Appendix: Godel on the ideality

of time
As the reader of this chapter will no doubt have gathered, I think that too much of the
philosophical literature on time travel has been devoted to Godel spacetime. It would be
healthier if attention were directed to other solutions to EFE which allow for time travel
and which do not exhibit one or other of the peculiarities of Godel spacetime (e.g., time
travel in the Godel universe requires a fantastically powerful rocket engine whereas in
other solutions time travel may be accomplished without the help of rocketry). By
contrast, there has been a relative neglect of the philosophical moral Godel (1949a)
himself wanted to draw from his solution to EFE. I will try to explain why the neglect has
been benign. Some explanation is called for, if for no other reason than because a deeply
held conviction of someone of Godels stature deserves serious consideration.

Unless otherwise indicated, page references are to Godel (1949b). The dialectic of his
argument goes as follows. He began with the idea that if STR were true, then time would
be ideal. He wrote:

Change becomes possible only through the lapse of time. The existence of an
objective lapse of time, however, means (or, at least, is equivalent to the fact) that
reality consists of an infinity of layers of "now" which come into existence
successively. But, if simultaneity is something relative [as is implied by STR] . . .
reality cannot be split up into such layers in an objectively determined way. Each
observer has his own set of "nows," and none of these various systems of layers
can claim the prerogative of representing the objective lapse of time. (p. 558)

In a footnote, Godel acknowledges that a possible response to this argument is that it

shows "that time is something relative, which does not exclude that it is something
objective; whereas the idealists maintain that it is something merely imagined" (p. 558, fn
5). Godel’s rejoinder is emphatic.

A lapse of time, however, which is not a lapse in some definite way seems to me
as absurd as a coloured object which has no definite colours. But even if such a
thing were conceivable, it would again be something totally different from the
intuitive idea of the lapse of time, to which the idealistic assertion refers, (p. 558,
fn 5)

This is a pretty piece of ordinary language philosophizing. But like most of its ilk, it
leaves one up in the air: even if one shares the linguistic intuitions, one can wonder how
such intuitions can support weighty philosophical morals. To thrash through these issues,
however, would lead us astray, for it is GTR and not STR that is true (or so we may
suppose).

The relevance of GTR is it implies that the existence of matter causes the curvature of
spacetime and thereby destroys the equivalence of inertial observers in the Minkowski
spacetime presupposed in Godel’s argument from STR. Furthermore, in all the
cosmological solutions to EFE known in the 1940s, there is a natural way to single out a
distinguished time function. Godel put it thus:

The existence of matter, however, as well as the particular kind of curvature of

space-time produced by it, largely destroy the equivalence of observers and
distinguish some of them conspicuously from the rest, namely those which follow
in their motion the mean motion of matter. Now in all cosmological solutions of
the gravitational equations (i.e., in all possible universes) known at present the
local times of all these observers fit together into one world time, so that
apparently it becomes possible to consider this time as the "true" one, which lapses
objectively, (p. 559)
From such considerations, Godel noted, James Jeans had concluded, in Godel's words,
that "there is no reason to abandon the intuitive idea of an absolute time lapsing
objectively" (p. 559).

At this juncture Godel issues a demurrer. In a footnote he mentions that the proposed
method for picking out a preferred simultaneity can be challenged. A successful challenge
would open the way to parroting within GTR the above argument from STR. Godel notes
that making the notion of the mean motion of matter into a precise concept may involve
"introducing more or less arbitrary elements (such as, for example, the size of the regions
or the weight function to be used in the computation of the mean motion of matter)." And
he goes on to assert "It is doubtful whether there exists a precise definition which has so
great merits, that there would be sufficient reason to consider exactly the time thus
obtained as the true one (p. 560, fn 9)." One can dispute this claim; for example, for the
class of models Jeans and Godel had in mind, one may be able to prove that there exists a
unique family of time slices with minimal intrinsic curvature. Such a family would
arguably be a good candidate for defining the true time. I will not pursue this matter since
Godel does not seem to put much weight on his demurrer to Jeans and bases his
case-in-chief on other considerations.

