CONSTANTE PIMENTEL vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINO C.

SALANGA,. G.R. No. L-27934 September 18, 1967 EN BANC

Raymundo A. Armovit for petitioner.

Constante P. Pimentel for and in his behalf as petitioner.
Respondent Judge for and in his behalf as respondent.

RESOLUTION

 SANCHEZ, J.:

          Challenged here in an original petition for certiorari and/or prohibition is the right of
respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch IV) to sit in
judgment in cases where petitioner, a practicing attorney, appears as counsel.
Petitioner's petition recites the facts that follow:

          Petitioner is counsel of record in cases pending before respondent judge, viz:

(1) Civil Case 21-C, entitled "Pablo Festejo et al., petitioners, vs. Marciano
Cabildo et al., respondents," a special civil action for mandamus to compel
payment of salaries of elective and appointive municipal officials; petitioner is
counsel for principal respondent, Acting Mayor Brigido Vilog;

(2) Criminal Case 4898 and C-5, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs.
Constante Anies, accused," for frustrated murder; petitioner is the private
prosecutor therein;

(3) Criminal Case C-93, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Romeo
Pimentel, accused," for frustrated homicide; petitioner is defense counsel therein;

(4) Election Case 2470, entitled "Avelino Balbin, protestant, vs. Clemente Abaya,
protestee," an election protest involving the office of mayor of Candon, Ilocos
Sur; petitioner is counsel for protestant therein.

          Petitioner's misgivings stem from the fact that he is complainant in an

administrative case he himself lodged in this Court on May 12, 1967, against respondent
judge upon averments of "serious misconduct, inefficiency in office, partiality, ignorance
of the law and incompetence."1 Petitioner seeks in the complaint therein to have
respondent judge immediately suspended from office, and, after due notice and hearing,
removed therefrom. The judge's return traversed the factual averments. Whereupon, this
Court, on July 13, 1967, referred the administrative case to Mr. Justice Eulogio Serrano
of the Court of Appeals "for investigation, report and recommendation." That case is still
pending.

          On July 31, 1967, petitioner moved in the court below to have respondent judge
disqualify himself from sitting in Civil Case 21-C, Criminal Cases 4898 and C-5, and
Election Case 2470 aforesaid. He there prayed that the records of those cases be
transferred to another sala, either at Narvacan or Vigan, both of Ilocos Sur.

          On August 1, 1967, respondent judge rejected the foregoing motion. He stood his
ground with the statement that the administrative complaint against him is no cause for
disqualification under the Rules of Court; that Civil Case 21-C and Electoral Case 2470
"are now on the final stages of termination" and transfer thereof to another sala "would
only delay their final disposition, make the parties suffer [from] further efforts and
expenses", and "would be violative" of Administrative Order 371 of the Department of
Justice defining the court's territorial jurisdiction; and that he is "sworn to administer
justice in accordance with the law and the merits of the cases to be heard and decided
by him." Civil Case 21-C was then calendared for August 10 and 11, 1967.

          A move to reconsider the foregoing resolution failed of its purpose. Civil Case 21-
C was rescheduled for hearing from August 10 and 11, 1967 to August 22 and 23, 1967.
          Hence, the present petition.

          Petitioner makes his exercise along the following lines: Immediate resolution of
the problem of disqualification "is a matter of profound importance, particularly on his
career and potential as a practitioner of law; his cases "may fall by the accident of raffle
into the sala of respondent Judge" and he cannot "resign from an accepted case every
time it falls" therein; his clients will have "the natural hesitation to retain as counsel one
who is sort of unacceptable to the presiding judge." Petitioner winds up with a prayer that
respondent judge be stopped from further sitting in or otherwise trying or deciding the
cases heretofore mentioned. He asks for the issuance forthwith of a writ of preliminary
injunction ex parte.1awphîl.nèt

          We now resolve the petition.

          Is a judge disqualified from acting in litigations in which counsel of record for one
of the parties is his adversary in an administrative case said counsel lodged against
him?

          The answer is to be sought within the terms of Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of
Court,2 which reads in full:

          Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in

any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consaguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which be has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided
in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.

          A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself

from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

          Petitioner says that, arguably, his case comes within the coverage of the second
paragraph of the rule just quoted. The theory advocated is that the present (1964) rules
for the first time provide a broad policy-oriented ground for disqualification of judges. It is
his submission that a judge may now be barred from the bench in specific cases for
reasons other than those enumerated in the law. He stresses that respondent judge, in
the factual environment presented, did not make use of his sound discretion when he
refused to disqualify himself from acting in the cases referred to.

          Before the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules, came into
being, law and early jurisprudence gave no room for a judge, on objection of a party, to
disqualify himself, absent any of the specific grounds for disqualification set forth in the
law. The following from People vs. Moreno [1949], 83 Phil. 286, 294, is expressive of the
rule: "To take or not to take cognizance of a case, does not depend upon the discretion
of a judge not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. It is his duty not to sit in its trial
and decision if legally disqualified; but if the judge is not disqualified, it is a matter of
official duty for him to proceed with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the
responsibility without the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction." 3 Then
came Del Castillo vs. Javelona, L-16742, September 29, 1962, from which sprang the
added second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, aforequoted. In Del Castillo, the judge
inhibited himself from the case because the lawyer of the party defendant was his first
cousin.4 The judge felt that if defendant should win, his blood relationship with
defendant's lawyer might cast some suspicion on his integrity; but, if defendant be the
defeated party, it might bring unpleasant consequences. Plaintiff protested the judge's
posture. In upholding the judge, we declared:

          . . . Obviously, Rule 126 [of the old Rules] enumerates the grounds for
disqualification of a judge upon being challenged and under which he should
disqualify himself. The rule, however, has never been interpreted to prohibit a
 judge from voluntarily inhibiting himself, in the absence of any challenge by either
party, due to his close blood relationship with counsel for one of said parties.
Considering the spirit of the Rule, it would seem that cases of voluntary inhibition,
based on good, sound and/or ethical grounds, is a matter of discretion on the
part of the judge and the official who is empowered to act upon the request for
such inhibition.

xxx     xxx     xxx

          . . . In other words, while Rule 126 provides for disqualification, it does not
include nor preclude cases and circumstances for voluntary inhibition which
depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned.5

          The Del Castillo opinion made the pointed observation that the cases cited by
plaintiff are instances where the judge was challenged — not cases of voluntary
inhibition. Indeed, as early as 1931, clear intimation there was that voluntary inhibition
upon sound grounds may be recognized, when this Court said in one case:6". . . It is true
that if Judge Garduño had abstained from trying the case at bar, there would have been
less susceptibility to suspicion. But, as a matter of law, the grounds for the motion of
recusation do not constitute a legal cause for the disqualification of a judge."

