Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

188 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
Gouldner’s study thus leads to important modifications of the

notion of bureaucracy as conceived by Weber. His mode of
analysis focuses upon the way in which the human element of
organisation modifies the formal or technical aspect. His study of
the way in which bureaucracy develops through the creation and
use of impersonal rules emphasises the unanticipated conse-
quences which result because of their effect upon interpersonal
relations within the organisation. Rules are shown as being used by
managers and workers for fundamentally different ends and in
ways which are dysfunctional for the formal aims of the organisa-
tion. In the process of his analysis Gouldner illustrates quite
clearly that organisations as such only have goals or ends in an
abstract or ‘metaphorical1 sense, and that the reality of organisa-
tional life is one dominated by individuals and groups striving
towards different ends. As in the case of Selznick, therefore,
insofar as the focus on dysfunctions takes the analysis of organisa-
tion away from the social system postulate of functional unity, a
pluralist view of organisation emerges, though it is not developed
to its full extent. Whose goals is the organisation trying to achieve?
For whom are the rules useful as a rational device? Questions such
as these are central topluralist views and emerge quite clearly from
Gouldner’s analysis.
A fourth study relating to the dysfunctional aspects of
bureaucratic organisation is presented in Peter Blau’s The Dynam-
ics o f Bureaucracy (1955). In this work Blau sets out to apply the
principles contained in M erton's ‘paradigm for functional analysis’
to the daily operations and interpersonal relations of government
officials in two bureaucratic agencies. His analysis focuses upon
the factors which generate disequilibrium and change within the
organisation, and confirms many of the bureaucratic dysfunctions
identified by Merton and his colleagues, such as overconformity
and goal displacement. It demonstrates how bureaucracies, far
from being the static structures supposedly envisaged in W eber’s
ideal type, are the scenes of an ongoing process of interpersonal
relationships which generate new elements of organisation. The
study also demonstrates the part played by the latent as opposed to
the manifest functions of bureaucratic procedure. Blau’s analysis
of the way in which employee performance is evaluated through
the use of statistical records, for example, demonstrates that in
addition to serving as a performance control, the system also has
the latent function of maintaining cordial relations between super-
visors and subordinates. The study emphasises the importance
of tracing these unanticipated consequences as a basis for under-
Functionalist Organisation Theory 189
standing the true significance of any particular organisational
characteristic. It clearly demonstrates the futility of confining
attention solely to the rational or manifest functions of organisa-
tion. In Blau’s analysis such factors are seen as lying at the heart of
explanations of organisational change. Bureaucratic structure,
like other aspects of social structure, is seen as generating forces
which lead to its own transformation.
This work of Merton, Selznick, Gouldnerand Blau thus presents
a coherent and systematically developed critique of the notion of
bureaucracy they saw as reflected in W eber's ideal type.40 Coming
as it did in the wake of the Hawthorne studies and the development
of the human relations movement, it is understandable that so
much attention should be devoted to the human or informal
aspects of organisation. However, in contrast to the perspective
reflected in the human relations movement and, indeed, social
system theory in general, the work of Merton and his colleagues
was specifically addressed to providing explanations of change in
social systems. They sought to inject a dynamic element into the
functionalist perspective. As we argued in Chapter 4, the notion of
‘dysfunction’ and its corollary, ‘functional autonom y’, contained
the potential for a radically different theory of organisation. How-
ever, with the exception of Gouldner’s steps in this direction in his
article ‘Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory’ (1959),
this path was not followed. As we shall argue in a later chapter, it
was left to theorists approaching organisations from a fundamen-
tally different standpoint to develop the implications of this line of
enquiry.41 Merton and his colleagues were largely content to dwell
upon the implications which their modified version of functional-
ism suggested.
The Action Frame of Reference

As will be clear from our discussion in Chapter 4, social action
theory or the action frame of reference is a perspective
characteristic of the most subjectivist boundary of the
functionalist paradigm. We have demonstrated how, along with
behavioural symbolic interactionism, it has developed largely as a
result of the fusion between positivist and idealist approaches to
social science. Whereas the action frame of reference was first
articulated by Max Weber, symbolic interactionism is largely the
product of the theoretical perspectives of Simmel and Mead.
Strictly speaking, it would be appropriate to give consideration
to both these schools of thought in any detailed analysis of the
theory of organisations, since, as we have argued, whilst reflecting
a similar perspective in terms of the subjective—objective
dimension of our analytical scheme, their focus of attention is
often somewhat different. However, we shall not do so here
because, for one reason or another, symbolic interactionism has,
in a pure sense, had relatively little impact upon the theory of
organisations. Whilst there have been many studies of interaction
at work, they have rarely been true to the assumptions
characteristic of the subjectivist region of the paradigm. More
often than not such studies have been conducted within the con-
text of a systems approach to organisations (for example, Homans,
1950; Lupton, 1963) or have been cast as studies of ‘deviant
behaviour’ or ‘informal organisation' (for example, Roy, 1960).
Yet others have ended up as an abstracted form of empiricism.
Similarly, the action frame of reference has rarely been con-
ceptualised or implemented in the pure form envisaged by Weber.
Its adherents have often taken as much of a lead from writers such
as Schutz, Blumer, Mead or even Merton as they have from
W eber.42 The lack of appreciation of the basic ontological .epi-
stemological and methodological assumptions which differentiate
the perspectives of these key writers has often led to hybrid
schemes of analysis which one can say are characteristic of the
subjectivist boundary of the functionalist paradigm but no more.
For this reason we are going to discuss them all under the heading
of the action frame of reference which, at least in Britain, has been
generally used as a label for describing a major proportion of the
work to be considered here. Whilst the work of Goffman and
Turner can be regarded as typical of symbolic interactionism, the
work of Goldthorpe and Silverman is more explicitly aligned with
the action frame of reference. However, this division, for the
reasons discussed above, is by no means a rigid one, there being
many points of overlap, particularly between the perspectives of
Goffman, Turner and Silverman.
Erving Goffman has established himself as the foremost expo-
nent of the ‘dramaturgical’ approach to symbolic interactionism. A
product of the Chicago School of sociology, the principal
orientation of his work has been to demonstrate the way in which
individuals shape and influence their social reality. One of his
earliest and most famous works, The Presentation o f S elf in
Everyday Life (1959), offers a view of individuals in ordinary work
situations as engaged in a ‘theatrical performance’, in a process of
Im pression management', as putting on a show through which
they attempt to guide and control the impressions which people
form of them. The purpose of Goffman’s analysis is to identify the
features which characterise the patterns of everyday life. In line
with the perspective of Si mmel, he is concerned to penetrate to the
underlying ‘form ’ of human affairs. As he observes in the introduc-
tion to another of his books, he is interested in building up a picture
of human interaction from basic elements such as glances,
gestures, positioning and verbal statements, with a view to
uncovering the normative order of social affairs (Goffman, 1967).
His analyses focus upon the rituals and routines which
characterise human interaction.
However, Goffman does not restrict himself merely to the study
of the rules. He is also concerned to show how people relate to
them, either conforming or adapting them to their purposes. Roles
and institutional patterns are not seen as determining individual
behaviour in any sense; rather, they provide a framework within
which the process of social life is acted out. Ontologically, in the
tradition of behavioural symbolic interactionism, society is seen as
being prior to self, but the individual is accorded a creative role in
the production of self, or at least the impression of self created as a
result of performance management. In these respects Goffman’s
analysis of interaction is much more subjectivist in orientation
than that of many other interactionists operating within the
functionalist paradigm. Compare his work, for example, with the
studies of behaviour in organisations offered by those theorists
who cast their analysis within a more managerially orientated
frame of reference and emphasise the systemic nature of life in an
organisational context (for example, Lupton, 1963; Roy, 1960).
Goffman’s approach to the analysis of human interaction clearly
has implications for the study of behaviour in organisations in a
general sense. In addition, Goffman himself has made a number of
studies of institutional behaviour, particularly within the context
of mental institutions. On the basis of these studies he has offered
an analysis of the nature of Total institutions', a term which is used
to characterise organisations such as prisons, mental hospitals,
concentration camps, ships, monastries, etc., in which people
spend whole periods of their lives, sleeping, playing and working
within institutional boundaries. Goffman depicts such institutions
as being characterised by the fact that all aspects of life are con-
ducted in the same place and under the same single authority; that
each member is in the company of a large group of others who are
treated alike and required to do the same things together; that the
phases of the days’ activities are tightly scheduled, with the
patterns imposed from above; that the various enforced activities
are brought together to form a single rational plan supposedly
designed to fulfil the official aims of the institution (Goffman,
1961).
For Goffman one of the most important aspects of such institu-
tions is that, whilst the authorities attempt to define the situation
for the inmates - through rules, regulations, indoctrination, dis-
cipline, etc. - the individuals who live within them ‘make out’ by
adjusting in various ways. They ‘develop a life of their own that
becomes meaningful, reasonable and normal once you get close to
it’ (Goffman, 1961, p. 7). Such adjustments take the form of ‘con-
formity’ (behaving as a ‘normal’ member) or it may be achieved
through unauthorised means. Goffman's work focuses upon these
adjustment processes, revealing what he calls the ‘underlife’ of the
organisation - the ways in which inmates ‘make out’ in an attempt
to defend themselves against the onslaught of the system upon
their impressions of self.
As Eldridge and Crombie (1974), have noted, in addition to
illuminating the concept of self, Goffman's study of ‘total institu-
tions’ also informs us about the processes of social control within
them and teaches us generally about the life and mechanisms
which operate in all formal organisations. Those who are familiar
with Goffman’s work can approach the interactionist-type studies
reflected in the work of more management-orientated theorists,
such as those referred to earlier, with a fresh and critical eye. The
difference in approach reflects their relative positions with regard
to the subjective—objective dimension of our analytical scheme.
Another example of interactionist research, of relevance to the
study of organisations and characteristic of the subjectivist region
of the functionalist paradigm, is presented by Barry Turner in his
monograph Exploring the Industrial Subculture (1971). Turner
was a member of Joan W oodward’s research team investigating
management control within organisations, a piece of work
characteristic of social system theory in the more objectivist
region of the paradigm (Woodward, 1972). Turner informs us that
his own particular book was written as a result of his dissatisfac-
tion with the prevailing forms of organisational analysis in general
and the management control project in particular. He was con-
cerned about the high levels of abstraction which characterised
much of this work and its remoteness from what seemed to him to
be ‘real’ industrial life. He was more interested in developing a
sociology of organisations which concerned itself ‘with discover-
ing the way in which people in industry define their life-positions,
with learning the sets of symbolisms which they adopt in the
definitions, and with examining the collective or organisational
consequences of these views which they hold of themselves’
(Turner, 1971, p. vii). In the course of his research for the
management control project, he also kept notes on his own
informal research observations of life in the organisation with
which he was concerned. It is this informal material which
provides the basis for his analysis of the industrial subculture.
Having collected his data, Turner searched the literature for
relevant concepts and theories which would make sense of his field
of observations, and he informs us in the course of his book that the
ideas of Schutz, Berger and Luckmann, and Weber had particular
relevance. From Schutz he seems to take the view that one of the
tasks of sociologists should be to analyse the ‘taken for granted’
assumptions of everyday life. Turner sets out to do this with regard
to what he calls the ‘industrial subculture’ - a feature of organisa-
tional life worthy of understanding in its own right but which most
researchers take for granted or dismiss in summary terms.
Although Turner takes Schutz as his point of reference, his
analysis is by no means representative of the phenomenological
sociology to be discussed in our chapter on the interpretive para-
digm. Rather, it is much more orientated towards an analysis of
‘meaning’, fused with the concerns of what we have described as
‘behavioural symbolic interactionism’. The general orientation of
Turner’s study is clearly indicated in his opening paragraph, in
which he defines his view of the notion of ‘subculture’ and the way
in which it is maintained. As he puts it,
A subculture is a distinctive sei of meanings shared by a group of

people whose forms of behaviour differ to some extent from those of
wider society. The distinctive nature of the set of meanings is
maintained by ensuring that newcomers to the group undergo a process
of learning or socialisation. The process links the individual to the
values of the group, and generates common motives, common reaction
patterns and common perceptual habits. Distinctiveness is also
maintained by the use of sanctions which are operated against those
who do not behave in appropriate ways. (Turner, 1971, p. 1)
Turner is thus concerned to study the way in which subcultures

