations would be to reinforce moral
regulation at these points. and thereby promote organic solidarity. This is a
task which cannot be accomplished by the family in modem societies. since
the family is becoming increasingly restricted in its functions. The occupa-
tional group is the only one • which is close enough to the individual for him
to be able to rely directly upon it. and durable enough to be able to give him
a perspective '.21 It is evident, Durkheim admits. that the old kind of occupa-
tional guild. such as existed in mediaeval times, has completely disappeared.
The trade unions which exist today are in general more loosely organised.
and do not meet the necessary social needs. since they are in a state of
permanent contlict with employers:
employers and workers are, in relation to one another, in the same situation as
two autonomous states, but of unequal power. As nations do, through the media-
tion of their governments, they can form contracts between themselves. But these
contracts only express the respective state of the economic power which they
possess, in the same way as treaties concluded between two belligerents only ex-
press the respective state of their military power. They sanction a condition of
fact, but they cannot make it a legal condition.1I
Accordingly. it is necessary to re-establish occupational associations as
legally constituted groups which • playa social role instead of expressing
only various combinations of particular interests t.
Durkheim refrains from offering a detailed exposition of how the occupa-
tional groups would be structured. They would not, however. simply be a
revived form of mediaeval guild;' while having a high degree of internal
autonomy. they would be brought within the overall legal supervision of the
state; they would have the authority to resolve contlicts both within their own
membership and in relation to other occupational groups; and they would be
the focus for a variety of educational and recreational activities.1O They
would also play an important role in the political system in a direct sense.

2t Durkheim discusses the role of occupational associations in • La famille conjugale',

originally a lecture given first in 1892. The lecture was not published until 1921
(RP, vol. 91, pp. 1-14).
~7 Durkheim planned a work, which he intended to write after The Division of Labour,
specifically dealing with the significance of the occupational associations, but this
project was never realised. cf. the Preface to the second edition of The Division of
Labour, p. 1.
28 • La famille conjugalc', p. 18.
:t DL. p. 6; DTS, pp. vii-viii.
30 PECM, pp. 28ft. & \03-4; Su, pp. 378-82; DL. pp. 24-7.
104 Part 2: Durkheim
One reason for the superficial volatility of some modem societies is to be
traced to the prevalence of direct representation in 'he electoral system. which
chains elected representatives closely to the whims of the electorate. This
could be overcome by the establishment of a two-stage or multiple-level
electoral system. in which the occupational groups would serve as the main
intermediary electoral units.
These proposals. according to Durkheim. are not mere wishful thinking.
but conform to his specification of the determination of • normal • social
forms set out in The Rules. That is to say. the development of the occupational
groups is an emergent principle of the complex division of labour.
The absence of all corporative institution creates, then, in the organisation of a
people like OUIS, a void whose importance it is difficult to exaggerate. It is a whole
system of organs necessary in the normal functioning of the common life which
is wanting... Where the State is the only environment in which men can live
comonmal lives, they inevitably lose contact, become detached, and thus society
disintegrates. A nation can be maintained only if, between the State and the in-
dividual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough
to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag
them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life. We have just shown how
occupational groups are suited to fill this role, and that is their destiny.31

31 DL, pp. 29 & 28. cr. Erik Allardt: • Emile Durkheim: sein Beitrag zur politischen
Soziologie', KQJner Zeitschrift fiir Soz;%gie und Sozialpsychologie, vol. 20, 1968,
pp. 1-16.
8. Religion and moral discipline

In his earliest writings Durkheim comments upon the importance of religion

in society. recognising it to be the original source of all subsequently evolved
moral. philosophical. scientific and juridical ideas. In The Division 0/ LAbour,
he outlines the thesis that any belief which forms part of the conscience collec-
tive tends to assume a religious character, although in that work this is
advanced only as a ' highly probable conjecture' which needs further study.l
But Durkbeim's recognition of the probable significance of religion in relation
to the influence of the conscience collective in society is counterbalanced by
an awareness of the fact that very profound changes have occurred with the
emergence of the modem societal type. Durkbeim consistently supports th~
conclusion, reached at an early point in his intellectual career, that both
the 'defenders of the old economic theories are mistaken in thinking that
regulation is not necessary today' and • the apologists of the institution of
religion are wrong in believing that yesterday's regulation can be useful
today'.' The declining importance of religion in contemporary societies is a
necessary consequence of the diminishing significance of mechanical
solidarity :
the importance we thus attribute to the sociology of religion does not in the least
imply that religion must play the same role in present-day societies that it has
played at other times. In a sense. the contrary conclusion would be more sound.
Precisely because religion is a primordial phenomenon. it must yield more and
more to the new social forms which it has engendered. 3
It was not until 1895, Durkbeim !ldmits, that he became fully aware of the
importance of religion as a social phenomenon. According to his own testi-
mony, this realisation of the significance of religion, which appears to have
been in large degree the outcome of his reading of the works of the English
anthropologists, caused him to reappraise his earlier writings in order to draw
out the implications of these new insights.' The conventional interpretation
of this is that Durkheim moved from the relatively' materialistic' position
which he is presumed to have held in The Division 0/ Labour, towards a
standpoint much closer to • idealism'. But this is misleading. if not wholly
fallacious, and is a misinterpretation of Durkbeim's views which stems in

1 DL. p. 169.
~ DL, p. 383.
3 Preface to the AS. vol. 2. 1897-8. in Kurt H. Wolff: Emile Durklleim I!I 01.• Essays
Oil Sociology and Philosophy (New York, 1964), pp. 352-3.
• Letter to the Editor of the Rente neo·sco/astique. p. 613.

105
106 Part 2: Durkheim
part from the frequent tendency of secondary writers to conflate Durkheim's
functional and historical analysis in a way which is in fact foreign to Durk-
heim's thought. s Durkheim repeatedly stresses, almost as often as did Marx,
the historical nature of man, and emphasises that the causal analysis \1f
historical development is integral to sociology: • history is not only the
natural framework of human life; man is a product of history. If one separates
men from history, if one tries to conceive of man outside time, fixed and
immobile, one takes away his nature.' I The main underlying body of theory
presented in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life is functional in
character; that is, it concerns the functional role of religion in society. But
The Elementary Forms also has to be read genetically, in relation to the series
of profound changes which have rendered modem societies very different in
form from prior types. In criticising Tonnies at the outset of his career, Durk·
heim emphasises that there is not an absolute break between mechanical and
organic solidarity: the latter type presupposes moral regulation as much as
the first, although this regulation cannot be of the traditional sort. The impor.
tance of Durkheim's novel understanding of religion, as developed in The
Elementary Forms, is that it leads to a clarification of the nature of this con-
tinuity between the traditional forms of society and the modern. • In order
to understand these new forms, one must connect them with their religious
origins, but without thereby confusing them with religious phenomena,
properly speaking.' T
That this allows Durkheim, at the same time, to elucidate certain themes
in his analysis of modem societies in a direct sense cannot, of course, be
doubted. One main element in this is that, in Durkheim's later writings, the
emphasis upon the constraining character of social phenomena cedes place
to a greater stress upon the significance of the specific character of the symbols
which mediate 'positive' attachment to ideals. But this is not a sudden
capitulation to idealism. The heavy emphasis upon constraint and obligation
in Durkheim's early writings is in considerable degree an outcome of the
form of critical attack in which these playa part; and throughout the whole

5 Parsons treats all Durkheim's writings as a monolithic attack on the • problem of

order '; whereas the main trend of Durkheim's work is about the analysis of the
changing forms of social solidarity over the course of societal development. Parsons,
esp. pp. 306, 309 & 315-16. Moreover, Durkbeim stresses that his work is Dot an
attempt to • treat sociology in genere', but is primarily confined to • a clearly
delimited order of facts', which are • moral or judicial rules ' •• La sociologie en
France au XIX~ si~cle " Revue bleue, vol. 13, 1900, part 2, p. 648.
• 'Introduction. la morale', RP, vol. 89, 1920, p. 89. For Durkheim's views on the
relationship between history and sociology. see his review of three articles on the
nature of history (two of which are by Croce and Sorel), AS, vol. 6,1901-2, pp. 123-5.
cf. also Robert Bellah: • Durkheim and history', in Nisbet, Emile Durkheim, pp.
153-76. See also below, pp. 224-8.
, Preface to the AS, 1897-8, p. v. cf. the early study by Gehlke: Charles Elmer
Gehlke: Emile Durkheim's Contributions 10 Sociological Theory (New York.
1915), pp. 48ff.
 Religion and moral discipline 107
of his works Durkheim affirms that society is both the source and repository
of human ideals.·

11ae character of the sacred

The Elementary Forms is based upon close scrutiny of what Durkheim calls
• the simplest and most primitive religion known today ': Australian tote-
mism.· In establishing a conceptualisation of religion, Durkheim follows
Fustel de Coulanges' typification of the sacred and profane. It is fallacious,
Durkheim states, to suppose that the existence of supernatural divinities is
necessary to the existence of religion: there are systems of belief and practice
which we should quite properly call • religious', but where gods and spirits
are either altogether absent, or are only of minor importance. What is a
• religious • belief cannot be defined with regard to the substantive content of
ideas. The distinctive characteristic of religious beliefs is that • they presuppose
a classification of all things known to men, real and ideal, into two classes,
two distinct kinds ... '.10 The character of religious thought is something which
cannot be grasped except in terms of the notion of dichotomy itself: the world
is separated into two entirely separate classes of objects and symbols, the
• sacred' and the • profane': • it is absolute. In the history of human thought
there exists no other example of two categories of things so profoundly
differentiated or so radically opposed to one another.' lJ
The special character of the sacred is manifest in the fact that it is sur-
rounded by ritual prescriptions and prohibitions which enforce this radical
separation from the profane. A religion is never simply a set of beliefs: it
always also involves prescribed ritual practices and a definite institutional
fonn. There is no religion which does not have a church, although the form
which this assumes varies widely. The concept of • church', as Durkheim
employs it, refers to the existence of a regularised ceremonial organisation
pertaining to a definite group of worshippers; it does not imply that there is
necessarily a specialised priesthood. Thus Durkheim reaches his famous
definition of religion, as • a unified (solidalre) system of beliefs and practices
relative to sacred things ... beliefs and practices which unite into a single
moral community called a church, all those who adhere to them.' 11
According to this definition, totemism is a form of religion, in spite of the
fact that it has no personalised spirits or gods. It is certainly the most primitive
type of religion which we know of today, and is probably the most primitive
fonn which has ever existed. U Thus to isolate the factors underlying the origin
of totemism is presumptively • to discover at the same time the causes leading
to the rise of the religious sentiment in humanity '. I t

• cf. above, pp. 67-70. • EF, p. 13; FE, p. I. 10 EF, p. 52; FE, p. 50.
U EF, p. 53; FE. p. 53. 12 EF, p. 62; FE, p. 65. 13 EF, p. 195.
Ie EF, p. 195. Durkheim rejects various theories which hold that totemism is itself
derivative of a previous form of religion (pp. 195-214).
108 Part 2: Durkheim
Totemism is integrally connected with the clan system of organisation
which is characteristic of the Australian societies. A specific feature of the
totemic clan is that the name which denotes the identity of the clan group is
that of a material object - a totem - which is believed to have very special
properties. No two clans within the same tribe have the same totem. Exami-
nation of the qualities which members of a clan believe to be possessed by
their totem shows that the totem is the axis of the dichotomy between the
sacred and the profane. The totem ' is the very prototype of sacred things '. H
The sacred character of the totem is manifest in the ritual observances which
separate it from ordinary objects which may be used to utilitarian ends.
Various ritual prescriptions and prohibitions also surround the totemic
emblem - the representation of the totem which is put on objects, or adorns
the person; these are often even more stringently enforced than those relating
to the totemic object itself.
In addition. however, the members of the clan themselves possess sacred
qualities. While in more advanced religions the believer is a profane being.
this is not the case in totemism. Every man bears the name of his totem, which
signifies that he shares in the:: religiosity of the totem itself, and there are
believed to be genealogical connections between the individual and his totem.
Totemism thus recognises three sorts of objects as sacred: the totem, the
totemic emblem, and the members of the clan themselves. These three classes
of sacred object in turn form part of a general cosmology: 'For the Austra-
lian, things themselves, all the things which populate the universe, are part of
the tribe; they are constituent elements of it and, so to speak, pe:manent
members of it; just like men, they have a determined place in the organisation
of society.' I I Thus, for example, the clouds belong to one totem, the sun to
another: the whole of nature is brought into an ordered classification based
upon the totemic clan organisation. All objects classed in a given clan or
phratry (a combination of a group of clans) are regarded as sharing qualities
in common, and such objects are believed by the members of the clan to be
affiliated to themselves - men 'call them their friends and think that they are
made out of the same flesh as themselves '.17 This shows that the scope of
religion extends much further than might initially appear. 'It not only com-
prises the totemic animals and the human members of the clan, but since
nothing exists that is not classified in a clan and under a totem, there is simi-
larly nothing which does not receive, in varying degree, a certain quality of
religiosity.' 11
Thus no one of the three sorts of sacred objects previously distinguished
derives its sacred character from either of the others. since they all share a

IS EF, p. 140; FE. p. 167.

1& EF. p. 166; FE, p. 201.
17 EF, p. 174. For a detailed description of such systems of classification, cf. Durkheim
and Mauss: Primitive Classification (London, 1963).
11 EF, p. 179; FE. p. 219.
 Religioll and moral discipline 109

common religiosity. Their sacred character must therefore emanate from a

source which embraces them all, a force which they all partially share in, but
which is nonetheless separate from them. In Australian totemism, this sacred
energy is not clearly differentiated as such from the objects which embody it.
Elsewhere. however. it is; among, for example, the North American Indians
and in Melanesia. where it is called mana. 19 The religious energy found in a
diffuse and all-pervasive form in Australian totemism is the original source
of all later more particularised incarnations of this general force which
become manifest as gods. spirits and demons in more complex religions.
Hence in order to explain the existence of religion we must discover the
basis of the general energy which is the fount of all that is sacred. It is clearly
not the immediate sensations produced by the totems as physical objel.:ls
which explains why they should be attributed with divine force. The totemic
objects are often insignificant animals or small plants, which could not intrin-
sically evoke the powerful feelings of religiosity which are attributed to them.
Moreover. the representation of the totem is usually regarded as more sacred
than the totemic object itself. This proves that 'the totem is above all a
symbol, a material expression of something else '. The totem thus symbolises
both the sacred energy and the identity of the clan group. 'So " Durkheim
asks rhetorically, 'if it is at once the symbol of the god and of the society, is
that not because god and the society are one? ' The totemic principle is the
clan group itself, 'hypostatised and represented to the imagination in the
perceptible forms of the vegetable or the animal which serves as totem '.20
Society commands both obligation and respect, the twin characteristics of the
sacred. Whether it exists as a diffuse impersonal force or whether it is per-
sonalised, the sacred object is conceived as a superior entity, which in fact
symbolises the superiority of society over the individual.
In a general way, it cannot be doubted that a society has all that is necessary to
awaken in human minds the sensation of the divine, simply by the influence which
it exerts over them ; for to its members it is what a god is to his believers. A god,
in fact. is first and foremost a being whom men think of as superior to themselves
in certain ways, and upon whom they believe that they depend. Whether it be a
conscious personality. such as Zeus or Jahveh, or merely abstract forces such as
those in play in totemism, the believer, in both cases. believes himself held to
certain manners of acting which are imposed upon him by the nature of the sacred
principle with which he feels he is in communion ... Now the modes of conduct
to which society is strongly enough attached to impose them upon its members,
are, by that very fact, marked with a distinctive sign which evokes respectP
The equation which Durkheim draws here between • society' and 'the
sacred' must not be misunderstood. Durkheim does not argue that ' religion

I, The development of an abstract conception of 17IQII/l as a universal force, according

to Durkheim. comes about only when the totemic clan system breaks down. Mana
is discussed at some length in Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss: • Thl!orie gl!nl!rale
de la m.:lgie " AS. vol. 7, 1902-3. pp. 1-146.
~o EF, p. :36; FE, p. 295. "' EF. pp. 236- 8; FE. pp. 295-7.
110 Part 2: Durkheim
creates society'; 22 it is just this misinterpretation which supports the notion
that he adopts an • idealist' position in The Elementary Forms. What he pro-
poses is, by contrast, that religion is the expression of the self-creation, the
autonomous development, of human society. This is not idealist theory. but
conforms to the methodological principle according to which social facts
must be explained in terms of other social facts.23
Durkheim attempts to show in a concrete way how religious symbolism is
created and re-created in ceremonial. The Australian societies pass through
alternate cycles, in one of which each kinship group Jives separately. giving
over the whole of its activities to economic ends, and in the other of which
members of the clans or phratries assemble together for a definite period
(which may be as short as a few days or may last several months). This latter
phase is an occasion for public ceremonial. which usually has a highly intense
and emotional character. In these ceremonials, according to Durkheim. men
feel overpowered by a force greater than themselves. which results from the
collective effervescence of the occasion. The individual is conveyed into a
world which appears to him to be utterly different to that of the everyday
utilitarian activity to which the bulk of his life is devoted. Here we see. there-
fore. the notion of the sacred in statu nascendi. Awareness of the divine is
born out of this collective ferment. and so is the conception of its separateness
from. and its superiority to, the everyday world of the profane.

CeremODiai and ritual

But why should this religious force take the specific form of a totem? This is
because the totem is the emblem of the clan: the sentiments aroused by the
presence of the collectivity fix themselves upon the totem as the most easily
identifiable symbol of the group. This explains why the representation of the
totem is more sacred than the totemic object itself. This still leaves the ques-
tion unresolved. of course. as to why the clan should have taken a totem to
begin with. Durkheim suggests that the totemic objects are simply those things
with which men are continuaJly in contact, and that each clan group has as its
totem the animal or plant most frequently found in the place of its ceremonial
meeting. Beginning with the totemic object. the religious sentiments come to
be attached to those substances which nourish it, which resemble and differ
from it. and thereby produce a general classification of nature relative to the
totem. Moreover, since the religious force emanates from the collective
assembly. at the same time as it • appears to be outside of the individuals and
to be endowed with a sort of transcendence over them " it • can be realised
only in and through them; in this sense, it is immanent in them and they neces-

22 I have taken this phrase from H. Stuart Hughes: Consciouslless and Society (New
York, 1958). p. 285.
23 RSM. p. 110.
 Religion and moral discipline III
sarily represent it as such '.::6 Thence derives the third feature of totemism.
that the individual members of the collectivity share in the religiosity of the
totem.
This explanation shows why it is futile to attempt to define religion in
terms of the substantive content of beliefs. Whether or not a given object or
symbol becomes sacred does not deper;td upon its intrinsic properties. The
most common-place object may become sacred if it is infused with the
religious force. • In this way a rag achieves sanctity and a scrap of paper may
become extremely precious.' 25 This also shows why a sacred object may be
subdivided without losing its holy quality. A piece of Jesus's cloak is as
sacred as the whole thing.
It remains to account for the second fundamental aspect of religion - the
ritual practices which are found in all religions. Two closely intertwined sorts
of ritual exist. Sacred phenomena are by definition separate from the profane.
One set of rites function to maintain this separation: these are negative rites
or taboos. which are prohibitions limiting contact between the sacred and the
profane. Such interdictions cover verbal as well as behavioural relationships
with sacred things. In the normal way, nothing from the profane world must
enter the sphere of the sacred in unchanged form. Thus special sacred
garments are put on for ceremonial occasions, and all the normal temporal
occupations are suspended.21 Negative rites have one positive aspect: the
individual who submits to them has sanctified himself and has thereby pre-
pared himseU for entry into the realm of the sacred. Positive rites proper are
those which affect fuller communion with the religious, and which constitute
the core of the religious ceremonial itself. The function of both sets of riles
is easily specified. and is a necessary adjunct to the explanation of the deriva-
tion of religious beliefs outlined previously. Negative rites serve to maintain
the essential separation between the sacred and the profane that the very
existence of the sacred depends upon; these rites ensure that the two spheres
do not encroach upon one another. The function of positive rites is to renew
the commitment to religious ideals which otherwise would decline in the
purely utilitarian world.
At this point the relationship between this analysis and that established in
Thf> Division of lAbour may be briefly re-stated. Small-scale, traditional
societies depend for their unity upon the existence of a strong conscience
collective. What makes such a society a • society' at all is the fact that its
members adhere to common beliefs and sentiments. The ideals which are

2. EF, p. 253. For a critical appraisal of Durkheim's analysis at tbis point, see P. M.
Worsley: • Emile Durkheim's theory of knowledge " SOCiological Review, vol. 4.
1956, pp. 47-62.
2:; Sociology and Pllilosoplzy, p. 94.
:. There are undoubtedly close connections between religious ritual and play. Durlt-
heim mentions that games originate in religious ceremonial. On tbis matter, cf.
Roger eaillois: Mall. Play and Games (London. 1962). Religious ceremonials are,
of course. for Durkheim in a literal sense' re-creation'.
112 Part 2: Durkheim
expressed in religious beliefs are therefore the moral ideals upon which the
unity of the society is fopnded. When individuals gather together in religious
ceremonial they are hence re-affirming their faith in the moral order upon
which mechanical solidarity depends. The positive rites entailed in religious
ceremonial thus provide for the regular moral reconsolidation of the group,
necessary because in the activities of day to day life in the profane world
individuals pursue their own egoistic interests. and are consequently liable
to become detached from the moral values upon which societal solidarity
depends.
The only way of renewing the collective representations which relate to sacred
things is to retemper them in the very source of religious life. that is to say, in
assembled groups. .. Men are more confident because they feel thermelves
stronger; and they really are stronger, because forces which were languishing are
now re-awakened in the consciousne6S.21
There exists yet another type of rite: the • piacular' (expiatory) rite. the
most important instance of which is that embodied in ceremonies of mourn-
ing. Just as religious sentiments of joy become raised to fever-point in the
collective excitation produced by the ceremonial. so a • panic of sorrow' is
developed in mourning rituals. 2I The effect of this is to draw together th~
members of the group whose solidarity has been threatened by the loss of one
of its members. • Since they weep together. they hold to one another and the
group is not weakened. in spite of the blow which has fallen upon it ... the
group feels its strength gradually returning to it; it begins to hope and to live
again: 2t This helps to explain the existence of malevolent religious spirits.
There are overywhere two sorts of religious powers: benevolent influences on
the one hand. and evil forces which bring sickness. death and destruction on
the other. The collective activity involved in piacular rites provides a parallel
situation to that which gives rise to the conception of beneficent forces. save
that grief is the dominant emotion. • This is the experience which a man
interprets when he imagines that outside him there are evil beings whose
hostility. whether constitutional or transitory, can only be placated by human
suffering.' ao

The catepries of bowJeclae

In totemism the divine principle is much more all-pervasive than in more
complex societal forms: we discover in the Australian societies religious
ideas such as must have everywhere formed the original source of all subse-
quently differentiated systems of ideas. The totemic classification of nature
provides the initial source of the logical categories or classes within which
knowledge is ordered. The classification of objects and properties in nature
,7 EF, p. 387. The • rhythm' of collective life is analysed in detail in Mauss's' Essai
sur les variations saisonnieres des spcic!tc!s esk.imos', AS, vol. 9, 1904-5, pp 39-130.
,8 EF, p. 446.
,. EF, pp. 447-8. 30 EF, p. 459; p. 590.
 Religion and moral discipline 113

is built upon the separation of society into totemic clan divisions. • The unity
of these first logical systems merely reproduces the unity of the society.' JI
This does not imply that society wholly structures the perception of nature.
Durkheim does not declare that there are no biologically given perceptual
discriminations, but points out. on the contrary, that the most rudimen-
tary classification presupposes some recognition of sensory similarities and
differences. The import of Durkheim's argument is that these native discrimi-
nations do not form the axis of the classificatory system. but constitute only a
secondary principle of ordering: 32 , The feeling of resemblances is one thing
and the idea of class (genre) is another. The class is the external framework of
which objects perceived to be similar form, in part, the contents.'
The existence of logical classes involves the formation of clear-cut dichoto-
mies. However, nature itself manifests continuity in space and time. and the
sensory information which we register from the world is not ordered in this
discontinuous fashion, but is made up of • indistinct and shifting images '."
Thus the notion of logical class itself, and the hierarchical distribution of
relationships between categories, derive from the division of society into clans
and phratries. But the mode in which objects are put into one category rather
than another is directly influenced by sensory discriminations. For example,
if the sun is in one category. the moon and stars will usually be placed in an
opposed category; if the white cockatoo is in one category, the black cockatoo
is put in the other.
Just as the axiomatic categories in terms of which abstract thought is
ordered are derived from society, so too are the basic dimensions of force.
space and time. The elemental religious force is the original model from
which the concept of force was derived, and later incorporated into philosophy
and natural science. J4 The same is true of the other of the Aristotelean cate-
gories: the notion of time finds its original prototype in the periodic character
of social life. and space from the physical territory occupied by society. Time
and space are not. as Kant held, inherent categories of the human mind. No
doubt every individual is conscious of living in a present which is distinct
from the past. But the concept of • time' is not personalised; it involves an
abstract category shared by all members of the group.• It is not my time that
is thus arranged; it is time in general. . .' 35 This must have originated from
the experience of the collectivity: the temporal divisions of years, weeks and
days stem from the periodic distribution of public ceremonials, rites and holy-

)1 EF, p. 170.
)2 1?"s· does introduce, however, difficulties of circularity in Durkheim's theory. cf.
arsons, p. 447.
~3 EF, pp. 171-2; FE, pp. 208-9.
.. , ~rkheim notes that Ihis has already been indicated by Cornie. But Comte mistakenly
inferred that the concept of force will eventually be eliminated from science • for
3 Owing to its mystic origins. he refused it all objective value '. EF, p. 234. '
• EF. p. 23.
114 Part 2: Durkheim
days. The notion of • space • similarly presupposes some original fixed point;
there can be no • north • or • south " or • right' or • left • without some common
standard whereby these can be judged. The territory occupied by the society
provides this standard. This can be directly illustrated: in some of the Austra-
lian societies, space is conceived in the form of a circle, mirroring the circular
shape of the camp, and the spatial circle is subdivided according to the
position of each clan in the encampmenL
Durkheim does not advance a simple form of • mechanical materialism .
here, any more than, in other parts of The Elementary Forms, he relapses into
the idealism for which the work is often criticised. He takes some pains, in
fact, to emphasise that this standpoint takes as its premise the dynamic inter-
play between the • substratum' of society, and collectively-evolved ideas:
Certainly we conside!' it to be evident that social life depends upon its substratum
and bear its mark, just as the mental life of the individual depends upon the
nervous system and indeed the whole organism. But the conscience collective is
something other than a mere epiphenomenon of its morpbologic:al basis, just as
individual consciousness is something other than a simple efDoresc:ence of the
DervOUS systan."
As a theory of knowledge, the thesis advanced in The Elementary Forms
is primarily genetic in character: it is not, as it is sometimes taken to be, a
theory which postulates the existence of an unvarying set of connections
between social organisation and collective ideas. Indeed, a basic aspect of
Durkheim's general conception of the process of social development concerns
the changing character of the content of the idea-systems which are found in
contemporary societies, and the increasingly diversified nature of the social
processes which underlie them. Of particular importance here is the relation·
ship between modem rationalism and secularised morality. The importance
of The Elementary Forms, in Durkheim's thought, is that it demonstrates con·
elusively that there can be no collective moral beliefs which do not possess a
• sacred' character. Thus while both the content and the form of the moral
order found in contemporary societies have changed radically, as compared
to traditional societies, there is indeed no solution de continuite between the
traditional and modem forms of solidarity.
The modem world is becoming increasingly penetrated by rationalism.
which Durkheim caUs the • intellectual aspect • of moral individualism. One
consequence of this is the demand for a • rational morality '. Now the main-
tenance of moral authority demands that moral ideas are • as if surrounded by
a mysterious barrier which keeps violators at arm's length, just as the religious
domain is protected from the reach of the profane '.57 This characteristic is
easily preserved when religion and morality are one and the same, because the
symbols and trappings of religion inspire attitudes of veneration. To seek to

36 EF, p. 471; see below, pp. 218-19.

31 Moral Education. p. 10.
 Religion and moral discipline 115
expunge all traces of religion from morality. however. can lead to the result
that all moral rules are rejected. because such rules can only survive if they
are accorded respect and are regarded. within the conditions of their applica-
tion. as being inviolable. This is why. even while they become detached from
their original foundation in divine law. they are bound to retain a sacred
character. as

RatioaaJism, ethics, and the ' aaIt of the iDdividaaJ '

This analysis can again be related back to the theory of the primitive inter-
mingling of religion and morality. Man has everywhere in religious thought
conceived himself to be two distinct beings. body and soul. The body is
believed to reside in the material world. the soul in the discontinuous sphere
of the sacred. A belief which is universal cannot be fortuitous. nor wholly
illusory. and must rest upon some duality which is intrinsic to human life in
society. This duality can be traced to the difierentiation between sensation.
on the one hand. and conceptual thought and moral beliefs on the other.
These are in an important sense separate from one another. Sensation. and the
sensory needs such as hunger and thirst, are ' necessarily egoistic '. in that they
relate to the appetites of the individual organism, and have no implied
reference to any other person. 3 ' Conceptual thought and moral rules are, by
contrast, 'impersonal' in the sense that they are universalised; they per-
tain to no particular individual. Every man begins life as an egoistic being
(although not, of course, an anomic one) who knows only sensation and whose
actions are governed by sensory needs. But as the child becomes socialised.
his egoistic nature becomes partly overlaid with what he learns from society.
Each individual thus has an egoistic side to his personaJity. at the same time
as he is a social being. The moral demands of life in society cannot be wholly
compatible with egoistic inclinations: 'society cannot be fonned or main-
tained without our being required to make perpetual and costly sacrifices.' 40
Again. however, this has to be read within a historical dimension; while sen-
sory needs are 'the type par excellence of egoistic tendencies " there are a
variety of egoistic desires which do not derive directly from sensory needs.
• Our very egoism is in large part a product of society.' 41
Durkheim clarifies this elsewhere through historical analysis." Christianity,
and Protestantism more specifically, is the immediate source from which
modem moral individualism is derived.
Since, for the Christian, virtue and piety do not consist in material procedures,
but in interior states of the soul, he is compelled to exercise a perpetual watch

" Ibid. pp. 9-11. • Moral life has not been, and never will be, able to shed all the
characteristics that it holds in common with religion '. Sociology and Philosophy,
p.48.
39 • The dualism of human nature and its social ~onditions', in Wolff, p. 327.
en Ibid. p. 338.
<I Suo p. 360. ez cf. L'b-o/urion pUagogiqul'. pp. 3324 & 326-7.
116 Part 2: Durkheim
over himself..• Thus of the two possible poles of all thought, nature on the one
hand, and man on the other, it is necessarily around the second that the thought
of the Christian societies has come to gravitate...n
Christian ethics provided the moral principles upon which the • cult of the
individual' is founded. but now Christianity is becoming surplanted by sacred
symbols and objects of a new sort. This is most clearly exemplified, Durk.-
heim says. in the events of the French Revolution. where freedom and reason
were glorified. and where there was a high level of collective enthusiasm stimu-
lated by public' ceremonial '. But while this helped to give birth to the ideals
which now dominate our life, the collective ardour of these times was
ephemeral. The modem world is consequently in a moral hiatus:
In a word, the old gods are growing old or are dying, and others are not yet born.
This is what made futile Comte's attempt to revive artificially the old historical
memories: it is not a dead past, but life itself which can give rise to a living CUlt.
But this state of uncertainty and bewildered turmoil cannot last forever. A day
will come when our societies will again know those times of creative effervescence
in which new ideas will spring up and new formulae will be discovered to serve
for a while as a guide to humanity...••
The French Revolution gave the most decisive impetu.s to the growth 0f
moral individualism in modem times. But the progression of individualism.
while occurring irregularly in different periods of western history. is not the
specific product of any definite epoch; its development takes place • unceas-
ingly throughout history '." The sentiment of the supreme worth of the human
individual is thus a product of society. and it is this which decisively separates
it from egoism. The • cult of the individual' is based. not upon egoism. but
upon the extension of quite contrary sentiments of sympathy for human suffer-
ing and the desire for social justice. While individualism cannot but produce
an increase in egoism as compared with societies dominated by mechanical
solidarity. it does not in any sense derive from egoism. and thus is not itself
productive of a ' moral egoism which would make all solidarity impossible'. 4&
This can be illustrated by the example of scientific activity. An intellectual
branch of moral individualism is the spirit of free enquiry embodied in
science: but far from entailing anarchy in the sphere of ideas. the pursuance
of scientific enquiry can only be carried on within a framework of moral rules
which enforce respect for the opinions of others. the publication of the results
of investigations. and the exchange of information.
The trend towards increasing individualism is irreversible, since it is the
outcome of the profound societal changes detailed in The Division 0/ Labour.
This is at the root of Durkheim's conception of freedom, and its relationship

.3 Ibid. p. 323. U EF, p. 475; FE, pp. 610-11.

.3 DL. p. 171; DTS, p. 146 .
•• • L'individualisme et les inteUectuels " pp. 7-13 .• Thus the individualist, who defend.
the rights of the individual. defends at the same time the vital interests of society.. :
(p. 12).
 Religion and moral discipline 117
to the moral order. Freedom cannot be identified with liberation from all
restraints: this is anomie, a state in which individuals are not free because
they are chained to their own inexhaustible desires:
rights and liberties are not things inherent in man as such ... Society has consec-
rated the individual and made him pre-eminently worthy of respect His progres-
sive emancipation does not imply a weakening but a transformation of the social
bonds..• The individual submits to society and this subtnimon is the condition
of his liberation. For man freedom consists in the delivecance from blind, un-
thinking physical forces; this he achieves by opposing against them the great and
intelligent force which is society, under whose protection he shelters. By putting
himself under the wing of society, he makes himself also, to a certain extent. de-
pendent upon it. But this is a liberating dependence.41
Consequently it is a basic error to believe that moral authority and freeQom
are mutually exclusive opposites; since man only obtains whatever freedom
he enjoys through his membership of society, he must be subject to the moral
authority which the existence of society presupposes. For Durkheim there is
no paradox in this, because' to be free is not to do what one pleases; it is 10
be master of oneseH.. .'.48
Discipline, in the sense of the inner control of impulse, is an essential com-
ponent of all moral rules. But it follows from the position stated above that the
view which equates discipline inherently with the limitation of human freedom
and seH-realisation is mistaken. There is no kind of life organisation, Durk-
heim points out, which does not function according to definite, regular prin-
ciples; it is the same with socia11ife. Society is an organisation of social
relationships, and by this very fact entails the regulation of behaviour accord-
ing to established principles, which in society can only be moral rules. It is
only through acceptance of the moral regulation which makes social life pos-
sible that man is able to reap the benefits which society offers him. The failure
to inject the historical element into Durkheim's analysis of this issue has led
many critics to suppose that his views represent a thinly veiled rationale for
an authoritarian political doctrine." But it is, in fact, central to Durkheim's
thesis that all forms of moral regulation are not identical. In other words,
• regulation • (society, social constraint) cannot simply be juxtaposed in an
abstract and universal sense with • lack of regulation • (anomie).60 The notions
of both egoism an~ anomie must be understood within the scope of the general
conception of the development of society presented in The Division of Labour.
Seen in this context, egoism and anomie are not simply functional problem"

47 Sociology and Philosophy, p. 72.

46 Education and Sociology (Glencoe, 1956), p. 90•
., See, for example, John Horton: 'The de-humanisation of anomie and alienation "
B,itish JOUl'nal of Sociology, vol. IS. 1964, pp. 283-300.
" Note Durkbeim's statement on this point: 'it does not follow from a belief in the
need for discipline that discipline must involve blind and slavish submission.' Mo,al
Education, p. 52.
118 pfII1 2: Durkheim
faciD. aD types of society in equivalent degree: they 8.R stimulated by the
very moral individualism which is the outcome of social evolutiOlL The
dilemmas faciDg the modem form of society. Durkheim maintains. 8.R not to
be resolved through a reversion to the autocratic discipline fOUDd in traditionaJ
societies. but only through the moral consolidation of the differentiated divi·
sion of labour. which demands quite different forms of authority from those
characteristic of earlier types of society.
Part 3: Max Weber

9. Max Weber: Protestantism and capitalism

While Max Weber was an almost exact contemporary of Durkheim. the
intellectual climate in which each lived was, in important respects, very
different. The short period which Durkheim spent studying in Germany
while a young man served to introduce him to some of the leading trends
in German social thought, and he did not subsequently relinquish his interest
in the works of German social scientists. Durkheim was certainly acquainted
with Max Weber's writings. as well as with those of the latter's brother.
Alfred. There are at least two sets of writings by German authors which
connect Durkheim and Weber directly: those of Schmoller and the members
of the Yerein fUr Soz.ialpolitik on the one hand, and those of Georg Simmel
on the other.1 But even these fairly direct intellectual connections are of
marginal significance. While Simmers thought undoubtedly was of some
importance in the shaping of Weber's views. Durkheim was highly critical
of Simmel, and was not inftuenced by the latter's writing in any important
respects: and while the writings of Schmoller and the Kathedersozialisten
formed a point of departure for Durkheim's early works. those aspects of
their views which Durkheim found most sympathetic were exactly the ones
which Weber rejected. and indeed fought against.'
The apparent lack of any significant reciprocal influence between Durk-
hcim and Weber has often occasioned surprise among subsequent writers.'
But it is perhaps less remarkable than may appear at first sight. for the
reasons stated above. The main intellectual influences in which Weber's
work is steeped are as predominantly German as those which shaped Dtuk-
heim's writing are French. Moreover. Durkheim's early studies are rather
abstract and philosophical in character - Durkheim wrote that C having begun
from philosophy. I tend to return to it, or rather I have been quite naturally

1 Durkheim reviews Simmel's Philosophie des Geldes in AS, vol. 5,1900-1, pp. 1~5,
and two articles by Simmel in AS, vol. 7, 1902-3, pp. 646-9. Durkheim also discusses
Simmel's formal sociology in ' Sociology and its scientific field " in Wolff, pp. 354-
75 (originally published in 19(0).
2 cf. above. pp. 66-9.
a e.g., Edward A. Tiryakian: • A problem for the sociology of knowledge " Archive.r
europeennes de sociologje, vol. 7, 1966, pp. 330-6. Tiryakian erroneously says that
there is no mutual reference in the works of Durkheim and Weber. In fact, Durk-
heim mentions Weber in reportins upon the proceedings of the German Sociological
Society (1911), AS, vol. 12, 1909-12, p. 26. (For Weber's contributions to the COD~
gress, see GASS, pp. 43J-83.)

119
 120 Part 3: Max Weber
brought back to it by the nature of the questions I met with on my route ' .•
Weber's first works, on the other hand, are detailed historical studies, and
it was from within the context of specific problems brought to light primarily
by the German historical school that Weber went on to expand the range of
his writings to embrace questions of a general theoretic3J nature. From the
flux of competing traditions in history. jurisprudence. economics. sociology,
and philosophy. Weber eventually fashioned a standpoint which borrowed
from many sources.

Early works
Weber's doctoral dissertation (1889) is a technical piece of work. dealing with
the legal provisions governing mediaeval trading enterprise. s In the thesis,
Weber gives particular attention to the Italian mercantile cities such as
Genoa and Pisa, showing that the commercial capitalism which developed
there entailed the formulation of principles of law regulating the mode in
which the distribution of risk and profit should be apportioned among the
collaborators in a business enterprise. At this time Weber was already con-
cerned, although only from this limited aspect, with an issue which was later
to play an important role in his later writings: the impact of Roman law
upon the development of the juridical system of mediaeval and post-
mediaeval Europe. He found himself unable to deal with this matter satis-
factorily, however. within the frame of reference which he had chosen for the
thesis.' Weber's second work. written under the aegis of Mommsen. and
which he finished some two years later, is expressly concerned with Rome
itself.1 Again, the work is heavily technical in character, and is directed to-
wards a current scholarly controversy of the day, providing a detailed analysis
of the evolution of Roman land-tenure, and connecting this with legal and
political changes.' In contrast to those who argued that the economic history
of Roman agriculture was unique in the specific form which it took. Weber
tries to show that it is amenable to treatment in terms of concepts derived
from other economic contexts.
These writings are perhaps rather less important for their substantive con-
tent than for what they indicate of the nascent line of Weber's intellectual

• The quotation is from a letter to Georges Davy, reported in the latter's • Emile
Durkheim " Revue franfaise de soci%gie, vol. I, 1960, p. 10.
S • Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften im Mittelalter', Gesanrmelte AufsiilU
ZlIr Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Tiibingen, 1924). pp. 312-443. For the
original title of the dissertation, see Johannes Winckelmann: • Max Webers
Dissertation', in Rene Konig and Johannes Winckelmann: Max Weber zum
Gediichttzis (Cologne and Opladen), 1963.
, lugendbriefe. TUbingen, p. 274.
7 Die romische Agrargescllichte in ih,rer Bedeutung fur des Staats- und Privatrecht
(Stuttgart, 1891) .
• For a brief discussion of the background to the work. cf. GUnther Roth: • Introduc·
tion ',ES. vol. I, pp. xxxvi-xl.
 Max Weber: Protestantism and capitalism 121

development. They already manifest a concern with what was to be the

principal focus of Weber's later work: the nature of capitalist enterprise, and
the specific characteristics of western European capitalism. The eady analysis
of Roman agrarian history is only the first of several later writings, examining
the social and economic structure of the ancient world.' As Marx did before
him, Weber perceives in ancient Rom.e certain of the main elements which
brooked large in the formation of modem capitalism. Like Marx, Weber con-
siders that 'Ancient civilisation is distinct from the mediaeval in certain
specifiable ways '; 10 but that in its driving expansionism, in the formation
of large-scale commercial interests, and in the development of a money
economy, Rome reached a level of economic development comparable to
that of early post-mediaeval Europe. His explanation of the decline of Rome
in fact shares a good deal in common with the outline account which Marx
had sketched in of these same events. l l
Weber's early work on Roman history also shows an early awareness of the
complicated nature of the relationship between economic structures and other
aspects of social organisation, and more especially, a conviction that all forms
of crude economic determinism must be rejected. 12 The continuity is clear
between these initial historical writings and the studies which Weber pub-
lished immediately after them, which deal with two different facets of the
modem German economy: the first being an investigation of the condition
of the peasantry to the east of the Elbe, the others being concerned with
operations of financial capital in Germany. Both of these latter studies analyse
aspects of the character and effects of modem commerce, and in the course
of writing them Weber reached a number of conclusions which proved of
lasting influence upon his work, and which lead directly into the themes
explored in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.
Between 1894 and 1897 Weber wrote a number of articles concerned
with the operations of the stock exchange and its relationship to capital
financing.13 Weber set out to counter a conception which, in his view, stems
from a naive understanding of the characteristics of functioning of a modem
economy, and which dismisses the stock exchange as nothing more than a
'conspiracy against society '.14 The notion that the stock exchange is simply

t ct. 'Agrarverhllitnisse im Altertum', GestJmmelte A.ufsiitze ~ur Sozial- und Win-

scJuzftsgeschichte, pp. 1-288; and • Die sozialen Grflnde des Unteraangs der antiken
Kultur', ibid. pp. 289-311.
10 • Agrarverhlltnisse im Altertum', p. 4.
11 Key parts of Marx's account of the disintegration of the Roman Empire appear in
Grundrisse, which was, of course, unavailable to Weber; cf. above, pp. 27-9, and
my article' Marx, Weber and the development of capitalism', Sociology, vol. 4,
1970, pp. 300-1.
12 ct. also' Zur Geschichte der Handelsgesellschaften " p. 322.
13 The most general of these is • Die BOrse', in GASS, pp. 256-322. cf. Reinhard
Bendix: Max Weber, an Intellectual Portrait (London, 1966), pp. 23-30.
14 'Die BOrse " pp. 256-7.
122 Part 3: Max Weber
a means of profit-~g for a capitalist minority neglects altogether the
mediating functions which the institution fulfils in the economy. The stock
market provides a mechanism whereby a businessman. through the use of
rational planning. can facilitate the progress of his enterprise. It is erroneous
to identify the operations of the stock exchange solely with irresponsible
speculation. The latter phenomenon does, of course, exist, but the main
effect of the stock exchange is to promote the rational conduct of the market
rather than to provide the opportunity for gambling coups. To show how this
is so. Weber gives the example of credit deals. When a time bargain is made,
such that a businessman is allowed to make an exchange in which he can
consummate his side of the transaction at a specified time in the future, the
result is an expansion of the range of trading operations which are possible.
However, Weber makes note of the difficulties for the normative regulation
of the stock market which the growth in scale and volume of transactions in
the modem economy brings about. Thus the extension of commercial opera-
tions tends to neutralise the ethical controls which are necessary to th~
functioning of exchange transactions.
The effects of the spread of market relations are analysed in a different
context in Weber's lengthy study of agricultural labour in eastern Germany,
which appeared in 1892.16 In the structure of agrarian enterprise in nineteenth
century Germany, the river Elbe marked a major dividing-line. To the west
of the river, most farmers were independent peasantry; but in the east the
Junkers maintained large-scale estates, which in many respects preserved a
semi-feudal organisation. Thus, to the east of the Elbe, agricultural workers
consisted of two distinct types. On the one hand, there were those tied to
their employers by annual contracts, and living within conditions similar to
those of mediaeval times: and on the other, wage labourers. hired on a day-
to-day basis. whose conditions of employment approximated to those of the
industrial proletariat. In these circumstances. traditional and modern forms
of labour relations became conjoined in a way which, as Weber notes in tbe
work, is quite unstable. The day-labourers, he concludes. are certain to pro-
gressively replace the bonded workers (Instleute). This process, Weber
shows. is transforming the overall structure of the estates; whereas the
bonded workers are not merely tied to their employers by an economic rela-
tion. but are enmeshed in a whole set of ties of right and obligation. the day-
labourers are hired on the basis of a wage-contract. The consequence is that
the latter group has no organic connections with the social system within
which the traditional workers live; therefore the interests of the day-labourers
are almost completely bound up with the securing of as bigh a wage as
possible. The increasing commercialisation of agriculture. which stimulates

IS Die Verhiiltnisse der Landarbeiler im ostelbischen Deutschland (Leipzig, 1892). cf.

also' Capitalism and rural society in Germany', in FMW, pp. 363-85.
 Max Weber: Protestantism and capitalism 123
the use of wage-labour, thus produces an accentuation of economic conflict
between the workers and their employers.
In spite of this, the commercialisation of agriculture does not lead to an
improvement in the living standards of the workers, but instead tends to
depress them. I I Weber describes in some detail conditions of life of the day-
labourers. showing that the dearth of ~e range of secondary benefits open
to the bonded worker frequently renders the overall economic position of the
former group worse than that of the latter. In the short run. the wage of the
day-labourer might be the higher. but in the long run this is reversed. Never-
theless. Weber points out, there is an obvious inclination among the bonded
workers to attempt to escape from the position of dependence which their
commitment to an annual contract entails. This search for independence can
be seen in the proclivity of bonded workers to exchange their security for
the uncertain existence of the day-labourer. According to Weber. this cannot
be explained in sheerly economic terms. but is partly a result of a quest for
personal • freedom' from the patriarchal • relationship of personal depen-
dence '.17 Thus the worker who possesses his own small plot of land will
endure the most extreme privations. and the most heavy indebtedness to
usurers. in order to preserve his • independence '.
The • freedom' which is thus obtained may be largely an illusion; but such
illUsions. Weber concludes. are basic to the understanding of human activity.
It is not' by bread alone • that the actions of the farm workers may be under-
stood. The ideas which guide the behaviour of the agricultural workers.
while they are not simply the • expression' of economic interests. do not,
however. spring from nothing. They in turn are related to the social and
economic changes which have modified the mediaeval forms of community
and labour. The nexus of relationships linking ideas and material interests is
rarely specifiable in terms of a unilinear causal derivation from one • level'
to the other. However. here Weber sets himself primarily against cultural
history. which analyses historical development in terms of the content of
ideas: it is always necessary to examine the possible bearing of deep-rooted
social and economic changes upon the nature of the values held by the
members of a given stratum or society. 14
To suppose that these views developed in Weber's thought simply within
the context of an encounter with Marxism would be to greatly oversimplify
tbe intellectual milieu in which Weber wrote. When Weber wrote his first
works. he took his point of departure from the contemporary problems which
dominated the mainstream of Gennan economic history and jurisprudence.
Weber's early interest in Rome reflects the current debate over the causes of

11 Verhiiltn;sse der Landarbeiter, pp. 774ff.

17 Ibid. pp. 797ff. Weber's account ~bould be compared to Kautsky's views, as given in
Die Agrarfrage (Stuttgart, 1899).
11 ct.• Sozialen GrOnde des UDtergangs der antiken Kultur', pp. 291-6.
124 Part 3: Max Weber
the economic decline of Rome. His investigation of the east German agricul-
tural workers is one part of a massive survey carried out by the members
of the Verein lilT Sozialpolitik. and was generated by a concern with problems
of practical political significance. which turned in large part upon the role of
the Junker' aristocracy' in German society.l9 Nonetheless. it is true to say
that the conclusions which Weber reaches in these early studies increasingly
channelled his concerns into avenues which brought him into direct relation
with the areas in which Marxist thought was concentrated: in particular, the
specific characteristics of modem capitalism and the conditions governing its
emergence and development.

