WILLIAM T FEE

BOHN S PHILOSOPHICAL LIBRARY.

TWO ESSAYS
BY

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.
CAMBRIDGE DEIGHTON, BELL &
:
CO.

NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN co.

BOMBAY : A. H. WHEELER CO.

 ON
THE FOUEFOLD EOOT OF THE
PEINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT EEASON
AND

ON THE WILL IN NATURE.

TWO ESSAYS BY

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

TRANSLATED BY MME. KARL HILLEBRAND.

REVISED EDITION.

LONDON
GEOEGE BELL AND SONS
1903
CHISWICK PRESS CHARLES WHITTINQHAM AND
:
CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.
 TRANSLATOR S PREFACE.
x
venturing to lay the present translation before the
IN public, I am aware of the great difficulties of my task,
and indeed can hardly hope to do justice to the Author.
In fact, had it not been for the considerations I am about
might probably never have published what had
to state, I
been undertaken in order to acquire a clearer
originally
comprehension of these essays, rather than with a view to
publicity.
The two treatises which form the contents of the present
volume have so much importance for a profound and cor-
rect knowledge of Schopenhauer s philosophy, that it may
even be doubted whether the translation of his chief work,
"Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," can contribute much

towards the appreciation of his system without the help at

least of the Yierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden
"

Schopenhauer himself repeatedly and urgently

Grande."

insistsupon a previous thorough knowledge of Kant s

philosophy, as the basis, and of his own Fourfold Boot,"
"

as the key, to his own system, asserting that knowledge to

be the indispensable condition for a right comprehension
of his meaning. So far as I am aware, neither the Four "

fold Root" nor the "Will in Nature

"

have as yet found

a translator therefore, considering the dawning interest
;

which has begun to make itself felt for Schopenhauer s

philosophy in England and in America, and the fact that
1
From the fourth edition by Julius Frauenstadt.
"

Fourfold Boot,"

Leipzig, 1875 ;
"Will in Nature," Leipzig, 1878.
Tl TRANSLATOR S PREFACE.

no more competent scholar has come forward to do the

work, it may not seem presumptuous to suppose that this
version may be acceptable to those who wish to acquire
a more than superficial knowledge of this remarkable
thinker, yet whose acquaintance with German does not
permit them to read his works in the original.
Now although some portions of both the Essays pub
lished in the present volume have of course become an

tiquated, owing to the subsequent development of the

empirical sciences, while others such as, for instance,
Schopenhauer s denunciation of plagiarism in the cases of
Brandis and Rosas in the beginning of Physiology and
Pathology
1
can have no interest for the reader of the pre
sent day, I have nevertheless given them just as he left
them and refrained from all suppression or alteration. And
if, on the whole, the "

Will in Nature
"

may be less indis

pensable for a right understanding of our philosopher s

views than the Fourfold Root," being merely a record of
"

the confirmations which had been contributed during his

lifetime by the various branches of Natural Science to
his doctrine, that the thing in itself is the will, the Second

Essay has nevertheless in its own way quite as much im

portance as the First, and is, in a sense, its complement.

For they both throw on Schopenhauer s view of the

light
Universe in its double aspect as Will and as Representation,
each being as it were a resume of the exposition of one of
those aspects. My plea for uniting them in one volume, in
spite of the difference of their contents and the wide lapse
of time (seventeen years) which lies between them, must be,
that they complete each other, and that their great
weight
and intrinsic value seem to point them out as peculiarly
fitted to be introduced to the
English thinker.
In endeavouring to convey the Author s thoughts as he
J
See "

Will in
pp. 9-18 of the original
Nature," j pp. 224-234 of the
present translation.
 TRANSLATOR S PREFACE. Vll

expresses them, I have necessarily encountered many and

great difficulties. His meaning, though always clearly ex
pressed, is not always easy to seize, even for his countrymen ;

as a foreigner, therefore, I may often have failed to grasp,

let alone adequately to render, that meaning. In this case
besides, the responsibility for any want of perspicuity cannot
be shifted by the translator on to the Author since the;

consummate perfection of Schopenhauer s prose is univer

sally recognised, even by those who reject, or at least who do
not share, his views. An eminent German writer of our time
has not hesitated to rank him immediately after Lessing
and Gothe as the third greatest German prose-writer, and
only quite recently a German professor, in a speech de
livered with the intent of demolishing Schopenhauer s

philosophy, was reluctantly obliged to admit that his works

would remain on account of their literary value. Gothe
himself expressed admiration for the clearness of exposition
in Schopenhauer s chief work and for the beauty of his style.
The chief obstacle I have encountered in translating these
Essays, did not therefore consist in the obscurity of the
Author s style, nor even in the difficulty of finding appro
priate terms wherewith to convey his meaning although at
;

times certainly the want of complete precision in our philo

sophical terminology made itself keenly felt and the selec
tion was often far from easy it lay rather in the great diffe
:

rence in the way of thinking and of expressing their thoughts

which lies between the two nations. The regions of German
and English thought are indeed separated by a gulf, which
at first seems impassable, yet which must be bridged over by
some means or other, if a right comprehension is to be
achieved. The German writer loves to develop syntheti
cally a single thought in a long period consisting of various
members he proceeds steadily to unravel the seemingly
;

tangled skein, while he keeps the reader ever on the alert,

making him assist actively in the process and never letting
Vlll

him lose sight of the main thread. The English author,

on the contrary, anxious before all things to avoid
confusion and misunderstanding, and ready for this end
not only to sacrifice harmony of proportion in construction,
but to submit to the necessity of occasional artificial join
ing, usually adopts the analytical method. He prefers to
divide the thread of his discourse into several smaller
skeins, easier certainly to handle and thus better suiting
the convenience of the English thinker, to whom long
periods are trying and bewildering, and who is not always
willing to wait half a page or more for the point of a
sentence or the gist of a thought. Wherever it could be
done without interfering seriously with the spirit of the
original, I have broken up the longer periods in these essays
into smaller sentences, in order to facilitate their compre
hension. At times however Schopenhauer recapitulates a
whole side of his view of the Universe in a single period
of what seems intolerable length to the English reader :

as, for instance, the resume contained in the Introduction

l
to his "Will in Nature," which could not be divided without
damage to his meaning. Here therefore it did not seem
advisable to sacrifice the unity and harmony of his design
and to disturb both his form and his meaning, in order to
minister to the reader s dislike for mental exertion in ;

keeping the period intact I have however endeavoured to

make it as easy to comprehend as possible by the way in
which the single parts are presented to the eye.
As regards the terms chosen to convey the German
meaning, I can hardly hope to have succeeded in every
case in adequately rendering it, still less can I expect to
have satisfied my English readers. Several words of fre
quent occurrence and of considerable importance for the
right understanding of the original, have been used at
1
Pp. 2 and 3 of the original, and pp. 216 to 218 of the present
translation.
 IX

different times by different English philosophers in senses

so various, that, until our philosophical terminology has

by universal consent attained far greater precision than at

present, it must always be difficult for the writer or translator
to convey to the reader s mind precisely the same thought
that was in his own. To prevent unnecessary confusion
however, by leaving too much to chance, I will here briefly
state those terms which give most latitude for misappre
hension, explaining the sense in which I employ them and
also the special meaning attached to some of them by
Schopenhauer, whooften differs in this from other writers.
They are as follows.
Anschauung (anschauen, literally to behold ) I
(a..)
have rendered differently, according to its double mean
ing in German. When used to designate the mental act by
which an object is perceived, as the cause of a sensation
received, it is rendered by perception. When used to lay
stress upon immediate, as opposed to abstract representa
tion, it is rendered by intuition. This last occurs however
more often in the adjective form.
*
Vorstellung (vorstellen, literally to place before ) I
(b.)
render by representation in spite of its foreign, unwelcome
sound to the English ear, as being the term which nearest
approaches the G-erman meaning. The faculty of repre
sentation is defined by Schopenhauer himself as an"

exceedingly complicated physiological process in the brain

of an animal, the result of which is the consciousness of a
there."
picture
(c.) Auffassung (auffassen, literally to catch up ) has so
many shades of meaning in G-erman that it has to be
translated in many different ways according to the relation
in which it stands in the context. It signifies apprehension,
comprehension, perception, viewing and grasping.
(d.) Wahrnehmung (^ ^ihrnehmen, from wahr, true, and
nehmen, to take), is translated by apprehension or perception,
according to the degree of consciousness which accom
panies it.

But the two words which have proved most difficult to

translate, have been Vernehmen and Willkuhr.

(e.) Vernehmen means, to distinguish by the sense of
hearing. This word conveys a shade of thought which it
is almost impossible to render in English, because we
have no word by which to distinguish, from mere sen
suous hearing, a sort of hearing which implies more than
hearing and less than comprehension. The French en
tendre comes nearer to it than our hearing, but implies
more comprehension than vernehmen.
(/.) As to Willkuhr (arbitrium, literally will-choice ),
after a great deal of consideration I have chosen (relative)

free-will as the nearestapproach to the German sense, or at

any which Schopenhauer uses it. Willkuhr
rate, to that in
means in fact what is commonly understood as free-will ;

i.e. will with power of choice, will determined by motives

and unimpeded by outward obstacles arbitrium as opposed :

to voluntas: conscious will as opposed to blind impulse.

This relative free-will however is quite distinct from absolute
free-will (liberum arbitrium indiferentice) in a metaphysical
sense, i.e. will in its self -dependency. its arbitrary When
character emphasized, we call Willkuhr, caprice,
is specially

but this is not the usual meaning given to it by Schopenhauer.

Besides the meaning of these German words, I have still
to define the sense in which I have used the term idea in
this translation for this word has greatly changed its mean
;

ing at different times and with different authors, and is even

now apt to confuse and mislead. Schopenhauer has himself
contributed in one way to render its signification less
clear ; since, in spite of his declaration in the
"

Fourfold
x
Hoot "

to the effect, that he never uses the word idea in

1
See p. 113, 34 of the original, and p. 133 of the present translation.
any other than its original (Platonic) sense, he has himself
employed it to translate Vorstellung, in a specimen he
gives of a rendering of a passage in Kant s "Prolego
mena" in a letter addressed to Haywood, published in

Gwinner Biography of Schopenhauer." This he pro

"

bably did because some eminent English and French philo

sophers had taken the word in this sense, thinking perhaps
that Kant s meaning would thus be more readily under
stood. As however he uses the word idea everywhere
else exclusively in its original (Platonic) sense, I have pre
ferred to avoid needless confusion by adhering to his own
declaration and definition. Besides, many English writers
of note have protested against any other sense being given
to it, and modern German philosophers have more and
more returned to the original meaning of the term.
Some readers may take exception at such expressions as
a priority, motivation, aseity ; for they are not, strictly
speaking, English words. These terms however belong to
Schopenhauer s own characteristic terminology, and have
a distinct and clearly denned meaning therefore they had ;

to be retained in all cases in which they could not be

evaded, in order not to interfere with the Author s intention :

a necessity which the scholar will not fail to recognise,

especially when I plead in my defence that fidelity and
accuracy have been my sole aim in this work.
If moreover Carlyte s words, He who imports into his
"

own country any true delineation, any rationally spoken

word on any subject, has done well," are true, I may also be
absolved from censure, if I lay before the public this version
of some important utterances of a great thinker, in the

hope that it may be an assistance in, and an incitement to,

a deeper study of all Schopenhauer s works.
THE TRANSLATOR.
May, 1888.
 CONTENTS.

