AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR

SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR

GUMANGAN CALILUNG, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SIMEON
DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of
Justice, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from

implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the
Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner maintains that Section 2
allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign
citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign
citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows
natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship
by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign
allegiance. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution, however, is categorical
that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest.

The OSG claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy and that
Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former
Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign
citizenship.

ISSUE:

1. Is RA No. 9225 unconstitutional?

2. Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual
allegiance?

RULING:

1. NO. From the deliberations of Congress of the legislative record, it is

clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do
away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized
citizens of other countries. What RA No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship
to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it
does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority
of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.
Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem
of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country.
What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act
No. 9225.

2. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it

is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on
dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were
not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a
law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including the Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.
Rogelio Batin Caballero v. Commission on Elections & Jonathan
Enrique V. Nanud

GR. No. 209835. September 22, 2015.

FACTS:

Caballero and Nanud were both candidates for mayoralty position in

Uyugan, Batanes during the May 2013 elections. Nanud then filed a
petition for cancellation of the COC of Caballero on the ground that he ran
for mayoralty position while being a Canadian Citizen.

In December 2012, Caballeroo claimed that he was not properly

served with a copy of the petition as the same was sent through registered
mail and not in his address in Imnajubu, Uyugan, Batanes. Instead of filing
an answer, he filed a memorandum controverting allegations against him.

He claimed that prior to the filing of COC, he took an Oath of

Allegiance before the Consul Genral in Toronto, making him a dual citizen.
He later renounced his Canadian Citizenship and executed an Affiidavit for
the same purpose and also claimed that he had not lost his citizenship as
his departure overseas was only temporary.

In view of the said allegations, COMELEC Cancelled his COC. Came

elections, Caballero won over Nanud and was proclaimed as Mayor of
Uyugan. Upon Motion for Reconsideration regarding the cancelled CoC,
the same was denied. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

WON Caballero automatically reacquired his domicile after

reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship

RULING:

Under RA 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their citizenship

by reason of nationalization in foreign country can reacquire his Philippine
Citizenship. Said law treats citizenship independently of residence as dual
citizens may establish either residence in the Philippines or in foreign
countries to which he is also a citizen. This, however, is different in cases
where a dual citizen chooses to run for public office because residency now
becomes material.

Taking together RA 9225 and RA 7160, it is clear that those who

retained or reacquired Philippine Citizenship shall enjoy full civil and
political rights provided that in case of those seeking elective public office
shall comply with the qualifications for such office, specifically the 1 year
residency immediately preceding the day of the election.

In this case, Caballero was a natural-born Filipino raised in Uyugan,

Batanes until he acquired Canadian Citizenship which required that he be a
permanent resident of Canada, thus, abandoning his domicile in the
Philippines. Waiver of such abandonment cannot be taken from his
vacations to Batanes.

Further, reacquisition of Philippine citizenship does not automatically

result to reacquisition of his residence/domicile. What it gives is a mere
option to again reestablish his domicile in the Philippines. Caballero must
prove that he had been a resident of the Philippines following his
renunciation of Canadian Citizenship for at least one year, immediately
preceding the day of the election. After reacquisition, one must prove his
physical presence coupled with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile.
RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

In 1974, petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian

citizen by naturalization. Upon retirement, petitioner and his wife returned
to the Philippines, and sometimes in 2000, they purchased a lot along the
beach in Tambong, Gloria, Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a
residential house.

In 2004, they came to know that the portion they built their house is
public land and part of the salvage zone. On April 12, 2007, petitioner filed
a Miscellaneous Lease Application over the subject land with the DENR at
the CENRO in Socorro, OrMin. In said application, petitioner indicated that
he is a Filipino citizen. Private respondent Agbay opposed the application,
on the ground that petitioner is disqualified to own land as a Canadian
citizen. Private respondent also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of
public documents against the petitioner.

Petitioner reacquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of

RA 9225, as evidenced by an Identification Certificate issued by the
Consulate General of the Philippines (Toronto) on October 11, 2007.
Petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he has intended
to reacquire Philippine citizenship and that he was assured by a CENRO
employee that he could declare himself as a Filipino citizen.