1be origiDs of die eapitafist ' spirit ,

The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit oj Capitalism, which Weber published
in the form of two long articles in 1904 and 1905, marks his first attempt to
confront certain of these issues on a general plane. 20 Some of the principal
features of the ethos which occupies Weber's attention in the book are already
indicated in his study of the agricultural labourers. The contrast between the
conditions of life and the outlook of the bonded and the day-labourers is
largely one between acceptance of traditional patterns of deference and pat·
ronage on the one hand, and an attitude of economic individualism on the
other. lbis latter attitude is, however, clearly not merely an outcome of the
economic circumstances of the day-labourers. but represents a part of an
ethic which is itself helping to break down the old traditional structure of the
landed estates.
Weber opens The Protestant Ethic by posing a statistical fact for explana-
tion: the fact that in modem Europe 'business leaders and owners of
capital. as well as the higher grades of skilled labour. and even more the
higher technically and commercially trained personnel of modem enterprises.
are overwhelmingly Protestant '.21 This is not merely a contemporary, bUI
also is an historical fact: tracing the association back. it can be shown that
some of ihe early centres of capitalist development in the early part of the
sixteenth century were strongly Protestant. A possible explanation for this
is ready to hand: that the break with economic traditionalism which occurred

II cf. Dieter Lindenlaub: Richtungskiimp!e im Verein fiir Sozia/poritik (Wiesbaden,

]967). See also below, pp. ]90-lff for a description of Weber's political assessment
of Germany in ]895, as expressed in his Freiburg inaugural lecture.
20 The Protestant Ethic first appeared in the Archiv fur SoziaJwissenschafl und Sozia/-
politik, vols. 20 &. 21, ]905, and is reprinted as the introductory part of Gesammelte
Aufsiitz.e zur Religionssoziologie (Tiibingen, 192~1). In this latter version, Weber
makes some revisions, and adds comments on some of the criticisms given in the
literature to which the first appearance of the work gave rise. cf. his' Antikritisches
Schlusswort zum .. Geist des Kapitalismus .. " in the Archiv, vol. 31, 1910, pp. 554-
99. A description of the debate with Rachfahl is given in I. A. Prades: La soc1%gie
de la religion chez. Max Weber (Louvain, 1969). pp. 87-95.
21 PE. p. 35.
 Max Weber: Protestantism and capitalism 125
in these centres produced a sloughing off of tradition in general. and of
religious institutions in their old form in particular. But this interpretation
does not stand up to close scrutiny. It would be quite wrong to regard the
Reformation as an escape from the controls of the church. In fact. the
surveillance of the Catholic church over everyday life was loose: the move-
ment to Protestantism involved aoceptance of a very much higher degree of
regulation of behaviour than that which was demanded by Catholicism.
Protestantism adopts a resolutely stringent attitude towards relaxation and
enjoyment - a phenomenon which is especially pronounced in Calvinism.
The conclusion can be reached. therefore. that we must look to the specific
character of Protestant beliefs if we are to account for the connection
between Protestantism and economic rationality.
The novelty of Weber's interpretation. of course. did not lie in the sug-
gestion that there is a connection between the Reformation and modem
capitalism. Such a connection was assumed to exist by many writers before
the appearance of Weber's work. Thus the characteristic Marxist explana-
tion. deriving mainly from the writings of Engels. held that Protestantism is
an ideological reflection of the economic changes which were incurred with
the early development of capitalism. 22 In rejecting this as an adequate view-
point. Weber's work begins from an apparent anomaly. the identification and
explication of which constitutes the real originality of The Protestant Ethic.
It is usually the case that those whose lives are bound up with economic
activity and the pursuit of gain are either indifferent to religion. or positively
hostile to it. since whereas their actions are directed towards the • material'
world. religion is concerned with the • immaterial '. But Protestantism. rather
than relaxing the control of the church over day-to-day activities, demanded
of its adherents a much more vigorous discipline than Catholicism. and there-
by injected a religious factor into all spheres of the life of the believer. There
is clearly a relationship between Protestantism and modem capitalism which
cannot be wholly explained by seeing the former as a • result' of the latter;
but the character of Protestant beliefs and codes of behaviour is quite
different from that which might be expected, prima facie, to stimulate
economic activity.
The elucidation of this anomaly demands not only an analysis of the con-
tent of Protestant beliefs and an assessment of their influence upon the
actions of believers. but also the specification of the particular characteristics
of modem western capitalism as a form of economic activity. Not only does
Protestantism differ in certain important respects from the religious form
which· preceded it, but so also does modem capitalism display basic character-
istics which separate it from prior sorts of capitalistic activity. The various
other forms of capitalism which Weber distinguishes are all found within
SOcieties characterised by • economic traditionalism '. The attitudes towards

22 cf. below, pp. 189-90 & 210-11.

126 Part 3: Max Weber
labour characteristic of traditionalism are illustrated graphically by the ex-
perience of modem capitalist employers who have attempted to introduce
contemporary methods of production into communities where they have
not previously been known. If the employer, interested in securing the highest
degree of effort possible, introduces a piece-rate whereby workers can poten-
tially increase their earnings well above those they are accustomed to
receiving, the result is often that the amount of work done decreases rather
than the reverse. The traditionalistic worker does not think in terms of
maximising his daily wage, but rather considers only how much work he has
to do in order to meet his usual needs. ' A man does not " by nature " wish
to earn more and more money, but simply to live as he lives and as he is
accustomed to live, and to earn as much as is required to do so.' 23
Traditionalism is by no means incompatible with the greed for wealth.
, Absolute and conscious ruthlessness in acquisition has often stood in direct
and close connection with the strictest conformity to tradition.' 24 Selfish
avarice is found in all societies, and is in fact more characteristic of pre·
capitalist tban of capitalist society. Thus' adventurers' capitalism " for ex-
ample, involving the pursuit of gain through military conquest or piracy,
has existed at all periods of history. This is quite different, however, from
modem capitalism, which is founded not upon the amoral pursuit of personal
gain, but upon the disciplined obligation of work as a duty. Weber identifies
the principal features of the' spirit' of modem capitalism as follows:
the acquisition of more and more money, combined with the strict avoidance of
all spontaneous enjoyment ... is thought of so purely as an end in itself, that vis-
i.·vis the happiness of, or utility to, the particular individual, it appears as quite
transcendental and wholly irrational. Man is dominated by acquisition as the pur-
pose of his life; acquisition is no longer a means to the end of satisfying his
material needs. This reversal of what we might call the' natural' situation, com-
pletely senseless from an unprejudiced standpoint, is evidently as definitely a
leading principle of capitalism as it is foreign to all peoples not under capitalistic
influence.25
The spirit of modern capitalism is thus characterised by a unique combina-
tion of devotion to the earning of wealth through legitimate economic
activity, together with the avoidance of the use of this income for personal
enjoyment. This is rooted in a belief in the value of efficient performance in
a chosen vocation as a duty and a virtue.
A traditionalistic outlook, Weber stresses, is not wholly incompatible with
modem forms of economic enterprise. Many small businesses, for instance.
have been run according to traditionally fixed modes of procedure, traditional
rates of exchange and profit, etc. 'Now at some time', Weber says, 'this
leisureliness was suddenly destroyed .. .'; 28 and this often happened with-
out any technological change taking place within the enterprise. Where such

~~ PE, p. 60; GAR. vol. I, p.44. 24 PE. p. 58; GAR. v,,[. I. p. 4J.
~s PE. p. 53; GAR. vol. I. p. 36. 26 PE, p. 67.
 Max Weber: Protestantism and capitalism 127
enterprises have been restructured, what has occurred is a rational reorganisa-
tion of production, directed towards maximising productive efficiency. Such
a change cannot be explained, in most cases, by a sudden influx of capital
into the industry in question. It is the result. rather. of the introduction of a
new spirit of entrepreneurial enterprise - the capitalist spirit. Hence the
dominant characteristic which distinguishes the modem capitalist economy
is that it
is rationalised on the basis of rigorous calculation, directed with foresight and
caution towards the economic success which is sought in sharp contrast to the
hand-ta-mouth existence of the peasant, and to the privileged traditionalism of
the guiJd craftsman and of the adventurers' capitalism, oriented to the exploitation
ofpoliticaJ opportunities and irrational speculation.2T
The spirit of capitalism cannot simply be inferred from the growth of
rationalism as a whole in western society. Such a way of analysing the pro-
blem tends to assume a progressive. unilinear development of rationalism:
in fact. the rationalisation of different institutions in western societies shows
an uneven distribution. Those countries, for example, in which rationalisa-
tion of the economy has proceeded further are, in respect of the degree of
rationalism of law, retarded by comparison with some of the more economi-
cally backward states. (England is the most notable instance here.) Rational-
isation is a complex phenomenon, which takes many concrete forms. and
which develops variably in different areas of social life. The Protestant Ethic
is concerned only with discovering' whose intellectual child that particular
concrete form of rational thought was, from which the idea of a calling and
devotion to labour in the calling has derived .. .'.21
The concept of the 'calling', Weber shows. only came into being at the
time of the Reformation. It is not found. nor does any synonym for it exist, in
Catholicism. nor in Antiquity. The significance of the notion of the calling,
and the mode in which it is employed in Protestant beliefs, is that it serves to
bring the mundane affairs of everyday life within an all-embracing religious
influence. The calling of the individual is to fulfil his duty to God through the
moral conduct of his day-to-day life. This impels the emphasis of Protestant-
ism away from the Catholic ideal of monastic isolation, with its rejection
of the temporal, into worldly pursuits.

1be influence of ascetic Protestantism

But Lutheranism cannot be regarded as the main source of the capitalist
spirit. The Reformation played an essential role in the introduction of the
notion of the calling, and thereby in placing the dutiful pursuit of mundane
activities at the centre of tbe stage. Luther's conception of the calling, how-

27 PE, p. 76.
21 PE, p. 78.
128 Part 3: Max Weber
ever, remained in some respects quite traditionalistic. 21 The further elabora-
tion of the conception of the calling was the work of the later Protestant
sects which make up the various branches of what Weber calls • ascetic
Protestantism '.
Weber differentiates four main streams of ascetic Protestantism: Calvinism,
Methodism, Pietism, and the Baptist sects. Of course, these were closely
related to one another, and cannot always be clearly separated. 30 Weber's
discussion of ascetic Protestantism is not concerned with an overall histori-
cal description of their dogma, but only with those elements in their doctrines
which are most consequential in affecting the practical conduct of the
individual in his economic activity. The most important part of the analysis
is concentrated upon Calvinism: not, however, solely upon Calvin's doctrines
as such, but rather upon those embodied in the teachings of Calvinists to-
wards the end of the sixteenth century and in the seventeenth century.
Having made these qualifications, Weber proceeds to identfy three major
tenets as most important in Calvinism. Firstly, the doctrine that the universe
is created to further the greater glory of God, and only has meaning in rela-
tion to God's purposes .• God does not exist for men, but men for the sake of
God.' 31 Secondly, the principle that the motives of the Almighty are beyond
human comprehension. Men can know only the small morsels of divine truth
which God wishes to reveal to them. Thirdly, the belief in predestination: onl}
a small number of men are chosen to achieve eternal grace. This is something
which is irrevocably given from the first moment of creation; it is not affected
by human actions, since to suppose that it were would be to conceive that the
actions of men could in1h:ence divine judgement.
The consequence of this doctrine for the believer, Weber argues, must
have been one of' unprecedented inner loneliness '. • In what was for the man
of the age of the Reformation the most decisive concern of his life, his eternal
salvation. he was forced to follow his path alone to meet a destiny which had
been decreed for him from eternity.' S2 In this crucial respect. each man was
alone; no one, priest or layman, existed who could intercede wi~ God to
produce his salvation. This eradication of the possibility of salvation through
the church and the sacraments, according to Weber, is the most decisive
difference which separated Calvinism from both Lutheranism and Catho-
licism. Calvinism thereby brought about a final conclusion to a great histori-
cal process which Weber discusses elsewhere in detail: the gradual process
of the • disenchantment' (Entzauberung) of the world. 33

21 PE, p. 85. An important part of Weber's concern is to demonstrate the contrasl

between Lutheranism and Calvinism, rather than solely between Catholicism and
Calvinism.
30 Weber states that Methodism and Pietism were both derivative movements, while
tho Baptist sects represent an • independent source of Protestant asceticism besides
Calvinism " PE, p. 144. 31 PE, pp. 102-3.
32 PE, p. 104; GA.R, vol. I, p. 94. 33 See below, pp. 214,.-6.
 Max Weber: Protestantism and capitalism 129
There was not only no magical means of attaining the grace of God for those to
whom God had decided to deny it, but no means whatsoever. Combined with the
barsh doctrines of the absolute transcendentality of God and the corruption of
everything pertaining to the flesh, this inner isolation of the individual con-
tains ... the reason for the entirely negative attitude of Puritanism to all the sen-
suous and emotional elements in culture and in religion, because they are of no
use toward salvation and promote sentimental illusions and idolatrous supersti-
tions. Thus it provides a basis for a fundamental antagonism to sensuous culture
of all kinds. 3~
The enormous strain to which this exposed the Calvinist is evident. The
decisive question which every believer must eventually have felt compelled to
ask himself - am lone of the chosen? - could not be answered. To Calvin
himself, this presented no source of anxiety. Since he believed himself to be
selected by God to carry out a divine mission. he was confident of his own
salvation. But no such certainty was possible for his followers. Consequently
Calvin's doctrine that there are no external differences between the elect and
the damned quickly came under pressure on the level of pastoral care. Two
related responses developed. Firstly, that the individual should consider it as
obligatory to deem himself one of the chosen: any doubts as to the certainty
of election are evidence of impeIiect faith and therefore of lack of grace.
Secondly. that 'intense worldly aotivity,' is the most appropriate means to
develop and maintain this necessary sdlf-confidence. Thus the peIiormance
of • good works' became regarded as a • sign' of election - not in any way a
method of attaining salvation. but rather of eliminating doubts of salvation.
Weber illustrates this by reference to the writings of the English puritan.
Richard Baxter. Baxter warns against the temptations of wealth, but. accord-
ing to Weber. this admonition is directed solely towards the use of wealth
to support an idle. relaxed way of life. Idleness and time-wasting are
the foremost sins. This doctrine • does not yet hold, with Franklin: .. time is
money". but the proposition holds to a certain degree in a spiritual sense.
It is infinitely valuable because every hour lost is lost to labour for the glory
of God.'35 Calvinism demands of its believers a coherent and continuous life
of discipline. thus eradicating the possibility of repentance and atonement
for sin which the Catholic confessional makes possible. The latter effectively
sanctions a haphazard attitude to life. since the believer can rely upon the
knowledge that priestly intervention can provide release from the con-
sequences of moral lapse.
Thus labour in the material world, for the Calvinist. becomes attributed
With the highest positive ethical evaluation. The possession of riches does
not provide a man with any sort of exemption from the divine command to
labour devotedly in his calling. The Puritan conception of the calling. in con-
trast to the Lutheran. places a premium upon the duty of the individual to

~4 PE, p. 105.
33 PE, p. 158; GA.R. vol. 1. pp. 167-8.
130 Part 3: Max Weber
approach his vocation in a methodical fashion as the instrument of God. The
accumulation of wealth is morally condemned only to the degree that it
forms an enticement to idle luxury; where material profit is acquired through
the ascetic pursuit of duty in a calling, it is not only tolerated, but is in fact
morally recommended. 'To wish to be poor was, it was often argued, the
same as wishing to be unhealthy; it is objectionable as a glorification of
works and derogatory to the glory of God.' 31
It is crucial to Weber's analysis that these characteristics are not' logical '.
but' psychological' consequences of the original doctrine of predestination
as formulated by Calvin. These subsequent developments in Puritan doctrine
stem from the phenomenal isolation experienced by believers, and the
anxieties to which this gave rise. The belief in predestination is not unique to
Calvinism, and its consequences for human 'action vary according both to the
other beliefs it is associated with. and the social context in which it occurs.
The Islamic belief in predestination. for example. produced. not the worldly
asceticism of Calvinism, but' a complete obliviousness to self. in the interest
of fulfilment of the religious commandment of a holy war for the conquest of
the world '.3f
The origins of the capitalist spirit thus have to be sought in that religious
ethic which is most precisely developed in Calvinism. It is to this ethic that
we may trace the unique qualities which distinguish the attitudes underlying
modern capitalistic activity from the amoral character of most previous forms
of capital acquisition. 'One of the integral characteristics of the modem
capitalist spirit, and not only of this. but of modem culture: the rational
conduct of life on the basis of the idea of the calling. was born - that is what
this exposition has sought to show - from the spirit of Christian asceticism.' J'
The other varieties of Protestant asceticism, in general, have less of a rigorous
discipline than Calvinism, which Weber speaks of as having an 'iron con-
sistency '. Weber suggests, however. that there may be a historical relation-
ship. in the origin of the capitalist spirit, between the forms of ascetic Pro-
testantism and the social strata at different levels in the capitalist economy.
Pietism, for example. which tended to induce, rather than the persistent
energy of the Calvinist, an attitude of humility and renunciation. may have
been most widespread among employees in the lower ranks of the industrial
order. while Calvinism was probably more directly influential among entre-
preneurs. at
What to the Puritan was compliance with divine guidance. increasingly,
for the world of contemporary capitalism becomes a mechanical conformity
to the economic and organisational exigencies of industrial production. at all
levels of the hierarchy of the division of labour. Weber is careful to disclaim
the suggestion that the Puritan ethos is a necessary component to the function-

36 PE, p. 163. Sf ES, vol. 2. p. 573.

U PE, p. 180; GAR, vol. 1. p. 202. at PE, p. 139.
 Max Weber: Protestantism and capitalism 131
ing of modem capitalism. once it is established upon a broad scale. On the
contrary. the specific conclusion of The Protestant Ethic is that. while the
Puritan. because of his religious faith, deliberately chose to work in a calling.
the specialised character of the capitalist division of labour forces modem
man to do SO.400
Since asceticism undertook to remodel the world and to work itself out in the
world. the external goods of this world have gained an increasing and finally an
inexorable power over the lives of men as at no previous period in history. Today
its spirit - whether finally, who knows? - has escaped from the cage (Gehiiuse).
But, in any case, victorious capitalism, since it rests on mechanical foundations,
needs this support no longer ... the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in
our life like the ghost of dead religious beliefs.41
Weber intends The Protestant Ethic to be a programmatic work: it is
a preliminary exploration of a complex set of issues. and his claims for the
range of its application are modest and restricted. The main accomplishment
of the work. according to Weber.'2 is that it shows that the moral instru-
mentality of the spirit of capitalism is an unintended offshoot of the religious
ethic of Calvin. and more generally of the conception of the worldly calling
whereby Protestantism broke with the monastic ideal of Catholicism. But
ascetic Protestantism is nonetheless in part simply the culmination of
tendencies which stretch far back into the history of Christianity as a whole.
Catholic asceticism already had a rational character. and there is a direct
line of development from the monastic! life to the ideals of Puritanism. The
main effect of the Reformation. and the subsequent history of the Protestant
sects. was to transfer this from the monastery into the everyday world.
The Protestant Ethic demonstrates that there is an 'elective affinity'
(Wahlverwandtscha/t) between Calvinism. or more accurately. certain sorts
of Calvinist beliefs. and the economic ethics of modem capitalist activity.
The distinctive feature of the work is that it seeks to demonstrate that the
rationalisation of economic life characteristic of modem capitalism connects
with irrational value-commitments. This is a prefatory task to the assess-
ment of causal relations, but is not in itself sufficient for the isolation of
causes.'3 Weber explicitly states that. for this to be achieved. two broad tasks
have to be undertaken: firstly. the analysis of the origins and spread of
rationalism in other spheres besides that of the economic (e.g.• in politics.
law. science and art); and secondly. the investigation of in what ways Pro-
testant asceticism was itself influenced by social and economic forces. None-

40 'Der Puritaner wollte Berufsmensch scin - wir mUssen es scin' (GAR, voL I, p. 203).
Weber stresses that the Puritan emphasis upon the importance of a fixed calling
provided an initial moral validation of the specialised division of labour (PE, p. 163).
ct. also Weber's discussion of the decline of 'church-mindedness' in American
business, in ' The Prom;tant sects and the spirit of capitalism " in FMW, pp. 302-22.
'1 PE, pp. 181-2; GAR, vol. I, pp. 203-4.
42 ct. ' Antikritisches Schlusswort', pp. 556-7.
43 PE, p. 54, pp. 90-91 & p. 183.
132 Part 3: Max Weber
theless Weber is emphatic that the material analysed in The Protestant
Ethic adequately disposes of • the doctrine of naive historical materialism "
according to which ideas such as those involved in Calvinist beliefs are
regarded simply as • reflections' of economic conditioos." • We must free
ourselves " Weber asserts. • from the view that one can deduce the Reforma·
tion, as a historically necessary development, from economic changes.' 4.
But Weber does not attempt to substitute any alternative • theory' for this
conception of historical materialism which he rejects: indeed, as Weber seeks
to show in his methodological essays, which were mostly written at the same
period as The Protestant Ethic, such a theory is impossible to achieve .

• 5 PE, p. 55; GAR, vol. I, p. 37•

.. PE, pp. 90-1; GAR, vol. I, p. 83.
10. Weber's methodological essays

The Protestant Ethic concludes with a plea for the rejection of both material-
istic and idealistic interpretations of history as overall theoretical schemes:
• each " Weber says, • if it does not serve as the preparation, but ~s the con-
clusion of an investigation, accomplishes equally little in the interest of
historical truth '.' Weber's methodological writings expound this position in
considerable depth. 2
The genealogy of Weber's methodological essays is complex. however.
and they must also be placed within the framework of the then current con-
troversy over the relationship between the natural and the • human or 1

social sciences. Whereas Durkheim was steeped in a tradition of positivism

which reached back to well before Comte. no directly comparable tradition
existed in German social thOUght. The lengthy and complicated debate which
arose in Germany over the status of the sciences of man thus explored issues
which remained largely quiescent in ~ench history and social philosophy.
Weber, in common with most of his German contemporaries. bluntly rejects
the Comtean notion that the sciences are ordered in the form of an empirical
and logical hierarchy, in which each science depends upon the prior historical
emergence of the one below it in the hierarchy. In this form of positivist
orthodoxy. social science is treated ~ involving simply the extension of the
presuppositions and methods of the natural science to the study of human
beings. In repudiating this conception, Weber does not, however. wholly
follow that of such authors as Rickert and Windelband in recognising two
fundamentally different orders of sciences. the • natural • and • cultural '. or
the cross-cutting dichotomy of • nomothetic' and 'ideographic'. While
Weber adopts the distinction which these writers drew between the logic of
statements of generalisation and the explanation of the unique, he applies it
in a different way.

1 PE, p. 183.
2 For an exposition of the relevant background, especially with regard to idealism,
cr. Alexander von Scbelling: Max Webers WissellSChafts/ehre (fObingen, 1934),
pp. 178-247. Weber's methodological essays represent only a partial treatment of
problems which Weber intended to treat at greater length. See Marianne Weber:
Max Weber: ein Lebensbild (Heidelberg, 1950), pp. 347-8. The' partial' character
of Weber's methodological essays is clearly demonstrated in F. Tenbruck: • Die
Genesis dec Methodologie Max Webers', Kenner Zeilschrilt lur Sozi%gre und
SOl.iaipsych%gie, vol. 11,1959, pp. 573-630.

133
134 Part 3: Max Weber
Subjectivity and objectivity
Weber's critique of Roscher and Knies, the first of his methodological essays,
makes the point that the supposed distinction between the natural and social
sciences may be used to support a spurious intuitionism.' The writings of
Roscher, for example, according to Weber. employ this distinction in such a
way as to introduce an overriding component of semi-mystic idealism into
the author's analysis.' The universe of human action is held to be one in
which natural scientific methods do not apply, and consequently where inexact
and intuitive procedures have to be employed. The human world is thus an
, irrational' one, which is epitomised by the Volksgeist or Volksseele, the
'spirit of the people '. It is impossible, Weber points out, to reconcile the
use of such notions as this with the claim, which is advanced by this same
author. that rigorous historical research is an end which should be striven
for.
Weber concedes that the social sciences are necessarily concerned with
, spiritual' or ' ideal' phenomena, which are peculiarly human characteristics
which do not exist in the subject-matter treated by the natural sciences. But
this necessary differentiation of ' subject' and 'object' need not, and must
not, involve the sacrifice of 'objectivity' in the social sciences, nor does it
entail the substitution of intuition for replicable causal analysis. Weber's
essay entitled '" Objectivity" in social science and social policy' attempts
to show how this is possible.'
The social sciences, Weber points out, originated in a concern with practi-
cal problems, and were stimulated by the concern of men to effect desired
social chanaes. It was from within such a context that there emerged
the impetus towards the establishment of disciplines interested in formulat-
ing 'objective' statements about human social and cultural reality. This
development. however, was not accompanied by a clear understanding of the
significance of the essentiallogica1 discontinuity between factual or analytic
statements, on the one hand. and normative propositions concerning not what
'is', but what' oUght to be 'on the other. Most forms of social thought have
sought to establish a closure between factual and normative propositions.
on the basis of one of two connected SOrts of assumptions. The first is that
the desirable can be identified with what is' immutably existent': invariant
laws governing the operation of social and economic institutioos. The other
is that the assimilation of the desirable and the real come to be located in
general principles of evolutionary development: not in the immutably
existent, but in the inevitably emergent.
Both of these conceptions must be rejected. It is logically impossible for

, GAW, pp. 9ft.

, MSS, pp. 50-112. Weber', essays also have to be understood apinst the views of
Menger and his 8chool of • scientific' economics. d. Marianne Weber, pp. 352-3;
for a longer account, see Lindenlaub, pp. 96-141.
 Weber's methodological essays 135
an empirical discipline to establish, scientifically, ideals which define what
• ought to be '. This constitutes a fundamental premise of the neo-Kantian
epistemology which Weber adopts. and it is a position which informs the
whole of his writing. But while valu~judgements cannot be validated through
scientific analysis, this most emphatically does not mean that they must be
Temoved altogether from the sphere of scientific discussion. AU judgements
concernins whether or not a specified course of action • ought to be taken •
can be separated into • means'. which are employed to reach certain par-
ticular or general • ends '. • We desire something concretely either" for its
own sake " or as a means of achieving something else which is more highly
desired.' J Scientific analysis can allow us to determine the suitability of a
given range of means for the attainment of a determinate end. But no amount
of scientific knowledge can demonstrate logically that a man should accept
a given end as a value. The social scientist is also able to show. if a given
objective is sought, what advantages are to be gained by employing one
means as compared to another, and thus also what costs are entailed. The
costs entailed by the selection of a particular means to a given end can be
of two sorts: (1) the partial rather than the complete realisation of a desired
end, or (2) the bringing about of additional consequences which deleteriously
affect other ends held by the individual. It is also possible. through empi-
rical analysis. in a certain oblique sense, to evaluate the end itself, in terms of
whether it is actually capable of realidtion at all given the particular set of
historical circumstances in which it is pursued.
Weber frequently illustrates these points by reference to the aspirations of
revolutionary socialism. since the dilemmas posed by the striving to achieve
the end of the establishment of a socialist society raise certain of these issues
with especial poignancy. The realisation of a socialist society by revolu-
tionary means involves the use of force to secure the desired social changes.
But the application of force must necessarily involve political repression
after the revolution, which will negate some of the freedoms which are
embodied in the very ideal of socialism itself. Secondly, the construction
of a socialised economy. particularly in a world where other countries
remain capitalist. is likely to entail a range of economic difficulties which are
neither previsaged nor desired by socialists.', Thirdly. whatever the means
whereby a socialist society comes into being. the result will almost certainly
contravene the objective which brought it into being, by creating a bureau-
cratic state.
There is still one additional sense in which scientific analysis can facilitate
the pursuance of practical ends. but this is of a somewhat different order from
those stated previously. This does not involve empirical study. but rather
the assessment of the internal consistency of the relationship between the

• MSS, p. 52.
• On the latter point, see ES, vol. 1, pp. 65-8 & 100-7.
136 Part 3: Max Weber
ideals which a person holds. It is very often the case that men are nOl. clearly
aware of the values implicated by the specific objectives which they strive for,
Nld frequently they hold ends which are partially or even wholly incongruent
with one another. H an individual has not' thought through' the ideals upon
which his particular goals rest, we ' can assist him in becoming aware of the
ultimate axioms which he unconsciously departs from, or which he must
presuppose '. T
Further than this, however. we cannot go. The use of empirical science
and logical analysis can show an individual what it is possible for him to
accomplish, what the consequences of that accomplishment will be. and help
to clarify the nature of his ideals; but science cannot, as such, show him what
decision he should take.
No ethics in the world can dodge the fact that in numerous instances the attain-
ment of • good' ends is bound to the fact that one must be willing to pay the
price of using morally dubious means or at least dangerous ones - arid facing
the possibility or even the probability of evil ramifications. From no ethics in the
world can it be concluded when and to what extent the ethically good purpose
• justifies' the ethically dangerous means and ramifications.-
The logical consequence and the necessary support for this position which
Weber adopts is that the human universe is characterised by the existence of
irreducibly competing ideals. Since there is no single ideal or set of ideals
which, at any point of history, can be shown ·by scientific analysis to be
, right' or ' wrong 'I there can be no universal ethics. This methodological
standpoint finds its main empirical counterpart in Weber's writings in his
sociology of religion, which traces the genesis of divergent ideals in history.
But whereas ideals and meanings are created in religious and political
struggles, they can never be derived from science itself :
The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know
that we cannot learn the meaning of the workl from the results of its analysis. be
it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to create this meaning itself. It
must recognise that general views of life and the universe can never be the pro-
ducts of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move
us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which
are just as sacred to others as ours are to us.'
Weber's analysis of politics. and of the logic of political motivation, is
founded upon these considerations. Political conduct may be oriented within
either an • ethic of ultimate ends' (Gesinnungsethik) or an 'ethic of res-
ponsibility' (Verantwortungsethik).lo The man who pursues an ethic of
ultimate ends directs the whole of his political conduct towards the securing
of an ideal, without regard to rational calculation of means:
You may demonstrate to a convinced syndicalist, believing in an ethic of ultimate
ends, that his action will result in increasing the opportunities of reaction, in

, MSS, p. 54; GAW, p. 151. • FMW, p. 121.

• MSS, p. 57; cf. also FMW, pp. 143-6. IG FMW, p. 120.
 Weber's methodological essays 137
ina-easing the oppression of his class, and obstructing its ascent - and you will
not make the slightest impression upon him. If an action of good oiDteot leads to
bad results. then, in the actor's eyes, not he but the world. or the stupidity of other
men. or God's will who made them thus, is responsible for the evil.
Such conduct is finally 'religious' in character, or at least shares with
r~ligious conduct its exemplary attributes: the individual whose action is
directed towards an ethic of ultimate ends believes that bis only duty is to
ensure that the purity of his intentions is maintained: • To rekindle the flame
ever anew is the purpose of his quite irrational deeds .. .' 11
The ethic of responsibility, on the other hand, involves consciousness of
what Weber sometimes calls the' paradox of consequences '. The actual con-
sequences of an action on the part of an individual may often be quite
different from, and sometimes even completely contrary to, his intentions in
perpetrating that action. The political actor who is aware of this governs his
actions not solely by the integrity of his motivation, but rather by the rational
calculation of the probable consequences of his conduct for the goals which
he wishes to obtain. The various uses of social science which have been speci-
fied above are thus of importance to the politics of responsibility, but are
utterly irrelevant to the pursuit of an ethic of ultimate ends. lJ It is important
to distinguish the pursuit of an ethic of responsibility from pragmatism, with
which it has frequently been confused ~ secondary interpretations of Weber's
thought. Pragmatism, as a philosophY' involves the identification of truth
with what is practicable at any given moment. But Weber does not treat
practicability as a criterion of «truth '; the whole point of Weber's analysis
is that there is an absolute logical gulf between factual and ethical truth, and
tbat no amount of empirical knowledge can validate the pursuit of one ethic
rather than the other.
It can. to be sure, be just as obligatory subjectively for the practical politician, in
the individual case, to mediate between antagonistic points of view as to take
sides with one of them. But this has nothing whatsoever to do with scientific
• objectivity '. Scientifically the 'middle course' is not truer even by a hai,'s
breadth, than the most extreme party ideals of the right or left.n
The substance of Weber's discussion of the nature of «objectivity' COD-
sists in the attempt to dispel the confusions which according to Weber, fre-
quently obscure the logical relationships between scientific and value-judge-

11 FMW, p. 121.
12 Save in so far as logical analysis can assist in the clarification of ideals. But, as has
been mentioned previously, this is not a result of empirical science per se.
13 MSS, p. 57. It is worthwhile pointing OUt that each of the three figures treated in
this book developed views which have at times been linked by critics to the philo-
sophy of pragmatism. Durkheim felt the matter to be important enough to devote a
Whole course of lectures to the subject. cf. Pragmatisme et 6ociologie (Paris, 1955).
To over-simplify somewhat, it could be said that all three would object to prag-
matism for the same reason: that it denies the capacity of the acting subject to
rationally effect change in the world.
138 Part 3: Max Weber
ments. As has been mentioned before, for Weber this most definitely does not
involve the elimination of ideals from scientific discussion. It is, in fact.
incumbent upon the social scientist to attempt to be as clear as possible about
his own ideals. If this obligation is rigorously observed. the result will not be
a withdrawal of the values of the social scientist from relevance to his work:
'An attitude of moral indifference (Gesinnungslosigkeit) has no connection
with scielllific " objectivity",' 16

Judgements of fact and jodgements of value

The absolute logical separation between factual and value-propositions - that
is. that science cannot itself be a source of validated cultural ideals - must be
distingl.tished from the sense in which the very existence of science pre-
supposes the existence of values which define why scientific analysis is itself
a 'desirable' or a 'valuable • activity. Science itself rests upon ideals which
cannot, any more than any other values. be validated scientifically. Thus the
principal objective of the social sciences, according to Weber. is the under-
I

standing of the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move'.

That is to say, the main goal of the social sciences is to comprehend why par-
ticular historical phenomena come to be as they are. But this presumes
abstraction from the unending complexity of empirical reality. Weber accepts
the neo-Kantianism of Rickert and Windelband in holding that there cannot
conceivably be any complete scientific description of reality. Reality con-
sists of an infinitely divisible profusion. Even if we should focus upon one
particular element of reality. we find it partakes of this infinity. Any form of
scientific analysis, any corpus of scientific knowledge whatsoever. whether in
the natural or the social sciences. involves selection from the infinitude of
reality.
Now. as has just been indicated. the social sciences are primarily interested
in knowing' on the one hand the relationships and the cultural significance of
individual events in the contemporary manifestations and on the other the
grounds of their being historically "so I t and not " otherwise It t.15 Since
reality is extensively and intensively infinite. and since. therefore. some sort
of selection of 'problems of interest' to the social scientist is mandatory
(whether or not this is consciously known to the individual concerned). we
must ask what are the value-criteria which determine 'what we wish to
know t. This question cannot be answered, according to Weber, simply by
the assertion that what we should be searching for in the social sciences are
regularly occurring relationships or 'laws '. such as exist in the natural
sciences. The formulation of laws involves a special order of abstraction of
the complexity of reality, such that every event which does not fall under
those covered by the law is considered to be • accidental tt and consequently

1. MSS. p. 60; GAW, p. 157.

15 MSS, p. 72; GAW. pp. 17(}-1.
 Weber's methodological essays 139
scientifically unimportant. But this is plainly inadequate to comprehend the
sorts of problems which occupy the centre of our interest in the social
sciences. The main focus of Weber's own life's work can be quoted in illustrd-
tion of this. The formation of western European capitalism, and the rational-
im1 associated with it, is not of interest to us because (certain aspects of)
these historical events can plausibly be subsumed under general, law-like
principles; what makes these events of significance to us is their very
uniqueness.
Moreover. it is mistaken to presume that the natural sciences are only
interested in the discovery of laws. Astronomy, for example, is often con-
cerned with particular sequences of development which are neither sub-
sumable under laws, nor derive their interest from their relevance to the
formulation of general relationships. Although Weber does not give this by
way of illustration, a good instance of this is Rickert's example of the interest
of astronomers in the detailed study of the origins of our solar system. In
terms of generalisation about properties of the universe, our own solar system
is utterly insignificant. Our own interest in its specific development derives
from the fact that it is in this part of the heavens that the earth is situated.
This shows that the distinction between the natural and the social sciences
is not an absolute one from the point of view of the differentiation between
nomothetic and ideographic knowledke. While the main concentration of the
natural sciences is upon the establishment of general principles, knowledge
of the particular is also sometimes sought. Nor is it valid to consider that
causal 'explanation' is only possible through the classification of events
under general laws. An event which is 'accidental • from the point of view
of a given law can equally well be traced back to its causal antecedents. But
it must not be imagined that there is a single cause, or a definite restricted
set of causes, which can yield a ' complete' explanation of an historical indi-
vidual. If it is the case that what is ' worth knowing' only implicates certain
aspects of reality, the same is true of causal explanation itself. The decision
where to end an investigation, to pronounce that our understanding of a given
phenomenon is adequate, is as much a matter of selection as the decision
where to begin it:
the totality of all the conditions back to which the causal regression from the
, effect' leads had to 'act jointly' in a definite way, and in no other for the con·
crete effect to be realised. In other words, the occurrence of the result is, for every
causally working empirical science, determined Dot just from a certain moment
but' from eternity '."
This does not mean, Weber stresses, that nomothetic propositions are not
POssible in the social sciences. But the formulation of general explanatory
principles is not so much an end in itself as a means which may be used to
facilitate the analysis of the particular phenomena which are to be explained:

II MSS, p. 187; GAW. p. 289.

140 Pari 3: Max Weber
• a valid imputation of any individual effect without the application of
.. nomological" krwwledge - i.e.. the knowledge of recurrent causal
sequences - would in general be impossible'.11 In other words, when the
researcher is attempting to impute causes, how far a given component is
designated as a cause will depend upon assumptions (which in cases of
doubt have to be justified) of valid relationships which pertain between
classes of events. How far the researcher can reach a valid causal imputation
'with his imagination sharpened by personal experience and trained in
analytic methods', and how far he must seek the help of concretely established
generalisations, depends upon the particular case in question. But it is always
true that the more precise and certain our knowledge of relevant general
principles, the more certain the causal imputation we can make. l I
But how, more concretely, do we establish the existence of a causal rela-
tionship? In his famous procedural illustration, Weber takes the example
of Eduard Meyer's treatment of the significance of the outcome of the battle
of Marathon for the subsequent development of western culture. The reason
why historians are interested in Marathon, which was in itself only quite a
small encounter, is precisely that its outcome had a decisive causal signi-
fiCance in the survival and independent development of Hellenic culture.
which later spread throughout Europe. In order, however, to show that the
battle of Marathon was causally significant in this way, we have to consider
two separate possible contingencies (Hellenism versus Persian theocratic in-
fluence over subsequent European cultural development). These are not, on-
tologically, 'real' possibilities; only one set of events was' possible' - that
which really occurred. This procedure necessarily is one of abstraction by the
social scientist, involving the construction of a ' thought-experiment " where-
by he projects what would have happened if certain events either had not
taken place or had occurred in a different way.
The assessment of the causal significance of an historical fact will begin with the
posing of the following question: in the event of the exclusion of that fact from
the complex of factors which are taken into accoullt as co-determinants. or in the
event of its modification in a Cel'tain direction, could the course of events. in ac-
cordance with general empirical rules (Erfahrungsregeln), have taken a direction
in any way diffel'ent in any features which would be decisive for our interest? II
In the example of the importance of the battle of Marathon, this can be
shown: if a Persian victory is imagined, and its probable consequences
assessed, it is certainly the case that these would indeed have greatly in-
fluenced the subsequent development of Hellenic, and thence of European.
culture. Weber designates this as an example of ' adequate' causation. We
can confidently state, in this case, that a different outcome of the battle of
Marathon would have been sufficient or 'adequate' to produce changes in
subsequent European cultural development.