evolve and are sustained. His focus is upon ‘meaning’ and the way
in which it becomes shared through ‘communicative exchanges’.
In his analysis of meaning Turner again makes reference to the
work of Schutz, particularly in relation to the notion of ‘reflexiv-
ity \ though, in point of fact, his overall perspective on this is much
more closely related to the symbolic interaction model outlined by
Rose discussed in Chapter 4. There is undoubted confusion with
regard to ontology in this aspect of Turner's work. In contrast to
the Schutzian position, Turner's ontology is much more realist in
nature. However, this aside, his primary concern is to follow
Schutz in the study of the nature of meaning patterns and the
mechanisms by which they are conveyed. In this he pays consider-
able attention to the role of language and the ritualistic role of
objects.
Turner’s thorough and clearly presented analysis of basic con-
cepts and their relationship to his empirical evidence results in a
valuable study of the informal aspects of organisational life. His
perspective is a very refreshing one. In contrast to most
interactionist studies of informal organisation, which are often
implicitly informed by a managerial perspective which regards
‘informal’ as ‘deviant’, Turner approaches the industrial sub-
culture on its own terms. He is concerned to reveal it for what it is,
without bringing in too many assumptions and preconceptions in
advance of detailed an aly sis. A lthough aspiring to a
phenomenological perspective, for reasons which have been
argued above, it should be regarded as a piece of theory and
research on organisational life typical of the subjectivist region of
the functionalist paradigm.
A third example of theory and research typical of this region of
the paradigm is found in the work of those members of the Chicago
School who have concerned themselves with the sociology of
occupations. Among these Everett Hughes is particularly promi-
nent for the work which he himself has conducted (for example,
Hughes, 1958) and for his influence upon other scholars who have
chosen to follow his lead. Their work is characterised by an
attempt to penetrate to the level of subjective meaning in an
exploration of occupational roles. In contrast to other role
theorists, who often tend to be concerned with the structural
aspects of role and tangible role behaviour, the Chicago theorists
have interested themselves in the study of what work means for the
individual, and the way in which this is related to attitudes and
relationships within the work place. These theorists tend to start
with the individual and build out from there in the construction of
his organisational world. Thus we are given an inside view of what
it is like to be ‘in the basem ent' as an apartment janitor or to be a
cab-driver relating to his ‘fares' (Gold, 1964; Davis, 1967). Taken
together, such studies build up a picture of work experience in
contemporary society, as viewed by the workers themselves
rather than by a ‘detached' observer.43 The approach draws
heavily upon ethnographic accounts and participant observation
techniques, and tends to focus upon process as opposed to static
structure as a means of characterising the principal features of
the world of work and everyday life.
The work of the occupational sociologists moves very close to
the use of an action frame of reference, in that they are primarily
concerned with the general orientation of individuals to their roles
and with the meaning of work at a subjective level. A similar
perspective characterises the work of Goldthorpe and his col-
leagues (1968), in their study of industrial workers' orientations to
work, though little explicit interest is shown in the analysis of
subjective meaning as such, particularly in its processual and
emergent aspects.44 Their study of ‘affluent’ manual workers in
the context of their industrial employment attempts to describe
and explain ‘orientations to work’. This perspective has much in
common with W eber's attempt to construct a typology of social
action based on four kinds of orientations - traditional, emotional,
value-rational and purposively rational. Goldthorpe and his col-
leagues do not employ W eber's typology as such or, for that
matter, make much reference to his work, though there are clear
and obvious links. They argue that among the workers studied a
particular orientation to work is predominant - one of a markedly
instrumental kind. As Eldridge (1971) has noted, the analysis of
Goldthorpe et al is closely linked to the use of reference group
analysis, in that one of the primary concerns of the research is to
examine the relationship between orientations to work and the
worker's place in the class structure. This research on orientation
to work is cast within the context of a wider study concerned to test
the widely acknowledged thesis of working-class embourgeoise-
ment: that is, as manual workers and their families become more
affluent, they become progressively assimilated into the middle
class. Thus in this study the action frame of reference is given a
background role; it is a tool to be used in relation to but a small part
of the research project as a whole. It does, however, present one of
the few well-known British attempts to operationalise the action
frame of reference, albeit in this limited sense.
Most prominent among the advocates of the action frame of
reference as a basis for organisational analysis has been the name
of David Silverman. Indeed, it was he who, for the most part,
introduced the term to organisation theorists, arguing in his book
The Theory o f Organisations (1970) that it provides an alternative
1% Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis
to systems theory. Silverman suggests that the systems approach,
as applied to organisations, has 'severe logical difficulties',
particularly in its assumption that organisations as systems have
‘needs’ or are ‘self-regulating’.45 He points out that to attribute
such characteristics to organisations, except as a heuristic device,
involves the problem of ‘reification’, a process whereby social
constructs are accorded the power of thought and action. He
argues that explanations of social change at a systems level usually
involves these problems of reification, since attention is drawn to
the purposive actions of the system , which is seen as recognising
threats to its existence and as adapting accordingly. The systems
view of organisations is thus seen as being pitched at a level of
analysis which does not take into account, or provide explanations
in terms of, the actions of the individual human beings who are its
constituent members. In opposition to this systems view Silver-
man argues that social scientists should build their theories upon
foundations which view social reality as being socially con-
structed, socially sustained and socially changed. In other words,
Silverman wishes to place man as a social actor at the centre of
the stage, insofar as the analysis of social phenomena such as
organisations are concerned. In recognition of the fact that social
life is an ongoing process, sustained and ‘accomplished’ by social
actors, Silverman advocates the action frame of reference as pro-
viding an appropriate basis for analysis.
Silverman’s view of the action frame of reference, which is
based upon the work of a number of writers, is summarised in
terms of the following seven propositions:
1. The social sciences and the natural sciences deal with entirely
different orders of subject-matter. While the canons of rigour
and scepticism apply to both, one should not expect their
perspective to be the same.
2. Sociology is concerned with understanding action rather than
with observing behaviour. Action arises out of meanings which
define social reality.
3. Meanings are given to men by their society. Shared orientations
become institutionalised and are experienced by later genera-
tions as social facts.
4. While society defines man, man in turn defines society.
Particular constellations of meaning are only sustained by con-
tinual reaffirmation in everyday actions.
5. Through their interaction men also modify, change and trans-
form social meanings.
6. It follows that explanations of human actions must take account
of the meanings which those concerned assign to their acts; the
manner in which the everyday world is socially constructed yet
perceived as real and routine becomes a crucial concern of
sociological analysis.
7. Positivistic explanations, which assert that action is determined
by external and constraining social or non-social forces, are
inadmissible. (Silverman, 1970, pp. 126-7)
In developing these propositions Silverman draws very heavily

upon ideas characteristic of the work of Dilthey, Weber and
Schutz.46 His distinction between the subject matter which charac-
terises the natural and social sciences (Proposition 1), for example,
follows Dilthey's distinction between Naturwissenschaften
(natural sciences) and Geisteswissenschaften (cultural sciences).
As we argue in Chapter 6 on the interpretive paradigm, this dis-
tinction is central to an understanding of the German idealist
tradition of social thought. The cultural sciences were seed as being
distinguished by their essentially "spiritual* character, and it was
held that they could not be understood through the approaches and
methods of the natural sciences. The idealists rejected positivist
epistemology and the nomothetic methods employed by the natural
scientists as simply inappropriate to the realm of social and cultural
affairs. They held that man was "free* and did not behave and act in
accordance with positivist-type laws. As a means of bridging this
gap between idealist and positivist perspectives, theorists such as
Dilthey and Weber concerned themselves with problems of
"understanding* in the realm of human affairs. The notion of
verstehen or ‘interpretive understanding* which they developed
was seen as providing a method appropriate to the social sciences.
As developed by Weber, the notion of verstehen was used as a
methodological tool which drew attention to the importance of
understanding the subjective meaning which lay behind social
action. For Weber explanations of social phenomena had to be
"adequate on the level of meaning*.
It is precisely this point which Silverman seeks to emphasise in a
number of the propositions of his action schema. Proposition 2, for
example, emphasises that "sociology is concerned with under-
standing action rather than with observing behaviour*, and that
"action arises out of meanings which define social reality*. This is
firmly in line with the Weberian position. Social action is seen as
deriving from the meaning which is attributed to the social world
by individual actors. It is imperative, therefore, that the sociologist

understand these subjective meanings if he is to understand the full
significance of individual a c ts. Thus to focus upon the behaviour of
individuals in the tradition of positivist social science is to miss the
point, since patterns of behaviour may mean different things to
different people. The action of men is meaningful to them. They
construct their social world by attributing meaning to it. Action
arises from meanings, so it is necessary to understand social
activities at the level of subjective meaning. This point is again
emphasised by Silverman in Proposition 6, which states that
‘explanations of human actions must take account of the meanings
which those concerned assign to their acts; the manner in which
the everyday world is socially constructed yet perceived as real
and routine becomes a crucial concern of sociological analysis’.
In Proposition 3 Silverman asserts that ‘meanings are given to
men by their society. Shared orientations become institutionalised
and are experienced by later generations as social facts’. Here we
are concerned with the issue of ontology, and we find Silverman
adopting a ‘realist’ position in which society is seen as being
ontologically prior to man. In developing his position on this point
Silverman makes specific reference to Durkheim and the view that
men are constrained by social facts which determine their actions
and their consciousness. Following Durkheim, Silverman suggests
that meanings reside in social institutions and that individuals play
roles that are given to them as a result of their location upon the
social map. As he puts it, ‘by participating in society, they are
given expectations about the appropriate acts of themselves and of
others when in various status positions. They are able to
apprehend the meanings associated with the actions of other
people and to form a view of self based on the responses of others’
(1970, p. 131). In order to explain why people should meet the
expectations of others Silverman invokes explanations presented
by Talcott Parsons in The Social System , which emphasise the
tendency to order in social affairs - ‘common values must pre-
dominate if the system is to survive’ (1970, p. 131). Ontologically,
therefore, Silverman’s position appears to be as ‘realist’ as that of
any other theorist within the functionalist paradigm. He argues, for
example, that ‘the social world is given to us by the past history
and structure of our society’, and that ‘social reality is “ pre-
defined” in the very language in which we are socialised.
Language provides us with categories which define as well as
distinguish our experiences’ (1970, p. 132). We are thus left in no
doubt that individual actors occupy a ‘realist’ social world which is
external to the individual and has a reality which is independent of
any individual's social construction of it.
However, in Proposition 4 Silverman immediately proceeds to
qualify this 'realism ' by asserting that ‘while society defines man,
man in turn defines society’. He emphasises that 'particular con-
stellations of meaning are only sustained by continual reaffirma-
tion in everyday actions’. In developing this proposition Silverman
emphasises that whilst individual actors may operate in
accordance with the ‘common-sense’ belief that the social world
exists outside themselves, in point of fact this common-sense
notion only holds insofar as it is sustained and reinforced through
the everyday actions of the actors directly involved in any given
social situation. It thus has a precarious existence. ‘The existence
of society depends upon it being continuously confirmed in the
actions of its members’ (1970, p. 134). In support of this view he
argues, following Berger and Pullberg (1966), that social structure
‘has no reality except a human one. It is not characterisable as
being a thing able to stand on its o w n . . . [and] exists only insofar
and as long as human beings realise it as part of their world’. He
goes on to argue that to attribute to society an existence separate
from and above its members is to reify it. Again following Berger
and Pullberg, Silverman suggests that ‘social roles and institutions
exist only as an expression of the meanings which men attach to
their world - they have no “ ontological status” ’ (1970, p. 134). In
other words, Silverman is suggesting that reality is socially con-
structed. He is advocating an ontology which is essentially
‘nominalist’ in orientation.
Propositions 3 and 4 thus tend to qualify one another, in that
the former suggests a ‘realist’ ontology, and the latter a
‘nominalist’ ontology. As we shall argue in Chapter 7, Silverman is
unclear on this point in most of his work and he oscillates pre-
cariously from one position to another according to his purpose.
His overall position seems to be that whilst recognising that there
is an external world which is ontologically prior to man, its crucial
significance as far as the study of social affairs is concerned lies in
the way in which its ‘meaning’ resulted from the interpretations
placed upon it by individual actors.
In emphasising the way in which individuals have the ability to
interpret and attribute meaning to their social world, Silverman in
effect directs attention to the voluntaristic nature of human
activities. This receives specific attention in Proposition 5, which
asserts that ‘through their interaction m en. . . modify, change and
transform social meanings'. In elaborating this proposition he
places emphasis upon the ways in which individuals can choose to
interpret the roles which they play, and how they can disrupt
prevailing views of reality by engaging in disruptive activities of
one kind or another. In his analysis Silverman qualifies his position
with regard to Parsons’ view of the nature of social order referred
to earlier, and recognises that because of the choices available to
the individual, social integration may, in fact, be problematic.
In the elaboration of his action schema Silverman thus presents
a view of the social world which emphasises the processual nature
of human affairs. It is a world where human actors interpret the
situation in which they find themselves and act in ways which are
meaningful to them. Social reality is thus seen as being in a process
of continual flux, as human beings interpret and redefine, through
their actions, the world in which they live. It follows that special
methods are required to study this social world. Thus Silverman,
in line with his opening proposition on the distinction between the
natural and social sciences, concludes by asserting that
‘positivistic explanations, which assert that action is determined
by external and constraining social or non-social forces, are
inadmissible’ (Proposition 7). Explanations of social affairs must
be adequate, on the level of meaning, for the actors directly
involved. The action frame of reference is offered as a perspective
adequate for this end.
As will become apparent from our analysis in Chapter 6, Silver-
man's action approach has much more in common with the work of
Weber than with that of Schutz. Although Silverman makes
frequent reference to Schutzian concepts, his perspective is far
rem oved from the ‘ex isten tial phen o m en o lo g y ’ which
characterises Schutz's work. Silverman, in The Theory o f
Organisations, seems primarily concerned, like Weber, to develop
a method of analysis appropriate to the nature of social
phenomena, and he advocates the action frame of reference as a
method of analysing social relations within organisations. It repre-
sents a perspective characteristic of the subjectivist boundary of
the functionalist paradigm. While quite voluntarist in terms of its
assumptions with regard to the way in which individuals define and
interpret the situations in which they find themselves, it is based
upon an ontology which is essentially realist in orientation. As
advocated by Silverman, in terms of epistemology the perspective
is set against the extreme form of positivism characteristic of the
most objectivist region of the functionalist paradigm, but does not
reject the positivist approach in its entirety. Silverman, for exam-
ple, is in favour of a measure of ‘generalisation’ in the social
sciences, but emphasises that the "generalisations which the social
sciences develop’ are ‘fundamentally different from the laws of the
natural sciences’ (1970, p. 128).
There has been a tendency in recent years for writers on
organisations to equate the action frame of reference with schools
of thought such as ethnomethodology and phenomenology. This
represents a gross misstatement of the actual position. Whilst
action theorists often m ake reference to the work of
phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists, they do not follow
the full implications of the latter’s point of view. In the manner of
other theorists within the paradigm, they tend to incorporate the
insights of ‘outsiders’ insofar as they serve useful ends. Action
theorists have used notions derived from the phenomenological
perspective to shore up and support the functionalist point of view.
As will be clear from our discussion in Chapter 6 this is clearly
evident in the work of W eber, who used idealist notions in a
positivist way. The same is true of Parsons and of Silverman.
Silverman, for example, in addition to concluding that the action
frame of reference is no more than a method of analysis, suggests
that it may ‘be a useful source of propositions in organisational
analysis’ (1970, p. 143). This view is firmly in line with the
positivist attitude to the whole concept of verstehen and clearly
emphasises its location within the context of the functionalist
paradigm. In Silverman’s work the action frame of reference
becomes no more than a different way of studying the same reality.
Emphasis is placed upon the importance of developing scientific
explanations at an individual as opposed to a systems level of
analysis, because of the problems of reification. The ontological
and epistemological assumptions remain firmly grounded in the
functionalist perspective. As will become clear in our discussion in
Chapters 6 and 7, phenomenology and ethnomethodology in their
true form are predicated upon fundamentally different views with
regard to the ontological nature of social reality itself.
Silverman did not adhere to the position articulated in The
Theory o f Organisations for long. As we will see in Chapter 7, his
subsequent work led him to a perspective firmly located within the
context of the interpretive paradigm. A comparison of this later
work with the approach presented in The Theory o f Organisations
clearly illustrates the essentially intermediate position which the
latter reflects in terms of the subjective—objective dimension of
our analytical scheme. Silverman’s early and later works are para-
digms apart.
Pluralist Theory
The issues of power and conflict within organisations have long