On January 8, 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor found

probably cause to indict petitioner for violation of Article 172 of the RPC
(Falsification) and recommended the filing of information in court. Petitioner
filed a petition for review before the DOJ. The DOJ held that the presence
of the elements of the crime of falsification of public document suffices to
warrant the indictment of the petitioner. AN information was filed before the
MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued against the petitioner. Petitioner
filed an Urgent Motion for Re-Determination of Probable Cause in the MTC,
who denied said motion. The MTC wrote that RA 9225 made a distinction
between those who became foreign citizens during its effectivity, and those
who lost their Philippine citizenship before its enactment when the
governing law was CA 63. Since the crime charged against the petitioner
was alleged and admitted to was committed on April 12, 2007 before he
had reacquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner
was at that time still a Canadian citizen.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning the foregoing

order denying him relief on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The MTC
denied the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner elevated the case to the
RTC, alleging grave abuse of discretion. He asserted that jurisdiction over
the person of an accused cannot be a precondition for the redetermination
of probable cause and that the order disregarded the legal fiction that once
a natural-born Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in another country
reacquires his citizenship under RA 9225, his Filipino citizenship is thus
deemed not to have been lost on account of said naturalization.

The prosecutor emphasized that the act of falsification was already

consummated as petitioner has not yet reacquired his Philippine
citizenship, and that his oath to reacquire the same will only affect his
citizenship status, and not his criminal act which was long consummated
prior to said oath. The RTC denied the petition. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner may be indicted for falsification of misrepresenting

himself as a Filipino, despite his subsequent reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225?

HELD:

Yes, he may. RA 9225 was signed into law on August 29, 2003. Section 3
of said law lays down such conditions for two categories of natural-born
Filipinos referred to in the first and second paragraphs. Under the first
paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship
by naturalization in a foreign country who shall reacquire their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the same oath. The law thus makes a
distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225.

The authors of the law intentionally employed the terms “reacquire”

and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines. This is also evident from the title of the law
using both reacquisition and retention. That the law distinguishes between
reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship was made clear in the
discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee:

“The reacquisition will apply to those who lost their Philippine

citizenship by virtue of Commonwealth Act 63. The second aspect is
the retention of Philippine citizenship applying to future instances.”

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public

document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time of the filing of said
application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian citizen. Under CA 63,
the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen,
naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a
natural-born citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he reacquired
Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six months later, the falsification was
already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive effect
insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did
not err in finding probable cause for falsification of public document under
Article 172, paragraph 1.

The petition is DENIED.

TECSON VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, more commonly known as Fernando Poe Jr., filed his
certificate of candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 2004
Elections under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino.

In said certificate of candidacy, it was stated that his name was “Fernando Jr” or
“Ronald Allan” Poe, his date of birth was August 20, 1939, his place of birth was in
Manila, and that he is a natural born Filipino citizen.

On January 2004, Victorino Fornier filed a petition before COMELEC to disqualify

FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy, alleging that
the latter made material misrepresentation that he is a natural born Filipino
citizen. Allan Poe, FPJ’s father, is a Spanish national being the son of Lorenzo Pou,
a Spanish subject. While FPJ’s mother Bessie Kelly Poe is an American national.
Fornier also alleged that even if Allan Poe is a Filipino, he could not have
transmitted his citizenship to Fernando Poe Jr. because he is an illegitimate child.
Fornier based said allegation on the assertions (1) that Allan Poe contracted a
prior marriage with Paulita Gomez before his marriage with Bessie Kelly; and (2)
that even if the prior marriage had not existed, FPJ was born a year before Allan
Poe married Bessie Kelly.