ON THE FOUBFOLD EOOT OF THE PRINCIPLE

OF SUFFICIENT EEASON.
CHAP. PAGE
Translator s Preface v
Author s Preface to the Second Edition
Editor s Preface to the Third Edition
.... .

xvii

xx
Editor s Preface to the Fourth Edition e . . xxviii

I. Introduction 1

II. General Survey of the most important views hitherto held

concerning the Principle of Sufficient Reason . . 6
III. Insufficiency of the Old and outlines of a New Demon
stration 28
IV. On the First Glass of Objects for the Subject, and that form
of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which predominates
in it 31
V. On the Second Class of Objects for the Subject and that
form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which pre
dominates in it 114
VI. On the Third Class of Objects for the Subject and that
form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which pre
dominates in it 153
VII. On the Fourth Class of Objects for the Subject, and that
form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason which pre
dominates in 165
....
it

VIIL General observations and results 177

xiv CONTENTS.

ON THE WILL IN NATUKE.

PAGE
Preface to the Second Edition 193
Editor s Preface to the Third Edition 213
Editor s Preface to the Fourth Edition 214
Introduction 215

Physiology and Pathology 224

Comparative Anatomy 252

Physiology of Plants 281

Physical Astronomy 305

Linguistic 322
Animal Magnetism and Magic 326

Sinology 359
Eeference to Ethics . . .372
Conclusion , . ,378
 ON THE FOUKFOLD ROOT
OF THK

PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT EEASON,

A PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE.

Nat /id rbv afttr tpy, ^ V X^ irapadovra rcrpajcrvv,

Ilaydv dou
dei <f>v
 THE AUTHOR S PREFACE TO THE
SECOND EDITION.

treatise on Elementary Philosophy, which first

THIS
appeared in the year 1813, when it procured for me
the degree of doctor, afterwards became the substructure
for the whole of my system. It cannot, therefore, be
allowed to remain out of print, as has been the case,
without niy knowledge, for the last four years.
On the other hand, to send a juvenile work like this
once more into the world with all its faults and blemishes,
seemed to me unjustifiable. For I am aware that the
time cannot be very far off when all correction will be
impossible but with that time the period of my real
;

influence will commence, and this period, I trust, will

be a long one, for I firmly rely upon Seneca s promise:
Etiamsi omnibus tecum viventibus silentium livor in-
"

T
dixerit ; venient qui sine offensa, sine gratia judicent" I
have done what I could, therefore, to improve this work
of my youth, and, considering the brevity and uncertainty
of life, I must even regard it as an especially fortunate
circumstance, to have been thus permitted to correct in
my sixtieth year what I had written in my twenty- sixth.
Nevertheless, while doing this, I meant to deal leniently
with my younger self, and to let him discourse, nay, even
speak his mind freely, wherever it was possible. But
1
Seneca, Ep. 79.
6
XV111 THE AUTHOR S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

wherever he had advanced what was incorrect or super

fluous, or had even left out the best part, I have been
obliged to interrupt the thread of his discourse. And
this has happened often enough ;
so often, indeed, that
some of my readersmay perhaps think they hear an old
man reading a young man s book aloud, while he frequently
lets it drop, in order to indulge in digressions of his own
on the same subject.
It is easy to see that a work thus corrected after so long
an interval, could never acquire the unity and rounded
completeness which only belong to such as are written in
one breath. So great a difference will be found even in style
and expression, that no reader of any tact can ever be in
doubt whether be the older or younger man who is speak
it

ing. For the contrast is indeed striking between the mild,

unassuming tone in which the youth who is still simple
enough to believe quite seriously that for all whose pur
suit is philosophy, truth, and truth alone, can have im

portance, and therefore that whoever promotes truth is

sure of a welcome from them propounds his arguments
with confidence, and the firm, but also at times somewhat
harsh voice of the old man, who in course of time has
necessarily discovered the true character and real aims of
the noble company of mercenary time-servers into which
he has fallen. Nay, the just reader will hardly find fault
with him should he occasionally give free vent to his
indignation; since we see what comes of it when people
who profess to have truth for their sole aim, are always
occupied in studying the purposes of their powerful
superiors, and when the e quovis ligno fit Mercurius is
extended even to the greatest philosophers, and a clumsy
charlatan, like Hegel, is calmly classed among them ?
Verily German Philosophy stands before us loaded with
contempt, the laughing-stock of other nations, expelled
from all honest science like the prostitute who sells her-
 THE AUTHOR S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. XIX

self for sordid hire to-day to one, to-morrow to another ;

and the brains of the present generation of savants are

disorganised by Hegelian nonsense : incapable of reflec

tion, coarseand bewildered, they fall a prey to the low
Materialism which has crept out of the basilisk s egg.
Good speed to them. I return to my subject.
My readers will thus have to get over the difference of
tone in this treatise for I could not do here what I had
;

done in my is, give the later additions I

chief work, that
had made in a separate appendix. Besides, it is of no
consequence that people should know what I wrote in my
twenty-sixth and what in my sixtieth year the only matter
;

of real importance is, that those who wish to find their way

through the fundamental principles of all philosophizing,

to gain a firm footing and a clear insight, should in these
few sheets receive a little volume by which they may learn
something substantial, solid, and true and this, I hope,
:

will be the case. From the expansion now given to some

portions, it has even grown into a compendious theory of
the entire faculty of knowing, and this theory, by limiting
itself strictly to the research of the Principle of Sufficient

Reason, shows the matter from a new and peculiar side ;

but then it finds its completion in the First Book of The "

World as Will and Representation," together with those

chapters of the Second Volume which refer to it, and also
in my Critique of Kantian Philosophy.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER
FRANKFURT AM MAIN,
September, 1847.
 EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE THIRD
EDITION.

the present volume I lay before the public the Third

INEdition of the Fourfold Root," including the emenda
"

tions and additions left by Schopenhauer in his own inter

leaved copy. I have already had occasion elsewhere to
relate that he left copies of all his works thus interleaved,
and that he was wont to jot down on these fly-leaves
any corrections and additions he might intend inserting in
future editions.
Schopenhauer himself prepared for the press all that
has been added in the present edition, for he has indicated,
by signs in the original context corresponding to other
similar signs in the MS. passages, the places where he
wished his additions to be inserted. All that was left for
me to do, was to give in extended form a few citations he
had purposed adding.
No essential corrections and additions, such as might
modify the fundamental thoughts of the work, will be
found in this new edition, which simply contains cor
rections, amplifications, and corroborations, many of them
interesting and important. Let me take only a single
instance : 21, on the Intellectual Nature of Empirical
"

As Schopenhauer attached great importance

Perception."
to his proof of the intellectual nature of perception, nay,
believed he had made a new discovery by it, he also
worked out with special predilection all that tended to
 XXI

support, confirm, and strengthen it. Thus we find him in

this 21 quoting an interesting fact he had himself ob
served in 1815 then the instances of Caspar Hauser and
;

others (taken from Franz s book, The Eye," &c. &c.) ; "

and again the case of Joseph Kleinhaus, the blind sculptor ;

and the physiological confirmations he has found

finally,
in Flourens* De la vie et de 1 intelligence des Animaux."
"

An observation, too, concerning the value of Arithmetic

for the comprehension of physical processes, which is in
serted into this same paragraph, will be found very re
markable, and may be particularly recommended to those
who are inclined to set too high a value on calculation.
Many interesting and important additions will be found
in the other paragraphs also.
One thing I could have wished to see left out of this
Third Edition: his effusions against the "professors of
philosophy."
In a conversation with Schopenhauer in
the year 1847, when he told me how he intended to
l
"

chastise the professors of philosophy," I expressed

my dissent on this point for even in the Second Edition
;

these passages had interrupted the measured progress of

objective inquiry. At that time, however, he was not to be
persuaded to strike them out so they were left to be ;

again included in this Third Edition, where the reader

will accordingly once more find them, although times have

changed since then.

another point, more nearly touching the real
Upon
had a controversy with Schopenhauer in the year
issue, I
1852. In arguing against Fichte s derivation of the Non-
2
Ego from the Ego in his chief work, he had said :

1
See "

Arthur Schopenhauer. Von ihm u jer ihn. Ein Wort der ;

Vertheidigung," von Ernst Otto Lindner, and Memorabilien, Briefe und "

Nachlassstiicke," von Julius Frauenstadt (Berlin, 1863), pp. 163-165.

2
Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung," second
"

edition, i. t 37 (third edition, i., 39).

xxn EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

"Just as if Kant had never existed, the Principle of

Sufficient Eeason still remains with Fichte what it was with
allthe Schoolmen, an ceterna veritas : that is to say, just as
the G-ods of the ancients were still ruled over by eternal
Destiny, so was the God of the Schoolmen still ruled over
by these ceterna veritates, i.e., by the metaphysical, mathe
matical, and metalogical truths, and even, according to
some, by the validity of the moral law. These veritates
alone were unconditioned by anything, and God, as well
as the world, existed through their necessity. Thus with
Fichte the Ego, according to the Principle of Sufficient
Reason, is the reason of the world or of the Non-Ego, of
the Object, which is the product or result of the Ego itself.
He took good care, therefore, neither to examine nor to
check the Principle of Sufficient Eeason any farther. But
ifI had to indicate the particular form of this principle by
which Fichte was guided in making the Ego spin the Non-
Ego out of itself, as the spider its web, I should point to
the Principle of the Sufficient Eeason of Being in Space ;
for nothing but a reference to this principle gives any sort
of sense or meaning to his laboured deductions of the way
in which the Ego produces and manufactures the Non-Ego
out of itself, which form the contents of the most senseless
and simply on this account most tiresome book ever
written. The only interest this Fichteian philosophy has
for us at all otherwise it would not be worth mentioning

being the tardy appearance of the real anti

lies in its

thesis to ancient Materialism, which was the most con

sistent starting from the Object, just as Fichte s philosophy
was the most consistent starting from the Subject. As
Materialism overlooked the that with the simplest
fact,

Object it forthwith posited the Subject also so Fichte ;

not only overlooked the fact, that with the Subject (what
ever name he might choose to give it) he had already
posited the Object also, because no Subject can be thought
 XX111

without it ;
lie likewise overlooked the fact, that all deri
vation a priori, nay, all demonstration whatsoever, rests
upon a necessity, and that all necessity itself rests entirely
and exclusively on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, be
cause to be necessary, and to result from a given reason,
are convertible terms that the Principle of Sufficient
;

Reason is still nothing but the common form of the

Object as such therefore that it always presupposes the
:

Object and does not, as valid before and independently of

it, first introduce it, and cannot make the Object arise in

conformity with its own legislation. Thus this starting

from the Object and the above-mentioned starting from
the Subject have in common, that both presuppose what
they pretend to derive : i.e., the necessary correlate of their
starting-point."
This last assertion" that the Principle of Sufficient Reason
already presupposes the Object, but does not, as valid before
and independently of it, first introduce it, and cannot make
the Object arise in conformity with its own legislation,"
seemed to me so far to clash with the proof given by
Schopenhauer in 21 of the "Fourfold Root," as, accord
ing to the latter, function of the Subject s under
it is ike

standing which primarily creates the objective world out

of the subjective feelings of the sensuous organs by the

application of the Principle of Sufficient Reason so that ;

all that is Object, as such, after all comes into being only
in conformity with the Principle of Sufficient Reason, conse

quently that this principle cannot, as Schopenhauer asserted

in his polemic against Fichte, already presuppose the Object.
In 1852, therefore, I wrote as follows to Schopenhauer :

In your arguments against Fichte, where you say that

"

the Principle of Sufficient Reason already presupposes the

Object, and cannot, as valid before and independently of it,
first introduce it, the objection occurred to me anew, that
Fourfold Root you had made the Object of per-
"

in your "
xxiv EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

ception come into being through the application of the

first

Principle of Sufficient Eeason, and that you yourself, there

fore, derive the Object from the Subject, as, for instance,

p.73 of the Fourfold Root "

(2nd edition).
"

How then can

you maintain against Fichte that the Object is always pre
supposed by the Subject ? I know of no way of solving
this difficulty but the following: The Subject only pre

supposes in the Object what belongs to the thing in itself,

what is inscrutable ;
but it creates itself the representation of
the Object, i.e. that by which the thing in itself becomes
phenomenon. For instance, when I see a tree, my Subject
assumes the thing in itself of that tree ;
whereas the repre
sentation of conversely presupposes the operation of my
it

Subject, the transition from the effect (in my eye) to its

cause."

