Module 5:

I. Post-judgment Remedies
a. Motion for New Trial or
Reconsideration

Manila Memorial Park

Cemetery, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 137122,
November 15, 2000

FACTS
1. respondents filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of land against petitioner
2. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and having been barred by the statute of limitations and by laches
3. On July 4, 1983, respondents received the said decision
4. On July 19, 1983 (the last day of the prescribed fifteen-day period for appeal), respondents filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration
5. RTC denied the said motion
6. On 07 December 1989, respondents filed a notice of appeal
7. On 11 December 1989, the trial court gave due course to the appeal
8. The records of the case, however, were not transmitted to the appellate court due to missing transcript of stenographic notes
9. On 23 April 1996, the trial court required the parties to appear in conference. Almost a year had lapsed but the missing stenographic notes were still not
submitted to the trial court
10. On 28 February 1997, respondents filed a motion for new trial for the retaking and presentation of testimonial and documentary evidence on the ground
that the reconstitution of the missing stenographic notes was no longer possible considering that the court stenographers who had transcribed the
testimony of witnesses by then since retired from the service, their whereabouts unknown.
11. petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and an opposition to the motion for new trial filed by respondents contending that the appeal was filed out of
time and that the remedy for new trial could not be availed of since it was filed long after the reglementary period to appeal had lapsed.
12. RTC denied the said motions on the ground that the final resolution of the case could not be held in abeyance indefinitely nor could petitioner's motion to
dismiss the appeal still be entertained after their having waited for eight years before raising the issue.
13. CA affirmed RTC decision on the ground that petitioner was estopped by laches from assailing the notice of appeal which had meanwhile been given due
course by the trial court
a. petitioner filed the motion to dismiss appeal after almost eight years the respondent court gave due course to respondent's notice of appeal.
Petitioner did not raise the issue of the timeliness of the appeal at the time the notice of appeal was filed by respondents on December 7, 1989
b. During the conference on April 23, 1996 for the completion of the record, petitioner remained silent on the issue. Instead, it voluntarily asked for
time to locate the missing transcript of records to be submitted to respondent court, which petitioner never accomplished without explanation
c. It was only after respondents filed on February 28, 1997 a motion for new trial for the retaking or presentation of testimonial evidence that
petitioner started questioning the appeal essayed by respondents

ISSUE
W/N the petitioner is estopped by laches to file a motion to dismiss the appeal
HELD
No.

MOTION TO DISMISS AN APPEAL

Petitioner could not be faulted for its failure to move for the dismissal of the appeal at an earlier time acting upon the assumption, albeit erroneously, that the
appeal was filed on time relying on the order, dated 11 December 1989, of the trial court declaring that the notice of appeal had been filed within the reglementary
period.

Neither can the conduct of petitioner's counsel during the conference called by and held before the trial court be regarded as a waiver of its right to contest the
seasonableness of the appeal.

The legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court, and the latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the
ground of its being out of time.

PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL
● The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional upon the court a quo,
● and the failure to perfect that appeal renders its judgment final and executory
● Not being a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege, the right to appeal may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with rules provided therefor.

Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; thus:

Sec. 3. Period of Ordinary Appeal - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration shall be allowed.

If the motion for new trial or reconsideration is denied, the moving party has only the remaining period from notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal.
No motion for extension of time to file such a notice of appeal is neither required nor allowed.

FINAL AND EXECUTORY

● the court loses all jurisdiction over the case and
● it becomes the ministerial duty of the court concerned to order execution of the judgment.
● vested rights are acquired by the winning party.

Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of the case
EXCEPTIONS (relaxation of rules on strict observance of reglementary periods)

1. In Ramos vs. Bagasao,[15] the Court excused the delay of four days in the filing of the notice of appeal because the questioned decision of the trial court
had been served upon appellant Ramos at a time when her counsel of record was already dead. The new counsel could only file the appeal four days
after the presecribed reglementary period was over.

2. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[16] the Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross
miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to lose hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for public
purposes.

3. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission,[17] a tardy appeal was accepted considering that the subject matter in issue had theretofore been
judiciallly settled with finality in another case, and a dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered twice to make the
same reparation to the appellee.[18] These instances indeed constituted exceptional circumstances that would hardly find parallel elsewise.

• RAFAEL Dinglasan, Jr. v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 145420,
September 19, 2006

FACTS
1. Elmyra, Dinglasan and Antrom entered into a MOA whereby the parties agreed that Antrom will extend credit accommodation in favor of Elmyra to
finance its prawn business.
2. As initial payment, Dinglasan issued a check
3. Upon presentment for payment with the drawee bank, however, the said check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
4. RTC found Dinglasan guilty of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
5. CA affirmed the RTC decision
6. Petitioner appealed to SC (Petition for Review on Certiorari)
7. SC denied the petition on 28 June 1999
8. The Resolution of this Court dated denying Dinglasan's Petition for Review became final and executory on 14 October 1999 as evidenced by the Entry of
Judgment
9. on 30 October 2000, filed the instant Petition for New Trial on the ground of the alleged newly discovered evidence

affidavits of Ma. Elena Dinglasan, in her capacity as Executive Vice-President and Treasurer of Elmyra, and Ma. Encarnacion Vda. De Dinglasan, the wife of
Mariano Dinglasan, who, during his lifetime, was the Cashier and Liaison Officer of the same company. These affidavits, together with the transmittal letter dated 8
October 1985 attached to Solidbank Manager's Check No. 002969 dated 3 October 1985 sent by Ma. Elena Dinglasan to Antrom, tends to prove that Dinglasan
made good of the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor. He could not, therefore, be validly convicted of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for one
of the essential elements of the offense, that is, the drawer failed and refused to make good the said check within five banking days from the notice of dishonor, is
absent.
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT A NEW TRIAL OR REOPENING OF THE CASE BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE SHOULD BE ALLOWED.

