Field Artillery Professional Bulletin 2022-4

2022, Issue 4
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Headquarters, Department of the Army. PB 6-22-4
Field Artillery Professional Bulletin
Contents
Editor: Jamie Southerland
Assistant Editor: Chris Gardner
Art Director: David Johnson
FA School PAO: Judith Oman
For more information, contact the U.S. Army Field Artillery School at
(580) 558-0836.
3 Chief of Field Artillery Sends
Disclaimer
By COL (P) Shane P. Morgan
The Field Artillery Professional Bulletin is published by
Headquarters, Department of the Army under the auspices of
5 A Message from the Fifth Chief the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 730 Schimmelpfennig Road,
Fort Sill, OK 73503. The views expressed within are those of the
Warrant Officer of the Field Artillery authors and not the Department of Defense or its elements.
By CW5 Rolando G. Rios The content contained within the Field Artillery Professional
Bulletin does not necessarily reflect the U.S. Army’s position
or supersede information in other official publications. Use of
6 Trust in Your MTOE to Gain Trust new items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy nor
By MAJ Joseph G. Jankovich product endorsements. The Field Artillery Professional Bulletin
assumes no responsibility for any unsolicited material.
10 Fires in Support of Division
CAB Deep Attack By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
By MAJ Christopher Walker, CPT James (JJ) Howse,
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
CPT Joseph Dami, and WO1 Kory Engdall
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
14 The 149th Field Artillery Battalion:
A Case Study of LSCO in the SWPA Official
during World War II

By Dr. Chris Rein
MARK F. AVERILL
Administrative Assistant
20 Dark Eagle is on the move: Soldiers to the Secretary of the Army
complete New Equipment Training 2226316
By Kristen Burroughs
24 The Kill Web: Dynamic Targeting

in Multi-Domain Operations SHANE P. MORGAN
Colonel (P), United States Army
By COL Mike Stewart
56th Field Artillery School Commandant, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
30 Putting the “Forward” Back in

Purpose
“Forward Observer” Originally founded as the Field Artillery Journal, the
By 1LT Christopher Lipscomb Field Artillery Professional Bulletin serves as a forum for the
discussions of all U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps Field
Artillery professionals, Active, Reserves and National Guard;
36 Improved Map Reconnaissance disseminates professional knowledge about progress,
for Field Artillery Emplacements development and best use in campaigns; cultivates a common
understanding of the power, limitations and application of
By CPT Cody Gilham
Fires, both lethal and nonlethal; fosters Fires interdependency
among the armed services, all of which contribute to the
42 Artillery Maneuver: Getting inside good of the Army, joint and combined forces and our nation.
The Field Artillery Professional Bulletin is pleased to grant
the decision cycle of the enemy permission to reprint; please credit Field Artillery Professional
counterfire officer Bulletin, the author(s) and photographers.
By MAJ Shaun Callahan, CPT Jacob Pachter,
and CPT Dana Meyers Cover
Blockhouse at Signal Mountain, Fort Sill, OK. (Photo by
48 Training a JAGIC at Home Station Judith Oman, Field Artillery Public Affairs)
By MAJ Bruce Archambault
2 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

Chief of Field Artillery Sends
The Compass of our Branch

By COL Shane Morgan
Throughout our warrior history, one thing remains clear — the

value of any military force lies in the quality and quantity of its
Field Artillery. No other branch is held in such high regard nor has
such a long and distinguished history as ours.
As we move into an era of modernization we cannot forget where

we, as Redlegs, came from. We need to celebrate those traditions
and customs that have made us the King of Battle for the past
247 years. We trace our origins to Henry Knox, the first Colonel
of the Field Artillery. Our colors today remain red and yellow,
paying homage to our early uniforms and plumage. Every year,
we appreciate the contribution and fighting spirit of Molly Pitcher.
COL (P) Shane P. Morgan As our Army transforms to face the future, we also honor those
Field Artillery School Commandant traditions with our annual Saint Barbara celebrations. This is a time
meant to inform and inspire future generations of Soldiers and
leaders about our heritage even as they seek to create new paths
of their own. It showcases the elements of our chosen military
profession — The Field Artillery — distinguishing Redlegs from
other branches and conveys the richness of our history and the
experience of our units.
The foundation of all things Artillery is Blockhouse Signal

Mountain, here at Fort Sill. Once used as an observation post in
old Cavalry days, the building is now the north compass of every
Redleg around the globe. Within the dusty confines of the old stone
structure is hidden a canister containing a base charge. The terrain
is steep and the journey to retrieve it each year is demanding. The
charge itself represents our line of selfless service and those who
made the ultimate sacrifice in the call of duty. It serves as the base
ingredient, a connection between the old and the new. Retrieved
for the Saint Barbara’s Ball, each year a portion is saved returned
afterward for our next leaders to reclaim again and continue our
traditions.
CSM Michael J. McMurdy
Command Sergeant Major
As we continue to grow and modernize, CSM Michael McMurdy
of the Field Artillery and I ask you to remember and honor where we came from,
embrace the future of our branch and be the empowering compass
for current and succeeding generations to follow.
Happy Saint Barbara’s Season Redlegs!! Zero mils!! KOB!!
2022 Issue 4 • 3
Background:
Senior leaders from around Fort Sill hike up
to Blockhouse Nov. 29, 2022, to retrieve the
base charge for the grog ceremony of the Saint
Barbara’s day celebration.
Right:
COL(P) Shane Morgan and CSM Michael
McMurdy pose for a photo in front of the
historic Blockhouse on Nov. 29, 2022, after the
rigorous hike up Signal Mountain.
Far right:
The survey marker in front of Blockhouse,
placed in 1948, gives the exact location
of Blockhouse.
(Photos by 1LT James Marshall,

FA CMDT Aide de Camp)
Below:
The survey marker in front of Blockhouse, placed in
1948, gives the exact location of Blockhouse.
Bottom:
The foundation of all things Artillery, where
every Redleg learns to cut a charge — Blockhouse
Signal Mountain. Built in 1917, it was settled as a
signal station and weather observatory providing
communications between Signal Mountain and the
Medicine Bluffs.
(Photos by Judith Oman, FA CMDT Public Affairs)

A Message from the Fifth Chief Warrant Officer of the Field Artillery
Greetings fellow Redlegs,
It is my distinct honor and privilege to work for you as the

fifth Chief Warrant Officer of the Field Artillery Branch (CWOB).
Rest assured that I take this obligation seriously and commit
myself to doing the absolute best for the Field Artillery and our
131A Cohort. This is truly the greatest branch in the Army.
As the CWOB, I structure, align, and energize my entire effort to

the Army’s “People Strategy” Lines of Effort:
1) Acquire
2) Develop
CW5 Rolando G. Rios
Chief Warrant Officer 3) Employ
of the Field Artillery
4) Retain
The premise behind the strategy centers on the Army’s WO

Stabilization Plan to acquire people with both talent and potential
for expertise, and future longevity of service, develop WO-specific
talents through experiential and expert development programs,
employ WO talent to meet the Army’s readiness requirements, and
retain WO expertise and talent for the betterment of the Army.
While my determination is driven by the Army’s “People Strategy”

and the FA Commandant’s priorities, I do not undertake these
tasks alone. I rely heavily on the Field Artillery Proponent Office’s
WO, the Warrant Officer Basic Course Manager, the 131A Branch
Manager, and input from commanders and senior leaders in the
branch. Collectively, we all have a role to play in safeguarding this
awesome branch.
To each one of you, I will give you 100% of my effort and will
find every strength available to me to do the very best that I can
for the cohort and the branch.
We must become scholars of our profession!
King of Battle!
2022 Issue 4 • 5
Trust in Your
D
MTOE
uring History 102 at the Command and
By MAJ Joseph G. Jankovich
General Staff College, my classmates and I

chuckled as we watched a video depicting
to Gain Trust
same. For example, Russian-backed separatists

creatively utilized drones as observers with
destructive fire effects during the Zelenopillia
engagements during the Revolutionary War. rocket attack in 2014, long before the current
The idea that people wholeheartedly lined up, Ukrainian campaign. The Ukrainian Army had
bounded, and traded volleys with an enemy shot down an inexpensive drone earlier in the
formation seemed too absurd to be a military week but continued to mass forces in a congested
paradigm of any era. Our instructor noted that the area only 9 km from the Russia-controlled
compliance to the process occurred because each border. The rocket attack lasted just over three
Soldier knew they would be shot as a deserter minutes but killed or injured over 100 personnel
at the slightest flinch. Several months later, while making multiple armored brigades combat
during the Advanced Operations Course, the same ineffective.
classmates very seriously huddled around a map of
Eastern Europe. We based phases, and movement Just as Ukrainian military leaders did not
triggers on our actions and the assessed enemy synthesize that enemy forces could observe
reactions. Blue Forces (BLUFOR) took objectives utilizing drones and could fire rocket artillery
with a fair certainty that the opposing force once those targets were known, somehow, many
(OPFOR) would take complementary objectives. military theorists did not overly note the event
It was a dance and predictable counter-dance of at the time. This was a paradigm change to
combat power. In effect, hundreds of years after warfare, all of which came from open-source
the Revolutionary War, the military paradigm media. The near-peer threats we prepare for in a
of lining up, bounding, and letting each side large-scale combat operations (LSCO) fight have
take a turn had not changed; only the weapons open-source programs or news reports of material
had changed. To win on future battlefields, focus areas. We have access to this information
artillerists must know their enemy’s capabilities and can assess the military paradigm beliefs of
and employ their own well-maintained organic our enemies to enable a proper counterplan. Just
capabilities while emphasizing survivability as with Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,
and digital communications. Simplicity in this analyzing and assessing the conventional and
employment results in a commitment to the unconventional tactics and means utilized by
effort through trust. the enemy form the foundation for all operations
that follow.
Know Your Enemy
Beyond the open-source intelligence, units
Field Artillery personnel must know enemy should regularly employ all organic equipment.
capabilities. The weapons will continue to Army policy requires us to inventory and service
change in future battlefields. We have seen in this equipment, so it should be used regularly and
recent warfare the heavy employment of drone fully. Just as Russia has fully embraced the use of
use for reconnaissance, target validation, and drones, most units have RQ-11 Ravens that could
direct kinetic effects. The United States military make the difference in initial Reconnaissance,
employs lethal drones consistently without Selection and Occupation of Position (RSOP),
often considering the enemy’s capacity to do the local enemy detection, and triggering the need for

Background: Survivability: The light medium tactical vehicle in the wood line has the tools to survive and move quickly: it is obscured
from enemy detection, dispersed from other equipment, and light enough to exfiltrate immediately. Above, left to right: Terrain
Model: Soldiers who are part of a process that utilizes all resources available to complete the mission and preserve personnel and
material readiness show better trust and commitment to the plan. Rocket Attack: The aftermath of Russia’s Zelenopillia attack
in 2014 shows the negative side of many points of this article: an inexpensive observer drone was used by Russia to neutralize an
immobile and undispersed formation. NVG: Just as the Army provides equipment to maneuver in all conditions, such as Night Vision
Goggles, units have MTOE Ravens that could provide critical protection information.
2022 Issue 4 • 7
survivability moves. FM 3-90-2: Reconnaissance, functions. The mantra to die in place while
Security and Tactical Enabling Tasks Volume 2 in delivering fires does not mean to make it easy
chapters 1-7 outline a fundamental requirement for the enemy.
of reconnaissance operations: never keeping
reconnaissance assets in the rear. The material The simplest counter to any indirect fire threat
readiness involved in maintaining and servicing is through the dispersion of combat power to
the equipment proves crucial to its effectiveness. prevent one enemy round or small arms attack
While time-consuming, using Ravens or similar from neutralizing the unit. Position Areas for
devices on the battlefield directly puts equipment Artillery consume a large amount of space that
rather than personnel in harm’s way while also needs full utilization to avoid placing multiple
providing intelligence for survivability. The smart fires delivery assets within enemy fire for effect
use of that material to preserve the personnel ranges. However, the best counter to holistically
readiness of our Soldiers also builds trust and survive while gaining initiative for the offense
commitment to the team effort. comes through operating lightly while employing
all equipment. Many senior 13Js in heavy artillery
Survive through Mobility units have, at some point, configured a regular
HMMWV to power an AFATDS and a whole fire
Artillery units must have high survivability direction center (FDC) to stay mobile when dealing
through mobility and dispersion to win on the with M1068 issues. This same mindset of mobility
battlefield. In an LSCO environment, static and creativity should apply to all equipment.
positions get friendly forces killed. There simply Units have a significant quantity of generators on
is no operational need to lay too much concertina hand to provide power to a handful of systems.
wire or set up a “TOC Mahal” that leaves a unit Employing combat power in unique ways that
susceptible to counterfire. Indeed ATP 3-09.50: show leaders care about their Soldiers also builds
The Field Artillery Cannon Battery chapters trust and commitment to the effort.
5-6 heavily emphasize continually hardening
a defense unless “emergency displacement To tie everything together, employing assets
is anticipated.” However, as a Field Artillery in decentralized but coordinated and dispersed
unit in LSCO, there is an inherent necessity to ways helps keep artillery on the offensive.
displace hastily. High dispersion and high mobility result in
high survivability. Utilizing the full array of
Mentally agile leaders must assess the enemy organic sensors or enablers also assists in
situation and find the proper balance. Most of knowing the enemy’s situation; if the enemy
us have experienced a Combat Training Center employs drones, perhaps a support platoon sets
rotation where each up a Listening Post/
survivability move Observation Post
or jumping off a to identify threats
main command early. None of this
post resulted in a occurs without the
far smaller foot- material readiness
print during the from maintaining the
next occupation. equipment coupled
We should always with ready personnel
strive to be light entrusted to take the
and mobile. Most initiative. Knowing
units embrace the the battlefield and
idea of mobility and having the capacity to
survivability with swiftly move directly
the initial setup of enables survivability,
a tactical command the preservation
post but then make of combat power,
themselves targets and the capacity to
Minimal TOC: This simple command post is already light, but the same
as they build in functionality could be achieved with the mission command nodes provide lethal fires
more command post operating out of vehicles that can easily complete survivability moves. to win.
Communicate Quickly and Effectively subordinate units’ knowledge and training base
results in culmination. This occurred when
Digital communications similarly enhance the Russian invasion of Ukraine halted near
survivability. A long-winded voice fire mission Konotop in February 2022 after supply lines
places an enormous target on all nodes in the kill and fuel were overlooked. Some leaders surely
chain. Even concise voice fire missions provide identified these issues but feared pointing out
an exponentially greater amount of location the lack of support. A simple, understandable
indication to the near-peer threats of an LSCO plan alleviates confusion and provides more
fight. ATP 6-02.53: Techniques for Tactical Radio achievable shared understanding. An environment
Operations in chapters 10-52 highlight that “the conducive to candid talk of concerns builds trust
most effective preventive [Electronic Protection] and commitment. Even when someone’s idea is
technique” is minimizing transmission times not utilized, they trust the process when they
and power outputs. Digital communications, can influence the process in even small ways.
enabled by utilizing MTOE Field Artillery unit
equipment, accomplish the mission with minimal Another concept of simplicity and trust to enable
electromagnetic output. winning comes down to the concept of ownership
through trust. The Marine Corps Rifleman’s
Leaders and young Soldiers must have a Creed states the idea well when stating, “This
fundamental understanding of how to properly is my rifle. There are many like it, but this one
utilize that Mission Command equipment. is mine.” Leaders should self-assess if they
In garrison and far too often in the field, military allow subordinates to truly own their equipment
units rely on cell phones rather than thoroughly and problem sets. Too often, units that do the
troubleshooting and gaining proficiency in right thing with full inventories do not take
operating their digital systems. We must not the time to teach and allow subordinates to
rely on a handful of 25Us to handle a unit’s understand the importance of that equipment.
troubleshooting issues. The fundamentals also When Soldiers look at their combat platform
encompass proper servicing and cleaning of the similar to how they look at their privately owned
end items and basic issue items; anything that vehicle, their commitment and investment into
stands between the Mission Command nodes and the material readiness and training for combat
delivering lethal fires puts our Soldiers at risk. grow exponentially.
With well-maintained and serviced equipment Conclusion