To this Schopenhauer replied as follows on the 12th of

July, 1852 :

Your answers (to the objection in question) are not the

"

right ones. Here there cannot yet be a question of the

thing in itself, and the distinction between representation
and object is inadmissible the world is representation. :

The matter stands rather as follows Fichte s derivation

of the Non-Ego from the Ego, is quite abstract A = A, :

ergo, 1 = 1, and so forth. Taken in an abstract sense, the

Object is at once posited with the Subject. For to be
Subject means, to know; and to know means, to have
representations. Object and representation are one and
the same thing. In the Fourfold Root," therefore, I "

have divided all objects or representations into four classes,

within which the Principle of Sufficient Reason always
reigns, though in each class under a different form never ;

theless, the Principle of Sufficient Eeason always presup

poses the class itself, and indeed, properly speaking, they co

1
incide. Now, in reality, the existence of the Subject of
See "

Die Welt a. W. u. V.,"

vol. ii.
pp. 17-21, and vol. i.
p. 39 of
 XXV

knowing is not an abstract existence. The Subject does not

and independently, as if it had dropped
exist for itself
from the sky it appears as the instrument of some indi
;

vidual phenomenon of the Will (animal, human being),

whose purposes it is destined to serve, and which thereby
now receives a consciousness, on the one hand, of itself, on
the other hand, of everything else. The question next
arises, as to how or out of what elements the representation
of the outer world is brought about within this conscious
ness. This I have already answered in my "Theory of
Colours and also in my chief work, 1 but most thoroughly
"

and exhaustively Second Edition of the Four

of all in the
"

fold Root," 21, where

shown, that all those elements
it is

are of subjective origin wherefore attention is especially

;

drawn to the great difference between all this and Fichte s

humbug. For the whole of my exposition is but the full
2
carrying out of Kant s Transcendental Idealism."
I have thought it advisable to give this passage of his
letter, as being relevant to the matter in question. As to the
division in chapters and paragraphs, it is the same in this
new edition as in the last. By comparing each single
the second edition. (The passages referred to by Schopenhauer in the
second edition are in the third edition vol. ii. pp. 18-21, and vol. i. p. 40).
1
Die Welt a. W. u. V., vol. i. p. 22 et seqq., and vol. ii. chap. ii. of the
second edition 5 vol. i. p. 22, 6, and vol. ii. chap. ii. of the third edition.
2
The passage I have quoted above from Schopenhauer s letter is also
to be found among the letters published in my book, Arthur Schopen
"

hauer. Von
ihm, liber ihn, u. s. w.," p. 541 et seqq,, and it results from
this, as well as from several other letters which likewise deal with

important and knotty points in his philosophy, that this correspondence

may perhaps not be quite so worthless and unimportant as many
among them Gwinner, in Schopenhauer und seine
his "

pamphlet,
Freunde" (Leipzig, 1863) represent it to be. This pamphlet of Gwin-
ners, by the way, has met with the treatment it deserves in the Pre
face to the collection, Aus Arthur Schopenhauer s handschriftlichen
"

Aphorismen und Nachlass. Abhandlungen, Anmerkungen, Fragmente,"

(Leipzig, 1864).
xxvi EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

paragraph of the second with the same paragraph of the

present edition, it will be easy to find out what has been
newly added. In conclusion, however, I will still add a
short list of the principal passages which are new.

LIST OP ADDITIONS TO THE THIRD EDITION.

8, p. 13, the passages from Notandum," &c., to Ex " "

necessitate" and p. 14, from Zundchst adoptirt down to "

"

the end of the page (English version, p. 14, &c., to

"

Not."

"Ex nee"; p. 15, from "First he adopts"

down to the
end of the paragraph, p. 16,
"

est causa sui"),

in confirma
tion of his assertion that Spinoza had interchanged and
confounded the relation between reason of knowledge and
consequent, with that between cause and effect.

from proUamirt down to gewusst haben

"
" "

9, p. 17, er
wird" (E. v., 9, p. 19, from He proclaims it down to
"
"

"

by others before.")

20, p. 42, in speaking of reciprocity (WecJiselwirJcung),

from the words Ja, wo einem Schreiber down to ins
"
" "

Bodenlose gerathen sei."

(E. v., 20, p. 45, from "

Nay, it is

precisely"
down to
"

his depth.")

21, p. 61, the words at the bottom, und raumlich Jcon- "

struirt" down to p. 62, Data erhalt," together with the "

quotation concerning the blind sculptor, J. Kleinhaus.

(E. v., 21, p. 67, the words and constructs in Space "
"

down to of the Understanding,") and the note.

"

21, pp. 67-68, from "

Ein specieUer und interessanter

Beleg"
down to "

alb ernes Zeug dazu."

(E. v., 21,

p. 73, "I will here add" down to p. 74, "followed by

twaddle.")

21, p. 73, sq., the instances of Caspar Hauser, &c., from

Franz, The Eye," &c., and the
"

physiological corrobora-
tions from Flourens, De la vie "

et de I intelligence" &c.

(E. v., p. 80, and following.)

 EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION, xxvii

21, p. 77, the parenthesis on the value of calculation.

(E. v., p. 83,
"

All comprehension," &c.)

21, p. 83, the words "

da ferner Substanz" down to

"

das WirJcen in concrete." (E. v., 21, p. 90,

"

Substance
and Matter "

down to "in
concrete")

29, p. 105, the words "im Lateinischen" down to

"

erJcannte." (E. v., 29, p. 116, from "

In Latin" down
tO "

KUT l^O-^IJV.")

34, p. 116, the words "

Ueberall ist
"

down to "

Praxis
und 34, p. 128, the words Seasonable
"

Theorie" (E. v.,

or Rational
"

down to "

theory and practice.")

34, p. 121, the verses from Gothe s

"

West-Ostlicher
Divan."

34, p. 125, AnmerJcung,t]i.e words Auch ist "

Brahma "

down to die erstere," and p. 126, the quotation

"

from I. J.

Schmidt s
"

Forschungen." (E. v., 34, p. 138, note,

"

Brahma is also
"

down to
"

first of these,")

34, p. 127, the words from "

Aber der naive

"

down to
"

"judaisirten gouverneurs (E. v., 34, p. 150, sentence be

ginning
"

But the
infancy,"
and the artless
"

down to "

Greek quotation from Plutarch in the note.)

34, p. 128, the words from Ganz ubereinstimmend
"
"

down to uberfliissige sein (E. v., p. 151, from

"

soil."

J. F. Davis
"

down to superfluous.") "

"

45, p. 147, the words Eben daher Jcommt es down to "

"

It is just for this

" "

sich erhalt."
(E. v., 45, p. 163,
reason too
"

down to their possession.")

"

45, p. 149, the words

"

Man suche Das" &c., down to

"

gelesen haben." (E. v., 45, p. 164, from "

We should
"

down to "

read in books.")

49, p. 154, the words Der bei den Philosophastern," "

down to zu kontroliren sind" (E. v., 49, p. 169, from

"

the words The conception of our," &c., down to "by per

"

ception.")

50, p. 156, the words "

Denn der Satz vom Grunde "

down to "

nur sich selbst nicht"

(E. v., 50, p. 172, from
"For the Principle of Sufficient Eeason," &c., down to
"

everything else.")

52, p. 158, the words "

Der allgemeine Sinn des Satzes

vom Grunde," down to "

der Kosmologische Beweis ist."

(E. v., 52, p. 173, from

"

The general meaning down to

"

"

the Cosmological Proof.")

JULIUS FBAUENSTADT.
BEKLIN, August , 1864.

EDITOR S PEEFACE TO THE FOURTH

EDITION.

present Fourth Edition is of the same content as

THE Third the therefore it contains the same corrections
;

and additions which I had already inserted in the Third

Edition from Schopenhauer s own interleaved copy of this
work.
JULIUS FBAUENSTADT.
BERLIN, September, 1877,
 ON THE FOURFOLD EOOT
OF THE

PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.
1. The Method.

divine Plato and the marvellous Kant unite their

THEmighty voices in recommending a rule, to serve as
the method of all philosophising as well as of all other
science.
1
Two
laws, they tell us the law of homogeneity :

and the law of specification, should be equally observed,

neither to the disadvantage of the other. The law of
homogeneity directs us to collect things together into kindr,
by observing their resemblances and correspondences, to
collect kinds again into species, species into genera, and
so on, till at last we come to the highest all-comprehensive

conception. Now
this law, being transcendental, i.e. es
sential to our Reason, takes for granted that Nature con
forms with it : an assumption which is expressed by the
ancient formula, entia prceter necessitatem non esse multi-
1
Platon, "Phileb." pp. 219-223. "Politic." 62, 63. "Phsedr."

3G1-363, ed. Bip. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Anhang znr
"

transcend. Dialektik." English Translation by F. Max Miiller. Ap "

pendix to the Transc. Dialectic." pp. 551, and seqq.

B
2 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. I.

plicanda. As for tlie law of specification, Kant expresses

it thus: entium varietates non temere esse minuendas. It

requires namely, that we should clearly distinguish one

from another the different genera collected under one com
prehensive conception; likewise that we should not con
found the higher and lower species comprised in each
genus that we should be careful not to overleap any, and
;

never to classify inferior species, let alone individuals,

immediately under the generic conception each concep :

tion being susceptible of subdivision, and none even

coming down to mere intuition. Kant teaches that both
laws are transcendental, fundamental principles of our
Reason, which postulate conformity of things with them
a priori; and Plato, when he tells us that these rules
were flung down from the seat of the gods with the Pro
methean fire, seems to express the same thought in his
own way.

2. Application of the Method in the present case.

In spite of the weight of such recommendations, I find

that the second of these two laws has been far too rarely

applied to a fundamental principle of all knowledge the :

Principle of Sufficient Reason. For although this principle

has been often and long ago stated in a general way, still^
sufficient distinction has not been made between its ex

tremely different applications, in each of which it acquires

a new meaning its origin in various mental faculties thus
;

becoming evident. If we compare Kant s philosophy with

all preceding systems, we perceive that, precisely in the

observation of our mental faculties, many persistent errors

have been caused by applying the principle of homogeneity,
while the opposite principle of specification was neglected ;

whereas the law of specification has led to the greatest and

most important results. I therefore crave permission to
 INTRODUCTION. 3

quote a passage from Kant, in which the application of

the law of specification to the sources of our knowledge is
especially recommended ;
for it gives countenance to my
present endeavour :

"

It is of the highest importance to isolate various sorts

of knowledge, which in kind and origin are different from
others, and to take great care lest they be mixed up with
those others with which, for practical purposes, they are
generally united. What is done by the chemist in the
analysis of substances, and by the mathematician in pure
mathematics, is far more incumbent on the philosopher,
in order to enable him to define clearly the part which, in
the promiscuous employment of the understanding, belongs
to a special kind of knowledge, as well as its peculiar value
*
and influence."