So the dialectical situation is now this. According to Godel, STR supports the thesis of
the ideality of time. However, Godel acknowledges that proponents of an objective lapse
of time can, with some justice, claim that GTR supports their case. To break the stalemate
Godel proposes to turn the tables by showing how an expanded knowledge of the
solutions to EFE establishes his ideality thesis. His strategy is based on his discovery of a
new class of solutions to EFE. In these solutions "the aforementioned procedure of
defining an absolute time is not applicable, because the local time of the special observers
used above cannot be fitted together into one world time" (p. 560). What Godel meant is
that there are solutions to EFE where matter is everywhere rotating so that the natural
way of singling out a time function by taking the spacelike hypersurfaces orthogonal to
the world lines of matter is not available. The technical point is this. If Va is the normed
timelike tangent field of the congruence of world lines of matter, the rotation or twist of
the congruence is defined by ⍵ab≕∇[aVb]. By Froberiius' theorem, the congruence is
hypersurface orthogonal just in case ⍵ab = 0. The point can be seen in a non-technical way
by analogizing the world lines of matter to the strands of a rope. If the rope is twisted, the
strands will not be orthogonal (in the Euclidean sense) to any plane slicing through the
rope. Granting for sake of argument that in a universe where matter is everywhere
rotating there is no natural way to single out a distinguished time function, how does this
conclusion bear on time in the actual universe where, presumably, matter on the average
has no twist? I will not press the point here since a similar one will soon arise.

Godel does not rest his case with his twist argument but goes on to claim that the
idealistic viewpoint is strengthened by some of the other surprising features of his
solution. The considerations that flow from these features add up to something less than
an argument. The task is to locate and assess the missing premise(s) that would produce a
valid argument.

(PI) In the Godel universe there is no global time function, nor does there exist a
single global time slice, nor is there a globally consistent time order
(P2) Therefore, in the Godel universe there is no objective lapse of time.
(P3) The Godel model satisfies EFE and other conditions, such as non-negativity
of energy density, that one wants for a physically possible model.
(P4) Furthermore, the Godel model cannot be excluded a priori on the grounds that
time travel leads to the grandfather paradox.
(P5) However, the Godel universe can be excluded a posteriori as a model for the
actual universe since, for example, it gives no cosmological redshift.
(P6) But our universe is different from the Godel universe only because of
contingent features—in particular, the distribution and motion of matter.
(P7) ?
(C) Therefore, time in our universe is ideal.

Premises (PI), (P3), (P5), and (P6) are uncontroversial. And given Godel's analysis of
time lapse, (P2) is also unexceptionable. (P4), however, is controversial. In its defense
Godel writes:
 This and similar contradictions [i.e., the grandfather paradox], however, in order to
prove the impossibility of the worlds under consideration, presuppose the actual
feasibility of the journey into one's own past. But the velocities which would be
necessary in order to complete the voyage in a reasonable length of time are far
beyond everything that can be expected ever to become a practical possibility, (p.
561)

On the analysis of the grandfather paradox I have offered, it seems to me that Godel's way
of dismissing the grandfather paradox is too quick. On the other hand, my analysis does
support the contention that cosmological models with CTCs and the other features listed
in (PI) cannot be easily dismissed as conceptually or physically impossible worlds. Thus,
the evaluation of Godel's argument devolves to the question of what has to go into (P7) in
order to make (C) follow from (PI) through (P7). Here is one try.

(P7.1) The existence of an objective lapse is not a property that time can possess
contingently.

This way of filling in (P7) is supported by the following passage from Godel's essay:

It might, however, be asked: Of what use is it if such conditions [i.e., those of (PI)]
prevail in certain possible worlds? Does that mean anything for the question
interesting us whether in our world there exists an objective lapse of time? I think
it does. . . . The mere compatibility with the laws of nature of worlds in which
there is no distinguished absolute time, and, therefore, no objective time-lapse can
exist, throws some light on the meaning of time also in those worlds in which
absolute time can be defined. For, if someone asserts that this absolute time is
lapsing, he accepts the consequence that, whether or not an objective lapse of time
exists. . . depends on the particular way in which matter and its motion are
arranged in the world. This is not a straightforward contradiction; nevertheless, a
philosophical view leading to such consequences can hardly be considered as
satisfactory. (pp. 561—562)
The most direct and the crudest interpretation of the pattern of argument would be:
L→N(L) (if time has the property of lapsing, then necessarily so), ~N(L) (lapsing is not a
necessary property of time), therefore ~L (time does not lapse). ~N(L) is equivalent to
P(~L), where P(•) means that • is possible. And P(~L) is established by showing there is a
physically possible world—the Godel universe—where ~L is true.