in the hands of quality Soldiers who trust their
leaders and the process, the United States Army To win on future battlefields, artillerists must
has myriad capabilities. At the lowest echelons, know enemy capabilities and employ well-
an FDC can send fire missions to the gun and win maintained organic capabilities while emphasizing
at the point of contact. Done properly at higher survivability and digital communications.
echelons, the interoperability of functioning When executed with simplicity, this results in
systems facilitates friendly radar detecting and commitment and developed trust. Despite the
beginning the process of counterfire. We only complex ideas of new battlefields and paradigms,
know and place trust in the systems when we focusing on the fundamentals and building
have repetition in their proper employment. personnel and material readiness provides a
simple solution to win. It enables us to build and
Simplicity Earns Trust lead dedicated teams that will own the battlefield,
the equipment, and the process.
Finally, simplicity in operations will win on
MAJ Joseph G. Jankovich currently serves as the executive officer
future battlefields. Everything comes down to
for 2-4th Field Artillery Regiment, 75th Field Artillery Brigade
fundamentals. Per FM 7-0: Training in chapters at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. His previous assignments include S3,
4-8, “units must master the basics” before Observer, Coach/Trainer, battery commander, and fire support
assuming more complex tasks. If we are moving officer during Operations Iraqi Freedom and New Dawn. He is an
our formations at the speed of trust, we must undergraduate alumnus of George Mason University ROTC and has
Master’s degrees from George Mason University, the University of
ensure our tactical plans are not so clever that Oklahoma, and the Command and General Staff College.
we miss out on the basics. Moving faster than
2022 Issue 4 • 9
Fires in Support of
Division CAB Deep Attack

“Success in Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) is
dependent on the Army’s ability to fight with fires (FM 3-0).”
I
ntroduction/ Problem: Army Attack Aviation’s This degradation is especially true when
ability to conduct a digital call for fire (D-CFF) conducting operations long of the coordinated
from the AH-64D Apache to an artillery fire line (CFL).
firing battery can have a significant impact
in the deep fight. However, over the last two Historically, conducting calls for fire from
decades, it has relied solely on its organic fires Army Attack Aviation has proven inefficient and
capabilities rather than its sensing capabilities. not conducive to delivering timely and accurate
As the Army continues to move away from the fires. Pilots conducting calls for fire would send
Counter Insurgency (COIN) fight and toward free text messages via BFT to their operation
LSCO, we must continue to focus on the “any cell’s Joint Battle Command Platform (JBCP).
sensor to best shooter” concept. One key Operation cells could process fire missions;
component moving forward is the ability of AH- however, pilots had no established means of
64s to provide D-CFFs, significantly decreasing receiving digital confirmation of prosecuted
mission processing time and the risk of human missions. This lack of information left pilots with
error. Up until May of 2022, AH-64 pilots relied no situational awareness regarding their requests
on the free messaging capabilities of the Blue and hindered the sensor-to-shooter process.
Force Tracking (BFT), increasing both time and Additionally, calls for fire could easily be lost
inaccuracies. Thanks to the efforts of the Fires or overlooked in the vast number of messages
Concepts & Development Integration Directorate transmitted from different staff sections to their
(CDID), Aviation Program Executive Office (PEO), higher-echelon counterparts. Furthermore, many
and 1st Armored Division, Combat Aviation Brigade operators manning the JBCP have not received
(AD CAB), there is now a streamlined solution that training to identify and process fire missions.
will allow for timely and accurate indirect fires in
support of the division’s deep fight. The 1AD CAB, Fires CDID, and Army Aviation
CDID have identified a solution by routing BFT
“If you can’t talk, you can’t fight.” calls for fire directly to the Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).
Communication capabilities between the CAB’s While the process is still in its trial period,
AH-64s and the Fires and Effects Coordination the future looks bright. The ability to send
Cell (FECC) may degrade by the depth and D-CFF from the AH-64 BFT directly to AFATDS
breadth of the division’s area of operations. drastically shortens the kill chain process,
By MAJ Christopher Walker, CPT James (JJ) Howse, CPT Joseph Dami, and WO1 Kory Engdall
Previous page: The 1AD CAB FECC routes a fire-for-effect mission from the AH-64D through 56th Fires Current Operations and
Integration Cell to the “Ghost Gun” where the mission is processed and executed.
2022 Issue 4 • 11
providing timely and accurate calls for fire For this exercise, the pilots’ call-for-fire
while reducing human error and limiting messages were “pre-cut” messages, allowing
transmission times. AH-64s can provide laser- little room for user variation. However, in the
designated targets and request accurate effects future, pilots will have the necessities regarding
while simultaneously conducting manned and the types of missions they can transmit.
unmanned targeting on high payoff targets The 1-501st Attack Battalion successfully
(HPT). In addition, pilots can either reserve their transmitted an observer-ready report, which
munitions for future engagements or remain must be the first report sent to the AFATDS
undetected while lasing targets for division before receiving any other mission. Other types
artillery to prosecute. All these points will of missions included: when ready, adjust fire,
prove to be force multipliers when conducting at my command, check firing, cancel check
LSCO. While AH-64s drift away from the “over firing, and a request for copperhead. A few
the shoulder” mindset exercised during COIN peculiarities occurred throughout the testing
operations, CAB fire support elements (FSE) can process. For example, the type of munition will
use this capability to multiply their lethality in default to dual-purpose improved conventional
the division deep fight. munitions (DPICM) unless the pilot requests
a munition. Without identifying, such as
AFATDS and AH-64 BFT Integration: The requesting copperhead (which no longer exists in
process of establishing digital communications the Field Artillery’s arsenal), FSEs must continue
between the AFATDS and the AH-64’s BFT is developing standard operating procedures to
relatively streamlined. Aviation CDID released a avoid unnecessary complications and streamline
draft (Digital Variable Message Format [VMF] Call the AH-64s digital calls for fire.
for Fire Network, AFATDS Setup, and Procedures
for AH-64Dv14 & AH-64E), which pinpoints What this means for firing units: The
the process of initializing the AFATDS database Fires community must prepare for this new
through reconstruction of the Master Unit List, capability and its effect on the targeting process.
building the AH-64 in the unit’s workspace, and Specifically, division must include the CAB
constructing the communications workspace in the priority of fires. AH-64s often act as
appropriately. reconnaissance elements, answering information
requirements for the ground force commander.
Some of the troubleshooting procedures taken Just like ground reconnaissance units, artillery
to link the two systems incorporated the AFATDS will serve as aviation’s biggest asset while
desktop command prompt window and required remaining undetected. Traditionally CABs do
conducting several TRACERTs of the Anycast IP not receive priority of fire. However, with the
to determine where breaks in the digital routing new D-CFF ability, AH-64s must receive top
chain were occurring. As VMF messages left the priority in the initial phases of an operation.
AFATDS, they were routed through 23 different
IPs through the network operation center and As reconnaissance teams begin scouting prior
regional hub node. Routing through that many to the division’s line of departure from the
IPs resulted in a system “timeout” and failure tactical assembly area, Field Artillery battalions
to deliver the D-CFF. will need to be more aggressive in positioning
their batteries. Because AH-64s are operating
Identifying where the timeout occurred allowed forward of the CFL, planners must either push
the Network Warrant Officer to coordinate with the batteries further forward or supply them with
Mission Command Support Center, which reduced long-range munitions. Batteries would have to be
the digital routing chain from 23 IP addresses to 8. in position, ready to fire, before the Air Calvary
Furthermore, when operating at the echelon of a orienting on the recon objective. Division FSEs
brigade FECC, the AFATDS unit role is set to FSE/ could decrease fire mission processing times by
FSCC/SACC with the selected Attack Analysis set as establishing a “quick fire net” between the CAB
FS System Level. This setting allows calls for fire to FSE and a firing battery.
be processed and routed at the appropriate level. To
be executed promptly, the System Attack Parameters Moving Forward/ Conclusion: During
must build in aviation. This enables the AFATDS to the “detect” portion of the “D3A” targeting
send and receive missions from the AH-64. methodology, AH-64s can serve as highly mobile
and accurate observers. Furthermore,
using AH-64s in developing named areas
of interest/ target areas of interest (NAI/
TAI) will allow the division to reallocate
information collection assets better. AH-
64s provide the unique opportunity to
Read.
unmask themselves from behind terrain,
lase a target, mask, and then conduct a call
for fire in a matter of seconds. This ability
to move quickly and silently while calling
for fire could prove detrimental to the
enemy as AH-64s can reposition multiple
times on the battlefield, destroying HPTs
in support of the division’s deep fight.
Write.
While the testing of this process is still
in progress, the successful completion of
trials has proven that FSEs can reliably
assign AH-64s as observers for preplanned
targets. Reducing target location error
ensures first-round effects when engaging
Photo-
targets beyond the CFL. The process of
fully understanding the communications
architecture is still underway. Future
tests must include live munitions from
Field Artillery units affecting targets.
Both division FSEs and CABs can begin
graph.
preparing for the future fight. The enemy
will no longer feel safe from artillery
while operating far from our forward line
of troops.
MAJ Christopher Walker is the Fire Support Officer

for the 1st Armored Division, Combat Aviation Brigade.
His most recent assignments include Fires Systems The
Integrations Officer for Joint Modernization Command FIELD ARTILLERY PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN
and Executive Officer for the Field Artillery Commandant. is the premier publication of the Field Artillery!
Stay informed and up-to-date on your profession.
CPT James (JJ) Howse is the Fires and Effects
Coordinator for the 1st Armored Division, Combat ACCELERATE YOUR CAREER
Aviation Brigade. His most recent assignments include by staying informed, reading and writing for
1st Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery as a Fire a widely-distributed, official US Army publication!
Support Officer, Platoon Leader, and Assistant S3.
Take a great picture while out in the field?
CPT Joseph Dami is the Assistant Fire Support Officer LIKE TO SEE IT PUBLISHED
for the 1st Armored Division, Combat Aviation Brigade. in magazine-quality color? Submit your charts, photographs
His most recent assignments include 10th Mountain and other support images with your article!
Division Artillery as the Command Group Operations
Officer, and 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment
Consider adding PUBLISHED AUTHOR to your resume!
as a Fire Support Officer, Platoon Leader, and Executive
For submission deadlines and writing guidelines, contact
Officer.
FA PAO Judith Oman at: [email protected]
WO1 Kory Engdall is the Targeting Officer for the
1st Armored Division, Combat Aviation Brigade. He is
a recent graduate of the Warrant Officer Basic Course.
2022 Issue 4 • 13
The 149th Field Artillery Battalion:
A Case Study of LSCO in the SWPA during World War II
By Dr. Chris Rein
A
s it had been in the Great War, Field France, and the final defeat of Nazi Germany,
Artillery (FA) remained an exceptional but the recent Pacific pivot and the threat an
arbiter of battle in World War II. While expansionist China poses across the Pacific has
new technologies, including much more mobile historians reexamining the Army’s significant
and heavily armed tanks, medium and heavy contributions to the defeat of Japan. Especially
bombers, and self-propelled artillery, entered in GEN Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific
the Army inventory in the decades before the Ocean Area (SWPA) that spanned from Guadalcanal
war, towed howitzers remained ubiquitous on in the Solomon Islands across New Guinea to the
battlefields across Europe and Asia. Army history Philippines.1 The experiences of one unit, the
privileges accounts of World War II in Europe, 149th Field Artillery Battalion, originally part of
especially the D-Day landings, the liberation of the Florida National Guard, highlights the Army’s
1 See, for example, John C. McManus’s trilogy on the Army in the Pacific, which includes Fire and Fortitude: The U.S.
Army in the Pacific War, 1941-1943 (New York: Dutton Caliber, 2019); Island Infernos: The U.S. Army’s Pacific Odyssey, 1944
(New York: Dutton Caliber, 2021); and the forthcoming third volume covering the final year of the war, including the
Philippine and Okinawa campaigns.

