TENANCIES

It would be recalled that at the commencement of the topic, ‘Interests in Land’, mention was
made of lesser interests, including tenancies and rights granted under contractual and
sharecropping arrangements. This is one of the interests which had been recognized and outlined
in Section 19 of the Land Title registration law, 1986 (PNDCL 152).
There are therefore two types of tenancies which shall be examined. These are;
a. Landlord and Tenant Relationships
b. Customary Tenancies (Agricultural tenancies)

LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP

The relationship of landlord and tenant arises when the owner of an estate in land, expressly or
impliedly grants to another person an interest in the same land which is less than a freehold
interest and which is less than the interest held in the land by the grantor, for a fixed period of
time. This relationship therefore arises usually out of an agreement (contract) between both the
landlord and the tenant. Tenancies are sometimes used interchangeably with ‘leases’ because of
the similarities between them. In reality however, tenancies are of shorter durations than leases
with limited interests in the land, unlike leases.
Types of Landlord & Tenant Relationships
Broadly, the following are the types of landlord and tenant relationships;
1. Periodic Tenancies
2. A Tenancy at Will
3. Tenancy at sufferance
4. Statutory Tenancy

1. PERIODIC TENANCIES
They are also known as ‘tenancy from period to period.’ They continuously renew themselves
until the landlord and tenancy relation has been brought to an end. Periodic tenancies can be
brought to an end by the giving of reasonable notice to the other side. Any purported attempt to
bring a periodic tenancy to an end without notice is void. In Ghana, the Rent Act, 1963 (ACT
220), governs the termination of tenancies.

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These types of tenancies may or may not be in writing. Generally, under Section 3 of the
Conveyancing Act, 1973(NRCD 175), an interest in land which is transferred to another, not
beyond 3 years needs not be in writing, even if the agreement is subject to a renewal.
The type of periodic tenancy is largely ascertained by reference to the mode of fixing the rent. It
is not how the tenant pays up the rent. In other words, if rent is fixed at GHC20 per month, but
the tenant pays upfront for a year, the tenancy is a monthly tenancy, and not a yearly tenancy.
The following are the main types of periodic tenancies;
a. Yearly Tenancy: Here the rent is calculated on a yearly basis. Even if the tenant chooses to
pay it on a monthly or quarterly basis, it does not change the fact that it remains a yearly tenancy.
It is brought to an end through a valid notice to the other party. The length of notice can be
agreed upon by the parties themselves. Where it is not expressly agreed upon, it has been held
that at least half yearly notice would suffice.
b. Quarterly Tenancy: This arises when the rent for the tenancy is calculated on a 3-month
basis. This tenancy also goes on indefinitely until it has been properly brought to an end through
the giving of a valid notice. In respect of quarterly tenancies, they may be terminated after the
giving of a 3-month notice, at the beginning of the tenancy.
c. Monthly Tenancy: This is a type of periodic tenancy in which the rent is fixed on a monthly
basis. This seems to be the most common form of tenancy in Ghana. Although tenants are
sometimes compelled to pay upfront for a period of years, like 2, 3 or more as rent to the
landlord, it remains a monthly tenancy. It can be brought to an end by a month’s notice, or by a
mutually agreed period for such notice.

2. TENANCY AT WILL
This comes about when a person takes up possession of land or house, without a fixed duration
and with the consent of the landowner, on the understanding that the tenancy could be brought to
an end by any of the parties. Unless otherwise agreed between the parties that no rent is to be
paid for the period of the tenancy, the owner is entitled to some form of compensation for the use
and occupation of the land. The payment of rent is therefore not a necessary condition for the
creation of this type of tenancy.
A tenancy at will may arise in any of these ways;
i. where a tenant’s lease has expired, but he continues to be on the land with the permission of
the landlord, without regularizing it into a periodic tenancy.
ii. where the landlord allows a person to occupy a house, without paying rent.
iii. where a purchaser has been let into possession pending completion of a purchase agreement.
iv. where a tenant takes possession under a void lease.
A tenancy at will comes to an end when;

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i. it becomes converted into a periodic tenancy, either expressly agreed upon by the parties or
impliedly when the tenant pays rent, which is accepted by the landlord at regular intervals.
ii. the tenant does an act which is inconsistent with his status as a tenant at will. This
automatically terminates the tenancy.

3. TENANCY AT SUFFERANCE
This arises when a tenant who has been let into possession lawfully, wrongfully remains in
possession after the tenancy has come to an end. Unlike a trespasser who unlawfully enters a
property, a tenant at sufferance entered the property lawfully. It just happens that with the
tenancy having come to an end, his continue occupation of the property has become unlawful.
He may originally lawfully have been in occupation either as a periodic tenant or a tenant at will.
A tenancy at sufferance does not involve the payment of rent by the tenant. The tenant is
however required to compensate the landlord for the wrongful use of the property.

4. STATUTORY TENANT
This type of tenancy is similar to tenancy at sufferance. There is however a thin line of
difference. A statutory tenancy arises when a tenant’s tenancy has come to an end, but he is
protected by statute (law) to continue to be in possession, and pay rent. The tenant at sufferance’s
continued possession of the land is unlawful, but that of the statutory tenant is not unlawful,
because of the intervention of statute to protect him. The protection of a statutory tenant is not
based on an agreement with the landlord but based on protection bestowed upon him by statute.
In the case of Union trading Co Ltd v Karam [1975] 1 GLR 212, the court reiterated the
principle that any tenant who after the expiration of his tenancy agreement continues stay in the
premises originally let out to him becomes a statutory tenant.
Statutory tenant is a person without an estate or interest in the land but enjoying only a personal
right of occupation or status of protection under the rent Act. Consequently, before a statutory
tenancy can come into existence, the prior contractual tenancy should first have been terminated.
— Boateng v Dwinfour [1979] GLR 360
The Statutory tenant’s continued occupation of the premises, would ironically still be governed
by the terms of the expired tenancy agreement.
Under Section 29 of the Rent Act (Act 220), the statutory tenant has the following obligations;
a. To hold the premises as a monthly tenant, ie payment of rent on a monthly basis.
b. To bring the statutory tenancy to an end by giving a lawful notice of one month to the
landlord.
c. In the event of failure to pay rent, the landlord can exercise all powers that can be exercised
against a monthly tenant for the payment of arrears of rent.
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The tenancy of a statutory tenant can be brought to an end under the following circumstances;
a. When any of the conditions in Section 17 (1) (a) - (j) of Act 220 have been properly invoked.
b. where he denies the title of his landlord he can be ejected by the landlord.
Memuna Amoudy v Kofi Antwi [2006] 3 MLR 183
GBO v Antie [2008] 116 MLR 5
c. voluntary vacation by the statutory tenant.
d. where he sublets premises without the consent of the landlord (Section 22 of Act 220)
e regularization of the tenancy into a periodic tenancy

LANDLORD & TENANT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE RENT ACT, 1963 (ACT 220)
Scope of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220)
The Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) regulates the relationship of landlord and tenant where the tenant
is expected to pay rent. This means that periodic and statutory tenancies would be covered by the
Act, while excluding tenancy at will and tenancy at sufferance.
In the case of Safo and Another v Badu [1977] 2 GLR 63 @67 the court stated;
“The Rent Act, 1963. (Act 220), sought to regulate the relationship of landlord
and tenant only where the consideration of rent is a feature of the lease or
tenancy, but left untouched tenancies existing under the common law where
landlords did not exact rent as consideration for the letting of premises. Thus,
the rights of the landlord and tenant at common law, in cases where the
consideration of rent is not a feature of the letting of premises, are unaffected
by Act 220.”
The Rent Act is not applicable to bare land. (See: Section 1(2)(b) of Act 220)
The Rent Act is also not applicable to customary tenancies, like Abunu and Abusa.
The Rent Act is however applicable in respect of all premises, unless they have been expressly
excluded in Section 1(2) (a) – (h) of Act 220. These include the following;
a. Premises given to a public officer as duty post (because of his official duties), and which is
owned by the government.
b. a lease under a law in connection with a concession
c. any government property though let out on rent is not giving any financial returns to that
effect. This would be supported with a certificate from the Minister for the sector.
d. A market stall owned by the District, Municipal and Metropolitan Assembly

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e. A lease for a land with premises on it at the time of the execution of the lease, but the premises
being destroyed and new premises being put up within 5 years of the grant of the lease.
Under section 36 of Act 220, "premises" means;

“any building, structure, stall or other erection or part thereof, movable or

otherwise, which is the subject of a separate letting, other than a dwelling house
or part thereof bona fide let at a rent which includes a payment for board or
attendance, and includes land outbuildings and appurtenances let together with
such premises at a single rent when adjoining the premises let therewith.”
The Rent Regulations, (L.I 369) also compliments the Rent Act (Act 220) in its’ work.