HELD
No.

The transmittal letter dated 8 October 1985 was already offered as evidence in CA-G.R. CR No. 14138 and was even annexed to the Petition for Review filed
before the Court of Appeals as Annex "B." Thus, the letter dated 8 October 1985 is not newly discovered. It is an attempt to raise again a defense which was
already weighed by the appellate court.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

Berry Rule
Sec 2, Rule 121
(a) the evidence was discovered after the trial;
(b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.

Berry v. State of Georgia

1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial.
2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner.
3d. That it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted.
4th. That it is not cumulative only - viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on the trial.
5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for. And
6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness.

● It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new evidence he seeks to present has complied with the
requisites to justify the holding of a new trial.
● The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly
discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence."
● The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one,
i.e., when should or could it have been discovered

• Flight Attendants and Stewards

Association of the Philippines v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R.
Nos. 178083 & A.M. No. 11-
10-1-SC (Resolution), March
13, 2018

PAL's Second Motion for Reconsideration

| of the Decision of July 22, 2008
| could be allowed in the higher interest of justice

b. Appeal - Appeals in general

1. Judgment and final orders
subject to appeal
2. Matters not appealable
3. Remedies against judgment
and orders which are not
appealable
4. Modes of appeal
5. Issues to be raised on appeal

a. Custodio v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. NO.
116100, 9 February 1996

FACTS
1. respondents filed an action before RTC for the grant of an easement of right of way against the petitioners
2. RTC rendered in favor of the respondents
3. Respondents appealed to CA raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor
4. CA affirmed the RTC decision
5. Petitioners filed a motion of reconsideration
6. CA denied the motion
7. Hence, this petition

ISSUES
W/N the ff. issues can be raised in the present appeal
1. w/n the grant of right of way to the respondents is proper
2. whether or not the award of damages is in order

HELD
 1. No

With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting
private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to
petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.

For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of
the trial court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in
this jurisdiction is that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to
defeat the appellant’s claim or to uphold the decision that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views
expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other grounds,
but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee’s favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.

2. Yes

However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The
award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the
fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the
closure of the passageway.

b. Citytrust Banking Corp. v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
92591, April 30, 1991

FACTS

ISSUE
The petitioner now assails the affirmation of the order of execution based on the trial court judgment in spite of the modified judgment which reduced the liability of
co-defendants to pay private respondent

HELD

6. Period of appeal

a. Heirs of Albano v.
Spouses Ravanes, G.R.
No. 183645, July 20, 2016
FACTS
1. respondent-spouses filed a Complaint for Ejectment14 against petitioner
2. MeTC rendered in favor of respondents
3. RTC reversed MeTC decision
4. CA reinstated the Decision of the MeTC
5. On September 19, 2007, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Stay the Execution of Judgment dated August 29, 2OO7
6. On February 20, 2008, CA denied petitioners' manifestation and motion
7. On February 22, 2008, petitioners received the copy of such resolution
8. On March 7, 2008, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated February 20, 2008
9. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated July 7, 2008.
10. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE
W/N the period to appeal has already lapsed

HELD
Yes. CA has become final and executory and the court has lost the jurisdiction to entertain the appeal

FIRST MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Since the Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment is a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, petitioners' receipt of the resolution denying
it triggers the running of the 15-day period within which to file an appeal. Petitioners received a copy of the February 20, 2008 Resolution on February 22, 2008.
Thus, counting 15 days from receipt, petitioners had only until March 8, 2008 to file a petition for review.

SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

This motion for reconsideration partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration as it contained mere rehash of the arguments raised in their earlier
Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment, which we found previously to be their (first) motion for reconsideration. Being a prohibited pleading, a
second motion for reconsideration does not have any legal effect and does not toll the running of the period to appeal

PERIOD TO APPEAL
● period to appeal should not be reckoned from the denial of a second motion for reconsideration
● Reckoning the period from the denial of the second motion for reconsideration will result in the same absurd situation where the courts will be obliged to
issue orders or resolutions denying a prohibited pleading in the first place
● An appeal is not a matter of right, but is one of sound judicial discretion. It may only be availed of in the manner provided by the law and the rules.

b. Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 141524,
September 14, 2005

FRESH PERIOD TO APPEAL

A party-litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order
(the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

c. Sumiran v. Spouses
Damaso, G.R. No. 162518,
August 19, 2009

FACTS
1. Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against respondents
2. RTC rendered in favor of the respondents
3. on March 8, 2003, petitioner received a copy of the decision
4. On March 6, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
5. On May 9, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
6. May 19, 2003, he received the copy of the resolution
7. On May 29, 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal for having been filed out of time
8. RTC dismissed the appeal
9. CA affirmed

ISSUE
W/N the "fresh period" rule could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated

HELD
Yes.