successes in adapting to a challenging physical training prescribed stateside.2 Despite being
environment, the value of well-trained and long- overruled, Lowry more accurately predicted his
serving National Guardsmen in the Total Force, units’ requirements, as his batteries engaged
and the enduring importance of indirect fire in primarily in the activities he described. Pre-
achieving success on any battlefield, whether the war guardsmen still led all four of the division’s
fields and forests of Europe or the tropical jungles battalions (three of 105 mm howitzers and one
and sunbaked atolls of the Pacific. of 155’s) as they completed a rigorous, eight-
week training course, capped by an inspection
The 149th Field Artillery Battalion came into by Sixth Army from June 5-10, 1944, and formal
existence in February 1942 after Florida’s 116th battalion tests the rest of the month.3 Under
FA Regiment (FAR) spun off its second battalion LTC Jones’s direction, the 149th FA even built a
into a separate unit. The reorganization was part miniature range at Dobodura in Australian Papua
of the belated “triangularization” of National to provide additional training for each battery in
Guard divisions, which reduced the two infantry adjusting fires.4 Unfortunately, the 149th never
brigades of two regiments each and three FA completed the tests: Sixth Army alerted it on June
regiments into three “regimental combat teams” 22 as part of the 124th Infantry RCT’s movement
(RCT) composed of a single infantry regiment, a to reinforce the Allied line along the Driniumor
supporting FA battalion, and attached engineer River, protecting the newly-won airfield at Aitape.
and medical companies. Throughout the process
of mobilization as part of the 31st Infantry “Dixie” Aitape was just one outpost in MacArthur’s
Division in November 1940, the 116th and its island-hopping campaign along the northern
sister regiments, Mississippi’s 114th FAR and coast of New Guinea. Aircraft based there provided
Alabama’s 117th FAR had retained the core of additional protection for the much larger airfields
their pre-war National Guard officers while and base area at Hollandia, seized against light
adding new levies, initially from their home opposition in early May, eventually launching
states, but eventually from across the country. MacArthur’s famous return to the Philippines
When the 149th FA entered combat in New in Leyte in October 1944. But the leap along the
Guinea, LTC Werner Eugene Jones, a pre-war coast bypassed the Japanese 18th Army (a U.S.
guardsman from Haines City, Florida, still led the corps equivalent containing the 20th and 41st
battalion, but most of his battery officers were infantry divisions) at Wewak, almost 100 miles
newly commissioned lieutenants and captains from Aitape. Rather than see his bypassed forces
from the rapidly mobilizing Army’s expanding wither on the vine, as was MacArthur’s intention,
manpower pool. Upon arrival in New Guinea, GEN Hatazo Adachi embarked on an ambitious
the division’s artillery faced the same tests they offensive to attack the American forces protecting
had completed before deployment stateside, but Aitape. Aware of this plan, GEN Charles Hall,
a quick inspection of combat conditions in the commander of XI Corps, directed elements of the
theater revealed new challenges. 32nd (Red Arrow) Infantry Division to establish
an outpost line behind the Driniumor River, a
Shortly after arriving in the SWPA in New small stream running north from the Torricelli
Guinea, the 31st’s Division Artillery (DivArty) Mountains to the sea, to keep Japanese light
commander, BG Sumter Lowry wrote to the XI artillery (primarily 70 mm “mountain” guns)
Corps Chief of Artillery to propose a new training far enough away from the airfield to prevent
regimen that consisted of practice embarking them from interfering with flying operations.
and disembarking from landing craft, firing from BG Clarence A. Martin, the 32nd’s deputy
beach positions, and training forward observers commanding general, posted elements of his
(FO) to work in the jungle and with the pilots own 127th and 128th RCTs behind the river, with
of the artillery’s attached light liaison aircraft, the 112th Cavalry Regiment, an independent
rather than completing the generic course of formation was anchoring the southern end of
2 Lowry to George Keyser, March 27. 1944, Box 14, Sumter Lowry Papers, Special Collections, University of South Florida
Library (USF), Tampa, Florida.
3 Lowry to George Keyser, July 13, 1944, Box 14, Lowry Papers, USF.
4 Julian Myrick, “History of 149th Field Artillery Battalion from Camp Pickett, Virginia to Morotai, NEI (St. Augustine:
Florida Department of Military Affairs, 1985), 8-9.
2022 Issue 4 • 15
the line. Rather than just wait for the Japanese our occupation as a complete perimeter from the
attack, Sixth Army Commander, Walter Krueger, west bank of the Driniumor and gave me and my
ordered Martin to conduct reconnaissance- crew a nice bunker right on the bank where we
in-force from both ends of his line to develop had a full panorama of the river bed which had to
Japanese intentions. Martin faced thinning out be at least 200 yards wide…Pappy Williams had
his defensive line to provide the attacking force, such confidence in the 149th that he kept at my
which prompted the 124th RCT’s rapid dispatch elbow and saying, ’bring it in, Lieutenant,’ until
to Aitape.5 my final bursts were in the middle of the river.”8
Unfortunately, Krueger’s order, while sound, Over the next two weeks, the 124th repelled
was ill-timed, and Adachi struck the center of repeated Japanese counterattacks, with the
Martin’s thinned line just as the reconnaissance- 149th FA firing multiple fire missions at all
in-force prepared to hours. Just after midnight
depart. After almost on July 23, the Japanese
suicidal assaults, Japanese made one last attempt on
forces broke through. the Third Battalion’s lines
They threatened a second but suffered devastating
defensive perimeter causalities to concentrated
around the airfield itself, artillery, mortar, and small
prompting Hall to send arms fire. Throughout
the newly arrived 124th the night, the 149th FA
RCT with the 149th FA in fired concentrations of
support to reestablish the forty rounds on at least
line. The 149th moved by Walker Assault on Red Beach Morotai. three different occasions,
sea to a position east of and the 124th RCT’s
the Nigia River and took up firing positions regimental history recorded, “When daylight
on a sand spit at the mouth of Akanai Creek. came, the riverbed was clogged with crawling,
At 0752 on July 13, Battery B of the 149th FA fired groaning, wounded and dead Japanese Soldiers.”
a concentration ahead of the Third Battalion, The defenders counted over 300 bodies, which
124th Infantry attack. SGT David Ballard of Plant fouled the river for days.9
City, Florida, pulled the lanyard, marking the
battalion’s entry into combat.6 The 149th FA With the river line restored, the 124th RCT
fired over 1,300 rounds during the day, providing received a new mission: to counterattack across
essential support for the advance.7 the Driniumor and swing south behind the
Japanese forces still besieging the 112th Cavalry
Once the infantry reestablished the broken at Afua. The change from defensive to offensive
line on the Driniumor River, the gunners quickly operations was a morale booster for the troops,
registered fires to defend the hedgehog position but it also highlighted the difficulties of moving
against expected Japanese counterattacks from through the jungle, not to mention coordinating
both directions. LT Stephen Harding, an FO with fires through the dense canopy. On the morning
Battery B, supporting the 124th’s Third Battalion of July 31, the attack jumped off against light
recalled, opposition. Preparatory artillery barrages had
largely done their work, though one round later
“[LTC George D.] Pappy [Williams] organized fell within Second Battalion’s perimeter and killed
5 For more detail, see Edward Drea’s excellent Leavenworth Paper, Defending the Driniumor: Covering Force Operations in
New Guinea, 1944 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1984), available online at https://www.armyupress.
army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/drea.pdf
6 Robert Hawk, The Florida Guardsman (Fall 1987), 16.
7 Battalion History, 149th Field Artillery Battalion, Box 414, World War II Unit Records, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential
Library (DDE), Abilene, KS.
8 Harding to Marion Hess, Aug. 28, 1996, Marion Hess Collection, Institute on World War II and the Human Experience,
Florida State University (FSU), Tallahassee, FL.
9 Regimental History, 124th Infantry Regiment, Box 1339, World War II Unit Records, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential
Library (DDE), Abilene, KS.

one man and wounded two more. MAJ Edward West, while he scouted the battalion’s perimeter.
Logan, regimental S-2, described the difficulties LT Harding, now back at the battery after rotating
of just moving in this terrain: out of FO duty, recalled “night infiltration was
our biggest security problem,” and it hampered
“The climate in this area is hot, humid, and the battalion’s ability to provide supporting
suffocating; troops stay wet 24 hours a day, fires in other ways. After Japanese infiltrators
either from rain or perspiration. The dank, wet cut communication wire laid along the beach,
air makes breathing hard after an hour’s march, the battalion had to use “Buffaloes” (an armed
and troops tire quickly as the water is pulled version of the Landing Vehicle, Tracked, or LVT, a
from their body, sapping their strength. It was “swimming tank” with bulldozer treads running
not uncommon to have five- and ten-minute along each side of an amphibious hull) to lay wire
halts for every 20 minutes of moving … the rate weighted with sandbags just offshore, hiding the
of advance was figured to be not more than 100 wire underwater and preventing disruption to
yards per hour. Each yard had to be cut—lead vital communications.11
platoons were changed every hour—squads every
fifteen minutes, and lead companies were changed The 149th FA continued to support the 124th
every three hours.” RCT through its advance as part of a massive
preparatory barrage by four artillery battalions to
Overhead, the artillery’s light liaison aircraft clear the area. The 149th FA alone fired 593 rounds.
helped with ground navigation by measuring the The 124th’s Third Battalion jumped off again on
distance from overhead marks to the beach and Aug. 4 and reached the trail to Afua around noon,
back to the river, enabling the companies to plot cutting the Japanese main supply line and route
their positions. of retreat. But coordination problems continued
to plague the troops in the dense jungle. Aug.
To keep pace with the infantry’s advance, on 8 saw one of the most tragic episodes of the
Aug. 2, the 149th FA displaced forward to the campaign: a friendly artillery barrage from the
mouth of the Driniumor. The artillerymen soon 32nd Division’s 120th FA fell on Company B,
learned that their new position on the beach 124th Infantry’s position. Throughout the night,
was not as secure as they expected. Early in the the battery had fired prepared concentrations in
morning of August 3, an estimated six to eight front of the river line at Afua that fell close to
Japanese infiltrators armed with explosives slipped the 124th RCT’s perimeter, demonstrating the
into the battalion’s perimeter, during a driving risk inherent when two friendly forces converge.
rainstorm. Several reached Battery A’s ammunition Two days earlier, the 149th FA established a
dump and detonated their charges, killing two fire-control line that limited fires east of the
men instantly. The blast threw loaded shells in Driniumor River, but the 120th FA either did not
every direction, and only a miracle spared the receive notification or violated the requirement
entire Battery A dump from destruction. On their for controlled fires in the area between the two
retreat, the infiltrators threw a grenade under LT forces. Robert Wright remembered that nine
Robert Powers’ cot, injuring him seriously and rounds killed four men (another member of
highlighting the dangers of sleeping above ground. the 149th’s FO team later died of his wounds).12
Though the initial group of attackers escaped, the Delbert Paris of Anniston, Alabama, recalled that
by-now fully alerted defenders detected another the men were burning cardboard ration boxes
infiltration effort several hours later and killed to heat their rations, and he believed that an
another saboteur armed with explosives just artillery-spotting aircraft mistook the smoke as
yards from a Battery B howitzer.10 The attacks a marker for enemy positions and called in fire.13
prompted more patrols from the artillerists, but
this was dangerous as well: two days later a But the successful defense of the Driniumor
Japanese booby trap claimed the life of CPL Ray River line and subsequent counterattack across it
10 149 F.A. History, 16-17, Box 414, DDE.

11 Harding to Hess, Aug. 28, 1996, Hess Collection, FSU; 124th Infantry S-3 (Operations) Journal, July 12, Aug. 3, 1944,
Box 1339, DDE; 149th History, Box 414, DDE.
12 Robert Wright to Marion Hess, Apr. 11, 1995, Hess Collection, FSU.
13 http://home.pcisys.net/~pwebber/31_id/text/delbert_parris.txt, accessed July 14, 2020; 149th Artillery History, 21,
24, Box 414, DDE.
2022 Issue 4 • 17
brought high praise for the 124th RCT, including on their ubiquitous presence.16 The 149th FA’s two
the 149th FA. Sixth Army awarded the Third liaison pilots, LT Frank Zirblis and LT John Kemp,
Battalion, 124th Infantry a Distinguished each received the Air Medal for their efforts in the
Unit Citation for “conspicuous gallantry” and attack, especially the vital drops of radio batteries
“outstanding performance of duty” for its attacks and blood plasma and their essential relay of radio
to restore the line on July 13 and the annihilation messages without which the attacking force could
of a Japanese supply party attempting to reach not have communicated.17
the forces west of the Driniumor the following
night, as well as holding the line against attacks The 149th FA emerged from the crucible of the
from the front and rear for the rest of the week. Driniumor strengthened by the ordeal, mostly
Infantrymen became true believers in their supporting artillery who “until the present
operation were completely unappreciated,” but now “were found to be absolutely
indispensable and their accuracy, control, and effectiveness uncanny.”
And the praise went all the way to the top. SWPA because the test of battle provided the opportunity
Daily Summary #871 for Aug. 9-10, 1944, read, to refine tactics and replace leaders unable to
“The 124th Infantry’s counter envelopment [and] withstand the rigors of combat. LT Harding, a
rapid expansion of its drive east to Afua…is replacement officer in Battery B, later recalled:
possibly unparalleled in the history of military
maneuver over this type of terrain.”14 “Most of the junior officers were aware of the
character shortcomings of our CO (commanding
Infantrymen became true believers in their officer), LTC W. Eugene Jones, even before we left
supporting artillery who “until the present the States. Resultant morale problems were put to
operation were completely unappreciated,” but one side during our baptism to combat, but when
now “were found to be absolutely indispensable 22 out of 33 officers in the battalion signed a letter
and their accuracy, control, and effectiveness to (MG John) Persons (CG of 31 ID) requesting
uncanny.” Seeing up close the effects that the reclassification if Jones were not relieved of
King of Battle could provide converted many command, you can believe there was something
skeptics who had resented the truck-mounted seriously wrong. To his everlasting credit, GEN
artillerymen riding through maneuvers while Persons assembled the recalcitrant group, dressed
the infantry marched. In fact, the artillery’s FOs us down for our action, but subsequently, Jones
shared every hardship with the infantrymen and was relieved and sent home under the pretense
frequently occupied the most exposed positions of incurable “jungle rot” of the feet, something
to control and adjust fire. BG Lowry testified, which a whole bunch of us suffered without losing
“the big men over here in this theater for the our combat capability … Major Milton “Ed” Hull
artillery are the forward observer and liaison replaced Jones who disappeared overnight with
pilots. The forward observers live in the front no fond farewells.”18
lines, accompany the combat patrols that we
send out, and are in the thick of things at all Harding’s testimony reveals the lingering
times. Liaison pilots are in the air almost all day tensions between the pre-war volunteer National
long on all kinds of missions, from dropping food Guard officers and the now-draftee Army they
to isolated units on up to the conduct of naval led. It also highlights MG Persons’ skillful use
gunfire.”15 In yet another tie to the division’s of diplomacy to remove guardsmen who failed to
home region and a nod to its troubled race preserve good order and discipline in their units,
relations, troops dubbed the artillery aircraft the regardless of their long pre-war association with
“Alabama Luftwaffe,” though they came to rely the division. In his memoir, Persons acknowledged
14 Quoted in Marion Hess, “Baptism of Fire,” 1, Hess Collection, FSU; Charles Pearson, “Pappy’s Boys at Tadji,” Yank,
Aug. 25, 1944.
15 Lowry to Baya, August 1, 1944, Box 6, Sumter Lowry Papers, USF.
16 “Kilroy,” Atabrine Time (Philadelphia, PA: Kilroy’s, n.d.), 115.
17 149th History, 11, Box 414, DDE.
18 Harding to Hess, Aug. 28, 1996, Hess Collection, FSU. Jones actually became S-3 of the DivArty staff.