3. Utility of this Inquiry.

Should I succeed in showing that the principle which

forms the subject of the present inquiry does not issue
directly from one primitive notion of our intellect, but
rather in the first instance from various ones, it will then

follow, that neither can the necessity it brings with it, as a

firmly established a priori principle, be one and the same
in all cases, but must, on the contrary, be as manifold as
the sources of the principle itself. Whoever therefore
bases a conclusion upon this principle, incurs the obligation
of clearly specifying on which of its grounds of necessity he
founds his conclusion and of designating that ground by
a special name, such as I am about to suggest. I hope
that this may be a step towards promoting greater lucidity
and precision in philosophising for I hold the extreme
;

1
Kant,
"

Krit. d. r. V. Methodenlehre. Drittes Hauptstiick," p. 842

of the 1st edition. Engl. Tr. by F. M. Miiller.
"

Architectonic of Pure
Reason," p. 723.
4 THE FOTTBFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. I.

clearness to be attained by an accurate definition of each

single expression to be indispensable to us, as a defence

both against error and against intentional deception, and
also as a means of securing to ourselves the permanent,
unalienable possession of each newly acquired notion within
the sphere of philosophy beyond the fear of losing it
again on account of any misunderstanding or double
meaning which might hereafter be detected. The true
philosopher will indeed always seek after light and perspi
cuity, and will endeavour to resemble a Swiss lake which
through its peacefulness is enabled to unite great depth
with great clearness, the depth revealing itself precisely
by the clearness rather than a turbid, impetuous moun
tain torrent. La clarte est la bonne foi des philosophies"
"

says Vauvenargues. Pseudo-philosophers, on the con

trary, use speech, not indeed to conceal their thoughts,
as M. de Talleyrand has it, but rather to conceal the
absence of them, and are apt to make their readers
responsible for the incomprehensibility of their systems,
which really proceeds from their own confused thinking.
This explains why in certain writers Schelling, for instance
the tone of instruction so often passes into that of re
proach, and frequently the reader is even taken to task
beforehand for his assumed inability to understand.

4. Importance of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Its importance is indeed very great, since it may truly

be called the basis of all science. For by science we un
derstand a system of notions, i.e. a totality of connected,
as opposed to a mere aggregate of disconnected, notions.
But what is it that binds together the members of a system,
if not the Principle of Sufficient Reason? That which
distinguishes every science from a mere aggregate is pre
cisely, that its notions are derived one from another as from
 INTRODUCTION. 5

their reason. So it was long ago observed by Plato : KUI

yap ai ocu at a\T]6ls ov TroXXov amt eiffiv, ZWQ av TLQ avrag

drjcrrj airlae Xoyioyj J (etiam opiniones verce non multi pretii
1
sunt, donee quis illas ratiocinatione a causis ducta liget).
Nearly every science, moreover, contains notions of causes
from which the effects may be deduced, and likewise other
notions of the necessity of conclusions from reasons, as
willbe seen during the course of this inquiry. Aristotle
has expressed this as follows: nava {.-moT^^rj Biavo^riKrj, ?}

Kal jj.Tt^ovffa TL ZiavoiaQ, irepl airiaq KO\

dp^ag Ian (omnis
intellectualis scientia, sive aliquo modo intellects, participans,
circa causas et principia est)* Now, as it is this very
assumption a priori that all things must have their
reason, which authorizes us everywhere to search for the
why, we may safely call this tvhy the mother of all science.

5. The Principle itself.

We purpose showing further on that the Principle of

Sufficient Reason is an expression common to several a
priori notions. Meanwhile, it must be stated under some
formula or other. I choose Wolf s as being the most
comprehensive Nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit, quam
:

non sit. Nothing is without a reason for its being. 3

1
Meno." p. 385, ed
"

Bip.
"

Even true opinions are not of much

value until somebody binds them down by proof of a cause."
[Trans
lator s addition.]
2
knowledge which
"

Aristot. Metaph." v. 1. "All is intellectual or

partakes somewhat of intellect, deals with causes and principles."

[Tr. s add.]
3
Here the translator gives Schopenhauer s free version of Wolf s

formula
 CHAPTEE II.

GENERAL SURVEY OF THE MOST IMPORTANT VIEWS

HITHERTO HELD CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE OF SUF
FICIENT SEASON.

6. First Statement of the Principle and Distinction between

Two of its Meanings.

A MOKE or less accurately defined, abstract expression

for so fundamental a principle of all knowledge must
have been found at a very early age it would, therefore, ;

be difficult, and besides of no great interest, to determine

where it first appeared. Neither Plato nor Aristotle have
formally stated it as a leading fundamental principle,
although both often speak of it as a self-evident truth.
Thus, with a naivete which savours of the state of innocence
as opposed to that of the knowledge of good and of evil,
when compared with the critical researches of our own
times, Plato says :
dvayKaiov, TTCLVTCL TO.
yiyvofj.va Sia nva
*
airiav yiyvtaQaC yap av \wp\g TOVT&V yiyvono
TTO)C (necesse ;

est, qucecunque fiunt, per aliquam causam fieri : quomodo

enim absque eafierent ?) and then again TTOLV %e TO yiyvo^vov :

VTT alrlov TIVOQ e avuytcrjg yiyveaQai iravrl yap a^vvaTOv^plg

~
yivtaiv ^x e iy3 (quidquid gignitur, ex aliqua causa
1 *

Platon, Phileb." p. 240, ed Bip.

"

It is necessary that all which

arises, should arise by some cause ; for how could it arise otherwise ?
"

[Tr. s add.]
2 All that from
p. 302. arises, arises necessarily
" "

Ibid. Timseus,"

some cause 5
for it is impossible for anything to come into being without
cause." [Tr. s add.]
 GENERAL SURVEY. 7

necessario gignitur: sine causa enim oriri quidquam, im-

possibile est). At the end of his book De fato," Plutarch "

cites the following among the chief propositions of the

Stoics p,a\iaTa juev /ecu TTOWTOV ILVUL ^6^ei } TO fj.rj^ev avaiTtMc;
:

ytyvcr0at,ctXXa Kara Trpotiyov/ulvaQ aiTiaQ (maxime id primum

esse videbitur, nihil fieri sine causa, sed omnia causis ante-

In the "

Analyt. post." i. 2, Aristotle states the principle

of sufficient reason to a certain degree when he says:
i-n-iGTaadat $e oio/ueda tKaarov aTrXwc, orav rriv r alriav
oloueda yivu)<7Keiv,$i f]V TO Trpayfj.a. tanv, on eKEivov aiTiaeff-iv,
-
K ai
fj,r] vce-%crdai TOVTO autem putamus
aXXwg eivai. (Scire
unamquamque rem simpliciter, quum putamus causam cog-
noscere, propter quum res est, ejusque rei causam esse, nee posse
earn aliter se habere.y In his "Metaphysics," moreover,
he already divides causes, or rather principles, a p^al, into
3
different kinds, of which he admits eight but this division ;

is neither profound nor precise enough. He is, nevertheless,

quite right in saying, Traawv jufv ovv KOLVOV T&V ap^oiy, ro

4
dvat, oQev f/ eartv, 77 ytVfrat, f/ ytyvoWKrerat.
irpuiTov (Omnibus
igitur principiis commune
est, esse primum, unde aut est, aut

fit, In the following chapter he distin

aut cognoscitur. )
guishes several kinds of causes, although somewhat super
ficially and confusedly. In the Analyt. post." ii. 11, he "

states four kinds of causes in a more satisfactory manner :

1
This especially would seem to be the first principle that nothing
"

arises without cause, but [everything] according to

preceding causes."
[Tr. s add.]
2
We think
"

we understand a thing perfectly, whenever we think we

know the cause by which the thing is, that it is really the cause of
that thing, and that the thing cannot possibly be otherwise." [Tr. s
add.]
3
Lib. iv. c. 1.
4 "

Now it is common to all principles, that they are the first thing

through which [anything] is, or arises, or is understood." [Tr. s

add.]
8 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. II.

alriai tie.
refftrapEQ pia pev TO n ?iv elvai pia. tie TO nvwv OVTUV,
dvajKr) TOVTO etvat tripa. tie, ij TL TT/OUITOV tKivijtre TtTaprr) ce,
1
TO T IVOQ eviKa. (Causes autem quatuor sunt: una quce
explicat quid res sit ; altera, quam, si qucedam sint, necesse
est esse ; tertia, quce quid primum inovit ; quarta id, cujus
gratia.) Now this is the origin of the division of the causes

universally adopted by the Scholastic Philosophers, into

causce materiales, formales, efficientes et finales, as may be
2
a real com
"

seen in Suarii disputationes metaphysicae

"

pendium of Scholasticism. Even Hobbes still quotes and

3
explains this division. It is also to be found in another

passage of Aristotle, this time somewhat more clearly and

Metaph." i. 3.) and
it is again
fully developed (" briefly
noticed in the book De somno et vigilia," c. 2. As for the
"

vitally important distinction between reason and cause,

however, Aristotle no doubt betrays something like a con
ception of it in the Analyt. post." i. 13, where he shows at
"

considerable length that knowing and proving that a thing

exists isa very different thing from knowing and proving
why it what he represents as the latter, being know
exists :

ledge of the cause ; as the former, knowledge of the reason.

If, however, he had quite clearly recognized the difference
between them, he would never have lost sight of it, but would
have adhered to it throughout his writings. Now this is not
the case for even when he endeavours to distinguish the
;

various kinds of causes from one another, as in the passages

I have mentioned above, the essential difference mooted in
the chapter just alluded to, never seems to occur to him
again. Besides he uses the term ainov indiscriminately
for every kind of cause, often indeed calling reasons of know-

1
There are four causes : first, the essence of a thing itself; second,
"

the sine qua non of a thing j third, what first put a thing in motion ;
fourth, to what purpose or end a thing is tending." [Tr. s add.]
2
Suarii disputationes metaph." Disp. 12, sect. 2 et 3.
"

Hobbes,
"

De corpore," P. ii. c. 10, 7.

 GENERAL SURVEY. 9

ledge, and sometimes even the premisses of a conclusion,

ahiag, as, for instance, in his Metaph." iv. 18
" "

Rhet."
;

ii. 2 De plantis," i. p. 816 (ed. Berol.), but more especially

;
"

Analyt. post." i. 2, where he calls the premisses to a con

"

clusion simply aiTiai TOV o v/u7re oa<r^aro (causes of the con

>

clusion). Now, using the same word to express two closely

connected conceptions, is a sure sign that their difference
has not been recognised, or at any rate not been firmly
grasped for a mere accidental hornoiiymous designation
;

of two widely differing things is quite another matter.

No where, however, does this error appear more conspicuously
than in his definition of the sophism non causce ut causa,
Trapa ro prj airiov utg airiov (reasoning from what is not cause
as if it were cause), in the book "De sophisticis elenchis," c. 5.

By UITLOV he here understands absolutely nothing but the

argument, the premisses, consequently a reason of know
ledge for this sophism consists in correctly proving the
;

impossibility of something, while the proof has no bearing

whatever upon the proposition in dispute, which it is never
theless supposed to refute. Here, therefore, there is no ques
tion at all of physical causes. Still the use of the word airiov
has had so much weight with modern logicians, that they
hold to it exclusively in their accounts of the fallacia extra
dictionem, and explain the fallacia non causce ut causa as
designating a physical cause, which is not the case.
Beimarus, for instance, does so, and G-. E. Schultze and
Fries all indeed of whom I have any knowledge. The
first work in which I find a correct definition of this

sophism, is Twesten s Logic. Moreover, in all other

scientific works and controversies the charge of a fallacia
non causce ut causa usually denotes the interpolation of a
wrong cause.
Sextus Empiricus presents another forcible instance of
the way in which the Ancients were wont universally to con
found the logical law of the reason of knowledge with the
 10 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. II.

transcendental law of cause and effect in Nature, persistently

mistaking one for the other. In the 9th Book Adversus
"

Mathematicos," that is, the Book "

Adversus Physicos,"

204, he undertakes to prove the law of causality, and says :

He who asserts that there is no cause (a ma), either has

"

no cause or has one. In the former

(air/ a) for his assertion,
case there is not more truth in his assertion than in its
contradiction ;
in the latter, his assertion itself proves the
existence of a cause."