attracted the attention of organisation theorists but have rarely
received sustained and systematic consideration. We intend to
argue here that many of the ideas and research findings which this
interest has generated anticipate, and point the way towards, the
development of a pluralist theory of organisations characteristic of
the conflict functionalism discussed in Chapter 4. Taken together,
they lay the basis for the analysis of organisations as pluralist
political systems - according to which organisations and their
environment are viewed principally as arenas of conflict between
individuals and groups whose activities are orientated towards the
achievement of their own personal goals, values and interests.
Many current theories of organisation contain elements of this
view but stop some way short of a fully developed pluralist theory
of organisations. Power and conflict are often studied as isolated
phenomena or used as concepts in schemes geared to wider ends.
They are rarely regarded as defining the nature of organisation
itself.
As Eldridge and Crombie (1974) have noted, the use of the term
‘pluralism' is fraught with danger because of the wide range of
interpretations which have come to be placed upon it. It will be as
well, therefore, if we set out in a little more detail the way in which
we intend to use it here. Broadly speaking, we see a ‘pluralist' as
opposed to a ‘unitary* view of organisations as reflecting three sets
of assumptions relating to what we shall describe as interests,
conflict and power.*1
The different assumptions with regard to interests are clearly
reflected in the distinction which Fox (1966) has drawn between
the industrial organisation as a ‘team ' striving towards the
achievement of a common objective and as a coalition with
divergent interests. Whereas the unitary view of organisations
tends to stress that an organisation is a co-operative enterprise
united in the pursuit of a common goal, the pluralist view stresses
the diversity of individual interests and goals. Whereas from a
unitary perspective organisations are viewed as instruments of
rational and purposive activity, from a pluralist view they rep-
resent a network of sectional groups interested in the wider pur-
pose of the organisation as a whole only insofar as it serves their
own individual ends. From a pluralist perspective the formal goals
of an organisation have the status of little more than a legitimising
facade, an umbrella under which a host of individual and group
interests are pursued as ends in themselves.
The unitary view of organisations regards conflict within
organisations as a rare and transient phenomenon which, when
present, can easily be eradicated or controlled through appropriate
managerial action. Because interests are regarded as being
characterised by a harmonious order, conflict within organisations
is regarded as an alien, obstrusive and unwelcome force and one
which is largely the creation of deviants and troublemakers. From
a pluralist perspective, on the other hand, conflict within organisa-
tions is viewed as an inevitable and ineradicable feature of every-
day life. The organisation is seen as a web of cross-cutting con-
flicts between the individuals and interest groups which give it life.
Rather than advocating its removal, the pluralist view emphasises
the possibilities of its playing a constructive role within the context
of the organisation as a whole. For the pluralist, conflict must be
institutionalised in some way, so that it can find expression and
‘work itself through’ without prejudice to the survival of the
system as a whole.
Within the context of a unitary view of organisation the ques-
tion of power is largely ignored. Since the organisation is viewed as
a harmonious and conflict-free enterprise, striving uniformly
towards the achievement of what is common and in the interests of
all, questions about the source and use of power do not often arise.
Concepts such as authority, leadership and control are preferred
ways of describing the ‘prerogative’ of managers to guide the
organisation as a whole towards desired goals and aims. Power in
this sense is little more than a neutral resource which oils the
wheels of the system as a whole. The pluralist view, on the other
hand, regards the power of various groups within the organisation
as a crucial variable for understanding what happens in everyday
affairs. Power is seen as the medium through which conflicts of
interest are settled. Organisational life, from a pluralist standpoint,
is a power-play between individuals and groups who draw upon
their various sources of power in order to control their work
situations and to achieve whatever objectives they value. The
organisation is viewed as a plurality of power holders who derive
their influence from a plurality of sources. The organisation is
regarded as a loose coalition which moves towards the achieve-
ment of its plurality of aims through an uncertain process of
bargaining and mutual adjustment of respective claims. Consider-
able emphasis is placed upon the importance of devising a network
of rules and regulations which allow this process to occur in an
orderly fashion and without undue prejudice to the survival of the
organisation as a whole.
Thus, by way of summary, the two views of organisation can be
illustrated as in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1
The unitary and pluralist views of interests, conflict and power
The unitary view The pluralist view
In te re sts P la ce s e m p h a sis u p o n th e P laces e m p h a sis u p o n th e

a c h ie v e m e n t o f c o m m o n d iv e rs ity o f in d iv id u al an d
o b je c tiv e s. T h e o rg a n is a tio n g ro u p in te re s ts . T he
is v iew ed as b ein g u n ite d o rg a n is a tio n is re g a rd e d as a
u n d e r th e u m b re lla o f c o m - lo o se c o a litio n w hich h as b u t
m o n g o a ls , a n d striv in g to - a re m o te in te re s t in th e f o r-
w a rd s th e ir a c h ie v e m e n t in m al g o a ls o f th e o rg a n is a tio n .
th e m a n n e r o f a well in te g -
ra te d tea m .
C onflict R e g ard s co n flict as a ra re a n d R e g ard s c o n flict as an in h er-

tra n s ie n t p h e n o m e n o n w hich ent and in e ra d ic a b le
c a n b e re m o v e d th ro u g h c h a ra c te ris tic o f o rg a n is a -
a p p r o p ria te m a n a g e ria l tio n a l a ffa irs a n d s tre s s e s its
a c tio n . W h ere it d o e s a ris e it p o te n tia lly p o sitiv e o r fu n c -
is u su ally a ttr ib u te d to th e tio n al a s p e c ts .
a c tiv itie s o f d e v ia n ts a n d
tro u b le m a k e rs.
P ow er L arg e ly ig n o res th e ro le o f R e g ard s p o w e r as a v a ria b le

p o w e r in o rg a n is a tio n a l life. c ru cial to th e u n d e rsta n d in g
C o n c e p ts su c h as a u th o rity , o f th e a c tiv itie s o f an
le a d e rs h ip a n d c o n tro l ten d o rg a n is a tio n . P o w e r is th e
to b e p re fe rre d m ea n s o f m ed iu m th ro u g h w hich c o n -
d e s c rib in g th e m a n a g e ria l flic ts o f in te re s t a re a lle v ia te d
p re ro g a tiv e o f g u iding th e a n d re so lv e d . T h e o rg a n is a -
o r g a n is a tio n to w a r d s th e tio n is v ie w e d a s a p lu rality o f
a c h ie v e m e n t o f c o m m o n p o w e r h o ld e rs d ra w in g th e ir
in te re s ts . p o w e r fro m a p lu ra lity o f
so u rc e s .
The unitary view of organisation is epitomised in the classical

theory of organisations which tends to view the organisation as a
machine geared to the achievement of formal goals. From this
point of view the organisation is an instrument of purposive ration-
ality, which directs its members in an effective and efficient
manner. The members of the organisation are viewed as respond-
ing to incentives which secure their commitment to the formal
goals of the organisation. The enterprise is thus envisaged as a
unitary phenomena in which the goals of all members can be
simultaneously satisfied; the task of management is to ensure that
the organisation is appropriately structured, directed and con-
trolled so that effective operation is achieved.
The unitary view is also reflected in many of the other theories
which we have reviewed in earlier sections of this chapter.
Barnard's view of an organisation as a ‘co-operative system ', the
human relations concern to integrate individual and organisational
needs and the open systems view of an organisation as being
geared to the process of survival, all in varying degrees reflect
elements of this perspective. Above all else the organisation is
viewed as a functionally integrated system, the operations of
which can be understood with reference to the organisational goals
which it is concerned to achieve. However, ever since the Haw-
thorne studies, increasing attention has been devoted to the role of
conflict within organisations, and it is now rare to find theoretical
perspectives which reflect the unitary view in an extreme sense. In
broad terms, developments in organisation theory over the last
fifty years have been away from the unitary and towards the
pluralist view of organisations. However, as we noted earlier, this
movement has been incomplete, so that many theories reflect
elements of a pluralist perspective but stop some way short of a
fully developed pluralist theory. To this extent many of the
theories which we have discussed in earlier sections of this chapter
are of a hybrid nature. Some are more pluralist than others. As a
means of developing the pluralist perspective in a little more detail,
therefore, it will be useful if we return to some of the theory and
research which we have already considered and examine the way
in which it has treated interests, conflict and power. We will then
proceed to examine the work of other theorists who have con-
tributed to the pluralist perspective.
Pluralist elements in social system theory