PAYMENT OF RENT
Rent which is paid in advance, in respect of a monthly or a shorter tenancy is not to exceed one
(1) month. In the case of a tenancy which is more than six (6) months, the Act requires that it
should not exceed 6 months.
If this provision is violated, it constitutes a criminal offence under Section 25(5) of Act 220. It
reads that;
“A person who as a condition of the grant, renewal or continuance of a tenancy
demands in the case of a monthly or shorter tenancy, the payment in advance of
more than a month’s rent or in the case of a tenancy exceeding six months, the
payment in advance of more than six months’ rent, commits an offence and is
liable on conviction by the Rent Magistrate to a fine not exceeding two hundred
and fifty penalty units.”
The payment of a yearly rent in advance would therefore also be unlawful, by virtue of section
25(5) of Act 220.

THE RENT OFFICER (Section 5)

Section 5 (1) (a-i) of Act 220 sets out the functions of a Rent Officer. He plays a crucial role in
the implementation of the Act. He works with the Rent Magistrate in giving teeth to the Act.
Section 5 (1) of Act 229 reads;
“(1) Subject to this Act, a rent officer
(a) may assess the recoverable rent of any premises, whether or not the premises
are occupied, on an application made by a landlord, a tenant or any person
interested in the premises, after an enquiry conducted by the rent officer;

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 (b) shall investigate, in the manner that the rent officer thinks fit, complaints by
a landlord against a tenant in respect of arrears of rent and complaints by a
landlord, tenant or any other person interested in the premises against any
other person in respect of any other matter in this Act, and shall make a
determination on that complaint or matter;
(c) shall investigate and determine in the manner that the rent officer thinks fit,
a matter relating to this Act referred to the rent officer by the Minister or a Rent
Magistrate;
(d) shall prepare rent registers and any other prescribed documents and specify
in the registers or documents the prescribed particulars;
(e) shall maintain a register of vacant premises for prospective clients and on
application made by a client, shall furnish information concerning those
premises;
(f) may examine a landlord, tenant or any other person for the purpose of
ascertaining whether this Act or of a statutory instrument made under this Act
is being observed;
(g) may take measures against tenants who have absconded from the premises
and may, for that purpose, force open the doors of, and search, any premises
under the authority of an order made by a Rent Magistrate;

(h) may make complaints to a Rent Magistrate that an offence under this Act
has been committed for the purpose of investigation and determination by the
rent officer, and may subject to article 88 of the Constitution, conduct the
prosecution of the offender before the Magistrate, but a public prosecutor
appointed generally may intervene and assume the conduct of the prosecution;
and
(i) shall perform any other functions for the purpose of carrying into effect the
principles of this Act as directed by the Minister.”
In the case of Hamid v Okata [1989-90] 2 GLR 420, the Court held that the Rent Officer’s
investigations can be extended into ejectments from premises by the landlord.
The rent officer, however has no power whatsoever under the Act to make an order of ejectment
but he is empowered to make the necessary investigation relating to an ejectment complaint and
refer the facts obtained including, of course, any available documents to the rent magistrate or
the judge for him to decide whether an ejectment order is justified or not.
See: SACKEY AND OTHERS v. KUMAH [1978] GLR 361-368
In the performance of his work, section 5(2) of Act 220 empowers the Rent officer to take
several administrative and quasi-judicial measures to that effect. It includes powers to subpoena

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witnesses, order the production of documents, inspection of premises, invitation of experts or
assessors to assist in the determination of issues before him, and requesting for information from
landlords.

RENT MAGISTRATE (Section 6)

The Rent Magistrate refers to the District Magistrate of the area in which the premises is
situated. The District Magistrate therefore sits as the Rent Magistrate. He is required to observe
the same procedure as a magistrate. He must therefore act fairly and observe the rules of natural
justice. Where the Rent officer failed to properly use the law, or the recommendations to the
Rent magistrate have no basis, the magistrate is expected to do whatever the law allows by either
varying the order or by setting it aside and taking evidence de no vo.
Section 6 lists his functions as;
“A Rent Magistrate
(a) may by order, on an appeal by a landlord, tenant or any other person
interested in the premises, who is dissatisfied with the amount of the
recoverable rent of the premises as assessed by the rent officer, vary the
amount;
(b) may by order, on an appeal by a landlord, tenant or any other person
interested in the premises from a determination of a rent officer under this Act
on any other matter, decide that matter;
(c) may by order, on a reference made by the Minister, assess the amount of the
recoverable rent of any premises; and
(d) may make an order for the ejectment of a tenant from premises situated
within the area of jurisdiction of the rent officer.”

OBLIGATIONS OF THE LANDLORD

1. Rent increase resulting from increase in rates (section 19): The landlord is enjoined not to
collect an increased rent based on the fact that there had been an increase in the property rates
unless he had given due notice in writing to the tenant.
2. Issuing of Rent cards (Section 20): Within seven (7) days of the commencement of the
tenancy, the landlord is required to issue to the tenant a rent card containing the following
information;

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(a) the name and address of the landlord of the premises,
(b) the name and address of the tenant of the premises,
(c) the amount of the recoverable rent of the premises, and
(d) and any other prescribed particulars.

3. Compensation for improvements (Section 21): A tenant who has made improvements to the
premises with the approval of the landlord is requested by the landlord to vacate the premises
before the expiry of the tenancy, the tenant shall be compensated by the landlord, the extent of
improvement so made.

4. Prohibition on serving notice to quit (Section 23): Where the Rent Officer or the Rent
Magistrate has assessed rent in respect of premises, and this has not been appealed against, the
landlord is not to serve any notice on the tenant to quit, unless the tenancy is expiring within the
two years.

5. Control of sub-letting (Section 22): No tenant can sublet the tenancy without the written
consent of the landlord. The landlord is therefore obliged to control subletting of tenancies in
respect of his premises.

RECOVERY OF POSSESSION / EJECTMENT OF A TENANT FROM PREMISES

The mere fact that a tenancy agreement has come to an end is not by itself a ground for the
recovery of possession of premises. And in fact, any ground which is not found in either Act 220
or not covered by the common law will not be a valid ground for the ejectment of a tenant from
premises or recovery of same.
Bassil v Sfarijilani (1967) CC 20
Sarkodie v Karam & Sons Ltd [1975] 1 GLR 411
It is however necessary to note that the tenancy should always be brought to an end before taking
steps to recover the premises from the tenant. Therefore, where the tenancy has not expired, the
landlord should terminate the tenancy by giving notice to the tenant.

Legal Bases for the ejectment of a tenant.

A tenant can therefore lawfully be ejected from the premises only under the following provisions
of the law;

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a. Section 17 of Act 220
b. Section 25 (2) of Act 220
c. Section 28 of Act 220, and
d. The common law

A. RECOVERY OF POSSESSION UNDER SECTION 17 OF ACT 220

Under Section 17 (1) of Act 220, the landlord can recover the premises from the tenant on the
following grounds;
1. Non-Payment of Rent
Where the rent which is due to be paid by the tenant has not been paid for at least one month of
the rent becoming due.
Section 17(1) (a) reads;
“where a rent lawfully due from the tenant has not been paid, or tendered
within one month after the date on which it became lawfully due”
The one month grace period is for the benefit of the tenant who may not be having any
money to instantly pay for the rent when it becomes due.
On a literal interpretation of the section, it would mean that the fact that a tenant has
substantially paid up his rent but left with only a small part of it outstanding can still be
ejected from the premises, for non-payment of rent.
What happens when a tenant who is being ejected through the court for non-
payment of rent suddenly pays up the outstanding rent arrears?
The rule is that if the tenant pays up the rent arrears before the commencement of legal
proceedings against him, then the court will not make an order for his ejectment. On the
other hand, if the landlord has already commenced legal proceedings against him, merely
paying the rent will not prevent the court from ordering his ejectment. The tenant may
however seek for relief under section 17(3) of the Rent Act.
In the case of Gyato v Pipim [1980] GLR 71, a landlord brought an action to eject the
defendant due to an arrears of rent of 11 months. Just before the hearing of the case, the
defendant rushed to pay up the full arrears. The court however ordered for his ejectment
on the ground that he was a chronic defaulter. The defendant appealed.
The appellate court in dismissing the appeal held that the mere fact that a tenant rushes to
pay up his arrears of rent, once the landlord has already begun action against him for
ejectment, does not mean that the action against him has become abated. The court can

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however exercise its discretion under Section 17(3) of Act 220 to grant the tenant relief
against the order or judgment for the recovery of possession.