Petitioner is entitled to a "fresh period" of 15 days counted from May 19, 2003, the date of petitioner's receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration of
the RTC Decision within which to file his notice of appeal.

Therefore, when he filed said notice on May 29, 2003, or only ten (10) days after receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration, his period to appeal
had not yet lapsed.

PROCEDURAL LAWS
procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.

d. Sumaway v. Urban Bank,

Inc., G.R. No. 142534,
June 27, 2006

FACTS
1. On September 19, 1995, petitioner received the decision of the trial court
2. On October 2, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
3. on April 25, 1996, petitioner received the order of the court denying its motion for recon
4. On May 3, 1996, petitioners’ counsel filed a Notice of Appeal

ISSUE
W/N the appeal is timely filed

HELD
Yes. In the precedent-setting case of Neypes v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion
for reconsideration within which to appeal. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
their cases, . the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration

e. San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders

and Developers Group,
Inc. v. Bayang, G.R. No.
194702, April 20, 2015

FACTS
1. On July 27, 2005, petitioner received the HLURB decision
2. On August 10, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for recon
3. On April 17, 2005, petitioner received the order of the court denying the motion for recon
4. On April 27, 2005, petitioner filed an appeal from a decision of the HLURB Board ofCommissioners to the Office to the President.

ISSUE
W/N the appeal is timely filed

HELD
No. It is settled that the "fresh period rule" in Neypesapplies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals. In case theaggrieved party files a motion for
reconsideration from anadverse decision of any agency/office, the said party hasthe only remaining balance of the prescriptive periodwithin which to appeal,
reckoned from receipt of notice ofthe decision denying his/her motion forreconsideration. Thus, Following the above rules, the filing of the said motion
interrupted the period of appeal and fourteen (14) days had already elapsed and thus, petitioners have only one (1) day left, or until April 18, 2006,
within which to file their notice of appeal.
FACTS
1. Respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before HLURB (Arbiter)
a. contract of sell between the parties
b. full payment by the respondent
c. petitioners failed to execute a deed of absolute sale and to deliver the certificate of title
2. Housing and Land Use Arbiter rendered decision in favor of the respondent
3. Petitioners appealed to HLURB (Board of Commissioners)
4. HLURB (Board of Commissioners) affirmed the HLURB (Arbiter) decision
5. On July 27, 2005, petitioners received the said decision
6. On Aug 10, 2005, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration (14 days lapsed)
7. On April 17, 2006, petitioners received the resolution denying their motion for reconsideration
8. On April 27, 2006, petitioners appealed to the Office of the President (OP)
9. OP dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time
10. Petitioners appealed to CA via a petition for review
11. Petitioners contended that fresh period rule applies to the case
12. the CA denied the petitioners' petition for review.The CA, likewise, denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration
13. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45)

ISSUE
W/N the fresh period rule applies to administrative appeals

HELD
No.

It is settled that the "fresh period rule" in Neypesapplies only to judicial appeals and not to administrative appeals

As reflected in the above-quoted portion of thedecision in Neypes, the "fresh period rule" shall applyto Rule 40_(appeals from the Municipal Trial Courtsto the
Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals fromthe Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals orSupreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the RegionalTrial Courts
to the Court of Appeals); Rule 43(appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court ofAppeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari to theSupreme Court).
Obviously, these Rules coverjudicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure.

HLURB

in case theaggrieved party files a motion for reconsideration from anadverse decision of any agency/office, the said party has the only remaining balance of the
prescriptive periodwithin which to appeal, reckoned from receipt of notice ofthe decision denying his/her motion forreconsideration.

Section 2, Rule XXI of the HLURB Resolution No. 765, series of2004, prescribing the rules and regulations governing appealsfrom decisions of the Board of
Commissioners to the Office ofthe President, pertinently reads:
Section 2. Appeal. - Any party may, upon notice tothe Board and the other party, appeal a decisionrendered by the Board of Commissioners to theOffice of the
President within fifteen (15) days fromreceipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 andA.O. No. 18 Series of 1987.

7. Perfection of appeal
a. Julian v. DBP, G.R. No.
174193, 7 December 201

FACTS

1. respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioners

2. Before writ of execution is carried out, petitioner filed for the cancellation of TCT in the name of the respondent
3. During the course of proceedings, a series of postponements were made at the instance of both parties due to an impending amicable settlement
4. RTC dismissed the case due to the failure of the petitioners and respondents to comply with the order to submit a joint motion to dismiss the case
5. Petitioner timely filed a Notice of Appeal but failed to pay the docket and other lawful fees
6. CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of his failure to pay the required fees due to oversight and non-cognizance of the necessity to pay the said fees
since his counsel did not inform him of such requirement to pay

ISSUE
W/N the dismissal of the appeal is proper due to non-payment of docket fees within the reglementary period is proper

HELD
Yes.