11 MSS. p. 79. 11 MSS. pp. 82ft. '9 MSS. p. \80.

 Weber's methodological essays 141
The fact that the selection and identification of the concerns 9f social
science is necessarily , subjective • - i.e., involves the selection of problems
which are of interest because they have some definite cultural significance -
does not, then, imply that objectively valid causal analysis cannot be made.
On the contrary, causal explanation is verifiable by others, and is not • valid •
for any particular person only. But both the selection of issues for investiga-
tion. and the degree to which the researcher deems it necessary to penetrate
into the infinite causal web, are governed by value suppositions. Given
Weber's premise that the main focus of interest is in unique configurations, it
follows that the subject-matter of the social sciences is ever in flux :
The stream of immeasurable events flows unendingly towards eternity. The cul-
tural problems which move men form themselves ever anew and in different
colours, and the boundaries of that area in the infinite stream of concrete events
which acquires meaning and significance for us, i.e., which becomes an ' historical
individual " are constantly subject to change. 20

The fonnuJatioa of ideal-type eoosfrocts

Weber's specification of the nature of ' ideal-type' concepts, and their usage
in the social sciences, is logically rooted in this general epistemological stand-
point. The concepts which are used in the social sciences cannot be derived
directly from reality without the intrus~n of value-presuppositions, since the
very problems which define the objectives of interest are dependent upon
such presuppositions. Thus the interpretation and explanation of an histoncal
configuration demands the construction of concepts which are specifically
delineated for that purpose and which, as in the case of the objectives of the
analysis itself, do not reflect universally 'essential' properties of reality.
In setting fo·rth the formal characteristics of ideal-type concepts, Weber does
not consider that he is establishing a new sort of conceptual method, but that
he is making explicit what is already done in practice. However, since most
researchers are not fully aware of the sort of col!cepts they are using, their
formulations often tend to be ambiguous and imprecise. ' The language which
the historian talks contains hundreds of words which are ambiguous con-
structs created to meet the unconsciously conceived need for adequate expres-
sion, and whose meaning is definitely felt, but not clearly thought OUt.':1
An ideal type is constructed by the abstraction and combination of 3n
indefinite number of elements which, although found in reality, are rarely or
never discovered in this specific form. Thus the characteristics of the 'Cal-

20 MSS, p. 84. Weber frequently stresses the importance of distinguishing the two
senses in which the social scientist may be interested in an • historical individual':
firstly, • in acquiring the most comprehensive knowledge possible' of • historically
.. great" and .. unique" individuals', and, secondly, in analysing • the significance
to be attributed, in a concrete historical relationship, to the causal force of the
actions of certain individuals - regardless of whether or nOl we would actually rate
tbem as .. significant" or .• insignificant" individuals .. .', GAW, p. 47.
21 MSS, pp. 92-3; GAW, p. 193.
142 Part J: Max Weber
vinist ethic' which Weber analyses in The Protestant Ethic are taken from
the writings of various historical figures, and involve those components of
Calvinist doctrines which Weber identifies as of particular importance in
relation to the formation of the capitalist spirit. Such an ideal type is
neither a • description' of any definite aspect of reality, nor, according to
Weber. is it a hypothesis; but it can aid in both description and explanation.
An ideal type is not, of course, ideal in a normative sense: it does not carry
the connotation that its realisation is desirable. It is as legitimate to construct
an ideal type of murder or prostitution as of any other phenomenon. An ideal
type is a pure type in a logical and not an exemplary sense: • In its conceptual
purity. this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in
reality.' 2~
The creation of ideal types is in no sense an end in itself; the utility of a
given ideal type can be assessed only in relation to a concrete problem or
range of problems. and the only purpose of constructing it is to facilitate the
analysis of empirical questions. In formulating an ideal type of a phenomenon
such as of rational capitalism. then. the social scientist attempts to delineate,
through the empirical examination of specific forms of capitalism. the most
important respects (in relation to the concerns which he has set himself) in
which rational capitalism is distinctive. The ideal type is not formed out of a
nexus of purely conceptual thought, but is created, modified and sharpened
through the empirical analysis of concrete problems. and in tum increases the
precision of that analysis.
Ideal types are thus different in both scope and usage from descriptive con-
cepts (GattungsbegriDe). Descriptive types play an important and necessary
role in many branches of the social sciences. These simply summarise the
common features of groupings of empirical phenomena. Whereas an ideal
type involves • the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view'. the
descriptive type involves • the abstract synthesis of those traits which are
common to numerous concrete phenomena '.U Weber gives the example of
the concepts of' church' and ' sect '. These may serve as the basis for a classi-
ficatory distinction; religious groups can be said to fall into one category or
the other. However. if we wish to apply the distinction in order to analyse the
importance of sectarian movements for the rationalisation of modem western
culture. we have to reformulate the concept of' sect' to emphasise the specific
components of sectarianism which have been influential in this particular
respect. The concept then becomes an ideal typical one. Any descriptive con-
cept can be transformed into an ideal type through the abstraction and recom-
bination of certain elements: in practical terms, Weber says, this is what is
often done.
Weber concentrates his discussion upon the formulation of ideal types
which relate to the elucidation of specific historical configurations. since this

22 MSS, p. 90. 23 MSS, pp. 90 & 91.

 Weber's methodological essays 143
presents the clearest differentiation of descriptive and ideal types. But ideal
type concepts are not solely limited to this objective. and there are various
kinds of ideal types which. without being simple descriptive concepts. never·
theless are generic in character. The transition from descriptive to ideal types
takes place when we move from descriptive classification of phenomena
towards the explanatory or theoretical analysis of those phenomena. This can
be illustrated by reference to the notion of • exchange '. This is a descriptive
concept in so far as we are simply content to observe that an indefinite num·
ber of human actions may be classified as exchange transactions. But if we
attempt to make the notion an element in marginal utility theory in econo·
mics. we construct an ideal type of ' exchange • which is based upon a purely
rational construct. 2 •
The relationship between social science and value-judgements is central to
Weber's discussion in the methodological essays published in 1904-5; this
relationship is treated from a different aspect in Weber's essay on 'ethical
neutrality' (Wertlreiheit). written a decade later. 25 In this latter essay. Weber
deals with a question which. while of basic importance to the relationship
between social science and social policy. concerns not the logical status of
value-judgements. but the practical issue of whether the scientist should use
his academic prestige or position to ~ropagate ideals which he holds. This
is itself a question which ultimately d!pends upon values. and consequently
cannot be resolved by scientific demonstration. It is an issue which • must
in the last analysis. be decided only with reference to those tasks which the
individual. according to his own value system. assigns to the universities '.2.
If the tasks of education be conceived in an extremely broad sense. so that it
is the role of the educator to introduce his students to a wide spectrum of
aesthetic and ethical culture. then it would be difficult for the teacher to
remove his own ideals from the sphere of his instruction. The view which
Weber expresses is that professional specialisation in education, especially
in subjects which have some degree of scientific pretension. is the proper
organisation of the modem university. In these circumstances. there is no
warrant for allowing the teacher to express his own world-view; the problems
of the social sciences. while they derive their interest as • problems' from
cultural values. cannot be solved except by technical analysis, and it is this
latter which it is the sole responsibility of the teacher to disseminate from
the lecture-platform.
However. what the student should, above all, learn from his teacher in the lecture-
hall today is: (I) the capacity to fulfill a given task in a workmanlike fasbion:

~4 For analyses of the logical status of • individual' as opposed to • generic' ideal types,
cf. von Schelling, pp. 329ff; and Parsons, pp. 601ff.
~,. MSS, pp. 1-47. For an analysis of the political context against which Weber
developed these views, cf. Wolfgang J. Mommsen: Max Weber und die deutsche
Politik, 1890-1920 (Tilbingen. 1959).
~& MSS, pp. 2-3.
144 Part 3: Max Weber
(2) definitely to recognise facts, even those which may be personally uncomfor-
table, and to distingtlish them from his own evaluations; (3) to subordinate him-
self to his task and to repress the impulse to make an unnecessary spectacle of
personal tastes or other sentiments."
The teacher in the university has all the opportunities which any other
citizen has for the furtherance of his ideal~ through political action, and
should not demand further privileges of his own. The professorial chair is
not a 'specialised qualification for personal prophecy'. A professor who
attempts to use his position in such a way is able to exploit his standing,
moreover, in relation to an audience which is particularly receptive and lack-
ing in mature self-confidence. In taking this position. Weber expresses a
personal conviction. If the university were to be made a forum where values
were discussed. this could only be on the basis of 'the most unrestrained
freedom of discussion of fundamental questions from all value-positions '.
But this does not at all pertain in the German universities, where basic political
and ethical issues cannot be openly discussed; and as long as this is so, ' it
seems to me to be only in accord with the dignity of a representative of science
to be silent as well about such value-problems as he is allowed to treat ' . l l
In saying this Weber does not, of course. mean that the university teacher
should refuse to express political and moral judgements outside the sphere of
the university itself. On the contrary. Weber scathingly dismisses the false
invoking of 'ethical neutrality' outside the academic sphere. It is as illegiti-
mate, in Weber's view. for a man to cloak his value-assertions in the field of
politics with a spurious scientific' neutrality '. as it is for him to openly preach
a partisan position within the university.
In any case it is essential to recognise, according to Weber, that the question
of whether an individual should advance a specific value-position in his teach-
ing should be recognised as separate from the logical relationship of factual
and value-propositions in the social sciences. ' The problems of the empirical
disciplines are, of course, to be solved" non-evaluatively n. They are not pro-
blems of evaluation. But the problems of the social sciences are selected by
the value-relevance of the phenomena treated. .. In empirical investigation.
no " practical evaluations" are legitimated by this strictly logical fact.' 29

27 MSS, p. 5; GAW. p. 493.

28 MSS, p. 8.
21 MSS. pp. 21-2.
11. F_damental concepts of sociology

Interpretative sociology
Weber's methodological essays were mostly written within the context of
lhe specific problems which occupied him in his early empirical works; they
document a struggle to break out of the intellectual confines of the traditions
of legal, economic and historical thOUght within which he was originally
trained. In the methodological essays, sociology is treated as subordinate to
history: the main problems of interest in the social sciences are deemed to
be those concerned with questions possessing definite cultural significance.
Weber rejects the view that generalisation is impossible in the social sciences,
but treats the formulation of general prin~ples mainly as a means to an end.
The very direction in which Weber's own empirical writings led. especially
as manifest in the massive Economy and Society. caused a certain change in
emphasis in this standpoint. Weber did not relinquish his fundamental stand
upon the absolute logical disjunction 1letween factual and value-judgements,
nor the correlate thesis that the analysis of unique historical configurations
cannot be carried through solely in terms of general principles. these latter
being only of prefatory significance to such a task. In Economy and Society.
however. the focus of Weber's interest moves more towards a direct concern
with the establishment of uniformities of social and economic organisation:
that is, towards sociology.
Sociology, Weber says. is concerned with the formulation of general prin-
ciples and generic type concepts in relation to human social action; history,
by contrast, • is directed towards the causal analysis and explanation of par-
ticular, culturally significant. actions, structures, and personalities '.1 This, of
course, reiterates the basic position established in the methodological essays,
and it may be said that in general the shift in Weber's concerns in the direc-
tion of sociology is a change of emphasis in his own personal interests rather
than a modification of his basic methodological views. The degree to which
Economy and Society represents a new departure in Weber's thinking has
often been exaggerated in secondary accounts of Weber's thought. Economy
and Society forms part of a large-scale collaborative work on different aspects
of political economy: Weber intends his own contribution to provide a pre-
face to the more specialised volumes written by his collaborating authors.'

1 ES, vol. 1, p. 19; WuG, vol. 1, p. 9.

2 The collection of volumes as a whole is entitled Grundriss de, S01.iolokonomik.
Authors include Sombart, Michels, Alfred Weber, and Schumpeter. The first con-
tributions were published in 1914, and others appeared up until 1930, when the

145
146 Part 3: Max Weber
In describing his objectives in writing Economy and Society Weber indicates
that the sociological analysis contained in it performs a task of ' very modest
preparation • which is necessary to the study of specific historical phenomena .
• It is then the concern of history to give a causal explanation of these
particular characteristics.' 3
In his essay on ' objectivity'. Weber emphasises that' in the social sciences
we are concerned with mental phenomena the empathic" understanding" of
which is naturally a task of a specifically different type from those which the
schemes of the exact natural sciences in general can or seek to solve '.~ One
of the main steps to the analysis of social phenomena. therefore. is that of
'rendering intelligible' the subjective basis upon which it rests; a principal
theme of the essay. of course. is that the possibility of the' objective • analysis
of social and historical phenomena is not precluded by the fact that human
activity has a 'subjective' character. On the other band. this subjectivity
cannot simply be eschewed from consideration by confiating natural and
social science. In outlining his conception of 'interpretative sociology' in
Economy ami Society. Weber preserves this stress upon the significance of
the subjective for sociological analysis. s
'In the sense in which this highly ambiguous word is used here '. Weber
says. sociology' shall be taken to refer to a science concerning itself with the
interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explana-
tion of its course and consequences'.' Social action or conduct (soziaies
Handeln) is that in which the subjective meaning involved relates to another
individual or group. There are two senses in which the meaning of action may
be analysed: either in reference to the concrete meaning which action has
for a given individual actor, or in relation to an ideal type of subjective
meaning on the part of a hypothetical actor.
There is no clear-cut separation in reality between action thus defined, and
behaviour which is purely unthinking or automatic. Large sectors of human
activity which are important for sociological purposes lie on the margins of
meaningful action: this is especially true of behaviour of a traditional kind.
Moreover. the same empirical activity may involve a fusion of understandable
and non-understandable elements. This may be the case. for instance. in some
forms of religious activity; which may involve mystical experiences which

coUection was terminated. See Johannes Winckelmann: • Max Webers Opus Post-
humum', Zeitschrilt liir die gesamten Slaalswissenschalten, vol. 105. 1949, pp.
368-87.
3 Letter to Georg von Below, June 1914, quoted in von Below: De, deutsche Slaal
des Mittelalters (LeipZig, 1925), p. xxiv.
• MSS, p. 74; GAW. p. 173.
I The ac:c:ount presented in the first volume of ES is a revised version of an eattier
essay' Ober einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie '. GAW, pp. 427-74
(originally published in 1913).
• ES, vol. I, p. 4; WuG. vol. J, p. 1. cr. Julien Freund: The Socio/OD 01 Max Weber
(London, 1968), pp. 90-1.
 Fundamental concepts of sociology 147

are only partially understandable to a social scientist who has not experienced
them. The full recapitulation of an e)tperience is, of course, not necessary to
this task of rendering it analytically intelligible: '" one need not have been
Caesar in order to understand Caesar" '. 7
It is important to capture the main drift of Weber's argument here. While
he accepts that subjective meaning is a basic component of much human con-
duct, Weber's point is that intuitionism is not the only doctrine which can
offer the possibility of studying this; on the contrary, interpretative sociology
can and must be based upon techniques of the interpretation of meaning which
are replicable, and thus are verifiable according to the conventional canons
of scientific method. This can be accomplished, according to Weber. either
by rational understanding of logical relationships which form part of the
subjective framework of the actor, or by understanding of a more emotive-
sympathetic kind. Rational understanding is most complete and precise in
the instance of the use by the actor of mathematical reasoning or formal logic.
, We have a perfectly clear understanding of what it means when somebody
employs the proposition 2X2=4 or the Pythagorean theorem in reasoning
or argument. or when someone correctly carries out a logical train of reason-
ing according to our accepted modes of thinking.' • But there is no absolutely
clear line between the comprehensioq of propositions of logic in this strict
sense. and the manner in which we 'Anderstand the actions of a man who
rationally selects and employs a given means to reach a practical end. While
empathy is an important means of obtaining understanding of action which
takes place in an emotive context. it is mistaken to identify empathy. and
understanding: the latter demands not merely a sentiment of emotional sym-
pathy on the part of the sociologist. but the grasping of the subjective intelli-
gibility of action. In general. however. it is true thaL the more the ideals
towards which human activity is directed are foreign to those which govern
our own conduct. the harder it is to understand the meaning they have for
those who hold them. We must accept. in these circumstances, that only par-
tial comprehension is possible, and when even this cannot be attained, we hav~
to be content to treat them as' given data '.
Sociology, must of course, take account of objects and events which influ-
ence human activity. but which are devoid of subjective meaning. These
phenomena (which include. for example. climatic, geographical and biological
factors) are' conditions' of human behaviour. but do not necessarily have any
relationship to any human purpose. But in so far as such phenomena do be-
Come involved with human subjective ends. they take on meaning, and become
elements within social action. An artifact such as a machine' can be under-
stOod only in terms of the meaning (Sinn) which its production and use have
had or were intended to have ...•.•

: ES. vol. I, p. S. Carlo Antoni: From History to Sociology (London, 1962). p. 170.
& ES, vol. I, p. S. • ES. vol. I, p. 7; WllG, vol. 1, p. 3.
148 Part 3: Max Weber
The scientific analysis of social action. in so far as it proceeds beyond mere
description. proceeds through the construction of ideal types: and. given the
difficulties involved in the understanding of many forms of value-directed or
emotively influenced action. it is normally useful to construct rational types.
Having specified in the ideal type what constitutes rational action. deviation
from it can be examined in terms of the influence of irrational elements. The
main advantage of rational ideal types has already been demonstrated. Weber
considers. in economics: they are precise in formulation and unambiguous in
application. Weber emphasises this as a procedural point; it is a methodolo-
gical device the use of which does not in any sense imply the existence of a
• rationalist bias '.
Weber distinguishes two basic kinds of interpretative grasp of meaning,
each of which may be subdivided according to whether it involves the under-
standing of rational or of emotive actions. The first kind is 'direct under-
standing '. In this case. we understand the meaning of an action through direct
observation: the rational subdivision of direct understanding can be illus-
trated by the example quoted previously. of the comprehension of a mathe-
matical proposition. We understand the meaning of the sum 2X2=4 at once
if we hear it spoken. or see it written. Direct understanding of irrational con-
duct, on the other hand. is shown. for example. where we ' understand an out-
break of anger as manifested by facial expression. exclamations or irrational
emotional reactions '. The second ki!td of understanding. 'explanatory under-
standing' (erkliirendes Verstehen) differs from this in that it involves the
elucidation of an intervening motivationalIink between the observed activity
and its meaning to the actor. Here there are similarly two subsidiary forms.
The rational form consists in the understanding of action where an individual
is engaged in an activity which involves the use of a given means to realise a
particular purpose. Thus. in the example which Weber adduces. if an observer
sees a man chopping wood, and knows that he wishes to get some fuel in to
light his fire. he is able without difficulty to grasp the rational content of the
other's action. The same sort of indirect proCess of motivational inference
can be made in relation to irrational conduct. So. for instance. we are able to
understand. in this sense. the response of a person who bursts into tears if we
know that he has just suffered a bitter disappointment
In explanatory understanding. the particular action concerned is 'placed
in an understandable sequence of motivation. the understanding of which
can be treated as an explanation of the actual course of behaviour. Thus for a
science which is concerned with the subjective meaning of action. explanation
requires a grasp of the complex of meaning (Sinnzusammenhang) in which an
actual course of understandable action thus interpreted belongs.' 10 This is
extremely important in Weber's conception of the application of interpretative

10 ES, vol. I, p. 9. For an analysis of the theoretical significance of this, see Parsons,
pp.63Sff.
 Fundamental concepts of sociology 149
sOCiology to empirical analysis. The understanding of 'motivation' always
involves relating the particular conduct concerned to a broader normative
standard with reference to which the individual acts. In order to reach the
level of causal explanation, a distinction has to be made between' subjective •
and' causal • adequacy. The interpretation of a given course of action is sub-
jectively adequate (adequate 'on the level of meaning ') if the motivation
which is attributed to it accords with recognised or habitual normative pat-
terns. This entails showing. in other words. that the action concerned is mean-
ingful in that it 'makes sense' in terms of accepted norms. But this is not
enough. in itself. to provide a viable explanation of the particular action.
Indeed. it is the basic fallacy of idealist philosophy to identify subjective
adequacy with causal adequacy. The essential flaw in tbis view is that there
is no direct and simple relationship between • complexes of meaning',
motives. and conduct. Similar actions on the part of several individuals may
be the result of a diversity of motives and. conversely. similar motives can be
linked to different concrete forms of behaviour. Weber does not attempt 10
deny the complex character of human motivation. Men often experience con-
flicts of motives; and those motives of which a man is consciously aware may
be largely rationalisations of deeper motives of which he is unconscious. The
sociologist must be cognisant of thes.~ possibilities. and ready to deal with
them on an empirical level - althouglt. of course, the more it is the case that
an activity is the result of impulses that are not accessible to consciousness,
the more this becomes a marginal phenomenon for the interpretation of
meaning.
For these reasons, ' causal' adequacy demands that it should be possible
'to determine that there is a probability. which in the rare ideal case can be
numerically stated, but is always in some sense calculable. that a given observ-
able event (overt or subjective) will be followed or accompanied by another
event '.11 Thus, in order to demonstrate explanatory significance, there must be
an established empirical generalisation which relates the subjective meaning
of the act to a specified range of determinable consequences. It fo])ows from
the intrinsic suppositions of Weber's method. of course, that if any such
generalisation, however precisely verified. lacks adequacy on the level of
meaning. then it remains a statistical correlation outside the scope of
interpretative sociology :
Only those statistical regularities are thus sociological generalisations which cor-
respond to an understandable common meaning of a course of social action, and
constitute understandable types of action, in the sense of the term used here.
OnJy those rational formulations of subjectively understandable action which
can at least with some degree of closeness be observed in reality, constitute socio-

11 ES, vol. I, pp. 11-12. Given this condition. as Weber makes clear in his critique of
Roscher and Knies. . The .. interpretative" motive-research of the historian is
~ausalattribution in exactly the same sense as the causal interpretation of any
mdividual process in nature .. .'. GAW. p. 134.
ISO Part 3: Max Weber
logical types relating to real events. It is by no means the case that the actual
likelihood of the occurrence of a given course of overt action is always propor-
tional to the clarity of subjective interpretation. 12
There are many sorts of statistical data which, while they may relate to
phenomena which conceivably influence human behaviour, are not meaning-
ful in Weber's sense of that term. But meaningful action is not refractory to
statistical treatment: sociological statistics in this sense include, for example,
crime rates or statistics of the distribution of occupations.
Weber does not limit the range of information which is of value in the
study of human social conduct to that which can be analysed according to
the method of interpretative sociology. There are many sorts of processes
and influences which have causal relevance for social life which are not
'understandable'. but the importance of which Weber by no means dis-
counts. It is essential to stress this, since it has become commonplace to
suppose that, according to Weber, interpretative sociology is the sole basis of
generalisation in relation to human social conduct Weber is conscious that
his own limitation of the term 'sociology' to the analysis of subjectively
meaningful action cross-cuts other conceptions of the ranse of the field which
are often applied: 'sociology in our sense ... is restricted to " interpretative
sociology" (verstehende Soziolog;e) - a usage which no-one else should Or
can be compelled to follow.' 13
Weber's specific reference to organicist sociology, &uch as represented by
SchafRe's BOll und Leben des Socialen Kiirpers - which Weber calls a 'bril-
liant work • - is of relevance here. Functionalism. Weber notes, has a definite
utility in approaching the study of social life : as a means of • practical illus-
tration and for provisional orientation ... it is not only useful but indispen-
sable '.14 Just as in the case of the study of organic systems. in the social
sciences functional analysis allows us to identify which units within the
• whole • [society] it is important to study. But at a certain point the analogy
between society and organism breaks down. in that in the analysis of the
former it is possible. and also necessary. to go beyond the establishment of
functional uniformities. Rather than being a barrier to scientific knowledge.
however. the achievement of interpretative understanding should be regarded
as offering explanatory possibilities which are unavailable in the natural
sciences. This does not come wholly without cost though: it is paid for by
the lower level of precision and certainty of findings characteristic of the
social sciences.
Where Weber does differ sharply with Schaffie is on the issue of the logical
status of holistic concepts. Those sociologists who take their point of depar-
ture from the' whole' and from thence approach the analysis of individual

12 ES, vol. 1, p. 12; WI/G, vol. I, p. 6.

U ES, vol. I, pp. 12-13; WuG, vol. I, p. 6.
1. ES, vol. I, p. 15.
 Fundamental concepts 0/ sociology lSI
behaviour are easily lured into the hypostatisation of concepts. Thus
• society'. which is never more than the multitudinous interactions of indivi-
duals in particular milieux. takes on a reified identity of its own. as if it were
an acting unit which has its own peculiar consciousness. Weber admits, of
course. that it is nec:essary in the social sciences to use concepts which refer
to collectivities. such as states. industrial firms. etc. But it must not be for-
gotten that these collectives are • solely the resultants and modes of
organisation of the specific acts of individual men, since these alone are for us
the agents who carry out subjectively understandable action '.11 There is
another respect, however, in which such collective agencies are of vital
importance in interpretative sociology: this is, that they form realities from
the subjective standpoint of individual actors, and are frequently represented
by them as autonomous unities. Such representations may play an important
causal role in intluencing social conduct.
Interpretative sociology, according to Weber, does not involve the con-
notation that social phenomena can be explained reductively in psychological
tenns.lt The findings of psychology are certainly relevant to all the social
sciences. but no more so than those of those of other borderline disciplines.
The sociologist is not interested in the psychological make-up of the indivi-
dual per se, but in the interpretative analysis of social action. Weber rejects
unequivocally the notion that sociai' institutions can be • derived', in an
explanatory sense, from psychological generalisations. Since human life is
primarily shaped by socio-cultural influences, it is in fact more likely that
sociology has more to contribute to psychology than vice versa:
tbe procedure does not begin with the analysis of psychological qualities, moving
tben to the analysis of social institutions •.. on the contrary, insight into the
psychological preconditions and consequences of iostitutions presupposes a pre-
cise knowledge of tbe latter and tbe scientific analysis of their stru<:ture... We
will not however deduce the institutions from psychological laws or explain than
by elementary psychological pbenomena.17

SGdaJ reJatiOllsbips _d the orieatatioD of sodIII eondud

Social action covers any sort of human conduct which is meaningfully
, oriented to the past, present, or expected future behaviour of others '.11 A
social • relationship' exists whenever there is reciprocity on the pan of two
or more individuals, each of whom relates his action to acts (or anticipated
acts) of the other. This does not necessarily imply. however. that the meanings
involVed in the relationship are shared: in many cases, such as in a • love'
relationship which cooforms to the proverb il y a un qui crime et un qui se

U ES, vol. I, p. 13; WuG, vol. I, p. 6. For an cxtcnsive critical consideration of this
and other points in Weber's outline of interpretative sociology, see Alfred Schutz:
"~
.:.S, voL I, p. 19. .
The Phenomenology of the Social World (Evanston 1967).

17 MSS, pp. 88-9. II ES,vo. I 1,p.22.

152 Part 3: Max Weber
laisse aimer, the attitudes held by one party are not at all the same as those
held by the other. Nevertheless in such relationships, if they are continued
over time, there are mutually complementary meanings which define for each
individual what is 'expected' of him. Following Simmel. Weber speaks of
Vergesellschaftung. which carries the sense of the formation of relationships
and means literally' societalisation " rather than of Gesellschaft (society).
Many of the relationships of which social life is compounded are of a transi-
tory character. and are constantly in the process of formation and dissolu-
tion. Nor, of course, is it implied that the existence of a social relation-
ship presupposes co-operation between those involved. As Weber is careful
to point out. conflict is a characteristic of even the most permanent of
rela lionshi ps.
Not all types of contact between individuals constitute, in Weber's terms,
a social relationship. If two men walking along the street collide with each
oth~r without having noticed the other prior to the collision. their interaction
is not a case of social action: it would become so if they should subsequently
argue over who was to blame for the mishap. Weber also mentions the case
of interaction in crowds: if Le Bon is correct. membership of a crowd group
can give rise to collective moods which are stimulated by subconscious
influences over which the individual has little control. Here the behaviour of
the individual is causally influenced by that of others. but this is not action
which is oriented to others on the level of meaning. and hence is not ' social
action' in Weber's terminology.
Weber distinguishes four types of orientation of social conduct. In 'pur-
posively rational' conduct. the individual rationally assesses the probable
results of a given act in terms of the calculation of means to an end. In secur-
ing a given objective. a number of alternative means of reaching that end
usually exist. The individual faced with these alternatives weighs the relative
effectiveness of each of the possible means of attaining the end, and the con-
sequences of securing it for other goals which the individual holds. Here
Weber applies the schema. already formulated with regard to the rational
application of social scientific knowledge. to the paradigm of social action in
general. 'Value rational' action. by contrast, is directed towards an over-
riding ideal. and takes no account of any other considerations as relevant.
'The Christian does rightly and leaves the results to the Lord: 11 This is
nonetheless rational action. because it involves the setting of coherent objec-
tives to which the individual channels his activity. All actions which are solely
directed to overriding ideals of duty. honour, or devotion to a 'cause',
approximate to this type. A primary distinction between a value rational
action and the third type. which is 'affective' action, is that, whereas the
former presupposes that the individual holds a clearly defined ideal which
dominates his activity. in the latter case this characteristic is absent. Affective

11 FMW, p. 120.
 Fundamental concepts of sociology 153
action is that which is carried out under the sway of some sort of emotive
state, and as such is on the borderline of meaningful and non-meaningful
conduct. It shares with value rational action the characteristic that the mean-
ing of the action is not located, as in purposively rational conduct, in the
instrUmentality of means to ends. but in carrying out the act for its own sake.
The fourth type of orientation of action. ' traditional • action. also overlaps
the margins of meaningful and non-meaningful conduct. Traditional action
is carried out under the influence of custom and habit. This applies to the
• great bulk of all everyday action to which people have become habitually
accustomed .. .'.JQ In this type, the meaning of action is derived from ideals
or symbols which do not have the coherent, defined form of those which
are pursued in value rationality. In so far as traditional values become
rationalised, traditional action merges with value rational action.
This fourfold typology which Weber delineates underlies the empirical
substance of Economy and Society, but it is not intended as an overall classi-
fication of social action; it is an ideal typical schema which provides a mode
of applying Weber's stated dictum that the analysis of social action can best
be pursued through the use of rational types against which irrational devia-
tions can be measured. Thus a particular empirical instance of human con-
duct can be interpreted according to which of the four types of action it most
closely approximates. But very few en'fpirical cases
will not in fact include. in
varying combinations, a mixture of elements from more than one type.
In his discussion of the difficulties posed by the problem of verification in
interpretative sociology. Weber stresses that causal adequacy always is a
matter of degrees of probability. Those who have argued that human
behaviour is ' unpredictable • arc demonstrably mistaken: • the characteristic
of II incalculability ..... is the privilege of - the insane '.21 But the uniformities
which are found in human conduct are expressible only in terms of the pro-
bability that a particular act or circumstance will produce a given response
from an actor. Every social relationship thus may be said to rest upon the
• probability' (which must not be confused with • chance' in the sense of
, accident') that an actor or plurality of actors will direct their action in a
specified manner. To affirm the element of contingency in human conduct. in
Weber's view. is not to deny its regularity and predictability; but it is to
emphasise once again the contrast between meaningful conduct and the
inVariant response characteristic of. for example. a subconsciously mediated
Withdrawal reaction t~ a painful stimulus.
In setting out a conceptual taxonomy of the principal types of social
relationship and more inclusive forms of social organisation. Weber thus
couches his description in terms of probability. Every social relationship

20 ES, vol. I. p. 25.

21 MSS, p. 124. See also GAW. pp. 65ff, where Weber discusses in detail the relationship
between • irrationality·, . unpredictability' and . freedom of will '.
154 Part 3: Max Weber
which is of a durable character presupposes uniformities of conduct which,
at the most basic level, consist in what Weber calls 'usage' (Brauch) and
'custom' (Sitte). A uniformity in social action is a usage' in so far as the
probability of its existence within a group is based on nothing but actual
practice '.22 A custom is simply a usage which is long established. A usage or
custom is any form of ' usual • conduct which, while it is neither expressly
approved or disapproved of by others, is habitually followed by an individual
or number of individuals. Conformity to it is not backed by any kind of sanc-
tions, but is a matter of the voluntary accord of the actor. 'Today it is custo-
mary every morning to eat a breakfast which. within limits, conforms to a
certain pattern. But there is no obligation to do so (except in the case of hotel
guests); and it was not always a custom.' 23 The social importance of usage
and custom must not be under-estimated. Consumption habits, for example,
which are usually customary, have great economic significance. Uniformity of
conduct founded upon usage or custom contrasts with that associated with
the ideal type of rational action where individuals. subjectively pursue their
own self·interest. The attitude of the capitalist entrepreneur in a free market
is the prototypical case of this.24 Where uniformity of conduct is adhered to
from motives of self·interest - in other words, approximates to this type - a
social relationship is usually much more unstable than one resting upon
custom.

Legitimacy, domiDation, and authority

The most stable forms of social relationship are those in which the subjective
attitudes of the participating individuals are directed towards the belief in a
legitimate order. In order to illustrate the distinctions at issue here, Weber
gives the following examples:
If furniture movers regularly advertise at the time many leases expire, this un i-
fonnity is determined 'by self-interest. H a salesman visits certain customers on
particular days of the month or the week, it is either a case of customary be·
haviour or a product of self-interested orientation. However, when a civil ser·
vant appears in his office daily at a fixed time, he does not act only on the basis of
custom or self-interest which he could disregard if he wanted to; as a rule, his
action is also determined by the validity of an order (viz., the civil service rules).
which he fulfils partly because disobedience would be disadvantageous to bim
but also because its violation would be abhorrent to his sense of duty (of course,
in varying degrees).25
Action may be guided by the belief in a legitimate order in other ways than
through adherence to the tenets of that order. Such is the case with a criminal,

22 ES, vol. 1, p. 29. 23 ES. vol. 1. p. 29; WuG. vol. I, p. 15.

24 It might be pointed out that Weber here is speaking of empirical cases which approxi-
mate to purposively rational action. This is not, therefore, the equivalent of Durk-
heim's • egoism '. since in Weber's instance the subjective pursuit of self-interest is
'oriented towards identical expectations' (ES, vol. I, pp. 29-30).
25 ES, vol. I, p. 31.
 Fundamental concepts 0/ sociology ISS
who. while violating laws. recognises and adapts his conduct to their existence
by the very measures he takes to plan his criminal activity. In this instance.
his actions are governed by the fact tbat violation of the legal order is
punished. and he wishes to avoid the punishment. But his acceptance of the
validity of the order purely as a ' fact • is only at one extreme of many sorts
of violations in which individuals make some attempt to claim legitimate
justification for their acts. Moreover. it is extremely important to note that
the same legitimate order may be interpreted in differing ways. This is some-
thing which can be readily illustrated from Weber's empirical analyses of the
sociology of religion: thus the Protestantism of the Reformation was a
radicalisation of the very same Christian order as was claimed by the Catholic
church as the.basis of its legitimacy.
There is no clear empirical line between usage and custom. and what
Weber calls 'convention '. Conformity is not, in this case. a matter of the
voluntary disposition of the individual. H. for example. a member of a high-
ranking status group departs from the conventions governing appropriate
standards of politeness. the probability is that he will be ridiculed or ostracised
by the rest of the group. The mobilisation of such sanctions is often an
extremely powerful mode of securing compliance to an established order.
, Law' exists where a convention is, backed. not simply by diffuse informal
sancti~ns. but by an individual, or diore usually a group, who has the legiti-
mate capacity and duty to apply sanctions against transgressors':" The law-
enforcement agency need not necessarily involve the son of specialised pro-
fessional body of judiciary and police found in modem societies: in the blood
feud, for example. the clan group fulfils an equivalent task as a sanctioning
agency. The empirical relationship between custom, convention and law is an
intimate one. Even the hold of sheer usage may be very strong. Those who
frame laws to cover conduct which was formerly merely' usual • frequently
discover that very little additional conformity to the prescription in question
is attained. However, usage and custom do in most cases provide the origin
of rules which become laws. The reverse also occurs. although less frequently:
the introduction of a new law may eventuate in new modes of habitual con-
duct. Such a consequence may be direct or indirect. Thus one indirect con-
sequence of the laws which allow the free formation of contracts. for example.
is that salesmen spend much of their time travelling to solicit and main-
tain orders from buyers; this is not enforced by the laws of contracc, but
nevertheless is conditional upon their existence.
Weber does not hold that we can only speak of the existence of 'law'
where the coercive apparatus involved is a political agency. A legal order

~. Weber distiDguishes at one point between' guaranteed' law and • indirectly guaran-
teed' law. The first type is backed directly by a coercive apparatus. The second type
refers to the case of a no~ ~e. transgression of which is not legally punished, but
has the consequence of lnfnngmg other norms which are guanu.teed laws. But
Weber normally uses' law' without qualification to denote guaranteed law.
156 Part 3: Max Weber
exists in any circumstance in which a group - such as a kinship group or a
religious body - assumes the task of applying sanctions to punish trans-
gressions. In fact, the influence of religious groups upon the rationalisation
of law is a main theme in Weber's empirical writings. In more general terms,
the inter-relationships between the 'legal 'J ' religious' and' political' are of
decisive significance to economic structures and economic development.
Weber defines a ' political' society as one whose' existence and order is con-
tinuously safeguarded within a given territorial area by the threat and applica-
tion of physical force on the part of the administrative staff '. This does not
imply. of course, that political organisations exist only through the continual
use of force. merely that the threat or actual employment of force is used as an
ultimate sanction. which may be utilised when all else fails. A political
organisation becomes a 'state' where it is able successfully to exercise a
legitimate monopoly over the organised use of force within a given territory.27
Weber defines' power' (Macht) as the probability that an actor will be
able to realise his own objectives even against opposition from others with
whom he is in a social relationship. This definition is very broad indeed: in
this sense, every sort of social relationship is. to some degree and in certain
circumstat!ces. a power relationship. The concept of 'domination' (Herr-
schaft) is more specific: it refers only to those cases of the exercise of power
where an actor obeys a specific command issued by another.2I Acceptance
of domination may rest upon quite different motives. ranging from sheer habit
to the cynical promotion of self-advantage. The possibility of obtaining
material rewards and of securing social esteem, however. are two of the
most pervasive forms of tie binding leader and follower." But no stable
system of domination is based purely upon either automatic habituation or
upon the appeal to self-interest: the main prop is belief by subordinates in
the legitimacy of their subordination.
Weber distinguishes three ideal type..'1 of legitimacy upon which a relation-
ship of domination may rest: traditional, charismatic. and legal. Traditional
authority is based upon the belief in the 'sanctity of age-old rules and
powers '.30 In the most elementary kinds of traditional domination, those who
rule have no specialised administrative staff through which they exercise their
authority. In many small rural communities, authority is held by the village
elders: those who are oldest are considered to be most steeped in traditional
wisdom and thereby qualified to hold authority. A second form of traditional

27 Compare Durkheim's divergent conceptualisation, above, p. 100. Neither the

possession of a fixed territory Dor thP. capability of applying force appears in
Durkheim's definition.
2' For a summary of issues relevant to the terminological debate over whether Herr-
schall should be translated as • domination' or • authority " see Roth's annotation
in ES, vol. J, pp. 61-2 (note 31). I have used the term' domination' as broader ia
denotation than • authority' (legitime Herrschalt).
2' FMW, pp. 8~1.
3. ES, vol. I, p. 226.
 Fundamental concepts oj sociology 157

domination, which in fact often exists in combination with gerontocracy, is

patriarchalism. In this form. which is normally based upon a household unit.
the head of the family possesses authority which is transmitted from genera-
tion to generation by definite rules of inheritance. Where an administrative
staff exists, subordinated by ties of personal allegiance to a master.
patrimonialism develops.
Patrimonialism is the characteristic form of domination in the traditional
despotic governments of the Orient. as well as in the Near East and in mediae-
val Europe. In contrast to the less complex patriarchal form, patrimonialism
i3 marked by a clear distinction between ruler and • subjects ': in simple
patriarchalism • domination, even though it is an inherent traditional right
of the master, must definitely be exercised as a joint right in the interest of
all members and is thus not freely appropriated by the incumbent '.31 Patri-
monial authority is rooted in the household administration of the ruler; the
intermingling of courtly life and governmental functions is its distinctive
feature, and officials are first recruited from the personal retainers or servants
of the ruler. Where patrimonial domination is exerted over large territories,
however, a broader basis of recruitment is necessary, and frequently a ten-
dency towards decentralisation of administration develops. providing a basis
for a variety of tensions and conflicts between ruler and local patrimonial
officials or • notables '.
While in historical reality numerous mixtures of types are possible and
have existed, the pure type of traditional organisation offers a contrast with
the ideal type of rational bureaucracy, which is founded upon legal domina-
tion. In traditional organisations. the tasks of members are ambiguously
defined. and privileges and duties are subject to modification according to
the inclination of the ruler; recruitment is made on the basis of personal
affiliation; and there is DO rational process of • law-making': any innova-
tions in administrative rules have to be made to appear to be rediscoveries of
• given' truths.
Weber sets out the pure type of legal authority as foUows. 32 In this type, an
individual who holds authority does so in virtue of impersonal norms which
are not the residue of tradition, but which have been consciously established
within a context of either purposive or value rationality. Those who are sub-
ject to authority obey their superordinate, not because of any personal depen-
dence on him. but because of their acceptance of the impersonal norms wnich
define that authority; • thus the typical person holding legal authority, the
.. superior", is himself subject to an impersonal order, and orients his actions
to it in his own dispositions and commands '.33 Those subject to legal authority

31 ES, vol. I, p. 231. I have also used here Weber's earlier account of patrimonialism in
ES, vol. 3, pp. 1006-10.
32 Weber's alternative exposition is to be found in ES, vol. 3, pp. 956-1005; the later
version is in vol. I, pp. 217-26.
33 ES, vol. I, p. 217; WuG, vol. I, p. 125.
158 ParI 3: Max Weber
owe no personal allegiance to a superordinate, and follow his commands only
within the restricted sphere in which his jurisdiction is clearly specified.
The pure type of bureaucratic organisation shows the following charac-
teristics. The activities of the administrative staff are carried out on a regular
basis, and thus constitute well-defined official • duties '. The spheres of com·
petence of the officials are clearly demarcated, and levels of authority are
delimited in the form of a hierarchy of offices. The rules governing conduct
of the staff, their authority and responsibilities, are recorded in writte!l
form. Recruitment is based upon demonstration of specialised competence
via competitive examinations or the possession of diplomas or degrees giving
evidence of appropriate qualifications. Office property is not owned by the
official, and a separation is maintained between the official and the office.
such that under no conditions is the office • owned' by its incumbent. This
type of organisation has distinct consequences for the position of the official:
1. The career of the official is governed by an abstract conception of duty; the
performance of official tasks in a faithful manner is an end in itself rather
than a means of obtaining personal material gain through rents, etc. 2. The
official obtains his position through being appointed, on the basis of his tech-
nical qualifications, by a higher authority; he is not elected. 3. He normally
holds a tenured position. 4. His remuneration takes the shape of a fixed and
regular salary. S. The occupational position of the official is such as to Pf(l-
vide for • career' involving movement up the hierarchy of authority; the
degree of progression achieved is determined either by manifest ability or
seniority, or by a combination of the two.
It is only within modem capitalism that organisations are found which
approximate to this ideal typical form. The main examples of developed
bureaucracies, prior to the emergence of modem capitalism, were those of
ancient Egypt, China, the later Roman principate, and the mediaeval Catholic
church. These bureaucracies, particularly the first three, were essentially
patrimonial, and were based largely upon the payment of officials in kind.
This shows that the prior formation of a money economy is not an essenti;'ll
prerequisite to the emergence of bureaucratic organisation, although it has
been of great importance in facilitating the growth of modem rational bureau-
cracy. The advance of bureaucratisation in the modem world is directly
associated with the expansion of the division of labour in various spheres of
social life. It is basic to Weber's sociology of modem capitalism that the
phenomenon of specialisation of occupational function is by no means limited
to the economic sphere. The separation of the labourer from control of bis
means of production which Marx singled out as the most distinctive feature
of modem capitalism is not confined to industry, but extends throughout the
polity, army, and other sectors of society in which large-scale organisations
become prominent. 3' In post-mediaeval western Europe, the bureaucratisation
34 cf. GASS, pp. 49811. The importance of this point is amplified, in relation to Marx's
position, sec below, pp. 234-8.
 Fundamental concepts oj sociology 159

of the state has preceded that in the economic sphere. The modem capitalist
state is completely dependent upon bureaucratic organisation for its continued
existence. 'The iarger the state, or the more it becomes a great power state,
the more unconditionally is this the case...' 3$ While sheer size of the adminis-
trative unit is a major factor determining the spread of rational bureaucratic
organisation - as in the case of the modem mass political party - there is not
a unilateral relationship between size and bureaucratisation. u The necessity
of specialisation to fulfil specific administrative tasks is as important as size
in promoting bureaucratic specialisation. Thus in Egypt. the oldest bureau-
cratic state, the development of bureaucracy was primarily determined by the
need for the regulation of irrigation by a centralised administration. In the
modern capitalist economy, the formation of a supra-local market is a major
condition stimulating the development of bureaucracy, since it demands the
regular and co-ordinated distribution of goods and services. 31
The efficiency of bureaucratic organisation in the performance of such
routinised tasks is the main reason for its spread.
The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organisations
exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. Pre-
cision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity.
strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs -
tbese are raised to the optimwn point in the strictly bureaucratic orgall!i5ation ...31
These qualities are demanded above all by the capitalist economy, which
requires that economic operations be discharged with speed and precision.
Weber's position on this point has often been misunderstood. Weber was
obviously aware of the view - common since the turn of the nineteenth cen-
tury - that bureaucracy is associated with' red tape ',and • inefficiency '.38 Nor
was Weber ignorant of the importance in the substantive operation of bureau-
cratic organisations of the existence of informal contacts and patterns of
relationship which overlap with the formally designated distribution of
authority and responsibilities. 40 Bureaucratic organisation may produce' de·
finite impediments for the discharge of business in a manner best adapted to
the individuality of each case '.41 It is from this latter fact that the concern
3. ES, vol. 3, p. 971; WuG, vol. 2, p. 568.
31 Weber thus criticises Michels for exaggerating the' iron' character of the tendency
towards the formation of oligarchy in bureaucracies. ES. vol. 3, pp. 1003-4.
37 It is important to emphasise that the modem state and economy do not become
totally bureaucratised. For those at • the top " specialised qualifications of a technical
kind are not required. Ministerial and presidential positions are filled through some
kind of electoral process, and tbe industrial entrepreneur is not appointed by the
bureaucracy he beads .• Thus at tbe top of a bureaucratic organisation. tbere is
necessarily an element which is at least not purely bureaucratic.' ES, vol. I, p. 222.
31 ES, vol. 3, p. 973.
39 cf. Martin Albrow: BureQucracy (London, 1970), pp. 26-54.
fO cf. Weber's contributions to the discussions of the Verein fiir Sozialpolitik in 1909,
G.4SS, pp. 412-16.
fl ES, vol. 3, pp. 974-5.
160 Part 3: Max Weber
with • red tape derives. and it is not wholly misplaced. because by its very
I

nature as a rationalised structure. bureaucracy operates according to systema-

tised rules of conduct. It is entirely conceivable. according to Weber. that
prior forms of administrative organisation may be superior in terms of deal-
ing with a given particular case. This can be illustrated by the instance of
judicial decisions. In traditional legal practice. a patrimonial ruler intervenes
at will in the dispensation of justice~ and consequently may sometimes be
able to render a verdict on the basis of his own personal knowledge of a defen-
dant which is more • just than a judgement returned in a similar case in a
I

modem law-court. because in the latter instance' only unambiguous general

characteristics of the facts of the case are taken into account I.U
But this would certainly not happen in the majority of cases. and it is pre-
cisely the element of 'calculability' involved in rational legal domination
which makes bureaucratic administration quite distinct from prior types:
indeed. it is the only form of organisation which is capable of coping with the
immense tasks of co-ordination necessary to modem capitalism. Weber states
the point as follows:
however many people may complain about the • bureaucracy', it would be an
illusion to think for a moment that oontinuous administrative work can 'be carried
out in any field except by means of officials working in offices. The whole pattern
of everyday life is cut to fit this framework.. U bureaucratic administration is,
ceteris paribus, always the most rational type from a formal. technical point of
view. the needs of mass administration (of people or of things) make it today
completely indispensable.· 3
Charismatic domination. Webers third type. is wholly distinct from the
other two. Both traditional and legal domination are permanent systems of
administration. concerned with the routine tasks of everyday life. The pure
type of charismatic domination is. by definition, an extraordinary type.
Charisma is defined by Weber as' a certain quality of an individual persona-
lity by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed
with supernatural. superhuman. or at least specifically exceptional powers
or qualities '.u A charismatic individual is, therefore. one whom others
believe to possess strikingly unusual capacities. often thought to be of a super-
natural kind. which set him apart from the ordinary. Whether a man" really"
possesses any or all of the characteristics attributed to him by his followers is
not at issue; what matters is that extraordinary qualities should be attributed
to him by others. Charismatic domination can arise in the most varied social
and historical contexts, and consequently charismatic figures range from
political leaders and religious prophets whose actions have influenced the
course of development of whole civilisations. through to many sorts of petty
demagogue in all walks of life who have secured for themselves a temporary
following. The claim to legitimacy in charismatic authority. in whatever con-

42 ES, vol. 2, pp. 656-7.

43 ES, vol. I, p. 223; WI/G, vol. I, p. 128. .4 ES. vol. I, p. 241.
 Fundamental concepts 0/ sociology 161
text it is found. is thus always founded upon the belief of both leader and
followers in the authenticity of the leader's mission. The charismatic figure
normally supplies 'proof' of his genuineness through the' performance of
nUracles or the issuing of divine revelations. Wbile these are signs of the
validity of his authority. however, they are not as such the basis upon which
it rests, which ' lies rather in the conception that it is the duty of those subject
to charismatic authority to recognise its genuineness and to act accordingly .,.5
Membership of secondary authority positions in a charismatic movement
is not based upon privileged selection through personal ties, nor upon the
possession of technical qualifications. There is no fixed hierarchy of subordi-
nation, nor is there a 'career' such as exists in bureaucratic organisations.
The charismatic leader simply has an indeterminate number of intimates who
share in his charisma or who possess charisma of their own. Unlike the per-
manent forms of organisation, a charismatic movement has no systematically
organ:isc:d means of economic support: its income is either received from
donations of some kind or another, or is acquired by plunder. The charismatic
movement is not organised around fixed juridical principles of a general kind,
such as are found. with different content, in both traditional and legal domi-
nation; judgements are made in relation to each particular case, and are pre-
sented as divine revelations. • The genuine prophet, like the genuine military
leader and every true leader in this sense, preaches, creates, or demands new
obligations.. : 61
This is symptomatic of the break with the accepted order which the emer-
acnce of charismatic domination represents. 'Within the sphere of its claims.
charismatic authority rejects the past, and is in this sense specifically revolu-
tionary.' C1 Charisma is a driving. creative force which surges through the
established rules, whether traditional or legal, which govern an existing order.
It is. according to Weber. a specifically irrational phenomenon. This is indeed
essential to Weber's very definition of charisma. since the sole basis of
charismatic authority is the recognitibn of the authenticity of the claims of the
leader: the ideals of the charismatic movement are consequently in no way
necessarily bound to those of the existing system of domination. Charisma
is thus particularly important as a revolutiomuy force within traditional
systems of domination, where authority is tied to precedents which have been
handed down in a relatively unchanging form from the past. • In prerationa-
listic periods, tradition and charisma between them have almost exhausted
the whole of the orientation of action.' .. With the advance of rationalisation.
however. the rational implementation of social change (e.g.• through the
application of scientific knowledge to technological innovation) becomes
increasingly significant.
~s £S, vol. I, p. 242.
•1 ES, vol. 1. p. 243 .• Kadi-juslice' is administered in this way, in priuciple; in practic:e
., Weber says, it was .actually closely bound to traditional precedent. '
ES. vol. I, p. 244; WuG, vol. 1. p. 141. 41 ES. vol. I, p. 245.
162 Part 3: Max Webei"

Because of its antipathy to the routine and the everyday. charisma neces-
sarily undergoes profound modification if it survives into anything like per-
manent existence. The ' routinisation • (VeraUtiiglichung) of charisma hence
involves the devolution of charismatic authority in the direction of either
traditional or legal organisation. Since charismatic authority is focused upon
the extraordinary qualities of a particular individual. a difficult problem of
succession is posed when that person dies or is in some other way removed
from the scene. The type of authority relationship which emerges as a conse-
quence of routinisation is determined in large degree by how the ' succession
problem' is resolved. Weber distinguishes several possible avenues whereby
this may take place.
One historically important solution to the succession problem is where the
charismatic leader. or his disciples who share in his charisma. designates his
successor. The successor is not elected; he is shown to possess the appropriate
charismatic qualifications for authority. According to Weber. this was the
original significance of the coronation of monarchs and bishops in western
Europe." Charisma may also be treated as a quality which is passed on
through heredity. and is consequently possessed by the closest relatives of
the original bearer. It is mainly in feudal Europe and Japan. however. that
this has become linked with the principle of primogeniture. When charismatic
domination is transmuted into a routine. traditional form. it becomes the
sacred source of legitimation for the position of those holding power; in this
way charisma forms a persisting element in social life. While this is ' alien to
its essence '. there is still justification. Weber says. for speaking of the persis-
tence of 'charisma '. since as a sacred force it maintains its extraordinary
character. However. once charisma has in this way become an impersonal
force. it no longer is necessarily regarded sa a quality which cannot be taught.
and the acquisition of charisma may come to depend partly upon a process
of education.
The routinisation of charisma demands that the activities of the adminis-
trative staff be placed upon a regular basis, which may be achieved through
either the formation of traditional norms or the establishment of legal rules.
H charisma becomes transmitted through heredity, the officialdom is likely
to become a traditional status grouP. with recruitment to positions itself being
based primarily upon inheritance. In other cases, criteria for admission to
office may become determined by tests of qualification, thus tending to the
rational legal type. Regardless of which of these lines of development is fol-
lowed, routinisation always requires the setting up of a regular series of
economic arrangements which, if the trend is towards traditionalism. will be
benefices or fiefs. and if it is towards the legal type. will take the shape of
salaried positions.
The content of the ideals promoted by the emergence of a charismatic

61 ES, vol. 1. pp. 247-8.

 Fundamental concepts of sociology 163
movement cannot be directly inferred from the pre-existing system of domi-
nation. This does not mean to say that the claims of the charismatic move-
ment are not inftuenced by the symbols of the order in reaction to which it
arises. nor that economic or • material 'interests arc not important in affecting
the growth of a charismatic movement. It docs mean, however, that the COD-
tent of the charismatic • mission' is not to be explained away as an ideal
• reflection ' of material processes which are effecting social changes. The
revolutionary dynamic. for Weber. is not to be pinned. to any rational
sequence of overall historical development. This preserves on a more empiri-
cal level the dismissal of developmental theories which Weber reaches
according to purely theoretical considerations.