2. Broken obligation
Where an obligation in the tenancy agreement (apart from the obligation to pay rent) has
been broken or not performed by the tenant, the landlord is entitled to recover possession.
Section 17(1) (b) reads;
“where an obligation of the tenancy, other than that specified in paragraph (a),
so far as that obligation is consistent with this Act, has been broken or not
performed.”
The obligation which has been broken by the tenant should however be a lawful
obligation, not prohibited by the Rent Act. An example would be the act of a tenant
subletting the premises or part thereof without the consent of the landlord. (section 21(1)
of Act 220).
This section is however subject to section 29 of the Conveyancing Act, 1973 (NRCD
175). The landlord is enjoined to notify the tenant in writing of the said breach,
requesting him to remedy same. It is only when the tenant fails to remedy same within a
reasonable time that he can be deemed to have breached section 17(1)(b) of Act 220.
Section 29 of NRCD 175 reads;
“1) A right of re-entry or forfeiture under any provision in a lease for a breach
of any covenant, condition or agreement in the lease shall not be enforceable,
by action or otherwise, until—
(a) the lessor serves on the lessee a notice:
(i) specifying the particular breach complained of;
(ii) if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the
breach; and
(iii) (expect where the breach consists of a non-payment of rent) requiring the
lessee to make reasonable compensation in money for the breach; and
(b) the lessee has knowledge of the fact that such notice has been served;
and the lessee fails, within a reasonable time thereafter, to remedy the breach, if
it is capable of remedy and, (except where the breach consists of a non-payment
of rent) to make reasonable compensation in money, to the satisfaction of the
lessor, for the breach.”

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3. Nuisance or Annoyance
Where the tenant or anyone living with the tenant has been engaged in nuisance or
annoyance to adjoining occupiers, the landlord can recover possession.
Section 17 (1) (c) reads;
“where the tenant or a person residing with the tenant has been guilty of
conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to adjoining occupiers.”
It is not that easy to determine what constitutes ‘nuisance’ or ‘annoyance’. Act 220 did
not define them. In its ordinary meaning, it can be said to be an unreasonable conduct of
a person which substantially interferes in another’s enjoyment of his land.
Justice Ofori Boateng in an article titled “NUISANCE, ANNOYANCE AND
ADJOINING OCCUPIERS [1971] VOL. III NO. 1 RGL 67—72”
The fact therefore that there is no precise definition for "nuisance" does not mean that
anything can properly be classified as "nuisance." …ordinary everyday speech, petty
discomforts and insults are termed "nuisance," but in legal parlance the expression
means something more precise than that. Although the expression has been used with
meanings varying in extent by both ancient and modern writers, and what may
constitute a nuisance in one set of circumstances may not be a nuisance in another set,
both ancient and modern cases show that questions of nuisance have always arisen out
of user of land.
"Annoyance" has been defined in Stroud, Judicial Dictionary,4 in the words of Bowen
L.J. in Tod-Heatley v. Benham, thus:
"Annoyance is a wider term than nuisance, and if you find a thing which reasonably
troubles the mind and pleasure, not of a fanciful person or of a skilled person who
knows the truth . . . if you find there is anything which disturbs his reasonable peace of
mind, that seems to me to be an annoyance although it may not amount to physical
detriment to comfort."
The Black’s Law dictionary also refers to a number of authorities which have attempted
to define the term nuisance thus:
“… A nuisance may generally be defined as anything that works or causes injury,
damage, hurt, inconvenience, annoyance, or discomfort to one in the enjoyment of his
legitimate and reasonable rights of person or property; or that which is unauthorized,
immoral, indecent, offensive to the senses, noxious, unwholesome, unreasonable,
tortious, or unwarranted, and which injures, endangers, or damages one in an
essential or material degree in, or which materially interferes with, his legitimate rights
to the enjoyment of life, health, comfort, or property, real or personal. A nuisance may
exist not only by reason of doing an act, but also by omitting to perform a duty.”
Joseph A. Joyce & Howard C. Joyce, Treatise on the Law Governing Nuisances 22
(1906). “A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the

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parlor instead of the barnyard.” Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
388, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118 (1926).

Generally, there are two types of ‘Nuisance’;

a. Public nuisance: This is an unreasonable interference with a right which generally
affects to the public. It may consist of activities which are deemed injurious to the public
health, public safety or the comfort of the public. These are usually forbidden by statute
and punishable as criminal offences, as pertains under Section 296 of the Criminal
Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29).
Section 296 (2) of Act 29 reads;
“A person commits a criminal offence and is liable to a fine not exceeding ten
penalty units who-
(2) in any town commits a nuisance in any public place or open space, or in
any place being an appurtenance of or adjoining a dwelling-house.”
b. Private nuisance: A private nuisance is a wrongful interference with the use or
enjoyment of land in the possession of another. The main test, is said to be how
reasonable or otherwise the conduct complained of would amount to nuisance. Emitting
smoke from burning wastes on the premises is an example.
In some circumstances, the same act may fall within both categories of ‘nuisance’.
What constitutes a nuisance may be a question of fact. The factors used in assessment of
whether an act constitutes a nuisance or an annoyance may include the situation of the
premises (locality), the customs and culture of the area, the particular class of tenants in
the premises as well as the adjoining premises.
In Mensah v Addison [1981] GLR 784, the tenant’s wife was found to be cooking on
the verandah instead of the kitchen, therefore making the house untidy. She was also fond
of drying cassava and frying gari on the premises. These were found to be acts of
nuisance upon which an order of ejectment was made against the tenant, under Section 17
(1) (c) of Act 220.
In an old English case of Leeman v Montagu [1936] 2 AER 1677, the crowing of
cockerels was held to be a nuisance. In Ghana, it is doubtful if this would amount to
nuisance, because of the accepted practice of rearing fowls at home. The crowing of
cocks in the villages at night or at dawn are even used by some to determine the time of
the day. There is an African proverb that;
“The cock may belong to one household, but when it crows, it is for the benefit
of the whole community.”

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Annoyance is said to have a wider meaning than nuisance. While nuisance may generally
involve some physical act, annoyance may not necessarily involve a physical act. Any act
which reasonably troubles the mind and pleasure of an ordinary person is said to be an
annoyance. Thus, a detestable conduct of a tenant may therefore fall under either a
‘nuisance’ or ‘an annoyance.’

There is also the use of the term, “has been guilty of….” Does it mean that the tenant
should actually have been found guilty in a court of law before the landlord could bring
an action against him for ejectment?

4. Immoral or Illegal Use

Where the tenant or anyone living with him has been convicted of using the premises for
immoral or illegal purposes, the landlord can recover possession.
Section 17 (1) (d) reads;
“where the tenant or a person residing with the tenant has been convicted of
using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for an immoral or illegal
purpose.”
The word ‘convicted’ which is derived from the word ‘conviction’ is defined by the
Black’s Law Dictionary to mean:
“The act or process of judicially finding someone guilty of a crime; the state of having
been proved guilty.”
The implication here is that there must be a conviction for an illegal or immoral purpose
on the part of the tenant before the landlord can eject him from the premises under this
section. According to Prof A.K.P Kludze in his book “Ghana Law of Landlord and
Tenant” @ page 886;
“To confer a jurisdiction under this subsection, there must have been a
conviction of a criminal offence committed on the demised premises by the
tenant or a person residing with him. Even an overwhelming evidence of illegal
or immoral user, if not provable by a criminal conviction, is not sufficient to
justify the ejection of the tenant under this sub-section; but it may bring the
matter within sub-section 17(1)(c) as a nuisance for which the lease may be
forfeited.”
An example of such immoral act that may result in justifying the ejectment of a tenant by
a landlord would be knowingly using or allowing the premises to be used as a brothel or a
prostitute under Section 277(b) of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). The section
reads;

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 “Whoever—
(b) being a tenant, lessee or occupier or person in charge of any premises,
knowingly permits the premises or any part thereof to be used as a brothel or
for the purposes of habitual prostitution; or
……shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.”