By this we see that the Ancients had not yet arrived at

a clear distinction between requiring a reason as the ground
cf a conclusion, and asking for a cause for the occurrence
of a real event. As for the Scholastic Philosophers of
later times, the law of causality was in their eyes an
axiom above investigation non inqidrimus an causa sit,
:
"

quia nihil est per se notius" says Suarez. At the same time
1

they held fast to the above quoted Aristotelian classification ;

but, as far as I know at least, they equally failed to arrive

at a clear idea of the necessary distinction of which we are
here speaking.

7. Descartes.

find even the excellent Descartes, who gave the

For we
firstimpulse to subjective reflection and thereby became
the father of modern philosophy, still entangled in con
fusions for which it is difficult to account and we shall ;

soon see to what serious and deplorable consequences these

confusions have led with regard to Metaphysics. In the
Responsio ad secundas objectiones in meditationes deprima
"

philosophia"
axioma i. he says Nulla res existit, de qua non :

possit quceri, qucenam sit causa,

cur existat. Hoc enim de
ipso Deo quceri potest, non quod indigeat ulla causa ut existat,

1 "

Suarez, Disp." 12, sect. 1.

 GENERAL SUE VET. 11

sea quid ipsa ejus naturce immensitas est CAUSA, SIVE RATIO,

propter quam nulla causa indiget ad existendum. Ke ought

to have said : The immensity of God is a logical reason
from which itfollows, that Grod needs no cause whereas
;

he confounds the two together and obviously has no clear

consciousness of the difference between reason and cause.
Properly speaking however, it is his intention which mars
his insight. For here, where the law of causality demands
a cause, he substitutes a reason instead of it, because the
latter, unlike the former, does not immediately lead to

something beyond it and thus, by means of this very

;

axiom, he clears the way to the Ontological Proof of the

existence of G-od, which was really his invention, for Anselm
had only indicated it in a general manner. Immediately
after these axioms, of which I have just quoted the first,
there comes a formal, quite serious statement of the Onto
logical Proof, which, in fact, already lies within that axiom,
as the chicken does within the egg that has been long
brooded over. Thus, while everything else stands in need
of a cause for its existence, the immensitas implied in the

conception of the Deity who is introduced to us upon the

ladder of the Cosmological Proof suffices in lieu of a
cause or, as the proof itself expresses it in conceptu entis
:

summe perfecti existentia necessaria continetur.

This, then,
is the sleight-of-hand trick, for the sake of which the con
fusion, familiar even to Aristotle, of the two principal
meanings of the principle of sufficient reason, has been
used directly in majorem Dei gloriam.
Considered by daylight, however, and without prejudice,
this famous Ontological Proof is really a charming joke.
On some occasion or other, some one excogitates a con
ception, composed out of all sorts of predicates, among which
however he takes care to include the predicate actuality or
existence, either openly stated or
wrapped up for decency s
sake in some other predicate, such as perfectio, immensitas,
12 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. II.

or something of the kind. Now, it is well known, that,

from a given conception, those predicates which are essential
to it i.e., without which it cannot be thought and like
wise the predicates which are essential to those predicates
themselves, may be extracted by means of purely logical
analyses, and consequently have logical truth that is, they :

have their reason of knowledge in the given conception.

Accordingly the predicate reality or existence is now ex
tracted from this arbitrarily thought conception, and an
object corresponding to it is forthwith presumed to have
real existence independently of the conception.

*
War der Gedank nicht so verwiinscht gescheut,
Man war versucht ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen." *

After all, the simplest answer to such ontological de

monstrations is : All depends upon the source whence you
"

have derived your conception : if it be taken from experi

ence, all well and good, for in this case its object exists
and needs no further proof if, on the contrary, it has been ;

hatched in your own sinciput, all its predicates are of no avail,

for it is a mere phantasm. But we form an unfavourable
prejudice against the pretensions of a theology which needed
to have recourse to such proofs as this in order to gain a,

footing on the territory of philosophy, to which it is quite

foreign, but on which it longs to trespass. But oh for !

the prophetic wisdom of Aristotle He had never even !

heard of the Ontological Proof yet as though he could ;

detect this piece of scholastic jugglery through the shades

of coming darkness and were anxious to bar the road to it,
a
he carefully shows that defining a thing and proving its
existence are two different matters, separate to all eternity ;

i
Were not the thought so cursedly acute,
One might be tempted to declare it silly."
SCHILLER,
"

Wallenstein-Trilogie. Piccolomini," Act ii. Sc. 7.

"

Aristot., Analyt. post."

c. 7,
 GENERAL SURVEY. 13

since by the one we learn what it is that is meant, and by

the other that such a thing exists. Like an oracle of the
future, he pronounces the sentence TO & eivai OVK ovaia :

ovCfvi" (ESSE autem uullius rei essentia

ov yap yevoQ TO ov :

est, quandoquidem ens non est genus) which means :

Existence never can belong to the essence of a thing."

"

On the other hand, we may see how great was Herr von
Schelling s veneration for the Ontological Proof in a long
note, p. 152, of the 1st vol. of his
"

Philosophische Schriften"

of 1809. We
may even see in something still more in
it

structive, i.e., how easily G-ermans allow sand to be thrown

in their eyes by impudence and blustering swagger. But for
so thoroughly pitiable a creature as Hegel, whose whole

pseudo-philosophy is but a monstrous amplification of the

Ontological Proof, to have undertaken its defence against
Kant, is indeed an alliance of which the Ontological Proof
itself might be ashamed, however little it may in general
be given to blushing. How can I be expected to speak with
deference of men, who have brought philosophy into con
*
tempt ?

8. Spinoza.

Although Spinoza s philosophy mainly consists in the

negation of the double dualism between God and the
world and between soul and body, which his teacher,
Descartes, had set up, he nevertheless remained true to his
master in confounding and interchanging the relation be
tween reason and consequence with that between cause and
effect he even endeavoured to draw from it a still greater
;

advantage for his own metaphysics than Descartes for his,

for he made this confusion the foundation of his whole
Pantheism.
A conception contains implicate all its essential predi
cates, so that they may be developed out of it explicite by
means of mere analytical judgments: the sum total of
14 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

them being its definition. This definition therefore differs

from the conception itself merely in form and not in con
tent ;
for it consists of judgments which are all con
tained within that conception, and therefore have their
reason in it, in as far as they show its essence. may We
accordingly look upon these judgments as the conse
quences of that conception, considered as their reason.
Now this relation between a conception and the judg
ments founded upon it arid susceptible of being developed
out of it by analysis, is precisely the relation between

Spinoza s so-called G-od and the world, or rather between

the one and only substance and its numberless accidents
l
(Deus, sive substantia constans infinitis attributis Deus,
sive omnia Dei attributa) It is therefore the relation in
.

knowledge of the reason to consequent whereas true

its ;

Theism (Spinoza s Theism merely nominal) assumes

is

the relation of the cause to its effect, in which the cause

remains different and separate from the consequence, not
only in the way in which we consider them, but really and
essentially, therefore in themselves to all eternity. For
the word God, honestly used, means a cause such as this
of the world, with the addition of personality. An imper
sonal God is, on the contrary, a contradictio in adjecto.
Now as nevertheless, even in the case as stated by him,
Spinoza desired to retain the word God to express sub
stance, and explicitly called this the cause of the world, he
could find no other way to do it than by completely inter
mingling the two relations, and confounding the principle
of the reason of knowledge with the principle of causality.
I call attention to the following passages in corroboration
of this statement. Notandum, dari necessario unius cujus-
que rei existentis certam aliquam CAUSAM, propter quam
existit. Et notandum, hanc causam, propter quam aliqua res

existit, vel debere contineri in ipsa natura et DEFINITIONE

1 "

Spinoza, Eth." i.
prop. 11.
 GENERAL SURVEY. 15

rei (nimirum quod ad ipsius naturam pertinet

existentis
1
EXTRA ipsam dari. In the last case he
existere), vel debere
means an efficient cause, as appears from what follows,
whereas in the first he means a mere reason of know
ledge yet he identifies both, and by this means prepares
;

the way for identifying God with the world, which is his
intention. This is the artifice of which he always makes
use, and which he has learnt from Descartes. He substi
tutes a cause acting from without, for a reason of know

ledge lying within, a given conception. Ex necessitate

divince naturce omnia, quce sub intellectum infinitum cadere

possunt, sequi debent? At the same time he calls God

everywhere the cause of the world. Quidquid existit Dei
3
potentiam, quce omnium rerum CAUSA est,exprimit. Deus
est omnium rerum CAUSA immanens, non vero transiens.*
Deus non tantam est CAUSA EFFICIENS rerum existentice, sed
5
etiam essentioe. Ex data quacunque IDEA aliquis EFFECTUS
6
necessario sequi debat. And: Nulla res nisi a causa ex-
7
terna potest destrui. Demonstr. DEFINITIO cujuscunque
rei, ipsius essentiam (essence, nature, as differing from

existentia, existence), ajjirmat, sed non negat ; sive rei essen

tiam ponit, sed non tollit. Dum itaque ad rem ipsam tan-
turn, non autem ad causas externas altendimus, nihil in
eadem poterimus invenire, quod ipsam possit destruere. This
means, that as no conception can contain anything which
contradicts its definition, i.e., the sum total of its predi
cates, neithercan an existence contain anything which
might become a cause of its destruction. This view, how
ever, is brought to a climax in the somewhat lengthy
second demonstration of the llth Proposition, in which
he confounds a cause capable of destroying or anni-
1
Spinoza,
"

Eth." P. 1. prop. 8, schol. 2.

2 3
Ibid. Prop. 1 6. Ibid. Prop. 36, dcmonstr.
* 5
Ibid. Prop. 18. Ibid. Prop. 25.
6 7
Eth." P. iii. prop. demonstr. Ibid. 4.
1, Prop.
16 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

hilating a "being,
with a contradiction contained in its

definition and therefore destroying that His definition.

need of confounding cause with reason here becomes so
urgent, that he can never say causa or ratio alone, but
always finds it necessary to put ratio sen causa. Accord
ingly, this occurs as many as eight times in the same page,
in order to conceal the subterfuge. Descartes had done
the same in the above-mentioned axiom.
Thus, properly speaking, Spinoza s Pantheism is merely
the realisation of Descartes Ontological Proof. First, he
adopts Descartes ontotheological proposition, to which we
have alluded above, ipsa naturce Dei immensitas est CAUSA
SIVE RATIO, propter quam nulla causa indiget ad existen-
dum, always saying substantia instead of Deus (in the
beginning) and then he finishes by substantice essentia,
;

necessario involvit existentiam, ergo erit substantia CAUSA

sui. 1 Therefore the very same argument which Descartes
had used to prove the existence of God, is used by Spinoza
to prove the existence of the world, which consequently
needs no God. He does this still more distinctly in the
2nd Scholium to the 8th Proposition Quoniam ad natu- :

ram substantia pertinet existere, debet ejus definitio necessa-

riam existentiam involvere, et consequenter ex sola ejus
definitione debet ipsius existentia concludi. But this sub
stance is,we know, the world. The demonstration to
as