The ln8aeace of market relatioasbips : classes aDd status groups

Weber's rejection of overall theories of historical development applies equally
to Hegelianism and Marxism. But a further basic conceptual and empirical
line of thought in Weber's work is particularly relevant to the claims of
Marxism. If • theories of history • as a whole are impossible. it follows on the
more specific level that any theory which attempts to tie historical develop-
ment to the universal causal predominance of economic or class relationships
is doomed to failure. Weber's di&cussion of' class '. • status ' and • party 'thus
establishes these as three • dimensions ' of stratifialtion, each of which is con-
ceptually separate from the others. and specifies that, on an empirical level.
each may. causally inftuence each of the others.
Economy and Society contains two sections deal..ing with class and status
groUps.IO Both sections, however. are short. and are incommensurate with
tbe importance of the concepts in Weber's historical writings. Like Marx.
Weber did not complete a detailed analytical account of the notion of class
and its relationship to other bases of stratification in society. Weber's con-
ception of class takes its point of departure from his more generalised analy-
sis of economic action in a market. Economic action is defined by Weber as
conduct which seeb, through peaceful means. to acquire control of desired
utilities.1I In Weber's usage. utilities include both goods and services. A
market is distinguished from direct reciprocal exchange (barter) in so far as it
involves speculative economic action oriented towards the securing of profit
through competitive trading. • Classes • can only exist when such a market -
which may take numerous concrete forms - has come into existence. and this
in turn presupposes the formation of a moneyeconomy.52 Money plays an
extremely important part in this because it makes possible the estimation of
the values exchanged in quantitative and fixed.. rather than in subjective,

so The earlier rendition is in ES. vol. 2, pp. 926-40; the later analysis is to be found iu
ES. vol. I, pp. 302-7.
81 ES, vol. I. p. 63. For an earlier formulation of the concept of the • economic '. see
MSS, p. 6S.
sa ES, vol. 1, pp. 80-2.
164 Pan 3: MtU Weber
terms. Economic relationships thus free themselves from the particular ties
and obligations of local community structure, and become fluidly determined
by the material chances which individuals have of using property, goods or
services which they possess for exchange on the competitive market .• There-
with " Weber says, ." class struggles to begin.' U
The • market situation • of any object of exchange is dofined as • all the
opportunities of exchanging it for money which are known to the participants
in exchange reJationships and aid their orientation in the competitive price
6.
struggle.' Those who own comparable objects of exchange (both goods and
services) share 'in common a specific causal component of their life
chances '.66 That is to say, those who share the same market or • class situa-
tion • are all subject to similar economic exigencies. which causally inftuence
both the material standards of their existence. and what sorts of personal life
experiences they are able to enjoy. A • class' denotes an aggregate of indivi-
duals who thus share the same class situation. In these terms, those who are
propertyless, and who can only offer services on the market, are divided
according to the kinds of services they can ofter. just as those who own
property can be diJlerentiated according to what they own and how they use
it for economic ends.
Weber admits, with Marx. that ownership versus non-ownership of pro-
perty is the most important basis of class division in a competitive market. He
also follows Marx in distinguishing. among those who possess property. rentier
classes and entrepreneurial classes. which Weber calls respectively • owner-
ship classes' (Besit1.klossen) and • commercial classes' (Erwerbsklassen).
Ownership classes are those in which owners of property receive rents through
their possession of land. mines, etc. These rentiers are • positively advan-
taged , ownership classes. • Negatively advantaged' ownership classes include
all those without either property or skills to ofter (for example. the declasse
Roman proletarians). Between the positively and the negatively advantaged
groups fall a range of middle classes who either own small properties or who
possess skills which can be offered as marketable services. These include such
categories of persons as officials. artisans and peasants. Commercial classes
are those where the positively advantaged groups are either entrepreneurs
offering goods for sale on the market. or those who participate in the financ-
ing of such operations. such as bankers. u Wage-labourers constitute the
negatively advantaged commercial classes. The middle classes include the
petty bourgeoisie and administrative officials in government or in industry.
Most secondary discussions of Weber's conception of class have C(>Dcen-
trated upon his earlier discussion (see below. note 59. p. 166). and have

II ES, vol. 2, p. 928. 5& ES, VO\. I, p. 82.

61 ES, vol. 2, p. 927.
II Positively advantaaed commercial claases also sometimes include those who are able
to control a monopoly of particular skills, such as professionals aDd craft workers.
ES, vol. J, p. 304.
 Fundamental concepts of sociology 165
neglected this second formulation. This is unfortunate, since it gives the
impression that Weber's conception is less unified than in fact is the case.
While in principle, according to the identification of class situation with
market situation, there could be as many class divisions as there are minute
gradations of economic position, in fact Weber regards only certain definite
combinations, organised around the ownership and non-ownership of pro-
perty, as historically significant. In his later exposition, besides differentiating
ownership classes and commercial classes, Weber also distinguishes what he
calls simply' social' classes. In so far as individuals may move freely within
a common cluster of class situations (e.g., a man may move without difficulty
from a clerical job in the civil service to one in a business firm), they form a
definite social class. Compressing some of the divisions which compose the
commercial classes, Weber describes the social class composition of capitalism
as consisting of the following: 1. The manual working class. The existence of
skill differentials - especially where they are controlled as monopolies - is a
major factor threatening the unity of the working class. But the increasing
mechanisation of industry is pushing a large proportion of workers into the
semi-skilled category. 2. The petty bourgeoisie. 3. Prupertyless white-collar
workers, technicians and intelligentsia. 4. The dominant entrepreneurial and
propertied groups, who also tend to share a privileged access to educational
opportunities. 57
The relationship between the existence of similar class interests, and the
occurrence of manifest class con1lict. is historically contingent. Groups of
individuals may share a similar class situation without being aware of it. and
without forming any organisation to further their common economic interests.
It is not always the most marked inequalities in the distribution of property
which lead to class struggles. Class conflict is likely to develop only where
the unequal distribution of life-chances comes to be perceived as not an
'inevitable fact': in many periods of history, the negatively advantaged
classes accept their position of inferiority as legitimate. Class consciousness
most readily becomes developed in circumstances where: 1. The class enemy
is a group in visible and direct economic competition: in modem capitalism,
for example, the working class can more readily be organised to fight against
the industrial entrepreneur or manager, rather than against the more remote
financier or shareholder.• It is not the rentier. the shareholder, and the banker
who sUffer the ill will of the worker, but almost exclusively the manufacturer
and the business executives who are the direct opponents of workers in wage
conflicts.' .8 2. There is a large number of people who share the same class
situation. 3. Communication and assembly are simple to organise: as where,

S1 ES, vol. 1. p. 305!'cf. Paul Mombert: • Zum Weseo der sozialen Klasse', in Melchior
Palyi: Erinnerungsgabe fur Max Weber (Munich and Leipzig, 1923), pp. 239-75.
a8 ES, vol. 2, p. 931. It is this fact, Weber points out, which has made possible the
growth of patriarchal socialism. Similarly, in the army, the soldier resents the
corporal rather than the higher echelons of command. GASS, p. 509.
166 Part J: Max Weber
for instance, in modem factory production, the workers are concentrated
together in large-scale productive units. 4. The class in question is provided
with leadership - such as from the intelligentsia - which supplies clear antJ
comprehensible goals for their activity.
, Class' refers to the objective attributes of the market situation of numbers
of individuals, and as such the influence of class upon social action operates
independently of any valuations these individuals might make of themselves
or others. Since Weber rejects the notion that economic phenomena directly
determine the nature of human ideals, it follows that such valuations have to
be conceptualised independently of class interests. Weber therefore dis-
tinguishes class situation from' status situation' (stiindische Loge). The status
situation of an individual refers to the evaluations which others make of him
or his social position. thus attributing to him some form of (positive or nega-
tive) social prestige or esteem. A status group is a number of individuals who
share the same status situation. Status groups, unlike classes, are almost
always conscious of their common position. ' In relation to classes, the status
group comes closest to the .. social Of class and is most unlike the .. com-
mercial Of class.'~· However, there is no necessary or universal connection
between status situation and any of the three types of class which Weber
distinguishes. Property classes often, but by no means always, constitute
definite status groups; commercial classes rarely do so.
Status groups normally manifest their distinctiveness through following a
particular life-style, and through placing restrictions upon the manner in
which others may interact with them. The enforcement of restrictions upon
marriage, sometimes involving strict endogamy, is a particularly frequent way
in which this may be achieved. Caste represents the most clear-cut example
of this; here the distinctive character of the status group is held to rest upon
ethnic factors, and is enforced by religious prescriptions as well as by legal
and conventional sanctions. While it is only in traditional India that a whole
society is organised according to strict caste principles, caste-like properties
are also characteristic of the position of 'pariah • peoples. These are ethnic
minorities, the most notable historical example of which is that of the Jews,
whose economic activities are limited to a particular occupation or range
of occupations, and whose contacts with the ' host • population are limited.
Stratification by status is not, for Weber. simply a • complication' of class
hierarchies: 00 the contrary. status groups. as differentiated from classes.
are of vital significance in numerous phases of historical development. More-
owr, status groups may act to influence in a direct way the operation of the
market. and so may causally affect class relationships. One historically im-
portant way in which this has occurred is through the restriction of the

at ES, vol. I, pp. 306-7; WllG, vol. I, p. 180. For Marx's use of the term Stand, see
above, p. 6, D. 22.
 Fundamental concepts 0/ sociology 167
spheres of economic life which are permitted to become governed by the
market:
For example, in many Hellenic aties durin8 the • status era ' and also orisiDally in
Rome, the inherited estate (as is shown by the old fonnula for placing spend-
thrifts under a auardian) was monopolised, as were the estates of knights, pea-
sants, priests, and especially the clientele of the craft and merchant guilds. The
market is restricted, and the power of naked property per se, which gives its stamp
to class formation, is pushed into the background.'o
Many instances can be adduced in which men draw clear distinctions
between economic possession and status privilege. The possession of material
property is not by any means always a sufficient basis for entry into a
dominant status group. The claims of nouveaux riches for entry to an estab-
lished status group are not likely to be accepted by those within it, although
the individual can ordinarily use his wealth to ensure that his offspring can
acquire the necessary criteria for membership. Nevertheless, Weber does
stress that, while status group membership' normally stands in sharp opposi-
tion to the pretensions of sheer property'. it is still the case that property is
• in the long run' recognised • with extraordinary regularity' as a status
qualification. t1 The degree to which status stratification is prevalent in any
given social order is influenced by how far the society in question is subject
to rapid economic transformation. Where marked economic changes are
occurring. class stratification is a more pervasive determinant of action than
in a situation wbere there is little cbange. In the latter case, status differentials
come increasingly to the fore.
Both class and status group membership may be a basis of social power;
but the formation of political parti:s is a further. analytically independent,
influence upon the distribution of power. A • party' refers to any voluntary
association whicb has the aim of securing directive control of an organisation
in order to implement certain definite policies within that organisation. In
this definition. parties can exist in any form of organisation in which the
formation of freely recruited groupings is permitted: from a sports club up
to the state. la The bases for the establishment of parties, even of modem
political parties, are diverse. A common class or status situation may provide
the sole source of recruitment to a political party but this is fairly rare. • In
any individual case, parties may represent interests determined through class
situation or status situation.... But they need be neither purely class nor
purely status parties; in fact. they are more likely to be mixed types, and
sometimes they are neither.' I I
The growth of the modem state has brought witb it the development of
mass political parties. and tbe emergence of professional politicians. A man
Whose occupation is concerned with the struggle for political power may

10 ES, vol. 2, p. 937.

1\ ES, vol. 2, p. 932.
12 ES. vol. I, pp. 284-6. " ES, yol. 2, p. 938.
168 Part 3: Mfa Weber
either live ' for' politics or ' off • politics. An individual who relies upon his
political activities to supply his main source of income lives 'off • politics; a
man who engages in full-time political activities. but who does not receive
his income from this source, lives 'for • politics. A political order in which
recruitment to positions of power is filled by those who live 'for' politics
is nec:essarily drawn from a propertied elite, who are usually rentiers rather
than entrepreneurs. This does not imply that such politicians will pursue
policies which are wholly directed towards favouring the interests of the
class or status group from whicb they originate."

I. FMW. pp. 8~.

U. Rationalisation, the 'world religions', and
western capitalism

Weber collectively entitles his studies of Judaism and the religions of China
and India, 'The economic ethics of the world religions '.1 The title is indica-
tive of the main thrust of Weber's interests, and manifests a line of immediate
continuity with the themes of his earlier essay on Calvinism and the spirit of
western capitalism. But in fact these subsequent studies embrace a much
broader range of social and historical phenomena than is suggested by the
relatively modest heading with which Weber prefaces them. The relationship
between the content of religious beliefs and the forms of economic activity
which characterise a given social order is often indirect. and is influenced by
other institutions within that order.
Weber stresses that his studies of the world religions
do not in any way constitute a systematic • typology' of religion. On the other
hand, they do not constitute a purely bistorical worlc. They are • typological' in
the sense that they consider what is typically important in the historical realisa-
tions of religious ethics. This.is important for the connection of religioDS with the
great contrasts of economic mentalities. Othe'l' aspects will be neglected; these
presentations do not claim to offer a well-rounded picture of world religiooa.2
More particularly, Weber states, the inftuence of religious ethics upon
economic organisation is to be considered above all from one specific stand-
point: in terms of their connections with the advance or retardation of
rationalism such as has come to dominate economic life in the West.
In using the term • economic ethic', Weber does not imply, then. that each
of the sets of religious beliefs which he analyses contains an explicit and
clearly formulated directive as to what sorts of economic activity are con-
sidered to be permissible or desirable. The degree of immediacy. as well as
the nature. of the influence of religion upon economic life is variable. As in
The Protestant Ethic, the focus of Weber's attention is directed not upon the
internal • logic' as such of a given religious ethic. but upon the psychological
and social consequences for the actions of individuals. Weber continues to
maintain his aloofness from either materialism or idealism as providing a
viable general interpretation of either the sources or the effects of the religious
phenomena: • externally similar forms of economic organisation are com-
patible with very different economic ethics and. according to their particular
character. may produce very different historical results. An economic ethic
is not a simple" function" of a form of economic organisation; and just as

1 GAR, vol. I, p. 237. 2 FMW, p. 292.

169
170 Part 3: Max Weber
little does the reverse hold.' 3 Of course, religious beliefs are only one among
various sets of influences which may condition the formation of an economic
ethic, and religion itself is heavily influenced by other social, political and
economic phenomena.

Religion and magic

Weber's essays on the world religions should be placed against the back-
ground of the broad tenets of his sociology of religion as set out in Economy
and Society.4 In their participation in religion and magic, men typically dis-
tinguish between those objects and beings which have special qualities, and
those which belong to the world of the • ordinary '.5 Only certain objects
possess religious properties; only certain individuals are able to attain states
of inspiration or grace which endow them with religious powers. These extra-
ordinary powers are charismatic, and relatively undifferentiated forms such
as mana are the original source of the charismatic qualities manifest in a
more specific way in the persons of the great religious leaders whose lives
led to the efflorescence of the major world religions. This is an important
point to stress, since all too often the account presented in Weber's general
discussion of charismatic domination has been quoted to reinforce the sug-
gestion that he uses the concept of charisma to introduce a • great man •
theory of history into his writings.· But, as should also be evident from
Weber's analysis of the modes in which charismatic legitimation may be
transmitted from generation to generation, charisma is not simply to be
treated as wholly an • individual' property. Weber is in accord with Dutk-
heim in accepting that, in the most primitive kinds of religion (which does
not imply that they are the most elementary forms in the sense of being the
evolutionary progenitors of more complex religions),' there are generalised
spiritual agencies which are not personified as gods, but which nonetheless
have volitional traits. When gods do emerge. they have only a precarious
existence initially: a god may be considered as controlling only one specific
event. Such Augenblicksgolter may have no personal mana, being referred
to only by the name of the type of event they regulate. The conditions under
which a god becomes a permanent and powerful deity are complicated and
often historically obscure.

3 FMW, pp. 267-8; GAR, vol. 1, p. 238. 4 ES, vol. 2, pp. 399-634.
• But Weber does not sUess, as Durkheim does, the radical nature of the dichotomy
of the • sacred' and • profane '. Weber holds that • religious or magical behaviour
or thinking must not be set apart from the range of everyday purposive conduct,
particularly since even the ends of the religious and magical actions are pre-
dominantly economic'. ES, vol. 2, p. 400.
• cf., for example, Gerth and Mills: • Introduction' to FMW, pp. 53-5.
, Weber notes: • The belief in the universality of toternism, and certainly the belief
in the derivation of virtually all social groups and all religions from totemism,
constitutes a tremendous exaggeration that has been rejected completel}' by now.'
ES, vol. 2, p. 434.
 Rationalisation, the • world religions' and western capitalism 171

Only Judaism and Islam, according to Weber, are monotheistic in the

strict sense of the term. In Christianity, the supreme deity tends to be con-
sidered, in practice if not in theory, as one figure in the holy Trinity: this is
particularly true of Catholicism. However. the beginning of trends towards
monotheism can be discemed in all the religions of world-historical signifi-
cance. The reasons why this has progressed further in some religions rather
than others are various; but one factor of general importance has been the
entrenched resistance of priestly strata who have vested interests in the main-
tenance of the colts of the particular gods whom they represent. A second
factor is the need of the lay population in traditional societies for gods who are
readily available and open to magical influence. The more all-powerful a
god becomes. the more remote he becomes from the everyday needs of the
mass of the population. Even where an omnipotent god has come to the fore.
magical propitiation has usually persisted in the practical religious conduct
of the lay believer.
Where men relate to divine entities through prayer. worship and suppli-
cation. we can speak of the existence of • religion " as distinct from the use of
• magic'. Magical forces are not worshipped. but are subordinated to human
needs by the use of charms or formulae. The distinction between religion and
magic corresponds to a status and power differentiation of considerable
historical importance, between priests on the one hand, and magicians or
sorcerers on the other. A priesthood consists of a permanent group of
functionaries, who are in continuous charge of the operation of a cult. There
is no priesthood which does not have a cult, although there may be cults
which have no distinct priesthood.' The existence of a priestly stratum is of
particular significance in the bearing which it has upon the degree of rationali-
sation of religious beliefs. In most cases of magical practice, or where a
cult without priests exists. there is usually only a low degree of development
of a consistent religious belief system.
In Weber's sociology of religion. ihe religious prophet is a figure of equal
importance to the priest. A prophet is • a purely individual bearer of charisma.
who by virtue of his mission proclaims a religious doctrine or divine com-
mandment '.' Although it is not only as a consequence of prophetic missions
that new religious communities are formed - the activities of priestly re-
formers can achieve the same result - prophecy supplies for Weber the
decisive historical source of doctrines which effect radical chanse in religious
institutions. This is particularly true of the historical impulse towards the
elimination of magic from the daily conduct of life: that process of the
• disenchantment' of the world which reaches its culmination in rational
capitalism.
In all times there has been but one means of breaking down the power of magic
and establishing a rational conduct of life; this means the great rational prophecy.

• ES, vol. 2, p. 426. 9 ES, vol. 2, p. 439.

172 Part J: Max Weber
Not every prophecy by any means destroys the power of magic j but it is possible
for a prophet wbo furnishes credentials in the shape of miracles and otherwise,
to break down thD traditional sacred rules. Propbecies have released the world
from magic and in doing so have created the basis fOT our modem science and
technology, and for capitalism.lO
Prophets only rarely emanate from a priesthood. and typically set them-
selves up in open opposition to a priestly stratum. An 'ethical • prophet is
one whose teaching is based upon the propagation of a divine mission, which
may consist of a set of concrete ordinances or of more generalised ethical
imperatives, and to which he requires compliance as a moral duty. An
, exemplary • prophet is one who makes manifest the route to salvation by
the example of his own personal life. but who puts forward no claim to be the
mediator of a divine mission which others are obligated to accept. While
exemplary prophecy is most common in India. and is also found in some
instances in China. ethical prophecy is especially characteristic of the near
East. a fact which is traceable to the omnipotent. transcendental god pro-
claimed as Yahwe in Judaism.
Both types of prophecy have the characteristic that they act to promote the
revelation of a coherent world-view which stimulates a 'consciously inte-
grated and meaningful attitude towards life '. The beliefs brought together as
prophetic revelation may be, in a strictly logical sense, incompatible; what
gives prophecy a unity is its typical consistency as a practical orientation to
life. Prophecy 'always contains the important religious conception of the
world as a cosmos which is challenged to produce somehow a "meaning-
ful", ordered totality .. .'.11 The results of conflict between prophets and
priests may vary. of course. leading either to the victory of the prophet and
his following and the establishment of a new religious order. or to accommo-
dation with the priesthood. or to the subjugation and elimination of the
prophecy by the priests.

IDdian and Chinese theodicy

The development of prophecy in traditional China was stultified at an early
date. In India, by contrast. an important salvation religion did emerge,
although since the Hindu (and Buddhist) prophets were exemplary, they
did not see themselves as entrusted with a divine mission which must be
actively disseminated. Hinduism differs in some important respects from each
of the other world religions. Hinduism is an eclectic and tolerant religion: it
is possible to lx: a devout Hindu and yet to accept • highly important and
most characteristic doctrines which every denominational Christian would
consider exclusively his own '.12 But there do exist certain beliefs which are
shared by most Hindus, and which are' dogmas' in the sense that they COD-
10 General Economic History (New York, 1961). p. 265.
11 ES, vol. 2. p. 451.
12 RI, p.ll.
 Rationalisation. the • world religions' and western capitalism 173

stitute truths the denial of which is considered to be heretical. The most im-
portant of these are those of transmigration of souls and compensation
(karma). Both of these are directly bound up with the social ordering of the
caste system. The doctrine of karma • represents the most consistent theodicy
ever produced by history '.1$ Because of it, Weber says. adopting a slogan from
the Communist Manifesto. the Hindu of the very lowest caste can • win the
world': he can realistically aspire. within the context of these beliefs. through
successive incarnations. to reach the very highest levels. to reach paradise
and obtain divinity. Through the doctrinal stipulation that the conduct of
the individual in his present life has irremediable consequences in his next
incarnation. and because this is directly tied into the caste system. Hindu
orthodoxy places insuperable barriers in the face of any challenge to the
existing social order.
Estranged castes might stand beside one another with bitter hatred - for the idea
that everybody had • deserved' his own fate. did not make the good fortune of
others more enjoyable to the socially underprivileged. For so long and insofar
as the Karma doctrine remamed unshaken, revolutionary ideas or the striving fOT
• progress' were inconceivable.a
During the era in the early history of India in which Hinduism became
firmly established. about four or five centuries before the birth of Christ. the
development of manufacture and trade reached a peak. Merchant and craft
guilds in the cities had an importance in urban economic organisation com-
parable to the guilds of mediaeval Euro~. Moreover. rational science was
highly developed in India, and numerous schools of philosophy flomished
there at different periods. These existed in an atmosphere of tolerance which
has been almost unrivalled elsewhere. Juridical systems were formed which
were as mature as those of mediaeval Europe. But the emergence of the caste
system. together with the ascendancy of the Brahmin priesthood. effectively
prevented any further economic development in the direction of that taken in
Europe.
The uniqueness of the development of India, however, lay in the fact that these
beginnings of guild and corporate organisatien in the cities led neither to the city
autonomy of the Occidental type nor, after the coming into being of the great
patrimonial states, to a social and economic organisation of the territories corres-
ponding to the • territorial economy' of the Occident Rather, the Hindu caste
system, whose beginnings certainly preceded that era, became paramount. In
part, this caste system entirely displaced the other organisations; in part. it
crippled them ; it prevented them from attaining any considerable importance. IS
The main influence of caste upon economic activity has been to ritually
stabilise the occupationaJ structure, and thereby to act against the further
advance of ration'ilisation of the economy. The emphasis of caste ritualism
in labour is upon the dignity and value of traditional ski11s in the production

13 RI. p. 21.
1. RI, pp. 122-3; GAR. vol. 2. p. 122. 15 RI. pp. 33-4; GAR. vol. 2. pp. 35-6.
174 Pan 3: Max Weber
of objects of beauty. Any attempt upon the part of an individual to break free
of these vocational prescriptions damages his chances of a more favourable
incarnation in his next life. It is for this reason that it is just the lowest-
caste individual who is likely to adhere most rigorously to his caste obliga-
tions. The negative influence of the caste system upon economic development.
however. is diffuse rather than specific. It would not be true to say. for ex-
ample. that caste organisation is completely incompatible with the existence
of large-scale productive enterprises with a complex division of labour. o(
the sort which are characteristic of modem industry in the West. This can be
seen by the partial success of colonialist firms in India. Nevertheless. Weber
concludes.
it still must be considered ~tremely unlikely that the modem organisation of in-
dustrial capitalism would ever have originated on the basis of the caste system. A
ritual law in which every change of occupation. every change in work technique.
may result in ritual degradation is certainly not capable of giving birth to econo-
mic and technical revolutions from within itself... 1.
There were important similarities between the position of the Brahmins in
India and that of the Confucian literati in traditional China. Both were status
groups whose domination rested largely upon their access to classical scrip-
tures written in a language separate from that of the laity. although. accord-
ing to Weber. Hindu intellectualism was much less of a purely written
culture than the Chinese. Both groups disclaimed any connection with magic
even if this was not always successful in practice; both rejected every sort of
Dionysian orgiasticism. 11
However, there were equally important dilferences between the two groups.
The Chinese literati were an officialdom. within a patrimonial bureaucracy;
the Brahmins were originally a priesthood, but were also employed in a
variety of occupations, as chaplains to princes. jurists. theological teachers
and counseUors.18 But among the Brahmins an official career was unusual.
The unification of China under a single monarch allowed the linking of
admission to official positions to literary qualification. Those having intellec-
tual training became the source of recruitment to the bureaucratic official-
dom. In India, on the other hand, the Brahmin priesthood became strongly
established prior to the development of the early universal kingships. Thus
the Brahmins were able to avoid incorporation within a hierarchy. and at the
same time laid claim to a status position which was. in principle. superior to
that of the kings.
In traditional China there were, at certain periods, a number of important
developments which Weber distinguishes as conducive to the rationalisation
of the economy. These include the emergence of cities and of guilds nol

11 Ri, p. 112.
11 In neither India nor China was magic eliminated from the activity of the bulk of the
general population; magical cults often flourished in India and in China.
11 RI. pp. 139-40.
 Rationalisation. the • world religions' and western capitalism 175
unlike those of India: the formation of a monetary system: the development
of law; and the achievement of political integration within a patrimonial
state. But there were certain significant differences between the nature of
some of these developments in China. and those which played a role in the
rise of European capitalism. In spite of the relatively high degree of urbanisa-
tion achieved in China in ancient times. and of the volume of internal trade.
the formation of money economy only'reached a comparatively rudimentary
leve1. Moreover. the Chinese city differed considerably from that character-
istic of Europe. This was in part a result of the failure to develop a money
economy beyond a certain point: 'In China, there were no cities like
Florence which could have created a standard coin and guided the State in
monetary policies.' 19 Equally important. the Chinese city did not acquire
the political autonomy and legal indl!pendence which were possessed by the
mediaeval European urban communities.
The citizen of the Chinese city tended to retain most of his primary kinship
ties with his native village; the city remained embedded in the local agrarian
economy. and did not set itself up against it, as happened in the West. No
equivalent to the • chalter' of the English burgesses ever existed in China.
Thus the potential importance of the guilds. which had a great deal of inter-
nal autonomy, was effectively curbed by the lack of political and legal
independence of the urban administrations. The low level of political auto-
nomy of the cities is partly to be attributed to the early development of the
state bureaucracy. The bureaucrats played a major part in the promotion of
urbanisation. but thereby were also able to regulate its subsequent develop-
ment, a control which they never completely relinquished. This again COll-
trasts with the West. where governmental bureaucracy was in large degree
a product of the prior formation of the autonomous city states. 20
One of the most important features of the social structure of traditional
China was that the Emperor combined both religious and political supre-
macy. China lacked a powerful stratum of priests, and did not generate pro-
phecy which offered a decisive challenge to the imperial order. While the
charismatic component in the Emperorship became heavily overlain with
traditional elements. even up to modem times the Emperor was expected to
manifest his charisma in controlling rainfall and the rivers. If the rivers broke
through the dykes, the Emperor had to perform public penitence, and in
common with all the officials was subject to censorial reprimand.
The actual degree of effective administrative centralisation in traditional
China. as in all large patrimonial states having poor communications, was
low, as compared to the modem European nation state. But the centrifugal
tendencies which might have permanently devolved into feudalism were
effectively countered by the system of using educational qualifications as a

I. RC. p. 13.
20 RC, p. 16.
176 Part 3: Max Weber
basis for appointment to bureaucratic positions: this had the consequence
of binding the officialdom to the Emperor and to the state. The record of each
otJicial was reassessed every three years, and he was thus subject to the con-
tinuous supervision of the state educational authorities. The officials were
salaried in theory, but in practice their salaries were not paid or only
accounted for a fraction of their income. Their economic interests were
highly conservative, because of the systematic use of official positions to
obtain income from tax revenues:
Profit opportunities were not individually appropriated by the highest and domi·
nant stratum of officialdom; rather, they were appropriated by the whole estate
of removable officials. It was the latter who collectively opposed intervention and
persecuted with deadly hatred any rational ideologist who called for • refonn '.
Only violent revolution from above or below could have changed this. 21
The lack of political autonomy of the urban communities in China must
not be taken to imply the absence of local power. Much of Weber's analysis
is in fact concerned with documenting the fluctuating tensions in the relation-
ship between the central authority and the provinces. Particularly important
in this connection were the powerful extended family units which provided
a major focus of economic activity and Co-operdtion. The kinship group
(tsung-tsu) was either the direct basis or the model for virtually all forms
of economic enterprise larger than the household. The tsung-tsu typically con-
trolled food-processing. weaving. and other domestic handicraft industries.
and also provided credit facilities for its members. In both rural and urban
production, co-operative control by the kinship group was supreme, mini-
mising individual entrepreneurial activity and free mobility of labour. both
o( which were essential characteristics of European capitalism. The power
of the local elders provided a major counterweight to the rule of the literati.
Irrespective of how qualified the official, in certain matters within the juris-
diction of the kinship grouP. he was subject to the authority of the most
illiterate clan elder.
The Chinese educational system gave no training in calculation in spite of
the fact that some forms of mathematics were already developed by the
sixth century B.C. The methods of calculation which were used in commerce
hence had to be learnt in practice, and were cut off from formal education.
In content, education was wholly literary, and directed towards the intimate
knowledge of classical writings. Because of their familiarity with these
writings, the literati were believed to possess charismatic qualities. But they
were not a hereditary priesthood like the Indian Brahmins, and Con-
fucianism is very different from the mystic religiosity of the Hindus. Weber
remarks that Chinese has no synonym for the English word ' religion '. The
Dearest approximations are terms meaning • doctrine' and • rite', which
make no distinction between the sacred and the secular.

21 Re, p. 60.
 Rationalisation, the • world religions' and western capitalism 177
In Confucianism. the social order is regarded as a particular case of the
cosmic order in general. the latter being considered to be eternal and
inevitable.
The great spirits of the cosmic orders obviously desired only the happiness of the
world and especially the happiness of man. The same applied to the orders of
society. The • happy' tranquillity of the Empire and the equilibrium of the soul
should and could be attained only if man fitted himself into the internally har-
monious cosmos.22
What is most valued in Confucianism is the • cultivated man '. who be-
haves with universal dignity and propriety. and who is in unison with
himself and the outside world. Self-control. the regulation of emotion. is
demanded by this ethic; since the harmony of the soul is the ultimate good,
passion must not be allowed to disturb this balance. The notion of sin. and
the corresponding concept of salvation, are absent. The Confucian emphasis
upon self-control is most emphatically not wedded to an asceticism. such as
is found in Hinduism. which seeks salvation from the toils of the woc1d.
Weber concludes his study of China by drawing an explicit comparison
between Confucianism and Puritanism. There ace two primary. although
interrelated. criteria in terms of which the degree of rationalisation of a
religion may be determined: how far magic has been eliminated. and ho"
far there has developed an internally consistent and universally applicable
theodicy. With regard to the first. ascetic Protestantism has been more radical
than any other religion: in terms of the second. however. Confucianism ranks
with Puritanism as having attained a high level of formal rationality. But the
content of Confucian rationalism and consequently its relationship to the
imperfections or irrationalities of reality. was quite difterent from that of
rational Puritanism. Whereas the Puritan ethic introduced a deep tension
between religious ideals and the earthly world. that of Confucianism centred
upon the harmonious adaptation of the individual to an inevitably given
order.
For the Confucian ideal man, the gendeman, • grace and dignity • were expressed
in fulfilling traditional obligations. Hence. the cardinal virtue and goal in self-
perfection meant ceremonial and ritualist propriety in all circumstances of life...
The Confucian demanded no other kind ·of • redemption' save that from the bar-
baric lack of education. As the reward of virtue he expected only long life, health,
and wealth in this world and beyond death simply the maintenance of his good
name. As for truly Hellenic man any sort of transcendental anchorage of ethics,
any tension between obligations to a supra-mundane God and world of the flesh,
any pursuance of a goal in the beyond. or conception of radical evil. was lack-
ing... The relentlessly and religiously systematised utilitarianism peculiar to ra-
tional asceticism [i.e., ascetic Protestantism]. to live • in ' the world and yet not
be • of' it, has helped to produce superior rational aptitudes and therewith the
spirit of the specialised man [Berufsmensch] which, in the last analysis, was denied
to Confucianism ... The contrast can teach us that mere sobriety and thriftiness

22 Re, p. 153.
178 Part 3: Max Weber
combined with· acqui9.itiveness • and valuation of wealth. were far from represent-
ing and far from releasing the' capitalist spirit'. in the sense that this is found in
the specialised economic man of the modern economy.23
Thus, in spite of the various factors which might have acted to promote its
rise, rational capitalism did not develop spontaneously in China. As in the
case of Japan. China would probably offer a fertile soil for the assimilation of
capitalist production introduced from the outside; but this is quite different
from providing the original impetus towards capitalist development.
It is important to specify the relationship between this conclusion and
Weber's analysis of the emergence of western European capitalism. In China,
Weber makes clear, the emergence of rational capitalism was inhibited • by
the lack of a particular mentality', due to the existence of normative prescrip-
tions which were • rooted in the Chinese .. ethos .. '. 2t In western Europe, this
• mentality' did come into being, with the formation of ascetic Protestantism.
But it is misleading to regard Weber's studies of India and China as constitut·
ing, in any simple sense, an ex post facto • experiment • in which the relevant
material factors (i.e.• those economic and political conditions conducive to
capitalism) are held constant. and the • independent • in1Iuence of the content
of ideas is analysed. While it is the case that in China, for example, there
existed, at particular periods, a number of 'material • factors which can be
designated as necessary or favourable to the emergence of capitalism, these
were connected in a specific combination. different from that pertaining in
Europe. There were important differences, then. in both the 'material • and
the' ideal • circumstances characterising the West as compared to the Orient. n

De spread of secular ntionalism

Among the characteristics, in terms of which European development was
distinctive, were the specific form of the state and the existence of rational
law. Weber attaches great emphasis to the significance of the heritage of
Roman law for the subsequent social and economic development of Europe,
and in particular for the rise of the modem state. • Without this juristic
rationalism, the rise of the absolute state is just as little imaginable as is the
[French] Revolution.' 2' The connection between this and the development
of rational capitalism, however, was not simple and clear-cut. Modem capi.

23 Re, pp. 228 &. 247; my parenthesis; GA.R, vol. 1, pp. 514 &. 534.
26 Re, p. 104.
U Weber places some emphasis upon the special geographical position of Europe. In
India and China, the large continental land masses were formidable barriers to the
extensive development of commerce. In Europe, the Mediterranean, together with
many rivers providing easy transportation, offered a situation much more favour'
able to trading enterprises on an extensive scale. General E~onomic History, p. 260.
In addition, Weber analyses at length the special properties of the western city, and
the significance of the early dissolution of the solidarity of the extended kinship
group. ES. vol. 3, pp. 1212-372.
2' EMW, p. 94. my parenthesis.
 Rationalisation, the 'world religions' and western capitalism 179
talism first took root in England, but that country was much less influenced
by Roman law than other continental countries were. The prior existence of a
system of rational law was only one influence in a complicated interplay of
factors leading to the formation of the modem state. The trend towards the
development of the modem state, characterised by the presence of a profes-
sional administration carried on by salaried officials, and based upon the con-
cept of citizenship, was certainly not wliolly an outcome of economic rationali-
sation, and in part preceded it. Nevertheless, it is true that the advance of the
capitalist economic order and the growth of the state are intimately connected.
The development of national and international markets. and the concomitant
destruction of the influence of the local groups, such as kinship units, which
formerly played a large part in regulating contracts, all promote' the mono·
polisation and regulation of all "legitimate" coercive power by one
universalist coercive institution .. .'.27
Essential to modem capitalistic enterprise, according to Weber, is the
possibility of rational calculation of profits and losses in terms of money.
Modem capitalism is inconceivable without the development of capital
accounting. In Weber's view, rational book-keeping constitutes the most inte-
gral expression of what makes the modem type of capitalist production dis-
similar to prior sorts of capitalistic activity such as usury or adventurers' capi-
taUsm.28 The circumstances which Weber details as necessary to the existence
of capital accounting in stable productive enterprises constitute those which
Weber accepts as the basic prerequisites of modem capitalism, and include
those factors upon which Marx placed most emphasis: 1. The existence of a
large mass of wage-labourers, who are not only legally • free ' to dispose of
their labour power on the open market, but who are actually forced to do so
to eam their livelihood. 2. An absence of restrictions upon economic exchange
on the market: in particular, the removal of status monopolies on production
and consumption (such as existed, in extreme form. in the Indian caste
system). 3. The use of a technology, which is constructed and organised On
the basis of rational principles: mechanisation is the clearest manifestation
of this. 4. The detachment of the productive enterprise from the household.
While the separation of home and workplace is found elsewhere, as in the
bazaar, it is only in western Europe that this has proceeded very far. 1I
But these economic attributes could not exist without the rational legal
administration of the modern state. This is as distinctive a characteristic of
the contemporary capitalist order as is the class division between capital and
labour in the economic sphere. In general terms, political organisations can
be classified in the same way as economic enterprises. in relation to whether
the • means of administration' are owned by the administrative staff or are
separated from their ownership. As has been mentioned (in the previous cbap-

27 ES, Yol. I, p. 337.

21 ES, Yol. I, pp. 164-fi. 21 General Economic History, pp. 172-3; PE, p. 22.
180 Part 3: Max Weber
ter). Weber here applies in a very broad sense Marx's conception of the ex-
propriation of the worker from control of his means of production. Political
organisations in traditional states are of an 'estate' character. in which the
means of administration are controlled by the officialdom. But such decen-
tralised systems of political power typically exist in an uneasy balance with
the centralised administration of an overlord or monarch. The monarch nor-
mally attempts to consolidate his position by creating a staff which is
materially dependent upon him. and by the formation of his own professional
army. The greater the degree to which the ruler succeeds in surrounding him-
self with a propertyless staff responsible only to him, the less he is challenged
by nominally subordinate powers. This process is most complete in the
modem bureaucratic state.
Everywhere the development of the modern state is initiated through the action
of the prince. He paves the way for the expropriation of the autonomous and
• private' bearers of administrative power who stand beside him, those who
possess in their own right the means of administration, warfare, and financial
organisation, as well as politically disposable goods of aU sorts. The whole process
is a complete parallel to the development of the capitalist enterprise through
gradual expropriation of the independent producers. We perceive that, in the
end, the modem state controls the total means of political organisation which
actually come together under a single bead. 30
The growth of the bureaucratic state proceeds in close connection with the
advance of political democratisation, because the demands made by demo-
crats for political representation and for equality before the law necessitate
complex administrative and juridical provisions to prevent the exercise of
privilege. The fact that democracy and bureaucratisation are so closely related
creates one of the most profound sources of tension in the modem capitalist
order. For while the extension of democratic rights in the contemporary state
cannot be achieved without the formulation of new bureaucratic regulations,
there is a basic opposition between democracy and bureaucracy. This is, for
Weber. one of the most poignant examples of the contradictions which can
exist between the formal and the substantive rationality of social action: the
growth of the abstract legal procedures which help to eliminate privilege them-
selves reintroduce a new form of entrenched monopoly which is in some
respects more 'arbitrary' and autonomous than that previously extant.
Bureaucratic organisation is promoted by the democratic requisite of
impersonal selection for positions, from all strata of the population,
according to the possession of educational qualifications. But this in itself
creates strata of officials who, because of the separation of their position
from the external influence of privileged individuals or groups, possess a
more inclusive range of administrative power than before.
This does not mean - and this is where Weber differs from Michels and

.0 FMW, p. 82; GPS, pp. 498-9.