5. Waste or neglect of premises

Where the court takes a decision that the condition of the premises has deteriorated due to
waste or neglect by the tenant or anyone living with him, the landlord can recover
possession.
Section 17 (1) (e) reads;
“where the condition of the premises has in the opinion of the Rent Magistrate
or judge deteriorated owing to acts of waste by, or the neglect or default of, the
tenant or a person residing with the tenant.”
Waste refers to any conduct which leads to a substantial damage to land or a house, thus
reducing the value of the reversion interest, vested in the landlord. Any act of a tenant
which changes the nature of the house or the land is technically regarded as a waste,
whether or not it leads to an improvement or not. That brings in the distinction between
‘Ameliorating waste’ and ‘Depreciation Waste’.
Ameliorating waste arises where the conduct is unauthorized, resulting in an alteration
to the nature or character of the premises, which improves the value of the property. In
this instance, the act is of benefit to the property.
Depreciating waste arises when the acts of the tenant leads to damage to the property.
It is believed the section can be invoked against a tenant only when the conduct has
resulted in a deterioration of the conditions of the premises. Ameliorating waste may
therefore not be enough ground to eject a tenant.
Waste can also be termed as ‘Voluntary waste’ or ‘Permissive waste’.
Voluntary waste is where the tenant positively does anything to the house or land like
cutting down trees or removing ceiling, etc.
Permissive waste is when a tenant who is obliged to do an act fails to do so, resulting in
deterioration of the premises. For example, refusing or failing to weed the premises or to
take good care of electrical and plumbing installations by getting them replaced.
A tenant may be in breach of this section whether or not his conduct is permissive or
voluntary waste provided that it could amount to a depreciating waste.

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6. Tenant’s intention to quit
This arises where the tenant gives notice of his intention to quit the premises to the
landlord and as a result the landlord offers to sell or let the premises, or so alters his
position as a result of that notice. The tenant may however change his mind. Here if the
court comes to the conclusion that the landlord would be greatly at a disadvantage if the
tenant is allowed to stay, the tenant would be ejected.
Section 17(f) reads;
“where the tenant has given notice of the intention to quit in writing and in
consequence of the notice the landlord has contracted to sell or let the premises
or has taken any other steps as a result of which the tenant would, in the
opinion of the Rent Magistrate or judge, be seriously prejudiced if the tenant
could not obtain possession.”
The notice should be in writing as a verbal notice would not suffice under the section.
Such notice cannot also be inferred by conduct on the part of the tenant. The insistence
on a written notice has been subjected to a lot of criticisms. This is due to the fact that
there is a high literacy rate, the creation of tenancies in themselves are exempted from
writing provided it does not exceed three years (section 3(1)(f) of the Conveyancing Act
of 1963, NRCD 175)

7. Occupation of Landlord, his family member or employee

Where the landlord honestly requires the premises for his own occupation, a member of
his family or his employee, the landlord would be justified in recovering the premises
from the tenant. This is however subject to the court satisfying itself that there is no
alternative accommodation, and no greater hardship would not be occasioned to the
tenant, and whether it was the usual practice for the landlord’s employees to be given
accommodation.
Section 17 (1) (g) reads;
“where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for personal
occupation as a dwelling house by the landlord, a member of the family of the
landlord or a person in the whole-time employment of the landlord, the
premises being constructed to be used as a dwelling house, but
(i) the circumstance that the premises are reasonably required by the landlord
for personal occupation by someone in the employment of the landlord shall not
be a sufficient circumstance if the Magistrate or judge is not satisfied that the
landlord usually provides premises for occupation by an employee of the class
to which that employee belongs, and

15
 (ii) an order shall not be made if the Rent Magistrate or judge is satisfied
having regard to the circumstances of the case, including an alternative
accommodation available for the person for whose occupation the premises are
required or for the tenant, that greater hardship would be caused by granting
the order than by refusing it.”

Conditions precedent for the grant of an order of possession of and ejectment from
premises under section 17 (1) (g)
I. Notice to the Rent Officer:
The landlord is required to comply with Regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I
369) by furnishing a statutory declaration to the Rent Officer giving the reason for the
seeking the recovery of possession.
II. Constructed as a Dwelling House:
The premises being recovered by the landlord should have been originally constructed to
be used as a dwelling house. Rooms and the design used in the construction of a dwelling
house are generally different from those constructed for business purposes. It is mainly a
question of fact in determining whether a house was constructed for use as a dwelling
house or not. The location of the building may also count as for instance permits would
not be granted for the building of a residential building in an industrial area. The fact that
out of necessity people may be using a house constructed for business purposes as a
dwelling house may not be a valid excuse for recovering it for a dwelling house.
III. Requirement for a Dwelling House:
Apart from the fact that the house should have been constructed as a dwelling house, the
landlord needs to prove that the house is required for personal occupation as a dwelling
house. He cannot therefore recover the premises and then rent it out to another tenant.
Under section 17(7) of Act 220 therefore, where a landlord recovers possession under
section 17(1)(g) in favour of persons he had named, to use as a dwelling house, he is not
allowed to give the premises out to any other person within two years of recovering
possession from such tenant. The section reads;
“ A landlord in whose favour an order for recovery of the possession of, or the
ejectment from, premises on any of the grounds specified in paragraph (g), (h)
or (k) of subsection (1) has been made or given shall not, within two years from
the date of the order, let such premises or any part thereof without an order of
the appropriate Rent Magistrate, except, in the case of an order on grounds
specified in the said paragraph (g), to the person or persons for whom the

16
 premises were stated to be required in the proceedings in which such recovery
or ejectment was obtained.”
But nothing stops a landlord from subsequently putting the building to his own
commercial or business use, once the premises comes into his possession or that of a
member of the family, initially as a dwelling house. In A.K.P Kludze’s own words in the
“Ghana Law of Landlord and Tenant @ page 900;
“Such a user….is not in contravention of section 17(7) of the Rent Act because
the premises are not let out to another person. So long as the premises remain
in the possession of the person named in 17(4), of the Act as the person who is
to occupy the premises, the nature of the use to which they are subsequently put
does not seem to be subject to either control or restriction under the Rent Act.”

IV. Occupation by member of family:

Apart from recovering the premises for the landlord’s own use, he may also recover
possession of the premises if reasonably required for the personal occupation by a
member of his family. According to Section 36 of Act 220, "member of the family"
means the father or mother, a wife, husband, child, brother or sister, or such other person
as may be prescribed. In the absence of any other persons who have been so prescribed in
the Act, other relations are therefore excluded.
In the case of Yawson v Brako [1987-88] 2 GLR 370, the appellate court held that the
trial judge erred in concluding that since the plaintiff gave the one room vacated by the
defendant to her sister and her children to occupy, the plaintiff did not need the premises
for the occupation of herself and her family. By the provisions of section 17 (1) (g) of Act
220 a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction was entitled to make an order for
ejectment of a tenant where the premises were reasonably required by the landlord for
personal occupation as a dwelling-house by himself or a member of family. Section 36 of
Act 2.20 defined family to include a sister. Accordingly, the plaintiff's sister was a
member of the plaintiff's family and since she was in distress she was equally entitled to
protection.
It must be noted that if a child, brother or sister of the landlord needs the premises
for occupation, their ages are irrelevant under the law. The fact that the child is
actually an adult may not matter.
This issue came to the fore in the case of Saka v Lokumal [1991] 1 GLR 312. This was
an action was brought by the plaintiff-landlord to recover possession of dwelling-
premises he had let out to the defendant on the ground that it was required for occupation
by his married daughter together with her two children and husband, counsel for the
defendant contended, inter alia, that a “child” within the meaning of the Rent Act, 1963
(Act 220) did not include a married daughter.