Many theories located within the bounds of social system theory
tend to move towards the pluralist perspective with regard to
conflict and, to a lesser extent, with regard to interests. But with
regard to power they remain firmly embedded within the unitary
standpoint. Conflict is recognised to occur in many forms. For
example, theorists in the human relations tradition, or those who
adopt a socio-technical systems perspective, have emphasised the
conflicts which can arise between human needs and the
characteristics of formal organisation structure (for example,
Argyris, 1952 and 1957), technology (Trist and Bamforth, 1951)
and the like. Other theorists and researchers have pointed towards
the conflicts which can arise between formal organisational roles
(for example, Dalton, 1959; Katz and Kahn, 1966) and to conflicts
between the different sub-units of an organisation (Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967). Others have documented conflicts in the work
place between individual workers, work groups and their
supervisors (for example, Lupton, 1963; W hyte, 1955). Theorists
who have focused upon decision-making processes within
organisations have emphasised the conflicts which occur between
managers (for example, Cyert and March, 1963). Social system
theory thus contains many examples of theory and research which
treat organisational life as based upon a plurality of conflicts.
However, these theories do not always recognise organisations
as being characterised by a plurality of interests. The human
relations theorists, for example, in focusing upon human needs,
tend to underplay the fact that individuals may have goals which
are in conflict with those of the organisation. Their perspective is
based upon the premise that it is somehow possible to satisfy
individual needs through the achievement of wider organisational
goals. The emphasis upon needs thus tends to present the organisa-
tion as a unitary phenomena which has the capacity to operate as a
well integrated team. The potential divergence of goals is de-
emphasised as a consequence of the focus upon universal needs.
Again, those theorists who have been concerned with the study of
conflicts between organisational roles and sub-units often stress
the structural determinants of conflict as opposed to the plurality
of individual and group orientations and interests, which, as Dubin
(1956) and Goldthorpe and his colleagues (1968) have demon-
strated, may be brought into the organisation from outside.
Similarly, the organisation theorists who have focused upon
decision-making processes within organisations also often tend to
de-emphasise the plurality of interests. This is particularly evi-
dent, for example, in the work of Simon (1957), March and Simon
(1958) and Cyert and March (1963), and in the notions of ‘bounded
rationality' and ‘administrative man*. Such conceptualisations
attempt to reconcile the unitary view of organisation as a rationally
ordered enterprise with the observations that organisational
activities do not in practice follow the pattern that the rational
model would lead us to expect. Their theories favour a unitary
view of organisation, based upon a qualified principle of rational-
ity, as opposed to a pluralist view, which gives full recognition to
the variety of orientations and interests of individual members.48
Most social system theories completely ignore the issue of
power within organisations. As we have argued at some length,
these theories are usually based upon assumptions that organisa-
tions are social processes characterised by equilibrium or
homeostasis. Theories based upon an organismic analogy, for
example, tend to stress the functional interdependence and unity
of the system and emphasise the functions which are performed in
the interests of the survival of the whole. The exercise of authority
and control is thus seen as an essential process geared to the
achievement of this overall state of affairs. The emphasis upon
common purpose and functional unity tends to deflect attention
from a consideration of the power of constituent elements. Issues
involving the use of power tend to be interpreted as issues or
problems of authority and control which are of direct relevance to
the effectiveness of the organisation in the achievement of its
formal goals (see, for example, Tannenbaum, 1968).
Pluralist elements in theories o f bureaucratic

dysfunctions
Moving on to consider the theories of bureaucratic dysfunctions,
we find that they usually reflect a pluralist view with regard to
interests and conflict and tend, to an extent, to recognise the
importance of power as a variable in organisational analysis. As we
have seen, the work of Merton (1968), Selznick (1949), Gouldner
(1954a and b) and Blau (1955) all demonstrated, in one way or
another, the unintended consequences of formal organisation. In
cases where these unintended consequences were dysfunctional
as far as the formal goals of the organisation were concerned, it
was usually because they were functional for other interests within
the organisation. M erton’s ‘bureaucratic personalities’ adopted a
defensive and ritualistic posture to protect themselves from the
possibility of criticism from outside the organisation; the dysfunc-
tions of specialisation and goal displacement revealed by Selznick
arose because the specialists sought to further their own interests;
the bureaucratic rules in G ouldner's gypsum factory were used by
the workers and managers to serve their own quite different
purposes; Blau’s study of government agencies revealed
numerous examples of group and sectional interests. The very
notion of dysfunction inevitably raises questions such as, func-
tional or dysfunctional for whom? Whose goals is the organisation
attempting to achieve? Whose interests are the rules rational for?
A theory of interests is thus a direct corollary of the theory of
dysfunctions. As Gouldner (1959) has noted, the notion of
dysfunctions directs attention towards issues such as the degree of
functional reciprocity which characterises the relationships
between system parts. To the extent that reciprocal relationships
are asymm etrical, interdependence of parts is less than perfect and
gives rise to various degrees of functional autonomy or inde-
pendence of parts within the context of the system as a whole. It is
this principle of autonomy which lies at the heart of the pluralist
theory of interests.
The role of conflict is also given considerable prominence in the
theories of Merton and his colleagues. These studies of
bureaucracy were, in many respects, stimulated by the Hawthorne
findings on the relationship between formal and informal
organisation, and they are permeated by the theme of conflict
between the rational and human aspects of organisation. Conflicts
between bureaucrats and their clients, between sectional groups
and coalitions within the organisation, and between management
and workers are all given prominence in one or more of these
studies. Conflict is central to the theory of bureaucratic dysfunc-
tions.
The work of Selznick (1949) and Gouldner (1954a and b), also
draws attention to the plurality of power relationships within
organisations, but the insights generated are not followed up to
their full extent. Selznick traces the struggle for control which
ensues from the different commitments and patterns of interest
within the organisation, and the process of co-option through
which they are brought within the bounds of the decision-making
system. However, his general orientation is the study of the
manner in which an organisation limits the influence of its dysfunc-
tions and is not so much concerned with tracing them to their
source, as a fully developed view of power would require.
Similarly, Gouldner gives much attention to the process of subor-
dination and control within ‘punitive’ bureaucratic structures, but
stops short of a full analysis of the power relationships between the
workers and managers under investigation. These studies both
point the way towards a pluralist view of power, but since they are
essentially orientated towards the specific study of the dysfunc-
tions of bureaucratic structures, they only treat the subject insofar
as it has relevance to this purpose. Their focus upon bureaucratic

structure necessarily overemphasises the role and importance of
formal authority as opposed to other forms of power relationships.
Nonetheless, in terms of general orientation and approach their
overall theoretical stance has much in common with, and has
contributed immeasurably towards, more fully developed pluralist
views of organisation, notably that of Crozier (1964).
Pluralism and the action frame o f reference

Theorists who adopt the action frame of reference as a basis for
their analysis of organisational situations usually do so in recogni-
tion of the fact that any social situation is characterised by a
plurality of interests. They also frequently point to the conflicts
which exist within the situations studied, and occasionally draw
attention to the role of power as a variable worthy of analysis.
However, their standpoint upon the last issue tends to be implicit
rather than explicit, and is not developed systematically to any
degree.
As will be clear from our earlier analysis, the action frame of
reference owes much to the Weberian view that explanations in
social science must be 'adequate on the level of meaning’. It is
based on the view that the various actors in a social situation
interpret and define that situation in ways which have m eaningfor
them, and act accordingly. The idea that there will be a plurality of
such definitions is central to this standpoint; if this were not so,
then the action frame of reference would prove unnecessary. That
organisational situations are characterised by a plurality of
interests is clearly evident in the work of Goffman (1961), Turner
(1971), Goldthorpe et al. (1968), and Silverman (1970), as dis-
cussed earlier. It is also evident in the work of many of the so-
called behavioural symbolic interactionists referred to in
Chapter 4.
The conflicts which arise as a result of the different definitions of
organisational situations have often provided the action theorist
with excellent case material for illustrating his particular point of
view. It is clearly evident in Goffman’s (1961) analysis of the
’underlife of total institutions’ and in Eldridge's analysis of
restrictive practices (Eldridge, 1971, pp. 4 5 -9 ). Silverman’s
reinterpretation of Gouldner’s Wildcat Strike in terms of a social
action perspective also provides an excellent illustration of the
ways in which conflicts in expectations, modes of involvement in
an organisation and general conflicts in the definition of situations
can account for change within organisations (Silverman, 1970, pp.
155-63). Indeed, the scheme which Silverman suggests for the
comparative analysis of organisations from an action perspective
has many characteristics which emphasise the pluralistic nature of
organisations. He summarises the issues which ought to be
addressed as follows:
1. The nature of the predominant meaning-structure and associated

role-system in different organisations and the extent to which it
relies on varying degrees of coercion or consent.
2. The characteristic pattern of involvement of the actors: differing
attachment to rules and definitions of their situation.
3. The typical strategies used by different actors to attain their
ends.
4. The relative ability of different actors to impose their definition
of the situation upon others. The nature and sources of the
symbolic ‘sticks’ (resources) available to the actors; their
relative effectiveness.
5. The origin and pattern of change of meaning-structures
(institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation of meanings) in
different organisations. (Silverman, 1970, pp. 171-2)
Points 1 and 4 draw attention to the role of power within

organisations, which is seen from an action standpoint largely in
terms of the ability to impose one’s definition of a situation upon
others. Many action theorists have referred to this. Goffman’s
definition of ‘total institutions’, for example, emphasises that such
organisations assume much of their special character because
those in authority are able to impose their definitions of the situa-
tion upon inmates. However, action theorists do not tend to
involve themselves in an analysis of the nature and sources of
power as such. Power is often seen as a variable relevant to the
explanation of the ‘meanings’ which prevail but is rarely analysed
in detail. Nevertheless, the action theorists have much in common
with more fully developed pluralist views of organisation.
Other movements towards pluralist theory

Since the early 1960s an increasing number of social theorists have
concerned themselves with the development of theoretical
perspectives which are essentially pluralist in nature. The work of
Peter Blau (1964) on exchange theory, for example, provides a
clear illustration of this. As will be apparent from our discussion in
Chapter 4, Blau’s ‘Exchange and Power Model’ provides a theory
of social integration which is explicitly based upon the variables
which are central to pluralist theory. Following Simmel, Blau
focuses upon the emergent properties of human interaction and
attempts to account for the nature and patterns which exist within
society in terms of the process of exchange. Social exchange
geared to the satisfaction of different needs and interests is seen as
creating inequalities of power and as generating a host of cross-
cutting conflicts and oppositions which lie at the heart of changes
within society as a whole. Blau thus provides a processual theory
of social interaction which is firmly based upon pluralist principles
but which, as he recognises, allows for further developm ent.49
Another step in the direction of a pluralist theory of organisation
has been taken by Michel Crozier (1964). However, he approaches
the subject from a different direction. Whereas Blau has developed
his theory from an interactionist stance, Crozier’s theory repre-
sents a direct development in the mould of the theories of
bureaucratic dysfunctions discussed earlier. His analysis of the
bureaucratic character of two French administrative organisations
leads him to a theory of bureaucracy which identifies power as ‘the
new central problem of the theory of organisation’ (Crozier, 1964,
p. 145). His analysis traces the conflict of interests and the bargain-
ing process which characterise relationships between groups
within an organisation, particularly at different levels of the
organisational hierarchy. It demonstrates how the various groups
attempt to gain control of their work situations by drawing upon
the various sources of power at their disposal, and the way in
which this influences the organisation structure. In line with other
theorists in the pluralist tradition, Crozier sees the power struggle
within organisations as being limited by certain stabilising factors,
such as the need to maintain minimum standards of efficiency, and
other social factors which ensure that the organisation continues
as an ongoing concern. In the true tradition of conflict functional-
ism, therefore, conflict is seen as having its limits.
A third example of the move towards a pluralist perspective is
found in the work of Etzioni (1% 1), whose comparative analysis of
organisations in terms of the ‘nature of compliance’ focuses upon
the relationship between power and employee commitment. The
nature of compliance is viewed as being related to many other
organisational variables, such as the goals that organisations
pursue, the kind, location, power and interaction of elites, the level
of consensus attained, etc. Etzioni’s analysis has done much to
draw attention to the role of power as a variable in organisational
analysis, but his treatment of the different ‘interests’ and ‘con-
flicts’ within organisations falls well short of what a more fully
developed pluralist theory would require.
In the field of industrial relations pluralist-type theories have
become well established. The perspective is clearly evident, for
example, in the opening words of the Report o f the Royal Com-
mission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations (1965-8;
Chairman, Lord Donovan), which describes the nature of the
business enterprise in the following terms:
The running of large businesses is in the hands of professional

managers. . . While in the long term shareholders, employees and
customers all stand to benefit if a concern flourishes, the immediate
interests of these groups often conflict. Directors and managers have to
balance these conflicting interests, and in practice they generally seek
to strike for whatever balance will best promote the welfare of the
enterprise as such.
This viewpoint is in line with an intellectual tradition which finds