In the hearing before the COMELEC, petitioner presented several documentary

exhibits [including 1) a copy of birth certificate of FPJ; 2) a certified photocopy of
an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Gomez attesting to her having filed a
case for bigamy and concubinage against Allan Poe; 3) an English translation of
said affidavit; 4) a certified photocopy of Allan Poe’s birth certificate; 5) a
certification issued by the Director of Records Management and Archives Office
that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Pou resided or
entered the Philippines before 1907; and 6) a certification from the Archives
Division of National Archives that no available information could be found
regarding the birth of Allan Poe.]
Respondent, on his part, presented 22 documentary evidences, [the more
significant ones being – 1) a certification issued by Estrella Domingo of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that there appear to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San
Carlos, Pangasinan; 2) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the
marriage of Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found; 3) a certificate of birth
of Ronald Allan Poe; d) original Certificate of Title of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Pangasinan in the name of Lorenzo Pou; 5) copies of tax declarations
in the name of Lorenzo Pou; 6) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou;
7) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Allan Poe and Bessie Kelly;
and 8) a certification by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan,
stating that the records of birth in said office from 1900 until May 1946 were
destroyed during WWII.]

The COMELEC dismissed the case for lack of merit. 3 days later, Fornier filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Petitioner then assailed
COMELEC’s decision before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen for him to qualify as
Presidential candidate?

RULING:

Yes. It is a recognized rule that each state, in the free exercise of its sovereign
power, is free to determine who its citizens are, but not who the citizens of other
states are:

As a general principle, each State is free to determine by its own law the persons
whom it considers to be its own nationals. The Hague Convention in 1930 on
Conflict of Nationality Laws laid down two important rules on the point. The first
rule is that it is for the municipal law of each State not for International Law to
determine who are the nationals of a particular State, subject to certain
limitations. The second rule is a logical corollary of the first. If it is for the
municipal law of each State to determine who are its nationals, it would
necessarily follow that any question as to whether a person possesses the
nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of
that State.”

Thus, no other law than that of the Philippines determine whether or not a
person is a Filipino national. And being a political status, citizenship is determined
by political law and not by civil or other laws.

Fernando Poe Jr. was born in August 20, 1939 under the regime of the 1935
Constitution. The prevailing fundamental law on his birth then is the provision on
Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution which provides that among the citizens of
the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

Tracing the lineage of his father, Lorenzo Pou, was shown as a Filipino citizen in
his death certificate. Having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have
been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of
residence upon his death was presumed to be his place of residence prior to his
death, such that he would have benefitted from the “en masse Filipinization”
which was effected in 1902. Being so, his Filipino citizenship would have extended
to his son Allan.

Since FPJ had been acknowledged as Allan’s son, though an American citizen, was
also a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by his birth
certificate. The 1935 Constitution confers Filipino citizenship to all person whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate; thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and that respondent was
born only before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s
citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation by the documentary
evidences presented.
GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES vs COMELEC

Facts:

These are consolidated petitions assailing the resolutions of the COMELEC

granting the petitions to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
for President of Petitioner Poe-Llamanzares in the 09 May 2016 Philippine
National and Local Elections.

Petitioner Grace Poe Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn infant in

the Parish Church in Iloilo City by a certain Edgardo Militar in 1968. He passed the
parental care and custody over Poe to his relatives Emiliano and his wife, who
subsequently reported and registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Iloilo. Petitioner was then given the name Mary Grace
Natividad Militar in her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth. At the
age of five, celebrity spouses Fernando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces filed a petition
for her adoption with the MTC of San Juan City which was thereafter granted and
ordered the petitioner’s change of name to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. It
was only in 2005 that Roces discovered that their lawyer failed to secure a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating Poe’s new name and her adoptive parents and
she immediately submitted an affidavit attesting the lawyer’s omission to the
OCR-Iloilo which thereafter issued a new Certificate of Live Birth.

At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan City and was also
issued a Philippine passport. In 1988 she opted to continue her studies abroad.
Thereafter, Poe married Teodoro Llamanzares, both of Philippine and US
citizenship, in San Juan City and flew back to the US two days after the wedding.
She became a naturalized citizen and obtained US passport in 2001.