This Court finds this not to be logically true to human experience. It is unusual for petitioner's counsel not to advice him of the required docket fees. More often
than not, counsels are aware of the docket fees required to be paid to the courts, and will ask clients for the said amount prior to filing pleadings in court. This is so
because counsels are not expected to shoulder or advance payment for their clients.

Assuming arguendo that petitioner's counsel did not inform him of the requirement to pay the docket fees to perfect the appeal, what we find incredible is that
petitioner apparently failed to communicate with his counsel after the filing of said appeal. This Court has repeatedly held that "litigants, represented by counsel,
should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. "It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel
from time to time in order to be informed of the progress of his case.

Moreover, the counsel's negligence binds petitioner and, for that reason alone the loss of his remedy was caused by his own negligence.

Consequently, a relaxation of the rule cannot be granted

PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES

payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional. [44] It is a condition sine qua non for the appeal to be
perfected and only then can a court acquire jurisdiction over the case. [45] The requirement of an appeal fee is not a mere technicality of law or procedure and
should not be undermined except for the most persuasive of reasons. Non-observance would be tantamount to no appeal being filed thereby rendering the
challenged decision, resolution or order final and executory.

warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the appeal

EXCEPTIONS (Incomplete payment)

Thus, the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for his failure to pay
the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault
on the part of the appellant.

does not apply to present case as there was not payment at all

b. Regional Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
165155, April 12, 2010

FACTS
1. Respondents are co-owners of lands being tilled by the petitioners
2. Petitioners did not pay the annual lease rentals
3. respondents filed a complaint for ejectment against petitioners before DARAB
4. DARAB- Regional Adjudicator rendered in favor of respondents
5. petitioners filed two separate notices of appeal
6. respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
7. Regional Adjudicator gave due course to the appeals
8. CA rendered notices of appeal have no legal effect

ISSUE
Whether the Notices of Appeal dated February 28, 2003 and March 3, 2003 are "mere scraps of paper" for failure to state the grounds relied upon for an appeal

HELD
No.
Both Notices of Appeal stated that the petitioners were appealing the decision "on the grounds of questions of fact and of law," which we find sufficient statement
of the ground for appeal under Section 2(a), Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules. While the notices omitted to state that "the decision would cause grave and irreparable
damage and injury to the appellant," we find such punctilious fidelity to the language of the DARAB Rules unnecessary. Surely by appealing the Decision of the
Regional Adjudicator, the petitioners were already manifesting that they will be damaged by the assailed decision. Requiring a literal application of the rules when
its purpose has already been served is oppressive superfluity.

It must be stressed that the purpose of the notice of appeal is not to detail one's objections regarding the appealed decision; that is the purpose of the appellants'
memorandum. In the context of a DARAB case, the notice of appeal serves only to inform the tribunal or officer that rendered the appealed decision (i.e., the
Regional Adjudicator) of the timeliness of the appeal and of the general reason for the appeal, and to prepare the records thereof for transmission to the appellate
body (i.e., the DARAB). Petitioners' Notices of Appeal contain everything that is necessary to serve these purposes.

DARAB APPEAL
Rule XIII
APPEALS

Section 1. Appeal to the Board. a) An appeal may be taken from an order, resolution or decision of the Adjudicator to the Board by either of the parties or both,
orally or in writing, within a period of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the order, resolution or decision appealed from, and serving a copy thereof on the adverse
party, if the appeal is in writing.

b) An oral appeal shall be reduced into writing by the Adjudicator to be signed by the appellant, and a copy thereof shall be served upon the adverse party within
ten (10) days from the taking of the oral appeal.

Section 2. Grounds. The aggrieved party may appeal to the Board from a final order, resolution or decision of the Adjudicator on any of the following grounds:

a) That errors in the findings of fact or conclusions of laws were committed which, if not corrected, would cause grave and irreparable damage and injury to the
appellant;

b) That there is a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Adjudicator; or

c) That the order, resolution or decision is obtained through fraud or coercion.

xxx

Section 5. Requisites and Perfection of the Appeal. a) The Notice of Appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided for in Section 1 of this Rule. It
shall state the date when the appellant received the order or judgment appealed from and the proof of service of the notice to the adverse party; and

b) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) shall be paid by the appellant within the reglementary period to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the
Adjudicators is situated. x x x
8. Residual Jurisdiction
a. Fernandez v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 131094, 16
May 2005

FACTS
1. Respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against the petitioner
2. MeTc dismissed the Complaint for lack of sufficient cause of action
3. RTC reversed MeTC decision and Fernandez to pay rental arrearages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs
4. On 28 June 1994, Fernandez received a copy of the decision.
5. On 12 July 1994 or 14 days after receipt of the decision, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
6. On 29 November 1994, Fernandez received an order denying his motion for reconsideration.
7. On 01 December 1994, Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review which was granted.
8. On 09 December 1994, Fernandez filed a Motion for New Trial before RTC
9. RTC denied the Motion for New Trial. It explained that when Fernandez went to the Court of Appeals and filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review, and the Court of Appeals accordingly acted on the same by granting the extension sought, jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
the parties and the subject matter had already attached

ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE MERE FILING BY PETITIONER OF A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW (WHICH INTENTION
[sic] WAS LATER WITHDRAWN), AUTOMATICALLY DIVESTED THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC) OF ITS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, AS TO
ENTERTAIN A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

HELD
Yes. Fernandez's motion for new trial was filed out of time and the period to appeal cannot be extended

He filed a motion for reconsideration fourteen (14) days after receipt of the decision. The motion was denied and he had only the remaining one (1) day to file a
motion for new trial which day fell on 01 December 1994. Since 30 November 1994 was a holiday, Fernandez had up to 01 December 1994 to file the motion for
new trial. Extant from the records, instead of a motion for new trial, he filed before the Court of Appeals on 01 December 1994 the motion for extension of time to
file petition for review. Thereafter, and pending the resolution of his motion before the Court of Appeals, Fernandez went back to the RTC and filed on 09
December 1994 a motion for new trial.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

The motion for new trial suspends the running of the period to appeal but does not extend the time within which an appeal must be perfected

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

● The fifteen (15)-day period for filing a motion for new trial cannot be extended.
 ● motions for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed only in connection with cases pending before the Supreme
Court. No such motion may be filed before any lower courts

RESIDUAL JURISDICTION
The residual jurisdiction of the trial court is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter
involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the
transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal

RTC
The appellate jurisdiction of the trial court is to be juxtaposed with its residual jurisdiction as set forth in Rule 42, Section 8(a), 3rd paragraph of the Rules of Court.
Before the Court of Appeals gives due course to a Petition for Review, the RTC retains jurisdiction for specified instances enumerated therein, to wit:
(1) To issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, such as, the appointment
of a receiver, and the issuance of writs of preliminary attachment or preliminary injunction.

(2) To approve compromises.

(3) To permit appeals of indigent litigants.

(4) To order execution pending appeal in accordance with section 2 of Rule 39.

(5) To allow withdrawal of the appeal.[40]

9. Appeal from judgment or final

orders of the MTC, MeTC,
MTC in cities, MCTC

10. Appeal from judgments or final

orders of the RTC
Ordinary Appeal Cases (Rules
40-41):

1. Encarnacion v. Amigo,
G.R. No. 169793, 15
September 2006

FACTS
1. Petitioner filed an ejectment case against the petitioner before the MTC
 2. MTC rendered in favor of the petitioner
3. RTC dismissed the case on the ground that MTC had no jurisdiction over the case

ISSUE
W/N RTC should dismiss the case

HELD
No. The case is remanded to RTC for further proceedings

The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC
on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the
case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest
of justice.

APPEAL TO RTC
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:

dismissal without trial on merits

SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. - If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case
without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be.
In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the
case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further proceedings.

Trial on merits
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it
has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.

2. Canlas v. Tubil G.R. No.

184285, 25 September
2009

Petition for Review Rule 42

Cases:

1. Ross Rica Sales v. Ong,

G.R. No. 132197, 16
August 2005

FACTS
1. petitioners filed a complaint for ejectment against the respondents
2. MTC rendered in favor of the petitioners
3. RTC affirmed MTC decision
4. On 28 April 1995, respondents received a copy of the decision
5. On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a notice of appeal.
6. On May 9, 1987, they filed a motion for reconsideration.
7. On 23 June 1997, the RTC issued an Order which concurrently
a. gave due course to respondents' notice of appeal filed on 8 May 1997;
b. denied their motion for reconsideration dated 9 May 1997 (declared that the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of
Appeal), and
c. granted petitioners' motion for immediate execution pending appeal.
8. On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion for an additional period of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for
Review.
9. On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review

ISSUE
W/N the petition for review was filed w/in the reglementary period

HELD
Yes.

Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and
not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following day.
Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule
contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal.

Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial
of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.

2. LBP v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 190660, 11
August 2011

3. Macawiwili Gold Mining

and Development Co.,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 115104, October
12, 1998

4. Anderson v. Ho, G.R. No.

172590, 7 January 2013

5. Heirs of Garcia I v.
Municipality of Iba,
Zambales, G.R. No.
162217, July 22, 2015

6. Intramuros Administration
v. Offshore Construction
Development Co., G.R.
No. 196795, March 7,
2018

11. Appeal to the Court of Appeals

12. Appeal from judgments or final
orders of the CA
13. Petition for Review Rule 45

14. Rule 45 vs. Rule 65; Question

of Law v. Question of Fact

a. Republic v. Mercadera,
G.R. No. 186027,
December 8, 2010

b. Asian Terminals, Inc. v.

Simon Enterprises, Inc.,
G.R. No. 177116,
February 27, 2013

c. Maza v. Turla, G.R. No.

187094, February 15, 2017
d. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No.
218901, February 15, 2017

e. Mackay v. Angeles, G.R.