that he “read them the riot act and hope I gave Hall and his section chiefs, and they brought
them something to think about,” but admitted effective fire to break the roadblock and forever
that the “bottom of [the] whole mess is Jones’ endear themselves with our infantry comrades.”
lack of dignity.”19
Harding concluded, “Dogfaces [the World War
MAJ Hull, another pre-war guardsman II nickname for enlisted infantrymen] and Redlegs
from Florida, led the battalion with distinction always did get along.”21
throughout the liberation of the Dutch East
Indies (Indonesia) and the Philippines. Hull The 124th RCT’s official history agreed:
insisted on training the battalion in mobile “this action of the artillery was one of the
operations and rapid battery emplacement in deciding factors in driving the enemy from his
preparation for operations in the Philippines. In advantageous position.”22
the opening stages of the liberation of Mindanao,
the battalion had just crossed the Pulangi River Throughout its service in the SWPA, the 149th
on LCMs (Landing Craft, Mechanized) and was FA effectively built on a core of experienced
moving up the road in the darkness when FOs National Guardsmen to train an Army composed
made urgent calls-for-fire. Thanks to their of newly inducted men. It joined an effective
training, the battalion quickly and skillfully combined arms team that was able to master the
took up its firing positions, which “required difficult conditions of the Southwest Pacific. In the
crossing a very decrepit bridge and skidding process, the battalion became a “joint force” in
down a steep embankment into a small clearing miniature. It flew its own light liaison aircraft and
next to the road. Although it was raining, the frequently operated from small landing craft that
obstacles were surmounted, and the battery was enhanced mobility along the Pacific’s shorelines
prepared for action and laid in [in] short order.” and inland rivers. In interdicting Japanese attacks
The commander of the lead infantry battalion or providing preparatory barrages for assaults on
reported he had hit a substantial roadblock and prepared positions, the organic fires of the 149th
was running short of machine gun ammunition FA were indispensable in the tropical jungles and
and needed artillery support. The battery sent coral atolls, especially when other forms of fire
a radio relay team forward. The 149th’s FO, LT support, including naval gunfire and close air
Raymond Marlowe of St. Paul, Minnesota, moved support, were unavailable or too slowly brought to
his own radio to an exposed position and began bear. Though the difficult terrain presented new
correcting protective concentrations all along the challenges for both coordination and logistics, the
battalion’s front and flanks. The battalion fired efforts of the Redlegs of the 149th FA ensured that
99 rounds by dawn, after which a final-54-round Dogfaces could call on artillery support when they
concentration cleared the battalion’s front.20 LT most needed it, cementing the reputation of the
Harding later recalled, King of Battle, no matter where it was employed.
“It was the perfect enactment of our old Dr. Chris Rein is the managing editor of Air University Press at
Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB) in Montgomery, Alabama. A retired
stateside Battery Test I, without the cheating we United States Air Force Lt. Col., he previously served as a navigator
did then with little secret code words so that the aboard the E-8C Joint STARS during multiple deployments to Southwest
battery would be sure to be in an easy occupation Asia and as a research historian at the Combat Studies Institute, Army
position. This time on the road on a dark night, University Press, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is the author of
multiple books, including most recently, Mobilizing the South: The
a “Fire Mission” order came from the Liaison Thirty-First Infantry Division, Race, and World War II. During a
Officer, and our 105s peeled off into darkness, not previous assignment at Tinker AFB, Altus, Oklahoma, he fondly recalls
knowing whether they would disappear in a bog live-firing a reproduction M1841 6-pounder on the range at Fort Sill.
or a large hole. They somehow found room and a
fire field. All this was orchestrated by SSG Donald
19 John C. Persons, “The Personal Story of General John C. Persons,” unpublished manuscript, Linn-Henley Research
Library, Birmingham Public Library (BPL), 407.
20 149th Field Artillery Battalion, “Report of Action Against the Enemy, Mindanao, P.I. April 22 through June 30, 1945,”
9-10, Box 417, DDE. Marlowe earned a Bronze Star for his actions. 31st Infantry Division, General Orders No. 166, Sept.
28, 1945, Box 591, DDE.
21 Harding to Marion Hess, Aug. 28, 1996, Hess Collection, FSU.
22 “Historical Record, 124th Infantry Regiment, Mindanao Operation, Apr. 3 through June 30, 1945,” 4-5, Box 1340, DDE.
2022 Issue 4 • 19
Dark Eagle
IS ON THE MOVE:
SOLDIERS COMPLETE NEW EQUIPMENT TRAINING
By Kristen Burroughs
hy·per·son·ic | ˌhīpərˈsänik |
adjective
1 relating to speeds of more than five times the speed of sound (Mach 5).
2 relating to sound frequencies above about a thousand million hertz.
T
he I Corps’ Bravo Battery, 5th NET was broken down into four iterations,
each lasting three weeks. The first week of
Battalion, 3rd Field Artillery each iteration allowed Soldiers to gain a basic
Regiment, 17th Field Artillery understanding of the functions and capabilities
of the equipment through interactive training.
Brigade, also known as the Dark This training took place in a classroom setting,
Eagle Battery, completed their New providing Soldiers ample time to train on the
equipment in a structured “gaming” environment.
Equipment Training (NET) with the
This environment, comprised of laptops and an
Nation’s first prototype hypersonic iPad, allowed Soldiers to familiarize themselves
equipment. with major hardware elements before initiating
hands-on training. During the second and
The Army marked this milestone with a third weeks, training provided the opportunity
ceremony at Joint Base Lewis-McChord on Feb. for initiating Soldier feedback, which plays
24, 2022. an influential role in the prototyping effort.
This feedback has enabled equipment modifications
The Army is creating, refining, and deploying to include alternative equipment storage solutions
capabilities that bring new solutions to our and more efficient ways to mount the GPS
Nation’s challenges. As part of its number one antennae on the battery operations center, thus
modernization priority, long-range precision saving time while loading an aircraft.
fires, hypersonics is the next major strategic
weapons capability. It is key to supporting the The first two NET iterations concluded in
Army in building a modern, multi-domain December 2021, with the last two ending in
operations-ready
force by 2035.
We’ve never had a system like this before …
NET began shortly
after the Rapid
Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office February. The training primarily focused on
(RCCTO) delivered the ground support equipment air transportation drills, security procedures,
for the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) canister reload operations, operational
prototype, known as Dark Eagle, in September emplacement of equipment, and performing fire
2021. From the start of the prototyping effort missions. Each iteration served a key purpose
in early 2019, Soldiers have played an integral in preparing them for their final training event.
part in the equipment’s development, testing,
and delivery. While training is ongoing, the Fires Center of
Excellence is simultaneously writing the doctrine
“Early hands-on training allows us to develop for the unit that will employ the first-ever
the pre-requisite tasks and techniques to be hypersonics weapon, marking another critical
successful in the future,” said CPT Austen milestone in developing this prototype.
Boroff, Bravo Battery Commander. “The Soldiers
have thoroughly validated critical individual “Our Soldiers have put an incredible effort into
and collective tasks that will enable operations developing LRHW expertise. They have trained
post-fielding.” with extraordinary effort throughout every step

of the fielding process and are equipped for
success as we continue to develop proficiency,”
said Boroff.
After successfully completing NET, Soldiers

will advance to post-NET training, which
includes the opportunity first to observe and
then participate in upcoming joint test events.
Soldiers will utilize a “leader-follower” role
where they will learn test operations and provide
hands-on support. The Army is partnered with
the Navy to execute the hypersonics mission
through missile commonalities and joint test
opportunities.
“We’ve never had a system like this before,”

said COL Ian Humphrey, RCCTO Hypersonics
Project Manager for Integration. “It was critical
that our team could get the hardware to these
Soldiers two years before the culminating joint
test event in FY23, allowing the Soldiers to train,
learn, and provide feedback.”
Upon completion of prototype-battery fielding,

Dark Eagle will transition to the Program
Executive Office for Missiles and Space.
“I was once a young, enlisted Soldier, and I

can appreciate all the hard work and dedication
each Soldier in this battery is putting forth,” said
LTG L. Neil Thurgood, Director of Hypersonics,
Directed Energy, Space, and Rapid Acquisition,
who leads the RCCTO. “Hypersonics is our number
one priority right now, and we remain on track
for executing operational capability in FY23.”
Photos: Using the Nation’s first prototype Long-Range

Hypersonic System, Bravo Battery Soldiers with the 5th Battalion,
3rd Artillery, 17th Field Artillery Brigade executed ground
movement, round transfers, and established firing capability at
Joint Base Lewis-McChord Feb. 22-24. (US Army photos by SSG
Casey Hustin, 17th Field Artillery Brigade)
2022 Issue 4 • 23
All models are wrong, but some are useful.
George E.P. Box 1
A
s the joint force faces increasingly complex
threat systems2 and develops linked
capabilities across all domains to counter
those threats, we must also address our underlying
processes and our ability to target those threat
systems with the entire suite of tools available
at any given moment. Specifically, we must
adapt our model for dynamic targeting to meet
the needs of current and future environments.
The model imposed by the term “kill chain” is
both incomplete and obsolete in reference to the
dynamic targeting process. This model no longer
THE KILL WEB:

accurately captures the complexities required
to complete a dynamic targeting process in a
contested electromagnetic environment. Instead,
the dynamic targeting process for multi-domain
Dynamic Targeting operations must evolve into the concept of a
“kill web,” which provides multiple paths along
in Multi-Domain multiple axes from a myriad of linked capabilities
to attack the associated system that comprises
Operations the target. Further development of the kill web
concept and its integrating capabilities should
By COL Mike Stewart
lead the joint force to a doctrinal definition of
the term “kill web” for future incorporation into
joint doctrine and applications.
The term “kill chain” has long been associated

with the dynamic targeting process. This process
is described by the steps of find, fix, track, target,
engage, and assess (F2T2EA), as shown in Figure
1. That is, F2T2EA describes the chain of events
in a process that leads from locating a target to
creating desired effects on that target. Each step of
the process can occur on a discrete platform linked
to other platforms, as when a counter-fire radar
acquires a rocket launched against friendly forces
and then passes the location of the acquisition
to a Multiple Launch Rocket System launcher or
strike aircraft to engage. All the steps of the kill
chain can also occur within one platform, such
1 This aphorism is frequently used in statistical analysis

and is generally attributed to George E. P. Box, FRS.
He specifically states this quote in his 1987 work co-
authored with Norman Draper, entitled Empirical Model-
Building and Response Surfaces, p. 424.
2 Such as Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD), Ballistic
Missile (BM), and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
systems, to name a few.

the steps of F2T2EA. Such a process can be
more accurately described as a kill web, not
a kill chain. Using the model of a kill web to
integrate capabilities through a dynamic targeting
process, we can also build a more enduring
concept to incorporate emerging technologies and
capabilities in information, artificial intelligence,
and machine learning.5
Two Kill Webs: Target-centric

and Capability-centric
Kill web analysis facilitates a multi-domain

approach to target analysis and weaponeering.
To effectively achieve the desired effects, the
joint force is faced with the challenge of layering
Figure 1. Dynamic Targeting Steps (Source for Figure 1) JP 3-60 lethal and nonlethal effects to create convergence
(28 September 2018), II-23 (Figure II-10). across domains to achieve operational objectives.
This analysis drives defining a kill web in two
as when a strike aircraft on an air interdiction approaches that are not mutually exclusive.
mission with its radar, pilot, and munitions
on board completes every one of the dynamic The first approach is target centric. It describes
targeting steps internally. While the term “kill the linkage of key nodes within a target system
chain” has never been doctrinally defined as that, when attacked, can exhibit compounding
the dynamic targeting process, most of the joint second and third-order effects. The target-centric
targeting community understands the association, kill web is essentially an application of Center of
and several publications describe the colloquial Gravity, or Target System Analysis (TSA), which
association of the term “kill chain” with F2T2EA.3 is normally associated with deliberate targeting.
Pulling the concept of TSA into the kill web for
Emerging concepts criticize the notion of a kill dynamic targeting helps conceptualize how we
chain as being “linear and monolithic.”4 While can detect and differentiate high-payoff targets
it was likely never intended, the metaphorical within a selection of multiple acquired targets
association of dynamic targeting with a chain that may be simultaneously exposed. A diagram
does imply that the process is linear. Further, of this kind of analysis, which can be adapted
it follows that a break in one of the steps will as a target-centric kill web, is shown in Figure
disrupt the entire process, as a broken link makes 2 (next page.)
a broken chain. Since the dynamic process should
not be considered linear or monolithic, and a Deliberate analysis of a target system as a kill
disruption at one node should not break the web reveals the relationships between critical
process, we find that we may have reached the capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities.
logical limit of using a chain as the model to These relationships, overlaid against an array
describe a process that actually spans multiple of detected targets in a common operational
paths across capabilities and domains through picture, help refine a high-payoff target list
3 AFDP 3-60: Targeting specifically associates kill chain as the colloquial description of F2T2EA. JP 3-09: Joint Fire Support
also mentions the term “kill chain” a few times in its section on dynamic targeting, but JP 3-60: Joint Targeting does not
use the term “kill chain” at all. The only actual doctrinal definition of a kill chain is in Army FM 3-01: Air and Missile
Defense, which describes the kill chain as “the successive linkage of commanders who can authorize engagements of air
and missile threats.” The FM 3-01 definition is not relevant to a discussion on dynamic targeting, aside from providing
the only doctrinal burden to the phrase “kill chain.”
4 David Deptula et al., “Restoring America’s Competitiveness: Mosaic Warfare,” (The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace
Studies, September 2019), 30; and Clark, Bryan, Dan Patt, and Harrison Schramm, “Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial
Intelligence and Autonomous Systems to Implement Decision-Centric Operations,” (Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, 2020), 28-9.
5 Clark, Patt, and Schramm, “Mosaic Warfare.”
2022 Issue 4 • 25
Figure 2. A target-centric kill web describes the linkage of key nodes within a target system that when attacked can exhibit
compounding second and third-order effects.
and associated attack guidance in stride with a and analysis are required to conduct F2T2EA on
developing situation. Anticipating second and the next vulnerability to keep the system from
third-order effects from a strike on one node regenerating.
or link within a target-centric kill web keeps
the targeting effort synchronized to create the The second approach views a kill web from
desired effects and achieve operational objectives domain-centric capabilities. In this approach, we
efficiently. describe a linked system of detection and delivery
assets, providing multiple paths on multiple axes
For example, analysis of a target-centric along which the critical steps of F2T2EA can flow
kill web would reveal the links and nodes of a across domains and capabilities. (See Figure 3).
target system like a Field Artillery battalion.
Using this kind of deliberate analysis could reveal As described in the Joint Concept for Fires 1.0:
that the most effective point to strike to break the
target system may not be the howitzers or their Each dot represents a functional component
support vehicles but rather the link from the Fire of the F2T2EA process. The black lines linking
Direction Center (FDC) to their guns. To locate and these dots represent the kill chains from various
isolate the FDC, we can utilize a multi-domain domain capabilities. The blue lines represent
approach. Within the Electromagnetic Spectrum, alternate kill paths across different domains
we can locate the FDC, jam the tactical network, in kill webs. By linking any of these functional
and, if required, cue and execute a kinetic strike components across different domains, kill webs
on the FDC. By disrupting or destroying this offer different combinations of sensors to shooters
one link, we could render the system ineffective from all domains to complete the entire process
while limiting the friendly assets needed and of servicing a target. The scale and tempo of these
eliminating the need to hunt and kill every gun kill webs require new processes or pre-authorized
and support vehicle. As the target system adapts actions that supplant or augment current Joint
to the loss of its FDC, continuous monitoring Targeting Boards.6
6 Joint Concept for Fires 1.0 (September 2021)