In 2004, Poe came back to the Philippines to support her father’s candidacy for
President in the May 2004 elections and returned to the US in July of the same
year. Petitioner, however, rushed back to the Philippines in December upon
learning his father’s deteriorating medical condition. She stayed in the country
until 2005 to take care of her father’s funeral arrangements and assist in the
settlement of his estates.
In her desire to be with her grieving mother, she and her husband decided to
move and reside permanently in the Philippines. In 2006, she took her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. She also filed with the
Bureau of Immigration a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship which
was granted. She again registered as a voter of San Juan City and also secured a
new Philippine passport. Thereafter, she was appointed as Chairperson of MTRCB
and before assuming her position, she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of American
citizenship.

In 2012, she run and was proclaimed Senator. In 2015, she filed her CoC for
Presidency wherein she declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her
residence in the Philippines up to the day before the May 9, 2016 would be 10
years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005.

Petitioner’s filing of her CoC for Presidency triggered the filing of several
COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated cases.
Respondents alleged that she lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to
qualify her for the Presidency. They argued that Poe cannot be considered as a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling.

The COMELEC ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to
complete the 10-year residency requirement and that she committed material
representation in her COC. It concluded that she is not qualified for the elective of
President.

Issue (on Nationality):

Whether or not Poe, as a foundling, is a natural-born citizen

Held:

YES, the Court held that Poe, as a foundling, is a natural-born citizen.

Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution is
silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language that would exclude them
either. Because of the silence and ambiguity in the enumeration, there is a need
to examine the intent of the framers of the Constitution. The deliberations of the
1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be
covered by the enumeration. Though the proposed Rafols amendment to include
foundlings as natural-born citizens was not carried out, it was not because there
was any objection to the notion that persons of unknown parentage are not
citizens, but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. There was no need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos because
they are impliedly so recognized. There was no intent or language that would
permit discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions
guarantee the basic right to equal protection of laws.

Contention:

The process to determine that the child is a founding leading to the issuance of a
foundling certificate act acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship.

Ruling: The argument is erroneous.

Under Article IV, Section 2, “Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship.

First, “having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done by
the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by
the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the
determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child.
Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to
acquire Philippine citizenship or the election of such citizenship by one born of an
alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to
perfect it.
In this case, the issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a
foundling as evidence by the Foundling Certificate in her favor and effectively
affirmed by the Decree of Adoption.

Generally Accepted Principles of International Law

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Generally accepted

principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the law of the land. The common thread of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child (UNCRC) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and to ensure
that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and
it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws
(Commonwealth Act No. 473 and RA No. 9139), both of which require the
applicant to be at least 18 years of age.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines,
are generally accepted principles of international law. Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws provides that a foundling is presumed to have the “nationality of the
country of birth” while Article 2 of the UN Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness states that a foundling is presumed to be born of citizens of the
country where he is found.

Current legislations show adherence to this generally accepted principle of

international law. Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that
foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first
place to be adopted. Recent legislations all expressly refer to “Filipino children”
and include foundlings as among children who may be adopted. Likewise, the DFA
issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This
shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers
foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles of international law is rational, reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their
parents are nationals of the Philippines.

Comelec’s ruling:

Petitioner’s repatriation under the provisions of RA 9225 did not result in the
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship since the applicant must perform an act,
what is reacquired is not natural-born citizenship but only plain citizenship.

SC Ruling:

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
status as a natural-born.

The Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987
Constitution: natural-born and naturalized citizens, and there is no third category
for repatriated citizens.
GREGORIO NUVAL, petitioner and appellant, vs. NORBERTOGURAY ET AL.,
respondents. NORBERTO GURAY, appellee.

FACTS

Gregorio Nuval filed in the CFI of La Union in his capacity as a voter and a
duly qualified and registered candidate for the position of municipal president of
Luna, a petition against Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his name from
the election list of the said municipality, not being a qualified voter since he had
not resided therein for 6 months as required by Section 431 of the Administrative
Code.

It appears that Guray has been a resident of Luna since birth where he had
married and held office as the municipal treasurer until June 1922, when he was
appointed as the municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union. His appointment in
Balaoan required him to live continuously in the municipality in order to perform
their official duties. In order for Guray to be qualified and be voted in such a
position he decided to ask for the cancellation of his name in the election list of
Luna. Guray made it also appear that his residence was in the residential district
of Balaoan.