Proposition 24 says in the same sense Id, cujus natura in :

se considerata (i.e., in its definition) involvit existentiam, est

CAUSA SUI.
For what Descartes had stated in an exclusively ideal
and subjective sense, i.e., only for us, for cognitive purposes
in this instance for the sake of proving the existence of
God Spinoza took in a real and objective sense, as the
actual relation of God to the world. According to Des
cartes, the existence of God is contained in the conception
1
Eth."P. i.
prop. 7.
 GENERAL SURVEY. 17

of God, therefore it becomes an argument for his actual

being: according to Spinoza, God is himself contained
in the world. Thus what, with Descartes, was only
reason of knowledge, becomes, with Spinoza, reason of
fact. If the former, in his Ontological Proof, taught
that the existentia of God is a consequence of the essentia
of God, the latter turns this into causa sui, and boldly

opens his Ethics with per causam sui intelligo id, cujus
:

essentia (conception) involvit existentiam, remaining deaf

to Aristotle s warning cry, TO c) elvat OVK ov<ria ovfovi \

Now, this is the most palpable confusion of reason and

cause. And if Neo-Spinozans (Schellingites, Hegelians,
&c.), withwhom words are wont to pass for thoughts,
often indulge pompous, solemn admiration for this
in
causa sui, for my own part I see nothing but a contra-
dictio in adjecto in this same causa sui, a before that is
after, an audacious command to us, to sever arbitrarily the
eternal causal chain something, in short, very like the
proceeding of that Austrian, who finding himself unable
to reach high enough to fasten the clasp on his tightly-

strapped shako, got upon a chair. The right emblem for

causa sui is Baron Miinchhausen, sinking on horseback
into the water, clinging by the legs to his horse and pull

ing both himself and the animal out by his own pigtail,
with the motto underneath Causa sui.:

Let us finally cast a look at the 16th proposition of the

1stbook of the Ethics. Here we find Spinoza concluding
from the proposition, ex data cujuscunque rei definitione
plures proprietates intellectus concludit, quce revera ex eadem
necessario sequuntur, that ex necessitate divince natural (i.e.,
taken as a reality), infinita infinitis modis sequi debent :

this God unquestionably stands in the same

therefore
relation to the world as a conception to its definition. The
corollary, Deum omnium rerum esse CAUSAM EFFICIENTEM,
is nevertheless immediately connected with it. It is im-
c
18 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

possible to carry the confusion between reason and cause

farther, nor could it lead to graver consequences than here.
But this shows the importance of the subject of the present
treatise.
In endeavouring to add a third step to the climax in
question, Herr von Schelling has contributed a small after
piece to these errors, into which two mighty intellects of
the past had fallen owing to insufficient clearness in think
ing. If Descartes met the demands of the inexorable law of
causality, which reduced his God to the last straits, by sub
stituting a reason instead of the cause required, in order thus
to set the matter at rest and if Spinoza made a real cause
;

out of this reason, i.e., causa sui, his God thereby becoming
the world itself Schelling now made reason and consequent
:

separate in God himself. 1 He thus gave the thing still

greater consistency by elevating it to a real, substantial

hypostasis of reason and consequent, and introducing us
to something in God, which is not himself, but his
"

reason, as a primary reason, or rather reason beyond reason

(abyss)."
Hoc quidem vere palmarium est. It is now
known that Schelling had taken the whole fable from
Jacob Bonnie s Full account of the terrestrial and celes
"

but what appears to me to be less well

"

tial mystery ;

known, is the source from which Jacob Bohme himself

had taken it, and the real birth-place of this so-called
abyss, wherefore I now take the liberty to mention it. It
is the fivtioQ, i.e. abyssus, vorago, bottomless pit, reason
beyond reason of the Valentinians (a heretical sect of the
second century) which, in silence co-essential with itself
2
engendered intelligence and the world, as Irenaeus re
lates in the following terms :
\iyovai yap nva eivat iv

ioparote, teal
aKarorofiaaroig i/i^a/jua^i riXtiov Aiutva. Trpoovra*
TOVTOV &= Kal fivdov Ka
/ecu
Trpoap^j/v, KOI TrpOTTaropa,
a
Abhandlung von der menschHchen
1
Schelling, Freiheit.
2 "

Irenseus, Contr. hseres." lib. i. c. 1.

 GENERAL SURVEY. 19

SE ctvrov a^wprjrov Kal aopctrov, d &iov TE Kal

dyiw>]Tov, EV ficrv^fa Kal ripe/ata iro\\rj yEyovlvai iv aVetpoic

ai&ffi Suvi/Trap^fiv $E ai/rw /ecu Evvotav, rjv $E Kal
"%pov<i)V.

Xaptv, Kdl 2ty//v oro/ud^ovffi KCti Evvorjdrjvai TTOTE a EO.VTOV

TOV fivdov TOVTOV dp\rjv TUJV TraVrwv, /ecu KaOdiref)

rrjv 7rpo(3o\rjv ravrrjv Ko.ds.fr~

(^v Trpo/SaXeV^ai evVo//0^)
6at, &g iv fjiYirpq.) rrj evvvTrap^ovar), kavry 2ty;;. TavTrjv ^e,
TO ffTTEppa TOVTO, KOI (yKv/^ova yevofjiEvrjv, drro-
iJ,lvr)V

Nouv, o^zotor TE Kdl iaov T(f TTiOo/SaXovrt, Kal p.6vov

TO ^iyeOuQ TOV Flarpoe- Tov SE vovv TOIITOV Kal
1
fj KaXovai, Kal ap^?)v rwv Trcivrwv. (IDicunt enim esse
quendam in sublimitatibus illls, quce nee oculis cerni, nee
nominari possunt, perfectum ^Eonem prceexistentem, quern
et proarchen, et propatorem, et
Bythum vacant. Eum
autem, quum incomprehensibilis et invisibilis, sempiternus
idem et ingenitus esset, inftnitis temporum seculis in summa,
quiete ac tmnquillitate fuisse. Una etiam cum eo Cogita-
tionem quam et Gratiam et Silentium (Sigeri) nun-
exstitisse,

cupant. Hunc porro Bythum in animum aliquando in-

duxisse, rerum omnium initium proferre, atque hanc, quam
in animum induxerat, productionem, in Sigen (silentium)

quce und cum eo erat, non secus atque in vulvam demisisse.

Hanc vero, suscepto hoc semine, prcegnantem effectam pepe-

1
in those unseen heights which have no name
For they say that
"

there a pre-existing, perfect ^Eon ; this they also call fore-rule, fore
is

father and the depth. They say, that being incomprehensible and in
visible, eternal and unborn, he has existed during endless ./Eons in the

deepest calmness and tranquillity; and that coexisting with him was
Thought, which they also call Grace and Silence. This Depth once be
thought him to put forth from himself the beginning of all things and to
lay that offshoot which he had resolved to put forth like a sperm into
the coexisting Silence, as it were into a womb. Now this Silence, being
thus impregnated and having conceived, gave birth to Intellect, a being
which was like and equal to its Creator, and alone able to comprehend
the greatness of its father. This Intellect also they call the Only-be
gotten and the Beginning of all things." [Tr. s add.]
20 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

risse Intellectum, parenti suo parem et cequalem, atque ita

comparatum, ut solus pater nee magnitudinis capax esset.
Atque Tiunc Intellectum et Monogenem et Patrem et princi-
pum omnium rerum appellant.)
Somehow or other this must have come to Jacob Bohme s

hearing from the History of Heresy, and Herr von Schelling

must have received it from him in all faith.

9. Leibnitz.

It was Leibnitz who first formally stated the Principle

of Sufficient Reason as a main principle of all knowledge
and of all science. He proclaims it very pompously in
various passages of his works, giving himself great airs,
as though he had been the first to invent it yet all he ;

finds to say about it is, that everything must have a suffi

cient reason for being as it is, and not otherwise : and this
the world had probably found out before him. True, he
makes casual allusions to the distinction between its two
chief significations, without, however, laying any particular
stress upon it, or explaining it clearly anywhere ebe. The

principal reference to it is in his

"

Principia Philosophise,"
32, and a little more French version,
satisfactorily in the
entitled
"

Monadologie
"

du : En
principe de la raisw
vertu

suffisante, nous considerons qu aucun fait ne sauroit se

trouver vrai ou existant, aucune enonciation veritable, sans
qu il y ait une raison suffisante, pourquoi il en soit aimi et
non pas autrement. 1

10. Wolf.

The first writer who explicitly separated the two chit -f

significations of our principle, and stated the difference

between them in detail, was therefore Wolf. Wolf, how-
1
Compare with this 44 of his "

Theodicee," and his 5th letter to

Clarke, 125.
 GENERAL SURVEY. 21

ever, does not place the principle of sufficient reason in

Logic, as is now the custom, but in Ontology. True, in
71 he urges the necessity of not confounding the principle
of sufficient reason of knowing with that of cause and effect ;

stillhe does not clearly determine here where in the difference

consists. Indeed, he himself mistakes the one for the other ;

for he quotes instances of cause and effect in confirmation

of the principium rationis sttfficientis in this very chapter,
de ratione sufficienie, 70, 74, 75, 77, which, had he really
wished to preserve that distinction, ought rather to have
been quoted in the chapter de causis of the same work.
In said chapter he again brings forward precisely similar
instances, and once more enunciates the principium cogno-
scendi ( which does not certainly belong to it, having
876),
been already discussed, yet which serves to introduce the im
mediately folio wing clear and definite distinction between this
principle and the law of causality, 881-884. Principium,
he continues, dicitur id, quod in se continet rationem alterius ;
and he distinguishes three kinds 1. PRINCIPIUM FIENDI
:

(causa), which he defines as ratio actualitatis alterius, e.g.,

si lapis calescit, ignis aut radii solares sunt rationes, cur
calor lapidi insit. 2. PRINCIPIUM ESSENDI, which he

defines as ratio possibilitatis alterius; in eodem exemplo,

ratio possibilitatis, cur lapis calorem recipere possit, est
in essentia seu modo compositionis lapidis. This last con
ception seems to me inadmissible. If it has any mean
ing at all, possibility means
correspondence with the
general conditions of experience known to us a priori, as
Kant has sufficiently shown. From these conditions we
know, with respect to Wolf s instance of the stone, that
changes are possible as effects proceeding from causes we :

know, that is, that one state can succeed another, if the
former contains the conditions for the latter. In this case
we find, as effect, the state of being warm in the stone ;

as cause, the preceding state of a limited capacity for

22 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

warmth in the stone and its contact with free heat. Now,
Wolf s naming the first mentioned property of this state
principium essendi, and the second, principium fiendi, rests
upon a delusion caused by the fact that, so far as the
stone is concerned, the conditions are more lasting and
can therefore wait longer for the others. That the stone
should be as it is that is, that it should be chemically so
:

constituted as to bring with it a particular degree of specific

heat, consequently a capacity for heat which stands in in
verse proportion to its specific heat that besides it should,
;

on the other hand, come into contact with free heat, is

the consequence of a whole chain of antecedent causes,
all of them principia fiendi ; but it is the coincidence of

circumstances on both sides which primarily constitutes

that condition, upon which, as cause, the becoming warm
depends, as effect. All this leaves no room for Wolf s
principium essendi, which I therefore do not admit, and
concerning which I have here entered somewhat into detail,
partly because I mean to use the word myself later on in
a totally different sense partly also, because this explana
;

tion contributes to facilitate the comprehension of the law

of causality. 3. Wolf, as we have said, distinguishes a

PRINCIPIUM COGNOSCENDI, and refers also under causa to

a causa impulsiva, sive ratio voluntatem determinans.

11. Philosophers between Wolf and Kant.

Baumgarten repeats the Wolfian distinctions in his

20-24, and 306-313.
"

Metaphysica,"
x
Eeimarus, in his
"

Vernunftlehre," 81, distinguishes

1. Inward which his explanation agrees with
reason, of
Wolf s ratio essendi, and might even be applicable to the
ratio cognoscendi, if he did not transfer to things what only

applies to conceptions 2. Outward reason, i.e. causa.

;
120
1
Doctrine of Reason.
 GENERAL SURVEY. 23

he rightly defines the ratio cognoscendi as a condition

et ssqq.,

of the proposition ; but in an example, 125, he neverthe

less confounds it with cause.