          Thus, the genesis of the provision (paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137), not to say
the letter thereof, clearly illumines the course of construction we should take. The
exercise of sound discretion — mentioned in the rule — has reference exclusively to a
situation where a judge disqualifies himself, not when he goes forward with the case. 7
For, the permissive authority given a judge in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule
137, is only in the matter of disqualification, not otherwise. Better stated yet, when a
judge does not inhibit himself, and he is not legally disqualified by the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137, the rule remains as it has been — he has to continue with the
case.1awphîl.nèt

          So it is, that the state of the law, with respect to the situation before us, is
unaffected by the amendment (paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 137) introduced in the
1964 Rules. And it is this: A judge cannot be disqualified by a litigant or his lawyer for
grounds other than those specified in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137.

          This is not to say that all avenues of relief are closed to a party properly
aggrieved. If a litigant is denied a fair and impartial trial, induced by the judge's bias or
prejudice, we will not hesitate to order a new trial, if necessary, in the interest of justice.
Such was the view taken by this Court in Dais vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 897, 902-904. In that
case, we found that the filing of charges by a party against a judge generated
"resentment" or the judge's part that led to his "bias or prejudice, which is reflected in the
decision." We there discoursed on the "principle of impartiality, disinterestedness, and
fairness on the part of the judge" which "is as old as the history of courts." We followed
this with the pronouncement that, upon the circumstances obtaining, we did not feel
assured that the trial judge's finding were not influenced by bias or prejudice.
Accordingly, we set aside the judgment and directed a new trial.8

          Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and
alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a
speculative approach to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as
biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain
against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that
divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum.
No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to
assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case
before him.9 We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before
trial that a party "will not be given a fair, impartial and just hearing" is "premature." 10
Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation
under his oath to administer justice "without respect to person and do equal right to the
poor and the rich."11 To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent
judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience.
          All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw
attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their capacity to try
and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by way of challenge from any
one of the parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But
when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party
or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable
of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should
exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might
nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the
scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated
because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not
altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should,
therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw
from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself
where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice
would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or
not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of
the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a
case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule
137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.

          In the end we are persuaded to say that since respondent judge is not legally
under obligation to disqualify himself, we may not, on certiorari or prohibition, prevent
him from sitting, trying and rendering judgment in the cases herein mentioned.12

          Upon the premises, the petition herein for certiorari and prohibition is denied. So
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles
and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Administrative Case 117, entitled "Constante P. Pimentel, as President of the Ilocos Sur Lawyers' Association,
complainant, vs. Angelino C. Salanga, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, Branch IV,
Candon, Ilocos Sur, respondent."

2
Formerly Section 1, Rule 126, 1940 Rules of Court. The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137, is a new
provision.

3
See also: Joaquin vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. 281, 287; Perfecto vs. Contreras 28 Phil. 538, 543.

4
This type of relationship was not yet a legal disqualification under the 1940 Rules; now, the 1964 rules
expressly prohibit judges from trying cases where he is related "to counsel within the fourth degree" of
consanguinity or affinity.

5
Emphasis supplied.

6
Benusa vs. Torres, 55 Phil. 737, 740; emphasis supplied.

7
We recently applied paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137, and confirmed the voluntary inhibition by a judge upon
his sound discretion in People vs. Gomez, L-22345, May 29, 1967.

8
See also: Government vs. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil. 374, 377.

9
See: Perfecto vs. Contreras, supra, at p. 543; U.S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil. 385, 403; Benusa vs. Torres, supra, at
p. 741; People vs. Moreno, supra, at p. 294; Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 101, 106.

10
Arteche vs. De la Rosa, 58 Phil. 589, 594.

11
Section 3, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.

12
See: Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126, 129.
ATTY. LAURO D. GACAYAN and NOEL SAROL, complainants, vs.Hon.
FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 3, Baguio City, respondent. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483
September 17, 1999 (OCA-IPI No. 98-578-RTJ)

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In this administrative complaint, respondent stands charged with Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Incompetence, Partiality and Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.

The factual and procedural antecedents as summed by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) are as follows:

Complainant Noel Sarol is the accused in Criminal Case No. 14549-

R, for Homicide, which was filed before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Baguio City, in an information dated September 26, 1996.

On October 14, 1996, complainant Sarol was allegedly arraigned and

thereafter, trial followed. The Honorable Joven Costales was then the
Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Baguio
City.

After the prosecution rested its case, the then Presiding Judge Hon.
Joven Costales, directed the accused to present his evidence on
March 2, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning. Complainant Sarol through
counsel instead of presenting his evidence filed a Motion for Leave to
File Demurrer to Evidence with the Demurrer to Evidence already
attached to said Motion.

On March 2, 1998, the Demurrer to Evidence was scheduled for

hearing. The Trial Prosecutor, however, asked for ten (10) days
within which to submit his Opposition thereto. Thus, Judge Costales
was constrained to set the hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence on
May 4, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning.

Meanwhile, the Honorable Fernando Vil Pamintuan took over as the

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Baguio City.
For the first time he presided in the hearing of the case. He then
inquired from the Trial Prosecutor about his announced Opposition to
the Demurrer to Evidence and the latter manifested off-the-record
that he is not submitting anymore said Opposition. Thereafter
respondent directed the trial prosecutor and complainant Atty.
Gacayan to see him in his chambers where he reportedly said the
following:

You see somebody died here and I can not just

dismiss this case as a result of insufficiency of
evidence. I want to talk to the mother of the
deceased.

or words to that effect.

Consequently, he issued an order which directed the mother and the

brother of the deceased who were not listed as witnesses in the
information to appear in the "HEARING ON THE DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE" scheduled for May 25, 1998 at 8:30 in the morning. No
other persons were required to appear on May 25, 1998.