In 1926, Guray's wife and children decided to go back to Luna due to the
high cost of living in Balaoan. Since then Guray used to go home to Luna after
office hours and spend the nights there with his family. In January 1927, he
commenced the construction of his house in Luna. On February 16 1928, Guray
filed his resignation by telegraph and was accepted on the same day. He then
obtained another cedula dated January 31, 1928, representing his residence in
Luna. On February 23, 1928, Guray applied for registration as a voter in Luna,
alleging that he had been residing in the said municipality for 30 years.

ISSUE

Whether or not Guray had the legal residence of one year immediately prior to
the general elections of June 5, 1928, in order to be eligible to the office of
municipal president of Luna, Province of La Union
RULING

It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a

state and acquires one in another state, he cannot again vote in the state of his
former residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence". The term
'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which imports not only
intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."

Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of

Luna and acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a candidate in the
municipality of Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter municipality
for the length of time prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not
only the intention to do so, but his personal presence in said municipality.

The court ruled that the fact that his family moved to the municipality of
Luna in 1926 in order to live there in view of the high cost of living in Balaoan; the
fact that his children studied in the public school of said town; the fact that on
afternoons after hours he went home to the municipality of Luna and there
passed the night with his family, are not in themselves alone sufficient to show
that from said year he had transferred his residence to said municipality.

The case at bar is different from that of Doctor Apacible since he never had
abandoned his legal residence in Batangas and never exercised his right of
suffrage there. Guray, on the other hand abandoned his legal residence when he
transferred it to Balaoan as required by his election as its municipal treasurer.

Hence, the court hold in fact and in law that Norberto Guray only
abandoned his legal residence in the Municipality of Balaoan, and began to
acquire another in the municipality of Luna from February 16, 1928, when he filed
his resignation from the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which he had
been holding, and which resignation was accepted; and on being elected
municipal president of Luna in the general elections of June 5, 1928, he had not
reacquired the legal residence necessary to be validly elected to said office.
A.L. VELILLA, administrator of the Estate of Arthur Graydon Moody
vs. JUAN POSADAS, JR., COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE

NO. 43314, DECEMBER 19, 1935

FACTS:

Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India. He had executed a will in the
Philippines, and bequeathed all of his property to his only sister Ida M.
Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and resident of New York, United
States of America.

A petition for appointment of special administrator was filed by W. Maxwell

Thebaut with then Court of First Instance of Manila. A petition was filed by
Ida M. Palmer, asking for the probate of the will executed by the deceased,
and was duly probated by the court. She was then declared as the sole and
only heiress of the deceased, Arthur Moody a few months after.

Evidence as provided by both parties show that Arthur G. Moody was an

American citizen who came to the Philippines around 1902 or 1903, and
engaged actively in business up to the time of his death. He had no
business elsewhere and at the time of his death, he left an estate
consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations
organized under the laws of the Philippines, bank deposits and other
intangibles and personal property valued by the commissioners of appraisal
and claims at P609,767.58 and by the Collector of Internal Revenue for the
purpose of inheritance tax at P653,657.47.

It was said that all of the property at the time of his death was located and
had its situs within the Philippines and it also shows that he left no property
of any kind located anywhere else.

It was alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G.
Moody was a “non-resident of the Philippine Islands.” An answer was filed
and it states that the deceased, was and prior to the date of his death, a
resident in the City of Manila, Philippines, where he was engaged actively
in business.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in the

Philippine Islands on the day of his death?

RULING:

Yes, Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippines on the

day of his death.

The Court stated that Moody was never married and there is no doubt that
he had his legal domicile in the Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903
forward during which time he accumulated a fortune from his business in
the Philippine Islands. He lived in the Elks’ Club in Manila for many years
and was living there up to the date he left Manila for the reason that he was
afflicted with leprosy in an advanced staged and was informed by a doctor
that he would be reported to the Philippine Authorities for confinement in an
institution as required by the law. He left the Philippines, violating his
promise to the doctor, under cover of night, on a freighter, without a ticket,
passport or tax clearance certificate. It was not shown where Moody was
during the remainder of 1928. He lived with a friend in Paris, France, where
he received treatment.