17
The court held that since a landlord could recover possession under sections 17(1)(g) and
36 of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) for the benefit of his adult sister or brother, it would
be absurd that the landlord’s own natural son or daughter of whatever age or marital
status should be excluded. Hence, the definition of “child” urged by counsel for the
defendant could not be the intent of the legislature. The court would, consequently, use
the purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes which took into consideration the
mischief the framers intended to cure or the right intended to be conferred and would
define “child” to mean son or daughter irrespective of his or her age or marital status.
“I do not think a landlord can ever want a house for a “child” in the real sense
of the word as we know it for the simple reason that it is difficult to see how that
child is even going to live in that house. Children live with their parents, not on
their own or alone. Again, when a sister or brother falls within the class of
persons for whom a landlord could recover possession, is counsel saying it is
meant a “child sister” or “child brother?” My argument is this that if an adult
sister or adult brother of whatever age, married or unmarried, enjoys this right
how absurd would it be that a landlord’s own natural son or daughter of
whatever age or marital status must be excluded! This definition cannot be the
intent of the legislature. “Child” must be interpreted to mean son or daughter
irrespective of his/her age or marital status.”
On the other hand, in the case of Owusu v Asante [1973] 2 GLR 220, the landlord was denied
an order of recovery of possession of the premises in Kumasi when he wanted them for the
occupation of his nephew. This was because the definition of member of family does not include
a ‘nephew’.
Taken to its logical conclusion, it means that a step - father and a step - mother may be excluded
as coming within the ordinary definition of a ‘member of family’ unless a court decides to give
it a more purposive interpretation, or there has been a formal amendment to the Act to include
step fathers and step mothers.
See also: Nimako v Archibold [1966] GLR 612 where it was also held that a landlord had no
duty to provide a tenant with alternative accommodation before recovering possession.
V. Occupation by Employee;
A landlord can also recover the premises for the personal occupation of an employee in his
whole-time employment. The court would however have to satisfy itself that it is the usual
practice of the landlord to provide such accommodation. An excuse by the landlord that, that is
the first time he is providing accommodation to that class of employee may not satisfy the
requirement. This requirement has been inserted to prevent an abuse by Landlords who would be
tempted to use it as an excuse to eject tenants and then rent the room out to others.
VI. The Reasonably Required rule
Whether the premises are for the occupation of the landlord, member of family, or an employee,
the landlord can only recover possession if he demonstrates that the premises are ‘reasonably

18
required’. The act does not define what constitutes ‘reasonable’ and therefore it would largely be
a question of fact. The onus lies with the landlord in proving that the premises are reasonably
required. It has been held that the fact that the landlord only requires part of the premises and not
all of it for his own occupation does not mean that he does not reasonably require the premises.
Kelly v Goodwin [1947] 1 AER 810
Other considerations may be how close the premises are to the place of work, and whether or not
the landlord has an alternative and convenient accommodation.
VII. The test of greater hardship:
The court is required to do a balancing act, looking at all the circumstances of the case to find out
whether it is the landlord or the tenant who will suffer more hardship before making such an
order. If the tenant would suffer more hardship, then the order should not be made. If on the
other hand, it is the landlord who will suffer more hardship, then the order for the ejectment of
the tenant can go ahead.
Boateng v Dwinfour [1979] GLR 360
Who bears the burden of proving greater hardship?
In an action for recovery of possession under section 17(1) (g) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220),
the determination of the comparative hardships between a landlord and a tenant was a question
of fact for the trial judge and his finding could not be disturbed if there was evidence supporting
his conclusion.
Donkor v Dzokoto [1993 –1994] 1 GLR 193
In Acquah v Oman Ghana Trust Holdings Ltd, [1984–86] 1 GLR 157-171, the court stated;
" The only statutory caveat provided by section 17 (g) of Act 220 is that the
court should decline to make an order for possession if:
“having regard to all the circumstances . . . including any alternative
accommodation available for the person for whose occupation the premises are
so required or for the tenant, that greater hardship would be caused by granting
the order than by refusing it.”
It must however be noted that it is the tenant who bears the burden of proving that he,(and not
the landlord) would suffer greater hardship if an order is made by the court for his ejectment.
In Adu v Clegg [1981] GLR 173, the court held thus;
“Section 17 (1) (g) of Act 220, among other things, stipulates that the order for
possession should not be granted if the court finds that by granting it greater
hardship would be caused to the tenants. The question is, was there evidence
before the learned trial judge on which he could decide for the plaintiff and
against the defendants on the issue of greater hardship?

19
 On the true construction of the proviso (ii) to section 17 (1) (g) of the Rent Act,
1963, we are of the view that the onus of proving “greater hardship” is on the
tenants and not on the landlord. Once the landlord has been able to satisfy the
court that the dwelling-house or premises are reasonably required by him for
the occupation of himself or any member of his family, then the court is entitled
to draw the inference that some hardship would be caused to the landlord by
refusing to grant possession. At that stage, the burden is then shifted to the
tenant to prove that he would suffer greater hardship by granting possession
than by refusing it.”

In the case of Dadson v Rana Motors [1992] 1 GLR 345, the plaintiff was the Anglican Bishop
in Tamale and the presiding bishop. He rented out his house in Accra to the defendant company,
which used it to accommodate two families. The plaintiff wrote to terminate the agreement, as he
needed it for his personal use. According to him, the nature of his job required that he comes to
Accra from time to time. Since the church failed to make an accommodation available to him, he
had to sleep in hotels or with friends whenever he came to Accra. The issue at the trial court
when he sued for recovery of possession was whether greater hardships would be afflicted on the
plaintiff or the defendant.
The trial judge dismissed the action on the ground that even if the church failed to provide him
with accommodation on his short visits to Accra, it was easier for him to put up with friends,
relatives and even sleep at hotels. Moreover, the court was of the view that since the defendant
company was using the house to accommodate two families, more hardships would be meted out
to them than the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed.
The appellate upheld the appeal, holding that plurality of the occupants of a house had never
been a criterion for determining the relative hardship which would be caused in an action for
ejectment. The court found that the respondent company had done little to look for alternative
accommodation for its workers as the appellant had given them about three years to do so.
“The facts disclose that the appellant comes to Accra quite often on official
duties. He is not provided with any accommodation by the church. It is
unreasonable to expect a whole bishop to be continually scrounging at the
doors of benefactors supplicating for a place to lay his head while he himself
has a house in Accra. The appellant may be priest all right but it has not been
established that he maintains a charitable family to sacrifice his own
convenience for the sake of the respondents. Even the Bible enjoins Christians
to “love thy neighbour as thyself” but not “more than thyself.”

8. Landlord’s Business Use

20
Where the landlord requires the premises for his own business provided the premises were
originally constructed for that purpose, he would be entitled to recover the premises, provided
that a minimum of 6 months’ notice had been given to the tenant.
Section 17(1)(h) reads;
“where the lease has expired and the premises are reasonably required by the
landlord to be used by the landlord for the landlord’s own business purposes,
the premises being constructed to be used as business premises, if the landlord
has given not less than six months’ written notice to the tenant of the intention
to apply for an order for the recovery of the possession of, or the ejectment
from, the premises.”

Conditions precedent for the grant of an order of possession of and ejectment from
premises under section 17(1)(h)
I. Business Premises
The premises should have been constructed to be used as business premises. This
apparently excludes dwelling houses. The onus therefore lies on the landlord to prove that
the premises were constructed for business purposes. In the case of Sfarijlani v Basil
[1973] 2 GLR 260, the court held that premises used for business purposes were deemed
to be premises constructed to be used as business premises.
II. Expiration of the Lease
The lease should have come to an end before the landlord would qualify to recover the
premises under this section. The use of the term ‘the lease has expired’ creates the
impression of a situation of statutory tenancy. This is because the section contemplates of
a situation in which the lease has come to an end but without recourse to the court, the
tenant cannot be ejected. It is a statutory tenant who fits into this description. Ordinarily,
at common law, when a lease proper comes to an end, the lessor or the landlord need not
seek judicial intervention before taking up possession.
III. The Reasonably Required rule
Just like a landlord who seeks to recover possession of premises for his personal
occupation, a recovery by a landlord for his business use would only be granted if he
establishes that he reasonably requires the premises for that purpose. As to what
constitutes ‘reasonable requirement’, this has not been defined by the Act and so it
remains a question of fact for the court to decide. However, the onus will be on the
landlord to prove that he reasonably requires it for his business use.
The law is that where the landlord of a business premises satisfies the court that he
reasonably requires his premises for his own business purposes, the court is entitled to
exercise its discretion in favour of the landlord.