On May 25, 1998, complainants herein were surprised to see inside

the courtroom the witnesses who were already presented by the
prosecution, namely, Restituto Abuan and Alejandro Castaneda. The
record of the case shows that a subpoena was issued to all
prosecution witnesses, including the policemen who already testified
to appear on said date without any motion from the prosecution or
from the accused requesting for their appearance considering that
the same was for the hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence only. It
was allegedly based purely on the initiative of the respondent judge.

The mother and brother of the deceased as well as the other

"witnesses" subpoenaed by respondent Judge on his own discretion,
were absent on said day thus, he set the hearing on the Demurrer to
Evidence on June 23, 1998 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning sharp.
Thereafter, complainant Atty. Gacayan made the observation that the
proceedings then taking place was unprocedural. He was warned
that he would be cited for contempt if he shall say that again.

Complainant Atty. Gacayan claims that at about 10:30 in the morning

of May 25, 1998 while he was about to leave the sala of RTC, Branch
4, Baguio City, which is next to RTC, Branch 3, he observed that the
prosecution witnesses (Alejandro Castaneda and Restituto Abuan)
who allegedly testified for the prosecution were seen talking to the
respondent Judge. Thus, he (Atty. Gacayan) went near the door of
the Session Hall of RTC Branch 3 and when seen by respondent
Judge, asked him to approach the bench. Thereafter respondent
Judge continued asking questions to said witnesses on whether they
saw complainant Sarol stabbed (sic) the victim, which they answered
"no".1âwphi1.nêt

Complainant contends that when said witnesses testified, they

categorically stated under oath that they did not witness the incident.
It was obvious that the Honorable Respondent Judge wanted the said
witnesses to admit that they saw the killing. Thereupon, he again
manifested his objections to the procedure being followed by the
Honorable Respondent judge considering that:

1] the prosecution had long rested its case;

2] the Court had long granted the accused's

Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence
and that the hearing being conducted is
supposed to be a hearing on the Demurrer to
Evidence, not [the] presentation of
prosecution's evidence; and

3] the hearing for that day insofar as the Sarol

case had been adjourned and terminated.

On June 17, 1998, respondent Judge ordered the arrest of one

Mirriam Dominguez whom he described as an "eyewitness" to the
incident. This was done without any motion from the Prosecution and
though there is no record whatsoever supporting said conclusion that
she is an eyewitness. Thereafter respondent Judge talked alone to
said witness in his chambers.

In view of the unusual interest exhibited by the respondent Judge in

favor of the prosecution and the highly unusual procedure he was
then conducting the hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence, they filed a
Motion to Suspend further Proceedings on the Demurrer to Evidence
until the Motion for Inhibition is resolved by the Honorable Court.

Considering that there is no resolution yet on his Motion for Inhibition

as well as the pending Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings,
complainant Atty. Gacayan did not appear in the hearing on the
Demurrer to Evidence.

The minutes of the hearing on June 23, 1998 shows that the
respondent Judge made the following orders:
 a. DENYING the Motion for Inhibition;

b. DENYING the Motion to Suspend Further

Proceedings;

c. ORDERING the prosecution to present the

witness who was ordered arrested by the
Honorable Court though:

1. There was no valid motion complying with

the requisites of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court,
filed by the prosecution praying that it be
allowed to present further evidence —
assuming such a procedure is allowed
considering that it had long rested its case
and there is a pending DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE;

2. There is no resolution yet on the demurrer

to evidence.

d. ORDERING the PAO lawyer who was then

present in court to act as counsel de officio
without giving said lawyer sufficient time to
study the case.

e. ORDERING the continuation of hearing of

said case to June 24, 1998 at 8:30 in the
morning and 2 o'clock in the afternoon.

In the morning of June 24, 1998 at 8:30, respondent Judge again

called the above case for hearing despite the fact that there was no
notice sent to complainant Atty. Gacayan. At 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of June 24, 1998, he appeared as counsel for the accused
and right then and there, he was ordered by the respondent Judge to
conduct the cross-examination of the witness he ordered arrested
despite:

a. his vigorous objections to the unprocedural

manner in which the hearing on the Demurrer
to Evidence is being conducted by the
respondent judge;

b. his objection that there was no motion duly

set for hearing for the re-opening of the
prosecution's evidence;

c. the fact that he has not heard the testimony

of the witness presented by the prosecution
who was ordered arrested by the respondent
Judge without any motion from the
prosecution;

d. the fact that there was no transcript of

records of the testimony of the witness
ordered arrested by the respondent Judge on
his own without any motion from the
prosecution.

Consequently, respondent Judge agreed to the resetting of the cross-

examination of the witnesses but ordered the resumption of the hearing of
said case on July 1, 1998 at 2:00 p.m. despite his (Atty. Gacayan's) vigorous
objection considering his obvious partiality. This is so because as early as
June 22, 1998, respondent informed the lawyers that the calendar of the
court is already full, yet he scheduled for June 24, 1998 at both 8:30 a.m. and
2:00 p.m. the Sarol case when the testimony of the witness he ordered
arrested was not completed on June 23, 1998. Complainants contend that
the act of respondent Judge is highly unusual to say the least and a blatant
violation of the unwritten rule on how a judge shall conduct himself.

Complainants stressed that considering the patent disregard by the

respondent Judge of the basic rules governing the trial of the criminal case,
they were left with no other recourse but to bring the matter to the attention of
this Honorable Court in order for it to exercise its function as well as its
disciplinary powers over men in robes who are causing litigants to lose trust
in our judicial system.

On August 7, 1996, Hon. Court Administrator Benipayo directed respondent

Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan to comment on the complaint of Atty. Lauro
Gacayan and Mr. Noel Sarol.

Respondent Judge in his comment alleged in sum that:

1. He was a newly-appointed Judge of barely

a few months when introduced to Criminal
Case No. 14549-R, it was still on a hearing
stage on accused's Demurrer to Evidence;

2. On May 4, 1998, as the new Judge inquired

into the nature of the case and called for the
Public Prosecutor Benedicto T. Carantes and
counsel for the accused, Atty. Lauro D.
Gacayan, in his Chamber and informed them
that he would need time to examine the
testimony of the witnesses and other evidence
already on record. Thus, the hearing of the
Demurrer to Evidence was reset on May 25,
1998, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning with the
agreement of both Public Prosecutor and
counsel for the accused. However, he takes
exception to counsel for the accused's
allegation that he would not dismiss the case
for insufficiency of evidence. He simply said
that he had to study the record of this case
and see the witnesses and the private
complainant/relatives of the victim in Court so
that he could be properly oriented as to the
evidence in this case;

3. On May 25, 1998, only two (2)

prosecution's witnesses appeared, Restituto
Abuan and Alejandro Castaneda, whose
presence were (sic) known to counsel for the
accused, Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan. These
witnesses affirmed that they did not see the
killing of the victim. This was in the presence
of counsel for the accused, Atty. Lauro D.
Gacayan. Then, he issued an order requiring
the witnesses who failed to appear to show
cause why they should not be cited in
contempt of court. The hearing on the
Demurrer to Evidence was reset to June 23,
1998, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Again,
said resetting was with the consent of the
Public Prosecutor and counsel for the
accused.