expression in other literature in the industrial relations field such
as that of Clark Kerr and his colleagues (1964). Their view of
‘pluralistic industrialism’ emphasises a movement towards a soci-
ety in which the state, organisations and employee associations
will be united through a web of rules which govern and settle
conflicts between interest groups. Others have built upon such a
perspective - notably Alan Fox (1966), who has been prominent in
advocating the pluralistic frame of reference as a means of under-
standing the nature of work organisations and, more recently (1973
and 1974), in emphasising its inherent w eaknesses and
deficiencies. Within the context of the industrial relations field the
debate over pluralism has in many respects focused upon the
nature of power. Those advocating the pluralist perspective have
usually underwritten their views with the assumption that there is a
rough balance of power between the competing interest groups,
and that all groups are united in preserving the system as an
ongoing concern. It is also assumed that the survival needs of the
organisation, or those of society, impose limits on the degree and
nature of conflict.
A fifth line of development which moves in the direction of a
pluralist theory of organisations is witnessed in the increasing
number of research studies which have focused upon the study of
power as a variable in organisational analysis (for example, Kahn
and Boulding, 1964; Zald, 1970, Hickson et al ., 1971). Most of
these studies are cast within the wider perspective of social system
theory but represent a temporary excursion outside the bounds of
the dominant model. As we have argued, power as a variable does
not figure prominently in functionalist systems theory, so the
fascination of these theorists with it can be seen as especially
significant. In many respects it can be understood as symptomatic
of a desire to forge a radical perspective within the context of the
functionalist paradigm akin to the movement towards conflict
functionalism described in Chapter 4. Organisation theory has
frequently attracted the charge of being conservative in orienta-
tion, unduly biased towards a managerial perspective and gener-
ally supportive of the status quo . A number of organisation
theorists who have wished to avoid this charge have directed their
attention to the study of power in organisational life. Yet other
theorists, more firmly committed to a managerial view, have
chosen to study power in the belief that an understanding of the
subject may facilitate better managerial control. Whatever the
reason, the result has been a series of studies in which power is the
focus of interest and its underlying definition essentially pluralist
in orientation.
A final trend in the direction of pluralist theory worthy of men-
tion here is found in the work of those theorists who have sought to
study decision making within organisations as an explicitly ‘politi-
cal* process. The recent study by Pettigrew (1973), for example, is
illustrative of this general trend and goes a long way towards
presenting a pluralist theory of decision making in which the rela-
tionships between interests, conflict and power are spelt out in
some detail. In essence, it develops the elements of pluralism
which we have described as characterising the decision-making
theories of Herbert Simon and Cyert and March, taking them to
their logical conclusion. In Pettigrew’s theory man is accorded a
‘political* rather than an ‘administrative’ orientation, which is
consistent with the nature of the ‘political system ’ within which he
operates.
Towards a clearer statement o f pluralist

theory
In the previous sections we have sought to show how elements of
functionalist organisation theory converge upon various factors
which characterise a pluralist approach to the study of organisa-
tions. The movement to this position has been gradual and
piecemeal rather than the response to the various research findings
which have demonstrated that models based upon unitary assump-
tions are inadequate for an understanding of the dynamics of
modern organisations. We have thus arrived at a point at which
pluralist models of organisation have developed in advance of a
clear statement of the pluralist perspective as such, except in its
relationship to the unitary view.
The lack of a clear perspective is well illustrated in relation to
the way in which the concept of power is handled in pluralist-type
theories of organisation. Where it is recognised as a key variable,
the major concern is usually to locate its source and measure the
extent to which it exists. Relatively little attention is devoted to the
nature o f power as such. Many theorists favour Dahl’s (1967)
conceptualisation of power, namely, that the power of a person A
over a person B lies in the ability of A to get B to do something that
he would not have done otherwise, and go hardly any further in
terms of an attempt to define the nature of the phenomenon under
investigation. Yet the problem of defining power seems to be a
crucial issue.
One of the few orthodoxies in the ‘What is power?’ debate is the
view that power refers to a ‘relationship’ rather than a ‘thing’. Ever
since the publication of Em erson's influential paper, ‘Power-
Dependence Relations’ (1962), it has become fairly well
established that the concept of power inevitably involves the ques-
tion: ‘power over whom?' However, this still leaves many issues
unresolved. Among the most important of these, we may cite the
following:
(a) Power or social control? Is it possible or meaningful to

identify power independently of a wider process of ongo-
ing social control? For example, processes of socialisation
have been shown to be important regulators of social
behaviour. Where does one draw the line between social
control and power? Is power utilised in the social control
of a child’s behaviour within the nuclear family? Is it
meaningful to equate this with the type of control
exercised by some form of elite through the mass media or
the control of workers through board-room decisions?
Wrong (1968) has suggested that it is necessary to restrict
the use of power to the intentional efforts of groups or
individuals to control others, and many pluralist theorists
follow his lead. However, the concept of social control
does undermine the utility of the notion of power. It shows
it to be at best a partial and incomplete conceptual tool for
the analysis of social affairs. The validity and utility of the
notion of power as a concept for organisational analysis is
thus worthy of much more detailed consideration and
attention than it has received up to now.
(b) Is power ‘zero-sum’ or ‘non-zero-sum’? Assuming that
one accepts that it is valid to treat power as a variable in
organisational analysis, the question of whether it is
‘zero-sum ’ becomes an issue. Is power something which
benefits one group at the expense of another, or is it
something which can benefit everyone? Talcott Parsons
(1963) supports the latter view, arguing that power is a
resource generated by the social system in a manner akin
to the generation of wealth, and whilst some people may
have more of it than others, the use to which power is put
is of as much interest as its distribution. Giddens (1972a)
has referred to these as the ‘collective’ and ‘distributive’
aspects of power.
(c) Illegitimate or legitimate power? This distinction serves
to undermine the simplistic equation found in some work
that power equals coercion. Parsons (1963) has argued
that the use of open force is an indication of a shallow and
unstable power base. Where authority is pervasive, for
example, power (in a coercive sense) will not be in
evidence. Thus questioning of the relationship between
power and coercion immediately draws attention to the
distinction often made in the literature between authority
and power. The term ‘pow er’ is often used simply to
characterise the non-legitimised use of power. A full
development of the concept of power must also concern
itself with the way in which it becomes legitimised in the
form of authority. Whilst organisation theory has paid
considerable attention to the notion of ‘authority’, it has
paid relatively little to the concept of power in a wider
sense.
(d) Negative or positive power? An important distinction can
be drawn between the notion of ‘positive power' - the
ability to get things done - and ‘negative power’ - the
ability to stop things being done. A focus upon negative
power is normally accompanied by an emphasis upon the
role of ‘veto groups' in organisational life. A fully
developed conceptualisation of power must take account
of both positive and negative elements of power.
(e) Actual or potential power? Power does not have to be
exercised to be present. The distinction between actual
and potential power is fundamental at both theoretical and
methodological levels. Those who are concerned to
operationalise power often restrict their attention to the
visible use of objective manifestations of power, ignoring
essential background elements which, whilst extremely
potent in their effects, may be hidden from view. The
distinction which we have in mind here is clearly related to
W rong's (1968) view of power as an ‘episodic’ as opposed
to a ‘dispositional’ concept. The former refers to specific
behavioural events, whereas the latter refers to the way in
which situations are defined by the individuals concerned.
The distinction between actual and potential power is thus
very much influenced by the way in which the situation is
perceived by the actors involved.
(0 Intercursive or integral power? Is power something which
is spread around? Or does it derive from one source or a
small number of sources? This distinction, which is again
found in Wrong’s discussion of power, is of crucial
relevance to the pluralist perspective. Pluralism is based
on the notion that power is intercursive and that no indi-
vidual or group dominates totally. It regards power as
deriving from many sources and as varying from situation
to situation and issue to issue. In other words, it assumes
that there are spheres of influence in which different indi-
viduals and groups have different degrees of power.
This brief and somewhat oversimplified overview of issues

relevant to a theory of power, serves to illustrate some of the major
problems facing pluralist organisation theory at the present time.
The foundations have simply not yet been fully explored. Pluralist
theory implicitly assumes that power is intercursive, and major
attention is devoted to an identification of relevant sources. The
classifactory scheme offered by French and Raven (1968), for
example, and the ‘strategic contingencies’ theory of power offered
by Hickson and his colleagues (1971), provide two prominent
examples of this endeavour. Their search for the bases of power
presumes answers to questions which they simply do not raise.
Future developments with regard to a pluralist theory of
organisation would thus seem to call for a much more systematic
statement of the theory of power upon which it is based.50 It also
calls for a much more systematic statement of the theory of
interests and the theory of conflict upon which it is founded. At the
present time assumptions with regard to these other two issues are
vague and underdeveloped. Interests tend to be equated with
individual, group or sub-unit goals; conflict tends to be seen as an
endemic but bounded and potentially constructive element of
organisational life. These and other related assumptions are in
need of systematic elaboration, so that a systematic theory of the
relationships between interests, conflicts and power can be
developed.
Such an endeavour would lead to the consideration of some
major issues. A theory of interests, conflict and power at an
organisational level necessarily implies a theory of interests, con-
flict and power at a societal level. This focus would thus encourage
organisation theorists to form a clearer idea of the relationship
between organisations and society, within both a contemporary
and a historical context. It would bring them to a direct considera-
tion of the nature of the assumptions which define their location
within the functionalist paradigm as opposed to the radical
structuralist paradigm. As will become apparent from our dis-
cussion of radical structuralism in Chapters 10 and 11, theorists
located there have also given consideration to a theory of interests,
conflict and power, and their stance is radically different from that
of the pluralist. At a sociological level, the confrontation of ideas
drawn from the work of Marx and Weber has produced a conflict
theory which offers a view of organisations substantially different
from those reviewed here within the context of the functionalist
paradigm.
So much, then, for our discussion of pluralist theory. Our review
of this perspective completes our analysis of contemporary
schools of thought located within the functionalist paradigm.
Clearly, they vary considerably in terms of general orientations
and underlying assumptions. In the concluding section of this
chapter we will examine briefly the way in which these differences
are reflected in terms of ongoing debate within the context of the
paradigm as a whole.
Debate Within the Functionalist Paradigm