21
In the case of Joseph v Farisco Gh. Ltd [1991] 2GLR 151, the Court of appeal held that
section 17(1)(h) of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) which required a landlord who sought to
recover possession of his business premises to satisfy the court that he reasonably
required the premises to be used by him for his own business purposes, was a statutory
requirement which the landlord was under a duty to discharge. Hence, even if the point
was not pleaded or raised by the tenant, no court, whether original or appellate, could
make an order for possession unless it was shown that it was reasonable to make the
order. In the court’s own words;
“In coming to a conclusion as to whether or not a landlord reasonably required his
premises for his own business, and in exercising his discretion as to whether or not to
grant an order for recovery of possession, the trial judge was duty-bound to take
account of all relevant circumstances which existed at the time of the hearing in the
broad commonsense way of a man of the world and give such weight as he thought
right to various factors in the situation. The judge should have regard on the one hand
to the general scheme and purpose of the Act and on the other to the special
conditions, including, to a large extent, matters of domestic and social character.”
In the case of Sfarijlani v Basil [1973] 2. GLR 260, the landlord who was a foreigner
brought an action to recover a house rented out to the tenant and of which part was being
used by the tenant as a shop. The landlord said that he needed the shop for his own
business. The landlord was the proprietor of a perfume factory. At that time, the Busia
government had passed the Ghanaian Business (Promotion) Act, 1970 (Act 334),
regulating the participation of non-Ghanaians in engaging in business activities in the
country. The court held that since the landlord was not a Ghanaian his business concerns
in the country were caught by the provisions of Act 334. He could only carry on the
business of wholesale or retail trade if he had a valid permit under Act 334; he was
however unable to prove that he had one or was confident of obtaining one.
Consequently, he could not reasonably require the premises for his own business
purposes.
In an old case of Owusu v Aidoo (1946) D.C (Land) ’38-47, 241, the landlord rented out
his own store in Kumasi to the tenant. He then rented a nearby store from his wife for his
own use. A quarrel ensued between the landlord and the wife. The landlord then vacated
the woman’s store and decided to recover his own store from the tenant, for his business
use. The issue was whether the landlord ‘reasonably required’ the premises. The court
came to the conclusion that he did not reasonably require the store for his use. This was
because merely having strained relations with his wife was no basis for him to move out
of the store which he had rented from the wife, as he was not obliged to do so.
In Farage v Maloni (1969) C.C 24, the court was of the view that the fact that the
landlord had other premises which he could use for his own business purposes, meant
that he did not reasonably require the premises for his own use.

22
Should the test of ‘greater hardship’ between the landlord and the tenant also be
considered just as under Section 17(1)(g) of Act 220?
Section 17(1)(g) of Act 220 is silent on it. The courts have held that it should not be taken
into consideration. In the case John Lawrence Chemists Ltd v Obeng-Ansong [1995-
96] 1 GLR 146 the court held that it is immaterial whether the tenant would suffer
greater hardship or not. This is because under section 17(1) (h) of the Rent Act, 1963
(Act 220) the court is not required to consider the issue of hardship in determining the
rights of the parties.
Some writers are however of the view that it should be taken into consideration despite
the fact that the subsection is silent on it.
IV. Landlord’s Use
The premises should be required for only the landlord’s use. Unlike Section 17(1)(g), the
landlord cannot recover the premises for the business use of other members of the family.
In the case of Dankwa v Anokwa [1989-90] 2 GLR 63, the plaintiff, the customary
successor of the original landlord, brought an action in the High Court for recovery of
possession of business premises and an order for ejectment against the defendant-tenant
on the ground, inter alia, that the premises was required by the son and niece of the
deceased original landlord for their business.
The court held that a landlord was entitled to an order of ejectment and recovery of
possession of his premises under section 17 (1) (h) of the Rents Act, 1963 (Act 220) only
if the premises were reasonably required to be used by him for his own business; he
would not be so entitled if (as in the instant case) it was required for use by a member of
the landlord’s family. The condition that the premises must be reasonably required by the
landlord himself, a member of his family or any person in his whole-time employment as
stated in section 17 (1) (g) was inapplicable in cases under section 17 (1) (h).
VI. Notice to the Rent Officer
The landlord is required to comply with Regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations, 1964
(L.I 369) by furnishing a statutory declaration to the Rent Officer giving the reason for
the seeking the recovery of possession.
Where the landlord seeks to recover possession of business premises under section 17(1)
(h) of Act 220, he is mandatorily required to comply with the provisions of regulation 18
of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369). However, the said regulation 18, which did not
fix any time for the delivery of the required declaration by the landlord, is duly complied
with if the declaration is filed before the end of the case; and the court could itself make
an order for the filing of the declaration before the execution of its judgment.
Joseph v Farisco Gh. Ltd [1991] 2GLR 151
VII. 6 month’s Written Notice

23
The landlord is required to give six months’ written notice to the tenant before applying
for the recovery of the premises from the tenant. An oral notice to the tenant would not
suffice. Where the requisite notice has not been validly given, the court cannot make an
order for the recovery of the premises in favour of the landlord.
Farage v Maloni (1969) C.C 24
In another case of Alawiye v Agyekum [1984-86] I GLR 179, the court also held that
before a court could order recovery of possession of a business premises in favour of a
landlord it must in accordance with the provisions of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), s 17
(1) (h) be satisfied by the landlord that he reasonably needed the premises for his own
business and that the requisite statutory notice of at least six months was given to the
tenant and furthermore, that the landlord had in compliance with the Rent Regulations,
1964 (LI 369) given an undertaking that he would not re-let to another tenant within a
certain specified period.

What is the effect of non-compliance with Regulation 18 of Rent Regulations?

It is provided by the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369), reg. 18 that:
“18. Where a landlord requires his premises for the purposes of section 17 (1)
(g), (h), (i) or (k), he shall furnish to the appropriate Rent Officer a declaration
as in Form 14 of the First Schedule hereto.”
Regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I. 369), therefore makes it imperative that
where a landlord requires his premises for the purposes of section 17 (1) (g), (h), (i) or (k)
to furnish to the appropriate rent officer with a declaration as in form 14 of the First
Schedule to L.I. 369.
Darko v Imadi [1991] 2 GLR 206
Asamoah v. Zweness [1980] GLR 867-872
The courts have however held that mere failure to comply with this directive does not
mean that the court cannot go ahead and make a determination as to whether the landlord
reasonably requires the premises for his own business use. In other word, non-compliance
with this statutory requirement does not oust the jurisdiction of the court to hear the
substantive matter. Regulation 18 must however be complied with
before an order for ejectment made by the court would become effective.
See: Gbedema v Ofori [1991] 1 GLR 345 in which the court stated;
“The real question is when can a landlord apply for possession under section
17(1)(g) of the Rent Act? Can he [p.350] go to the rent magistrate for an order
when the statutory requirement has not been complied with? The answer will
depend to a large extent on the nature of the rent magistrate's power to make

24
 such an order under section 17(1)(g). The exercise of the magistrate's power
however is not dependent upon the statutory requirement, but upon satisfactory
evidence shown that the landlord reasonably requires the premises for his own
use. Non-compliance with the aforementioned regulation of the Rent
Regulations does not therefore oust the jurisdiction of the rent magistrate...
What then is the purpose of the statutory requirement stipulated under
regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations? It is to ensure fair-play so that a
landlord who has obtained possession of his house, does not turn around to let
it to another tenant for a higher rent…. The order therefore that the plaintiff
should comply with regulation 18 of LI 369 before the judgment became
effective was proper. If the law required that no action should be brought
without compliance with the regulation, it would have said so. In any case, no
substantial miscarriage of justice was occasioned by the plaintiff’s failure to
comply with regulation 18 of LI 369."
Where, however, the landlord comes under any of the provisions of section 17 (1) (a),
(b), (c), (d), (e) or (f) of the Act, he is not required to comply with regulation 18 of L.I.
369. This is because when a tenant, for instance, fails to pay due rent, or where he is in
breach of a covenant in the tenancy agreement, or where, as in the present case he is
guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to adjoining occupiers, he
automatically forfeits his right of occupation of the premises under Act 220, and the
landlord is entitled to, and may come to court direct and ask for ejectment, if the tenant
refuses to quit.
Mensah v Addison (supra)

9. Reconstruction, Remodeling or Redevelopment

This is where the tenant is a statutory tenant and the landlord requires the premises for the
purpose of pulling down the premises and reconstruction of new premises, remodeling or
for redevelopment and these works cannot be done while the tenant is still in occupation.
Section 17 (1)(i) reads;
“where the lease has expired and the tenant is a statutory tenant and the
landlord—  
(i) intends to pull down the premises and construct new premises,
(ii) intends to remodel the premises and the remodeling cannot be carried out
with the tenant in occupation, or
(iii) requires possession of the premises to carry out a scheme of re-
development, if the landlord has given not less than six months’ written notice
to the tenant of his intention to apply for an order for the recovery of the
possession of, or the ejectment from, the premises, so, however, that—

25
 (aa) the Magistrate or Judge may, on making or giving an order under this
paragraph, make it a condition that if the landlord fails to carry out his
intention within such period as may be allowed by such Magistrate or Judge the
landlord shall reinstate the former tenant as a statutory tenant at the same rent
as that formerly payable or pay to the tenant such compensation as the
Magistrate or Judge may consider reasonable,
(ab) the Magistrate or Judge shall cause a copy of such order to be served on
the appropriate Rent Officer for the area where the premises are situated and
such officer shall take such proceedings as are necessary to ensure compliance
with the terms of the order, and
(ac) the making or giving of an order under this paragraph in the
circumstances specified in paragraph (i) (ii) of this subsection shall be subject
to any option of the tenant to acquire under the provisions of section 18, a new
statutory tenancy of any premises remodeled to which such an order relates.”