4. For failure of the prosecution's witnesses

Mirriam Dominguez and Joseph Sarol to
appear in Court, despite notice, and again
failure to show cause why they should not be
cited in contempt of court, the Court issued a
warrant for their arrest. Mirriam Dominguez
was arrested on June 16, 1998. Since the
next hearing on the Demurrer to Evidence
was still on June 23, 1998, Mirriam
Dominguez could have been detained at the
Baguio City Jail until the said next hearing.
That was the reason why she had to see him
for her possible release before June 23, 1998.
Had he not granted an audience to
prosecution witness Mirriam Dominguez, she
could have been detained at the Baguio City
Jail from June 17, 1998 to June 23, 1998.
With the commitment that she would appear
on the June 23, 1998 hearing, and further
commitment to bring along [the] prosecution's
eyewitness Neil Joseph Sarol, she was
released. This occasion was transparent and
properly recorded in the minutes of the
proceedings of June 17, 1998;

5. On June 23, 1998, [the] prosecution's

eyewitness Joseph Sarol appeared in Court
and upon motion of the Public Prosecutor that
the prosecutor is resting its case (sic) be set
aside given the appearance of an eyewitness
to the crime who could not be found before,
the Court granted the same in the interest of
justice. His act in allowing the prosecution to
introduce an eyewitness in a crime despite the
fact that the prosecution had already rested its
case is supported by a legion of cases in
jurisprudence. 1

Also in the scheduled hearing, counsel for the

accused, Atty. Lauro D. Gacayan, failed to
appear, despite notice. Prompting him to
appoint a counsel de officio for the accused in
the person of Atty. Reynaldo Banta [the]
detailed PAO lawyer in court. Testimony of the
eyewitness Neil Joseph Sarol on direct and
initial cross-examination was completed.

6. On June 24, 1998 for the continuance of

the cross-examination of eyewitness Neil
Joseph Sarol, said eyewitness manifested that
he had a class examination at 11:00 o'clock in
the morning and understanding the plight of
said eyewitness, he reset the hearing for the
afternoon of June 24, 1998;

On June 24, 1998, in the afternoon, the

hearing was cancelled on the ground that
counsel for the accused, Atty. Lauro D.
Gacayan, had to study the transcript of
stenographic notes of the direct testimony of
eyewitness Neil Joseph Sarol and moved for
resetting of this case which the Court granted.
This case was reset to July 1, 1998, at 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon.

On July 1, 1998, at 2:00 in the afternoon,

counsel for the accused, Atty. Lauro D.
Gacayan, manifested that he did not have a
copy of the transcript of stenographic notes of
the testimony of eyewitness Neil Joseph Sarol
and he had to study the same, and moved for
the resetting of the hearing which the Court
granted, so that the cross-examination was
reset to September 9, 1998 at 8:30 o'clock in
the morning SHARP.

7. On the matter of his inhibition, the same

has been denied and extensively discussed in
the Order dated June 23, 1998.

The pertinent portion reads as follows:

Also before this Court is the accused's motion

for inhibition of this Court from hearing this
case the same is denied for lack of factual and
legal basis. Furthermore, the counsel for the
accused, Atty. Lauro Gacayan who filed this
motion for inhibition failed to appear in today's
hearing despite notice and therefore failed to
substantiate this motion in open court. It must
be stressed that this Court is not only a Court
of Law but also a Court of Justice. This
Presiding judge does not personally know
neither accused Noel Sarol [n]or the other
people involved in this case. The Presiding
Judge does not come from Baguio City and,
therefore, does not have any special interest
as to any person from Baguio City.

The Presiding Judge is only interested that

justice shall be realized in the hearing of every
case. It does not personally matter to this
Presiding Judge if the accused will be
convicted or acquitted on the basis of the
evidence and law. If the accused is to be
acquitted, so be it. If there is no evidence
against him to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, therefore, he should be
acquitted. But the Court cannot close its eyes
to the fact that there is still an eyewitness in
this Homicide case, by the name of Neil
Joseph Sarol whose written affidavit is even
on record (p. 4, Record), and can possibly
shed light to the killing of the victim Cesar
Dominguez in this case. The Judge of this
Court does not sit in this chair as a mute
witness of what is going on in a case. It is the
duty of this Judge to see to it that justice is
dispensed with. Whether or not [the] accused
Noel Sarol is convicted is none of the personal
concern of this Judge. Conversely, whether or
not the accused will be acquitted is none of
the personal concern of this Judge. Let the
accused be convicted or acquitted as the
evidence and the law warrant.

There lies a dead victim in my Court, so to

speak — a victim of the crime of Homicide. It
is the sacred duty of this Court to judicially
determine the truth regarding the death of this
victim. If the accused did not kill the victim, so
be it. If according to the evidence and law, the
 killing of this victim is justified, so be it. If the
killing of this victim falls under an exempting
circumstance favorable to the accused, so be
it. This court will have no choice but to acquit
the accused in this case under those
circumstances. But for as long as there is a
vital eyewitness whose written affidavit is on
record and who can tell the Court and the
public as to what really happened in this
capital homicide case, this Court which should
be true to its duty, as a dispenser of justice
shall not rest finding out the truth. Much more,
this Court cannot be a party to the
suppression of an eyewitness to a homicide
case.

As the new Presiding Judge of this Court, of

only a few months, I cannot help but
remember my declared sworn solemn
Covenant with God and the people gathered
in my oath-taking as a new judge in the
conference room of the Court of Appeals,
Manila last February 28, 1998. In my
Covenant, I vowed:

That I shall be an efficient,

impartial and honest judge;

That I shall never compromise

a case for money or any other
considerations; and

That justice shall prevail in my

Court whatever it takes.