No. 144230 (Resolution),
September 30, 2003

15. Appeal from judgments or final

orders of the Sandibanbayan

16. Appeal from judgments or final

orders of the CTA

17. Review from judgments or

final orders of the COA

18. Review from judgments or

final orders of the COMELEC

19. Review from judgments or

final orders of the CSC

20. Review from judgments or

final orders of the Ombudsman

21. Review from judgments or

final orders of the NLRC

22. Review from judgments or

final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies

Petition for Review Rule 43

Cases:

1. Fabian v. Desierto, G.R.

No. 129742, September
16, 1998

2. Lanting v. Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 141426, May 6,
2005

3. St. Martin Funeral Home

v. NLRC, G.R. No.
130866, September 16,
1998

4. Alcaraz v. Gonzales, G.R.

No. 164715, 20 September
2006
c. Relief from judgments, orders and
other proceedings

• Purcon v. MRM Philippines,

G.R. No. 182718, 26 September
2008

1. petitioner filed a complaint for NLRC Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint a. petitioner was an employee of the
reimbursement of medical expenses, respondent
sickness allowance and permanent b. he worked overtime due to the
disability benefits with prayer for pressure of his work
compensatory, moral and exemplary c. acquired aliment during work
damages and attorney’s fees before
the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC

2. petitioner filed an appeal to NLRC Third NLRC dismissed the appeal

Division

3. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari CA dismissed the petition

(rule 65) before the CA

4. petitioner filed with SC a petition for SC denied the petition

review on certiorari (rule 45)

5. petitioner filed the instant petition for SC denied the petition on the ff grounds (below)
relief from judgment of SC

DOCTRINES
1. A petition for relief from judgment is not an available remedy in the Supreme Court/CA
2. Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.
○ As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule as it now allows the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court which decided
the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief
○ The procedural change in Rule 38 is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for Municipal and Regional Trial Courts13 and
designation of Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record
 3. Finally, it is a settled rule that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the loss
of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or a mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, the petition for relief will be tantamount
to reviving the right of appeal which has already been lost either because of inexcusable negligence or due to mistaken mode of procedure
by counsel
○ In exceptional cases, when the mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross negligence, this Court affords a party a
second opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioner has
squandered the various opportunities available to him at the different stages of this case. Public interest demands an end to every
litigation and a belated effort to reopen a case that has already attained finality will serve no purpose other than to delay the
administration of justice.

SUPREME COURT
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence,
a party in any court may file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56 , which enumerates the
original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court , thus:

a. Rule 56
Section 1. Original cases cognizable. – Only petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus, disciplinary proceedings
against members of the judiciary and attorneys, and cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls may be filed originally in the
Supreme Court.

b. Question of Law
If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot be availed of in the
Supreme Court. This Court entertains only questions of law. A petition for relief raises questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court.

COURT OF APPEALS
There is no provision in the Rules of Court making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this Court. The procedure in the CA from Rules 44
to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available before said Court such as annulment of
judgments or final orders or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief under
Rule 38 mentioned.

• Valencia v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 119118, February 19,
2001
Respondents: THE PEOPLE OF BO. STA. CRUZ, PAOMBONG, BULACAN

1. respondents filed a INTERLOCUTORY ORDER a. the fishpond was

complaint for declaration of registered under the name
nullity of the OCT in the RTC issued a resolution enjoing of RCBM
name of RCBM before the RCBM and co-defendants as well b. Valencia entered into a
RTC alleging they were the as all persons claiming under lease agreement with
true owners of the fishpond them from leasing the fishpond RCBM
○ they also prayed or from implementing the lease
for issuance of
injunction to
prevent RCBM
from leasing the
fishpond

2. petitioner filed an answer in FINAL ORDER

intervention with a counterclaim
RTC issued judgment upholding
the validity of RCBM's title and
its lease contract with petitioner.

However, he dismissed
petitioner's counterclaim for lack
of evidence

3. petitioner filed a petition for RTC deferred action on the petition

relief from the portion of the for relief
judgment dismissing his
counterclaim
- where he alleged that
his failure to move for
reconsideration of or
appeal from said
judgment was due to a
mistaken belief of his
former counsel that he
was no longer
interested to pursue
the counterclaim.

4. Pending appeal, petitioner filed CA dismissed the petition

 with the CA a petition for
certiorari and mandamus

5. petitioner filed a petition for SC denied the petition and ruled

review before the SC a. A petition for relief under Rule 38 is only available against a
final and executory judgment. In this case, the trial court's
judgment subject of the petition for relief has not yet
attained finality because of the timely appeal by private
respondents. Therefore, petitioner cannot require the judge to
follow the procedure laid down in Rule 38.
b. Corollarily, the Court of Appeals did not err in failing to
annul the portion of the trial court's judgment dismissing
petitioner's counterclaim for lack of due process. This can
well be settled in the petition for relief before the trial court.
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court19 provides that
parties can avail of the action for annulment of judgment
when a petition for relief is no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner. In the present case, the latter remedy
was still available.

DOCTRINE
A petition for relief under Rule 38 is only available against a final and executory judgment.

• Gomez v. Montalban, G.R. No.