Lambert, in the new Organon, does not mention Wolfs

distinctionshe shows, however, that he recognizes a diffe
;

l
rence between reason of knowledge and cause for he ;

says that God is the principium essendi of truths, and that

truths are the principia cognoscendi of G-od.
Plattner, in his Aphorisms, 868, says What is called :
"

reason and conclusion within our knowledge (principium

cognoscendi, ratio rationatum), is in reality cause and effect
(causa efficiens effectus). Every cause is a reason, every
effect a conclusion." He is therefore of opinion that
cause and effect, in reality, correspond to the conceptions
reason and consequence in our thought that the former ;

stand in a similar relation with respect to the latter as

substance and accident, for instance, to subject and predi
cate, or the quality of the object to our sensation of that
quality, &c. &c. I think it useless to refute this opinion,
for it is easy to see that premisses and conclusion in judg
ments stand in an entirely different relation to one another
from a knowledge of cause and effect although in indi ;

vidual cases even knowledge of a cause, as such, may be

2
the reason of a judgment which enunciates the effect.

12. Hume.

No one before this serious thinker had ever doubted

what follows.First, and before all things in heaven and
on earth, is the Principle of Sufficient Eeason in the form
of the Law of Causality. For it is a veritas ceterna : i.e. it is
in and by itselfabove Gods and Fate; whereas every
thing else, the understanding, for instance, which thinks
1
Lambert,
"

New Organon," vol. i. 572.

8
Compare 36. of this treatise.
24 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

that principle, and no less the whole world and whatever

may be its cause atoms, motion, a Creator, ei ccetera is
what it is only in accordance with, and by virtue of, that
principle. Hume was the first to whom it occurred to
inquire whence this law of causality derives its authority,
and to demand its credentials. Everyone knows the result
at which he arrives that causality is nothing beyond the
:

empirically perceived succession of things and states in

Time, with which habit has made us familiar. The fallacy
of this result is felt to refute. The
at once, nor is it difficult

merit lies in the question became the impulse

itself ;
for it

and starting-point for Kant s profound researches, and by

their means led to an incomparably deeper and more

thorough view of Idealism than the one which had hitherto

existed, and which was chiefly Berkeley s. It led to transcen
dental Idealism, from which arises the conviction, that the
world is as dependent upon us, as a whole, as we are depen
dent upon it in detail. For, by pointing out the existence of
those transcendental principles, as such, which enable us to
determine a priori, i.e. before all experience, certain points
concerning objects and their possibility, he proved that
these things could not exist, as they present themselves to
us, independently of our knowledge. The resemblanco
between a world such as this and a dream, is obvious.

13. Kant and his School.

Kant chief passage on the Principle of Sufficient Reason

s

is work entitled On a discovery, which is to

in a little "

1
permit us to dispense with all Criticism of Pure Reason."
Section I., lit. A. Here he strongly urges the distinction
between "the
logical (formal) principle of cognition
every proposition must have its reason, and the transcen-
1 "

Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle Kritik der reinen Vernunft
entbehrlich gemacht werden soil."
 GENERAL SURVEY. 25

dental (material) principle every thing must have its

cause,
"

in his controversy with Eberhard, who had iden

them as one and the same. I intend myself to criticize
tified
Kant s proof of the a priori and consequently transcen

dental character of the law of causality further on in a

separate paragraph, after having given the only true
proof.
With these precedents to guide them, the several writers
on Logic belonging to Kant s school Hofbauer, Maass, ;

Jakob, Kiesewetter and others, have denned pretty accu

rately the distinction between reason and cause. Kiese
1
wetter, more especially, gives it thus quite satisfactorily :

Reason of knowledge is not to be confounded with reason

"

of fact (cause). The Principle of Sufficient Eeason belongs

2
to Logic, that of Causality to Metaphysics. The former is
the fundamental principle of thought the latter that of ;

experience. Cause refers to real things, logical reason has

only to do with representations."
Kant s adversaries urge this distinction still more
3
strongly. Gr. E. Schultze complains that the Principle of
Sufficient Eeason is confounded with that of Causality.
Salomon Maimon 4 regrets that so much should be said
about the sufficient reason without an explanation of what
5
is meant by it, while he blames Kant for deriving the

principle of causality from the logical form of hypothetical

judgments.
8
F. H. Jacobi says, that by the confounding of the two

conceptions, reason and cause, an illusion is produced,

which has given rise to various false speculations and he ;

points out the distinction between them after his own

Kiesewetter, "Logik,"
vol. i. p. 16.
Ibid. p. 60.
G. E. Schultze, "

Logik," 19, Anmerkung 1, und 63.

6
Sal. Mairaon, "Logik," p. 20, 21. Ibid.
"

Vorrede," p. xxiv.
Jacobi,
"

Briefe iiber dieLehre des Spinoza," Beilage 7, p. 414.

26 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. II.

fashion. Here, however, as is usual with him, we find a

good deal more of self-complacent phrase-jugglery than of
serious philosophy.
How Herr von Schelling finally distinguishes reason
from cause, may be seen in his "

Aphorisms introductory
l
to the Philosophy of Nature," 184, which open the first
book of the first volume of Marcus and Schelling s Annals "

of Medecine." Here we are taught that gravity is the

reason and light the cause of all things. This I merely
quote as a curiosity; for such random talk would not
otherwise deserve a place among the opinions of serious
and honest inquirers.

14. On the Proofs of the Principle.

We have still to record various fruitless attempts which

have been made to prove the Principle of Sufficient Eeason,
mostly without clearly defining in which sense it was
taken Wolf s, for instance, in his Ontology,
:
70, repeated
by Baumgarten in his
"

Metaphysics," 20. It is useless

to repeat and refute here, as it obviously rests on a
it
2 3
verbal quibble. Plattner and Jakob have tried other
proofs, in which, however, the circle is easily detected. I
purpose dealing with those of Kant further on, as I have
already said. Since I hope, in the course of this treatise,
to point out the different laws of our cognitive faculties,
of which the principle of sufficient reason is the common

expression, it will result as a matter of course, that this

principle cannot be proved, and that, on the contrary,

4
Aristotle s remark \6yov fyTovai OVK :
\oyog. <Lv t<m

1 *
Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie."
2
Plattner,
"

Aphorismen," 828.
3
Logik und 38 (1794).
"

Jakob, Metaphysik," p.
4 " "

seek a reason for that which

Aristotle, Metaph." iii. 6. They
has no reason ;
for the principle of demonstration is not demonstration."

Compare with this citation

"

[Tr. s add.] Analyt. post." i. 2.

 GENERAL SURVEY. 27

yap dp\rj OVK aVoate ort (rationem eorum

qucerant, quorum non est ratio : demonstrationis enim prin-
cipium non est demonstratio) may be applied with equal
propriety to all these proofs. For every proof is a refe
rence to something already recognised and if we continue
;

requiring a proof again for this something, whatever it be,

we at last arrive at certain propositions which express the
forms and laws, therefore the conditions, of all thought and
of all knowledge, in the application of which consequently
all thought and all knowledge consists so that certainty
:

isnothing but correspondence with those conditions, forms,

and laws, therefore their own certainty cannot again be
ascertained by means of other propositions. In the fifth
chapter I mean to discuss the kind of truth which belongs
to propositions such as these.
To seek a proof for the Principle of Sufficient Eeason, is,

moreover, an especially flagrant absurdity, which shows a

want of reflection. Every proof is a demonstration of the
reason for a judgment which has been pronounced, and
which receives the predicate true in virtue precisely of that
demonstration. This necessity for a reason is exactly what
the Principle of Sufficient Eeason expresses. Now if we
require a proof of it, or, in other words, a demonstration of
itsreason, we thereby already assume it to be true, nay,
we found our demand precisely upon that assumption, and
thus we find ourselves involved in the circle of exacting a
proof of our right to exact a proof.
 CHAPTEE
INSUFFICIENCY OF THE OLD AND OUTLINES OF A NEW
DEMONSTRATION.

15. Cases which are not comprised among the old estdb-
lished meanings of the Principle.

the summary given in the preceding chapter we

FEOM
gather, that two distinct applications of the principle
of sufficient reason have been recognized, although very

gradually, very tardily, and not without frequent relapses

into error and confusion the one being its application to
:

judgments, which, to be true, must have a reason the ;

other, its application to changes in material objects, which

must always have a cause. In both cases we find the
principle of sufficient reason authorizing us to ask why ? a
quality which is essential to it. But are all the cases in
which it authorizes us to ask why comprised in these two
relations? If I ask: Why are the three sides of this
triangle equal ? the answer is Because the three angles
:

are so. Now, is the equality of the angles the cause of the
equality of the sides? No; for here we have to do with
no change, consequently with no effect which must have a
cause. Is it merely a logical reason ? No for the equality
;

of the angle not only a proof of the equality of the

is

sides, it is not only the foundation of a judgment mere :

conceptions alone would never suffice to explain why the

sides must be equal, because the angles are so ;
for the
conception of the equality of the sides is not contained in
that of the equality of the angles. Here therefore we
 THE OLD AND NEW DEMONSTRATION. 29

have no connection between conceptions and judgments,

but between sides and angles. The equality of the angles
is not the direct, but the indirect reason,
by which we know
the equality of the sides ;
for it is the reason why a thing
is such as this case, that the sides are equal)
it is (in the :

angles being equal, the sides must therefore be equal.

Here we have a necessary connection between angles and
sides, not a direct, necessary connection between two

judgments. Or again, if I ask why infecta facta, but never

facta infecta fieri possunt, consequently why the past is
absolutely irrevocable, the future inevitable, even this does
not admit of purely logical proof by means of mere abstract
conceptions, nor does it belong either to causality, which
only rules occurrences within Time, not Time itself. The
present hour hurled the preceding one into the bottomless pit
of the past, not through causality, but immediately,
through
its mere existence, which existence was nevertheless inevi
table. It is impossible to make this comprehensible or even
clearer by means mere conceptions we recognise it, on
of ;

the contrary, quite directly and instinctively, just as we

recognize the difference between right and left and all that
depends upon it for instance, that our
: left glove will not
fit our
right hand, &c. &c.
Now, as all those cases in which the principle of sufficient
reason finds its application cannot therefore be reduced

to logical reason and consequence and to cause and effect,

the law of specification cannot have been sufficiently at
tended to in this classification. The law of homogeneity,
however, obliges us to assume, that these cases cannot differ
to infinity, but that they may be reduced to certain
species.
Now, before attempting this classification, it will be neces
sary to determine what is peculiar to the principle of suffi
cient reason in all cases, as its special characteristic be ;

cause the conception of the genus must always be deter

mined before the conception of the species.
30 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. III.

16. The Roots of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Our knowing consciousness, which manifests itself as outer

and inner Sensibility (or receptivity) and as Understanding
and Reason, subdivides itself into Subject and Object and
contains nothing else. To be Object for the Subject and to be
our representation, are the same thing. All our representa
tions stand towards one another in a regulated connection,
which may be determined A PRIORI, and on account of which,
nothing existing separately and independently, nothing single
or detached, can become an Object for us. It is this connec
tion which is
expressed by the Principle of Sufficient
Reason in its generality. Now, although, as may be
gathered from what has gone before, this connection
assumes different forms according to the different kinds of
objects, which forms are differently expressed by the Prin
ciple of Sufficient Eeason still the connection retains what
;

is common to all these forms, and this is expressed in a

general and abstract way by our principle. The relations

upon which it is founded, and which will be more closely
indicated in this treatise, are what I call the Root of the
Principle of Sufficient Eeason. Now, on closer inspection,
according to the laws of homogeneity and of specification,
these relations separate into distinct species, which differ
widely from each other. Their number, however, may be
reduced to four, according to the four classes into which
everything that can become an object for us that is to say,
allour representations may be divided. These classes will
be stated and considered in the following four chapters.
We shall see the Principle of Sufficient Reason appear
under a different form in each of them but it will also
;

show itself under all as the same principle and as derived

from the said root, precisely because it admits of being
expressed as above.
 CHAPTEE IV.

ON THE FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT, AND

THAT FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.