Having completed our review of the different approaches to the
study of organisations characteristic of the functionalist paradigm.
it will be useful by way of conclusion if we turn our attention to
examine some of the issues of debate within the paradigm. Anyone
familiar with the literature on organisational analysis cannot have
failed to notice the differences of opinion which exist between
members of different schools of functionalist thought. We intend
to argue here that much of this debate can be understood in terms
of the positions which its participants adopt in relation to the two
dimensions of our analytical scheme. Whilst they are committed to
the overall view of science and society which characterises the
paradigm, they differ in the degree and manner in which they
subscribe and address themselves to these common basic assump-
tions. It is these differences which underwrite the nature of the
debate.
We will take the dominant perspective within the paradigm,
social system theory and objectivism, as our starting point. Putting
aside for the moment debate concerning ‘levels of analysis' (that
is, whether it is fruitful to focus upon individual, group, organisa-
tional or societal issues as topics of analysis),51 we find that debate
within this perspective tends to focus upon points of detail. It is
usually ‘friendly’ and ‘constructive’ in tone, and it focuses upon
the ways in which particular models can be refined and research
methods improved, and what the precise meaning and significance
of a particular set of empirical results might be. The debate is often
about the technical improvements which might be made within the
context of the perspective as a whole.
Criticisms that this dominant perspective is characterised by an
undue and extreme commitment to positivism and a naive empiric-
ism, and that it is characterised by a complete disregard for the
nature of the phenomena under investigation, tend to be of a
different order. Whilst such charges are often levelled from out-
side the paradigm by interpretive theorists or radical humanists,
they are also levelled within the paradigm by theorists who adhere
to a subjectivist position typical, for example, of the action frame
of reference. From the standpoint of action theory, the work of the
social system theorist and objectivist is dubious because it reflects
too strong a commitment to the models and methods of the natural
sciences as a basis for social analysis. These criticisms are often
founded on the charge that social system theorists and objectivists
‘reify’ their subject of study.
The charge that social system theorists and objectivists are
overdeterministic in their view of human nature also arises from
the same source. The voluntarism which characterises the action
approach, for example, is often set in opposition to the technologi-
cal or structural determinism characteristic of much of the theory
and research located in the more objectivist regions of the para-
digm.
Another charge levelled at social system theory and objectivism
is that it is ideologically biased in favour of a managerial view of
organisation. This charge has come from all directions. The action
theorists have claimed that the meanings which managers attribute
to organisations are given undue prominence and that the mean-
ings and orientations of other organisational actors are, relatively
speaking, ignored. The theorists who have focused upon
bureaucratic dysfunctions have stressed the non-managerial
interests which account for much of organisational activity. The
pluralists have criticised social system theorists for adopting a
unitary frame of reference and for ignoring the role of power as an
organisational variable. All in their various ways have contributed
to the view that social system theorists and objectivists are little
more than the handmaidens and functionaries of those in control of
organisational life.
For their part the social system theorists and objectivists are
often at a loss to understand the basis of such charges. They may
not be consciously aware of being managerially biased and may see
their overall endeavour as directed at increasing the effectiveness
of ‘the organisation’ or the satisfaction and productivity of the
work force in the interests of all. Such is the nature of the unitary
frame of reference which underwrites their approach. However,
the issue runs much deeper than this. Their conservative or
managerially orientated stance is rooted in the models which they
adopt for the purpose of analysis. We have already devoted con-
siderable space to a discussion of the assumptions which under-
write different approaches to the study of organisations, but it is
worth re-emphasising them here.
Social system theory and objectivist approaches to the study of
the organisations are built around the common-sense, ‘taken for
granted’ assumptions that organisations are purposive, goal-
seeking enterprises. The question ‘What is an organisation?’ is
rarely given very much attention; the answer is taken to be self-
evident. The problem of defining an organisation is usually tackled
in three or four lines, which form a convenient springboard for
moving on to the issues which are regarded as being of real con-
cern. Yet it is the question ‘What is an organisation?’ that should
lie at the heart of organisational analysis. Different paradigmatic
locations yield different answers to this question.
If a social theorist takes the definition of the phenomena which
he is attempting to investigate as largely self-evident, it is also
likely that he will adopt a model for analysis which is similarly
unquestioned. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the mechani-
cal and organismic models, particularly the latter, have proved
such popular analytical tools for the study of organisations. The
notion of equilibrium which characterises the mechanical analogy
is well suited for the study of organisations - which, by definition,
are assumed to be relatively stable entities. The notions of func-
tional unity, homeostasis, adaptability and survival which
characterise the organismic analogy lend themselves well to the
study of organisations, if they are assumed to be rational,
purposive, goal-seeking, adaptive enterprises coping with the
demands of an environment. As we have argued in Chapter 4, as a
result of the distinction drawn between ‘closed' and ‘open'
systems, it has now become almost routine to view organisations
as ‘open’ rather than ‘closed' and to view the organismic analogy
as providing an appropriate basis for analysis. The adoption of an
open systems approach has been mistakenly regarded as
synonomous with the use of an organismic analogy. As a result the
use of organismic models for the study of organisations has been
regarded as being as self-evident and obvious as the common-
sense definition of the phenomenon which they are used to
analyse.
The upshot of our argument, therefore, is that the conservatism
or ideological and managerial bias which many theorists have
suggested characterises social system theory and objectivism is
built into the models which are used as a basis of analysis. For this
reason many theorists are not conscious of being biased one way or
another. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the work of
many socio-technical system theorists or human relations
theorists who, whilst attracting the charge of conservatism and
managerialism, actually see themselves as perhaps taking a ‘radi-
cal' stand in favour of employees and their job satisfaction. What
they fail to realise is that their radicalism is constrained by the
nature of the models upon which their work is implicitly based.
Insofar as they adopt organismic models which presume a func-
tional unity of system parts, with certain imperative functions
which must be satisfied if the organisation is to survive, their
analyses are constrained by the requirements chacteristic of a
managerial point of view. It is this consonance between the nature
of the organismic analogy and the requirements of managerialism
which underwrites the dominance of organismic models within the
field of organisation theory.
Notes and References

1. For an extended discussion of classical management theory,
see, for example, Massie (1965)*.
2. Taylor, hard, direct and abrasive in approach, soon became
embroiled in a battle with organised labour and was seen as
the arch-enemy of the working man. By 1912 his system of
scientific management had become the subject of a hearing
before a Special Committee of the House of Representatives.
3. For an overview of the early work and history of the
industrial psychology movement, see Rose (1975), pp.
65-100. For a discussion of some early research, see Mayo
(1933), pp. 1-54.
4. See, for example, Myers (1924).
5. See, for example, Schein (1970), pp. 55-76.
6. For a critical discussion of the human relations movement,
see Perrow (1972).
7. For a review of the research conducted, see Vroom (1964)
and Locke (1975).
8. Part III of their book is devoted to this conceptual scheme
(1939, pp. 255-376).
9. As we have mentioned earlier, and will discuss further later
in this chapter, the model can be more accurately regarded as
the product of the Harvard School under Henderson and
Mayo. Mayo (1933) sets out some of the notions underlying
the model in a somewhat crude and incomplete form.
Barnard (1938) also uses the notion of an equilibrating social
system, though his model is much more general in nature.
10. It is interesting to note that many early social researchers
were at pains to avoid attributing to social phenomena too
concrete a reality. See, for example, M ayo(1933), pp. 3 3 -4 .
11. Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939), p. 272. Other significant
influences, in addition to those of Pareto and Durkheim,
included Freud, Piaget, Jung, Levy-Bruhl, Malinowski and
RadclifTe-Brown.
12. Roethlisberger and Dickson refer to Durkheim on only two
occasions in the whole of their work.
13. Many of the criticisms reviewed by Landsberger (1958) are
launched from a pluralist perspective.
14. See, for example, the critique offered by Carey (1967). This is
subtitled 'A “ Radical” Critique', but in addressing itself to
problems of methodology and interpretation of results op-
erates within the problematic set by the Hawthorne model.
15. For an overview see, for example, the following collections
of readings: Vroom and Deci (1970), Warr (1971), Davis and
Taylor (1972).
16. For a review of these, see Miner and Dachler (1973).
17. For a review of recent evidence, see, for example, Locke
(1975).
18. Most contemporary ‘expectancy’ models are based upon
that developed by Vroom (1964).
19. See, for example, W arner and Low (1947), especially pp.
6 6 -8 9 , and Homans (1950).
20. See, for example. Rice (1958 and l963)andT ristefa/.(l963).
21. The relationship between human and structural aspects of
organisation was also explored in a systematic fashion by
Merton, Selznick, Gouldner, Blau and others. Taking
their point of departure from the bureaucratic theory of
Max W eber, they sought to show how dysfunctions arise as a
result of the unanticipated responses of organisation mem-
bers. As will be apparent from our discussion of Mertonian
theory in Chapter 4, M erton’s and his colleagues’ study of
dysfunctions reflects a perspective which falls outside the
bounds of social system theory. We shall be considering this
important work in detail in a separate section later in this
chapter.
22. The non-rational or informal aspects of organisation are
given detailed attention in some of Selznick's earlier works.
See, for example, Selznick (1943).
23. See, for example, Miller and Rice (1967).
24. See, for example. Rice’s discussion on the management of
change (Rice, 1958, pp. 248 - 54).
25. The notion of ‘appreciation’ is derived from the work of
Vickers (1966).
26. For a discussion of these term s, see Katz and Kahn (1965),
pp. 2 5 -8 .
27. Most open systems models for the study of organisations can
usually be expressed in terms of a series of assumptions
about ‘functional imperatives’. The apparent diversity of
such systems models usually disappears when they are
stripped down to the basic assumptions deriving from the use
of an organismic analogy.
28. In point of fact, W oodward’s work also involved case studies
which incorporated the use of some interesting methodologi-
cal approaches. However, it is the hard quantitative results
of her survey which are given the most prominence in reports
of the research and which have been most influential.
29. The references cited here are illustrative. The writers con-
cerned have produced a large number of publications in this
area.
30. It can be argued, for example, that in attempting to correlate
the technology and structure of organisations, researchers
are examining two aspects of the same variable - viz. the
method of control.
31. The notion of differentiation and integration of social
systems was utilised by Herbert Spencer, who, as we have
argued, was one of the earliest social theorists explicitly to
develop the implications of the biological analogy.
32. As we have already discussed, the general concerns of the
classical management school (structures) and those of the
human relations school (human and social factors) had
already been integrated within the context of a framework for
the study of organisations by both Simon and Selznick.
However, this synthesis did not reconcile the detailed pro-
positions with regard to what constituted ideal management
practice.
33. Administrative Science Quarterly contains numerous reports
on research testing various aspects of the Lawrence and
Lorsch model. See, for example, Osborn (1974).
34. Kast and Rosenweig (1973) present many good and relevant
ideas on the contingency approach in a book of readings
which brings together some of the well-known articles in this
area.
35. The utility of and reliance which can be placed upon these
studies is qualified later in this section in terms of the distinc-
tion which we draw between the importance of ‘process’ as
opposed to ‘structure’.
36. The choice of these departments is arbitrary and an oversim-
plification. It is unlikely that a whole department - a struc-
tural manifestation of process - would comprise an element
on its own account. It is very easy to fall back upon structural
characteristics as a means of describing the differentiation of
an organisation, to the detriment of an overall systems view.
See below our qualifications on this point in our discussion of
the distinction between structure and process.
37. Even the research of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) suffers
from this problem. They virtually ignore the processual
aspects of system and resort to hard quantitative measures of
structures and attitudes as a means of testing their scheme.
The methodology employed in this study is nowhere near as
sophisticated as the conceptual ideas which they present.
They equate subsystems with structural features within the
organisation; structure rather than system provides the start-
ing point for their analysis. The same problem is found in the
extension of the contingency approach presented in Lorsch
and Morse (1974); this study does little to advance the con-
cepts and methods presented in the earlier work. Insofar as it
is presented under the guise of systems theory as opposed to
determinism, the work of Pugh and Hickson (1976) and Hall
(1972) also stands as abstracted empiricism.
38. A similar point of view is presented in the work of Burns and
Stalker(1961), Rice(1963),Tristef 0/. (1963) and Child(1972).
However, it could be argued that the choice available to the
strategic decision makers is, in fact, fairly restricted,
bounded by the structural constraints imposed by the envi-
ronment.
39. For an excellent presentation of some of the central features
of the work of Merton, Selznick, and Gouldner, see March
and Simon (1958), pp. 36-47.
40. The work of these writers diverges quite considerably after
the publication of these case studies on bureaucracy. We
have already referred to the way in which Selznick follows
the implications of a fairly traditional structural functionalist
approach to organisation. Peter Blau makes a specific break
with the case study as a method of organisational analysis in
favour of empirical studies of formal organisational struc-
tures, as referred to in an earlier section of this chapter. In
essence this line of development reflects an attempt to follow
Merton’s call for ‘middle-range’ activities linking theory to
research. We would argue that much of Blau’s recent work in
this area represents a form of abstracted empiricism, in
which methods dominate theoretical perspectives. We also
referred in Chapter 4 to Blau’s theory of exchange and
power, which reflects another ‘middle-range’ investigation
characteristic of a different region of the functionalist para-
digm - that of interactionism. Blau’s work is thus charac-
teristic of a number of distinct areas. Blau presents a useful
outline on the development of his general research interests
in the introductory chapter of his book of essays On the
Nature o f Organisations (1974).
The work of Alvin Gouldner demonstrates the greatest
change of all. Since his early work on bureaucracy, Gouldner
has ranged very considerably in general orientations. From
the cautious but potentially radical critique of functionalism
presented in his ‘Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional
Theory' published in 1959, he has moved to what constitutes
an all-out attack upon the functionalist perspective. This is
most clearly illustrated in The Coming Crisis o f Western
Sociology (1970), which provides a somewhat rambling
‘reflexive sociology’ characteristic of the general trend to
individualism and subjectivism in sociology during the 1960s.
It is a perspective which, whilst moving towards the view of a
radical humanist seems much more concerned to develop a
subjectivist attack upon functionalism than to focus upon a
sociology of radical change. This dimension is much more
evident in The Dialectic o f Ideology and Technology (1976).
41. See, for example, our discussion of radical organisation
theory in Chapter 11.
42. Schutz and Weber are discussed elsewhere in this text. The
work of Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction o f
Reality (1966), presents a strange mixture of sociological
positivism and phenomenological sociology in the neo-
idealist mould. Their ideas have influenced many theorists
located in this area of the functionalist paradigm, including
David Silverman, whose work we shall be considering in a
later section.
43. See also, the collection of ethnographic accounts of work
presented in Fraser (1968).
44. As we argue below, the action frame of reference only figures
as an element in their overall work, which viewed in its
totality draws heavily upon much more objectivist
methodologies. We include it here as an example of the
action framework with considerable qualification and,
indeed, reservations. It is often cited as an example of the
action approach, but its links with the Weberian perspective
are at times very tenuous.
45. Silverman (1970), pp. 3 -4 . This view of the systems
approach implies that it is necessarily associated with the use
of a biological analogy. Whilst this is true in relation to the
majority of systems applications within the field of organisa-
tion theory, it is not a necessary characteristic of the systems
approach as such. Please see our discussion in Chapter 4 for
further elaboration of this point.
46. Silverman acknowledges the influence of the following
writers: Weber (1947), Schutz (1964), Berger and Luckmann
(1966), Berger and Pullberg (1966), Rose (1962), Goffman
(1959), Cicourel (1964) and Cohen (1968).
47. The distinction between ‘unitary’ and ‘pluralist’ frames of
reference has come into prominence through the work of Fox
(1966). It is also possible to introduce a third category - the
‘radical’ frame of reference (Fox, 1973, 1974a, 1974b). We
are excluding the radical perspective from our discussion
here because it belongs to a different intellectual tradition,
one characteristic of the radical structuralist paradigm. See
Chapter 11 for a discussion of this radical organisation
theory.
48. The view put forward in March and Simon (1958), for exam-
ple, is that whilst members of an organisation have different
goals and values, the major implication for a theory of
organisations is that they have to be motivated to produce
and to remain members of the organisation. Hence their
elaboration of the ‘inducement—contribution’ theory first
introduced by Barnard (1938).
49. For a review of some of these developments, see Chadwick-
Jones (1976).
50. An extensive literature on the theory of power does already
exist upon which organisation theorists can draw. See, for
example, the wide range of articles in Olsen (1970) and the
discussion presented by Lukes (1974). Lukes' distinction
between different views of power has much in common with
the distinction which we have drawn between the
functionalist and radical structuralist paradigms.
51. We will return to this in our concluding chapter.
6. Interpretive S ociology
Origins and Intellectual Tradition