Conditions precedent for the grant of an order of possession of and ejectment from
premises under section 17(1)(i)
I. Notice to Rent Officer
The landlord is required to comply with Regulation 18 of the Rent Regulations (L.I 369)
and furnish a formal declaration to the Rent officer. This enables the court orders to be
monitored by the Rent Officer. The court would usually give time lines for the works to
be undertaken by the landlord.
II. Expiration of the Lease
The subsection cannot be invoked during the subsistence of the tenancy. The tenant
should therefore be a statutory tenant. On the other hand, the landlord can lawfully
terminate the tenancy (written notice) if it is still in force and then go ahead to recover it
under this section.
III. Intention must be honest (genuine)
To avoid an abuse by the landlord who may under the pretext of recovering the premises
for remodeling, reconstruction or re-development, recover the premises, the court is
enjoined to scrutinize the genuineness of his intention. Usually, the court may order the
landlord to carry out his intentions within a time frame. If the landlord is unable to carry
out his intentions within the condition set by the court, the tenant would be reinstated in
the house or in the alternative he would be compensated by the landlord.
IV. Written notice in respect of Scheme of Re-development
The landlord is to give to the tenant a written notice of 6 months where the premises are
being recovered for the purpose of carrying out a scheme of re-development.

26
Construction of New Premises
Where the landlord intends to demolish the premises, and build a new one on the site, the
tenant cannot remain in the premises. The tenant can be ejected to enable the work to go
on. The court has the power to indicate when this demolishment must take place, failing
which the former tenant can be entitled to be re-instated as a statutory tenant. The former
tenant may if he chooses not to go back to that house be awarded compensation by the
court, payable by the landlord. This is to avoid abuse on the part of the landlord who
may use this section as a ruse just to throw out the tenant and bring in another tenant.

Remodeling
The Act failed to define what was meant by ‘Remodeling’. According to the Construction
Dictionary, ‘Remodeling’ means;
“Making alterations to an existing structure such that it will be better suited to
current needs. This type of work may involve changing the use of interior space
by repositioning walls, replacing bathroom or kitchen fixtures, or other such
modifications.”
Where the landlord seeks to undertake remodeling of the premises but it cannot be carried
out while the tenant is living in the premises, he may be allowed to recover the premises.
Where the remodeling can be done while the tenant is in occupation, the landlord cannot
recover the premises. The onus is on him to prove that the remodeling cannot be
undertaken with the tenant in occupation. Trivial structural works may not be enough
ground for ejecting the tenant.
In the case of Seraphim v Pacific stores [1974] 1 GLR 301, the court ruled that where
the landlord had the drawings of the proposed remodeling prepared and a permit had been
secured from the Town and Country Planning Dept. secured, it constituted bonafide
intention of remodeling the premises. The court however sparked a controversy when it
stated that the fact that the landlord had failed to show that he had the present means or
ability to do the remodeling does not mean that he cannot be allowed to recover
possession of the premises under this 17(1)(i) of Act 220.

Scheme of Re-development
The Act failed to specify what is meant by the term ‘scheme of redevelopment’.
‘Development’ means the act of expanding, enlargement or improvement of the premises
or the facilities thereon. It is believed to be conveying an idea of a more comprehensive
type of redevelopment. Drawing a distinction between ‘remodeling’ and ‘redevelopment’
is therefore blurred. With separate subparagraphs being used to describe

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“reconstruction’, ‘remodeling’, and ‘redevelopment’, each of these is expected to have a
different meaning.
This confusion was apparent in the case of Seraphim v Pacific Stores [1974] 1 GLR
301. The court referred to an intended demolition of part of an existing building and
rebuild same for being weak and old was described by the Court of Appeal as “a scheme
of redeveloping and remodeling the building”, and in another breadth as a plan to
“reconstruct and redevelop”.
Where the recovery of the premises is being made because of a scheme of redevelopment
it is important to remember that;
i. The landlord needs to give a written notice of 6 months to the tenant,
ii. The landlord needs does not need to prove that the redevelopment cannot be done
while the tenant is in occupation.
iii. The landlord only needs to show that he requires the premises for redevelopment.

10. Cessation of Tenant’s Employment

This arises where the tenant is living in the landlord’s premises as a result of being in the
employment of the landlord, as part of conditions of service but this employment has
ceased. In this case, the landlord is entitled to recover possession of the premises from the
tenant.
Section 17 (1) (j) reads;
“where the premises were let to the tenant by reason of his employment in the
service of the landlord and such employment has ceased.”
It must be noted that a tenant cannot refuse to leave the premises on the ground that the
termination of the employment by the landlord was unlawful.
In the case of Haroutunian v Medz- Moroukian [1962] 2 GLR 94–96 the defendant,
an employee of the plaintiff, was, as part of his terms of service, given a fully furnished
bungalow, free of rent. On the 30th April, 1962, the plaintiff terminated the defendant’s
appointment. The defendant contended that his dismissal was wrongful, and so took
action in the High Court for damages for wrongful dismissal. He refused to vacate the
bungalow pending a determination of the suit, whereupon the plaintiff instituted the
proceedings under the Rent Control Ordinance, No. 2 of 1952, section 11(1) (f) for
recovery of possession.
The court held that the defendant is not entitled to plead the wrongfulness or otherwise of
his dismissal as a defence in an action for the recovery of possession of the premises once
his employment had been terminated. This is because the Act does not make any
distinction between an employee who was wrongfully dismissed and an employee who

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was lawfully dismissed. Once it is admitted that the employment has ceased, no matter
how, the employer-landlord is entitled to an order for recovery of possession.
The court said;
“The defendant's contention that he is entitled to remain in possession of the
said house because the termination of his employment is wrongful is untenable.
The wording of section 11 (1) (f) of the Rent Control Ordinance, 1952,[now s
17(1)(j) does not admit of any interpretation or construction that makes a
distinction between a ceasing of employment de facto and a ceasing of
employment de jure. It simply says in clear, unambiguous words that "where
the premises were let to the tenant by reason of his employment in the service of
the landlord and such employment has ceased," the landlord shall be entitled to
an order for recovery of possession of the premises. The section means what it
says.
No authority has been cited by counsel for the defendant for the proposition
that the termination of the employment must be adjudged to be rightful before
the landlord or employer can obtain an order for recovery of possession. I
therefore give judgment for the plaintiff and order that the defendant should
quit and give up possession of the said house to the plaintiff”

11. Recovery of Premises Previously Occupied by Landlord

This arises where the landlord rented out his substantially furnished premises and then
left the country or the area of the location of the premises, but has since returned and
needs the premises for his personal re occupation.
Section 17(1)(k) reads;
“where the landlord was personally in occupation of the premises and has let
the `premises substantially furnished for a term during his absence from Ghana
or that area of Ghana in which the premises are situated and has returned and
requires the re-occupation of the premises for himself, so, however, that no
order granting the possession of, or the ejectment from, the premises shall be
granted on or after the commencement of this Act unless the lease is in writing
and sets out that the lease has been granted for a term during the absence of the
landlord from Ghana or such area.”
The conditions for recovering possession under Section 17(1)(k) are that;
i. There must be a previous personal occupation of the premises by the landlord.
ii. The tenancy should have been rented out in a situation where the landlord is absent from
Ghana or absent from the locality in which the premises are situated.
iii. The premises was let out at a time when it was furnished or substantially furnished.

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iv. The tenancy (lease) must be in writing, indicating that it was granted during the absence of
the landlord or where the landlord was not in the locality of the location of the premises
v. The landlord has returned to the area where the premises are situated and he requires the
premises for his personal reoccupation.