174414, 14 March 2008

1. petitioner filed a complaint for sum of RTC decided in favor the petitioner a. respondent obtained a loan from the
money, damages and attorney’s fees petitioner
before the RTC b. he failed to pay despite several demands

2. respondent filed a petition for relief RTC granted the petition The summons was received by one Mrs. Alicia
- alleging that there was no effective dela Torre, who was not authorized to receive
service of summons upon her since summons or other legal pleadings or
there was no personal service of the documents on respondent’s behalf. Respondent
same. attributes her failure to file an Answer to fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence.
 3. petitioner filed directly before this court SC granted the petition and ruled

a. a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is only available against a final
and executory judgment.
○ Since respondent allegedly received a copy of the Decision dated 4 May 2004
on 14 May 2004, and she filed the Petition for Relief from Judgment on 28 May
2004, judgment had not attained finality. The 15-day period to file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal had not yet lapsed. Hence, resort by respondent to a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was
premature and inappropriate.
b. Under Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, the court may grant relief from
judgment only "[w]hen a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is
taken against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence
○ In the case at bar, there being no fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence that would have prevented petitioner from filing either a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review on certiorari of the 4 May 2004 Decision
of the RTC, her resort to a Petition for Relief from Judgment was unwarranted.

MISTAKE
As used in Section 1, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, "mistake" refers to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case.30 The word
"mistake," which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have
committed in the trial. Such errors may be corrected by means of an appeal.31This does not exist in the case at bar, because respondent has in no
wise been prevented from interposing an appeal.

FRAUD
"Fraud," on the other hand, must be extrinsic or collateral, that is, the kind which prevented the aggrieved party from having a trial or presenting his
case to the court,32or was used to procure the judgment without fair submission of the controversy.33This is not present in the case at hand as
respondent was not prevented from securing a fair trial and was given the opportunity to present her case.

NEGLIGENCE
Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.34 Under Section 1, the "negligence"
must be excusable and generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client.35 To follow a contrary
rule and allow a party to disown his counsel’s conduct would render proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the mere
subterfuge of replacing counsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erring counsel and not ask for the
reversal of the court’s ruling.36

DOCTRINE
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other available or adequate
remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the
trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot
avail himself of this petition. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru
inexcusable negligence .

*********
The distinction between questions of law and questions of fact has long been settled. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of probative
value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to
the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, the existence
and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

• Victory Liner v. Malinias, G.R.

No. 151170, 29 May 2007

SAME below

• Madarang v. Spouses Morales,

G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

1. respondents filed a complaint for judicial RTC decided in favor the respondents a. Sps. Morales loaned to Sps. Bartolome
foreclosure of the lot of the petitioner b. Sps. Bartolome mortgage their property to
before the RTC secure the loan
c. They did not pay the loan

2. petitioners filed a motion for recon RTC denied. Their motion for reconsideration a. In this case, petitioners, through
did not toll the 15-day period to appeal. counsel, received a copy of the trial
court’s decision on January 29, 2010.
3. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal RTC denied for being filed out of time
b. They personally received a copy of the
4. Petitioners filed a petition for relief RTC denied for being filed out of time decision only on August 11, 2011.
- blaming their 80-year-old lawyer who
failed to file the notice of appeal
within the reglementary period
 5. petitioners filed a filed the petition for certiorari CA denied
with CA

6. SC denied

a. This court agrees that the petition for relief from judgment was filed out of time.
○ However, the trial court erred in counting the 60-day period to file a petition for
relief from the date of finality of the trial court’s decision.

DOUBLE PERIOD
Rule 38, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear that the 60-day period must be
counted after petitioner learns of the judgment or final order. The period counted from the finality
of judgment or final order is the six-month period.

SIX MONTH PERIOD

Petitioners cannot argue that the period to appeal should be counted from August 11, 2011, the
day petitioners personally received a copy of the trial court’s decision. Notice of judgment on the
counsel of record is notice to the client. Since petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the
decision on January 29, 2010, the period to appeal shall be counted from that date.

Thus, the decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on February 13, 2010.
Petitioners had six (6) months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010, to file a
petition for relief from judgment. Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment on
September 24, 2010, the petition for relief from judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from
finality of judgment. The trial court should have denied the petition for relief from judgment on
this ground.

b. The mere allegation that there is excusable negligence simply because counsel was 80 years
old is a prejudicial slur to senior citizens. It is based on an unwarranted stereotype of people in
their advanced years. It is as empty as the bigotry that supports it.

EXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE
If the petition for relief is filed on the ground of excusable negligence of counsel, parties must
show that their counsel’s negligence could not have been prevented using ordinary diligence and
prudence.

d. Annulment of judgments or final

orders and resolutions
• Republic v. De Castro, G.R. No.
189724, 7 February 2011
FACTS
1. petitioner filed a complaint for cancellation of the TCT in the name of the respondents and reversion of the subject prop to the Republic against Manipon
before the RTC
a. Manipon acquired the subj prop by virtue of a free patent
b. Manipon sold it to the respondents
c. later, the free patent issued to Manipon was showed that the lot is not an alienable and disposable land of the public domain
2. respondents failed to file their answer to the complaint
3. respondents were declared in default
4. respondents filed a motion to lift the order of default
5. RTC denied the motion
6. Following the ex parte presentation of evidence by petitioner, the trial court rendered a Decision6 dated October 9,2002 in its favor nullifying Manipon’s
Free Patent No. V-16555 and respondents’ TCT No. T-33730; ordering thereversion of the lot to the State
7. No motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision; thus decision became final and executory
8. RTC issued a writ of execution pursuant to motion filed by the petitioner
9. respondents filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the CA on the ground that:
a. the trial court’s decision did not attain finality as they did notreceive a copy of its decision, hence, the execution thereof was void.
10. CA denied the petition
11. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari (rule 45)

ISSUE
W/N the petition for annulment of judgment should be granted

HELD
No.