Godel's essentialist intuitions here are not easy to fathom. There seems to be no lurking
contradiction or anything philosophically unsatisfactory in saying in the same breath:
"Space in the actual world is open, but if the mass density were a little greater, space
would be closed," or "Time in the actual universe goes on forever into the future, but if
the mass density were greater the universe would eventually recollapse and time would
come to an end." Why then is there a lurking contradiction or something philosophically
unsatisfactory in saying: "Time in our universe lapses, but if the distribution and motion
of matter were different, there would be no consistent time order and so time would not
lapse"? Godel seemed to have thought that one should see the unsatisfactory character of
this utterance just by reflecting on the concept of time. This game of using an inner sense
to perceive conceptual truths is a dangerous one, for others claim to perceive the
non-existence of CTCs as essential to the concept of time and, therefore, that contrary to
(P4) the Godel model can be ruled out on a priori grounds. Godel gives us no guidelines
for judging superiority of conceptual insight.

But there is an even more puzzling feature of Godel's endorsement of ~L. He concedes at
this juncture of the dialectic that the actual universe has all the geometrical properties
necessary for an objective time lapse, namely, the existence of an appropriately
distinguished global time function. So in affirming ~L he must be claiming that time in
the actual universe lacks some non-geometrical feature necessary for time lapse. What is
this missing ingredient? Recall that Godel says "The existence of an objective time . . .
means (or, at least, is equivalent to the fact) that reality consists of an infinity of layers
of'now' which come into existence successively." By hypothesis the actual universe
consists of an infinity of layers of'now'. So Godel must have believed that these 'nows' fail
to "come into existence successively." There are two mysteries here. First, how is the
non-existence of a global time function in some other possible world relevant to whether
the 'nows' of the distinguished time function of this world come into existence
successively? Second, if what GodePs argument for the ideality of time amounts to is that
time lacks a shifting 'newness', then there is no need to invoke GTR and the Godel
universe. For even if the actual universe and all physically possible universes were fully
Newtonian, it would be difficult to make any non-psychologistic sense of shifting
newness. Another attempt to fill in (P7) comes from Yourgrau (1991).

(P7.2) "Since the actual world is lawlike compossible with the Godel universe, it
follows that our direct experience of time is compatible with its ideality. . . . But if
even direct experience is inadequate to establish the existence of. . . genuine,
successive time that lapses or passes—then nothing further will suffice."
(Yourgrau 1991, p. 53)

In support of this reading Yourgrau cites the following passage from GodePs essay:

If the experience of the lapse of time can exist without an objective lapse of time,
no reason can be given why an objective lapse of time should be assumed at all.
(p. 561)

Let it be granted for sake of argument that some observers in the Godel universe are
under an illusion—they experience a time lapse and in consequence think that time
objectively lapses even though in fact there is no objective lapse of time. How is that fact
about the Godel universe supposed to impinge on us? Granted, it should make us cautious
in drawing consequences about the lapsing of time from our own experiences. But apart
from our experiences of time lapse we have all sorts of other experiences that lend strong
support to the inference that we do not inhabit a Godel type universe hut rather a universe
that fulfills all of the geometrical conditions necessary for an objective lapse of time. To
block this move, consider

(P7.3) There are cosmological models that (i) lack the features necessary for an
objective time lapse, but (ii) reproduce the redshift, etc., so that they are
effectively observationally indistinguishable from models that fit current
 astronomical data and have the spatiotemporal structure needed to ground an
objective lapse of time.

This tack is suggested by another passage from GodePs essay:

Our world, it is true, can hardly be represented by the particular kind of rotating
solutions referred to above (because these solutions are static and therefore, yield
no red-shift for distant objects); there exist however also expanding rotating
solutions. In such universes an absolute time might fail to exist, and it is not
impossible that our world is a universe of this kind. (p. 562)

And indeed Godel did go on to generalize his solutions to EFE in such a way as to allow
for a cosmological redshift (Godel 1952). However, I very much doubt there are
cosmological models which allow for time travel and which are observationally
indistinguishable from non-time travel models.30 But even if there were, Godel would
seem to need an additional premise asserting something like a verifiability theory of
meaning in order to reach his conclusion (G). I take it that few people will be attracted by
such a premise.

I have been unable to locate any plausible argument which starts from Godel's
considerations and leads to the conclusion that time is ideal. Rather, what I find is a
collection of arguments each of which is intriguing but ultimately unpersuasive. A bunch
of unpersuasive arguments do not add up to one persuasive one. Reading between the
lines of his "Reply to Criticisms," one can infer that this was Einstein's view also.
Einstein begins by praising Godel's essay as "an important contribution to the general
theory of relativity, especially to the analysis of the concept of time" (Einstein 1949b, p.
687). But then he immediately brushes aside the question of the relation of GTR to
idealistic philosophy and goes on to discuss issues of causation. This seems to me to be
the correct response to Godel.