The interpretive paradigm embraces a wide range of philosophical
and sociological thought which shares the common characteristic
of attempting to understand and explain the social world primarily
from the point of view of the actors directly involved in the social
process. Its history is firmly rooted in the German idealist tradi-
tion, and in the view that the ultimate reality of the universe lies in
‘spirit’ or ‘idea’ rather than in the data of sense perception. This
tradition, which runs counter to that of sociological positivism,
owes much to the work of Immanuel Kant (1724-1803), who was
one of the first philosophers to articulate its basic ontological and
epistemological foundations. Kant, whose philosophy is open to a
wide range of interpretations, posited that a priori knowledge must
precede any grasp or understanding of the sense data of empirical
experience. He argued that there must be inherent, in-born
organising principles within man’s consciousness by which any
and all sense data is structured, arranged and thus understood. A
priori knowledge was seen as independent of any external reality
and the sense data which it ‘em its’; it was seen as the product of
‘mind’ and the interpretive processes which go on within it. Whilst
the world in which men live may be the product of a complex
interrelationship bet ween a priori knowledge and empirical reality,
for Kant the starting point for understanding this lay in the realm of
‘mind’ and ‘intuition’. It is this basic, uncomplicated assumption
which underlies the whole of German idealism.
The development of idealism has, however, been far from
uniform. Subject to diverse influences ranging from the ‘romantic’
writings of Goethe and Schiller to the somewhat dogmatic philoso-
phy of Hegel, its fortunes have been mixed. From a period of
ascendency in European thought during the later eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, it was thereafter more or less forced
into a secondary place by the ‘practical ’ achievements of sociolog-
ical positivism. However, by the end of the nineteenth century a
revivial of interest was underway, giving rise to the so-called
neo-idealist, or neo-Kantian movement.
As H. Stuart Hughes has so clearly argued, the period
1890-1930 was a time of considerable intellectual ferment
characterised by a concern with the subjective aspects of scientific
enquiry. The major intellectual figures of the 1890s ‘were
obsessed, almost intoxicated, with a rediscovery of the non-
logical, the uncivilised, the inexplicable' (H. S. Hughes, 1958, p.
35). This interest in the subjective and irrational was reflected in
the work of writers as widely diverse as Freud, Weber and
Husserl, each of whom responded in his own distinctive fashion.1
In addition to focusing attention upon the essentially complex and
problematic nature of human behaviour and experience, the work
of this generation of theorists returned to the basic problems of
epistemology identified by Kant, which confronted both the
natural and social sciences. The positivist position came to be seen
as increasingly unsatisfactory and problematic on at least two
counts. First, within the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften ) it
became clear that human values intruded upon the process of
scientific enquiry. It was evident that scientific method could no
longer be regarded as value-free; the frame of reference of the
scientific observer was increasingly seen as an active force which
determined the way in which scientific knowledge was obtained.
Within the realm of the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften)
a second set of difficulties were also seen as arising, since their
subject matter was distinguished by its essentially spiritual charac-
ter. It was realised that man as an actor could not be studied
through the methods of the natural sciences, with their concern for
establishing general laws. In the cultural sphere, it was held, man
was ‘not subject to law in the physical sense, but was free. An
intellectual apprehension of his life and action could be attained
only by the speculative methods of philosophy, especially by a
process of the intuition of the total wholes (Gestalten) which it was
illegitimate to break down by “ atom istic” analysis' (Parsons,
1949, p. 475). As a result of this disenchantment with sociological
positivism, idealism assumed a new lease of life. In short, there
was a distinctive shift in the focus of intellectual attention along the
subjective—objective dimension of our analytical scheme, which
involved certain theorists in clarifying the intellectual foundations
of what we describe as the interpretive paradigm.
Among the theorists who have contributed to these intellectual
foundations, we identify Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber and
Edmund Husserl as having been particularly influential. In
fundamentally distinct ways they have done much to define the
character and issues which have commanded the attention of
Interpretive Sociology 229
interpretive sociology during the twentieth century.
Dilthey (1833 —1911) and Weber (1864-1920) were particularly
concerned to bridge the gulf between idealism and positivism, or at
least place the cultural sciences upon a firm foundation in terms of
their ‘objective validity’.2 If the cultural sciences were defined by
their spiritual character, then the ‘spirit’ of a social situation or
type of institution was of key importance. This posed considerable
problems for social philosophers, who were concerned to provide
explanations of social and historical affairs without reverting to the
methods of positivism. The idealist process o f‘the intuition of total
wholes’ provided a means of organising the historical process but
got no closer to an understanding of it. It often resulted in an
entirely relativistic view of history as a series of unique and essen-
tially unconnected systems. Explanations in the idealist tradition,
it seemed, could only be provided through recourse to intuition or
metaphysics.3
Dilthey’s solution to the problem was found in the notion of
verstehen (understanding). In drawing a distinction between the
natural and cultural sciences, he maintained that the difference
between them was essentially one of substance, and that the two
types of science addressed themselves to fundamentally different
kinds of subject matter. Whereas the natural sciences investigated
external processes in a material world, the cultural sciences were
essentially concerned with the internal processes of human minds.
Even though these processes may be translated into relatively
tangible cultural phenomena such as art, poetry, institutions and
the like, it was maintained that they could only be fully understood
in relation to the minds which created them and the inner experi-
ence which they reflected. Cultural phenomena were, in essence,
seen as the external manifestations of such inner experience and
hence, it was argued, could only be fully appreciated with this
reference point in view. In these situations the approach and the
methods of the natural sciences, with their emphasis upon the
search for general laws and causal explanations, were deemed
inappropriate. The cultural sciences needed a new analytical
method based on verstehen , through which the investigator could
seek to understand human beings, their inner minds and their
feelings, and the way these are expressed in their outward actions
and achievements. In short, the outward manifestations of human
life needed to be interpreted in terms of the inner experience which
they reflected through the method of verstehen .
We wish to place emphasis here upon the word method since, as
conceptualised by Dilthey and later by Weber, this was its essen-
tial status. Verstehen was viewed as a method which could be used
in the cultural sciences to generate scientific knowledge of an
objectivity comparable with that obtained in the natural sciences.
The notion of verstehen provided a means of studying the world of
human affairs by reliving or re-enacting the experience of others.
As we shall see, Dilthey’s view of verstehen has had an important,
direct and formative influence upon the hermeneutic school of
thought which we discuss later in this chapter. In more general
terms, his social philosophy had a marked but indirect influence
upon the development of many other elements of thought
characteristic of the interpretive paradigm. Indeed, the notion of
‘understanding’ in one form or another is a defining characteristic
of all theories located within this paradigm.
Despite Dilthey’s importance and underlying formative influ-
ence, it is through the work of Weber that the notion of verstehen
as method has had the greatest impact on sociological thought, and
nowhere is the bridge-building exercise between idealism and
positivism more evident.4 As Hughes (1958), Runciman (1972) and
others have suggested, Weber was fighting a war on at least two
fronts. He was dissatisfied with the superficialities which he
regarded as characterising positivist explanations of society, and
also greatly concerned with the subjective and ‘unscientific’
nature of idealist thought. His solution to the problem is found in
his methodological writings, in which he develops the view that
explanations of social affairs must be ‘adequate on the level of
meaning’, and that the essential function of social science is to be
‘interpretive’, that is, to understand the subjective meaning of
social action. He defines sociology as ‘a science which attempts
the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to
arrive at a causal explanation of its courses and effects. . . Action
is social insofar as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to
it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the
behaviour of others, and is thereby oriented in its course’ (Weber,
1947, p. 88).5
This definition clearly reflects the attempted fusion of idealist
and positivist perspectives. He adheres to the positivists’ concern
for providing causal explanations of social phenomena but insists
that such explanations must be reduced to the level of the indi-
vidual. As Schutz notes, ‘Weber reduces all kinds of social rela-
tionships and structures, all cultural objectifications, all realms of
objective mind, to the most elementary forms of individual
behaviour’ (Schutz, 1967, p. 6). His view of sociology is thus one
which is concerned to provide causal explanations of social
phenomena whilst avoiding the pitfalls of reification. He is con-
cerned to build an objective science of sociology upon the founda-
tions of subjective meaning and individual action.
In this task W eber’s notion of the ‘ideal type’ plays a central
part.6 Indeed, Weber insists that objectivity in the social sciences
is only made possible through the use of ideal types, which allow
for the ordering of elements of reality. Through the use of these
constructs Weber attempts to reconcile the method of verstehen
with the need to develop an objective social science. Ideal types
incorporate the ‘spirit’ which characterises individual phenomena
into a wider generalised whole. In certain important respects,
therefore, the method of verstehen is assimilated into a typological
scheme of analysis which provides a means of ordering and
explaining human action.
Weber thus seeks to balance and reconcile the potentially
divergent perspectives of idealism and positivism. Whilst stressing
the importance of subjective meaning in explanations of social
affairs, he at the same time seeks to contain and limit the role of
these subjective factors. This is clearly evident, for example, in his
classification of behaviour into different types such as ‘rationally
purposive’, ‘rationally value-orientated’, ‘emotional’ and ‘tradi-
tional’. Although the central task of his sociology is to understand
and interpret social action, he constrains this endeavour by the
implicit assumption that behaviour can be causally explained with
reference to fairly narrowly defined typologies of action.
Viewed critically, therefore, W eber’s stand with regard to
‘interpretive sociology’ can be seen as reflecting certain strains
and tensions. Interpretation and the notion of verstehen in
W eber’s hands acts as little more than a methodological tool for
overcoming obvious deficiencies in positivist method. Essentially,
Weber is interested in developing a causal theory of social explana-
tion rather than in pursuing the full implications of the idealist view
of the nature of social reality. As Schutz (1967) has observed,
Weber was most concerned with confronting concrete problems
and was interested in the more fundamental epistemological issues
only insofar as they had a contribution to make towards this end.
Weber can be seen as a ‘sociologist of regulation’, in that one of
his central concerns was to provide a thorough-going analysis of
social order. In this the notion of rationality was accorded a central
role. Whether he can be more appropriately described as a
positivist rather than an idealist will no doubt continue to be
debated.7 As far as the four strands of the subjective—objective
dimension of our analytical scheme rs concerned, he appears to
occupy an intermediate and somewhat incongruent position. In
terms of methodology, his interpretive perspective would suggest
a location on the boundary of the interpretive paradigm, along with
Dilthey’s hermeneutics. His position with regard to ontology,
epistemology and human nature would appear to be more
objectivist. For Weber, the objective reality of the social world is
not a central issue. It is the way in which it is interpreted by human
actors that is important. In this his position directly parallels the
theoretical perspective which we have described as behavioural
symbolic interaction within the context of the functionalist para-
digm. As we have suggested, theory and research based upon the
action frame of reference, which derives more or less directly from
W eber’s explorations in methodology, is most appropriately
located there, and it would seem that a similar case can be made in
relation to much of W eber’s other work.
What, then, is W eber’s significance as far as the interpretive
paradigm is concerned? We argue that it arises from his role as a
point of departure for other writers, notably Schutz, who have
taken W eber’s work as a base from which to develop a much more
subjectivist view of sociology. It will be apparent from our dis-
cussion later in the chapter that the notion of verstehen in other
hands has assumed a significance beyond that of mere method. As
Giddens has noted, from a phenomenological point of view ‘it is
the very ontological condition of human life in society as such’
(Giddens, 1976, p. 19). This ontological status of verstehen is
clearly evident, for example, in the work of Edmund Husserl, and
it will be helpful if we conclude our discussion of the origins and
intellectual traditions of the interpretive paradigm with a brief
review of his work. The extremely subjectivist position which he
adopts will also serve to illustrate the essentially intermediate
perspective reflected in Weber.
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is widely regarded as the founder
and leading exponent of the phenomenological movement in
philosophy. As will become apparent from our discussion later in
the chapter, it is not altogether a coherent movement and does not
lend itself to any simple and straightforward definition. Maurice
Natanson, one of phenomenology’s leading contemporary
spokesmen, offers the following characterisation:
Phenomenology is a presuppositionless philosophy which holds con-