B. RECOVERY OF POSSESSION UNDER SECTION 25 OF ACT 220

Where a principal tenant is convicted of any of the offences listed in section 25(1) of Act 220,
the court may order the ejectment of the tenant.
Section 25(2) of act 220 reads;
“Upon the hearing of a charge alleging the contravention of the provisions of
subsection (1), it shall be lawful for the Magistrate, in addition to imposing a
fine if the accused is convicted, to order the accused to pay the tenant such one
or more of the following sums as may be appropriate to the case… Upon such
hearing the Magistrate may, also if the accused is a principal tenant order his
ejectment.

C. RECOVERY OF POSSESSION UNDER SECTION 28 OF ACT 220

A statutory tenant is prohibited from asking to be paid any premium (goodwill) or consideration
before giving up vacant possession of the premises. If the statutory tenant is convicted for
infringing this law, the court may order for the ejectment of the statutory tenant.
Section 28 reads;
“Where a statutory tenant demands or receives the payment of a fine or
premium or any other consideration for giving up possession of premises to the
landlord or to any other person with or without the knowledge or approval of
the landlord, the tenant commits an offence and is liable on conviction by the
Rent Magistrate to a term of imprisonment not exceeding three months or to a
fine not exceeding one hundred and fifty penalty units or to both the
imprisonment and the fine.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) the demanding or receiving of a price or
consideration for furniture, fittings, fixtures or any other articles in excess of a
reasonable price or consideration constitutes the demanding or receiving of a
premium.
(3) On the hearing of a charge alleging the contravention of a provision of
subsection (1), the Rent Magistrate on conviction of the accused and in addition
to imposing a fine,

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 (a) may order the accused to pay the person from whom the fine, premium or
the other consideration has been received the amount of the fine, premium or
the other consideration wrongfully received, including the amount by which the
price or consideration paid for the furniture, fittings, fixtures or any other
articles exceeds the reasonable value of those articles, and
(b) may order the ejectment of the tenant.”

D. RECOVERY OF POSSESSION UNDER THE COMMON LAW

The main ground for the recovery of possession of the premises from the tenant under the
common law is when the tenant denies the title of the landlord. Section 27 of the
Evidence Act, 1975 (NRCD 323) reads;
“Estoppel of tenant to deny title of landlord
Except as otherwise provided by law, including a rule of equity, against a claim
by a tenant, the title of a landlord at the time of the commencement of their
relation is conclusively presumed to be valid.”
Where the tenant denies the title of his landlord, it is enough ground for the landlord to
recover the premises from the tenant.
Memuna Amoudy v Kofi Antwi [2006] 3 MLR 183
G.B.O v Antie [2008] 116 MLR 5

CRIMINAL LIABILITIES OF THE LANDLORD

Under the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) and the Conveyancing Act, 1973 (NRCD 175),
certain actions of the landlord may result in his incurring criminal liability, and
subsequent prosecution accordingly. These are;
1. Rent advance
Reading sections 25(5) and 25(1)(b) together, landlords are prohibited from demanding
or receiving rent which is more than one month, in respect of a monthly or a shorter
tenancy. Where the tenant takes a tenancy for a duration of more than six (6) months
however, the landlord is required not to demand or receive more than 6 months’ rent
advance.
Section 25(5) of Act 220 reads;
“(5) A person who as a condition of the grant, renewal or continuance of a
tenancy demands in the case of a monthly or shorter tenancy, the payment in
advance of more than a month’s rent or in the case of a tenancy exceeding six

31
 months, the payment in advance of more than six months’ rent, commits an
offence and is liable on conviction by the Rent Magistrate to a fine not
exceeding two hundred and fifty penalty units.”
Section 25(1)(b) of Act 220 also reads;
“1) A person who, in respect of any premises-
(b) demands or receives a consideration, whether in money or in kind or in any
other manner and whether by way of rent, fine, premium or otherwise, for the
grant, renewal, continuance or assignment of a tenancy……….
commits an offence and is liable on conviction by the Rent Magistrate to a fine
not exceeding two hundred penalty units or to a term of imprisonment not
exceeding six months or to both the fine and the imprisonment.”

2. Inducing a Tenant to Quit

Under Section 27 of the Rent Act, it is an offence for a landlord to do any act or refrain
from doing any act which he is obliged to do as a means of compelling the tenant to quit
from the premises, even though the tenancy has not come to an end. Some of these acts
may include removing doors, windows or the roofing of the premises, disconnecting the
tenant’s access to electricity and water, preventing access to the use of the bathroom and
toilet facilities and any other acts that lead to the inconvenience of the tenant . The
landlord may also refuse to undertake any repairs that he may be obliged under the
tenancy to do. The landlord may commit those acts by himself or through his agents.
Section 27 of Act 220 reads;
“Offence for inducing tenant to quit
(1) A person who does an act or refrains from doing anything which the
conditions of the tenancy require that person to do, with intent to compel the
lessee of premises to give up possession of the premises, commits an offence and
is liable on conviction by the Rent Magistrate to a fine not exceeding one
hundred and fifty penalty units.”

3. Issuance of Rent Cards

Under section 20(1) of Act 220, every landlord is required to issue a rent card to the
tenant within 7 days of the tenancy coming into effect. This card is expected to contain

32
particulars of the parties, the premises, the rent and address of the parties. Section 20(1)
of Act 220 reads;
“Rent cards
(1) A landlord of premises on monthly or shorter tenancies shall issue to the
tenant of the premises, within seven days after the commencement of the
tenancy, a rent card specifying
(a) the name and address of the landlord of the premises,
(b) the name and address of the tenant of the premises,
(c) the amount of the recoverable rent of the premises, and
(d) and any other prescribed particulars.”
The Act does not expressly make an infringement of section 20(1) an offence. However,
by the provisions of section 25(1)(i) of Act 220, failure to comply with any provision of
the Act is a criminal offence and upon conviction by the Rent Magistrate, the offender
would be made to pay a fine not exceeding two hundred penalty units or to a term of
imprisonment not exceeding six months or to both the fine and the imprisonment.
4. Failure to issue receipt
A landlord is required under section 33 of Act 220 to issue receipts to a tenant whenever
he receives rent from him. It reads;
“Receipt for rent to be supplied
At the time of payment to a landlord of a sum of money in respect of rent for
premises, or of rent for premises and for the use of furniture or fixtures, the
landlord shall provide the person making the payment with a receipt in writing
duly stamped if a stamp is required under any other enactment, specifying the
premises in respect of which the rent is paid, whether the premises are
furnished or unfurnished, the amount paid, the period in respect of which the
payment is made and the name of the tenant.”
Just like 20(1), no express provision has been made criminalizing a landlord’s failure to
comply with section 33. But recourse can once again be made to section 25(1)(i) of Act
220 which makes it an offence for provisions of the Act to be flouted.

4. Other General Offences

Under section 25 of Act 220, there are a whole list of general offences that could be
committed by the landlord or any other person who contravenes the Act. Section 25
reads;

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“Offences
25. Offences, general
(1) A person who, in respect of any premises
(a) demands or receives more than the recoverable rent for those premises
despite a lease to the contrary,
(b) demands or receives a consideration, whether in money or in kind or in any
other manner and whether by way of rent, fine, premium or otherwise, for the
grant, renewal, continuance or assignment of a tenancy,
(c) being or acting as an agent or broker or go-between demands or receives for
services in connection with the procuring of a grant, renewal, continuance or
an assignment of a tenancy, a consideration which exceeds five percent of the
recoverable rent for one year of those premises,
(d) where the purchase or hire of furniture, fittings, fixtures or any other
articles is required by that person as a condition for the grant, renewal,
continuance or assignment of a tenancy, demands or receives a price or
consideration for the purchase or hire in excess of a reasonable price or
consideration for the purchase or hire,
(e) enters into or carries out a fictitious or an artificial agreement which has the
effect of attempting to defeat the objects of this Act,
(f) being a landlord fails to furnish an information the landlord is required to
furnish by or under this Act,
(g) being a landlord of premises ejects a tenant of the premises for failing to pay
more than the recoverable rent of the premises,
(h) being a landlord and having remodelled premises after obtaining possession
under paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of section 17 fails to comply with the
requirements of section 18, or
(i) contravenes any other provision of the Act,
commits an offence and is liable on conviction by the Rent Magistrate to a fine
not exceeding two hundred penalty units or to a term of imprisonment not
exceeding six months or to both the fine and the imprisonment.”

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