I have not forgotten said Covenant.

Thus finding no factual nor legal basis on this

motion for the inhibition of this Presiding
Judge who does not know any one of the
parties in this case, and whose conscience is
clear on the matter, the same motion is
hereby denied . . .

8. Finally, he does not see any factual and

legal basis for the complainant's charge
against him. He has been simply doing his job
as a dispenser of justice in the best way he
could.

From the foregoing factual findings, the OCA recommends that respondent Judge be
severely reprimanded for his obvious partiality with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely reasoning that —

The sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and
impartially without regard to persons or their circumstances or the opinion of
one. A judge thus should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested,
impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing
before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from the suspicion as to its fairness and as to its integrity." Hence, judges
should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. While judges
should possess proficiency in the law or order that they can completely
construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and
behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have
confidence in their impartiality. 2

The issue before us is whether or not a Judge can motu proprio order the
case to be re-opened without being perceived as partial in favor of the
prosecution.

The re-opening of the case by a court on its own motion was largely a matter
in its discretion and for the orderly administration of justice, and there is no
merit in the first assignment of error. 3

There is no specific provision in the Rules of Court governing motion[s] to re-

open a case for the reception of evidence after a case has been submitted
for decision but before judgment. This is a judicial action which is controlled
only by the paramount interest of justice and rest[s] entirely on the sound
discretion of the trial court. This [is] supported by existing jurisprudence on
the matter, to wit:

. . . it is within the discretion of the court whether or not to

admit further evidence after the party offering the evidence
has rested, and the discretion will not be reviewed except
where it has clearly been abused. 4 More, it is within the
sound discretion of the court whether or not it will allow the
case to be reopened for the further introduction of the
evidence after a motion or request for a non-suit, or a
demurrer to the evidence; and the case may be reopened
after the court has announced its intention as to its ruling on
the request, motion or demurrer, or has granted it or has
denied the same, or after the motion has been granted, if the
order had not been written, or entered upon the minutes or
signed. 5

In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties
have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed
to offer rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the
court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of justice, may
permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its
ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no
abuse of discretion appears. 6 So, generally, additional
evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered or where it
has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake or where
the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously
offered. 7

In the light of the foregoing jurisprudence, it is thus necessary to determine

whether respondent judge acted within the bounds of his authority.

There is no doubt as borne by the previous resolutions of this Honorable

Court thru (sic) respondent Judge may in his own initiative order the
reopening of a case or upon motion of one of the parties for the orderly
administration of justice. It must not, however, be done whimsically,
capriciously and/or unreasonably.

The records show that the subject case was filed on September 27, 1996. It
took the prosecution no less than one (1) year and four (4) months to adduce
evidence against the accused, and when the defense filed a Demurrer to
Evidence due to an apparent failure of the prosecution to prove its case,
respondent all of a sudden reopened the case. He subpoenaed witnesses to
appear before him and directed them to testify on what they know about the
case. This he made because of the fact that there lies a dead victim and he is
to determine who is responsible thereof. Thus, in so doing his actuation was
viewed as partial by the complainants. He acted as though he was actively
prosecuting the case at the expense of the accused.
 Moreover, there was no "paramount interest of justice" to speak of in this
case which would have justified the actuations of respondent in reopening
the case. The prosecution was given all the opportunity to present its
evidence and to order anew the presentation of additional evidence is but a
superfluity, especially so that the same will not materially affect the position
of the prosecution.

Hence, the complainants have all the reasons to doubt the impartiality of
respondent Judge.

It is, thus well to remind the members of the Judiciary:

. . . to so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and

suspicion and be free from any appearance of impropriety in
their personal behavior not only in the discharge of their
official duties but also in their everyday life, for as we have
earlier stressed "no position exacts a greater demand on [the]
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the Judiciary so that (a) magistrate of the law must
comport himself at all times in such a manner that his
conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching
scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice. 8

We agree with the factual findings of the OCA. However, the penalty recommended, i.e.,
reprimand, is too light given the facts of the case.

Apropos the charge of partiality, the Court pointed out in Dawa v. De Asa 9 that the [p]eople's
confidence in the judicial system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge
and the diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of integrity
and moral uprightness they are expected to possess. 10 It is towards this sacrosanct goal of
ensuring the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct
mandates the following:

CANON 2 — A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE

APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.

RULE 2.01 — A judge should so behave at all times to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

CANON 3 — A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES

HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.

RULE 3.01 — A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence.

RULE 3.02 — In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain

the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public
opinion or fear of criticism.

The Canons of Judicial Ethics further provides that: "[A] judge's official conduct should be
free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also his everyday life should be beyond
reproach." Thus, the Court in taking the respondent to task in Sarah B. Vedana v. Judge
Eudarlo B. Valencia, 11 minced no words when it said:

. . . his being a public official, holding a position in the Judiciary and

specifically entrusted with the sacred duty of administering justice, breached
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics which mandate respectively, that "a judge should avoid
impropriety in all activities", and that "a judge's official conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon
the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in everyday life,
should be beyond reproach." These most exacting standards of decorum are
 demanded from magistrates if only, in the language of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to "promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary."

The spirit and philosophy underlying these Canons is best expressed in

Castillo v. Calanog 12 thus:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be
free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his
judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged
by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave
with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judge's
official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should

freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.1âwphi1.nêt

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify

honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both
in the performance of official duties and in private life should
be above suspicion. 13

Verily, no position is more demanding as regards moral righteousness and

uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench. Within the hierarchy
of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of
government, especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial
judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the
communities which the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an
exalted position in the administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price
for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, the judge must comport himself at all
times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the
most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice. 14 In insulating the Bench from the unwarranted criticism,
thus preserving our democratic way of life, it is essential that judges, like
Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion.

A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must appear to be impartial. 15

Fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance. 16 It was, thus, held that it is
improper for a judge to meet privately with the accused without the presence of the
complainant. 17 Talking privately alone to an alleged eyewitness to the incident in the
seclusion of his chambers, as what transpired in this case, likewise taints this image
much more so considering the circumstances surrounding the production of said
witness.