sciousness to be the matrix of all phenomena, considers phenomena to
be objects of intentional acts and treats them as essences, demands its
own method, concerns itself with prepredictative experience, offers
itself as the foundation of science, and comprises a philosophy of the
life world, a defence of Reason, and ultimately a critique of philosophy.
(Natanson, 1973b, p. 19)
Husserlian phenomenology is based upon a fundamental ques-

tioning of the common-sense, 'taken for granted’ attitudes which
characterise everyday life and the realms of natural science. As
Natanson has suggested, ‘the central endeavour of phenomenol-
ogy is to transcend [what Husserl calls] the natural attitude of daily
life in order to render it an object for philosophical scrutiny and in
order to describe and account for its essential structure’
(Natanson, 1966, p. 3). The view that there is an objective external
world which exists in space and time and is real for all men is
subjected to thorough scrutiny. The presuppositions of science are
reduced to implicit metaphysical commitments. In the process the
external world is shown to be an artefact of consciousness;
phenomena are shown to be willed into existence through
intentional acts. Man is shown to live in a world created through
consciousness.
Husserl thus adopts an extremely subjectivist position in rela-
tion to the subjective—objective dimension of our analytical
scheme. Ontologically, the world constitutes a stream of con-
sciousness; it is experiential; the subjective is the source of all
objectivities. The task of epistemology is to explore and reveal the
essential types and structures of experience. Phenomenology
studies essences and clarifies the relationships between them; it
seeks to delve into experiences and clarify the very grounds of
knowledge. In this endeavour the methods of ‘direct intuition’ and
‘insight into essential structures’ are offered as the principal means
of penetrating the depths of consciousness and transcending the
world of everyday affairs in search of subjectivity in its pure form.
The procedure of epoche - whereby the phenomenologist
suspends his complicity and participation in the ‘natural attitude’
—also plays a central role. As Natanson puts it, ‘believing-in-the
world is the paradigm of normality. The philosopher’s task is not to
ridicule it but to understand it and point out its implications. Any
attempt to examine such believing will be prejudiced, however, by
the philosopher’s own believing unless he finds a way to free
himself of the very attitude he seeks to elucidate’ (Natanson,
1973b, p. 15). £poche, or suspended complicity, provides a
means of entering the realm of subjectivity which phenomenology
seeks to analyse and describe.
C om pared with the philosophy of H u sserl, W eber’s
‘interpretive sociology’ thus emerges as a very limited excursion
into the realm of the subjective. It is perhaps fair to say that it does
little more than attribute an element of voluntarism to the indi-
vidual's interpretation of his world which more positivist theories
typical of the functionalist paradigm tend to deny, or at least
ignore.
Interestingly enough, Husserl, like Weber, began to articulate
his distinctive intellectual position as a result of his dissatisfaction
with conventional science. He began his academic career as a
mathematician and physicist but soon became concerned with
what he regarded as defects in their essential foundations.* He was
passionately committed to the ideal of a ‘rigorous science’ and
looked to philosophy and logic for answers to what he saw as the
fundamental problems. Disappointed with what he found, his
desire to penetrate to the sources of science led him to an increas-
ingly subjectivist position, and the conclusion that philosophy
required a phenomenological reorganisation which would ‘assist
even the objective scientist in the clarification and critique of his
unclarified fundamental concepts and assum ptions’ (Spiegelberg,
1965, p. 79).
Like Weber, Husserl was highly dissatisfied with positivist sci-
ence, with its uncritical study of mere facts and its inability to cope
with problems of ultimate truth and validity. How ever, whilst
Weber concerned himself with the refinement of methodology and
addressed himself to what he saw as the fundamental problems of
social science, Husserl travelled in another direction. Addressing
himself to fundamental problems of ontology, epistemology and
methodology, he embarked upon an intellectual journey leading to
a radically subjectivist form of transcendental phenomenology. In
so doing he laid the foundations for further exploration in the
highly subjectivist region of the interpretive paradigm.
The Structure of the Paradigm

Whilst its intellectual roots can be traced back to the work of the
early German idealists, the interpretive paradigm has been most
decisively shaped and influenced by the works of Dilthey, Husserl
and Weber. For the most part, therefore, it can be regarded as a
twentieth-century phenomenon.
We argue that the paradigm can be considered in terms of four
distinct but related categories of interpretive theory, distinguished
for the most part by their degree of ‘subjectivity’ in terms of the
four strands of the subjective—objective dimension of our analyti-
cal schem e.9 We identify them as (a) solipsism; (b) phenomenol-
ogy; (c) phenomenological sociology; (d) hermeneutics. Their
location within the paradigm is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
The Hermeneutic school occupies the least subjectivist region of
the paradigm. Deriving largely from the work of Dilthey and the
notion of verstehen , it first evolved as a method of study especially
adapted to an idealist view of the world. More recently, under the
influence of Gadamer, it has assumed a new dimension and has
developed in broader theoretical term s, particularly in relation to
the role and influence of language in social life. Its contemporary
importance within the context of the interpretive paradigm is
rapidly increasing, though up to now has been largely over-
shadowed by its use in critical theory within the context of the
radical humanist paradigm. We identify solipsism in the most
subjectivist region of the paradigm. It belongs to the realm of
metaphysics rather than sociology and is included here to highlight
the ultimate dilemma facing all philosophical and sociological
perspectives which emphasise the subjective in an extreme form.
Phenomenology occupies the middle ground of the paradigm.
We distinguish between the transcendental phenomenology of
Husserl and the existential phenomenology of Schutz. The latter
attempts to link themes drawn from the sociology of Weber and the
philosophy of Husserl.
G osely related to phenomenology, but distinct from it, we
identify two branches of sociological thought which combine the
phenomenological perspective with elements drawn from
elsewhere. Ethnomethodology fuses phenomenology and ele-
ments of ordinary language philosophy, particularly that typical of
the work of the later Wittgenstein and Winch. Phenomenological
symbolic interactionism interprets the work of G. H. Mead from a
phenomenological perspective, in the manner discussed in an
earlier chapter.
We will examine each broad category and school of thought in
turn.
Hermeneutics
Hermeneutics is concerned with interpreting and understanding
the products of the human mind which characterise the social and
cultural world. Ontological! y, its proponents adopt an ‘objective
idealist’ view of the socio-cultural environment, seeing it as a
humanly constructed phenomenon. Human beings in the course of
life externalise the internal processes of their minds through the
creation of cultural artefacts which attain an objective character.
Institutions, works of art, literature, languages, religions and the
like are examples of this process of objectification. Such
objectifications of the human mind are the subject of study in
hermeneutics.
As we have already noted, it is largely through the work of
Dilthey that hermeneutics has achieved the status of a school of
thought within the context of contemporary social theory.10 In
Dilthey’s hands it was essentially a methodology for studying the
objectifications of mind. It played a central role in his overall
scheme for generating objectively valid knowledge in the
Geisteswissenschaften through the m ethod of verstehen.
Verstehen, we recall, was the means by which we comprehend the
meaning of a historical or social situation or cultural artefact. It
was a method of understanding based upon re-enactment. In order
to be comprehended, the subject of study needed to be relived in
the subjective life of the observer. Through this process, Dilthey
claimed, objective knowledge could be obtained.
Dilthey argued that one of the main avenues for verstehen was
through the study of empirical life assertions - institutions, histor-
ical situations, language, etc. - which reflected the inner life of
their creators. The study of these social creations was seen as the
main avenue to an understanding of the world of objective mind.
The method was that of hermeneutics. As he puts it,
Re-creating and re-living what is alien and past shows clearly how
understanding rests on special, personal inspiration. But, as this is a
significant and permanent condition of historical science, personal
inspiration becomes a technique which develops with the development
of historical consciousness. It is dependent on permanently fixed
expressions being available so that understanding can always return to
them. The methodical understanding of permanently fixed expressions
we call exegesis. As the life of the mind only finds its complete,
exhaustive and, therefore, objectively comprehensible expression in
language, exegesis culminates in the interpretation of the written
records of human existence. This method is the basis of philology.
The science of this method is hermeneutics. (Dilthey, 1976, p. 228)
Dilthey singled out hermeneutics as a key discipline and method

in the human sciences. He advocated that social phenomena of all
kinds should be analysed in detail, and interpreted as texts, to
reveal their essential meaning and significance. The method of
hermeneutics thus involved human scientists adopting the style of
literary analysts rather than natural scientists. Textual analysis of
meaning and significance was regarded as more appropriate than a
scientific search for knowledge of general laws. Dilthey was con-
cerned that the basic rules of hermeneutics should be defined, so
that the insights of interpreters of rare genius could be utilised by
others.
Dilthey’s overall approach to hermeneutics is clearly illustrated
in the notion of the so-called ‘hermeneutic circle’. He recognised
that the social whole cannot be understood independently of its
parts, and vice versa. Words in a sentence have to be understood in
terms of their total context. Whilst one can attribute a particular
meaning to words on their own account, they may assume a
different meaning in the context of other words. So, too, with
social phenomena. Dilthey recognised that this part—whole rela-
tionship was characteristic of the social world and that a
systematic approach was necessary. The desire to formulate
methodical rules of interpretation, therefore, was accompanied by
a recognition that ‘there are no absolute starting points, no self-
evident, self-contained certainties on which we can build, because
we always find ourselves in the middle of complex situations which
we try to disentangle by making, then revising, provisional
assum ptions’ (Rickman, 1976, p. 11). In this way the methodolog-
ical rules of hermeneutics were seen to move in a circular and
iterative fashion towards an increased understanding of the
objectifications of mind.
In recent years the hermeneutic tradition has assumed a new line
of development particularly through the work of Gadamer
(1965).11 He argues that the circle of understanding, as envisaged,
for example, by Dilthey, is not a ‘methodological’ circle, but
describes an ontological structural element in understanding. Tak-
ing Heidegger’s description and existential account of the
hermeneutic circle as a point of departure, he argues that we
cannot relate, for example, to a historic tradition as if it existed as
an object apart from us, since there is an interplay between the
movement of tradition and the interpreter. In order to understand
social or cultural phenomena, the observer must enter into a
dialogue with the subject of study. As Giddens puts it,
Understanding a text from a historical period remote from our own, for
example, or from a culture very different from our own is, according to

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188 Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis

Gouldner’s study thus leads to important modifications of the

The Action Frame of Reference

A subculture is a distinctive sei of meanings shared by a group of

Turner is thus concerned to study the way in which subcultures

In developing these propositions Silverman draws very heavily

by individual actors. It is imperative, therefore, that the sociologist

The issues of power and conflict within organisations have long

The unitary view The pluralist view

In te re sts P la ce s e m p h a sis u p o n th e P laces e m p h a sis u p o n th e

C onflict R e g ard s co n flict as a ra re a n d R e g ard s c o n flict as an in h er-

P ow er L arg e ly ig n o res th e ro le o f R e g ard s p o w e r as a v a ria b le

The unitary view of organisation is epitomised in the classical

Pluralist elements in social system theory

Pluralist elements in theories o f bureaucratic

as it has relevance to this purpose. Their focus upon bureaucratic

Pluralism and the action frame o f reference

1. The nature of the predominant meaning-structure and associated

Points 1 and 4 draw attention to the role of power within

Other movements towards pluralist theory

The running of large businesses is in the hands of professional

This viewpoint is in line with an intellectual tradition which finds

Towards a clearer statement o f pluralist

(a) Power or social control? Is it possible or meaningful to

This brief and somewhat oversimplified overview of issues

Debate Within the Functionalist Paradigm

Notes and References

Origins and Intellectual Tradition

Phenomenology is a presuppositionless philosophy which holds con-

Husserlian phenomenology is based upon a fundamental ques-

The Structure of the Paradigm

Dilthey singled out hermeneutics as a key discipline and method

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