 Rationalisation. the' world religions' and western capitalism 181
others ~1 - that the modem democratic order is a mere sham in so far as it
rests upon claims of the participation of the mass of the population in politics.
The growth of democracy has had a definite ' levelling' effect, which can be
brought into sharp focus by comparing contemporary societies with previous
historical examples of highly bureaucratised states. Such a comparison shows
very clearly that. however close the connections between democracy and
bureaucracy in modem times. it is entirely possible that. while the extension
of democratic rights demands the expansion of bureaucracy. the reverse does
not follow. The instances of ancient Egypt and Rome provide ample evidence
of the total subordination of the population in a highly bureaucratised state.
In this respect. one has to remember that bureaucracy as such is a precision in-
strument which can put itself at the disposal of quite varied interests. purely poli-
tical as well as purely economic ones. or any other sort. Therefore, the measure
of its parallelism with democratisation must not be exaggerated, however typical
itmaybe.32
In the modem democratic state it is obviously impossible for the mass of
the population to govern, in the sense of participating continuously in the
exercise of power. ' Direct ' democracy is only possible in small communities
where the members of the group can gather together in a single spot. In the
contemporary Western world. 'democracy' can only refer to a situation in
which. firstly. those who are governed can exert some influence. through the
ballot box, over those who govern them; and secondly. where representational
assemblies or parliaments can influence the decisions taken by executive
leaders. The existence of large-scale parties is inevitable in the modem state;
but if these parties are headed by political leaders who have a strong convic-
tion of the significance of their vocation. bureaucratisation of the political
structure can be partially checked. Democracy necessarily stimulates
'Caesarist' tendencies in its major political figures. since under conditions
of universal suffrage political leaders must possess the charismatic qualities
required to attract a mass following. 'Caesarism ' itself presents a threat to
democratic government. but may be controlled by the existence of a parlia-
ment in which political skills can be nurtured. and which provides a means of
withdrawing the mandate of leaders who seek to surpass the bounds of their
legal authority. In the contemporary state. ' there is only the choice between
leadership democracy with a "machine " and leaderless democracy. namely.
the domination of professional politicians without a calling. without the inner
charismatic qualities that make a leader '.33
Weber's attitude towards the likely consequences of the establishment of
socialism derives from an extension of certain of these points. If the modern

31 On Weber's relationship to Michels, cf. GUnther Roth: The Social Democrats in

Imperial Germany (Englewood Cliffs, 1963). pp. 249-57.
32 ES. vol. 3. p. 990.
U FMW. p. 113; GPS, p. 532. For Marx's views on ' Caesarism ' ;>.5 a concept applying
to modern politics. see SW. vol. 1. pp. 244-5.
182 Part 3: Max Weber
economy were organised on a socialist basis, and sought to attain a level of
technical efficiency in the production and distribution of goods comparable to
that of capitalism, this would necessitate' a tremendous increase in the impor-
tance of professional bureaucrats ,.a. The specialised division of labour which
is an integral characteristic of the modern economy demands the precise co-
ordination of functions. This is a fact which has been at the root of the
increase of bureaucratisation associated with the expansion of capitalism.
But the formation of a socialist state would entail a considerably higher
degree of bureaucratisation, since it would place a wider range of adminis-
trative tasks in the hands of the state.
Weber also foresees various economic problems which would be faced in
a socialist society, especially in so far as it would be expected to operate using
labour credits, rather than money, as a means of remuneration. Another source
of difficulty in a socialist economy might be that of maintaining incentives to
work, in so far as these are no longer reinforced by the possibility of losing a
job because of inadequate performance. However, a socialist economy could
potentially make use of a strong mass commitment to socialist ideals. U Any
country which experiences a socialist revolution while those around it remain
capitalist would face a variety of additional economic problems, particularly
concerning the maintenance of foreign trade and credit. 3I But Weber's primary
objections to socialism concern the bureaucratic ramifications which it would
entail. This offers another example of the characteristic dilemma of modem
times. Those who seek to set up a socialist society, whatever branch of socia-
lism they adhere to, all act under the vision of the achievement of an order
in which political participation and self realisation will go beyond the circum-
scribed form of party democracy found in capitalism. But the result of the
impetus to realise this vision can only be in the direction of promoting the
bureaucratisation of industry and the state. which will in fact further reduce
the political autonomy of the mass of the population.
It is a !lingular feature of bureaucracy that once it has become established
it is. in Weber's words, • escape proof '. In those societies of the past where
bureaucratisation has been highly developed, such as in Egypt. the bureau-
cratic officialdom has remained in uninterrupted control, and has only been
undermined by the total disruption of the social order as a whole. Modem
bureaucracy. characterised by a much higher level of rational specialisation
than patrimonial organisations, is even more resistant to any attempt to prise
society from its grip .• Such an apparatus makes" revolution ", in the sense
of the forceful creation of entirely new formations of authority, more and
more impossible .. .' 37

34 ES, vol. I, p. 224.

,. ES, vol. I, pp. 110-11.
31 Weber regarded this as of critical importance in his evaluation of the likely success
of a socialist revolution in Germany in 1918. See GPS, pp. 446ff.
37 ES, vol. 3, p. 989.
 Rationalisation, the • world religions' and western capitalism 183
The spread of bureaucracy in modern capitalism is both cause and consc-
quence of the rationalisation of law, politics and industry. Bureaucratisation
is the concrete. administrative manifestation of the rationalisation of action
whicb has penetrated into all spheres of western culture. including art, music,
and architecture. The overall trend towards rationalisation in the West is the
result of tbe interplay of numerous factors. a1thougb the extension of the
capitalist market has been the dominant impetus. But it must not, of course,
be regarded as an • inevitable' evolutionary trend.
The concept of rationalisation enters into so many of Weber's historical
writings that elucidation of the main spberes of its application is difficult. In
a negative sense. the spread of rationalisation can be indexed by the progres-
sive • disenchantment of the world • - the elimination of magical thought and
practice. The great religious prophets. and the systematising activities of
priests. are the main forces producing the rationalisation of religion which
establishes coherent systems of meaning separate from the irregular magical
forms of interpretation and propitiation. The rationalisation of religious
thought, however. involves a number of related processes: the clarification of
particular symbols (as occurs in the historical emergence, for instance. of the
conception of a single omnipotent god in Judaism); the relating of such sym-
bols to other symbols in a consistent fashion. according to general principles
(as in the development of an internally coherent theodicy); and the extension
of such principles to cover the whole of the cosmic order. so that there are no
concrete events which cannot potentially be interpreted in terms of its religious
meaning (thus, for example, Calvinism is a 'total • ethic in this sense).
In assessing the significance of the growth of secular rationalisation in the
West. it is important to bear in mind the distinction between formal and sub-
stantive rationality.38 In Weber's view. this distinction is focal to sociological
analysis. and application of it to the examination of the course of develop-
ment of modem capitalism is critical in his interpretation of the dilemmas
faced by contemporary man. The formal rationaJity of action refers to tbe
degree to which conduct is organised according to rationally calculable prin-
ciples. Thus the ideal type of bureaucracy is, in terms of formal rationality,
the most rational type of organisation possible. In a broader way. it can be said
that the formal rationality of western culture is evinced in its wholesale pene-
tration by science. Science is not. of course, unique to the West, but nowhere
else has it reached a comparable level of development. The fact that scientific
principles underlie so much of modem social life does not entail that eacb
individual knows what those principles are: • Unless be is a physicist. one
who rides on tbe streetcar has no idea how the car happened to get into motion.
And be does not need to know ... The savage knows incomparably more

" ES. vol. I, pp. 85-6. d. Friedmann's comments on Marcuse's paper 'Industi-ialisier-
ung und Kapitalismus " in the Verhandlungen des IS. deutschen Soziologentages:
MIlX Weber und die Soziologie heute (TllbiDgen, 1965), pp. 201-5.
184 Part 3: Max Weber
about his tools.' However. these principles are nevertheless • known • in the
sense of being available to the individual should he wish to ascertain them.
and his conduct is governed by the belief that • there are no mysterious
in<:alculable forces that come into play. but rather that one can. in principle.
master all things by calculation '.31
The relationship between the spread of formal rationality and the attain-
ment of substantive rationality - that is. the application of rational calculation
to the furtherance of definite goals or values - is problematic. Medern rational
capitalism. measured in terms of substantive values of efficiency or produc-
tivity. is easily the most advanced economic system which man has developed.
But the very rationalisation of social life which has made this possible has
consequences which contravene some of the most distinctive values of western
civilisation. such as those which emphasise the importance of individual
creativity and autonomy of action. The rationalisation of modem life.
especially as manifest in organisational form in bureaucracy. brings into being
the • cage , within which men are increasingly confined. This is the sense of
Weber's concluding observations in The Protestant Ethic:
Limitation to specialised work, with a renunciation of the Faustian universality
of men which it involves, is a condition of any valuable work in the m~m
world; hence deeds and renunciation inevitably condition each other today.
This fundamentally ascetic trait of middle-class life, if it attempts to be a way
of life at all, and not simply the absence of any, was what Goethe wanted to
teach, at the beight of his wisdom, in the Wanderjahren, and <in the end which
he gave to the life of his Faust. For bim the realisation meant a renunciation, a
departure from an age of full and beautiful humanity, wbich can no more be
repeated in the course of our cultural development than can the flower of the
Athenian culture of antiquity .'0
In this sense. western society can be said to be founded upon an intrinsic
antinomy between formal and substantive rationality which. according to
Weber's analysis of modem capitalism. cannot be resolved.

3. FMW. p. 139.
"0 PE. p. 181.
Part 4: Capitalism, socialism
and social theory
13. Marx's influence
The intellectual relationship between the writings of Marx on the one hand.
and those of Durkheim and Weber on the other. cannot be analysed satis-
factorily without reference to the social and political changes which both
conjoined and disconnected the works of the three writers. Durkheim and
Weber were each critics of Marx, and consciously directed part of their work
to the refutation or qualification of Marx's writings: indeed. the remark that
the bulk of Weber's intellectual output represents a prolonged' dialogue with
the ghost of Marx ',' has often been reiterated in the secondary literature.
But in both France and Germany, in the late nineteenth centwy, the influence
of Marx's thought was far more than purely intellectual in character: in the
shape of ' Marxism " Marx's writings became the primary impetus within a
vital and dynamic political movement. As such, Marxism, and ' revolutionary
socialism' more generally. formed a major element in the horizon of
Durkheim and Weber, especially so in the case of the latter.f
Marx conceived his works to furnish a platform for the accomplishment of
a definite Praxis, and not simply as academic studies of society. The same is
true, although not of course in an exactly comparable manner, of both Durk-
heim and Weber; each directed his writings towards the prophylaxis of what
they considered to be the most urgent social and political problems confront-
ing contemporary man, and attempted to provide an alternative standpoint
to that set out by Marx. It is worth remarking upon the fact that no British
author of comparable status to Durkheim or Weber emerged in their genera-
tion. While the reasons for this are no doubt complex. it is unquestionably
true that one factor responsible was the absence, in Britain. of a really signi·
ficant revolutionary socialist movement.

Society and politics in Germany : Marx's standpoint 3

At the tum of the nineteenth century. Germany consisted of thirty-nine com-
peting principalities. The two leading German states. Prussia and Austria.

I See Albert Salomon: • German sociology'. in Georges Gurvitch and Wilbert E.

Moore: Twentil'lh Century Sociology (New York, 1945), p. 596.
2 In the chapters which follow I shall adopt the procedure of calling those views
which. I attribute to Marx himself • Marxian' ideas, terming • Marxist' those
propositions or actions adopted by professed followers of Marx. I shall use • Marx-
ism • in a broad sense to refer generically to the latter group.
3 In this chapter I have drawn upon material previously published in my article
• Marx, Weber. and the development of capitalism', pp. 289-310. For a description

185
186 Part 4: Capitalism. socialism and social theory
were both major European powers: their very rivalry was one factor hinder-
ing German unification. The hopes of German nationalists were also obstruc-
ted by the internal ethnic composition of Prussia and Austria. Austria. after
1815. had more non-Germans than Germans in her population; and Prussia
incorporated large numbers of Poles within her territories to the east. Espousal
of the nationalist doctrine could forcibly entail, for Prussia. the return of these
lands to Polish dominion. The Austrian government was flatly opposed to any
movement towards the formation of an integral German slate.
But of greater weight than these factors in hindering the development of
Germany were more basic characteristics of the social and economic structure
of the country. Compared to the most advanced capitalist country, Britain.
Germany was still almost in the Middle Ages, both in terms of the level of her
economic development, and in terms of the low degree of politicalliberalisa-
tion within the various German states. In Prussia the Junker landowners,
whose power sprung from their ownership of the large ex-Slavic estates to the
east of the Elbe, maintained a dominant position within the economy and
government. In the early part of the nineteenth century, as Landes has re-
marked, ' the further east one goes in Europe the more the bourgeoisie takes
on the appearance of a foreign excrescence on manorial society, a group apart
scorned by the nobility and feared or hated by (or unknown to) a peasantry
still personally bound to the local seigneur '.'
But Germany could hardly remain isolated from me sweeping currents of
change which had been set in motion in France by the events of 1789. Marx's
early works were written in the anticipation of a German revolution. Indeed,
it might be said that Marx's awareness of the very backwardness of Germany
in its social and economic structure was at the root of his original conception
of the role of the proletariat in history. In France, Marx writes in 1844. 'par-
tial emancipation is a basis for complete emancipation '; but in Germany, so
much less developed. a ' progressive emancipation' is impossible: the only
possibility of advancement is through radical revolution, which in turn can
only be accomplished through a revolutionary proletariat. A proletariat at
this time barely existed in Germany, and by 1847 Marx was clear that the
imminent revolution in Germany would be a bourgeois one, and that 'the
bourgeoisie in that country had just begun its contest with feudal absolutism '."
But the peculiar circumstances of the social structure of Germany, so it
seemed to Marx, would make it possible for a bourgeois revolution to be
closely followed by a proletarian one.'

of the in1luence of Marx's writings on sociology at the tum of the century, see
Maximilien Rubel: • Premiers contacts des sociologues du XlXe si~le avec la
pen~ de Marx" Colliers internalionaux de sociologie. vol. 31, 1961, pp. 175-84.
• Landes, p. 129. 5 CM, p. 167.
, d. Engels' views on this matter, as set out in his' Der Status Quo in Deutschland'.
We. vol. 4, esp. pp. 43-6 and 49-51; and Germany,' Revolution and Counter·
revolution (London, 1933).
 Marx's influence 187
The failure of the 1848 revolutions. however. dispelled Marx's optimism
about an immediate' leap into the future' in Germany. The 1848 uprisings
were also something of a salutary experience for the ruling circles in the
German states. and especially in Prussia. but did not break their dominance.
The failure of 1848 to produce any radical reforms served as a death-knell,
not only to the hopes of the small grou~ of socialists. but also to those of the
liberals. The maintenance of Junker economic power. of their dominance in
the officer corps in the army, and in the civil service bureaucracy. led the bulk
of the German liberals to acceptance of a series of compromise measures
introducing nothing more than a semblance of parliamentary democracy. as
well as fostering lasting divisions within their ranks.
The events of 1848 mark a line of direct historical connection between Marx
and Weber. For Marx. the result was physical exile in England. and an intellec-
tual recognition of the importance of showing in detail the 'laws of move-
ment' of capitalism as an economic system. Within Germany. the failures of
1848 paved the way fot the inept character of liberal politics which. as com-
pared to the bold successes of Bismarck's hegemony, forms such an important
background to the whole of Weber's thought! Moreover. the persistence of
the traditional social and political structure in Germany after 1848 drastically
affected the role of the labour movement. It is not relevant in this context to
analyse the complicated nature of Marx's relationship to Lassalle and to the
movement which Lassalle founded. but certain aspects of this relationship are
pertinent. There was from the beginning of the Social Democratic movement
an inbuilt ambivalence towards Marx's doctrines which formed a permanent
source of schism within the party. While on the one hand Lassalle was deeply
indebted in his theoretical views to Marx's writings on the development of
capitalism. in his practical leadership of the new movement he frequently
acted in ways opposed to Marx's views on specific issues. and advocated
policies difficult to reconcile with the theory he professed to accept. Thus. in
contrast to Marx's opinion that the German working class should throw in its
weight with the bourgeoisie in order to secure the bourgeois revolution which
would subsequently provide the conditions for the assumption of power by the
proletariat, Lassalle led the working class movement away from collaboration
with the liberals. As Mehring remarked. Lassalle ' based his policy on the
assumption that the Philistine movement of the progressive bourgeoisie would
never lead to anything. "not even if we wait for centuries, for geological
eras " .. .'.'
Lassalle died the same year that Weber was born. By this time the imme-
diate future of Germany had already been set. The detachment of the labour

~ In his copy of Simmers book Schopenhallt!r lind Nietzsche, where Simmel says:
• Society ultimately resides in what the individual does', Weber noted: 'Quite
correct. cf. Bismarck '. Quoted in Eduard Baumgarten: Max Weber: Werk und
Person (Tilbingen, 1964), p. 614.
• Franz Mehring: Karl Marx (Ann Arbor, 1962), p. 313.
188 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
movement from the liberals, in conjunction with other factors. set the scene
for Bismarck's unification of Germany, in which. as Bismarck said, • Germany
did not look to Prussia's liberalism, but to her power '.' In 1875, when Liebk-
necht and Bebel, Marx's leading advocates in Germany, accepted union with
the Lassallean wing of the labour movement. Germany was in both political
and economic terms a very different nation from that which Marx originally
wrote about in the 18405. Political integration had been achieved. not through
the rise of a revolutionary bourgeoisie. but largely as a result of a policy of
Realpolitik and nationalism founded essentially upon the bold use of political
power' from the top' and occurring within a social system which - in spite of
achieving some of the trappings of a • welfare state • - in large degree retained
its traditional structure. The difficult phases of initial political unification,
and the • take off ' into industrialisation. were accomplished in quite a different
fashion in Germany from the typical process of development in Britain. From
the beginnings of his career, Marx remained conscious of the variations in his-
torical development which have created social and economic differences
between Germany. France and Britain. It is quite mistaken to suppose that,
according to Marx's view, there is a unitary relationship between level of
economic development and the internal character of the capitalist state (see
below, p. 197). Nevertheless, Marx bases his writings upon the assertion that.
in analytic terms. economic power is everywhere the foundation of political
domination. Therefore. in Capital. Marx logically accepts Britain as providing
the basic model for his theory of capitalist development. and in spite of his
awareness of the complicated issues possessed by the peculiar character of the
German social structure, he never abandoned the basic standpoint summed
up in his use of the phrase • De te tabula narratur ': • It is of you that the story
is told.' ' The country that is more developed industrially oniy shows, to the
less developed. the image of its own future.' 10
Thus neither the Marxist socialists nor the liberals in Germany of the late
nineteenth century had an adequate historical model in terms of which they
could satisfactorily comprehend the peculiarities of their position. Both

• Marianne Weber has testified to the strength of the emotional impact which the 1870
war had upon the household in which the young Weber was living. Marianne Weber,
pp. 47-8. For a recent analysis of Weber's personality and psychological develop-
ment (written, in part, in conscious attempt to revise aspects of Marianne Weber'!
biography), see Arthur Mitzman: The Iron Cage,' An Historical Interpretation of
Max Weber (New York, 1970).
10 Preface to the first German edition of the first volume of Capital, SW, vol. I, p. 449.
Many economists and sociologists even today continue, explicitly or otherwise, to
take the British experiern:e as the model against which to analyse industrial I
political development. But it is probably more appropriate, in some respects, to
treat Britain as a • deviant' case. cf. on some relevant issues, Barrington Moore:
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (London, 1969), pp. 413-32 and
passim. A Marxist account of German social thought in relation to the' backward-
ness' of the country is given in Georg Lukacs: Die Zerstorllng der Vernunft
(Berlin, 1955).
 Marx's influence 189
looked to theories developed in an earlier epoch, and based primarily upon
the experience of Britain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
In the Social Democratic Party, this situation forced out into the open the
inherent tension between Marx's stress upon the revolutionary overthrow of
capitalism, and the Lassallean emphasis upon the appropriation of the capita-
list state through the achievement of a fully universal franchise. Bernstein's
Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus, although itself based partly upon a
British model, was the most concrete theoretical expression of the realisation
that the relationship between the political and economic development of
capitalism could not be adequately a>mprehended in tenus of what most
Marxists look to be the main theses of Capital: the progressive formation of
a two-class society, the • pauperisation' of the vast majority,· and the
immanent collapse of capitalism in a final catastrophic crisis. Bernstein's
• revisionism' was rejected by the SPO orthodoxy, but at the cost of strength-
ening the trend towards a mechanical materialism which effectively reverted
to the 'passive' materialism which Marx had criticised and discarded in the
early phases of his career. This trend was given a definite theoretical backing
by the fact that • Marxism ' came to be identified, in the eyes both of its
adherents and its liberal critics, with the systematic exposition set out by
Engels in Anti-Duh,ing. l l Today it is usual among western scholars to
emphasise the fundamental discrepancies between the thOUght of Marx and
Engels. The differences have undoubtedly been exaggerated.l~ Nevertheless.
the implications of the position which Engels takes in this work are certainly
at variance with the subject-object dialectic central to Marx's formulations.
By transferring the dialectic to nature, Engels obscures the most essential
element of Marx's conception, • the dialectical relationship of subject and
object in the historical process '.13 In so doing Engels helped to stimulate the
notion that ideas simply' reflect' material reality in a passive sense. u.
The partial disappearance of the principle upon which Marx's original
writings were based - the creative dialectical interaction between subject and
object - has two possible outcomes on the level of ethical theory, both of which

II Anti-Diihring (Moscow. 1954). See also the posthumously published DialeClics of

Nalure (Moscow, 19S4).
1a It is more accurate to say. in Laski's words •• that the two men had, as it were.
evolved in common a joint stock of ideas which they regarded as a kind of intel-
lectual bank account upon which either could draw freely'. Harold I. Laski,
Introduction to eM, p. 20.
13 The phrase is Lukacs', Geschichte urul Klassenbewusslein, p. 22.
I, Engels' own attempt to escape the theoretical impasse to which his views led is given
in his statement that' According to the materialist conception of history the deter-
mining element in history 1s ultimately the production and reproduction in real
life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted.' Engels to Bloch, Sep-
tember 1890. Selecled Correspondence, p. 47S. Marx had earlier felt compel\ed to
comment ironical\y that he • was not a Marxist '. An interesting analysis, indicating
the 10Dg-standing nature of Engels' sympathy to positivism, is given in H. Bollnow:
• Engels Auffassung von Revolution und Entwicklung in seinen II GruDdsltzen des
Kommunismus" (1847)', Marxi:rmllsstlldien, vol. I, pp. 77-144,
190 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
occurred in German Social Democracy. One outcome is to move in the direc-
tion of a philosophical materialism, which treats ideas as epiphenomena, and
thereby is able to preserve the Marxian adherence to an immanent conception
of ethics. The other path, taken by the revisionists. is to reintroduce the possi-
bility of forming an ahistorica1 theoretical ethics on a par with traditional
philosophy. This has the advantage of eliminating any embarrassment which
might be felt in allowing ideas an • independent' role in conditioning social
change, but introduces a voluntaristic standpoint which dislocates the presence
of an ideal from the possibility of its attainment. This is the position adopted
by Bernstein.

Weber's relation to Marxism ud Marx

The import of Weber's many references to Marx and to Marxism can only be
properly understood against this background, which has been sketched in an
exceedingly brief fashion. An appreciation of the significance of • political',
as distinct from • economic' power, such as wielded by Bismarck in success-
fully promoting the internal consolidation and the economic development of
Germany (and, more specifically, the importance of the bureaucracy in this
process), is a key dimension of Weber's approach to politics, and of his
sociology more generally. Weber's commitment to nationalism, and his life-
long emphasis upon the primacy of the German state, also have to be under-
stood in these terms. This determination to recognise the realities of the use
of political power, however, is counterpointed in Weber's thought by an
equally resolute adherence to the values of classical European liberalism. This
is one main factor producing the pathos which is SQ strongly marked in much
of Weber's writing; he finds himseH compelled to recognise an expanding
divergence between the typical line of development in modem society and
the values which he recognises as representing the distinctive ethos of western
culture. But this is in part an expression, albeit in a bighly subtle and ratio-
cinated form, of the peculiar dilemmas of German liberalism as a whole. U
Weber's inaugural address at Freiburg in 1895 outlines his interpretation
of the hopes of bourgeois liberalism in Germany in the face of Romantic con-
servatism on the one side, and the Marxist party on the other. The lecture
expresses a fervent advocacy of the • imperialistic' interests of the nation-
state, and analyses the position of the various major classes in Germany in
terms of the degree to which they are capable of generating the political
leadership necessary to maintain German integrity in the face of international
pressures. • The object of our work in social policy', Weber declares, • is not
to make the world happy, but to unify socially a nation surrounded by econo-

11 For a lengthy description of Weber's political writings. see Mommsen. This work
underplays, bowever, Weber's commitment to classical liberal values, towards what
Weber cans' man's personal autonomy', • tbe spiritual and moral values of man-
kind '. Quoted in Marianne Weber, p. 159. d. Eduard Baumgarten, p. 607; and my
Politics and Sociology in the Thollg"t of Max Weber.
 Marx's influence 191
mic progress .. .' 11 Weber dissociates himself, however, from the ' mystical '
conception of the state as advanced by conservative idealism. and condemns
the Junkers as an economically declining class not capable of leading the
nation. But the .working class is a]so politically • infinitely immature' and
not able to provide the requisite source of political direction. Consequently,
the main hope for leadership is to be found in the bourgeoisie; but this class
has been stunted by its history of subordination to Bismarck's rule, and is
itself not yet ready for the political tasks which it eventually must be called
upon to assume. Weber derides the timidity of the bourgeoisie in the face of
the' red spectre' :
The threatening thing in our situation, however, is that the bourgeois classes as
the bearers of the power interests of the nation seem to wilt away, while there are
as yet no signs that the workers are beginning to show the maturity to replace
them. The danger ... does not lie with the masses. It is not a question of the
economic position of the ruled, but rather of the political qualifications of the
ruling and ascending classes ...17
It is wholly mistaken, according to Weber. to regard radical revolution as the
only means for the political emancipation and economic advancement of the
working class. In fact. the growth of the political power and the improvement
in the economic circumstances of the working class are both possible within
capitalism. and are actually in the interests of the bourgeoisie.
The strengthening of the liberal boUl'geoisie, as Weber came to recognise
with increasing clarity at later stages of his political career, entails developing
a governmental system which would vest real political power in parliament.
and create a reservoir of genuine political leaders. The result of Bismarck's
rule, according to Weber. has left Germany without the parliamentary auto-
nomy necessary to generate the political leadership which can take control of
the bureaucratic machine of government bequeathed to the country from the
past. and which threatens Germany with ' uncontrolJed bureaucratic domina-
tion '.11 Weber's attitude to the possibility of establishing socialism in Ger-
many - including the transitory Eisner government - is directly bound up with
these views upon the German social and political structure. Weber notes early
on in his career that much of the revolutionary fervour of the leaders of the
main body of the Social Democratic movement is quite divergent from the
real trend of its development. As Weber expresses it. the German state will
conquer the Social Democratic Party and not vice versa; the party will move

11 • Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik t, GPS, p. 23. Compare Durk-

heinl's account of Treitscblce as the epitome of German conservative nationalism, in
• L'Aliemogne au-dessus de tout' (Paris. 1915). The significance of Weber's' move
to the left' in politics over the course of his career is often exaggerated (see, for
example. Ralf Dahrendorf: Society and Democracy in Germony (London, 1968),
pp. 41-<l1); Weber cbanged his evaluation of politics, rather than of fundamentals of
political attitude. cf. Gustav Schmidt: Deutscher Hislorismus und der Ober60ng
zur parlamentarischen Demokratie (LUbeck and Hamburg, 1964).
17 GPS. p. 23. 11 ES. vol. 3, p. 14S3.
192 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
towards accommodation to the prevailing order rather than providing a
realistically revolutionary alternative to it. I I The SPD, Weber asserts, is itself
already highly bureaucratised. The major political dilemma facing Germany
is that of escaping from the toils of the arbitrary rule of bureaucracy: should
a socialist government, and a planned economy, be set up, the result would
be an extension of bureaucratic repression. Not only would there be no
counterweight to the spread of bureaucracy in the political sphere, but this
would be the case in the economic domain also. 'This would be socialism',
in Weber's eyes, 'in about the same manner in which the ancient Egyptian
" New Kingdom " was sociaHst.' 20
Weber's views on the character of the SPD as a 'revolutionary' party
remained fairly consistent over the course of his Hfe. His evaluation of his
own political position with regard to the policies of the party did change,
however, with the changing nature of the German political structure, especi-
ally as a result of the Great War. Thus, towards the end of his life, having wit-
nessed the occurrence of what he had previously foreseen - the increasing
integration of the Social Democratic Party into the existing parliamentary
order - Weber declared himself to be as close to the party as to find it difficult
to separate himself from it. 21 But Weber's consistent view of 'Marxism' as
represented by the SPD in Germany is that its professed objectives. the revolu-
tionary overthrow of the state and the achievement of a classless society, are
entirely divergent from the rea'l role which it is destined to play In German
politics.
The attitude which Weber took towards the theoretical and empirical writ-
ings of academic' interpreters' of Marx cannot simply be deduced from his
relationship to the Social Democratic Party, since the latter was determined in
some degree by Weber's appreciation of the political realities of the German
situation. Weber recognised, of course, that some of the leading Marxist
authors of his time had made distinct and even brilliant contributions to
economics, sociology, and jurisprudence, and he maintained a close contact
with scholars influenced heavily by Marx. 22 It is important to recognise that
the bulk of Weber's writing on capitalism and religion is not in a simple or

19 GASS, p. 409.
70 ES, vol. 3, p. 1453. For Weber's views on revolutionary Russia, in the early part of
the nineteenth century, cf. GPS, pp. 192-210. Of the domination of Bolshevism,
Weber observed in 1918, it • is a pure military dictatorship, not simply that of
generals, but of corporals' (GPS, p. 280).
21 GPS, p. 472. Weber's views of the more radical attempts at socialist reconstruction
were very severe: • I am absolutely convinced that these experiments can and will
only lead to the discrediting of socialism for 100 years' (letter to Luk:1cs. quoted in
Mommsen, p. 303); • Liebkrtecht belongs in the lunatic asylum and Rosa Luxem-
burg in the zoological gardens' (quoted ibid. p. 300).
22 On the relationship between Weber and Sombart, cf. Talcott Parsons: • Capitalism
in recent German literature: Sombart and Weber '0 Journal 01 Political Econom~.
vol. 36, 1928. pp. 641-61; on Weber and Michels, see Roth, pp. 249-57. On the
reception of Marx's ideas by the Kalhedersozialislen, see Lindenlaub, pp. 272-384.
 Marx's influence 193
direct wayan intellectual response to Marx's works. Weber Wldoubtedly had
a general acquaintance with Marx's writings at an early stage in his career;
but other influences were far more important':" Most of Weber's interests.
especially in the early part of his career. stemmed from orthodox problems
of historical economics and law. Moreover. when Weber uses the tenn . his-
torical materialism '. the reference is often to the spate of scholarly works
claiming Marxian ancestry which appeared in the 18905. These sometimes
represent what Weber takes to be a vulgarisation of Marx's ideas, or other-
wise depart notably from what Weber considers to be the main tenets of
Marx's posiLion.24 Thus The Protestant Ethic has a complicated genealogy.
Weber was interested from his youth in religion as a social pbenomenoo.7S
While his studies of law and economics diverted him from following this
interest directly in his first academic writings. the work is in some part an
expression of concerns which had remained in the forefront of his mind.
Weber's views upon the validity and usefulness of Marx's original work
thus have to be partially disentangled from his assessment of 'vulgar'
Marxism. Nevertheless. the numerous scattered references to Marx contained
in Weber's writings do furnish a clear exposition of the main sources of simi-
larity and di1ference as Weber conceived them. Weber recognises. of course.
that Marx had made fundamental contributions to historical and sociological
analysis. But. according to Weber. Marx's developmental conceptions can
never be regarded as anything other than sources of insight. or at most as
ideal typical concepts. which might be applied to illuminate specific historical
sequences. In Weber's eyes. Marx's attribution of overall rational • direction'
to the course of history is. within the terms of the framework which Marx
adopts. as illegitimate as that embodied in the Hegelian philosophy which
helped to give it birth. While Weber admits, with strong reservations. the use
of developmental ' stages' as theoretical constructs which can be applied as
a 'pragmatic means' to aid historical research. he rejects completely the
formulation of 'deterministic schemes' based upon general theories of
development.
Z3 As Roth has pointed out, Weber's early writinss embodied a preliminary critique of
historic:al materialism, but this was by no means central to Weber's interests until
later on. GUnther Roth: • Das historische Verhliltnis der Webersc:hen Soziologie
7.um Marxismus', Kolner Zeitschrilt liir S01.iologie und SoziIJlprychologie, vol. 20.
1968, pp. 433ff. .
2' See, for example, Weber's discussion of Stammler, in • R. Stammlers .. Uberwin-
dung" der materialistischen Gesc:hichtsauffassung', GAW. pp. 219-383. The
sarcastic reference which Weber makes to Debel at the end of his thesis on Roman
agrarian history is not untypical of various asides on contemporary Marxist
theoreticians in Weber's writings. Die romische Agc.argesc/Uchle, p. 275.
zs It is interesting to note that Weber was impressed at an early aae by his reading of
Das Leben lesu, by David Strauss: the same work which played a prominent part
in forming the views of the Young Hegelians. c:f. Marianne Weber, pp. 117-20;
lugendbriele (Tllbingen, n.d.), pp. 205ff. In addition to the stimulus provided by
the work of Sombart, Georg Jellinek's Erkfiirung der Menschen- und Biirgerrechle
(1895) was probably important in influencing Weber's direction of interest.
194 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
It follows from this that there can be no more than contingent validity in
the conception that economic relationships constitute the source of historical
development. The specific importance of the 'economic' is variable, and
must be assessed by empirical study of particular circumstances. Weber
accepts that ideas and values, while most definitely not being • derivations'
of material interests in any simple sense. nevertheless must always be
analysed in relation to such interests:
Liberated as we are from the antiquated notion that aU cultural phenomena can
be deduced as a product or function of the constellation of • material' interests.
we believe nevertheless that the analysis 01 socia/and cultural phenomena with
special reference to their economic conditioning and ramifications was a scienti-
fic principle of c:.reative fruitfulness, and with careful application and freedom
from dogmatic restrictions, will remain such for a very long time to come. 2I
But a theory which seeks to deny the independent historical significance of
the content of ideas (which itself is variable) cannot be acceptable. The theory
that economic factors in any sense • finally , explain the course of history,
Weber asserts, • as a scientific theorem, is utterly finished '."
Weber recognises that Marx's writings vary in the degree of sophistication
with which his materialist interpretation of history is presented. The Com-
munist Manifesto, for example, sets out Marx's views • with the crude
elements of genius of the early form '." But even in the more thorough formu-
lation in Capital, Marx nowhere defines precisely how the • economic' is
delimited from other spheres of society. Weber's distinctions between • econo-
mics '. • economically relevant', and • economically conditioned' phenomena
are aimed at clarifying this deficiency. There are many modes of human action,
such as religious practices, which while they are not themselves • economic'
in character, have relevance to economic action in so far as they inftuence the
ways in which men strive to acquire or make use of utilities. These are econo-
mically relevant types of action. Actions which are economically relevant can
in tum be separated from those which are economically conditioned: the
latter are actions, which are again not 'economic' but which are causally
in1luenced by economic factors. As Weber points out, ' After what has been
said. it is self-evident that: firstly, the boundary lines of .. economic ..
phenomena are vague and not easily defined: secondly the .. economic ..
aspect of a phenomenon is by no means only "economically conditioned ..
or only .. economically relevant" .. .' 21
Weber also points to another source of ambiguity in Marx's writings: that
Marx fails to distinguish in a clear manner between the • economic' and th~
• technological'. Where Marx slips into a more or less direct technological
determinism, Weber shows, his work is sometimes manifestly inadequate.
Marx's famous assertion that • The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal

2B MSS, p. 68; GAW. p. 166. 27 GASS. p. 456.

21 MSS, p. 68. 21 MSS. p. 65.
 Marx's influence 195
lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist ',30 is according to
Weber, • a technological proposition. not an economic one, and it can be
clearly proven that it is simply a false assertion. For tbe era of the band-mill,
which lasted up to modem times. showed tbe most varied kinds of cultural
.. super-structures" in different regions.' 31 A given form of technology may
be associated with varying sorts of social organisation - a fact implicit in
Marx's own views since, although it would involve essentially the same tech-
nological basis as capitalism. socialism would for Marx be a very different
form of society.
Weber admits the significance of class conflicts in history. while denying
that the role of class struggles is as important as is postulated by Marx.
Although in some ways Weber's conceptions of class and class conflict are
not so divergent from those of Marx as is often thOUght - Weber does heavily
underscore the point that property versus lack of property constitutes the
most important source of class divisions - it is true nonetheless that the his-
torical significance of status monopolies is strongly emphasised by Weber.
For Weber, status group conflicts. however, are no more important in history
than conflicts between political associations and nation-states. In Weber's
view, therefore. the concept of divergent sectional • interests' cannot be limited
to economic interests. but must be extended to other spheres of social life.
Thus political parties. for example. have interests which derive from their
situation as aspirants to, or as wielders of. power, and such interests do not
necessarily rest upon shared :::lass situations.
But the most important respect in which Weber separates his views from
those of Marx concerns the broad epistemological standpoint which underlies
the whole of Weber's writings. The radical neo-Kantian position which Weber
accepts takes as its premise the complete logical separation of factual and
normative propositions. In Weber's work, the necessary corollary of this is the
postulate of the irreducibility of competing values. It is this epistemological
position which Weber takes as separating his perspective most decisively
from that of Marx: Marx's work. whatever its undoubted merits. involves the
commitment to the 'scientific' ethic of' ultimate ends', and thus entails the
acceptance of a • total' conception of history. The conception of charisma,
and the role which it plays in Weber's work, manifests Weber's conviction
that historical development cannot be interpreted in terms of a rational scheme
which expresses what is normatively valid. For Weber, science cannot answer
the question: , .. Which of the warring Gods should we serve? ", 32

30 Poverty of PhUosophy, p. 92. Weber does not, however. take account of the polemical
context in which this statement is made. For Weber's own distinction between
• economy' and • technology', see ES. vol. 1. pp. 65-7.
31 GASS. p.4S0.
32 FMW. p. 153. cf. Weber's remark on socialist parties: • I shall not join these
churches.' Quoted in Baumgarten, p. 607.
196 Part 4: Capitalism. socialism and social theory
France in the nineteenth century: Marx and the growth of Marxism
Marx and Marxism were parts of Max Weber's intellectual universe to a
degree which was not the case for Durkheim. Marx was a German. and wrote
most of his major works in that language; and no other country in the nine-
teenth century possessed as large or as politically significant a Marxist party as
the German Social Democratic Party. In spite of the fact that be spent a period
studying in Germany in the early part of his career. Durkheim's intellectual
perspective remained almost obstinately French. Nonetheless. the formative
social and political context in which Durkheim developed his sociology was
comparable in certain important respects with that which influenced Weber.
Like Weber. Durkheim lived and wrote in a situation in which two divergent
streams of political thought and activity threatened to submerge the liberal
principles bequeathed from the French Revolution: a conservative nationa-
lism on the one hand, and a radical socialism on the otber. In common with
Weber, Durkheim accepted some elements from each of these competing
systems of thought, and embodied them within his own political standpoint.
and within bis social theory more broadly. The conclusions which each author
reached. however. are in some respects quite divergent, and this is in part to
be traced to the specific ways in which the overall development of France
contrasted with that of Germany in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
Marx's attitude towards France in the 1840s was. naturally enough. domi-
nated by a consciousness of the relative superiority of the level of political
advancement of that country as compared to Germany. Whatever the strength
of the reaction which bad set in against the Revolution in France. it was
obvious that the political sophistication of the French socialist thinkers was
rooted in a social structure which had already made its decisive break with its
feudal past. One of the principal criticisms wbich Marx directs against the
majority of German socialists was that they • imported • ideas from France
without appreciating the depth of the disjunction between the material
differences between the two countries. As Marx writes in 1843:
If one were to begin with the status quo itself in Germany, even in the most
appropri:.te way, i.e. negatively, the result would still be an anachronism. Even
the negation of our political present is already a dusty fact in the historicallum-
her room of modern nations. I may negate powdered wigs, but I am still left
with unpowdered wigs. If I negate the German situation of 1843 I have, accord-
ing to French chronology. hardly reached the year 1789. and still less the vital
centre of the present day.33
But the course of development taken after the Paris risings of 1848-9 made
it apparent that the degree to which the liberal bourgeoisie in France had
achieved a stable footing in the control of government prior to this date was
open to serious question. Engels documents at some length the reconsidera-
tions of previous views which were forced upon Marx and himself by the con-

33 EW, pp. 44-5. See also eM, pp. 167-70.

 Marx's influence 197

sequences of the events of 1848 and 1849 in France. Although proletarian

elements played a major role in the Paris rising of 1848, the resuhs were
really a victory for the grande bourgeoisie. who thereby consolidated the
advances which had not been fully secured as a result of the counter-reaction
of conservative forces subsequent to the 1789 Revolution. • History has
proved us, and all who thought like us, wrong'. Engels writes. ' It has made it
clear that the state of economic development at that time was not, by a long
way, ripe for the elimination of capitalist production. . .' 3.
Marx discusses the situation in France at the mid-point of the nineteenth
century in two lengthy analyses: The Class Struggles in France and The
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 3S It is an indication of the lack of a
, mechanistic' conception of the relationship between economy and state in
Marx's writings that, while treating Britain as the model for the economic
theory of Capital, Marx nonetheless regards France as the purest example of
advanced liberal bourgeois politics. The particular circumstances of British
historical development. according to Marx, have created a state which is
based upon an alliance between the bourgeoisie and the remnants of the old
land-owniog aristocracy. 31 In France, by contrast, such a ' compromise ' was
not effected, and the political character of class conflicts is hence more clearly
evinced. For Marx. the French bourgeoisie and proletariat are the ' politi-
cians ' of Europe, as the Germans were the ' philosophers '. and the British
the' political economists '.37
Under Louis-Philippe, according to Marx, only one section of the bour-
geoisie maintained control of political power: the financial capitalists,
bankers and rentiers. The main group benefiting from the fall of Louis-
Philippe are the large industrialists, who had little aocess previously to the
reins of government. The result is a clarification of the class-struggle, bringing
the division between working class and bourgeoisie into a sharper focus, and
thus providing the source for a subsequent direct political confrontation
between the two great industrial classes:
The French workers could not take a step forward, could not touch a hair of the
bourgeois order. until the course of the revolution had aroused the mass of the
nation, peasants and petty bourgeois, standing between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie, against this order. against the rule of capital, and had forced it to
attach itself to the proletarians as their protagonists.3 •
Marx does DOt expect, however. that France will be immediately plunged
into a new civil war in which the proletarians would emerge as victors; such
hopes have to be postponed for an indefinite period .• A new revolution is
possible only in consequence of a new crisis. It is, however, just as certain as
this crisis.' 3t The crisis indeed did come, twenty years later, not, as Marx

sc SW. vol. 1. p. 125. 33 SW, vol. 1. pp. 139-344.