Verily, "[n]o position exacts a greater demand on [the] moral righteousness and uprightness
of an individual than a seat in the judiciary. A magistrate of the law must comport himself at
all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise can bear the most searching
scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as an epitome of integrity and justice." 18 Indeed,
more than simply projecting an image of probity, a judge must not only appear to be a "good
judge"; he must also appear to be a "good person". 19

As has been stated by this Court in Ruperto v. Banquerigo 20 "[T]he office of a judge exists
for one solemn end — to promote the ends of justice by administering it speedily and
impartially. The judge as the person presiding over that court, is the visible representation of
the law and justice. These are self-evident dogmas which do not even have to be
emphasized, but to which we are wont to advert when some members of the judiciary
commit legal missteps or stray from the axioms of judicial ethics . . ."

The rule on inhibition and disqualification of judges is laid down in Section 1, Rule 137 of the
Rules of Court, which states:
 Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall sit in
any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor, or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned
above.

While the second paragraph does not expressly enumerate the specific grounds for inhibition
and leaves it to the sound discretion of the judge, such should be based on just and valid
reasons. 21 The import of the rule on voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on
whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the trial judge based
on his rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought
before him. It points out to members of the bench that outside of pecuniary interest,
relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be
other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition for,
indeed, the factors that lead to preferences and predilections are many and varied. 22

Considering the high-handed manner in which the respondent resolved the motion seeking
his inhibition vis-a-vis his manifest partiality in favor of the prosecution in Criminal Case No.
14549-R, his attention is called to the pronouncement of the Court in Pimentel v. Salanga 23
reiterated in Gutang v. Court of Appeals. 24

All the foregoing notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to

draw attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation where their
capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously comes to the fore by
way of challenge from any one of the parties. A judge may not be legally
prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record
that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of circumstance[s] reasonably capable of inciting
such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He
should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of
justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability
that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the
judge unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on
the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of
misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, if not altogether remote.
He is a man subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore,
exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw
from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace
inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where
no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to the others involved therein.
On the result of his decision to sit or not to sit may depend on a great extent
the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after
reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where
his motives and fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be
interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls
miscarriage of justice.

A presiding judge, to be sure, must maintain and preserve the trust and faith of the parties-
litigants. He must hold himself above reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of
faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative
but to inhibit himself from the case. 25 He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge under
such circumstances is to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being misunderstood, his
reputation for probity and objectivity is preserved. What is more important, the ideal of
impartial administration of justice is lived up to. 26
Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, it needs be stressed that to be able to render
substantial justice and to maintain public confidence in the legal system, judges are
expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing jurisprudence, 27 consistent with the
standard that magistrates must be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence. 28

As aptly stated in Borromeo v. Mariano 29 "[O]ur conception of good judges has been, and is,
of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance
with law . . ." Thus, it has been held that when the judge's inefficiency springs from a failure
to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties,
a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is
too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave
abuse of judicial authority. 30

Indeed, everyone, especially a judge, is presumed to know the law. When, as in this case,
the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 31
Judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial
competence requires no less. 32 It is imperative that a judge be conversant with basic legal
principles and that he be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. 33 He should strive for
excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of
justice and the rule of law. 34

Needless to state, respondent was in this instance wanting in the desired level of mastery of
a fundamental rule on criminal procedure.

In Cortes v. Judge Catral, 35 this Court found respondent judge therein guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for granting bail to the accused without the requisite hearing. The
respondent judge was ordered to pay a fine of P20,000.00 with the warning that a repetition
of the same or similar acts in the future would be dealt with more severely. In Mamolo, Sr. v.
Narisma, 36 the Court held respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
penalized him with a fine of P20,000.00. The same penalty was imposed by this Court on
respondent judge in Buzon, Jr. v. Velasco, 37 who was found to have fallen short of the
standard set forth in Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, thereby eroding the
litigant's confidence in his competence and knowledge.

Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, We find the recommended penalty of reprimand not
commensurate with the misdeed committed. A fine of P10,000.00 and reprimand, with a
warning that a commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely is a
more appropriate penalty.

Furthermore, in view of the prevailing circumstances in this case, the Court deems it the
better course for respondent Judge to inhibit himself from further hearing Criminal Case No.
14549-R. In that way, he avoids being misunderstood, his reputation for probity and
objectivity is preserved. Most important of all, the ideal of impartial administration of justice is
lived up to. 38

WHEREFORE, for violations of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the
Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of an officer
of the Judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service, respondent Judge
FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Baguio
City, is hereby FINED the amount of P10,000.00. He is likewise REPRIMANDED and sternly
WARNED that a repetition of the foregoing or similar transgressions shall be dealt with more
severely. Finally, he is ORDERED to inhibit himself from further hearing Criminal Case No.
14549-R. The Executive Judge is ordered to re-raffle the case with dispatch to another
sala.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Citing U.S. v. Cinco, 8 Phil. 388 [1907]; People v. Concepcion, 84 Phil. 787 [1949]; Alegre v.
Reyes, 181 SCRA 80 [1990]; U.S. v. Visquera, 4 Phil. 380 [1905]; U.S. v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303 [1910];
Alvarez v. Guevarra Wee, 47 Phil. 12 [1924]; Gaas v. Fortich, 54 Phil. 196 [1929]; Siuliong & Co. v.
Ylagan, 43 Phil. 393 [1922]; U.S. v. Alviar, 36 Phil. 804 [1917]; Lopez v. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429 [1948];
People v. Castro-Bartolome, 204 SCRA 38 [1991].

2 Citing Tan v. Judge Gallardo, 73 SCRA 306 [1976].

3 Citing Gaas v. Fortich, supra.

4 64 CJ 160.

5 64 CJ 164.

6 Siuliong & Co. v. Ylagan, supra; US v. Alviar, supra.

7 I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d 545; 64 J 160-163, cited in Alegre v. Reyes, ibid.,
pp., 232-233; Agulto v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 80 [1990].

8 Association of Court Employees of Panabo, Davao v. Tupas, 175 SCRA 292 [1989], citing Dia-
Anonuevo v. Bercacio, 66 SCRA 81 [1975]; Quiz v. Castano, 107 SCRA 196 [1981]; Fonacier-
Abano v. Ancheta, 107 SCRA 538 [1981]; Cabrera v. Pajares, 142 SCRA 127 [1986].

9 AM No. MTJ-98-1144, 22 July 1998, 292 SCRA 703.

10 Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, 259 SCRA 354 [1996].