The Way Ahead
The evolution of weapons to incorporate
networked warfare changes the targeting
methodology. Each new system has built-in
resilience that challenges the old concept of a
kill chain and single-point vulnerability.
This evolution changes our lexicon. If the kill

chain model is limited because of its implication
of a linear and monolithic process, then a
new model is necessary. Further, the term art
associated with dynamic targeting should be more
formally established than a colloquial association;
it should be a doctrinally defined association.
Figure 3. A capability-centric kill web describes a linked system The dynamic targeting process should be
of detection and delivery assets providing multiple paths on doctrinally associated with a kill web, not a kill
multiple axes along which the critical steps of F2T2EA can flow chain. Concepts are emerging now that link an
across domains and capabilities.
expanding network of sensors and shooters to
(Source for Figure 3) As described in the Joint Concept for create effects against increasingly complex target
Fires 1.0: Each dot represents a functional component of the systems. These concepts fundamentally challenge
F2T2EA process. The black lines linking these dots represent the existing model of dynamic targeting as a kill
the kill chains from various domain capabilities. The blue lines chain. Instead of using a chain, the idea of a kill
represent alternate kill paths across different domains in kill
webs. By being able to link any of these functional components web implies a correct model of both capabilities
across different domains, kill webs offer different combinations and the target system as a linked series of nodes
of sensors to shooters from all domains to complete the entire with multiple paths and points of attack.
process for servicing a target. The scale and tempo of these kill
webs require new processes or pre-authorized actions that
Further discussion and experimentation on
supplant or augment current Joint Targeting Boards.
a kill web concept should refine the proposed
definition above into a doctrinal term associated
A capability-centric kill web describes how with the dynamic targeting process. With such a
we disaggregate linear kill chains for specific doctrinal evolution, the emerging concepts and
capabilities and domains to create more resilient capabilities can begin to link the nodes of the kill
and adaptive paths from the “find” step through web together using an integrated network enabled
to the “assess” step. Constant awareness and links by artificial intelligence and machine learning.
across capabilities become critical in applying a Our fundamental understanding of a target as a
capability-centric kill web. The disaggregation system in its own right, with associated nodes
and distribution of sensors and shooters and and vulnerable points, can also be captured in
the linkage across domains allow the joint force the model of a kill web. The method we use for
to find and follow an optimal path through the conducting target system analysis can adapt to
kill web. This also builds resilience across our emerging sensors and networks.
targeting process by eliminating the notion that a
break in any one node or link necessarily disrupts COL Mike Stewart is a Field Artillery officer currently serving as
Commander of 434th Field Artillery Brigade, with recent experience
the kill web. as Chief of Fires for U.S. Forces Korea. His fire support and targeting
experience span over 24 years, including experience from Brigade
By combining the target-centric and capability- Combat Team through to theater level. He has previously served
centric approaches, we can arrive at a functioning as Chief of Fires for U.S. Army Cyber Command, U.S. Army Africa,
definition of a kill web as the linked capabilities and as the Chief of Doctrine at the Fires Center of Excellence.
that provide multiple paths along multiple axes
across domains to find, fix, track, target, engage,
and assess effects against an associated system
that comprises a target.
2022 Issue 4 • 27
A RT I L L E
LD RY
IE
F
K
IN
T LE
G O
F BAT
Recognized as the most

lethal of all the combat
arms branches, with the
well-earned title “King
of Battle,” the United
States Field Artillery
traces its origins to 17
November 1775 when the
Continental Congress
unanimously elected
Henry Knox “Colonel
of the Regiment of
Artillery”.

U.S. soldiers assigned to Bravo Battery, 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 7th Infantry Division, conduct field
artillery certifications on Joint Base Lewis-McChord Dec. 8, 2021. The Lancer Brigade is the premiere ready force for the Indo-Pacific2022
region and continues
Issue 4 • 29
to maintain readiness across the formation. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Beggs)
Paratroopers from B Company, 2-508th PIR in the defense
during the 2nd Brigade FTX, Falcon Strike, February 2022.
PUTTING THE
“Forward” BACK IN
“Forward Observer” By 1LT Christopher Lipscomb

BACKGROUND noncommissioned officers (NCO) of 2 Fury
regarding lessons learned and, with their input,
I
n October 2021, the 2nd Battalion, 508th re-worked the battalion’s organization with
Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 2 Fury, an eye toward large-scale combat operations
participated as the testing unit in the Mobile (LSCO). In their conversations, the battalion’s
Protected Firepower Limited User Test (LUT) leaders identified three key challenges that needed
involving two weeks of force-on-force lanes addressing, all of which had been brought to light
at Fort Bragg designed to test the suitability during the LUT:
of the two finalists for the Army’s new light
tank. This training was very eye-opening for the Refocusing on fighting a mechanized or
battalion for several reasons. First, it revealed motorized peer or near-peer adversary in
a significant manning issue, with the battalion LSCO.
only able to field about 70 percent strength due to
numerous factors such as ETS, PCS, and medical. Addressing persistent manning issues.
Realistically, this number was likely somewhat
lower because of our assuming division taskings Addressing experience issues within the
within 72 hours of coming out of the field. NCO corps.
Further, the experience of battling tanks as In addressing these challenges, the battalion
light infantry illustrated how badly our anti- significantly reorganized the rifle companies,
tank (AT) skills had atrophied over the Global replacing the traditional three rifle platoons
War on Terrorism (GWOT) years; squads tended per company with two 30-man assault platoons
to have excellent riflemen and machine gunners; and one 44-man heavy weapons platoon.
however other skills were lacking, a consequence Overall, these changes reduced the manning
of simply not training on skills that squad leaders requirements of each company by 31 paratroopers.
were less familiar with. We found that we did not At the company level, this revision mirrored
know how to effectively engage and kill tanks in transformations made organically by each
a near-peer scenario. company at various times during the LUT, with
lighter sections used to identify armor to mass
Beyond the technical challenges of using fires fires and eliminate the threat.
against armor, we also struggled with the tactical
side of employing our forward observers in a Key to the revision was enabling the right
force-on-force scenario with a peer adversary; leaders with the right capabilities. One of the
over the course of the training, we found that major changes at the company level was pushing
the traditional approach of forward observer/ FOs down to the squad level, increasing the assets
radiotelephone operator (FO/RTO) attached at the available to the squad. Through this, platoons and
hip with the platoon leader (PL) was generally squads could operate more independently while
not the most effective way to employ the Fire simultaneously avoiding triggering the enemy’s
Support Team (FIST). As we went through the high pay-off target list and drawing indirect
lanes, we played around with various methods fires. Additionally, it allowed for significant
of employment: for several lanes, we sent out employment of fires to defeat the enemy by more
an FO/RTO team with battalion scouts well in accurately leading with high explosives, enabling
advance of the company, and for one lane, we greater conservation of the maneuver force.
detached the FIST from the company’s main body
entirely, pushing the team far ahead to scout and ASSAULT PLATOONS AND
call for fire. Neither of these approaches alone HEAVY WEAPONS PLATOONS
solved all our problems; however, each, in its
own way, enabled the FIST to provide better fires The assault platoons were organized as a 30-
for the company. man element, with two 12-man sections and a
6-man headquarters element; within the platoon
TASK ORGANIZATION REVISION were three FOs, one with the platoon leader and
one with each section leader. The diminished
Following the LUT, our battalion commander, footprint of the assault platoon created a smaller,
LTC Ryan Bell, engaged with the officers and lighter, and faster element that was less likely
2022 Issue 4 • 31
to be identified by unmanned aircraft systems of how to best use their newly-acquired FO, and
or engaged by indirect fire. the FOs were similarly unfamiliar with running
with that small of an element and struggled to
The increased number of FOs in each platoon keep up with the faster pace of a squad versus
made the platoon FO, in essence, a miniature Fire the familiar platoon-sized operation.
Support (FS) NCO. Due to the assault platoon’s
ability to operate more independently, the platoon Our brigade field training exercise, Falcon
FO was given a greater role in planning and Strike, proved to be our biggest challenge with
coordinating fires, as well as serving as another fires up until JRTC because we were operating
checkpoint in the sensor-to-shooter chain. at the brigade level for the first time during the
Professionally, this benefited the platoon FO training cycle and, by extension, were exposed to
through increased exposure to the team chief’s the brigade’s competing requirements. As a result,
role and increased opportunities to train and we had to be flexible in the execution of our fires
mentor junior FOs. plans, acknowledging that we might not get the
primary asset requested for a target, especially
The heavy weapons platoons were organized if it was artillery. Frustrating at the time, in
as a 44-man element which included all the retrospect, this was good training, especially from
company’s M240s, Javelins, and Carl Gustavs, as an FSO/FSNCO perspective–we had to remain
well as a Stinger/AA section. Within the platoon, flexible and adapt to the situation while also
one platoon FO continued to work with the PL managing expectations within the company, all
in the traditional manner. This FO could be used of which proved to be especially helpful at JRTC.
to great effect from company support by fire Additionally, the nature of the scenario enabled
positions, identifying targets to prep objectives, us to further develop tactics, techniques, and
and working together with the AT teams to procedures (TTPs) for pushing our FOs to the
efficiently engage enemy armor. lowest level.
INTENSIVE TRAINING CYCLE Our greatest learning point throughout Falcon

Strike was on employment in the defense.
From January to March 2022, 2 Fury executed Having FOs dispersed throughout the company
its intensive training cycle (ITC) in preparation provided vastly greater coverage than would
for assumption of immediate response force (IRF) have been the case under the traditional platoon
1. In addition to training up for Joint Readiness FO/RTO model. Namely, by employing FOs with
Training Center (JRTC) and eventual assumption individual squads, we were able to get broader
of IRF 1, this was when we began experimenting observer coverage of the engagement area in
with how we could employ our FOs within the new the form of two to three unique vantage points
task org to the most significant effect. The first throughout each platoon’s section of the line, as
event of the ITC was a fire support coordination opposed to the single vantage point per platoon
exercise involving all FOs and their PLs. This that occurs under the traditional model due to the
training helped us set conditions for pushing FO/RTO team being always co-located with the
FOs down to the section level. We could pull platoon leader. Additionally, the broad dispersal
them in for the planning process and have them of FOs made the commander and platoon leaders
deeply involved, providing them with invaluable more comfortable with pushing out operations,
repetitions given the increased responsibilities as we could pull two or three observers off the
being thrust upon them under the new task org. line from across the entire company while still
having at least one or two FOs set up within each
The first proving ground for the task org was platoon’s sector.
section live fires. For these lanes, we ran each
section with an integrated FO, precisely as outlined Before leaving for JRTC, we were able to apply
in the task org. Through the iterations, we found our lessons learned from the entire training cycle
that this method was effective for battle tracking to our FO employment scheme for platoon live
as well as getting company mortars far more fires. The major issues identified were varied
involved than they might otherwise have been. levels of experience across the FIST, manning, and
However, we had some significant struggles on significant equipment shortages; our workaround
the integration side–section leaders were unsure was simple: in the assault platoons, the senior
B Company, 2-508th PIR FIST at the end of JRTC Rotation 22-06, April 2022.
2022 Issue 4 • 33
FO would stick with the PL while a second would The finest hour for fires during our rotation was
be pushed out with a section based on METT-TC, undoubtedly company live fires. Through several
and the weapons platoon would continue to work blank iterations and the final live iteration, we
with their one allotted FO; given the constraints brought all our lessons learned from the entirety
identified, we felt this was the best way to push of the training cycle, including the box, to bear to
out our FOs to provide coverage down to the great effect. Throughout the iterations, the FOs
lowest possible level, while still ensuring they worked hard to ensure that they were pushing as
were gainfully employed at their level. We were far forward as possible, keeping the fires steady
generally successful with this approach, with the on the objective, and minimizing the gaps in
assault platoon FOs enabling their platoons to fires. Although new lessons learned during LFX
echelon fires and ride the REDs (Risk Estimate were negligible, the iterations did hammer home
Distances) all the way onto the objective, while the lessons already learned and provided a final
the weapons platoon FO was able to identify learning point for us to apply as we continue to
targets better to prep the objective and begin to develop TTPs for how to most effectively push
identify and engage targets beyond the objective. observers down to the lowest level.
JRTC Overall, pushing FOs down to the squad level