~. We. vol. 11, pp. 95-7. 31 We, vol. J. p. 405.
3. SW, vol. 1. p. 149. 31 SW, vol. I, p. 231.
198 Part 4: Capitalism. socialism and social theory
expected. as a consequence of an economic depression in Britain, • the
demiurge of the bourgeois cosmos " but as a result of the disastrous war which
Louis Napoleon undertook against Germany in 1870.
The consequences of Bismarck's victory constitute the decisive axis which
connects the thought of the three authors whose work is analysed in this book.
In Germany. the military triumph was a major factor promoting Bismarck's
programme of Prussian dominance in a unitary German state; for France, the
results were calamitous. producing political disarray and lasting feelings of
humiliation among large sections of the popUlation. Marx's attitudes towards
the Commune are notoriously complicated, and it is not possible to pursue
this matter here. What is important is that the immediate effects of the brief
life of the Commune, and of its savage repression. were to promulgate class
hatreds which further accentuated the internal disunity of the French state.
But the Commune was not to be. as Marx hoped, , the glorious harbinger of
a new society ' .•0 Instead. it was succeeded by a period in which a resurgence
of nationalism in France provided the most tangible ideological basis for the
recovery of national unity. and in which the country to some extent came to
terms with its own backwardness. For the bulk of provincial France had in
many respects remained unchanged since the eighteenth century; strongly
conservative elements remained powerful, in the form of the church, pro-
pertied rentiers, and the peasantry. Even Marx's description in The Class
Struggles in France, sober as it was compared to his earlier views, proved to
be optimistic as an appraisal of the level of real political power attained by
the progressive sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie.'1
Under the Third Republic. however, considerable progress was made to-
wards the emancipation of the country from the lingering hold of conservative
elements. The Dreyfus affair brought to a head the conflict between republi-
canism and the reactionary concerns of the church and the military, and
eventuated in stimulating the separation of various administrative functions
from hierocratic control: of basic importance here was the expansion of the
secularisation of education. Much of this derived from the activities of the
Radical Party. The history of Marxism in France in the late nineteenth cen-
tury is a pale shadow of the powerful resurgence of the Social Democratic
Party in Germany towards the end of the century. As in Germany, however,
the seeds of Marxist thought which were implanted in France during the
decades following the repression of the Commune became mixed with indi-
genous socialist traditions with which Marxism existed in uneasy alliance.
Given the much weaker position of the Marxist left in France. the result in
this case was the evolution of a doctrine which, as Lichtheim has commented.
• was at best an approximation and at worst a caricature '.42

40 SW. vol. 1. p. 542.

41 See Marx's comments in • The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', SW. vol.
I, pp. 333-5 and passim. 42 For footnote, see p. 199.
 Marx's influence 199

Durldleim'. assessment of Marx

In these circumstances it is not difficult to appreciate why Marxism had little
influence upon Durkheim in the early part of his career. Unlike Max Weber,
Durkheim had little taste for active involvement in political action, and main-
tained an aloofness from the struggles and disputes of the 'cu;s;ne polit;-
que '.~3 In general terms the main substance of Durkheim's political stance is
clear enough, .involving the repudiation of both conservatism and revolu-
tionary socialism. As is the case with Weber, Durkheim's liberalism was
heavily influenced by the specific social and political conditions of his native
country. In Durkbeim's case, the importance of national reconstruction
following the catastrophes of 1870-1 is basic, and the influence of a general
concern with moral consolidation is clearly imprinted upon the whole of
Durkheim's writings. The leading theme, indeed, in Durkheim's work is the
concern to reconcile the growth of secular individualism with the moral
demands which are posed by the maintenance of unity in a modem differen-
tiated society. Durkheim's contribution to the Dreyfus struggle. an article
written in response to the expressed views of a leading Catholic conservative,
delineates these issues very clearly.'~ The individualism of the Drey/usards,
Durkheim argues, is quite different from the amoral self-seeking with which
it is identified by the partisans of church and army. The pursuit of egoistic
ends which is the economists' model of man is not at all to be equated wiLh
rationalistic individualism. The economists reduce human conduct to a
market exchange. This utilitarianism is now defunct; the emergent ethic of
individualism is itself a moral. not an amoral. phenomenon: • the human
person ... is considered as sacred '.'5 There is thus no paradox in asserting
that a modem society must be founded upon a collective moral unity. and that
it must provide for the maximal expression of the rights and liberties of the
individual. The issues which have to be faced cannot be solved by seeking to
restrain individualism through the reimposition of the traditional forms of
authority. On the contrary. the main problem is to extend the concrete oppor-
tunities of individuals to develop their potentialities, in conformity with the
moral principles which today are basic to the social order.
Durkheim's proposals for the establishment of occupational associations
intermediary between the individual and the state have their roots in the

42 George Lichtheim: Marxism in Modern France (New York, 1966), p. 9. cf.

Althusser's remark that Marx's works first came to be known in France • without
the heritage and assistance of a national Iheor.elical tradition t. Althusaer: For
Marx, p. 26.
U Georges Davy: • Emile Durkheim', Revue de metaphysique el de morale, vol. 26,
1919, p. 189.
" • L'individualisme et les intellectuels.' The very occurrence of the Dreyfus case
epitomises some of the main differences between Prance and Germany. In Germany,
a Jew could not have attained the position achieved by Dreyfus; nor could such an
affair have stimulated a comparable crise de conscience of national proportions.
~J Ibid. p. 8.
200 Part 4: Capitalism. socialism and social theory
solidarisme of the Radical Socialists." BUI, for Durkheim, these proposals
rest upon strictly sociological premises, derived from the conclusions estab-
lished in The Division of Labour. It would be misleading to suppose tbat
Durkbeim developed these notions in close conjunction with the political
interests of the solidarists, in spite of the fact that his formulation undoub-
tedly did exert a significant influence upon a number of major political
figures. 41 Durkheim is sympatheticaJly inclined towards the solidarist pro-
gramme for the provision of state-run welfare schemes covering unemploy-
ment, sickness and old age. But he insists that these should not be allowed (0
assume the dominant position, and that they must be iutegrated with a
concern for the systematic moral regulation of industrial organisation.
The increasing spread of Marxism among various sectors of the French
labour movement in the 1890s. and the growth of a scholarly interest in
Marx's writings ampng intellectuals, eventually forced Durkheim to confront
in a direct way the relationship between sociology and socialism. The di1fu-
sion of Marxist socialism in France at the turn of the century was manifest in
the appearance of the translations of the works of, among others, Engels,
Kautsky and Labriola, which thus replaced the crude Guesdist version of
Marxism with a more comprehensive account of Marx's ideas. Durkheim's
review of the French translation of Labriola's general exposition of Marx's
thought contains the most explicit statement whereby Durkheim identifies
his differences with Marx. 411 Durkheim's lectures on socialism, delivered in
1895-6; were apparently stimulated in part by the challenge posed by the
conversion of some of his students to Marxism. While he devoted most of
his attention to Saint-Simon, as the key figure whose writings fonD the most
important single source of both socialism and sociology. he intended to pro-
ceed to a consideration of ProudhOD. and thence to Lassal1e and Marx. But
the founding of the Annee sodologique in 1896 meant that these plans had
to be deferred. and Durkheim was never able to return to them at a later date.
Durkheim lays some considerable stress in Socialism upon the closeness of
the historical connedions between socialism and sociology. In the period
shortly after the opening of the nineteenth century, Durkheim points out,
three sets of ideas came to the fore: • I. The idea of extending to social
sciences the method of the positive sciences (out of which sociology has come)
and the historical method (an indispensable auxiliary of sociology); 2. The
idea of a religious regeneration; and, 3. The socialist idea.' .. It is no accident,

41 ct. Hayward. For Durkheim's views on revolutiODary syndicalism, see tbe account
of his discussion witb Lagardelle, in Libres entretiens, 1905. pp. 425-34.
47 Including leaders of the syndicalist movement. For Sorel's views on Durkheim's
influence, see Georges Sorel: • Les tMories de M. Durkheim', u devenir social.
vol. I, 189S, pp. 1-26 &: 148-80.
•• R.eview of Antonio Labriola: Essais $IIr Ia conception mtllirialiste tk rhistoire.
RP, vol. 44, 1897. pp. 645-S1. Labriola's work leans heavily on Engelsj Anti·
Diihring is called • the unexcelled book in the literature of socialism '. Antonio
Labriola: Socialism and Philosophy (Chicago, 1918), p. S3. 4. Soc, p. 283.
 Marx's influence 201
Durkbeim adds, that these three tendencies are again re-emerging strongly
towards the end of the nineteenth century, in times which are as eventful and
critical as the decades following the 1789 Revolution. At first sight, these
appear to be three contrary currents of thought, which share little in common.
The movement calling for a religious revival is conceived by its adherents to
be hostile to rationalism and to science. The socialist movement, in general,
is based upon the rejection of religion, and also upon the notion that sociolo-
gical study must be subordinated to the normative demands of political
action. But in fact these three streams of thought seem to be contradictory
because each expresses only one side of social reality. Each expresses some
of the needs which men feel when social change has radically upset accepted
habits such that • the unsettled collective organisation no longer functions
with the authority of instinct '.10
The stimulus to sociology derives from the need to understand the causes
of the changes which have called forth the exigency for far-reaching social
reorganisation. But scientific study proceeds slowly and with caution. Durk-
heim often stresses in his writings that scientific activity is worthless if it does
not in some way lead to practical results. Nevertheless, it is of the essence of
science that its procedures and objectives be detached from immediately
practical requirements; only by the maintenance of a • disinterested ' attitude
can scientific enquiry attain its maximal effectiveness. Science must not be
made • a sort of fetish or idol'; it allows us • only a degree of knowledge,
beyond which there is nothing else '.11 The needs for solutions to urgent social
problems, however, often go far beyond that which can be based upon scien-
tifically established knowledge: hence the spur to the development of socialist
doctrines, which present overall programmes for the necessary reorganisation
of society. The reactionary call for a revival of religion similarly indicates
the shortcomings of science. The moral hiatus which results from a situation
in which old beliefs have come under question, but have dot yet been replaced
by new ones, produces a concern with the mom consolidation of society:
hence the resurgence of religious ideals.
Durkheim does not except Marx from his overall judgement of socialism.
Marx's writings offer a complete system of thought which is presented as a
scientifically established body of propositions. But such a system in fact pre-
supposes an enormous fund of knowledge, far and above that which is avail-
able at the present time. A great deal Ilf research would be necessary to
substantiate even some of the more limited generaIisations contained in
Capital. Thus, reviewing Gaston Richard's Le soc;aiisme et Ia science sociale.
Durkheim comments: • of all the criticisms which Richard has directed at
Marx, the strongest appears to us to be that which limits itself to setting in

so Soc, p. 284.
51 • L'enseignemcnt philosophique et l'agn!ption de philosophie', RP, vol. 39, 189S,
p.I46.
202 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
relief what a distance there is between the fundamental propositions of the
system and the observations upon which it rests.' 62
These views are amplified in Durkheim's discussion of Labriola's exposi-
tion of Marx's thought. Durkheim expresses his agreement with certain of
the most important notions embodied in historical materialism. It is a fruit-
ful conception, Durkheim states, which regards social life not merely from
the point of view of the consciousness of the individuals involved, but which
examines the influence of factors which escape consciousness and help to
shape it. Moreover, it is also valid to hold, as Marx does, that these factors
must be sought in the organisation of society. • For in order for collective
representations to be explicable, it is certainly necessary that they derive from
something and, since they cannot form a circle closed upon itself, the source
from which they derive must be located outside of themselves: U It is quite
correct to locate the source of ideas in a definite substratum; and what else,
Durkheim asks rhetorically, can this substratum be composed of, if not the
members of society organised into definite social relationships?
According to Durkheim, however, there is no reason to presume that this
perspective commits whoever adopts it to the acceptance of the whole corpus
of Marx's thought. Durkheim remarks that he himself arrived at this concep-
tion without accepting the rest of the principles upon which Marx's work is
founded, and that his own formulations have in no way been influenced by
Marx. One can, as follows from the general. conclusions concerning the
relationship between sociology and socialism stated above, study social or-
ganisation in this manner without accepting the additional premises entailed
by Marxian socialism. The perspective which examines the interplay between
ideas and their • material' substratum is simply the substance of sociological
method, and is a necessary condition for studying society in a scientific
manner. lust as Weber emphasises that socialism is not a conveyance which
can be stopped at the wish of those who travel in it - socialist beliefs must
themselves be made subject to the sort of analysis which socialists apply to
other forms of belief - so Durkheim stresses that socialism itself must, from
the point of view of the sociologist, be treated as a social fact like any other.
Socialism is rooted in a definite state of society, but it does not necessarily
express accurately the social conditions which gave rise to it. 54
Moreover, the central thesis of historical materialism. which ties the origin
of ideas directly to economic relationships, is • contrary to facts which seem
established '. It has been proved, Durkheim declares, that religion is the
original soun:e out of which all more differentiated systems of ideas have
52 Review of Gaston Richard: Le socialisme et la science socia/e, RP, vol. 44, 1897,
p. 204. Durkheim expresses his approval of those socialists in Germany and Italy who
were trying • to renew and extend the formulae which they have been prisoner of
for far too long' - especially • the doctrine of economic materialism, the Marxist
theory of value, the iron law [of wages] ... [and1 the pre-eminent importance attri-
buted to class conflict '. Review of Merlino: Formes et essence du socialisme, RP.
vol. 48, 1889, p. 433. 63 Review of Labriola. p. 648. 54 Soc, pp. 40ft.
 Marx's influence 203
developed. But in the simplest forms of society. 'tbe economic factor is rudi-
mentary, while religious life is, on the contrary, luxurious and enveloping '.n
In this case, the economy is influenced much more by religious practice and
symboJism than the other way around. It does not follow from this that, with
the growth of organic solidarity and the consequent decline of the all-encom-
passing character of religion. the influence of economic relationships becomes
predominant in determining the nature of the beliefs which occupy the pri-
mary place in the conscience collective. Once a set of beliefs are established,
• they are, in virtue of this, realities sui generis, autonomous, capable of being
causes in their turn and of producing new phenomena'. 51 Tn primitive socie-
ties, which have a simple structure, all ideas are connected to a single system
of religious representations, and are consequently closely tied in their content
to the form of the organisation of the society. But with the growth of differen-
tiation in the division of labour. and of the application of critical reason. pro-
ducing the clash of divergent ideas. the relationship between beliefs and the
substratum in which they are rooted becomes more complex.
In conjunction with this emphasis. Durkheim rejects the Marxian supposi-
tion that economic relationships - the class structure - are the major focus
of political power in society. According to Durkheim, there is wide variability
in the political organisation of societies which are otherwise structurally
similar. It follows that the importance of classes, and of class conflict gener-
ally, in historical development, is minimised by Durkheim. It is significant. of
course, that Durkheim does not use either the Saint-Simonian term • indus-
trial society " or the economists' 'capitalism' in his writings, but talks rather
of 'modem society' or 'contemporary society'. Durkheim's model of de-
velopment. while recognising the significance of definite ' stages' of societal
advancement, emphasises the importance of cumulative changes, rather than
of revolutionary dynamism, in history. According to Durkbeim, those socie-
ties in which political revolutions are most frequent are not those which
manifest the greatest capacity for change, Indeed. the opposite is the case:
these are societies in which the basic traditions remain the same. 'On the
surface there is an uninterrupted stream of continually new events. But this
superficial changeability hides the most monotonous uniformity. It is among
the most revolutionary peoples that bureaucratic routine is often the most
powerful.' aT If the past development of society cannot be understood in terms
of the primacy which Marx gave to class conflict, the same is true of the
present. The prevalence of class conflicts in contemporary societies is symp.-
tomatic of the malaise of the modem world, but not its root cause. Qass con-
flict derives from a disorder which has its origins elsewhere. • From which it

Ii Review of Labriola, p. 6S0. 56 Ibid. p. 6S1.

~1 Moral Education. p. 137; L'Educat;oll morale (Paris, 1925), p. lS6. Marx's position
on this matter should not be over-simplified. Marx makes a rather similar point, in
relation to nineteenth-century France, in • The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis
Bonaparte', SW, vol. I, pp. 249-50.
204 Part 4: Capitalism. socialism and social theory
follows '. in Durkheim's view, • that the economic transformations which
have been produced during the course of this century, the changeover from
small- to large-scale industry. do not necessitate an upheaval and radical
reorganisation (renouvellement integral) of the social order.. .' I I
Although Durkheim rejects the possibility of radically reorganising con-
temporary society on the basis of revolutionary change, he does foresee a
definite trend towards the disappearance of class divisions. The maintenance
of rights of inheritance is one main factor perpetuating class conflict between
labour and capital. 58 Inheritance is a survival of the old form of collective pro-
perty. when property was owned in common by a kinship grouP. and will
eventually be abolished just as the hereditary transmission of status and legal
privileges has been abolished. eo Of course, this does not. for Durkheim. entail
the collectivisation of property in the hands of the state. The moral indivi-
dualism of contemporary societies demands that all barriers to the formation
of equitable contracts be removed. not that private property be abolished.
In Durkheim's view, however, economic reorganisation cannot provide
the main solution to the • crisis' in the modem world which has generated
socialism. because the causes of the crisis are not economic but moral. Elimi-
nation of the • forced • division of labour will not in and of itself put an end
to the • anomic' division of labour. This is the source of Durkheim's most
important conscious basis of divergence from Marx. Marx's programme for
the alleviation of the pathological state of capitalism rests upon economic
measures. Advocacy of the interests of the working class is directly bound up,
in Marx's writings. with the latter's views upon the • contradictory' nature
of the capitalist market economy. The • anarchy of the market' derives from
the class structure of capitalism. and will cede place to a system which regu-
lates production in a centrally coordinated economy: • In short, in Marxist
socialism, capital does not disappear; it is merely administered by society
and not by individuals.' 61 Marx's writings hence share a commitment to the
main principle which is the definitive characteristic of socialism according to
Durkheim's usage: the concentration of the productive capacity of society in
the hands of the state. But this in itself does nothing to alleviate the moral void
which results from the anomic condition of modem industry; rather, it accen-
tuates the problem, because the result would be to further the domination of
society by • economic' relationships. Such a merging of the state with the
economy would have the same consequences as Saint-Simon's industrialism.
To Marx. as to Saint-Simon, • it appears that the way to realise social peace
is to free economic appetites of all restra,int on the one hand, and on the other
to satisfy them by fulfilling them. But such an undertaking is contradictory '.12

H Review of Labriola', p. 651. ~t PECM, p. 123.

I ••La famille conjugate', RP, vol. 91, 15021, p. to. Durkheim slightly qualifies this in
PECM, p. 2·17.
,. Soc, p. 90. In fact. this is an exact description of what Marx regards as the transiliDnol
stage between capitalism and communism. U Soc, p. 241.
14. Religion, ideology and society

Marx's writings have their initial source in the critique of religion as formu-
lated by David Strauss. Bruno Bauer and Feuerbach. Behind these looms the
intluence of Hegel. whose philosophy. as Feuerbach commented. 'negated
theology in a theological manner '.1 Hegel's philosophical system unites two
basic elements which Marx later identified as characteristic of religion as a
form of • ideology': the transmuted representation of values which are in fact
created by man in society. and the provision of principled support for an
existing social and political order - in this case. that of the Prussian state. The
intluence of religion upon social life is also a leading concern of both Durk-
heim and Weber. and forms one most significant dimension along which some
of the themes intrinsic to the writings of the latter two authors may be com-
pared with those of Marx. There are two connected sets of problems in the
analysis of the' ideological' character of religion which are important here:
the derivation of the content of religious symbolism. and the consequences of
the • secularisation ' of modem life.
The first serves to focus some of the issues involved in the great, protracted
debate over the nature of the ' materialistic' interpretation of history in the
latter part of the nineteenth century. Both Durkheim and Weber. in common
with all other liberal critics of Marx, reject what they take to be Marx's con-
ception of the relationship between ideas and 'material interests'. In dis-
cussing this matter in this chapter. most attention is given to an examination
of the relationship between Marx and Weber. The writings of Max Weber.
as has been mentioned in the previous chapter. are much more directly aimed
at the critical elucidation of historical materialism than are those of Durk-
heim. Moreover. the publication of The Protestant Elhic sparked off a con-
troversy over the role of ' ideas' in historical development which has barely
abated today.2
The second set of problems. to do with 'secularisation " relate not to the
nature of the interplay between' ideas • and ' material reality' as such. but to
the implications of the declining influence of religion in the modem world.
The consequences of the diminishing hold of religion upon s9Ciallife concern
each of the three writers discussed in this book. on both a practical and a theo-

I Feuerbach: Siimmlliche Werke. vol. 2. p. 27S.

2 Much of the debate over The Protestant Ethic bas taken place in ignorance of
Weber's publisbed replies to his early critics. cf. his • Antikritisches zum .. Geist des
Kapitalismu5"'. Archiv IUr Sozialwissenschalt und Sozialpolitik. vol. 30, )9)0,
pp. 176-202; and' Antikritisches Schlusswort '.

205
206 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
retica1 level. All three attribute tremendous importance to the progressive
displacement of religious thought and practice by the penetration of rationa-
lism into all spheres of social life. Clarification of some of the main points of
similarity and divergence on this issue provides another source of insight into
some of the most significant contrasts between tbe works of Marx as compared
to those of Durkheim and Weber.

Marx and Weber: the problem of religioa as ' ideology ,

In examining the relationship between Marx's views on religion and those of
Weber. a major difficulty is presented. of course. by the fragmentary nature
of Marx's writings on the subject. Most of Marx's statements about the
influence of religious institutions are unequivocally hostile, but largely disin-
terested. Marx's concern. even in his early writings. is overwhelmingly with
modern capitalism and its transcendence by socialism. He did not study
religion in any detail after 1845. because in breaking with the Young Hege-
Hans and with Feuerbach. and in perceiving the need to analyse sociologically
the relationship between economics. politics. and ideology. he effectively
overcame - in terms of his own objectives - the need to subject religion to a
detailed analysis. The Young Hegelians. as is made clear in The Holy Family.
continued to devote most of their efforts to the critique of religion. and thereby
always remained imprisoned within a world-view which was. even if only
negatively. a religious one.
Any attempt. therefore. to compare in detail the views of Marx and Weber
on specific religious phenomena is doomed to failure. Thus Marx's account
of oriental society is too skimpy to form the basis of detailed comparison with
Weber's lengthy discussions of the religions of India and China. Even Marx's
views upon the emergence and significance of Christianity in the development
of the European societies have to be mainly inferred from various oblique
statements in his critiques of Hegel and the Young Hegelians. These do indi-
cate. however. both parallels and contrasts with Weber. As a close student of
Hegel. Marx is obviously aware of the fundamental importance which his-
torians and philosophers have attributed to Christianity in the West. Marx
does not question the validity of this. What he does attack is the idealistic
standpoint from which the inftuence of Christianity is analysed. Thus he
objects to Stirner's treatment of the rise of early Christianity in that it is con-
ducted wholly upon the level of ideas. 3 Christianity arose. Marx states. as a
religion of wandering. uprooted vagrants. and the causes of its expansion ha ve
to be related to the internal decay of the Roman Empire: • finally the Hellenic
and Roman world perished. spiritually in Christianity and materially in the
migration of the peoples '.f. Weber. however. holds that Christianity has

3 GI. pp. 143ft'.

• GI. p. lSI (footnote).
 Religion, ideology and society 207
always been primarily a religion of the urban artisanate.' But Marx does
emphasise that the Christian ethical outlook formed a vital new current. con-
trasting with the moral decadence of Rome. Christianity substituted for
Roman pantheism the conception of a single universal God, whose authority
is founded upon uniquely Christian notions of sin and salvation. In the later
evolution of Christianity in Europe. the Reformation provided a similar moral
regeneration in relation to an internally disintegrating feudal society. ' Luther
.. , overcame bondage out of devotion by replacing it by bondage out of con-
viction. He shattered faith in authority because he restored the authority of
faith ... He freed man from outer religiosity because he made religiosity the
inner man.' G Marx's hostile posture towards religion should not obscure the
fact that, while religious ideology serves to content men with an existence of
misery on this earth. it nevertheless provides a positive inspiration towards a
better world: it constitutes' a protest against real suffering ', 1
But to proceed beyond the level of such relatively unsystematic compari-
sons, we have to revert to a more general plane of analysis. The questions
raised by the interpretation of Marx's treatment of religion can only be satis-
factorily dealt with. in relation to the issues posed by Weber's writings, in
the context of Marx's overall conception of • materialism '. In evaluating
Marx's • materialism " two central points have to be borne in mind. Firstly,
Marx was at no time concerned solely with the formulation of an academic
theory. Marx's attitude is well conveyed in his famous epigram: • The philo-
sophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is. to
change it.' 8 In Marx's conception, the theories of the social thinker them-
selves form a part of the dialectic in terms of which social life both' changes
men' and is 'changed by men'. Secondly, Marx's life's work encompasses
no more than a fraction of the project which. in early adulthood. he deter-
mined to set himself. The bulk of Marx's theoretical writings consist, in effect,
of successive drafts of Capital. Even this work remained unfinished in Marx's
lifetime. But Capital itself was origfually planned as the preliminary analysis
of bourgeois economics which would establish in a precise fashion the class
character of bourgeois society. It is misleading to treat Capital, compendious
although it is in its four volumes,' as an overall study and critique of the
structure of bourgeois society, although this is how the overwhelming majority
of Marxists. and critics, have regarded the work. The same rider by which

S ES, vol. 2, pp. 48111. For Kautsky's theory of the • proletarian' character of
Christianity - which Weber rejects - see his Der Ursprung des Clzristentums
(Stuttgart, 1908).
e • Contribution to tho critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right', translation as per
On Religion (Moscow, 1957), p. 51. Nonetheless, Marx is unequivocally hostile to
Luther and Lutheranism; Luther' freed the body from chains because he enchained
the heart '.
: EW,p. 43.
B WYM, p. 402.
• The • fourth volume' of Capital is Theol'ien uber dea Me/ml'eTl.
208 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
Marx qualifies the nature of his intentions in the 1844 Manuscripts could
equally accurately be applied to Capital: • in the present work, the relation-
ships of political economy with the state, law. morals. civil life. etc.• are
touched upon only to the extent that political economy itself expressly deals
with these subjects.' 10
Marx did not. therefore, ever write a systematic exposition of his materia-
listic conception of history. even as applied to that societal form which occu-
pied the prime focus of his attention. bourgeois society. Nevertheless. in the
light of his early writings. it is no longer possible to doubt that Marx's con-
ception of historical materialism does not represent a simple ' inversion • of
Hegelian idealistic philosophy. Feuerbach's writings. on the other hand, are
fcunded upon such an inversion, and for this reason Feuerbach's philosophy
of materialism remains confined to a transposed religious humanism. The
consequence of Feuerbach's position is that religion is a symbolic' represen-
tation' of man, and that to eliminate human self-alienation religion has to be
demystified, and placed upon a rational level. Marx's view is different. Feuer-
bach's errors, as Marx sees them, are to speak of 'man' in the abstract. and
thus to fail to understand that men only exist in the context of specific societies
which change in the course of historical development; and, secondly, to treat
ideas and 'consciousness' as simply the 'reftection ' of human activities in
the material world.
Feuerbach, in other words, preserves that philosophical connotation of the
term' materialism " which Marx seeks to break away from. In Marx's words,
• The chief defect of all previous materialism (including Feuerbach's) is that
the object, actuality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the
object or perception, but not as sensuous human activity, Praxis, not subjec-
tively '.11 It is just such a conception of materialism which stands behind the
notion that ideas are mere' epiphenomena " and consequently that the analy-
sis of the content of ideologies is irrelevant to the explanation of human
action. It must be admitted that there is more than a trace of this conception
in Marx's writings. Thus. in The German Ideology, Marx writes that' in all
ideology man and their circumstances seem to be standing on their heads, as
in a camera obscura. . .'. But it is made clear that such statements are to be
understood in a historical context. Human consciousness is, in the early
stages of social development, 'the direct outcome' of material activity; it is
'mere herd-consciousness '. With the expansion of social differentiation, how-
ever, , consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and
to proceed to the formation of "pure" theory, theology, philosophy, ethics,
etc.'. (This' emancipation' is fallacious in the sense that ideas can never be
wholly' free' of the social conditions which generate tthem.) This first be-

10 EW, p. 63.
11 WYM, p. 400; We, vol. 3, p. S. For a recent discussion of Feuerbach. see Eugene
Kamenka: The PhilosoplJy 01 Ludwig Feuerbach (London, 1970).
 Religion. ideology and society 209
comes possible with the appearance of a division of labour allowing the emer-
gence of a stratum concerned with • mental labour " which occurs historically
in the shape of the development of a priesthood. l t The fonowing paragraph
expresses Marx's standpoint clearly:
This conception of history depends on our ability to expound the real process of
production, starting out from the material production of life itself, and to com-
prehend the form of intercourSe connected with this and created by this mode of
production (Le., civil society in its various stages), as the basis of all history; and
to show it in its action as state, to explain all the different theoretical products
and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics, etc., etc., and trace their
origin and growth from that basis; by which means, of course, the whole thing
can be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these
various sides on one another).13
Ideologies are thus • rooted in the material conditions of life', but this does
not entail that there is a universal or unilateral relationship between the ' real
foundation' of society - the relations of production - and 'legal and political
superstructures '. The specific conclusion which Marx reaches in criticising
Feuerbach is that ideas are social products, which cannot be understood by
the philosopher who stands outside history. The decisive characteristic of
Marx's materialism is to be found in the links which are drawn between class
structure and ideology. Simple and obvious although this appears, it is this
which is fundamental to Marx's ' materialism " rather than any notion of
ideas as epiphenomena of material relationships. Where Marx generalises
about the relationship between ideology and material' substructure " this is
in terms of the specification that the class structure is the main mediating
link between the two_ The class structure of society exerts a determinate effect
upon the ideas which assume prominence in that society; similarly. the emer-
gence of ideas which can serve as an effective challenge to the dominant order
depends upon the formation of class relationships which generate a structural
base for the new ideology. Thus. while.the • idea of communism • has been
'expressed a hundred times' in history. the real possibility of a communist
revolution ' presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class '.14
It may be pointed out that. even in Feuerbach's philosophy, religion is
something more than a complete reflection of material reality: it is also the
source of ideals towards which man should strive. God is man as he oUght to

I~ G1, pp. 37 &: 43; We, vol. 3, pp. 27 &: 31. As Poulantzas says, according to this
analysis' the realm of the" sacred" would appear to be closer to the infrastructure
than that of "law", at least from the moment that we can speak of a juridical reality
which begins to become distinct: it is the religious level which constitutes the most
imponant medium whereby law can be undentood in relation to the infrastructure'
Nicos Ar. Poulantzas: Nature des choses et du droit (Paris, 1965), p. 230.
13 GI, p. SO.
II GI, pp. 51 &: 62. Failure to grasp Marx's point on this matter is one element which
has confused much of the recent discussion of so-called' integration' and' coercion'
theory in sociology. cf. My article'" Power" in the recent writings of Talcott
Parsons', Sociology. vol. 2, 1968, pp. 268-70.
210 Part 4: Capitalism. socialism and social theory
be. and therefore the image of the deity holds out the hope of what man could
become. Marx mates this conception with the dialectical view that it is the
reciprocal interaction of such ideas with the social organisation of ' earthly
men • which must form the core of an historical perspective. This reciprocity
must be understood in terms of the empirical study of concrete forms of
society, and cannot be grasped if we ' abstract from the historical process '.16
The particular character of the relationship between class structure and
ideology is thus itself historically variable. Capitalism. which strips away an
the pelsonalised ties of feudalism, substitutes for them the impersonal opera-
tioDS of the market; and by applying science to the construction of rational
technology, cuts through the ideological embellishments of the traditional
order - so much so, that the influence of religious beliefs upon the origins of
the capitalist order tends to be forgotten:
Wholly absorbed in the production of wealth and in peaceful competitive struggle,
it [bourgeois society] no longer comprehended that ghosts from the days of Rome
had watched over its cradle. But unheroic as bourgeois society is, it nevertheless
took heroism, sacrifice, terror, civil war and battles of peoples to bring it into
being •.. Similarly, at another stage of development, a century earlier, Cromwell
and the English people had borrowed speech, passions and illusions from the
Old Testament for their bourgeois revolution. When the real aim had been
achieved, when the bourgeois transfonnation of English sooiety had been accom·
plished, Locke supplanted Habakkuk'"
Such considerations make clearly manifest that there is indeed a substantial
order of truth in Schumpeter's assertion that' The whole of Max Weber's
facts and arguments (in his sociology of religion) fits perfectly into Marx's
system '.11 That is to say. given an understanding of the dialectic, as the active
interplay between subject and object. it follows that ideology or ' conscious-
ness • provides a necessary set of meanings whereby the individual acts upon
the world at the same time as the world acts upon him. Reality is not merely
, external • to man. shaping his consciousness. but is adapted to human ends
through the active application of consciousness and the modification of the
pre-existing environment. In this approach. ideology is quite definitely not
to be treated as an • effect' which can be 'deduced' from material reality.
The conception of Marx's thought adopted by Weber, on the other hand. is
the characteristic' interpretation' of Marx in the social thought of the late
nineteenth century. Engels' later writings certainly played an important role
in offering a basis for the legitimacy of such a transmutation of Marx. But,
as had been indicated in the previous chapter. such an 'interpretation' was
also generated by the practical exigencies of the position of the leading
European Marxist party in the country of its origin. If the dialectic is deemed

15 WYM. p. 40.
16 SW, vol. I, p. 248.
17 Joseph A. Schumpeler: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York, 1962).
p.lI.
 Religion, ideology and society 211
to exist in nature, as in Anti-Dilhring, the way is clearly laid open to a philo-
sophical materialism which removes from the historical scene the role of
ideas as the active source of social change: ideology is the • effect " and
material conditions are the • cause '. This provokes the characteristic problem
of philosophical materialism which Marx perceived early on in his career:
if ideology is simply the passive • reftection ' of material circumstances, then
there is no place for the active role of men as creators of social reality. U
Weber's writings on religion brilliantly refute the standpoint of • reflective
materialism' as a viable starting-point for sociological analysis. But in this
respect, considered in relation to Marx, it might be said that Weber's writings
almost bring the wheel full circle. Weber refused to wear the straitjacket of
philosophical materialism which the followers of Marx sought to impose upon
history in the name of historical materialism. From this regard, Weber's writ-
ings on the sociology of religion, beginning from the standpoint of subjective
idealism, partially vindicate Marx against his own disciples. Weber treats as
Marx's premise the contention that ideology can be rationally transposed to
expose its • real' content. But in fact, it is precisely this conception which
Marx repudiates in breaking with the Young Hegelians. Thus Weber's use of
the conception of • elective affinity', It in analysing the relationships between
idea-systems and social organisation, is perfectly compatible with Marx's
treatment of ideology. Weber employs this conception to indicate the con-
tingent nature of the connections between the symbolic content of beliefs
which individuals • elect' t!l follow, and the consequences which adherence
to those beliefs entails for social action. Vice versa, the mode of life of a given
social class or status group can generate an affinity to accept certain sorts of
religious ethic, without • determining' the nature of the beliefs involved.
Thus urban artisans and traders, whose life is founded upon the use of prac-
tical calculation in economic enterprise, have an • affinity' towards • the
attitude of active asceticism, of God-willed action nourished by the senti-
ment of being God's .. tool", rather than the possession of the deity or the
inward and contemplative surrender to God, which has appeared as the
supreme value to religions inftuenced by strata of genteel intellectuals '.20
Nevertheless, • active asceticism' has not been limited to the religions of
urban strata, nor have all urban groups by any means adhered to religious
el hies of this type.
The phraseology in which Marx expresses his position is actually very
similar to that often adopted by Weber. Thus, in Marx's words: • Ideas can-
not carry anything out at all. In order to carry out ideas men are needed who
dispose of a certain practical force.' 21 Weber always stresses the contingent

II WYM, p. 401. The importance of this point is not fully brought out in the otherwise
excellent discussion given in Norman Birnbaum: 'Conflicting interpretations of
the rise of capitalism: Marx and Weber', BritisiJ JOllrnal of Sociology, vol. 4,
]953. pp. 125-41. 18 cf. for example; PE, pp. 90-2.
20 F/I,fW, p. 285. 21 Holy Family. p. 160.
212 Part 4: Capita/ism. socialism and social theory
nature of the relationship between the content of an ideology and the social
position of the group who are its' carriers I, but. like Marx. Weber frequently
identifies instances where ideas express material interests in a very direct way.
For both Marx and Weber, religious systems express the creation of human
values, which are not ' given' in the biological makeup of man, but are the
outcome of the historical process. Both agree that stable religious orders
characteristically legitimise relationships of domination: and also that. prior
to the modem age, ' breakthroughs • in the accomplishment of rctdical social
change are achieved within a framework of religious symbolism. Moreover,
Marx does not dispute the fact that, in pre-capitalist societies, religion pro-
vides a cosmology which makes existence intelligible to those who accept it.
The comparative analysis of these points. then. makes clear that the stan-
dard view that Weber's sociology of religion constitutes a 'refutation I of
Marx's historical materialism. by showing the role of ideology as an ' inde-
pendent' influence upon social change. is misconceived. Schumpeter's judge-
ment, in this respect. must be considered apt. That this should not be allowed
to overshadow the fundamental elements of diJIerence between Marx and
Weber which in fact - in the polemical context in which he wrote - made
possible Weber's critique of philosophical materialism. For, according to
Weber's premises, there can be no question of constructing the sort of rational
scheme of historical development which Marx attempts to establish. In the
sense that Weber denies the possibility of deriving objectively verifiable norms
from the study of society and history, those who have stressed the similarity
of his view to that of existentialism are perfectly correct. The moral faith of
the individual. at least as regards acceptance of ultimate values, cannot be
validated by science. On the other hand, the attribution of a discoverable
rationality to history is an essential element in Marx's thought. As Marx
says: 'My dialectic method is not only di1ferent from the Hegelian. but is its
direct opposite.' 22 This does not entail that Marx's thought preserves Hege-
lian ideology in simply the ' reverse' form of that found in Hegel's writings.
In fact, Marx is at some pains to reject such a standpoint. It is, according to
Marx, a 'speculative distortion' which treats later history as 'the goal of
earlier history': 'what is designated with the words" destiny", "goal",
" germ ", or " idea" of earlier history is nothing more than an llbstraction
formed from later history. from the active influence which earlier history
exercises on later history '.13 However Weber is obviously perfectly right in
assuming that Marx's writings constitute a philosophy of history. insofar as
this term is taken to refer to a theoretical position which asserts that there is a
definite' Jogic' of development which can be derived from the empirical
study of historical process.
On the more directly empirical level, these differences are expressed in

22 SW. vol. 1. p. 4S6.

23 GI. p. 60.
 Religion. ideology and society 213
terms of the role of 'charisma' in Weber's writings. and that of 'class' in
Marx's. Marx insists that class relationships form the basic axis upon which
ideologies find general acceptance in a society. Thus ideology is, in an impor-
tant sense ' illusory': not in the sense that the content of idea-systems is a
mere' reflection' of material life and therefore is irrelevant to the activity of
the subject, but insofar as ideas which are thought to be of general or universal
validity are in fact the expressions of sectional class interests.:' According to
Weber's position, however, ideology cannot be adjudged illusory in this sense,
because this demands the assumption of a value-position which cannot
rationally be said to be ethically superior to any other. The conception of
charisma, as Weber uses it, connects closely with this. The point about charis-
matic innovation is that it is ' irrational' in relation to the pre-existing social
order since, in its pure form, it depends solely upon belief in the extraordinary
qualities of a leader. The relation of legitimacy in charismatic authority is
hence the same regardless of the substantive interests which may be served
by the existence of a charismatic organisation: the most ruthless terrorism
may be • charismatic' in exactly the same sense as the most bounteous good-
ness. This is focal in Weber's thought, and draws a tight logical connection
between his conception of verstehende Soziologie on the one hand, and his
neo-Kantian methodological position on the other. In this way, Weber seeks
to document the fact that the understanding of • complexes of meaning' is
necessary, not only to the interpretation of social action which conforms to
accepted cultural beliefs, but also to the explanation of revolutionary depar-
tures from the routine. Since such innovatory action is founded upon the
irrational quality of charismatic attachment to a leader, it follows that the
new norms which are created cannot be ' deduced' from the accompanying
social or economic changes.2~ On the empirical level, this is the correlate of
the logical impossibility of the deduction of value-judgements from factual
knowledge, upon which Weber has laid so much stress as an abstract pt.in-
ciplc. Thus while Weber admits with Marx the importance of the connections
between ideas and the sectional interests of groups, he does not accept the
normative asymmetry of class interests and ideology. For Weber, adherence
to any given set of ideals, whether they are religious, political, economic, or
whatever, generates interests which can only be defined in terms of the con-
tent of those ideals themselves. In Marx's schema. on the other hand, the
ascription of rationality to history is possible precisely because of his accep-
tance of the dichotomy between • sectional' (class) interests and' societal'

:. GI, p. 52.
:s It is important to recognise that, while the influence of Nietz~che on Weber is very
profound, Weber rejects the Nietzschian view of the • slave's revolt' as a reduc-
tionist theory of religion. But the significance which Weber gives to Nietzsche is
indicated by the statement, made just before his dealh, that Marx and Nietzsche are
the two most significant figures in the modem inteUectual world.
214 Part 4: Capitalism. socialism and social theory
interests which is progressively resolved. in favour of the latter, in the develop-
ment from feudalism through capitalism to socialism.28 On an empirica1level,
this divergence is manifest in Marx's assumption that class relationships
constitute the source of political power. The assimilation of economic and
political power is a key theorem in Marx's writings. For Weber. by contrast,
both political and military power are historically as significant as economic
power and do not necessarily derive from it.

Secu1arisation and the modem capitalist ethos

It is apposite at this point to turn to the question of ' secularisation '. Such
a term. of course, hardly does justice to the manifold consequences which
both Marx and Weber ascribe to the decline of religious belief with the
advance of capitalism. For Weber. the progressive' disenchantment' of the
world is a process which is itself promoted by the rationalisation stimulated
by religious prophecy. The elimination of magical ritual is completed with the
advent of Calvinism. which in tum becomes increasingly irrelevant with the
maturity of capitalist industrial production. It is dubious how far Marx would
have acceded to the specific details of Weber's account of the affinity between
the Protestant ethic and the ' spirit' of modem capitalist enterprise. But Marx
accepts the historical importance of the connection, and strongly accentuates
the ' ascetic rationality' of modem capitalism. According to Marx. this is
manifest in the dominance of the market in human relationships. and in the
pursuit of monetary gain as an end in itself. Money is the epitome of human
self-alienation under capitalism, since it reduces all human qualities to quan-
titive values of exchange. Capitalism thus has a 'universalising' character.
which breaks down the particularities of traditional cultures. and which
generates its own 'money morality': 'capital develops irresistibly beyond
national boundaries and prejudices ... it destroys the self-satisfaction con-
fined within narrow limits and based upon a traditional mode of life and
reproduction.' 21 Capitalism is ' ascetic' in that the actions of capitalists are
based upon self-renunciation and the continued reinvestment of profits. This
is manifest. Marx points out, in the theory of political economy: 'Political
economy. the science of wealth. is. therefore. at the same time. the science of
renunciation, of privation and saving... Its true ideal is the ascetic but
usurious miser and the a.fceti£: but productive slave.' 28 The pursuit of wealth
for its own sake is a phenomenon which is. as'general moral ethos. found only
within modem capitalism. Marx is as specific on this point as Weber:
The passion for wealth as such is a distinctive development: that is to say, it is
something other than the instinctive thirst for particular goods such as clothes.
arms. jewelry, women, wine ... The taste for oossessions can exist without money;

?6 Gru. pp. 438-9.

~. Grit, p. 313. Here Marx makes a point later elaborated in great detail by Weber in
his studies of the' r:ltionatising' activities of priesthoods.
"8 EW. p. 171.
 Religion, ideology and society 215
the thirst for self-enrichment is the product of a definite social development, it is
not natural, but historicaP'
Both Marx and Weber treat mature capitalism as a world in which religion
is replaced by a social organisation in which technological rationality reigns
supreme. Marx frequently underlines the secularising effects of the progression
of capitalism, which' has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious
fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy
water of egOistic calculation '_ It is because of this that the theory of bourgeois
society, political economy, can serve as the basis of a scientific explanation
and critique of the development of capitalism; in bourgeois society, 'all that
is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his
real conditions of life and his relations with his kind '. ~o
In Marx's conception, the decline of religion makes possible the real imple-
mentation of the beliefs which, in the traditional order, remained • illusory'-
in the sense that the perfection of life in heaven is a mystical substitute for the
possibility of a satisfying existence for all men here on earth. This is not,
however, realisable within capitalism. The capitalist order serves to de-
mystify and to sharpen the alienation of men, but in doing so creates the con-
ditions which will allow the attainment of a new society in which the values
expressed in religious form in Christianity will be capable of being actualised.
'The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men, is a demand for
their real happiness.' ~l For Marx, this does not entail the' disappearance'
of moral values, but rather the extirpation of value-commitments which,
firstly, have the function of legitimating sectional class interests and, secondly,
are not expressed in rational terms (' ideology' has both of these characteris-
tics). It is often said that the society of the future which Marx anticipated in
his writings on the' higher stage of communism' constitutes merely another
version of utilitarianism, and this would indeed be the case with a theory
which rested solely on philosophical materialism. But given an understanding
of Marx's view of consciousness which rests upon the subject-object dialectic,
such a criticism cannot be sustained. Communism, in other words. generates
its own intrinsic morality, which is certainly not definable in terms of an
aggregation of individuals. each of whom follows his own egoistic interests.
The main source of disparity between Marx and Weber in relation to the
consequences of the declining hold of religion upon social life does not lie
where it is ordinarily sought - in the disappearance of 'ideals '. In fact the
critical assessment of the characteristic mode of life stimulated in capitalism
is quite remarkably similar in the writings of each author (the dominance of
technological rationality). But for Weber the technical exigenc:es of the Of-

29 Gm, pp. 133-4. Marx's position here is close to that latcr formulatcd in detail by
Simmd: Georg Simmel: Philosophie des Geldes (Leipzig, 19(0). Weber remarks of
Simmer, book: 'money economy and capitalism are too closely identified, to the
detriment of his concrete analysis '. PE, p. 185.
30 eM, p. 1%. n EW, p. 44.
216 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
ganisation of a • secular' society are such that they necessarily involve the
submergence or denial of some of the dominant values which stimulated the
development of that society: there are no other possibilities open. In Marx's
thought. on the other hand. the alienative characteristics of modem capitalism
stem from its class character. and will be eliminated through the revolutionary
restructuring of society. Weber's description of the effects of bureallcratic
routine is almost identical to Marx's account of the consequences of
alienation in capitalism:
Fully developed bureaucracy stands, in a specific meaning, under the principle
sine ira ac studio. Its speoific character, which is welcomed by capitalism. de-
velops the more, completely the more the bureaucracy is • dehumanised " the
more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business, love, hatred,
and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape
calculation.32
Weber thus perceives a primary irrationality within capitalism. The formal
rationality of bureaucracy, while it makes possible the technical implementa-
tion of large-scale administrative tasks, substantively contravenes some of the
most distinctive values of western civilisation, subordinating individuality
and spontaneity. But there is no rational way of overcoming this: this is • the
fate of the times " to live in a society characterised by • mechanised petrifica-
tion '. Only the charismatic rebirth of new gods could conceivably offer an
alternati ve. ~3
Integrity, however, compels us to state that for the many who today tarry for
new prophets and saviours, the situation is the same as resounds in the beautiful
Edomite watchman's song of the period of exile that has been included among
Isaiah's oracles: • He calleth to me out of Seir, Watchman. what of the night?
The watchman said, The morning cometh, and also the night :if ye will enquire,
enquire ye: return. come.' The people to whom this was said has enquired and
tarried for more than two millenia ... 34
The most deeply rooted divergence between Marx and Weber, therefore.
concerns how far the alienative characteristics which Marx attributes to capi-
tllism as a specific form of class society in fact derive from a bureaucratic
rationality which is a necessary concomitant of the modem form of society.
whether it be • capitalist' or • socialist '. ~5 This will be taken up in more detail
in the next chapter.

Marx and Durkheim : religion aad modem individualism

Durkheim's concerns in his sociology of religion, of course, differ in a number
of specific respects from those of Weber. The attempt to formulate a general

32 ES, vol. 3, p. 975; WuG, vol. 2. p. 571.

"" PEt p. 182.