There was no statement of Moody, whether oral or written, in the record

that he adopted a new domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though
he was physically present for some months in Calcutta prior to his death
there, the appellant does not claim that Moody had a domicile there
although it was written that Moody wished to sell his business in Manila and
he had no intention to live there again.

The Civil Code provides that the definition of domicile of natural persons is
that it is “the place of their usual residences.” And to effect the
abandonment of one’s domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable
choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chose,
with a declared or provable intent that it should be one’s fixed and
permanent place of abode, one’s home. There is a complete dearth of
evidence in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a
foreign country.
MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-22041 May 19, 1966
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J

Facts:
Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal,
Ilocos Sur. He is married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one son,
Prospero, who is now of legal age. He left the Philippines for the United
States of America in 1927 where after a residence of more than 20 years
he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. He returned to the
Philippines on November 10, 1960 to which he was admitted merely for a
temporary stay. He owns an agricultural land and a residential house
situated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less than P5,000.00. He
receives a monthly pension of $115,00 from the Social Security
Administration of the United States of America. He has no record of
conviction and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the U.S.A.

Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition

filed before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. the court a quo
rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that petitioner did not
have the residence required by law six months before he filed his petition
for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Hence the present appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the denial of reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship is
proper.

Held:
YES. One of the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is
that the applicant shall have resided in the Philippines at least six months
before he applies for naturalization [Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No.
63]. The term “residence” in Commonwealth Act No. 63 has already been
interpreted to mean the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise
known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of
the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state where he lives
and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary
absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other words, domicile is
characterized by animus manendi. “Residence” imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also presence coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention (Yen vs. Republic, L-18885, Jan. 31, 1964;
Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). So an alien who has been admitted into this
country as a temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for
reasons of health, though actually present in this country cannot be said to
have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is only
temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is
accomplished.

Since legal residence for six months is required for the reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship, the applicant should secure a quota for permanent
residence here. A permit for temporary residence would not be sufficient.
He is not qualified to reacquire Philippine citizenship.

NOTE:

residence was considered synonymous with domicile (1) in

connection with section 8 of the Revised Naturalization Law, providing for
the venue of a naturalization proceeding: (2) in election and suffrage laws ;
(3) in connection with the venue of actions under Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court; and (4) in connection with the venue of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court.
MATEO CAASI vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C.
MIGUEL,

FACTS:

These two cases were consolidated because they have the same
objective; the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, on the ground that he is a green
card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America,
not of Bolinao.

G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito
Cascante et. al for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to
the local elections.

G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for
review of the decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed
by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his
being a green card holder.

Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US

Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the
United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in
order that he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical
examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a
permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous
elections.

The COMELEC dismissed the petitions and ruled that the possession of a
green card by the respondent does not sufficiently establish that he has
abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite of his
green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to
continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive
elections in said municipality. As the respondent meets the basic
requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local
officials as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there
is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.

Commissioner Badoy, Jr., on the other hand, opposed and said that : A
green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a
foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a green card
holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has not
done.

In the present case, the the petitioner prays for a review of the decision of
the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court
which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed
by Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the regional trial court to dismiss
and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. As per the CA
it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the
qualification of the petitioner as resident of the Philippines, after the
COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements
of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials and
that there is no legal obstacles for the candidacy of the petitioner,
considering that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo
warranto cases under the Election Code are appealable to the COMELEC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent

resident of the United States
2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent
resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections
3. Whether or not Miguel is disqualified from office.

RULING:

1. Yes.
 Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in
the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status
are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the United
States. In the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration" which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and
submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the
United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein
regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state),"
Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that
was subsequently issued by the US Department of Justice and
Immigration and Registration Service to Miguel identifies him in clear
bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the
upper portion, the following information is printed: “Alien Registration
Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is entitled to reside
permanently and work in the United States.”