was successful for us at JRTC, even though we
Going into JRTC, we made minor refinements could not implement it exactly as prescribed
to the TTPs we had developed over the course of under the revised task org. The nature of JRTC,
the training cycle, based largely upon what we particularly the challenges of getting fires shot
learned during platoon live fires. We kept the and adjudicated, limited our ability to truly use the
assault platoon organization the same, with two FOs to hunt for the enemy; as a result, it would
FOs, one with the PL and one with whichever be dishonest to say that having completed JRTC,
element the PL determined made the most sense we have enough practical application to say this
for the mission. For the weapons platoon, we is the way forward. At a minimum, putting FOs
added a second FO since the platoon rarely fights in squads has the potential to greatly increase
as a consolidated element and is typically split our lethality on the battlefield; however, we need
between the assault platoons; this way, we could more time in the field to play around with it–
get the same consistent results as during the another ITC would likely provide the ideal amount
platoon’s live-fire exercises (LFX) rather than of field time to come to a final conclusion.
only if the platoon is fighting as a consolidated
company support by fire. We held one FO with CONCLUSIONS
the company headquarters (HQ) to serve as an
RTO, which ultimately proved crucial during the Although it did not survive long after our
box as we encountered major comms problems. return from JRTC, the idea of pushing forward
observers down the squad level has great potential,
Naturally, the gameisms of JRTC inhibited our especially as the Army transitions to LSCO. If the
ability to do fires during the rotation; however, ongoing fighting in Ukraine has proven anything,
we found that the dispersal of FOs once again it is that the artillery is still the King of Battle
provided options to the maneuver elements that and that the ability to engage with fires in an
might not have existed otherwise, especially accurate and timely manner is as important as
in the defense, when we employed the FOs ever. That being said, several challenges must be
similarly to how we did for the defense lanes overcome in order to make it work:
during Falcon Strike. Significantly, the dispersal
proved fortunate once the company began taking Experience. In a post-GWOT Army, the bench
casualties, as it meant the FOs were less likely of experience is much smaller, and the approach
to be co-located and both taken out of the fight. we have worked with requires far more experience
As a consequence of the casualties taken, junior than simply completing Advanced Individual
FOs found themselves having to step up and fill Training and a training cycle. Gone are the days
roles they had not before–the newest member of of getting a year or two on a FIST to master Skill
the team spent 24 hours as the FSNCO–providing Level 1, then progressing to Skill Level 2, and so
opportunities for growth and deepening the well forth; given the nature of the 82nd and the IRF
of experience that can be brought to the table. mission, if every 13F in the formation is going
to be employed as a true FO, they need to be units. But suppose you are not deliberate about
prepared to perform at Skill Level 2 the day they which specific components of the JETS are taken
show up to a platoon. Joint Fires Observer, Target and by whom. In that case, you will quickly find
Mensuration Only, Joint Firepower Course, and your FOs carrying significantly more weight than
other specialty schools are going to be needed they would have if they had just taken the LLDR,
to greater extents than before. Units will have defeating the purpose of the JETS. Ideally, every
to take a hard look at their FIST Certification FO in the FIST should have a DAGR (Defense
standards to ensure that they are evaluating and Advanced GPS Receiver), binoculars, and a radio.
certifying Fire Support Teams to a level that is The platoon FO should maintain the JETS for
appropriate to the level of responsibility they find his platoon FIST while being deliberate about
thrust upon them. It will ultimately be up to FSOs which components he takes out based upon the
and FSNCOs to develop creative and challenging mission; section FOs should have Vectors, and
training plans that will ensure their FISTs are the FIST HQ element should maintain the LLDR.
trained to a high enough standard in the basics This is ideal, but the reality is that our MTOE, as
to make up for the real-world experience lost it exists today, does not support this distribution.
with the end of the GWOT. Unfortunately, even if it did, we would still need
spare equipment to account for the inevitable
Manning. Without a fully manned FIST, it is occurrence of something breaking. Despite these
impossible to do what we did over the course of challenges, we were still able to work towards
the ITC. At a minimum, 100 percent manning is something very similar to what the task org called
needed to accomplish this task org effectively. for, and we achieved some good results with it.
In a perfect world, if we move to this task org
as a permanent thing, we need to be manned All things considered, putting FOs at the section
consistently above one hundred percent. At the level has great potential; however, we lack the
company and battalion levels, there is little that reps and sets to say if it is the answer to the
we can do to overcome shortages here; this issue LSCO problem for the FIST. We got some good
ultimately comes down to a Big Army issue, not reps in during our ITC; however, the difficulties
only in terms of recruiting but also in terms of we had with fires in a training environment,
prioritizing where soldiers are assigned based largely stemming from timely adjudication of
on their task org. In other words, if the entire fire missions, severely hampered our ability to
82nd moves to this task org but the 101st does truly do fire support, subsequently leading to our
not, does the Army assume the risk as a whole FOs being limited in their ability to go out, hunt
and prioritize assigning FISTers to division in for, and kill the enemy. In the end, our successes
order to fill out our task org while simultaneously were a direct consequence of our willingness to
short-changing the 101st? What we can control at be creative, which would not have been possible
our level is how we man our elements, ensuring without our existing relationship with our
that the right people are in the right seats, even if maneuver counterparts going into the training
this means prioritizing rifle companies over delta cycle. This may very well be the way of the future,
companies when it comes to filling out FISTs. but until we can figure out workarounds for the
challenges previously discussed and further refine
Equipment. This was our greatest inhibitor, our TTPs, it is impossible to feel comfortable with
especially during Falcon Strike and JRTC. the idea of deploying to combat in 18 hours with
Even if all MTOE equipment is fully mission- section FOs.
capable, it is still challenging to effectively
distribute it in a way that enables employment 1LT Christopher Lipscomb has spent the past 18 months serving
as the company FSO for Brutal Company, 2-508th PIR. In addition
strictly in line with the task org as written; this
to his time as a Company FSO, he has also spent time as acting
was the major contributing factor to us moving Battalion FSO and as the Battalion Assistant FSO.
to the organization we ran with throughout
JRTC. And how do we equip the section FOs Note: 1LT Lipscomb would like to thank SSG Joseph Franco for
compared to the platoon FOs? We relied heavily providing his insights into this article and CPT Travis Chambers
for his editing support and feedback.
on the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS) at
JRTC largely because it is, in theory, lighter and
smaller than a Lightweight Laser Designator
Rangefinder (LLDR) and more suited to light
2022 Issue 4 • 35
econnaissance
Improved Map R placements
for Field Artillery
Em am
By CPT Cody Gilh
Vecteezy.com
Page elements by
{ Current workflows and solutions for site suitability analysis
in support of Field Artillery operations are inefficient. }
This inefficiency stems from analog processes, satellite imagery used to select a suitable site for
dated topographic maps, and human error. ArcGIS emplacement. That experience and knowledge can
Pro mapping platform will demonstrate a more be incorporated into ArcGIS Pro1. Armed with the
efficient and accurate process compared to the results of the emplacement process determined
current mission planning processes of a howitzer by ArcGIS Pro, RSOP (Reconnaissance, Selection,
and battery site selection. This article discusses and Occupation of a Position), commanders and
the Position Area of Artillery (PAA) Finder – a teams will have up-to-date information and site
mobile application that applies expert knowledge locations at their disposal before departing the
to the process of identifying suitable locations for battery to find the next proposed firing location.
howitzer emplacement. This proof-of-concept Having demonstrated the proof-of-concept
application will be developed in ArcGIS Pro using successfully through ArcGIS Pro, the PAA Finder
satellite imagery and a digital elevation model application will be presented.
(DEM) data layer to model the site selection
process. Utilizing specific ArcGIS Pro tools such Analysis
as Slope, Aspect, Classify, Reclassify, and Raster
Calculator, locations on Earth’s surface that meet PAA Finder’s workflow (Figure 1, next page)
the site suitability criteria are identified as suitable includes six steps that start by identifying
for howitzer emplacement. Once these sites are two criteria: 5-degree side slope and terrain
identified, a Field Artillery commander can then suitability. The first criterion is the 5-degree side
make an informed decision when choosing sites slope (cant) or 90 mils limitation of our firing
to emplace a howitzer battery. Moving the site systems2. The second criterion identifies areas
selection process into a digital platform increases that provide a variety of terrain and vegetation,
efficiency, reduces human error, and potentially including hilly, wooded, flat, and open areas.
saves Soldiers’ lives. Optimal howitzer site suitability would include
generally flat and open terrain.
The Problem
The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC)
Field artillery battalions and batteries at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the National Training
routinely struggle with the site selection Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, and the
process for howitzer emplacement. Presently, training area at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, are the
the site selection process begins by analyzing study areas for this analysis. These areas were
paper topographic maps for suitable locations. chosen as they encompass a variety of terrain
These maps provide valuable information but types. JRTC provides a heavily wooded area and
are often outdated when it comes to showing gently rolling terrain. NTC provides a desert
land cover. The analysis also includes a visual and mountainous environment. Fort Campbell
inspection of satellite imagery. In addition to provides wooded and open areas as well as gently
maps and satellite images, the emplacement rolling terrain. These terrain types are typical of
problem relies on the analyst’s accumulated what commanders would encounter during an
expertise and knowledge of topographic maps or emplacement problem.
1 ArcGIS Pro is a computer mapping application intended for GIS analysis developed by ESRI (Environmental System
Resource Institute).
2 This proposed analysis does not include the capabilities of the Suspension Lock Out System (SLOS) on the M119A3.
Including the SLOS into the analysis, the capabilities of the system would need measured to understand how to include
it into the analysis.
2022 Issue 4 • 37
The second step is downloading the satellite
imagery and DEM from the United States Geological
Survey (USGS)3. This is the geospatial data used in
the third step of the workflow analysis: to create
land cover types, a slope layer, and an aspect
layer. For example, a digital layer representing the
desired land cover types of the study areas will be
derived from satellite imagery. The desired land
Figure 1. PAA Finder Workflow Analysis Diagram.
cover types include water, urban roads, forest, and
agriculture/grassland and are the more prominent
types around the world in which a firing battery
will have to operate. The classifier tools in ArcGIS
Pro operate to produce a map layer that has
classified the original satellite image into four
land cover types.
The DEM creates slope (Figure 3) and aspect

(Figure 4) layers. The slope layer shows the
amount of slope of the area, and the aspect layer
Figure 2. Land cover types of the JRTC study area. The legend
shows which direction a particular slope is facing.
explains the color association with the land cover type.
The fourth step requires a reclassification of

the slope and aspect layers. For example, the
reclassification identifies all slopes 5 degrees or
less, meeting the manufacturer’s limitations for
the howitzers. The reclassification also identifies
the aspect facing a certain direction, and for this
analysis, facing north and south. The north and
south-facing aspects provide the perpendicular
side slope that the howitzers will be emplaced on
and facing across when firing east to west or west
to east. This process can then be replicated for any
direction of fire on the battlefield. These criteria
are discussed further in the limitations section.
Figure 3. Slope layer of the JRTC study area. Tan represents areas
With the land cover, slope, and aspect layers that are less than 5 degrees, and green represents areas greater
reclassified to meet the criteria of the analysis, than 5 degrees.
the fifth step combines the land cover, slope, and
aspect layers to identify suitable emplacement
sites. The Raster Calculator tool combines these
inputs by digitally overlaying them on top of each
other. The sixth step produces the combined layer
that identifies where a howitzer can fire east to
west or west to east.
Results
The same six-step analysis was applied to
each study area except for NTC. The land cover
classification step was not used with NTC as
Figure 4. Aspect layer of the JRTC study area. The main cardinal
3 The USGS Earth Explorer provides several types of directions are represented by red (north), yellow (east), light
data to include imagery and DEMs located at https:// blue (south), and purple (west). The remaining colors represent
earthexplorer.usgs.gov. intermediate directions.

the land cover at NTC is mostly an unpopulated
desert environment. These characteristics at
NTC resulted in the land cover classification not
accurately separating the various types of soil
from rock and pavement. Figures 5, 6, and 7
show the map layers identifying the areas that
are suitable for emplacement when firing east
to west or west to east at JRTC, NTC, and Fort
Campbell, respectively. In each figure, the areas
shown in purple meet all criteria for howitzer
emplacement.
Figure 8 (next page) shows two maps. The larger

scale map illustrates two land cover categories at
Figure 5. Emplacement areas for firing east to west that meet
Fort Campbell: forested and non-forested. Forested
criteria at JRTC (shown in purple).
land cover is shown in dark blue, and non-forest
land cover is shown in bright green. Based on
this land cover classification, the areas that are
suitable for firing in all directions are shown in
bright green. Figure 8 does not incorporate slope
into the firing suitability results. The small inset
map shows a topographic map for Fort Campbell
dated 1984. This map also shows two land cover
types: forested and non-forested. Areas in green
are unsuitable as they are covered in vegetation.
Many, but not all, areas represented by the bright
green on the larger map are suitable firing sites
according to the lighter green shades shown on
the topographic map. This difference is due to the
Figure 6. Emplacement areas for firing east to west that meet
topographic map being outdated. For example,
criteria at NTC (shown in purple).
the area outlined by the dark red rectangle on
the topographic map shows no areas suitable for
emplacement. The results from PAA Finder in
Figure 8 show that the area highlighted in yellow
(same location as highlighted in red) provides a
suitable area for emplacement.
Discussion
This analysis was a proof of concept that will
eventually be converted into a mobile application
(PAA Finder) whose interface is shown in Figure
9. The PAA Finder will be based on the site
suitability analysis described above and eliminate
most of the necessary technical knowledge
needed to conduct this analysis in ArcGIS Pro.
Once the selected location and an azimuth of fire Figure 7. Emplacement areas for firing east to west that meet
are entered, the PAA Finder will automatically criteria at Fort Campbell (shown in purple).
determine suitable locations. The battalion S2 is
being recommended as the shop to oversee the
downloading of the appropriate and up-to-date
data from USGS and ensure it is pre-loaded into
the mobile application for firing units to use.
2022 Issue 4 • 39
The emplacement process in PAA Finder
involves three steps. First, a user views a digital
topographic map based on Military Grid Reference
System (MGRS) to select a proposed location for
the howitzer emplacement (Figure 9). The user
selects a location by either clicking on a location
on the map or by typing the grid location into
the MGRS box. Additional parameters that must
be entered into PAA Finder include the location,
piece, charge, shell, fuze, and AOF (azimuth of
fire). The location is derived from user input;
the piece refers to which howitzer system is
being fired, charge is the type of propellant,
shell is the type of round being fired, fuze is the
fuze to be fired, and AOF is the direction of fire.
If these parameters align, then a green circle
appears (shown in the right-hand corner of the
PAA Finder interface). A red circle appears if the Figure 8. Emplacement areas suitable for firing in all directions
parameters do not align. This “system check” are light green, and unsuitable areas for firing are blue.
provides not only a way for the commander to The zoomed-in image shows the difference between the current
plan where to emplace the battery but also a way topographic map and the PAA Finder results.
for the commander to quickly check, without
having to reference a book, if the ammunition
available is compatible.
Second, a black line represents a vector (or

direction) that corresponds to the proposed AOF
(Figure 10). Note that the AOF is in mils but may
be switched to degrees if desired.
Third, the final results use all of the inputs

located on the top row of the application (Figure
10). If the inputs agree, then a green circle
appears, and blue range rings will appear on
the map (Figure 11). Inoperable firing azimuths Figure 9. The screen where the howitzer emplacement location
from the selected location will be highlighted is proposed. The black dot in the center of the screen, training
with diagonal lines. Incompatible results will area 20, represents the proposed site location.
display a location error message.
Once the three steps are completed, and range

rings are displayed, the operator will be able
to save this location along with the AOF and
range rings for later use. These locations will
be saved based on the PAA naming convention.
For example, PAA 30 or a naming convention of
the user’s choice.
Other functions that could be included in a

PAA Finder before it is fielded include friendly
radar capabilities and enemy radar and artillery
capabilities. Including this data and the ability Figure 10. Setting the Azimuth of Fire.
to visualize the range rings of all systems on the
battlefield would drastically improve planning
capabilities at the brigade and battalion levels.
Incorporating information on the site to crest would
ensure an unobstructed view from the howitzer
to the target. The second criterion is side slope
(cant) validation. While the side slope limitation
used for the analysis is 5 degrees (90 mils), the
beyond perpendicular angle to the side slope must
be verified for each howitzer. The analysis used 10
degrees beyond perpendicular left and right of the
AOF (Figure 12) to establish temporary criteria to
demonstrate the capability of this analysis. Figure
12 represents the howitzer emplaced on an azimuth
of fire of 4800. While the FDC determines the left
Figure 11. Final results based on howitzer inputs and locations and right limits, the left and right limits used are
analysis. Range rings appear as blue concentric circles (not to 10 degrees left and right of the AOF to demonstrate
scale), and areas not compatible with firing are highlighted with the capabilities of the analysis.
diagonal lines.
Conclusion
With today’s fast-paced combat operations
and the need to make decisions quickly, Field
Artillery cannot become a limiting factor on the
battlefield. While there are numerous intricacies
in the emplacement of the howitzer systems, site
selection is the most important step. Expediting
this step is a critical measure that can save
time and lives on the battlefield. Enabling the
Figure 12. Light howitzer symbol representing azimuth of fire
site selection process with ArcGIS Pro, through
and 10 degrees beyond perpendicular, left and right, of the north
and south facing slope.
identifying locations that meet the aspect, side
slope, and land cover classification can allow
commanders to confidently move their units
PAA Finder would be faster than referencing a to areas that will provide an emplacement
book or drawing on acetate but is not meant opportunity. With this proof-of-concept analysis
to replace analog products. The efficiency that successful, the mobile application PAA Finder will
comes from PAA Finder would identify any gaps be developed, enabling artillery commanders the
between range rings, either friendly or enemy, ability to solve the emplacement problem quickly
and could result in winning or losing a battle. and accurately in the field.
While ArcGIS Pro was utilized to conduct this CPT Cody Gilham is a Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
Observer, Coach/Trainer (OC/T) Team Chief in 1st Battalion, 307th
analysis, there are other software platforms Infantry Regiment, 174th Infantry Brigade, 1st Army East. His
available or platforms that can be developed. previous assignments include Field Artillery battalion and battery
These other platforms may be well suited or better OC/T in 3rd Battalion, 314th Field Artillery, battery commander of
suited to perform the analysis and functions A/2-32nd Field Artillery Regiment, Fire Support Officer (FSO) for
1/101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and FSO for 1-32nd Calvary.
behind PAA Finder. ArcGIS Pro was chosen
based on familiarity with the program through CPT Gilham would like to give special thanks to Dr. Fritz Kessler,
schoolwork at Stephen F. Austin State University Teaching Professor at Penn State Department of Geography, for
and Penn State University. his efforts in helping make this project possible.
Limitations
Addressing two additional criteria will improve
PAA Finder’s accuracy and efficiency. The first
criterion is site to crest. Trees, buildings, and other
obstacles may impede a howitzer’s site to crest.
2022 Issue 4 • 41
ver:
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By MAJ Shaun Callahan,