11 AM No. RTJ-96-1351, 3 September 1998.

12 199 SCRA 75 [1991].

13 See also Junio v. Rivera, Jr., 225 SCRA 688 [1993]; Imbing v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690 [1994].

14 Jugueta v. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]; Dia-Anonuevo v. Bercacio, supra.; Association of

Court Employees of Panabo, Davao v. Tupas, supra; Imbing v. Tiongson, supra; National
Intelligence and Security Authority v. Tablang, 199 SCRA 766 [1991].

15 Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.

16 Cortes v. Agcaoili, AM No. RTJ-98-1414, 20 August 1998, 294 SCRA 423.

17 Gallo v. Cordero, 245 SCRA 219 [1995].

18 Cortes v. Agcaoili, supra, citing Dia-Anonuevo v. Bercacio, supra.

19 See Address delivered by Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa at the Judicial Career Development
Program for Judges, Tagaytay City, 25-29 November 1991, Reflections on Law and Justice, 1994
ed., p. 84.

20 AM No. MTJ-98-1154, 6 August 1998, 293 SCRA 704.

21 Parayno v. Meneses, 231 SCRA 807 [1994].

22 Mateo v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18 [1973], as cited in Query of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada
of Malolos, Bulacan, 155 SCRA 72 [1987].

23 21 SCRA 160 [1967]

24 G.R. No. 124760, 8 July 1998, 292 SCRA 76.

25 Gutang v. Court of Appeals, supra. P. 84.

26 Ibid., citing Intestate Estate of the Late Vito Borromeo v. Fortunato Borromeo, 152 SCRA 171
[1987], citing Bautista v. Rebueno, 81 SCRA 535 [1981].

27 Carpio v. De Guzman, 262 SCRA 615 [1996].

28 Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; See also Buzon, Jr. v. Velasco, 253 SCRA
601 [1996]; Galan Realty Co., Inc. v. Arranz, 237 SCRA 770 [1994].
 29 41 Phil. 322 [1921].

30 Macalintal v. Teh, 280 SCRA 623 [1997].

31 Agcaoili v. Ramos, 229 SCRA 705 [1994], citing Santos v. Judge Isidro, 200 SCRA 597 [1991].

32 Cortes v. Judge Catral, 279 SCRA 1 [1997]; Cui v. Madayag, 245 SCRA 1 [1995].

33 Estoya v. Abraham-Singson, 237 SCRA 1 [1994], citing Aducayen v. Flores, 51 SCRA 73

[1973]; Ajeno v. Insierto, 71 SCRA 166 [1976]; Ubongen v. Mayo, 99 SCRA 30 [1980]; Libarios v.
Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]; Lim v. Domagas, 227 SCRA 258 [1993].

34 Conducto v. Monzon, AM No. MTJ-98-1147, 2 July 1998, 291 SCRA 619, citing Estoya v.
Abraham-Singson, supra, citing Cuaresma v. Aguilar, 226 SCRA 73 [1993].

35 279 SCRA 1 [1997].

36 252 SCRA 613 [1996].

37 253 SCRA 601 [1996].

38 Gutang v. Court of Appeals, supra, citing Intestate Estate of the late Vito Borromeo v. Borromeo,
supra, citing Bautista v. Rebueno, supra.

SERGIO F. DEL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL H. JAVELONA, JP of

Bago, LUIS G. TORRES, JP of Pulupandan, Negros Occidental,

JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Executive Judge, CFI Negros Occidental, and MA-

AO SUGAR CENTRAL, CO., INC., respondents. G.R. No. L-16742            
September 29, 1962

Sergio F. del Castillo for and his own behalf as petitioner.

Roberto A. Guianzon and Eriberto D. Ignacio for respondent.

PAREDES, J.:

          This is a petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.

          It appears that on October 7, 1959, Sergio F. del Castillo filed a complaint for
breach of contract and damages against the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc., (Civil Case
No. 330), before the Justice of the Peace Court of Bago, Negros Occidental, presided
over by Justice of the Peace Manuel H. Javelona. Before the defendant company could
answer, JP Javelona filed a petition with Hon. Jose Querubin, the Executive Judge of the
Occidental Negros CFI, requesting that he (Javelona) be authorized to inhibit himself
from hearing the case on the ground that counsel for defendant company, Atty. Emilio Y.
Hilado, is his first degree cousin. Judge Querubin designated respondent Luis G. Torres,
Pulupandan JP to hear Civil Case No. 330. In the interim, the defendant company had
filed its Answer and JP Torres had set the case for hearing. No hearings were held,
however, due to the absence of JP Torres and/or postponements asked by defendant.
On January 27. 1960, plaintiff therein (now petitioner), filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the order of Judge Querubin, alleging that relationship between judge
and counsel is not a legal basis for inhibition, citing Section 1 of Rule 126 of the Rules
and American cases. JP Javelona answered the motion for reconsideration stating: (1)
That he inhibited himself from presiding over the trial of Civil Case No. 330 in the Bago
Court on the ground that he is a first degree cousin of defendant's counsel; (2) that he
candidly believes that such relationship might cast some suspicion in his integrity as a
JP if and when his first cousin wins, and/bring unpleasant consequences if he loses; and
(3) that a JP of Sagay, Negros Occidental, was dismissed from the service on the same
ground of relationship, with the party or with the adverse attorney.

          On February 12, 1960, Judge Jose F. Fernandez, then the Executive Judge, same
CFI, handed down the following Order: —

          Although it is true as stated in the motion for reconsideration that the

reason advanced by Judge Javelona is not one of those specified in Sec. 1, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court nevertheless, it appears that the matter in question is
one "inhibition", and "disqualification". And it appearing that the reason advanced
by Judge Javelona is a valid cause for inhibition, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby denied.

          Questioning the jurisdiction of respondent Torres to try the case, alleging that the
order designating him to preside over the case is contrary to law, petitioner del Castillo
brought the matter to us and prays:

1) That after due hearing, this Court render judgment declaring that Rule 126 of
the Rules provides for the only valid grounds which a judge may avail to
disqualify himself; that apart from said rule, there is no other law providing for
ground of inhibition as distinguished from disqualification and the relationship to
counsel is not a valid and legal ground for disqualification or inhibition;

2) That accordingly, respondent Manuel H. Javelona cannot, lawfully disqualified

himself from hearing Civil Case 330 and the Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance can, neither lawfully disqualify respondent Javelona from presiding over
said case and designate respondent;

3) That the orders issued by respondent Executive Judge designating and the
one sustaining the designation of respondent Torres to preside over said Civil
Case No. 330 be declared null and void;

4) That this Court declare, all the actuations of respondent Torres in said civil
case are null and void; and

5) That respondent Javelona be compelled to hear said Civil Case No. 330.