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United

States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. He did not go to the United States
merely to visit his children or his doctor there. He entered the US with
the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application
for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.

2. No.

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law

requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have
"waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or
acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective
office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified
to run for any elective office."
 Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in
the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status
are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S.
despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such
immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it.
Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that
status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S.
authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on
January 18, 1988, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for
said public office.

3. Yes

Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a

permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the
records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his
status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of
Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was
disqualified to become a candidate for that office. Hence, his election
was null and void.

Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective

office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of
candidacy is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective
public office must possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification
because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he
resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year)
after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he
ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are

permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus
Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right
to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess
dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for
its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental
reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those
who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such
entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with
one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on
their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in
order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that

"any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship
or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for
he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he
was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of

Candidacy for Representative the position of the First District of Leyte
providing that she has been a resident of Leyte for seven months.

Cirilo Roy Montejo, current Representative of the First District of

Leyte at the time who also happens to be running for the same position
filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the
COMELEC charging Marcos for not complying with the Constitution’s
one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives.

Petitioner Marcos then filed an Amended Corrected Certificate of

Candidacy, wherein she changed seven months to since childhood
under residency. But unfortunately the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Leyte did not receive the aforementioned COC as it was already filed out of
time.

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of

Candidacy with the COMELEC’s Head Office. Furthermore, her Answer to
private respondent’s petition was likewise filed wherein her answer was
that the entry of the word “seven” in her original Certificate of
Candidacy was the result of an “honest misinterpretation” which she
sought to rectify by adding the words “since childhood” in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that “she has
always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.”

Ruling of the COMELEC:

The COMELEC ruled against petitioner Marcos striking off petitioner’s

Corrected/amended COC and cancelling her original one. The arithmetical
accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her
certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter’s
Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that
she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the
said registration.

Furthermore, respondent’s conduct reveals her lack of intention to

make Tacloban her domicile, she registered as a voter in different places
and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila.
Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have
abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different
places. Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must
likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent’s statements
to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the
accompanying conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her
choice of residence. It is evident from these circumstances that she was
not a resident of the First District of Leyte “since childhood.”

Petitioner also correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995;

respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she
resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months.

May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a resolution allowing petitioner’s

proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the
highest number of votes. However, on the same day the COMELEC
essentially backtracked and directed that the proclamation of petitioner’s
proclamation be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest
number of votes.

Issues:

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the

First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9,
1995 elections. (Yes)

Ruling:

The SC ruled that the resolutions of the COMELEC reveal a tendency

to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a
conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s
qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by
the 1987 Constitution.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that “[f]or the exercise of

civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of
natural persons is their place of habitual residence.”

This court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual’s

“permanent home,” “a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in
the sense that they disclose intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship

of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in
a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to
leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode
ends.

If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent

is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in
various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless,
for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. ‘Residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; ‘domicile’ denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in
another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled
with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence.
 As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly
and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes
is used synonymously with domicile.

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy

which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said
statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her

place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner’s claimed
domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay
in her actual residence in a space which required her period of stay in
her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7
and Item 8—the first requiring actual residence and the second
requiring domicile—coupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioner’s registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her
writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified.
This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the
fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by
means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once

acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the
fact of petitioner’s being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile
of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when
she reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family
back to Leyte contrary to private respondent’s averments.

Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of

domicile, one must demonstrate:

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of
continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced
by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required
to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of
a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires
the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s former domicile with an intent
to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife
are physically together. This takes into account the situations where the
couple has many residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband
has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may “live together.” Hence, it is
illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.”
Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the
domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one
of their (various) residences.

by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code —to follow her husband’s
actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that
time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San
Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these
places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family’s residence.
Note:

domicile is said to be of three kinds that is:

1. domicile by birth
2. domicile by choice
3. and domicile by operation of law:
The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis;

the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium

proprio motu ;

the last which is 3 consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage, 3

is sometimes called domicilium necesarium.