CPT Jacob Pachter,
and CPT Dana Meyer
U.S. Soldiers with Cobra Battery, Field Artillery Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, take cover because
of a simulated attack during the squadron’s training exercise at the 7th Army Training Command’s
Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, July 21, 2021. (U.S. Army photo by Issue
2022 Gertrud
4 Zach)
• 43
Five minutes later, the BM-30 unit sends the firing report, “50-round
salvo fired. Three minutes to impact. Moving to alternate location now.”
The enemy counterfire officer’s screen

flashes and an accompanying beeping is
heard. Six lines on her digital map overlay
appear, converging over one of their 2S9
self-propelled artillery units operating
west of the command post. The lines draw
out to an open field just off an eastern
European highway. Each line connects to
a blip within a 500 x 500-meter position
area. After putting down her coffee, the
counterfire officer clicks on the position
area and selects the center grid that is
automatically calculated from the six firing
positions. A list of available firing units in
range populates, and she selects a BM-30
Smerch. She sends the fire mission digitally
and then radios the Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) Company Commander to
instruct him to send two of his Orlan-10
small unmanned aerial systems to the
enemy position to collect an assessment
of the fire mission. Five minutes later,
the BM-30 unit sends the firing report,
“50-round salvo fired. Three minutes to
impact. Moving to alternate location now.”
CPT Higgins sat with his executive

officer in the battery command post.
They overlooked Bravo Battery, arrayed
in a standard “lazy w” formation in the
position area. To pass the time, they were
teaching their radio operator the game of
chess. A board was strewn across the top
of their radio stacks, and 1LT Roberts, the
executive officer, explained the rules:
The king is the most important piece Three minutes later, two Orlan-10 drones circled
on the chessboard. Without it, you overhead. Sitting almost 30 kilometers away, the
lose. But it is also the most vulnerable. operators watched from their flight control node.
When the opponent still has their The radio operator picked up the hand microphone and
queen, rooks, and knights, it is crucial keyed the brigade fires net. “Counterfire headquarters,
to protect your king through constant this is Hawk 9. Six howitzers destroyed, no movement,
maneuvering on the board. A static king enemy battery destroyed.”
is vulnerable, and you open yourself up
to being targeted. You shouldn’t wait
until the king is directly threatened to Cannon Battery Operations
move it. If you do that, your opponent and the “Spirit of the Offense”
has gained the initiative, and they will
control the pace of the game and the
options available to you. By proactively The battery commander is responsible for all
and unexpectedly moving your king, you aspects of battery operations. Our current cannon
can maintain the initiative and prevent battery doctrine emphasizes the importance of
your opponent from dictating your our battery commanders and their requirements
actions. Plus, you’re more likely to win. to determine the operational employment of the
pieces in their command. While the responsibility
CPT Higgins interjected. “Fire Mission!” His M777A2 for the employment of the battery lies with the
Battery Fire Direction Center had just received the fire battery commander, they are often only able to
order “Battery, three rounds, BONUS, Target Number control the employment of the firing line with
AC1006” and sent it to the gunline. As each piece fired the approval of battalion fire direction centers.
its three rounds, he and his executive officer listened Battery commanders can control the survivability
over the battery fire direction net, hearing “rounds of their cannon pieces using survivability criteria
complete” after a few minutes of firing. As they waited and thereby determine the level of control to
patiently for the battalion to end the mission, 1LT be exercised by the battery or platoon fire
Roberts asked if she should direct the howitzer sections direction center. To maximize the capabilities
to prepare to conduct survivability moves. “No, didn’t and employment of cannon pieces, towed cannon
you read the Battalion Field Artillery Support Plan? battery commanders and the Field Artillery branch
Survivability move criteria is a Battery four; we’ve must move from a mindset of continuous defense
only shot a Battery three. Also, we’re standing by for to one that meets the characteristics of fire
a planned mission. We can’t have the guns moving support in FM 3-09, primarily “to always operate
and risk being unable able to shoot. Why don’t you in the spirit of the offense.”
go make sure the Howitzer sections have prepared
their sector sketches to defend against dismounted As Fires professionals, it should be apparent
attack? Also, ensure they have finished digging their to the cannon artillery community that though
fighting positions.” we may soon reach parity and exceed our threat
artillery piece ranges, we still need to catch up
Just as CPT Higgins finished issuing his orders, the when it comes to the quantity of pieces. Without
surrounding countryside disappeared in a storm of delving into specific theaters, we as a community
fire and deafening noise. “Any Bulldog element, this is should guarantee that in the world of tactical
Bulldog Five. Radio Check. Over. Any Bulldog element, fires delivery in the context of large-scale combat
this is Bulldog Five. Radio Check. Over. Any Bulldog operations, the U.S. Army Field Artillery will
element, this is Bulldog Five. Radio Check. Over.” operate at a quantitative deficit.
The radio operator picked up the hand microphone and keyed

the brigade fires net. “Counterfire headquarters, this is Hawk 9.
Six howitzers destroyed, no movement, enemy battery destroyed.”
2022 Issue 4 • 45
To offset this quantitative deficit, several commanders must start thinking of their enemy
exquisite force multipliers are on the horizon. during mission analysis within their troop-
From hypersonics to precision-guided systems, leading procedures as the enemy counterfire
the artillery is clearly moving toward improving officers. What are we showing to that enemy, and
effects on targets with fewer munitions. when? How are we coordinating our “movement”
That makes each piece in action more valuable with our “fires,” and what picture does that
and more critical to fires delivery than ever resulting maneuver produce?
before. From an economic perspective, the
greater quantitative overmatch we face, the more Imagine a firing battery in a basic lazy w
damaging the loss of a firing piece becomes to our formation within a position area for artillery.
mission to deliver fires in support of maneuver. The battery likely has camouflage nets and uses
terrain masking to reduce their electromagnetic
As artillery professionals, we’ve adapted to the and visual signature as much as possible within the
demands of large-scale combat operations through position area for artillery. The battery fire direction
iterative learning at our combat training centers. center receives a fire order from the battalion fire
Notable improvements in camouflage techniques, direction center, “Battery, two rounds, BONUS,
electronic signature reduction, and survivability Target Number # AC1006,” through the AFATDS.
have been widely spread through professional The fire direction center processes the mission
channels. However, many of the lessons learned and sends it all six pieces. All six pieces fire. Did
and reinforced at the combat training centers for the firing unit meet any prescribed survivability
towed artillery units focus on reducing signature move criteria? Unlikely due to the low number
as the primary method of avoiding enemy counter- of volleys fired. As a result, no firing pieces are
battery due to towed cannon artillery’s movement moved from their last firing position.
limitations. Frequent movement strains crews
and takes pieces out of action to be available to Would a competent and effective fire support
service targets. enterprise miss 12 rounds from a single firing
position? Would we have appropriately queued
Our current method of preserving pieces and scheduled radar coverage to acquire this fire
centers around the idea of survivability criteria mission? In this hypothetical scenario, let us
resulting in planned or unplanned survivability assume that, yes, that fire mission was acquired
moves within a position area for artillery. This is through either counterfire radar or other methods.
a defensive-minded operation primarily aimed What would we do with that information?
at preserving pieces and limiting damage from We could place a call-for-fire zone over top of
counter-battery fire. ATP 3-09.50 describes the that position to cue our sensors appropriately
assignment of control of survivability moves to and possibly lay a firing battery on an azimuth
the Fire Direction Center within the confines of of fire that enables reactive counter-battery fire
the battery commander’s prescribed criteria. should we receive another acquisition from that
Fire Direction Centers can control movement firing position. Another option would be to use
in either a centralized or decentralized method. that counterfire acquisition to queue another
Using a Howitzer Tracking Chart or a digital collection asset, like an unmanned aerial system.
equivalent on a Joint Battle Command Platform or Either way, when we fire a piece against a capable
Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System can fire support threat, we should operate under the
help ensure pieces move in a coordinated manner. assumption that that piece has been acquired.
The lack of return counter-battery fire should
By definition, this movement is defensive not lead us to believe that we’ve gone undetected.
in nature. To meet the demands of the future This is an example of confirmation bias and often
operational environment and the Army’s role leads to battery commanders remaining in place
in enabling Multi-Domain Operations, battery following a mission.
commanders need to approach their Troop-
Leading Procedures and command their firing What if the battery commander hadn’t issued
unit “in the spirit of the offense.” To accomplish simple survivability criteria but took the time
this, we propose a concept called “Artillery to develop an artillery maneuver plan as a
Maneuver.” Maneuver, as defined by FM 1-02.1, product of his or her assumptions about the
is movement in conjunction with fires. Artillery enemy’s strength, capabilities, composition, and
disposition within his or her area of operations Towed artillery battery commanders need
and area of interest? An artillery commander to rethink their responsibilities as part of the
right now bases his or her scheme of maneuver combined arms team. Multi-domain operations
on essential Field Artillery tasks he or she is and restructuring of divisions to meet the demands
designated to support by phase of an operation. of a changing threat landscape should cause all
For a commander, this requires the designation artillery professionals to rethink and relook at
of ready rack loads, preferred charge based on what our responsibilities on the battlefield have
range to planned targets, and azimuth of fire. been historically and may be moving forward.
Battery commanders need to do more and consider Suppose artillery must be available to enable
their planned movements within and between maneuver and deliver munitions at critical
position areas for artillery in relation to the enemy points in an operation. In that case, artillery
counterfire officer and the enemy fire support commanders need to think and act in the spirit
enterprise. By truly putting on a red hat during of the offense and place the enemy counterfire
troop-leading procedures, a battery commander officer in a dilemma every time we fire.
will quickly see that his or her battery’s signature
after even a single fire mission has placed the Major Shaun Callahan is a Field Artillery Officer currently
assigned as an instructor at the United States Military Academy.
firing unit in the enemy’s crosshairs for proactive
Previously he served as a commander of an M777A2 battery in
counter-battery fire and reconnaissance efforts the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Germany. While serving in Europe, he
through UAS and ground-based forces. participated in multiple NATO and USAREUR training exercises in
addition to three Combat Training Center rotations at JMRC. MAJ
So, what is on the menu of options for towed Callahan is a graduate of the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course
and the Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course.
battery commanders? Move every piece after every
mission? Bulldog Battery, Field Artillery Squadron Captain Jacob Pachter is a Field Artillery Officer currently
wrestled with this problem at Saber Junction assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Battery (HHB), 1-37th
20 at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center FA, 1-2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team at Joint Base Lewis-
McChord. He has served in various leadership and staff roles in
(JMRC). Moving every towed piece after every
M777A2 Battalions, as a Lieutenant and Captain. While stationed
mission simply strained cannon crews to the in Europe, he participated in Combat Training Center rotations
point that they became ineffective. The concept of at the National Training Center and JMRC and multiple NATO
moving following each mission is still a reactive and United States Army Europe and Africa (USAREUR) exercises.
way to look at battery operations. Commanders CPT Pachter is a graduate of the Field Artillery Captain’s Career
Course and the Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course.
must plan the variety of fire missions that need
to be fired by a battery versus a platoon and Captain Dana Meyers is a Field Artillery Officer currently
possibly, at times, just a section. Minimizing assigned as a Battalion Fire Support Officer (FSO) for 1-327th
the number of pieces firing could reduce the Infantry/1st Brigade Combat Team at Fort Campbell. Previously
she served as a Troop FSO, Platoon Fire Direction Officer, Platoon
overall signature of the battery’s operating area.
Leader, and Executive officer in the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in
By firing with one platoon, keeping the sister Germany. While serving in Europe, she participated in multiple
platoon in position, and preparing to fire the next USAREUR training exercises, a six-month rotation to Bemowa-
mission while the first platoon moves allowed Piskie, Poland, in support of Enhanced Forward Presence, and
Bulldog Battery to reduce crew strain and continue two Combat Training Center rotations at JMRC. CPT Meyers is a
graduate of the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course and the Field
maneuvering the battery within large position Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course.
areas for artillery. Another alternative method,
referred to by Bulldog Battery as “the amoeba References
method,” called for firing the battery and moving
Department of the Army, ATP 3-09.50, “The Field Artillery
the middle pieces to the flanks of the position Cannon Battery,” May 2016.
areas for artillery as a method to change the shape
Department of the Army, FM 3-09, “Fire Support and Field
of the firing formation between missions from Artillery Operations,” May 2020.
the enemy perspective. This technique proved
Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, “The Russian Way
highly effective at deceiving the counterfire officer of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the
and confused follow-on aerial reconnaissance Russian Ground Forces,” Foreign Military Studies Office, (2016).
elements. There are undoubtedly other solutions, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot%20Spots/
but we as a Fires community must push battery Documents/Russia/2017-07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-
commanders to think of their units from a fire Grau-Bartles.pdf
and maneuver perspective to gain the upper hand Osteen, K. (1990, July 1). Artillery in Maneuver Warfare.
against the enemy counterfire officer. Marine Corps Association.
2022 Issue44 • • 47
2022Issue 47
Illustration of Ivy Mass. (Howitzers photo by CPT Alexander Werden;
Apache and HIMARS fire created by the 14th Public Affairs Detachment.)
Training a JAGIC at Home Station

By MAJ Bruce Archambault
B
ackground. The 4th Infantry Ivy Division synchronization matrix and the high-
completed Warfighter Exercise (WFX) 23- payoff target list, attack guidance
01 on October 2, 2022 – the first-ever WFX matrix, and target selection standards
executed within a Pacific scenario. The exercise [HAT]) to achieve the desired effects.
was divided into two distinct operations. The first
half of the WFX consisted of Joint Task Force and b. Conduct clearance of fires and
Corps shaping as preparation for a joint forcible airspace to effectively support current
entry operation which included simultaneous operations, deliver joint fires and
airborne, air assault, and amphibious landing achieve desired effects.
operations. The second half consisted of
approximately three days of large-scale combat c. Determine the best use of available
operations. In all, the Ivy Division fought for fire support resources during the current
approximately 120 hours, or five days. operations fight.
During the five days of fighting, the Ivy d. Integrate the targeting and
Division’s Joint Air Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC) intelligence collection processes by
conducted 240 surface-to-surface strikes (cannon
dynamically coordinating fires against
and rocket fires), 40 strikes using armed Gray
Eagle, and controlled 42 sorties of close air high-payoff targets, high-value targets,
support (CAS) and air interdiction (AI). Since a and targets of opportunity within the
majority of allocated sorties conducted strikes division area of operations.
against multiple targets, the total number of The success of the joint team comprising the
strikes from fixed-wing aircraft exceeded 100. Ivy JAGIC is directly attributable to the training
While the JAGIC engaged targets in the division’s plan developed and executed by its leadership –
deep area, the airspace manager cleared airspace a training plan that was fully supported by both
for over 400 strikes, a number which includes the division artillery (DIVARTY) and division
the 120 counterfire missions cleared above the commanders.
coordinating altitude on behalf of the division
counterfire headquarters. By all accounts, the Home Station JAGIC Training. Ivy JAGIC leaders
JAGIC team excelled at its core competencies, developed and executed a scalable and tailorable
detailed in the Ivy JAGIC’s standard operating home-station training progression to prepare for
procedures (SOP): WFX 23-01 utilizing a crawl-walk-run training
progression. This training progression can be
a. Conduct dynamic targeting/ applied to any division JAGIC’s train-up, and it
determine the best weapon-target can be adjusted for unique mission variables or
solutions available in accordance with for personnel, sustainment, equipment and/or
the Commander’s guidance (target facilities limitations and/or requirements.