          The petition does not allege lack of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent
Executive Judge to grant the petition to inhibit. No excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse
of discretion is attributed to said respondent Executive Judge. Even on this score alone,
certiorari does not lie because the respondent Judge in granting JP Javelona's petition to
inhibit might have only made an erroneous conclusion of law or of facts, which can not
be corrected by certiorari (Government v. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo, 34 Phil. 157).
The apprehension of petitioner that the designated JP may not be legally clothed with
jurisdiction, and Civil Case No. 330 would again be retried before respondent Javelona,
thereby entailing waste of time, effort and money, is also without valid basis so as to
entitle him to the relief prayed for.

          Leaving aside, however, the procedural aspect of the controversy, let us take up
the question of the legality of the inhibition by JP Javelona and the order authorizing the
same issued by respondent Judge. Admittedly, the law governing disqualification or
inhibition of judges is Rule 126, which provides:

          SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judge or judicial officer shall

sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the
sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, computed according to the rules of civil
law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or
counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or
 decision is the subject of the review, without the written consent of all parties in
interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

          The question posed, therefore, is whether or not, in the absence of any challenge
directed against him by either party to a case, a judge, may voluntarily request that he
be allowed to inhibit himself from hearing and deciding a case, where the lawyer for one
of the parties is his "first degree cousin" or on grounds of similar nature. Obviously, Rule
126 enumerates the grounds for disqualification of a judge upon being challenged and
under which she should disqualify himself. The rule, however has never been interpreted
to prohibit a judge from voluntarily inhibiting himself, in the absence of any challenged by
either party, due to his close blood relationship with counsel for one of said parties.
Considering the spirit of the Rule, it would seem that cases of voluntary inhibition, based
on good, sound and/or ethical grounds, is matter of discretion on the part of the judge
and the official who is empowered to act upon the request such inhibition.

          In the case of Gutierrez v. Hon. A. Santos, et al. G.R. No. L-15824, May 30, 1961,
the judge had inhibited himself on the ground that the opinion expressed by him in a
letter addressed by him as counsel for Manuel Borja and others, to the then Secretary of
the Interior "might, some way or another, influence his decision in the case at bar" and
expressed his fear of not being able to render a truly impartial judgment. This Court,
interpreting the Rule said:

          Petitioner invoking the provisions of Section 1, Rule 126 of the Rules of

Court, argues that the case of respondent Judge does not fall under any one of
the grounds for the disqualification of judicial officers stated therein. Assuming
arguendo that a literal interpretation of the legal provision relied upon justifies
petitioner's contention to a certain degree, it should not be forgotten that, in
construing and applying said legal provision, we cannot disregard its true
intention nor the real ground for the disqualification of a judge or judicial officer,
which is the impossibility of rendering an impartial judgment upon the matter
before him. It has been said in fact, that the due process of law requires a
hearing before an impartial and the interested tribunal, and that every litigant is
entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge (30 Am. Jur
p. 767). Moreover, second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is the
duty of doing it in a manner that not arouse any suspicion as to its fairness and
the integrity the Judge. Consequently, we take it to be the true intention the law
— stated in general terms — that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is
not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent (30 Am. Jur., Supra)
because —

          . . . However upright the judge, and however free from the slightest
inclination but to do justice, there is peril of unconscious bias or prejudice, or lest
any former opinion formed ex parte may still linger to affect unconsciously his
present judgment, or lest he may be moved or swayed unconsciously by his
knowledge of the facts which may not be revealed or stated at the trial, or can not
under the rules of evidence. No effort of the will can shut out memory; there is no
art of forgetting. We cannot be certain that, the human mind will deliberate and
determine unaffected by that which it knows, but which it should forget in that
process . . . (Ann. Cas. 1917 A, p. 1235).

          Little need be commented on the salutary ruling, just quoted, except to add that if
in the instant case, counsel for respondent company, will win the case, the petitioner
could not be prevented from applying the saying that "Blood is thicker than water", and
from thinking and suspecting that respondent Javelona was biased and prejudiced. The
courts should administer justice free from suspicion of bias and prejudice; otherwise,
parties litigants might lose confidence in the judiciary and destroy its nobleness and
decorum.

          In the cases cited by the petitioner, the qualification of the trial judge was
challenged by one of the parties thereto and not one has ruled upon the question of
voluntary inhibition, like the case at bar. We do not wish to dwell on semantics, by
establishing a distinction between inhibition and disqualification. They may mean the
same thing and bring the same result, in the final analysis. For while the judge who is
disqualified under said Rule 126 may and should inhibit himself; he who remains
qualified may be inhibited or may inhibit himself on some other grounds. In other words,
while Rule 126 provides for disqualification, it does not include nor preclude cases and
circumstances for voluntary inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers
concerned.

          We should also be mindful of the supervisory duties of the Court of First Instance
over the justice of the peace courts, which includes the power to reprimand the justice of
the peace or recommend his removal and disqualification from holding office or suspend
him from Office pending action by the President (See. 97, Judiciary Act of 1948). And
the Court of First Instance, in proper cases "shall advise and instruct them whenever
requested, or when occasion arises, and such justices shall apply to him and not to the
Secretary of Justice for advise and instructions . . ." (section 96, ditto), which simply go
to show that the respondent JP Javelona and Torres and the respondent Executive
Judge, have all acted wit the discretional powers and duties vested upon them law, in
the exercise of which, they have not abused, gravely or otherwise.1awphîl.nèt

          The respondents have taken a bold step towards strengthening of the judicial and
ethical precepts discussed in this opinion, and this court can not but spouse their cause
and declare that mandamus does not likewise lie, because the petitioner has not
established a clear right to compel respondents to act in accordance with his petition.

          Having reached this conclusion, we find it superfluous to rule on the admissibility

or not of the petitioner's deposition.

          WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merits, with costs
against herein petitioner, Sergio F. del Castillo.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Dizon and Makalintal JJ., concur.
Regala, J., took no part.