3. FMW, p. 156.
3l cf. E. JUrgen Kocka: • Karl Marx und Max Weber. Ein methodologischer Vergleich '.
Zeilschrifl jur die Gl'Samle SlaalslI'issenschajl, vol. 122, 1966, p. 328.
 Religion. ideology and society 217

• theory' of religion is foreIgn to the main thrust of Weber's writings. Never-

theless. it is easy to misconstrue the focus of Durkheim's attention in The
Elementary Forms. It is generally agreed. and correctly so, that the concep-
tion of religion developed in that work is basic to Durkheim's thinking with
regard to the structure of modem societies. But all too often secondary inter-
preters of Durkheim have failed to make the correlate inference: that the
evolutionary dimension analysed in The Division of Labour has to be inter-
polated between the portrayal of the functions of religion in primitive society.
and the relevance of this to the contemporary social order. It is one of Durk-
heim's principal emphases that the character of the • sacred' beliefs which
exist in modem societies are distinctively di!Jerent from those typical of tra-
ditional forms. It is evident that one main theme of The Elementary Forms
is the identification of the functional significance of religion as the crucial basis
of solidarity in traditional societies. It is this which has occupied the attention
of the vast majority of anthropological and sociological studies which claim
derivation from Durkheim. But there is a second motif which is equally
important in Durkheim's work, and which is not expressed in the • static'
tying of ideas to the categories of social structure in what is normally repre-
sented as Durkheim's • sociology of knowledge '. This is that society.
particularly as manifest in the collective enthusiasm generated in periodic
ceremonial. is the source of new beliefs and representations. Religious cere-
monial does not simply reinforce existing beliefs; it is a situation of both
creation and re-creatioo.u • Now this concentration brings about an exalta-
tion of moral life which takes form in a group of ideal conceptions in wbich
the new life thus awakened is portrayed; they correspond to this new set of
psychical forces whicb is added to tbose which we have at our disposition for
the daily tasks of existence.' 31
There is no necessary contradiction between this conception and the
apparently • mechanical' tbeory of social change advanced in The Division
of lAbour. In that work, Durkheim treats population change as the main
factor Jeading to the expansion of the division of labour. But this effect is
only produced because of the action of a mediating variable - • dynamic den-
sity , - whicb is both a social and a moral phenomenon. The moral character
of the process at work here is indicated by the fact that Durkheim uses the
terms • moral density • and • dynamic density' as synonymous. The break-
down of segmental social structure is associated with' an exchange of move-
ments between part~ of the social mass which, until then. had no effect upon
one another ... this moral consolidation can only produce its effect if tbe
real distance between individuals has itself diminished in some way... It is

S6 EF. p. 464.
31 EF, p. 476; FE, p. 603. Hence it is a notable misunderstanding to pose the question
• why. after all, is the worship of society any more readily explicable than the
worship of gods? ' W. G. Runciman: : The sociological explanation of .. religious ..
beliefs " Archi~'es europeennes de sociologie, vol. 10, 1969. p. 188.
218 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
useless to try to find out which has determined the other; suffice it to say that
they are inseparable.' a8 The changes which lead to the differentiation of the
division of labour are both social and moral, and each is dependent upon the
other; moral individualism. the' cult of the individual " is the normative
counterpart of the emergence of a complex of division of labour: 'as indivi-
duals have differentiated themselves more and more and the value of an
individual has increased, the corresponding cult has taken a relatively greater
place in the totality of the religious life .. .' 31
It is in emphasising the relativity of the connection between social organisa-
tion and systems of ideas that Durkheim seeks to separate his position from
that of Marx :
Therefore it is necessary to avoid seeing in this theory of religion a simple resur-
rection of historical materialism: that would be a singular misunderstanding of
our thought. In showing that religion is something essentially social, we do not
at all mean to say that it confines itself to translating into another language the
material fonns of society and its immediate vital necessities.40
The historical implications of this are evident: Durkheim dissociates him-
self from a theory of knowledge which specifies a unilateral relationship
between ideas and their social' base '. This has to be placed in the forefront
when considering how far Durkheim's thesis does in fact differ from that
established in Marx's writings. The Elementary Forms is thus explicitly con-
cerned with the simplest extant form of religion; the theory of knowledge
set out in the work cannot be applied en bl.oc to more differentiated types of
society. The main theoretical connection linking the simplest to the more
complex societal types may be said to constitute a theoretical elaboration of
the principle which Durkheim slated at the outset of his career: that, while
there are very profound differences between traditional and modern societies,
there is still, between mechanical and organic solidarity, a definite moral
continuity.41
According to Durkheim's thesis in The Elementary Forms, the categories
of thought in totemism are formed of representations of social facts: the
notions of 'space', 'time', etc., are derived from' social space', 'social
time " and so on. As Durkheim says, this rests upon the general premise that
content of religious beliefs' cannot be purely illusory '.42 Since Durkheim
rejects the view that the elementary forms of religious belief are founded upon
representations of natural phenomena, or upon categories innately' given'
in the human mind, it must be the case that they rest upon the only other
• reality', that factual order which is society. The effect of Durkheim's insis-
tence upon a strict separation between' nature' and' society' is definitely to
draw something of an opposition between the two. This is responsible for a

38 DL, p. 257; DTS, pp. 237-8. 39 EF. p. 472.

40 EF. p. 471; FE. p. 60S .
•• Review of Ttinnies. p. 421. 42 EF. p. 464.
 Religion, ideology and society 219

major difference of emphasis between Durkheim and Marx. Marx's view is

not dissimilar to Durkheim's in recognising the relatively direct tie between
social reality and ideas in simple societies. In such societies 'conscious-
ness is ... merely consciousness concerning the immediate sensuous environ-
ment and consciousness of the limited connection with other persons and
things outside the individual who is growing self-conscious '.43 But, for Marx,
this inevitably is built upon the interplay between man and nature in produc-
tion. Primitive man is almost wholly alienated from nature; consequently, his
comparatively feeble efforts to master the natural world are overshadowed by
a sense of his own impotence in the face of cosmic forces which lie outside his
own control. Nature appears as an 'all-powerful and unassailable force. with
which men's relations are purely animal and by which they are overawed like
beasts; it is thus a purely animal consciousness of nature (natural religion) '.
Marx does not conceive of 'natural religion', however, as the result of
an unmediated confrontation between 'man' and • nature '; • this natural
religion ... is determined by the form of society and vice versa '. u
In common with Durkheim, Marx sees increase in population density as
• fundamental' to advancement beyond this state of • sheep-like or tribal con-
sciousness '.45 This leads to the development of the division of labour. which
in turn, as has been shown previously, for Marx is the main precondition for
the formation of systems of ideas which function to legitimate the existence of
a class society. Durkheim's analysis, however, minimises the significance of
the inter-relationship between economy and society, emphasising the specifi-
cally social character of the generation of religious beliefs in collective cere-
monial. Durkheim admits the possible influence of economic activity upon
the idea-systems of simple societies, but argues that it is most likely that
economic relationships are, in the main, subordinate to religious concep-
tions. 46 This empbasis is also transfet'red to the portrayal of tbe morphology
of more complex societies. In Durkheim's morphological scheme, the prin-
cipal ordering principle is the degree of structural differentiation. Conse-
quently, no special importance is given to the existence of economic classes:
certainly class relationships do not constitute, for Durkheim, the major axis
of the social structure of societies possessing a differentiated division of
labour. Even the distribution of political power in Durkheim's typology of
societies is regarded as of secondary importance to the basic morphological
criterion of differentiation. The main source of divergence between Durkheim
and Marx, then, concerns, not the degree to which ideas have • independence '
from their social • infrastructure " but the constituent character of thllt infra-
structure. The further development of this point can again be left to the next
chapter.
The question of the' illusory' character of religious belief forms an appro-

t3 GI, p. 42. U GI, p. 42.

4S GI, p. 43. 46 EF, p. 466 (footnote).
220 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
priate bridge between the theory of primitive religion. and the views of Durk-
heim and Marx upon the significance of religion in modem societies. In some
measure, the differences between the two thinkers upon this issue, as in the
case of Weber and Marx, stem from a discrepancy in their respective ethical
standpoints. Durkheim rejects philosophical neo-Kantianism in favour of his
own particular conception of ethical relativism. based upon the notion of
social • pathology '. According to this view, the • valid' morality for one type
of society is not appropriate to a society of a different type; there are no moral
ideals which can claim universal validity. Marx accepts. in large degree. a
similar emphasis. But whereas for Durkheim the main criterion for the validity
of a given set of moral ideals is their general • correspondence to the needs of
the social organism'. in Marx's conception this is linked to class relationships.
so that morals express the asymmetry of the distribution of economic power
in society. In Marx's writings, but not in those of Durkheim. this is in turn
integrated with an underlying emphasis upon the historical resolution of
the division between • sectional' and • general' interests (class structure /
alienation).
For Marx. therefore. the • illusory' character of religion is measured
against the historical development of alienation. Primitive man is alienated
from nature, and this alienation is expressed in the form of • natural religion '.
With the expansion of the division of Jabour, yielding increased mastery of
nature. religious beliefs become elaborated into more clearly • rationalised '
systems of ideas (in Weber's sense) which express the self-alienation of man.
Capitalism enormously advances man's mastery of nature: nature is increas-
ingly • humanised ' by human technical and scientific endeavour - but this is
accomplished at the expense of a great increase in self-alienation, which is
contingent upon the advance of the division of labour stimulated by capitalist
production. The • illusory' character of religion here is to be found in the fact
that it serves to legitimate the existing (alienated) social order. by transferring
to a mythical universe the human capacities which are potential. but which
are not actualised. in capitalism.
The immediate sociological content of Marx's (derogatory) statement that
religion is the • opium • of the people,41 since religious beliefs serve to legiti-
mise the position of subordination of a dominated class, is the same as that
of Durkheim's proposition that religion consoles the poor • and teacl]es them
contentment with their lot by informing them of the providential nature of
the social order.. .'.48 But, within the context of Marx's thesis of alienation,
the hold of religion is nonetheless based upon an • illusion', since it disguises

.1 EW, p. 44.
u Su, p. 254. This is why it is misleading to take Durkheim's • favourable' and Marx's
• hostile' attitudes towards religion at their' face value' in drawing a sociological
comparison between them. For an example of this sort of simpliste viewpoint. see
Robert A. Nisbet: The Sociological Tradition (London. 1967), pp. 22S~ and
243-51.
 Religion. ideology alld society 221

human capacities as those of super-human powers. For Durkheim, by contrast.

religion cannot be illusory in this sense, except insofar as a given set of
religious beliefs is no longer functionally compatible with the existence of a
given type of society. This indeed is the case with traditional religion in
modem society. Durkheim admits that Christianity, and more specifically,
Protestantism, was the immedi~te source of the modem cult of the individual.
The contrasts between the religious cults of Antiquity and the symbolic con-
tent of Christianity are given considerable stress by Durkheim: the religions
of the ancient world were' above all, systems of rites whose essential obj~­
the was to ensure the regular working of the universe '; their focus was thus
'turned towards the external world'. But Christianity places its emphasis
upon the salvation of the individual soul:
Since. for the Christian. virtue. and piety does not consist in material rites, but
in interior states of the soul. he is constrained to exercise a perpetual surveillance
over himself. .. Thus. of the two possible poles of all thought, nature on the one
hand and man on the other. it is necessarily around the second that the thinking
of Christian societies came to gravitate..."
However, while moral individualism derives from this source, it is also
expressive of the series of changes which have transformed modem societies
from the end of the eighteenth century onwards, and which involve the pene-
tration of rationalism into all aspects of social life. While these beliefs have a
genuinely 'sacred' quality, they cannot be guaranteed by a reversion to the
dominance which the church previously held; the state must increasingly
assume the main responsibility for the overall maintenance of the contem-
porary moral order.
Durkheim's theoretical linkage between the religions of former times and
the moral needs of the present should not be allowed to gloss over the equally
significant divergences between tradi~ional and contemporary society. Durk-
heim wholly rejects the conservative plea for a return to the traditional deism.
It is because Durkheim defines' religion' in a broad sense which identifies it
with the sacred, and thence with moral regulation in his sense, that he is able
to emphasise the continuity in symbols and values while at the same time
stressing the important elements of discontinuity between past and present.
The morality of the future, based on the 'cult of the personality' is nothing
less than the transformation of religion into secular humanism. What makes
this conception distinct from that of Marx (and of Feuerbach) is not the
notion that traditional religion must be replaced by a humanist ethic, a stand-
point common to both French and German social thought from the early part
of the nineteenth century, but the nature of the relationship between this ethic
and the concrete social structure (i.e .• the division of labour). At this point, a
methodological issue must be briefly touched upon.
In interpreting the relationship between Durkheim's conception of social

U L'b-olulion pidagogique. p. 323.

222 Part 4: Capitalism. socialism and social theory
facts as • external' to and exerting • constraint' over the individual, and
Marx's emphasis that one must' above all avoid postulating" society" once
more as an abstraction confronting the individual " it is important to bear in
mind Marx's distinction between alienation and objectification. For Marx,
social • facts' - in bourgeois society - are' external' to the individual in two
senses. Firstly, in common with the material artifacts created by men, social
relationships are objectified in that they are • realities': thus Marx's con-
sistent criticism of utopian socialism (and idealism generally) is that it
assumes away the reality of social life by treating society as the creation of
the intellect. In this sense. every man is both a product and producer of
the social relationships of which he forms a part; this holds. of course, for
every sort of society, including socialism. But in bourgeois society. social
facts also have an • external' and constraining character which is historically
relative, and which derives from the structure of alienated relationships.
Thus, in this sense, the individual worker is compelled to enter into relation-
ships which are' external' to him in the various ways which Marx specifies
in his analysis of alienation; but this duality between the individual and
society will be dissolved with the transcendence of capitalism. Hence, while
in Durkheim's methodology, externality and constraint are necessarily
closely independent. in Marx's thinking externality / constraint. in the sense
of alienation, are not universal characteristics of social phenomena. In
socialist society, the character of moral authority will not demand the main-
tenance of the Kantian element of ooligation or duty. insofar as this is linked
with the necessity of adhering to moral norms which the individual finds anti-
pathetic.
These theoretical considerations underlie the differential treatment of the
consequences of secularisation in the writings of Marx and Durkheim.
According to Marx, religion is always a form of alienation. because religious
beliefs involve the attribution to mystical entities of capabilities or powers
that are in fact possessed by man. The Aufhebung of religion does not.
according to this standpoint. simply entail the replacement of religious
symbolism by rational, scientific knowledge, but the conscious recovery of
those human capacities or modalities previously expressed in mystical form.
The transcendence of religion is possible because the resolution of the dicho-
tomy and opposition between the individual and society is possible. From
Durkheim's position, this is sheerly utopian, as regards the organisation of
contemporary societies. There is a sense in which Durkheim is in accord with
Marx that a form of society can exist in which there is no dichotomy between
the individual and society - in the case of mechanical solidarity. Mechanical
solidarity 'binds the individual directly to society without any inter-
mediary '.5Q But this societal form has ceded place to organic solidarity, and
cannot be recovered; and even if it were possible, the type of society envis-

50 DL, p. 129.
 Religion, ideology and society 223
aged by Marx would only be conceivable given a reimposition of a pervasive
conscience collective. which would necessarily entail a vast re-extension of
the realm of the sacred.
The contrast between Durkheim and Marx concerning the consequences
of secu1arisation in modem societies becomes most significant in relation to
their respective diagnoses of the primary trends of development which are
emergent in those societies. This leads into one major theme in the writings
of Marx, Durkheim and Weber which both unites and expresses some of the
main points of difference in their works: that which concerns their various
interpretations of the effects of the social differentiation entailed by the
growth in complexity of the division of labour.
15. Social differentiation and the division of labour

The writings of Marx, Weber and Durkhei.m, in their varying ways, fuse
together an analysis and a moral critique of modem society. Weber's insist-
ence upon the absolute logical dichotomy between empirical or scientific
knowledge, and value-directed action, should not be allowed to obscure his
equally emphatic affirmation of the relevance of historical and sociological
analysis to active involvement in politics and social criticism. Both Marx and
Durkheim reject Kant's ethical dualism, and attempt more directly to inte-
grate a factual and a moral assessment of the characteristic features of the
contemporary social order. Durkheim maintained a lifelong commitment to
the formulation of a scientific foundation for the diagnostic interpretation of
the • pathological' features of the advanced societies. Marx's work and
political actions are predicated upon the argument that • Man must prove the
truth, that is, the actuality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking, in
Praxis ".1
In the works of the latter two writers, the concepts of • alienation' and
• anomie' respectively provide the focal point of their critical interpretation
of modem society. The conception of ali~nlltio!l is th~l!l_liin prop of Ma!'!'s
critigu~. 0.£ capitalismLand therefore of his thesis that the bourgeois order
can be transcended by a new kind ot society. It does not merely represent an
early utopian position which Marx later abandoned, nor does it become re-
duced to the relatively minor place which Marx's discussion of the • fetish-
ism of commodities' occupies in Capital. The same is true of Durkhhim's
notion of anomie: it is integral to his whole analysis of the modem • crisis '
and the mode in which it can be resolved.

Alieaatioa, anomie, aad the' state of mdure '

It might appear obvious that the primary differences between the concepts of
alienation and anomie, as employed by Marx and Durkheim respectively,
rest upon divergent implicit views of man in a • state of nature'. It is con-
ventionally asserted that ¥.arx's concept otalien~tJ.9P,js_fQlYl.ded_uW.n the
premise that m~is_' .naturllUY'-A.QOd.....but has been corrupted by society; and
that the notion of anomie, by contrast, stems from the assumption that man
is • naturally' a refractory being. whose egoism must be rigidly restrained by
society. The 6rst view is assumed to be close to that of Rousseau, the second

1 WYM, p. 401; We, vol. 3, p. S.

224
 Social difJerendation and the division of labour 225
to that of Hobbes. 2 But this considerably over-simplifies the relevant issues.
To measure alienation and anomie primarily against a hypothetical state of
nature is to neglect what is the most essential dimension of both Marx's and
Durkheim's writings: th!UJj,slat:ical nature of m~. As Durkheim expresses
it: • The present opposes itself to -the past. yet derives from and perpetuates
it.' 3 Both thinkers explicitly and decisively separate their position from that
of abstract philosophy. which stands outside of history. Durkheim specifi~
cally criticises both Rousseau and Hobbes from this standpoint. Both. accord-
ing to Durkheim. begin from the assumption of a • break in continuity
between the individual and society'. and hold that • Man is thus naturally
refractory to the common life; he can only resign himself to it when forced "
Durkheim emphasises here that the meaning which he gives to the term • con-
straint ' is quite different to that of Hobbes.'
It is true that Durkheim anchon egoistic needs in the biological (i.e .• • pre-
social,) structure of the individual organism; but he nevertheless makes it
clear that egoism is also in large part a product of society - the impulse to
economic self-advancement. for instance. is as much a creation of modem
society for Durkheim as it is for Marx. 6 In modem societies. where indivi-
duality is highly developed. egoism presents a concomitantly greater threat
to social unity. Individualism is very emphatically not the same as egoism.
but its growth nevertheless expands the range of egoistic inclinations. The
condition of anomie which prevails in certain sectors of modem societies
reflects the very advance in the range of motives and sensibilities of individual
men which is the outcome of a long process of social developmenL Modem
man. in other words. when experiencing a situation of anomie. is a quite
different being from a (hypothetical) savage in the pre-social state of nature.
The latter would not be in an anomic position. Similarly. a human infant.
when newly bom. is an egoistic being. but not an anomic one. since his needs
are tied to defined biological limits. As the child becomes a socialised being.
the range of his egoistic impulsions·expand. and so do the possibilities of his
becoming placed in a state of anomie. • Let all social life disappear. and moral
life will disappear with it. since it would no longer have any objective. The
state of na.ture of the philosophers of the eighteenth century. if not immoral.
is at least amoral.' •
This general standpoint is not nearly so different from that of Marx as is
usually assumed. Marx is as aware as Durkheim that the eighteenth-century

2 See for example, John Horton: • The de-bumaDisation of anomie and alieaatioD '.
Pp. 283-300; Sheldon S. Wolin: Politics and Vision (Boston. 1960), pp. 399-407; a
more sophisticated discussion is offered in Steven Lukes: • Alienation and anomie '.
in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman: Philosophy, Polilics and Society (Oxford.
1967), pp. 134-56.
3 Vivolution pidllgogique. p. 21. 6 RSM, pp. 121 & 124.
s Su, p. 360; cf. also DL, vol. II, 272-4 & 403-4.
• DL, p. 399.• Although a child is naturally an egoist ... the civilised adult •.. has.
many ideas, feelings and practices unrelated to organic needs.' Su, p. 211.
226 Port 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
rationalists endowed man in a state of nature with faculties which are in
reality derived from society. The early forms of human society, which are
dominated by the relatively uncontrolled vagaries of nature, are accom-
panied by a restricted range of human qualities and capacities. It is precisely
the social character of man which, for Marx, makes him • human ': that is,
distinguishes man from the animals. All the senses and biological urges of
the human being are capable of this transformation. Sexual activity, or eating
and drinking, for instance, are not for human beings the simple satisfaction of
biological drives, but have become transformed, during the course of the
development of society, into actions which provide manifold satisfactions.
As Marx writes: • Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure
them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satis-
faction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.' ,
In this sense, then, there is a much closer similarity between the • constants •
lying behind the concepts of alienation and anomie than might appear from
superficial comparison.' Both Marx and Durkheim emphasise the fact that
human qualities, needs and motives are in large part the product of social
development. Both perceive a primary flaw in the theory of political economy,
which treats egoism as the foundation of a theory of social order. As Marx
comments: • The division of labour and exchange are the two phenomena
which lead the economist to vaunt the social character of his science, while
in the same breath he unconsciously expresses the contradictory nature of
his science - the establishment of society through unsocial, particular
interests.' • Similarly, Durkheim criticises Tonnies because the latter's con-
ception of Gesellschllft treats society in the manner of utilitarian theory, as
an aggregate of independent, individual • atoms', which only constitutes a
unity insofar as it is cohered by the • external' influence of the state. Accord-
ing to Durkheim, this is completely inadequate: the activity of individuals in
forming contracts expresses a broad network of social ties in the division of
labour; and this is in fact the foundation of the state. Marx makes almost
exactly the same point in a different polemical context. The individual in
civil society is not comparable to en atom, because an atom ' has no needs'
and • is self-sufficient '. The fallacy of the conception of the atomic indivi-
dual, adopted by the economists. is that the member of civil society is bound
to others by relationships of interdependence. It is these unacknowledged
relationships which are the real foundation of the state: in reality it is the

7 SW, vol. I, p. 94.

• Tho over-facile comparisons often made between Freud and Durkbeim also neglect
tho latter's emphasis upon abo historical and social charactor of human needs. How
far Durkheim's position is comparablo to Hobbes' in the relevant respects depends
upon how far tho latter did, in fact, assume a slate of nalure. See C. B. Macpherson:
The Political Theory 01 Possessive Individualism (London, 1962), pp. 19ft
• p. 187; cf. also the criticism of Stirner's philosophy of egoism, GI, pp. 486-9S.
 Social differentiation and the division of labour 227
state which' is held together by civil life '.10 The integrative character of the
growth of the division of labour in bourgeois society is in fact one pole of
Marx's critique of political economy: the expansion of capitalism destroys
the autonomous local community, and brings men within the framework of
an interdependence which is enonnously more inclusive - although, accord-
ing to Marx, this occurs only at the expense of a ramification of alienation.
Moreover. Marx's conception of • freedom' is in fact quite close to the
notion of autonomous self-control taken by Durkheim, and is definitely not
to be identified with the utilitarian view. The words' free' and' rational' are
as closely associated in Marx's writing as they are in that of Hegel. Hegel
dismissed the notion. implicit in utilitarianism, that a man is free to the
degree that he can do whatever his inclinations lead him to desire. • The man
in the street thinks he is free if it is open to him to act as he pleases. but his
very arbitrariness implies that he is not free.' 11 Freedom is not the exercise
of egoism. but is in fact opposed to it. A course of action is • arbitrary ,
rather than • free • if it simply involves irrational choice among alternative
courses of action with which the individual is confronted. An animal which
chooses. in a situation of adversity, to fight rather than to run from an enemy,
does not thereby act • freely'. To be free is to be autonomous. and thus not
impelled by either external or internal forces beyond rational control; this is
why freedom is a human prerogative, because anIy man, through his member-
ship of society. is able to control, not only the form, but also the content of
volition. In Hegel's view, this is possible given the identification of the indivi-
dual with the rational ideal. For Marx. it presupposes concrete social re-
organisation. the setting up of a communist society. The position of the
individual in society will be analogous to that characteristic. for instance of
the scientists within the scientific community. (This is an example Durkheim
also uses in a similar context.) A scientist who accepts the norms which
define scientific activity is not less free than one who deliberately rejects
them; on the contrary. by being a member of the scientific community. he is
able to participate in a collective enterprise which allows him to enlarge. and
to creatively employ. his own individual capacities. In this way. acceptance
of moral requisites is not the acceptance of alien constraint, but is the
recognition of the rational
This is not to say, of course. that there are no important differences in the
respective standpoints of Marx and Durkheim which can be regarded as of
, ahistorical • significance. Durkheim is emphatic that the individual person-
ality is overwhelmingly influenced by the characteristics of the form of
society in which he exists ancl into which he is socialised. But he does not

10 Holy Family, p. 163. Marx also makes the point that the' atomic' position of the
individual in civil society is legitimised by norms of contract and property. As
contrasted with feudalism, ' Right has here taken the place of privilege' (p. 157).
11 Philosophy of Right, ed. Knox (London, 1967), p. 230. For Weber's conception of
, freedom ',see his discussion of Roscher and Knies, in GAW.
228 Purt 4: Capitalism. socialism and social theory
accept a complete historical relativism in this respect: every man. no matter
whether' primitive' or ' civilised '. is a homo duplex. in the sense that there
is an opposition in every individual between egoistic impulses and those
which have a ' moral' connotation. Marx does not adopt such a psychological
model; in Marx's conception. there is no asocial basis for such an implicit
antagonism between the individual and society. For Marx. 'The individual
is is the social being . .. Individual human life-.arul.spccies-Jjfe are nO.1different
things.' 12 The egoistic opposition between the individual and society which
is found in a particularly marked form in bourgeois society is an outcome
of the development of the division of labour. Durkbeim's identification of the
duality of human personality, on the other hand. is founded upon the sup-
position that the egoism of the infant. deriving from the biological drives with
which he is born. can never be reversed or eradicated completely by the sub-
sequent moral development of the child.
This can again be connected to the discrepant role of productive activity in
the model of society employed by Durkheim and Marx respectively. For
Durkheim. the emphasis upon the causal specificity of the 'social • - the
autonomy of sociological explanation -leads to a general neglect of the inter-
relationships between society and nature. In a specific way. this is manifest in
the proposition that those needs connected with physical survival in the
material world are not assimilated to those impulses which are rooted in
social commitments. Marx. by comparison. makes the interplay between
society and the natural world the focus of his analysis. and thereby emphasises
the socialised character of the ' sensuous needs • which mediate between the
individual organism and his adaptation to the physical environment. But this
must not be exaggerated: as has been shown above. both Marx and Durk-
heim stress the historical dimension in the conditioning of human needs, For
Durkheim. egoism becomes a threat to social unity only within the context
of a form of society in which human sensibilities have become greatly
expanded: 'all evidence compels us to expect our effort in the struggle
between the two beings within us to increase with the growth of civilisation.' 13

De future of the division of labour

In Marx's analysis of bourgeois society. there are two directly related but
partially separable sources of alienation rooted in the capitalist mode of pro-
duction. The first of these is alienation in the labour-process. in the produc-
tive activity of the worker. The second is the alienation of the w~rker from
his product. that is. from control of the result of the labour-process. I shall
refer to these. for the sake of convenience. as ' technological alienation' and
, market alienation' respectively!· Both of these derive from the division of

12 EW. p. 158. 13 • The dualism of human nature', p. 339.

14 This does Dot exactly correspond to the various senses of alienation which Marx
distinguishes, but provides a basic distinction for the purposes of this chapter.
 Social differentiation and the division 01 labour 229
labour involved in capitalist production. The latter expresses the fact that
the organisation of productive relationships constitutes a class system resting
upon an exploitative dominance of one class by another; the former identifies
occupational specialisation as the source of the fragmentation of work into
routine and undemanding tasks.
For Marx. bow types of alienation are integral to the expansion of the
division of labour: the emergence of class societies in history is dependent
upon the growth of the specialisation of tasks made possible by the existence
of surplus production. The formation of a classless society will thus lead to
the abolition of the division of labour as it is known under capitalism. In
~'~_oo~~011 both market and t~hnolosicall!li~ation are thus insepar-_
able from the division of labour: • the division 01 labour is nothing but the
alienated form of human activity"~ .' IS The overcoming of market alienation
through the revolutionary reorganisation of society will lead to the reversal
of the fragmenting effects of specialisation which. by channelling the activities
of the indivic!ual witbi!l the ~nfines of a limited task, provides nQ opportunity
for bimJ9 ~ Jhefl,lU range Qf his talent~ and capacities in his-Iabour:- -
Durkheim's theory of the division of labour leads him in quite a different
direction. For Durkheim. the growth of the division of labour is portrayed in
terms of the integrating consequences of specialisation rather than in terms of
the formation of class systems. Consequently. Durkheim treats class conflict,
not as providing a basis for the revolutionary restructuring of society. but as
symptomatic of deficiencies in the moral co-ordination of different occupa-
tional groups within the division of labour. In Durkheim's thesis. the • forced'
division of labour is largely separate from the • anomic' division of labour.
and the mitigation of the first will not in itself cope with the problems posed
by the second. According to him, the socialism of Marx is wholly con-
cerned with the alienation of the forced division of labour, which is to be
accomplished through the regulation of the market - the socialisation of pr0-
duction. But. in Durkheim's stated view. which he opposes to this. the increas-
ing dominance of economic relationships. consequent upon the destruction of
the traditional institutions which were the moral backbone of prior forms of
society. is precisely the main cause of the modem • crisis '.
In fact. Durkheim is mistaken in supposing that the regulation of the
market (the elimination of market alienation) is the sole focus of Marx's
interest. Marx is from the outset concerned more fundamentally with just the
same issue as Durkheim: the amoral domination of modem society by
economic relationships. and conceives the socialisation of production as a
means to the elimination of the conditions of labour (technological aliena-
tion) which. by subordinating man to economic production. • dehumanise '
him. Durkheim himself certainly recognises the alienative character of the
modem labour process. whereby the worker • repeats the same move-

IS EW, p. 181; We, Ergd. p. 557.

230 Part 4: CapitQ]ism, socialism and social theory
ments with monotonous regularity, but without being interested in them. and
without understanding them', and he agrees that this is 'a debasement of
human nature '.1& But whereas Durkheim's proposals for the reduction or
eradication of this dehumanisation of the worker are based upon the moral
consolidation of specialisation in the division of labour. Marx's hope and
expectation is that this division of labour will itself be radically changed.
This is really the crux of the most significant differences between Marx's use
of the conception of alienation and Durkheim's employment of the notion of
anomie. For Durkheim, the dehumanisation of productive activity is a pheno-
menon which derives, not from the fragmenting consequences of the division
of labour itself, but from the anomie moral position of the worker. In other
words, the dehumanisation of the labour process has occurred because the
individual worker has no clear conception of a unity of purpose which binds
his work activity together with the collective productive endeavour of society.
This situation can therefore be remedied by providing the individual with a
moral awareness of the social importance of his particular role in the division
of labour. He is then no longer an alienated automaton, but is a useful part
of an organic whole: 'from that time, as special and uniform as his activity
may be, it is that of an intelligent being, for it has direction. and he is aware
of it.' 11 This is entirely consistent with Durkheim's general account of the
growth of the division of labour, and its relationship to human freedom. It
is only through moral acceptance in his particular role in the division of
labour that the individual is able to 'achieve a high degree of autonomy as a
self-conscious being, and can escape both the tyranny of the rigid moral con-
formity demanded in undifferentiated societies on the one hand, and the
tyranny of unrealisable desires on the other.
Not the moral integration of the individual within a differentiated division
of labour, but the effective dissolution of the division of labour as an organis-
ing principle of human social intercourse, is the premise of Marx's concep-
tion. Marx nowhere specifies in detail how this future society would be
organised socially, but, at any rate, this perspective differs decisively from
that of Durkheim. The vision of a highly differentiated division of labour,
integrated upon the basis of moral norms of individual obligation and cor-
porate solidarity, is quite at variance with Marx's anticipation of the future
form of society. 11
According to Durkheim's standpoint, the criteria underlying Marx's hopes
for the elimination of technological alienation represent a reversion to moral
principles which are no longer appropriate to the modem form of society.
This is exactly the problem which Durkheim poses at the opening of The

11 DL, p. 371.
11 DL. p. 373; DTS. p. 365. For a critique of Durkheim's position, see Georges
Friedmann: The Anatomy of Work (London, 1961), pp. 72-81 and passim.
11 The views set out by Engels, however, are much closer to Durkheim's position. cf.
Engels, • On authority', SW, vol. I, pp. 636--9.
 Social differentiation and the division of labour 231
Division of LAbour: 'Is it our duty to seek to become a thorough and com-
plete human being. one quite sufficient unto himself; or. on the contrary, to
be only a part of a whole. the organ of an organism? • 1_ The analysis con-
tained in the work, in Durkheim's view, demonstrates conclusively that
organic solidarity is the' nonnal • type in modem societies. and consequently
that the era of the ' universal man' is finished. The latter ideal, which pre-
dominated up to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in western Europe.
is incompatible with the diversity of the contemporary order.20 In preserving
this ideal. by contrast, Marx argues the obverse: that the tendencies which
are leading to the destruction of capitalism are themselves capable of effect-
ing a recovery of the 'universal' properties of man. which are shared by
every individual :
the abolition of division of labour is conditional upon the development of inter-
course and productive forces to such a degree of universality that private pro-
perty and division of labour become fetters on them ... private property can be
abolished only on condition of an all-round development of individuals... With-
in communist society. the only society in which the original and free development
of individuals is not a mere phrase. this development is determined precisely by
the interrelationship of individuals, an interrelationship which consists partly in
the economic prerequisites and partly in the necessary solidarity of the free
development of all, and, finally, in the universal character of the activity of in-
dividuals on the basis of the existing productive fC?rces. 21
Contrary to what is often held, this conception does not entail any commit-
ment to a metaphysical 'perfectibility' of man. The imputation of such a
view to Marx rests upon a confusion of alienation and objectification - which
is precisely the charge which Marx levels at utilitarianism. If the overcoming
of alienation is read to mean the complete disappearance of any barriers to
the activity of the subject-man - then this would indeed suppose a utopian
world in which human self-detennination reigns supreme, and ~ human
of
potentialities are finally realised. But the transcendence- alienation does not
involve the end of objectification; society (and the material environment) will
continue to be • external' to the individual. They will not. however. as in a
condition of alienation, represent worlds which are opposed to or cut off
from conscious Praxis, but will be recognised to be integrated with it. In all
previous eras, according to Marx, the ideal of the universal man has been
either achieved only at the expense of the alienation of man from nature - as
in primitive societies - or has remained exclusive to minority classes. Through

11 DL. p. 41; DTS. p. 4.

20 L'evo/lltion pedagogique, pp. 3741£. Durkheim says elsewhere: • We evaluate, in
The Division of Labour, the old ideal of humanist morality. the moral ideal of the
cultivated man: we show how it can today be regarded as increasingly anachronistic,
how a new ideal is forming and developing as the result of the increasing specialisa-
tion of social functions.' AS. vol. 10. 1907. p. 355.
21 01. p. 495. The influence of Hegel and, through Hegel, Schiller. is evident here. cf.
Schiller's On the Aesthetic Ed"cation of Man (1795) (Oxford. 1967). pp. 31-43 (6th
letter).
232 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
the abolition of the division of labour with the overthrow of capitalism, every
man will be released from the occupational categorisation which makes a
specialised work task the principal social quality of the individual (a man' is '
a teacher, or 'is' a wage-labourer). Since each individual will then contain
within himself the universal properties of humanity, the alienation of man
from his 'species-being • is thereby dissolved. 22
It is in such a context that the more general divergence between the respec-
tive standpoints of Marx and Durkheim must be set. For Durkheim, the social
structure of modem society exacerbates the opposition between egoism and
the moral demands which membership in the collectivity places upon the
individual. There is no possibility of this dichotomy being resolved. because
the very organisation of contemporary society, which makes possible the
development of individuality and self-consciousness. necessarily heightens
the egoistic inclinations of the individual. Moreover. since Durkheim's theory
of the division of labour involves the contention that organic solidarity -
functional interdependence in the division of labour - is the' normal' modern
type. it follows that the problem of moral integration (anomie) must be given
overriding prominence. The problem of • restraining one's horizons'. or con-
versely of the opening-out of desires which cannot be satiated. is particularly
acute in a social order which has the organisational requisite of maintaining
the existence of specialised and restricted tasks in the division of labour. and
which is not dominated oy a strong ethic subordinating the individual to the
collectivity. Durkheim foresees the existence of a society with multiple occu-
pational positions, in which access to the leading strata will depend, not upon
transmitted privilege, but upon competitive selection of the talented through
the medium of the educational system. Such a society, which places a pre-
mium upon individual attainment through the public manifestation of ability,
clearly exerts a pressure towards the expansion of incompatible egoisms. In
such a society, the' war of all against all' is a ready threat, which must be
contained by the balancing of egoism with altruism; these are destined to be
in perpetual conftict.

'The problem of bureaucracy

In Marx's analysis of the extension of the division of labour underlying the
formation of capitalist enterprise. the expropriation of the worker from his
means of production is given pride of place. In Marx's view, this is the most
essential condition for the emergence of bourgeois society. and identifies,
along an historical dimension. the formation of the class relationship between
capital and labour which is implicit in the capitalist mode of production.
It is the intrinsic nature of the connection between the division of labour
and the class structure which makes it possible for Marx to proceed to the

2~ ct. Thilo Ramm: . Die kilnftige Gesellschaftsordnung nach der Theorie von Marx
und Engels', Marxismllsstlldi£'II, vol. 1.1957, pp. 77-179.
 Social differentiation and the division of labour 233

conclusion that the transcendence of alienation is possible through the

abolition of capitalism. Neither Durkheim nor Weber denies the possibility
of the formation of socialist societies: but both assert that the transition to
socialism will not radically change the existing form of society. However, the
substance of Durkheim's position here diverges sharply from that of Weber,
and it may be said that Weber's conception of the development of the division
of labour in the occidental societies constitutes a third alternative to that
offered both by Marx and by Durkheim.
Weber's epistemology separates his general perspective upon social
development from that assumed by the other two authors who, whatever their
differences, share a commitment to a definite overall pattern in the • stages •
of development of society, from primitive society to modem times. It has
often been remarked that, in Weber's writings, • the general drift of secular
rationalisation' 23 is the counterpart to the schemes of development offered by
other writers. But it should not be forgotten that. from Weber's standpoint. the
analysis of the growth of rationalisation does not equal the • only' or the
• correct' representation of history, but simply knowledge from one culturally
given • point of view'. With this important qualification in mind, however,
it is possible to essay a comparison of Weber's analysis of the typical process
of capitalist development with that given by Marx.
An important part of Weber's writings consists in delineating the factors
promoting rationalisation • on the level of meaning', in the sphere of religious
belief. However, Weber always insists upon tracing the nexus of social rela-
tionships which both influence, and are influenced by, the growth in rational-
isation. In this sense, the most important questions concern, not only the
• degree' of rationalisation, but the mode in which its effects promote a
particular conjunction of social relationships and institutions. Thus not only
the degree, but the • direction' assumed by rationalisation in the West, and
more specifically, in capitalism. differs from that of the other major civilisa-
tions. In modem western capitalism, there are various spheres in which
rationalisation has proceeded in a direction. as well as to an extent, unknown
elsewhere. The first is in the spread of science, a phenomenon of basic signifi-
cance: not only does it complete the process of • disenchantment '. but it
makes possible the progressive implementation of rational technology in pro-
duction. M~reover, • Scientific work is chained to the course of progress...
Every scientific" fulfilment" raises new" questions"; it asks to be .. sur-
passed" and outdated.' 24 Thus the institutionalisation of science weds
modem life to an implicit dynamic of innovation and change which cannot,
in itself, confer • meaning' (except to the professional practitioners of
science. to whose activity scientific enquiry serves as an organising norm).
The application of scientific innovation to technology is combined, in the

23 Gerth and Mills: 'Introduction: the man and his work '. FMW. p. 51.
2t FMW, p. 138.
234 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
modem economy, with the introduction of methods of rational calculation,
exemplified in book-keeping, which promote that methodical conduct of
entrepreneurial activity which is so distinctive of contemporary capitalism.
The conduct of rational capitalism in tum entails unavoidable consequences
in the sphere of social organisation, and inevitably fosters the spread of
bureaucracy.
Weber does not, of course, deny that modem capitalism entails the forma-
tion of a class system based upon capital and wage-labour, and he recognises
the importance of the historical expropriation of the peasantry upon which
Marx places so much stress. But this is not in itself, according to Weber's
standpoint, the main structural axis in the differentiated division of labour
which characterises capitalism. By emphasising the significance of the
rationalisation of activity as characteristic of modem capitalist production,
and by stressing iu, partial independence of class relationships. Weber separ-
ates (but in a different manner from Ourkheim) the class system of capitalism
from differentiation in the division of labour as such. In other words, bureau-
cratic specialisation of tasks is treated by Weber as the most integral feature
of capitalism. This is reinforced upon a more empirical level by Weber's
analysis of the partly separable processes of bureaucratisation in the economy
and the polity. The growth of the rational state, which has its corpus of
bureaucratic officials, is not wholly derivative of economic rationalisation, but
has to some extent preceded the development of capitalism - and indeed, has
created conditions which promoted its rise.
Thus Weber expressly denies that the expropriation of the worker from his
means of production has been confined to the immediate sphere of industry,
and instead applies the conception to other institutional contexts. In Weber's
thesis, any form of organisation which has a hierarchy of authority can
become sub!ect to a process of ' expropriation': for the Marxian notion of
the 'means of production' Weber substitutes the 'means of administration '.
Oversimplifying somewhat, it might be said that Weber gives to the organisa-
tion of relationships of domination and subordination the prominence which
Marx attributes to relationships of production. Any political association,
according to Weber, may be organised in an 'estate' form, in which the
officials themselves own their means of administration. Thus in the Middle
Ages, vassals were in direct control of the financing of their administrative
districts, and were responsible for providing tbeir own soldiery and military
equipment. The formation of the modem state apparatus was promoted by
the actions of the monarch in gathering the means of administration into his
own hands:
No single official personally owns the money he pays out, or the buildings, stores,
tools, and war machines he controls. In the contemporary • state' - and this is
essential for the concept of state - the' separation' of the administrative staff. of
 Social differentiation and the division of labour 235
the administrative officials, and of the workers from the material means of
administrative organisation is completed. 23
These developments were the most important factors promoting the
emergence of the modem state in which 'expert officialdom. based on the
division of labour' 21 is wholly separated from ownership of its means of
administration. In general. the advance of the division of labour progresses in
step with the centralisation of the means of administration. and the con-
comitant • expropriation' of officials. This can be documented. Weber points
out. in military organisations. In feudal armies, each soldier supplies his own
weaponry: this is the case with militia of all types. But in states where there
is a need for a permanent army at the disposal of the monarch, such as in
ancient Egypt, a bureaucratised structure develops, in which the king owns
and supplies the arms and military equipment. In western capitalism. under
the twin influences of centralisation of administration and the rational calcula-
tion of tasks, the process of expropriation from the means of administration
penetrates into many spheres, including not only that of the military. but also
into other organisations in which there is a specialised division of labour -
universities. hospitals, and so on. The spread of bureaucratic specialisation
is mainly promoted by its technical superiority over other types of organisa-
tion in co-ordinating administrative tasks. This in turn is partly dependent
upon the filling of bureaucratic positions according to the possession of
specialised educational qualifications. • Only the modem development of ful1
bureaucratisation brings the system of rational. specialised examinations
irresistibly to the fore.' 21 The expansion of bureaucratisation hence neces-
sarily leads to the demand for specialist education, and increasingly fragments
the humanist culture which, in previous times. made possible the • universal
man " the • thorough and complete human being' whom Durkheim speaks
of. Weber expresses an essentially similar point in holding that the' cultivated
man ' of earlier ages is now displaced by the trained specialist. Since the
trend towards bureaucratisation is irreversible in capitalism, it follows that
the growth of functional specialisation is a necessary concomitant of the
modem social order.
According to Weber•• the further advance of bureaucratic mechanisation •
is • inevitable' in the modem world.28 But. as has been pointed out in a
previous chapter. in Weber's eyes the progression of bureaucratisation
increasingly reveals a tension between the demand for technical efficiency of
administration on the one hand. and the human values of spontaneity and
autonomy on the other. The bureaucratic division of labour constitutes the
• cage • in which modem Berufsmenschen are compelled to live: • The Puritan

IS FMW, p. 82.
21 FMW. p. 88.
n ES, vol. 3, p. 999; W/lG, vol. 2, p. 585; cf. also GASS, pp. 500-1.
I I GASS, p. 413.
236 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so.' 21 The Faustian' uni-
versal man' has to be renounced in favour of the specialisation of labour
which is the condition of the efficiency of modem production - ' specialists
without spirit, sensualists without heart '. The main normative issue, in
Weber's view. is not how the process of bureaucratisation can become
reversed. because that is impossible in a society which requires calculative
precision in the administration of its various institutions: 'the great question
thus is ... what we can set against this mechanisation to preserve a certain
section of humanity from this fragmentation of the soul. this complete
ascendancy of the bureaucratic ideal of life? '.30
It should be clear that. in Weber's terms. there can be no possibility of the
transformation of the bureaucratisation of social life through the occurrence
of socialist revolution. Precisely the opposite is the case. In the capitalist
economy. a considerable number of operations are left to the play of market
forces: but in a socialised economy. these would be taken over by the state.
and would then become subject to bureaucratic administration. A socialist
society would hence inevitably be more imprisoned within the toils of bureau-
cratic control than is already the case in capitalism: the elimination of pri-
vate property in the means of production would not enable this process to be
reversed. but would further hasten its advancement. Marx's view of bureau-
cracy is quite different, and again the difference lies primarily in the connec-
tion which Marx establishes between market alienation and technological
alienation - that is. between the class structure and bureaucratic specialisa-
tion. The substance of Marx's thinking on the question of bureaucracy is set
out in his early critique of Hegel's writings on the same question.
In Hegel's treatment of the matter. the state bureaucracy is represented as
the ' universal class' which is responsible for implementing what is in the
general interest of society. and which hence cuts across the egoistic bellum
omnia contra omnes which exists in civil society. According to Hegel. the
'division of labour in governmental affairs '. the civil service bureaucracy.
forms the organisational mediation between the particular. individual
interests of men in civil society, and the universal qualities of the state. The
hierarchical character of bureaucracy is explained in terms of the necessity
of establishing levels of co-ordination between the 'concrete' interests of
individuals in civil society and the 'abstract' character of state policy.
Appointment of officials on the basis of examinations. and the separation into
salaried offices. together with the conception of impersonal moral • duty'.
ensures that the member of the' universal class' renunciates the • capricious
satisfaction of subjective purposes ... So far as public business is concerned.