Training Circular 3-91.1, Training the Joint techniques” (incorporate the DIVARTY and brigade
Air Ground Integration Center, lists multiple fire support elements when possible), and “fight
opportunities for training the JAGIC, including to train” (this training was made a priority by
attending the echelons above brigade airspace the division and DIVARTY commanders). Other
course (EABAC) and specialized joint air-ground training objectives were to incorporate elements
training (SJAT). While these two courses are of the multidomain operations operational concept
excellent training for the JAGIC, there are only (place cyber and electromagnetic activities space
four short paragraphs in the “Home Station team personnel in the JAGIC), to utilize the MTC
Training” section of the TC, two of which detail to provide simulation support to the training,
individual systems training (Advanced Field and to incorporate the Ivy “Strike Cell” to train
Artillery Tactical Data System [AFATDS], joint information collection plan execution as well as
automated deep operations coordination system, the intelligence support to targeting function.
tactical airspace integration system [TAIS],
etc.) as opposed to collective JAGIC training. Crawl Phase. The first training iteration relied
This required the Ivy JAGIC and the Fort Carson wholly on the Fort Carson MTC for physical space,
Mission Training Complex (MTC) to devise a plan command and control (C2) systems, and network
that would adequately prepare the JAGIC for both services. Only Army personnel participated in
WFX 23-01 and any follow-on missions assigned this phase; however, the senior air director and
to the division headquarters. senior air technician visited during the execution
days to both identify where they would fit into
During the design phase, the DIVARTY future training (white cell and training audience
commander directed that the training requirements) and advised the JAGIC chief on how
progression’s objectives include both doctrinal the air support operations center (ASOC) fit into
objectives and objectives unique to the Ivy JAGIC. the JAGIC battle drills. The MTC organized a room
Doctrinally, it aimed to achieve the following to reflect the JAGIC layout within our command
training principles from FM 7-0: “train as you post integrated infrastructure mission command
fight” (use our own systems, network, and platform (MCP). (Figure 1)
command posts), “sustain levels of training
proficiency over time” (execute training at least The white cell consisted of a brigade fire support
once per quarter), “train using multi-echelon element with an AFATDS, a DIVARTY fire control
Figure 1. MTC Room Layout for Crawl Phase
2022 Issue 4 • 49
element (FCE) with an AFATDS, a DIVARTY air assessment of the high-payoff target list, attack
defense and airspace management (ADAM) cell guidance matrix, target selection standards, or
with a TAIS, firing battalion fire direction centers HAT, and the commander’s targeting guidance.
with an AFATDS, a G-2 strike cell representative The team spent approximately an hour at a time
with a master scenario event list, and the JAGIC processing strikes before pausing to conduct
Field Artillery intelligence officer (FAIO) with a hot washes, adjust and go again. Following this
Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination training, the JAGIC team and the MTC transitioned
System (JADOCS). The MTC utilized the low to planning for the next iteration – the walk phase.
overhead training system to provide simulation
support to training. These simulation drivers Walk Phase. For this training iteration, the
were used instead of Warfighter’s Simulation division ASOC participated in the training along
(WARSIM) due to no maneuver units taking part in with all Army personnel in the JAGIC. The team
the training (targets and firing units were static, executed training in the division main command
and other friendly units were not built), making posts’ MCPs (see figure 2 for the updated
terrain effects on maneuver that WARSIM provides layout following the original training iteration).
not required. The tactical scenario used for the In addition to the JAGIC, the G2 strike cell set up
training was a European Command-based scenario their MCP (layout shown in figure 3) in order to
from the last WFX that the Ivy Division executed. execute the division’s information collection plan
and conduct intelligence support to targeting
The primary training objectives were to 1) within the simulated training environment.
validate individual C2 systems training across The DIVARTY established their FCE, counterfire
the JAGIC team, 2) refine JAGIC battle drills, element, and ADAM cell in their main command
and 3) validate the JAGIC’s digital and analog post on the MTC Tactical Operations Center’s pad.
common operational picture. The training was
scheduled to last one week - two days for setup White cell support for this iteration did not
and thread testing and three days for training. require the DIVARTY or G2 strike cell personnel, as
During execution, the FAIO sent targetable they were now included in the training audience.
intelligence data (TIDATS) to the JAGIC targeting The white cell still required the cannon and rocket
officer via JADOCs. For each TIDAT sent, the JAGIC fire direction centers to execute fires in the
team executed its battle drill (figure 2) based on simulation. It added the requirement for an ASOC
Figure 2. JAGIC Dynamic Strike Battle Drill Flowchart

Figure 3. Current Operations Integrating Cell MCPs (L to R – All-source Collection Element, JAGIC, Chief of Operations, connected by
catwalks)
Convergence is an outcome representative the team executed approximately two hours of

created by the concerted to act as the training in the morning and three hours in the
employment of capabilities tactical C2 afternoon, with a hot wash conducted after each
from multiple domains and agency and training session. This training paved the way for
echelons against combinations as pilots for the JAGIC and DIVARTY’s culminating training
of decisive points in any the division’s exercise ahead of moving into the command
domain to create effects allocated CAS post-exercise progression for WFX 23-01.
against a system, formation, and AI sorties
decision maker, or in a specific (this required Run Phase. The Ivy JAGIC, with 4th DIVARTY,
geographic area. (FM 3-0) creation of an executed Operation Ivy Mass in June 2022.
air tasking Concurrent with the WFX 23-01 “command post
order and airspace control order for the training). exercise 0” for the rest of the division staff, the
For this iteration, the MTC employed WARSIM, the exercise incorporated traditional observers (fire
modular universal simulation environment, and support teams, joint terminal attack controllers,
warfighter intelligence module to stimulate the Shadows and Gray Eagles) as well as electronic
training audience. The map set, enemy order of intelligence
battle, and threat tactics were identical to those collection Multidomain operations are the
employed during the crawl phase. assets (ground, combined arms employment
air, and space- of joint and Army capabilities
The primary training objectives were to 1) based), and to create and exploit relative
validate the JAGIC battle drill that was refined employed 155 advantages that achieve
during the crawl phase and 2) integrate mm cannons, objectives, defeat enemy
information collection and intelligence support High Mobility forces, and consolidate
to targeting into the training. This training Artillery Rocket gains on behalf of joint force
was scheduled for two weeks – one for setup S y s t e m s commanders. (FM 3-0)
and one for execution. During training, the (HIMARS),
strike cell identified targets using ground- army attack aviation, fixed-wing support and
moving target indication and simulated Gray electronic attack (space control electronic
Eagle feeds. Once identified and built into the warfare). Both the JAGIC and the strike cell
Distributed Common Ground System - Army operated from the MCPs within the division’s
(DCGS-A), the strike cell chief passed TIDATS main command post.
to the FAIO from DCGS-A to JADOCS, at which
point the FAIO validated targets and passed The objective of Ivy Mass was to execute
them to the JAGIC via JADOCS. Once game plans a live-fire multidomain exercise (simulation
were determined, the strikes were executed in support was not required or used), thereby
accordance with the JAGIC SOP. On training days, demonstrating the JAGIC’s ability to employ
2022 Issue 4 • 51
joint fires, control airspace, and integrate all fire missions. The ASOC procedurally controlled
available kinetic and non-kinetic detect and airspace with simultaneous use by multiple
deliver systems. This included assets organic unmanned aerial vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft,
to the division and others that were allocated rotary-wing aircraft, cannon fires, and rocket
for division’s use by higher headquarters. fires - with zero incidents or airspace conflicts.
DIVARTY planners created a synchronization
matrix that served as a schedule of fires for the Recommendations. Based on the Ivy JAGIC
exercise control team. Over a 12-hour execution experience while developing and executing a
window, the ASOC procedurally controlled the home-station training progression, the following
airspace over Fort Carson. During this 12-hour should be considered when developing JAGIC
window, the JAGIC processed strike requests home-station training plans:
from ground-based observers (multiple fire
support teams/subordinate fire support elements, 1) Build relationships with ASOC
joint terminal attack controllers, Versatile Radio leadership early and often engage during
Observation and Direction [VROD], and VROD train-up. While Ivy JAGIC soldiers were at
Modular Adaptive Transmit), aerial observers EABAC and SJAT, Army Joint Support Team
(Shadow, Gray Eagle, Air-Rod) and space- personnel shared that Army JAGIC personnel
based collection assets. The JAGIC achieved often meet their ASOC counterparts for the
convergence by employing both kinetic and non- first time during SJAT. This was not the case
kinetic effects simultaneously and sequentially. with the Ivy team, as the Ivy JAGIC trained
The combination of lethal and non-lethal effects together prior to SJAT. As a result, the team
defeated enemy air defense, indirect fires, and transitioned to the lab portion of SJAT with
maneuver formations - the first two replicated an established team that was focused on
by emitters placed on the edge of the impact area executing the training, not team building.
and the last replicated by vehicle hulls in the During the WFX, the JAGIC Observer, Coach/
impact area. The JAGIC successfully executed the Trainers shared with JAGIC leadership their
operation in accordance with the synchronization surprise at how efficiently the Army and Air
matrix - with zero missed strikes or time on target Force worked together. JAGIC leadership
1 Repetition per Phase, 1 Phase per Quarter.
Trained Crew, ready for CTC or WFX

New Crew
Outputs by Phase are Specific to Each Phase’s Training Objectives
Figure 4. Crawl/Walk/Run Progression.

(Army and Air Force alike) attributed this SOP says you should fight). The Ivy JAGIC
to the joint training prior to the WFX – team, during the first iteration (crawl
training that helped build relationships phase), spent part of the first execution
and establish a common understanding day continuing to troubleshoot digital
of everyone’s roles, responsibilities, and systems. This enabled the digital link
expectations. between JADOCS and the JAGIC AFATDS and
between the JADOCS and DCGS-A servers.
2) Get buy-in and support from division This digital link ensured that the digital
leaders. During initial planning discussions sensor-to-shooter chain was not broken,
for every training iteration, multiple eliminating a potential ingress point for
elements of the division staff usually had error during mission processing (such as
some form of conflict with the training an AFATDS operator typing in an incorrect
timelines. However, support from senior grid). In hindsight, it would have been
leaders in the division allowed for the beneficial to allocate more time to set up
tasking of staff sections using a division- and avoid using training time to work on
level operations order written by the division communications issues.
fire support element. This prioritized the
training across the division staff and ensured Conclusion. The JAGIC is a complex hub within
that the staff supported the training. the division’s main command post that must
regularly train as a combined team to maintain
3) Trust the TC regarding timing of proficiency. Any training plan that aims to produce
EABAC and SJAT. While excellent training a fully trained JAGIC must be deliberate in its
opportunities, this training best serves approach and progressive in nature (crawl, walk,
new JAGIC teams that have not already run), and, importantly, must begin very early in
executed collective training. TC 3-91.1 the training progression. It must also be flexible
depicts training timing in figure 1-3 enough to be tailored to any combination of
(EABAC, then SJAT, then home-station mission variables a division may face. This type
training), but the Ivy JAGIC developed and of approach ensured that the Ivy JAGIC team
implemented home-station training prior was trained on all individual and collective tasks
to attending in-person training due to how and was prepared to execute WFX 23-01, during
far out WFX 23-01 was once the team was which the team excelled at performing its core
formed. Looking back, instead of waiting competencies.
until the team had executed multiple home-
MAJ Bruce Archambault is the JAGIC Chief for the 4th Infantry
station training repetitions, it would have Division at Fort Carson, Colorado. His previous assignments include
been best to send the team to SJAT as an serving as an Observer, Coach/Trainer at the National Training
introductory exercise. Center, a small group leader at the Field Artillery Captain’s Career
Course, and commanding B/3-321st Field Artillery, HIMARS.
He commissioned through the University of Kansas ROTC program,
4) Pre-execution communications earned a master’s degree in management and leadership from
exercise. Build ample time into the setup Webster University, and is a graduate of the Field Artillery Captain’s
phase of any training iteration (i.e., - do Career Course and the Command and General Staff College.
not rush to execute substandard training or
training that does not reflect how doctrine/
Ivy Mass is a live fire exercise that demonstrates and validates the 4th Infantry Division’s ability to converge multi-echelon operations
alongside joint service partners to engage a simulated enemy at all levels of the battle space: on the ground, in the air, in space, and
cyberspace. (U.S. Army photo by SPC Collin MacKown)
2022 Issue 4 • 53
SGT Paul Grillot, left, and PVT Brandon Kramer, center, Soldier assigned to 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, 428th Field
Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, OK., feed ‘SSG Big Deuce’ sugar grass in an open field on Fort Sill, April 24, 2020. ‘Big Deuce’ is one of two
iconic livestock mascots associated with Fort Sill. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Dustin D. Biven / 75th Field Artillery Brigade)
The 2023 submission deadlines for the

Field Artillery Professional Bulletin:
Spring edition, Jan. 6
Summer edition, Apr. 7
Fall edition, Jun. 9
Winter edition, Sep. 15
Submit your articles to: [email protected]
PIN: 213491-000

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2022, Issue 4

during World War II

24 The Kill Web: Dynamic Targeting

30 Putting the “Forward” Back in

By MAJ Bruce Archambault

2 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

The Compass of our Branch

Throughout our warrior history, one thing remains clear — the

As we move into an era of modernization we cannot forget where

The foundation of all things Artillery is Blockhouse Signal

Happy Saint Barbara’s Season Redlegs!! Zero mils!! KOB!!

(Photos by 1LT James Marshall,

(Photos by Judith Oman, FA CMDT Public Affairs)

4 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

Greetings fellow Redlegs,

It is my distinct honor and privilege to work for you as the

As the CWOB, I structure, align, and energize my entire effort to

The premise behind the strategy centers on the Army’s WO

While my determination is driven by the Army’s “People Strategy”

We must become scholars of our profession!

General Staff College, my classmates and I

same. For example, Russian-backed separatists

6 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

With well-maintained and serviced equipment Conclusion

Division CAB Deep Attack

10 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

MAJ Christopher Walker is the Fire Support Officer

14 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

16 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

10 149 F.A. History, 16-17, Box 414, DDE.

18 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

22 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

After successfully completing NET, Soldiers

“We’ve never had a system like this before,”

Upon completion of prototype-battery fielding,

“I was once a young, enlisted Soldier, and I

Photos: Using the Nation’s first prototype Long-Range

THE KILL WEB:

The term “kill chain” has long been associated

1 This aphorism is frequently used in statistical analysis

24 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

Two Kill Webs: Target-centric

Kill web analysis facilitates a multi-domain

6 Joint Concept for Fires 1.0 (September 2021)

26 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

This evolution changes our lexicon. If the kill

Recognized as the most

28 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

“Forward Observer” By 1LT Christopher Lipscomb

30 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

INTENSIVE TRAINING CYCLE Our greatest learning point throughout Falcon

JRTC Overall, pushing FOs down to the squad level

The DEM creates slope (Figure 3) and aspect

The fourth step requires a reclassification of

38 • Field Artillery Professional Bulletin

Figure 8 (next page) shows two maps. The larger

Second, a black line represents a vector (or

Third, the final results use all of the inputs

Once the three steps are completed, and range