CASE
he allegedly learnedof the cases filed against him when the writs of execution were issued against him. At thevery least then, he could have moved to quash the
writs of execution. In the alternative, he could have filed apetition for relief from judgment under Rule 38.

DOCTRINE
before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment ofjudgments, final orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must
have failed to move for new trialin, or appeal from, or file a petition forrelief against said issuances or take other appropriate remedies thereon, through no fault
attributable to him. If hefailed to avail of those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the action for annulmentprovided in Rule 47, for
otherwise he would benefit from his own inaction or negligence
• Victory Liner v. Malinias, G.R.
No, 151170, 29 May 2007

vehicular collision

Parties Court

1. respondent filed complaint for sum of MTC rendered decision in favor of the respondent
money and damages before MTC

2. Petitioner filed a motion for MTC ruled that the motion for recon was defective
reconsideration due to non compliance with the mandatory
requirements of the notice of hearing; such motion
was a mere scrap of paper; thus did not suspend
the period to appeal

3. petitioner filed a notice of appeal MTC ruled that the notice of appeal has been filed Instead of filing a notice of appeal, petitioner should
beyond the reglementary period availed either of the ff:

4. MTC judgment had long become final and 1. Certiorari has as its object the
executory nullification of the MTC Order on the
basis that it was rendered with grave
5. Petitioner filed a petition for relief from MTC denied the petition for it had been filed out of abuse of discretion,
judgment time 2. while a petition for relief seeks that the
MTC allow the appeal despite the
finality of judgment on the ground that
petitioner was prevented from taking an
appeal due to fraud, accident, mistake,
or excusable negligence.

6. petitioner filed a motion for recon MTC denied

7. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari RTC denied

(Rule 65) with the RTC

8. petitioner filed a motion for recon RTC denied

9. petitioner for certiorari to Annul Judgment CA denied on the ff grounds:

of the RTC before the CA 1. petitioner’s failure to comply with the
 a. verification requirements in the execution of the
b. cert against forum shopping verification and certification against
forum-shopping,
a. counsel. of the petitioner filed the
petition
b. belatedly submitted the
certificate of authority
2. and the petition’s reliance on the
ground of extrinsic fraud which could
have been raised or availed of in a
motion for new trial or petition for
relief.

10. petition for review (rule 45) SC denied the petition and ruled
1. the requirements can be relaxed under the rule on substantial compliance
2. did not concur with CA but petitioner is mostly to blame by filing the wrong remedy

All the errors could have been avoided had petitioner, at the onset, recognized that the judicial system deemed the original MTC Judgment dated 13
January 1998 as having become final and executory after no valid motion for reconsideration was filed thereto. On many levels, there existed ample
remedies to undo such deleterious consequence, yet petitioner ended up each time selecting the wrong answer among the varied options. In the end,
all petitioner accomplished was to persistently water a dead plant.

• Islamic Da'wah Council of the

Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 80892, September 29,
1989

FACTS
1. The Council instituted foreclosure proceedings before the RTC
a. Da Silvas executed a promissory note in favor of the Council
b. real estate mortgage over the parcel of land of Da Silva was executed as a security of the payment of his obligation
2. The parties submitted a compromise agreement to the RTC whereby the parties agreed to convey the subject property to the Council
3. RTC approved the compromise agreement
4. a TCT of the subject property was issued in the name of the Council
5. Araneta filed an affidavit of adverse claim with RD over the subject property
6. the Council filed in the RTC a complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against Araneta
7. the heirs of Jesus Amado Araneta, private respondents herein, filed with the CA a petition to annul the RTC judgment for foreclosure
8. petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the judgment can be annulled
9. Hence, this petition for certiorari (Rule 65)
ISSUES
W/N the judgment can be annulled on the ff. grounds:
1. judgment already fully executed
2. they are foreign to the transaction of mortgage between petitioner and Da Silvas

HELD

1. Yes

In Garchitorena u. Sotelo, supra, the Court affirmed the trial court's annulment of the judgment on foreclosure notwithstanding the fact that ownership
of the house and lot subject of the mortgage had passed from the mortgagee who foreclosed the mortgage and purchased the property at public
auction to a person who bought the same and finally to another individual in whose name the Torrens certificate of title stood by the time the case
reached this Tribunal.

A judgment which has been fully executed can be annulled; not only the final and executory

2. Yes

In this present case it is true that the heirs of Araneta are not parties to the foreclosure case. Neither are they principally nor secondarily bound by
the judgment rendered therein. However. their petition filed with the Court of Appeals they alleged fraud and connivance perpetuated by and between
the Da Silvas and the Council as would adversely affect them.

What is essential is that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely
affected thereby.

Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The judgment may be
annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud

e. Collateral attack of judgments