21 PE, p. 18t. The individual worker today is • a small wheel' in the bureaucratic
machine, and • asks himself only whether or riot he can progress from this small
wheel to being a bigger one " GPS, p. 413.
~o GASS, p. 414.
 Social differentiation and the division of labour 231
here lies the link between universal and particular interests. constituting the
concept of the state and its inner stability.' 31 In Marx's terms. however.
Hegel's discussion of bureaucracy merely exemplifies in a particularly direct
way the general errors contained in the Hegelian concept of the state. Bureau-
cracy does not represent the common interest. but a particular interest;
bureaucratic authority rests upon an illusory universality which in fact cloaks
a specific class interest. The state bureaucracy is thus the administrative
organ through which the sectional power of the dominant class is institu-
tionalised. The formal hierarchy of authority which is embodied in bureau-
cratic organisation hence does not create the link between civil society and
the state which Hegel specifies. but instead acts to concentrate political power
and to separate it from the control of those in civil society: the bureaucratic
state is • an organ superimposed upon society '.32 Moreover. because of its
tightly integrated character. bureaucracy is an especially irresponsible form of
political administration: • Bureaucracy is a circle no-one can leave ...
Bureaucracy possesses.the state's essence. the spiritual essence of society, as
its private property. The universal spirit of bureaucracy is the secret. the
mystery sustained within bureaucracy itself by hierarchy and maintained on
the outside as a closed corporation.' 33
For Marx, then. the state bureaucracy is the archetype of bureaucratic
organisation. and the possibility of its eradicatien is given as one consequence
of the revolutionary transition to socialism. According to Marx, the countries
which are marked by the existence of a highly developed bureaucratic state -
both France and Germany fall into this category - are those in which the
struggle of the bourgeoisie against the land-owning aristocracy for political
power has been particularly severe. Thus the French bureaucratic machine
originated in the days of the absolute monarchy. and was given mighty a
thrust forward by the Revolution of 1189. As regards its historical content,
Marx's analysis of bureaucracy hence shares certain central points with that
of Weber. Marx agrees that the bureaucratic state in Europe arose as an
instrument serving the monarchy in its attempts to reduce the feudal dispersal
of powers: the centralisation of the state in the hands of the monarch was a
major condition allowing the rise of bourgeois interests. which then appro-
priated power to themselves. 34 But in Marx's view this is not. as it is for
Weber, one part of an irreversible general trend towards bureaucratic special-
isation of the division of labour in all spheres of social life. To Marx. bureau-
cratic centralisation is rather one particular manifestation of the bourgeois
state. and consequently is as transitory a social form as is capitalism itself.
SOme indication of how Marx envisages the elimination of bureaucracy in
socialist society is given in his remarks upon the bureaucratisation of the
31 Hegel. quoted by Marx. WYM, p. 181.
32 SW, vol. 2, p. 32.
33 WYM, pp. 185-6. cf. Iring Fetschcr: Karl Marx und der Marxismus (Munich,
1967). pp. 164-73. 34 SW, vol. I, p. 516.
238 Part 4: Capitalism, sociali,sm and social theory
French state. In France, this' parasitic body' has acquired • a ubiquity, an
omniscience' which surpasses even that in Germany. Marx specifically com-
ments upon the persistent growth which has characterised the French bureau-
cracy since the late eighteenth century: • All revolutions perfected this
machine instead of smashing it: 35 But the existence of such an independent
bureaucratic order is not intrinsically necessary to the maintenance of a
centralised economy; socialism will make it possible to' simplify the adminis-
tration of the state', and to 'let civil society and public opinion create organs
of their own, independent of the governmental power '.38 Such a programme
of change, as Marx makes clear in discussing the Commune in The Civil War
in France, is equivalent to the abolition of the bourgeois state altogether. The
Commune was to be composed of officials who were • chosen by universal
suffrage ... and revocable at short terms'. The judiciary and police were
also to be • turned into the responsible and at all times revocable' agents of
the Commune. In such conditions, the bureaucratic state, as an agency of
political power independent of civil society, has ceased to be: 'Public func-
tions ceased to be the private property of the tool of the central government.' 11
The differences between this standpoint and that adopted by Weber are
evident. Weber generalises the influence of bureaucratisation on the basis of
linking the advance of bureaucracy to the administrative requisites of rational
authority. Consequently, for Weber. the analysis of the growth of the bureau-
cratic state provides a paradigm for the explanation of the progression of
bureaucratisation in all spheres. For Marx, on the other hand. the ' systema-
tic and hierarchical division of labour' 31 in the administration of the state
represents a concentration of political power which will be aufgehoben when
the bourgeois state itself is transcended. The problem of bureaucratisation in
the sphere of industry is not discussed by Marx in relation to the question of
the bureaucratic state. but is nevertheless handled in comparable terms. The
authority system of the modem factory. according to Marx. is intrinsically
linked to the necessities engendered by the capitalist economy. But the various
forms of co-operative factory which have been set up show that a quite
different type of authority structure can be created, which will break down
the bureaucratic hierarchy. In the co-operative factories. there is no longer a
unilateral distribution of authority. at

35 SW, vol. I, p. 333.

31 SW, vol. I, p. 284.
H SW, vol. 1. p. 519. d. Marx's comments in the first draft of The Civil War in FrQ/ICe,
We, vol. 17. pp. 538-49. The Commune, Marx says. was' the political form of
social emancipation' (ibid. p. 545).
31 SW, vol. I, p. 516. Marx's representation of the political system of bourgeois society,
in relation to the bureaucratisation of the governmental machine, closely parallels
Weber's view. Thus, discussing nineteenth-century France, Marx says, • The seg-
ments and parties of the ruling class, which alternately struggle to power, regarded
the possession and leadership of this enormous government machinery as the highest
fruit of victory '. We, vol. 17, p. 539. 3t Cap, vol. 3, p. 431.
 Social differentiation and the division of labour 239
Conclusion
The object of this concluding chapter has been to emphasise that the socio-
logical perspectives of Marx. Durkheim and Weber are rooted in divergent
conceptions of the basic structure and trend of development of the modem
fonn of society. Marx's analysis of capitalism is wholly predicated upon the
postulated connection between the expansion of the division of labour (and
thus the ramification of the form's of alienation) on the one hand. and the
emergence of a polarised class structure on the other. For Marx. a primary
factor underlying the early origins of capitalism in western Europe is the
historical process of the expropriation of producers from control of their
means of production. Capitalism is thus. in its very essence. a class society;
the existence of a bourgeois class presupposes a subordinate class of property-
less workers. and vice versa. However. the class system of capitalism differs
decisively from that of the form of society which preceded it in Europe. In
feudalism. domination is certainly founded upon differential access to con-
trol of the means of production. i.e .• landed property. But the feudal class
structure. expressed in the differentiation between the Stiinde. does not
wholly separate the individual from participation in communal relationships;
the' social' and the 'economic' are not clearly separated. The emergence of
capitalism transfonns the ties of civil society into pure ties of the market: the
individual functions as a member of a 'community' only in the abstract
sense in which he has rights as a citizen in a separate' political' sphere. The
modem social order thus 'separates the subjective essence of man' from
human control, and transfonos man's own capacities into forms in which
they are' externalised '.40 The material expropriation of the worker from
his means of production - which. historically speaking. is the same thing as
the formation of the class system of bourgeois society - thus proceeds hand-
in-hand with his alienation from his .' species-being', from the exercise of the
capacities and faculties which his participation in society could potentially
offer him. Capitalism, in other words. vastly increases the productive powers
of society. but only at the expense of maximising alienation. In bourgeois
society. the rational explication of the world through science has largely dis-
pelled the religious world-view, according to which reality is ultimately
governed and controlled by gods or spirits. But it has replaced this form of
human alienation by one in which men are controlled by the economic forces
of the market. The ' rule of the gods • is replaced by the ' rule of the market ' :
human goals and objectives thus appear as conditional upon the external
play of economic forces. On a concrete level. this is manifest in the helpless-
ness of the Fachmensch. who is subordinated to the division of labour.
Expressing this in the economic tenos of Capital. capitalism is a system of
commodity production. in which the driving impulse is the search to maxi-
mise exchange-value. Exchange-value. not use-value, is integral to the Jogic

40 We. vol. 1. p. 285.

240 Part 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
of capitalist production. and this applies even to human labour itself: labour
has value only as labour-power, as the abstract expenditure of energy. The
basic' contradictions' inherent in the capitalist economy derive directly from
its character as a system based upon production for exchange-value. The
need to maintain, or to expand, the rate of profit, is in opposition to the
tendential law of declining profits; the separation of the producer and con-
sumer (i.e.• the necessity of capitalism to maximise exchange-value rather
than to produce for known needs) is the main factor lying behind the crises
to which capitalism is recurrently subject; and the operation of the capitalist
market entails both that labour-power cannot be sold above its exchange-
value (thus condemning the majority of the working-class to continued
economic deprivation), and that there comes into being a large 'reserve
army' destined to live in pauperism. The economic transformations generated
by the' laws of movement' of capitalist production both transform the
system from within, and at the same time, prepare it for its dialectical super-
session by a new social order. The transcendence of the class system of bour-
geois society, according to Marx, allows for the development of a society in
which the existing division of labour is radically transformed.
For Durkbeim and Weber, on the other hand. the class structure is not
integral to the progressive differentiation in the division of labour. Both
authors accept that the modem form of society is a class society: but each
repudiates the notion that these class divisions express its underlying nature.
In Durkheim's conception, the' forced' division of labour is an ' abnormal
form', but it is not a necessary consequence of the extension of social
differentiation in itself. Class struggles, in contemporary society, are an out-
come of the fact that' the institution of c1asses ... does not correspond. or no
longer corresponds, to the distribution of natural talents ' .• 1 In other words.
it is primarily the use of economic power to enforce unjust contracts which
explains the occurrence of class conflict. What distinguishes the modem form
of society from the traditional types is not its specific class character, but the
prevalence of organic solidarity. The basic organising principle of modem
society is to be found. not in its' capitalist' character. as a class system
of propertied and propertyless. but in the 'organic' specialisation of co-
operative occupational divisions.
From Durkbeim's standpoint. Marx's linking of class structure and the
alienation of the individual in the division of labour rests upon a confusion
between' egoism' and' individualism'. The' individualism' of the modem
social order is not to be confused with the ' egoism' of the political econo-
mists and utilitarian philosophers: individualism - the moral sanctioning of
specialisation in the division of labour - is an inevitable concomitant of the
development of modem society. The characteristic factor underlying the
• pathology' of the modern order is precisely the lack of moral validation of

&1 DL. p. 37S; DTS. p. 368.

 Social differentiation and the division of labour 241
the division of labour. Such moral validation cannot be secured from the
traditional source - religion; in a rationalised world, the old symbols and the
old forms of moral domination have become obsolete. Hence the state and
the occupational associations must become the principal sources of moral
support for the 'cult of the individual '. There can be no possibility of a
movement forward into a society in which the existing division of labour is
radically transformed, and, correspondingly, in which the state, as a separate
political sphere, disappears. On the contrary, the separation of the state from
society is a necessary condition for the reduction of anomie. For Durkheim,
the state is certainly not to be a merely • political' agency: but it fulfils its
moral role only insofar as it remains a unity connected with, but distinct
from, civil society."
Weber, in contrast to Durkheim, uses the term' capitalism ',&I but his
identification of the basic character of the modem form of society is similarly
divergent from that of Marx. In Weber's conception, rational calculation is
the primary element in modem capitalistic enterprise, and the rationalisation
of social life generally is the most distinctive attribute of modem western cul-
ture. The class relation which Marx takes to be the pivot of capitalism is in
fact only one element in a much more pervasive rationalisation, which extends
the process of the • expropriation of the worker from his means of produc-
tion' into most of the institutions in contemporary society. The economic
gains which the transition from • capitalism I to 'socialism I could possibly
help to bring about for the working class are only attainable given a further
growth of bureaucratisation. The • parcelling-out • of humanity brought about
by the bureaucratised division of labour is a necessary concomitant of this
rationalisation of human conduct. The • disenchantment' of the world
which is both prerequisite to, and completed by, the advent of rational
capitalism, transforms what previously was on'ly a 'means' (rational pursuit
of pin in a specialised vocation) into the' end • of human activity.~~
In a social world which is organised on the basis of a routinised division of
labour, the avenues for the expression of individual autonomy and spon-
taneity become limited to the interstices of social institutions. C5 Anything
else is a ftight from the irrational dominance of rationality in the con-
temporary world. An individual • who cannot bear the fate of the times' can
seek refuge in established religion, or in new forms of mysticism; but these
are nothing more than an escape from the demands of the modem social

42 PECM, pp. SS-69,

43 c:f. Parsons: 'Capitalism in recent German literature "
•• See Karl Uwith: 'Max Weber und Karl Marx " Archiv IUr Soziaiwissensc/uz/lllnd
Soziaipolitik, vol. 67, 1932, part I, p. 8S.
U Thus Weber notes: • It is not accidental that our greatest art is intimate and not
monumental, nor is it accidental that today only within the smallest and most
intimate circles, in personal human situations, in pianissimo, that something is
pulsating that corresponds to the prophetic pneuma, which in former times swept
through the great communities like a firebrand, welding tbem together,' FMW, p. ISS
242 Pmt 4: Capitalism, socialism and social theory
order. Weber's own methodological requirements for social science mesh
closely with this analysis: the man who faces ' the fate of the times ' is one
who possesses 'the trained relentlessness in viewing the realities of life, and
the ability to face such realities and to measure up to them inwardly·...
The existen<:c, therefore, of • contradictions • within capitalism generates
no historical ne<:eSsity for such contradictions to be resolved. On the contrary,
the advance of rationalisation, which certainly creates a hitherto unknown
material abundance,·' inevitably stimulates a further separation between the
distinctive values of western civilisation (freedom, creativity, spontaneity)
and the realities of the ' iron cage , in which modem man is confined .

•• FMW, pp. 126-7. ct. Uwith: I The ideal-typical II CODStructiOU" bas as its basis a
specifically" disillusioned" humanity •. .', Uwith, part I, p. 75.
" • Quito correctly did the Communist Manifesto emphasise the economic - Dot the
political - nvolutioruuy character of the work of the bourpois capitatiat entre-
preneur: GPS, p. 448.
Postscript: Marx and modem sociology

There are two polar sorts of orthodoxy in terms of which the relationship
between Marx's writings and those of the other two authors discussed at
length in this book, is usually presented. The first, adopted by many westem
sociologists, holds that Marx's works belong to the ' pre-history' of social
thought; and that the history of sociology proper only begins with the genera-
tion of writers to which Durkheim and Weber belonged.1 The second is that
usually expressed by Marxists, and holds that the works of this subsequent
generation of social thinkers represent nothing more than a bourgeois
response to Marx - and that, consequently, most of what passes for' socio-
logy , can be dismissed as simply a latter-day expression of liberal bourgeois
ideology. Each of these orthodoxies contains more than a substance of truth;
and each is dangerously misleading.
The first standpoint rests upon straightforward acceptance of the stated
views of the writers of the generation of Durkheim and Weber, that their own
work was 'scientific' in its formulation, and thereby different substantially
from the grandiose, ' speculative' constructions of earlier nineteenth-century
writers. Those who have accepted this view, by and large, have defined as
irrelevant the social and political circumstances in which Durkheim, Weber,
and their contemporaries developed their ideas, and have consequently
largely ignored the broader Weltanschauung which, in each case, was intrinsi-
cally bound up with the academic writings of the thinker in question. Latter-
day Marxists, by contrast. in mounting their critiques of sociology, have con-
centrated upon the identification of the social context in which Durkheim and
Weber wrote, and the political interests which their writings are presumed to
mask. i The content of their works is thus defined, in the cruder versions of
such attacks, as 'fallacious', since they represent a more or less direct parti-
san defence of liberal bourgeois society in the face of the Marxist challenge.
This latter view is not even consistent with Marx's own epistemology,
which avoids such a naive relativism. Marx accepts, for example, a great deal
of bourgeois economic theory as valid for the explanation of capitalist
development, while recognising its truth to be only partial and, in some ways,
distorted. In Manist terms, both Durkheim and Weber are committed to a
, bourgeois' political position, but this is hardly an adequate basis for dismis-

1 See Talcott Parsons: • Some comments on the sociology of Karl Marx', in Socio-
logical Theory and Modern Society (New York, 1967), pp. 102-3S.
i cf. Herbert Marcuse: • Industrialisierung und Kapitalismu5 " pp. 161-80.

243
244 Postscript: Marx and modern sociology
sing the content of their writings as false and thus to be discounted. The fact
of the matter is that Weber's own critique of Marxism, departing from pre-
mises of neo-Kantian idealism, reaches conclusions which are in some
respects closer to the original Marxian dialectic than are the deterministic
doctrines of some of Marx's declared followers. It is no accident that the
political· views of both Durkheim and Weber are difficult to categorise in
terms of the traditional division between liberalism and socialism. Weber's
methodological position is more' individualistic' than that of Durkheim. but
both reject - as Marx did before them - the theoretical solipsism of the
utilitarians. and with it certain of the suppositions of nineteenth-century
political liberalism. As I have tried to show in the foregoing chapters, the
social and political background to this can be understood in terms of the
development of Britain, France and Germany in the latter part of the century.
This stands at the back both of the critique of Marx contained in the works
of Durkheim and Weber, as well as of the main differences between the latter
two authors. which I have not analysed in this book.
The writings of both Durkheim and Weber have their origin in an attempt
to defend - or rather to re-interpret - the c1aims of political liberalism within
the twin pressures of Romantic hypernationalistic conservatism on the one
side, and revolutionary socialism on the other. Marx's writings, on the other
hand, constitute an analysis and critique of early capitalism. As the source
of a political mass movement, however, Marx's work achieved prominence
during the period of the consolidation of capitalism in the latter part of the
nineteenth century. This occurred within a context which transmitted Marx's
original conception into one which appeared much more as the direct expres-
sion of the main intellectual trends of the nineteenth century than as a critical
analysis and an attempt to supersede them. The result is that the Marx's
writings share a good deal more in common with those of Durkheim and
Weber than was apparent to either of the latter two authors: in perceptible
measure, the polemical foils of the three writers were the same. since Marx's
works, like those of the two later writers, constitute an attempt to transform
and supersede both Romantic conservatism (in German philosophy) and
utilitarianism as manifest in classical economics.
This having been said. it must, of course. be recognised that there are
irreconcilable differences of theoretical perspective and empirical interpreta-
tion between Marx and the other two authors. I have attempted to show that
some of the most basic differences centre upon divergent explanations of the
consequences of the growth of the division of labour - understood not in
sheerly economic terms, but as social differentiation - in modern society. For
those, however. who recognise the significance of Marx's contribution to
sociology. but who are able to treat Marx not as 'a dead saint' but rather as
a 'living thinker'.s there are many significant problems which can be

3 Erich Fronun: • Foreword '. EW, p. i; cr. Iring Fetscher, pp. 91(.
 Postscript; Marx and modern sociology 245
conveniently posed through the comparative analysis of Marx's writings and
those of other social thinkers, considered in terms of their intellectual content.
It is no exaggeration to say that a major process of theoretical re-thinking
is taking place today within both Marxism and in academic sociology." In
large degree, this has been stimulated by the same circumstance: the apparent
• convergence' in the social structure of capitalist and socialist societies. At
the time at which Durkheim and Weber wrote the bulk of their works, there
was no extant society which either called itself • socialist' or claimed to
derive its primary inspiration from Marx. However, large-scale working
class movements, of a self-professed revolutionary character, existed in both
France and Germany, and the occurrence of a socialist revolution was by no
means beyond the bounds of possibility. But the October Revolution in
Russia took place in a country which was one of the least advanced. in
economic terms. in Europe. It was not the clarion call fo~ the revolutionary
overthrow of western European capitalism which Marx anticipated when.
late in his career, he accepted the possibility that the communal organisation
of the mir could allow Russia to move directly to socialism. Instead. it was a
stimulus to revolutionary change only to countries of comparable or of a
lower level of economic development than Russia itself.
If the advanced capitalist countries have changed, it has not been by means
of revolution, but by the gradual accumulation of change from within them-
selves. Today it is no longer possible to deny the profound nature of some
of these internal modifications in such things as the increasing intervention of
the state in the economy, the growth in the white-collar sector. and the partial
replacement of the old propertied upper class by a more amorphous pluralism
of elites. But just as the western capitalist countries have changed in con-
siderable degree over the past three or four decades. so have Russia and the
European countries which followed it in experiencing socialist revolutions.
In these countries. Marx's anticipations of an order in which class domina-
tion would be replaced by a rational order • in which the free development of
each is the condition for the free development of all ' & appears as far from
attainment as in the western liberal democracies. Rather, an epistemologically
distorted form of Marxism has been employed to legitimate a commitment to
industrialisation, in which the • overtaking' of the economic level of the
western countries has become the primary goal.
As a consequence, at least until quite recently. Marxist social thought has
utterly failed to come to grips with the problems posed by the trends of
development in both capitalist and socialist societies over the past few
decades. The Hobson-Lenin theory of . imperialism' has been used to bolster

" d. Norman Birnbaum: . The crisis in Marxist sociology', in Hans Peter Dreitzel:
Recent SOdology No. J (London, 1969), pp. 12-42. See also JUrgen Habcrmas:
Theorie und Praxis (Ncuwied and Berlin, 1967). pp. 261-335.
• CH, p. 162.
246 Postscript: Marx and modern sociology
the assumption that these trends are not to be explained in terms of any
important intrinsic modifications in the structure of these societies, but derive
from the exploitative relationship between them and the • underdeveloped ,
countries. Any theoretical reassessment of the development of the socialist
societies themselves has been precluded by the ideological dogma which
Marxism has itself become in these countries. The imnical outcome of this
is that • sociology' in these countries has come to be understood as a
peculiarly narrow descriptive discipline. But neither have western sociolo-
gists yet come to grips with these problems. In general, those writings which
have attempted to comprehend the changes that have occurred in the
capitalist societies. have been simply extrapolations of views given in the
writings of the generation of social thinkers to which Durkheim and Weber
belonged. The most important emphasis. however. has been placed upon the
attempt to formulate a body of ahistorical • general theory', a concern which
consciously directs attention away from problems of social change or develop.
ment. 1 Until recently, as in Marxist social thought, where the study of
development has been undertaken. interest has been concentrated upon the
non-industrial countries.
The impact of western technology and culture upon the non-industrialised
countries is obviously an area of theory and research which is of enormous
significance for sociology. But the framework within which this is approached
normally betrays an implicit assumption that the main characteristics of the
, developed societies' are known. and that the question is simply how far the
societies of the ' third world' will successfully match this model at some time
in the future. The way in which the term' industrial society ',or more recently
'post.industrial society '. has slipped into almost universal usage in socio-
logy to denote both societies which are nominally' capitalist • and those which
are socialist ',signifies the assumptions which underlie this standpoint. But
the various debates which have recently arisen concerning the question of the
• convergence' of capitalist and socialist societies,' and of the supposed dis-
solution of class relationships in the form in which these are traditionally
conceived.- are symptomatic of a resurgence of interest in the analysis of the
trends of development within the ' advanced' societies.
In important respects. this represents a return to the issues which were of
over· riding significance in the writings of the three authors discussed in this
book. Their works must still form the main point of departure if this is to
effect an important reorientation of social theory. It may be granted that
Marx's model of capitalism. in its entirety. 'is inappropriate to the post-

I See, above all, Talcott Parsons: The Social System (London, 1951).
1 See John H. Goldthorpe: 'Social stratification in industrial society', in Paul
Halmos: The Development of Industrial Society. Sociological Review Monograph.
no. 8, 1964, pp. 97-122.
• Ralf Dabrendorf: Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society; Norman Birnbaum:
The Crisis of Industrial Society (New York, 1969).
 Postscript: Marx and modern sociology 247
bourgeois industrial society in which we live ... '.' It does not follow from this
that some of the major elements of Marx's analysis of bourgeois society are
not of considerable significance today. This does not imply the reiteration of
the familiar theme that Marx accurately • predicted' some of the important
characteristics of contemporary societies, or that others of his supposed • pre-
dictions' have subsequently been falsified. It is to hold that Marx's analysis
poses issues which must still be regarded as problematic for modem socio-
logy: exactly the same is true of the writings of Durkheim and Weber. To
argue that it must be one of the main tasks of modem sociology to revert to
some of the concerns which occupied its founders is not to propose a step
which is wholly regressive: paradoxically, in taking up again the problems
with which they were primarily concerned. we may hope ultimately to liberate
ourselves from our present heavy dependence on the ideas which they
formulated.

• George Lichtheim: • On the interpretation of Marx's thought', in Lobkowicz,

p.4.
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 Bibliography of works cited in text 249
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Louis Althusser et al.: Lire Ie Capital. Paris. 1967.
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Index

Acton, H. B., 21n, 250 Calvinism, 127-31, 141, 142, 169, 177,
Acton, Lord, xi, 250 178, 183, 214
adventurers' capitalism, 126 Capital, 9, II, 28, 34, 37, 45, 46, 48,
Aimard, Guy, 87n, 250 SO, 52, 57, 59, 60, 64, 188, 189, 194,
Albrow, Martin, 159n, 250 197, 207, 224
alienation, see Marx, Karl capitalism, xvi, 9, 10-15, 19, 20, 28, 30,
Allardt, Erik, 104, 250 33, 34, 38-40, 45, 46-64, 121, 125,
Alpert, Harry, 87n, 250 126, 130, 131, 139, 142, 158, 159,
Althusser, Louis, 190, 35, 199n, 250 178, 179, 185-204, 205, 210, 214-16,
Annie soclologique, founding of, 200 232,239-47
anomie, see Durkheim, Emile Catholicism, 83, 125, ISS, 171
Anti-Diihring, xiv, xv, 189, 210 causal explanation, see explanation,
Antoni, Carlo, 147n, 250 causal
Aron, Raymond, 890. 250 causal imputation, 140, 141, 149, 153,
ascetic character of capitalism, 214, 215 228
ascetic Protestantism, see Calvinism charismatic authority, see Weber, Max
Asiatic mode of production, see Oriental China, 26, 78, 158, 169, 172-8, 206
society Christian ethic, 206, 207, 221
Aufhebung, 7, 59, 63, 222, 238 church and sect, 142
Avineri, Shlomo, 6n, 6On, 250 city, development of, 26, 27, 30, 175
civil society, 5~, 226, 227, 241
Civil War in France, The, 238
Baptist sects, 128
Barnes, J. A., 72, 250 class. see Durkheim, Emile; Marx,
Bau und Leben des Socialen Korpers, Karl; Weber, Max
66, ISO classification of knowledge, 108, 112-14,
Bauer, Bruno, 20, 205 217-23
Baumgarten, Eduard, 187n, 19On, 195n, Class Struggles in France, The, 38, 197,
250 198
Bebel, A., 188, 193 'coercion theory', 2090
Bellah, Robert, 100n Cole, W. A., xiin, 251
Below, G. von, 146n, 250 commercial classes, 164
Bendix, Reinhard, 121n, 250 Communist Manifesto, The, 64, 194
Bernstein, E., 189 Comte, A., 65, 68, 71, 72, 89, 91, 113n,
Birnbaum, Norman, 211n, 245n, 246n, 116, 133
250 Confucianism, 174-8
Bismarck, O. von, xiii, 187, 188, 190, conscience collective, 67, 75, 77, 79, 80,
191, 198 85, 92, 101, 102, lOS, 111, 114, 203,
Weber and, 190 223
Bollnow, H., 189n, 250 constant capital, SO, 51
Bottomore, T. B., 23n, 248 contradiction, 44, 52-5, 240, 242
bourgeoisie, see Marx, Karl Contribution to the Critique of Political
Boutroux, E., 65 Economy. A, 18
bureaucracy co-operative factories, 238
Durkheim on, 101, 102, 203, 204
Marx on, 236-8, see also Weber, Max Cornu, A., In, 250
corporations, 101-4, 199, 200
Coulanges, Fustel de, 65, 107
Caesarism, 181 crises, 5H, 189, 197, 198, 240
Caillois, Roger, ll1n, 250 Cronzet, F., xiiin
calling, concept of, 127, 129-31, 235, • cult of the individual " 72, 73, 80, 115,
236 116, 218, 241
2SS
256 Index
Dahrendorf. R., 37n, 191n, 250 Durkheim and Marx, 6S, 96-8. 196-
Darwin, C .• 66, 79 204, 205, 206, 216-32. 239-41
Davy, Georges, 12011, 199n. 251 Duvignaud, Jean, 7On, 251
Deane, Phyllis, xim, 251 dynamic density, 78, 79, 217, 218
declining profit, law of, 52, S3, 240
dehumanisation, 229, 230 Easton, Loyd D., 248
democracy Ecole Normale, 65
Durkheim on. 99, 101-4 EcolIDmic and Philosophical Manu-
Weber on, 180-2 scripts, xiv, xv, 3, 9-17, 19-21. 23,
Denis, E., 65n, 249 60
Deploige, Simon, 68n, 71n, 249, 2S1 economic as distinct from technological,
descriptive concepts, 142, 143 194, 195
determinism economic conditioning, 194
dialectic and, 189, 190 economic ethic, 131, 169, 170
Marx on, 40-5, 207-10 economic relevance, 194
revolution and, 60 economic traditionalism, 125-7
Weber on, 131, 139, 140, 141, 193-5 Economy and Society, 145, 146, 153,
dialectic. 20, 21-3, 59, 60, 189, 207, 208, 170
education, 101, 103, 143, 144, 198
212,240 egoism
direct understanding, 148 Durkheim on, 69, 70, 77, 84
.division of labour, see Dillision of individualism and, 115-18
. Labour in Society, The; Durkheim, Marx on, 5, 6, 10, 35
Emile; Marx, Karl; Weber, Max Egypt, 158, 159, 181, 182, 192
Dillision 01 Labour in Socfety, The, 69, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaptllte,
72, 7~9, 82, 84, ~2, 9S, 97, 98. The, 197
102, 103n, lOS, 111, 116, 117, 217 eighteeath-century philosophers, 22S
Dobb, Maurice, 30u, 34n, 2S1 elective affinity, 131, 211, 212
domination Elementary Forms of the Religious
authority, 156--63 Life, The, 106, 107, 110, 114, 217,
class structure, 36-40, 163-7 218
concept, 1S6 Engels, Frederick, xiv, xv, 3, 9, 16, 18,
Dreitzel, Hans Peter, 24Sn, 251 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 37, 46, 66, 125,
Ikeyfiq Case, 6Sn, 19~ 199 186n, 189n, 196, 197, 210, 23011,
Durkheim, Emile 248
anomie, 69, 71, 79-81, 84, 85, 99, 103, and Marx, 189, 190, 230n
liS, 117, 204, 224-8, 230, 232, 241 Entiiusseru"" 12
class. 8~1, 97-9, 103, 203, 204, 219, Entfremdun" 12
220, 229-31, 240. 241 ethical neutrality, 143, 144
division of labour, 69, 70-9, 92, 93, ethical theory, 93, 94, 116, 136, 169, 189,
97, 118, 228-32, 240, 241 190, 19S
externality, 86-8, 90, 222. ethic of responsibility, 136-8
mecbanical solidarity, 75-9, 105, 112, ethic of ultimate ends, 137, 138, 195,
222, 223 212
moral authority, 88, 89, 103, 106, exchange-value, 46-8, 64, 239, 240
114-18, 199, 200, 2J8-23, 240, 241 explanation
normality and pathology, 91-4, 104, and history, 22, 23, lOS, 106, 141-3
220, 224, 231, 240 and interpretative sociology, 146-S1
organic solidarity, 76-80, 92, 93, 103, causal, 89-91, 139-41
222, 223, 23~2 types of, 90, 91, 139, 140
psychology, 72, 86, 87 expropriation
reliajon, 71, 75, 83, 99, 105-18, 199, and alienation, 239
2~2, 216-23 and division of labour, 158, 159, 119-
science of moral life, 66-70 81,234-42
socialism., 95-7, 198, 200-4 ~arx on, 30-2, 236-42
socioloajcal method, 82-94 Weber on, 179-81,234-6
state, the, 96-101, 156, 241 external inequality, 81
suicide, 71, 78, 82-5 externality, see Durkheim, Emile
 Index 257
Fetsch~r, Iring, 237n, 244n, 251 Hobson-Lenin theory of imperialism,
feudahsm, 29-31, 39, 51, 64, 227, 235, 245,246
239 Hodges, Donald. 380, 25 1
Feuer, Louis. 19n, 251 Holy Family, The, 18, 206
Feuerbach. Ludwig. 3-6, 12, 13, 2~2, homo duplex, 228
205, 206, 208n, 221, 251 Horton, Iohn, J17n, 225n, 251
Fichte. I. G., 2 Hubert, Henri, 100n, 251
forced divisioo of labour, 80, 204, 240 Hughes. H. Stuart, 1100, 251
formal and substantive rationality, 183, Hyppolite, lean, 5n, 251
184, 216
Fraoce, developmeot of in nineteenth
century. 196-8 ideal types, see Weber, Max
freedom, concept of, 116-18, 123, 127, ideas, role of, xv, 21-3, 40-4, 190, 194,
230,242 195, 202, 203, 204, 21~12
French Revolution, xi, xii, xiii, I, 7, 44. ideology, see Marx, Karl
72, 116, 186, 196, 197, 201 India, 26, 169, 172-8, 206
Freud. S., 226n individual, concept of, 86-8, ISO, lSI,
Freund, Iulien, 1460, 251 226,227
Friedmann, G., 183n, 2300, 251 individualism, 35, 72, 73, 79-81, 95, 101,
Fromm. Erich. 244n 114-17, 199, 216-23, 225, 240
function, 90, 91, 106, ISO, 151 Industrial Revolution, xii, 188
industrial society, xii, 246
inheritance, 99, 204
Gehlke, Charles Elmer, ]06n, 251 Instleure, 122, 123
Gemeinscha/t und GeselIschaft, 71 n, 72 'integration' theory, 2090
German Ideology, The, 18-21, 22, 63, interpretative sociology, 143-51, 213
208 • iron cage', 235, 236, 242
Germany, development in nineteenth
century, 185-8
Gerth, H. H., 1700, 233n, 249 Iellinek, Georg, 193n
• ghost of Marx', 185 Johnson, Barelay. 85, 252
Giddens, Anthony, 251 Iordan, Z. A., 21n, 252
Goldthorpe, Iohn H., 2460, 251 Iudaism. 169, 171, 172
Gotthei1, Fred. M., 51, 251 Junker' aristocracy', 186, 187, 191
Gouldner, Alvin, 65n
grande bourgeoisie, 197, 198
Guesdism, 200 kadi-justice, 161 n
Gumplowicz, L., 68n. 71n, 249 Kamenka, Eugene, 208n, 252
Gurvitch, Georges, 2n, 1850, 251 Kantianism, 2, 67, 91, 92, 113, 134, 135,
Guyau, M. I., 70, 80, 249 138, 195, 220, 222, 224, 233, 244
Kathedersozialisten, 95, 119. 192n
Kautsky, Karl, xv, 46, 123n, 200, 206n
Habermas, lUtgen, 245n, 251 Klages, Helmut, 19n, 252
Hartwell, R. M., xiiin. 251 Knies, K. G. A.• 134, 1490, 227n
Hayward, I. E. S., 740, 200n, 251 Kocka, E. 11lrgen, 216n, 252
Hegel, G. W. F., 1-6, 14, 16, 18-21, 100, K<Snig, Rene, 252
205-7, 212, 227, 236, 237, 251 Korsch, Karl, 430, 252
Herrschaft, 36, 156
Hess, Moses, 15n, 16
Hinduism, 172--4 Labedz, L., 19n. 252
historical materialism, xiii, xv, 18-34, labour
132, 133, 190, 193, 202, 203, 204, abstract, 47
211, 218 and capital, II, 12, 14-15, 33, 34, 39,
historical school, 120 46-64
history and sociology, xi-xii, 20, 22, 23, labour-power, 47, 240
68, 90, 91, 106, 117, 133, 141, 163, theory of value, 46-8
193, 194. 210, 225, 226, 246, 247 Labriola, Antonio, xv, 200, 202, 2030,
Hobbes, T., 225, 226n 204o, 249, 252
258 Index
Lacombe, Roger, 900, 252 Marx. Karl-cont.
Landes, David S., xiin, 252 communism, conception of, 16, 17,
Laski, Harold 1., 189n, 248 60-4, 204n, 206, 209, 21S. 227, 240,
Laslett, Peter, 225n, 252 245
LassaUe, F., 187-9, 200 division of labour, 19, 24, 25, 26, 209,
lati/undiae, 28, 29 226, 228-32, 239
laws in social science, 138, 139, 187, 193, and Hegel, 1-6, 14, 16, 18-21, 193.
212, 213 212
leadership problem in Gennany, 190-2 ideology, ~5, 205, 206-16
materialism, xv, 4-5, 20. 21-3, 204,
Le Bon, G., IS2 207-10
legal authority, see Weber, Max peasantry, 37-9, 44
Lenin, V. I., lOvn, 252 proletariat, 8, 19, 32, 34, 50, 61, 186,
liberalism 197, 198
in France, 196-8 religion, 7, 9, 11-12, 206-16
in Gennany, 187, 188, 19~2 stages in development of society, 22-
liberalism and sociology, 244 34
Lichtheim. George, xvn, 6n, 27n, 198, state, 4-6, 16, 18, 19, 26, 40, 61-3,
1990, 247n, 252 97,226,227
Uebknecbt, W., 188, 192n Marxism, 123, 163, 185-93, 198, 200,
Ulienfeld, P., 66 207, 243-7
Lindenlaub, Dieter, 1240, 134n, 1920, and modem sociology, 243-6
252 materialism, lee Marx, Karl
Lobkowicz, Nicholas, 36, 252 Mauss, Marcel, 95, lOIn, 1000, 1120,
logical classes, 113 249, 251, 252
USwith, Karl, 241n, 2420, 252 meaDS of administration, 234, 235
LukAcs, Georg, 20, 43n, 600, 188n, mechanical solidarity, see Durkheim,
189n, 1920, 252 Emile
Lukes, Steven, 225n, 252 Meek, Ronald L., 46n, 48, 252
Mehring, Franz, 187n
Lumpenproletariat, 38 Menger, A., 1340
Lutheranism, 127-9, 207
M6aztr08. Istvtn, 160, 252
Luxemburg, Rosa, 192n methodism, 128
Meyer, Alfred, G., 160, 252
Meyer, Eduard, 140
McLellan, David, 3n, 252 Michels, R., 145n, 159n, 180, 181, 192n
Macpbenon, C. B., 226, 252 Mil:la, C. Wright, 170n, 233n, 249
magic and religion, Weber on, 214, 2IS Mitzman, Artbur, 188n, 252
mona. 109, 170 Mombert, Paul, 1650
Mandel, Ernest, 64, 252 Mommsen, T .• 120
Marcuse, H., 183n, 243n Mommsen, Wolfgang 1., 143n, 190ft,
market,the 1920.252
centralisation, 58-60 Montesquieu, C. de S., 65, lOIn, 102n
concentration, 58-60 Moore, Barrington, 188n, 252
and feudalism, 29-33, 38-40 Moore, Wlibert E., 1850
and growth of capitalism, 33, 34, 64 moral authority, see Durkheim, Emile
• market alienation', 228, 229
market situation, defined, 164 natural religion, 219
stock market, 121, 122 nature and society, 218-20
Marx, Karl Nietzsche, F., 213n
alienation, 9-16, 19, 52, 57, 64, 215, Nisbet, R. A., 70, 22On, 252
216, 219, 220, 222, 224-32, 239 nomothetic venus ideographic dicho-
bourgeoisie, 33, 34, 38, 39, 44, 186, tomy, 133, 139, 140
187,196-8,207,210
capitalist development, ~
class, 27, 28, 36-40, 195, 197. 198. objectification, 11-12, 222, 231
209, 210. 213. 215. 219, 220. 229. occupational groups, see corporations
232. 239. 240. 245 organicism, 65, 150, 151
 Index 259
organic solidarity, see Durkheim, Emile Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Oriental society, 25-7, 76, 157 Capitalism. The. 121, 124, 12S, 127,
Origin of the Family, Private Property 131, 132, 133, 142, 169, 184, 193,
and the State, 29 205
Ossowski, Stanislaw, 36n, 2S2 Protestantism, 83, 115, 119-32, ISS, 206,
ownership classes, 164 2J)7
Proudhon, P. J., 23n, 200
Prussia, 186-8
Palyi, Melchior, 165n, 252 psychology, see Durkheim, emile;
Paris Commune, 62, 198, 238 Weber, Max
Parsons, Talcott, 7On, 710, 72n. 86n, purposively rational conduct, 1S2
87n, 1060, 113n, 1430, 1480, 1920,
209.n,241n, 243,2460,2S3
pathology, see Durkheim, Emile: Radical Party in France, 198, 200
normality and pathology Ramm, Tbilo, 232n, 253
patrimoDialiam, 1S7, 1S8 rate of exploitatioo, 49
pauperisation, 55-8, 189, 240 rationalisatioo, see Weber, Max
peoal law, 74-6 reflective materialism, 211, 212
perfectibility, 231, 232 Reissner, Hans Gtlnther, In, 253
Peru, 36 relations of production, 35-8, 209
pietism. 128 religion
Pizzomo, Alessandro, 71, 253 ceremonial in, 110-12
Plamenatz, John, 42n, 253 concept, of, 107, 170-2
political ecooomy disenchantment, 128, 136, 239, 241
conception of society in, 10-11, 68. 69 Feuerbach on, 5
critique of. 43, 44, 68-70, 226, 227 Hegel on, 20S
politics ideology. 206-14, 219-22
and communism, 96. 97 kno~edge. 108-10. 112-1S, 216-17
concept of, 4-6, 39-40, 62, 1S6 magic, 170-2, 174n
French, 196-9 secularisation, lOS, 214-16, 221-3
German, 185-90 transcendence of, 3, 4, 206, 214-16,
Hegel on, 4-6 222,223
Plato on, 96 ue also Calvinism; Catholicism; China;
Popitz, H.. 13n, 253 Christianity; Durkbeim, Emile; India;
post-industrial society, 246 Marx, Karl; Weber, Max
Poulantzas, Nicos Ar., 209n, 253 Renouvier, C.. 65n. 72
power repressive sanctions, 74, 15
and authority, 4-6, 61. 62, 98-100, reserve army, S6-8, 240
1S4-7, 190 . restitutive sanctions. 74, 75
and class. 38-40, 42-4, 80, 81, 97, 19S revolution, 44, 45, 59, 60, 116, 135, 182,
defined, IS6 185-7, 1920, 196, 200n, 203, 204,
lctrltimacy, 154-7 237
and parties, 167, 168 Ricardo. D., 46
Prades, J. A., 1240, 253 Richard, Gaston, 201, 202n. 249
pragmatism, 137 Rickert, H., 133, 138, 139
Praxis, 6-8, 20, 41. 42, 60. 18S, 208, ritual, 110-2 •
224,231 negative rites, 111
predestination, 128, 129 piacular rites, 112
primitive accumulation, 31 positive rites. 111, 112
private property Robinson, Joan, 57n, 2S3
and alienation, 11-14, 228-32 Roman law, 120, 178, 179
and class structure, 36-40, SO, 98, 99, Roman society, 23, 27-9, 40, 44, 120,
164-6, 192. 204, 228-32 121. 167. 206
and communism, 16, 17, 60-4, 239, romantic conservatism, 244
240 Roscher. W., 134. 149n.2270
proletariat, see Marx. Karl Roth. GQnther. 12On, 156n, 181n. 1920,
prophecy, 171, 172 193n. 253
260 Indu
Rousseau, J.-J., 65, 67, lOin, 102n, 224, state and politics, see Duritbeim, Emile;
225 Marx, Karl; Weber, Max
routinisation of charisma, 162 state in Britain, 197
Rubel, Maximilien, 23n, 186n, 248, 253 state of nature, 224-6
Ruge, Arnold, 4n, 7n status position, 166, 167, 195
Rules 01 Sociological Me/hod, The, 78, Stirner, Max, 206, 2260
82, 86, 89, 91, 104 stock exchange, 121, 122
Runciman, W. G., 217n, 225n, 253 Strauss, D., 20, 193n, 205
Russia, 78, 1920 Strauss, Leo, 92n, 253
Russian revolution, I, 192n, 245 suicide,
altruistic. 78, 85
anomie, 84, 85
egoistic, 84, 85
sacred and profane, 107-9, 217, 221 see also Suicide; Durkheim, Emile
Saint-Simon, H. de, 65, 98, 200, 204 Suicide, 82, 83, 86, 91, 95
Salomon, Albert, 185, superstructure, 39-44, 194, 195. 218, 219
Schllflle, A., 66-9, 72, 95n, I SO, 249 surplus, value, 46-52
Schelting, A. von, 133n, 143n, 253 Sweezy, P., 31n, 48, 51, 53, 253
Schiller, F. von, 231n, 253
Schmidt, Alfred, 21n, 253
Schmidt, Gustav, 191n, 253 • technological alienation " 228, 229
technological rationality, 215, 216
Schmoller, G., 68, 69, 119 Tenbruck, F., 133n, 253
Schumpeter, J., 145n, 210, 212, 253 Theses on Feue,bach, 20, 21
Schutz, Alfred, 151n, 253 Tiryakian, Edward A., 1190, 253
science of moral life, see Durkheim, Tonnies, F., 71, 77, 106, 226, 249
Emile totemism, 107-13, 1700
secular humanism, 221, 222 traditional authority, 156, 157
Simmel, Georg, 119, 152, 187n, 214n, Treitschke, H. von, 101, 191n
253 tribal society, 24-7
Smith, Adam, 35, 46, 54n Tucker, Robert C., 20, 13n, 253
social action, 146, 147
Social Democratic Party (SPD), xiv, xv,
187-92, 196, 210 usage and custom. 154, 155
social facts, 87-90, 110, 202 use-value, 46, 47, 239
social integration, 83, 84 utilitarianism, 72, 77, 78, 91, 92, 100,
socialism, see Durkheim, Emile; Marx, 199
Karl; Weber, Max
social morphology, 219, 220
society value-judgements. 138. 139, 212, 213
and economy, 10, 11, 12-14, 21-3, 35, value rational action, 152, 153
36, 99, 100, 164-7, 193-5, 239-42 values and prices, 48-52
mode of study of, 21-2, 86-8, 145-51 variable capital, 50-I
stages in development of, 24-34, 44, Vere;n iiJ, Sozialpoli/ik, 119, 124n.
45,76-9 1590
and state, 4-6, 19, 20, 40, 61-3, 98- verstebende Soziologie, see interpreta-
104, 159, 167, 168, 18<r2, 234-42 tive sociology
Voden, A., 18n
sociological method, see Durkheim, Volksgeis/, 134
Emil-: sociological method
Volksseele. 134
sociology, development of, xii, 67, 68,
89,90, 243-7
Sombart, W., 145n, 1920, 193n Wagner, A., 68
Sorel, Georges, 200n, 253 Weber, Alfred, 119, 145n
soul. concept of, 115 Weber, Marianne, 133n, 134n, IS8n,
species-being, 13, 14, 16 19On, 193n, 253
Spencer, Herbert, 65n, 77 Weber, Max
spontaneity, 216, 241 bureaucracy. 158-60, 175, 180-3, 191,
Stammler, R., 193n 192, 216, 234-S
 Index 261
Weber, Max-cont. Weber, Max-cont.
charismatic authority, 160-3, 170, 213 spirit of capitalism, 124-32, 142, 169,
classes. 163-7, 190, 191, 19S, 213, 234 184
critique of Marxism, 123, 124, 131, Weber and Marx, 123-'5, 131, 132. 158,
132, 190-6, 244 159, 164, 179, 180, 190-6, 205-16,
ideal types, 141-3, 148, 242n 232-8, 241, 242
law, definition of, ISS, 156 Weitling, W., 16n
legal authority. 157-9 Wesolowski, W., 36n
legitimacy and domination, 154-63, WinckeImann, Johannes, 1200, 146n,
190-2 2S2, 253
objectivity, 134--8 W'mdelband, W., 133, 138
Wittfogel, Karl A., 26n, 27n, 254
political society and the state, 1S6, WoltI, Kurt, 10Sn, 1190, 254
IS9, 167, 168, 17S-6, 178-82, 234--8 Wolfson, Murray, SI, 2S4
and psychology, lSI, 169 Wolin, Sheldon S., 225, 254
rationalisation, 36, 127, 128, 139, 142, Wonley, P. M., 1lin, 254
178-84, 214--16, 220, 233, 241 Wundt, W., 70
religion, 124--32, 136, 137, 170-8, 192,
193, 206-16
socialism, 135, 165n, 181-2, 191, 192, Young Hegelians, XIU, 2, 3, 7, 17, 18,
19S, 202, 216. 236 193n, 206, 211