17. General Account of this Class of Objects.

^ I ^HEfirst class of objects possible to our representative

JL faculty, is that of intuitive, complete, empirical repre

sentations. They are intuitive as opposed to mere thoughts,
i.e.abstract conceptions they are complete, inasmuch as,
;

according to Kant s distinction, they not only contain the

formal, but also the material part of phenomena and they ;

are empirical, partly as proceeding, not from a mere con

nection of thoughts, but from an excitation of feeling in
our sensitive organism, as their origin, to which they con
stantly refer for evidence as to their reality partly also
:

because they are linked together, according to the united

laws of Space, Time and Causality, in that complex without
beginning or end which forms our Empirical Reality. As,
nevertheless, according to the result of Kant s teaching,
this Empirical Reality does not annul their Transcendental

Ideality, we shall consider them here, where we have only

to do with the formal elements of knowledge, merely as

representations.

18. Outline of a Transcendental Analysis of Empirical

Reality.

The forms of these representations are those of the inner

and outer sense namely, Time and Space. But these are
;
32 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

only perceptible when filled. Their perceptibility is Hatter,

to which I shall return further on, and again in 21. If
Time were the only form of these representations, there
could be no coexistence, therefore nothing permanent and
no duration. For Time is only perceived when filled, and
its course is only perceived by the changes which take place
in that which fills it. The permanence of an object is
therefore only recognized by contrast with the changes going
on in other objects coexistent with it. But the represen
tation of coexistence is impossible in Time alone ;
it de
pends, for its completion, upon the representation of Space ;
because, in mere Time, all things follow one another, and
in mere Space all things are side by side ; it is accordingly

only by the combination of Time and Space that the repre

sentation of coexistence arises.
On the other hand, were Space the sole form of this class
of representations, there would be no change ; for change
or alteration is succession of states, and succession is only
possible in Time. We
may therefore define Time as the
possibility of opposite states in one and the same thing.
Thus we see, that although infinite divisibility and infi
nite extension are common to both Time and Space, these
two forms of empirical representations differ fundamen
tally, inasmuch as what
is essential to the one is without

any meaning at all for the other juxtaposition having no

:

meaning in Time, succession no meaning in Space. The

empirical representations which belong to the orderly com
plex of reality, appear notwithstanding in both forms to
gether nay, the intimate union of both is the condition of
;

reality which, in a sense, grows out of them, as a product

grows out of its factors. Now it is the Understanding

which, by means of its own peculiar function, brings about
this union and connects these heterogeneous forms in such
a manner, that empirical reality albeit only for that
Understanding arises out of their mutual interpenetra-
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 33

tion, and arises as a collective representation, forming a

complex, held together by the forms of the principle
of sufficient reason, but whose limits are problematical.
Each single representation belonging to this class is a part
of this complex, each one taking its place in it according
to laws known to us a priori; in it therefore countless
objects coexist, because Substance, i.e. Matter, remains
permanent in spite of the ceaseless flow of Time, and be
cause its states change in spite of the rigid immobility of
Space. In this complex, in short, the whole objective, real
world exists for us. The reader who may be interested in
the present rough sketch of the analysis of
this, will find

empirical reality further worked out in 4 of the first

volume of
"

Die Welt als Wille und Yorstellung,"

l
where
a closer explanation is given of the way in which the Un
derstanding effects this union and thus creates for itself
the empirical world. He will also find a very important
help in the table, Prcedicabilia apriori of Time, Space, and
"

Matter," added to the fourth chapter of the second

which is

volume of the same work, and which I recommend to his

attention, as it especially shows how the contrasts of Time
and Space are equally balanced in Matter, as their product,
under the form of Causality.
We shall now proceed to give a detailed exposition of
that function of the Understanding which is the basis of
empirical reality only we must first, by a few incidental
;

explanations, remove the more immediate objections which

the fundamental idealism of the view I have adopted might
encounter.

Vol. i.
p. 12, and seqq. of the 1st edition j p. 9 of the 3rd edition.
34 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

19. Immediate Presence of Representations.

Now as, notwithstanding this union through the Under

standing of the forms of the inner and outer sense in repre
senting Matter and with it a permanent outer world, all
immediate knowledge is nevertheless acquired by the Subject
through the inner sense alone the outer sense being again
Object for the inner, which in its turn perceives the percep
tions of the outer and as therefore, with respect to the
immediate presence of representations in its consciousness,
the Subject remains under the rule of Time alone, as the
l
form of the inner sense : it follows, that only one representa
tion can be present to it (the Subject) at the same time,
although that one be very complicated. When we
may
speak of representations as immediately present, we mean,
that they are not only known in the union of Time and Space
effected by the Understanding an intuitive faculty, as we
shall soon see through which the collective representa
tion of empirical reality arises, but that they are known in
mere Time alone, as representations of the inner sense, and
just at the neutral point at which its two currents sepa
rate, called the present. The necessary condition men
tioned in the preceding paragraph for the immediate pre
sence of a representation of this class, is its causal action
upon our senses and consequently upon our organism,
which itself belongs to this class of objects, and is there
fore subject to the causal law which predominates in it
and which we are now about to examine. Now as therefore,
on the one hand, according to the laws of the inner and outer
world, the Subject cannot stop short at that one represen
tation but as, on the other hand, there is no coexistence
;

1
Compare Kant,
"

Krit. d. r. Vern." Elementarlehre. Abschnitt ii.

Schllisse a. d. Begr. b and c. 1st edition, pp. 33 and 34 5

5th edition,

p. 49. (Transl. M. Mviller, p. 29, b and c.)

 FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 35

in Time alone: [that single representation must always

vanish and be superseded by others, in virtue of a law
which we cannot determine a priori, but which depends
upon circumstances soon to be mentioned. It is moreover
a well-known fact, that the imagination and dreams repro
duce the immediate presence of representations the inves ;

tigation of that fact, however, belongs to empirical Psy

chology. Now as, notwithstanding the transitory, isolated
nature of our representations with respect to their imme
diate presence in our consciousness, the Subject nevertheless
retains the representation of an all- comprehensive complex
of reality, as described above, by means of the function of
the Understanding ; ^representations! have, W the strength
of this been viewed,! as something quite dif
antithesis,
I

ferent when considered as belonging to that complex

than when considered with reference to their immediate
presence in our consciousness. From the former point
of view they were called real things ; from the latter i
\

only, ^presentations I^LT klo^v. This view of the matter,

which is the ordinary one, is known under the name of
Realism. On the appearance of modern philosophy,
Idealism opposed itself to this Realism and has since been
steadily gaining ground. Malebranche and Berkeley were
its and Kant enhanced it to the
earliest representatives,

power of Transcendental Idealism, by which the co-exis

tence of the Empirical Eeality of things with their Trans
cendental Ideality becomes conceivable, and according to
which Kant expresses himself as follows l Transcen :
"

dental Idealism teaches that all phenomena are represen

2
tations only, not things by themselves." And again:
T
Krit. d. Kritik des Vierton Paralogismus der transcen-
"

Kant, r. V."

dentalen Psychologie, p. 369, 1st edition. lEngl. Transl. by M. Miiller,

p 320.)
2
Ibid. 1st edition, pp. 374-375. Note. (Engl. Transl. p. 325.
Note.)
36 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

nothing but mere representation, and what

"

Space itself is
ever is in it must therefore be contained in that represen
tation. There
nothing whatever in Space, except so far
is
x
"If we
as it is
Finally he says
really represented in it." :

take away the thinking Subject, the whole material world

must vanish because it is nothing but a phenomenon in the
;

sensibility of our own subject and a certain class of its repre

sentations." In India, Idealism is even a doctrine of popular

religion, not only of Brahminism, but of Buddhism in ;

Europe alone is it a paradox, in consequence of the essen

tially and unavoidably realistic principle of Judaism. But
Realism quite overlooks the fact, that the so-called exis
tence of these real things is absolutely nothing but their
being represented (ein Vorgestellt-werderi), or if it be in
sisted, that only the immediate presence in the conscious
ness of the Subject can be called being represented icar*
it is even only a possibility of being represented

The realist forgets that the Object ceases to

be Object apart from its reference to the Subject, and that
if we take away that reference, or think it away, we at

once do away with all objective existence. Leibnitz, while

he clearly felt the Subject to be the necessary condition for
the Object, was nevertheless unable to get rid of the
thought that objects exist by themselves and independently
of all reference whatsoever to the Subject, i.e. indepen

dently of being represented. He therefore assumed in the

first place a world of objects exactly like the world of
representations and running parallel with it, having no
direct,but only an outward connection with it by means
of a harmonia prcestdbilita ; obviously the most super
fluous thing possible, for it never comes within perception,
and the precisely similar world of representations which
does come within perception, goes its own way regardless
1
Kant,
"

Krit. d. r. V."
"

Betrachtung iiber die Summe," &c., p. 383

of 1st edition. (Engl. Transl. p. 331.)
 FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 37

of it. When, however, he wanted to determine more closely

the essence of these things existing objectively in them
selves, he found himself obliged to declare the Objects in
themselves to be Subjects (monades), and by doing so he
furnished the most striking proof of the inability of our
consciousness, in as far as merely cognitive, to find
it is

within the limits of the intellect i.e. of the apparatus by

means of which we represent the world anything beyond

Subject and Object the representer and the represented.
;

Therefore, if we abstract from the objectivity of an Object,

or in other words, from its being represented (Vorgestellt-
werden), if we annul it an Object, yet still
in its quality as
wish to retain something, we can meet with nothing but
the Subject. Conversely, if we desire to abstract from the
subjectivity of the Subject, yet to have something over,
the contrary takes place, and this leads to Materialism.
Spinoza, who never thoroughly sifted the matter, and
never therefore acquired a clear notion of it, nevertheless
quite understood the necessary correlation between Subject
and Object as so essential, that they are inconceivable
without consequently he defined it as an identity in the
it ;

Substance (which alone exists) of that which knows, with

that which has extension.
OBSERVATION. With reference to the chief argument of this para

graph, I take the opportunity to remark that if, in the course of this
treatise, for the sake of brevity and in order to be more easily under
stood, I at any time use the term real objects, I mean by it nothing
but the intuitive representations that are united to form the complex of
empirical reality, which reality in itself always remains ideal.

20. Principle of Sufficient Reason of Becoming.

In the Class of Objects for the Subject just described, the

principle of sufficient reason figures as the Law of Causality,
and, as such, I call it the Principle of Sufficient Reason
of Becoming, principium rationis sufficients fiendi. By it,
38 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

all objectspresenting themselves within the entire range

of our representation are linked together, as far as the

appearance and disappearance of their states is concerned,

i.e. in the movement of the current of Time, to form the
complex of empirical reality. The law of causality is as
follows. When one or several real objects pass into any
new state, some other state must have preceded this one,
upon which the new state regularly follows, i.e. as often as
that preceding one occurs. This sort of following we call
resulting ; the first of the states being named a cause, the
second an effect. When a substance takes fire, for instance,
this state of ignition must have been preceded by a state,
1, of affinity to oxygen 2, of contact with oxygen ;
;

3, of a given temperature. Now, as ignition must ne

cessarily follow immediately upon this state, and as it has
only just taken place, that state cannot always have been
there, but must, on the contrary, have only just supervened.
This supervening is called a change. It is on this account
that the law of causality stands in exclusive relation to
changes and has to do with them alone. Every effect, at the
time it takes place, is a change and, precisely by not having
occurred sooner, infallibly indicates some other change ly
which it has been preceded. That other change takes the
name of cause, when referred to the following one of
effect, when
referred to a third necessarily preceding change.
This the chain of causality. It is necessarily without a
is

beginning. By it, each supervening state must have re

sulted from a preceding change in the case just men
:

from the substance being brought into

tioned, for instance,
contact with free heat, from which necessarily resulted the
heightened temperature this contact again depended
;

upon a preceding change, for instance the sun s rays falling

upon a. burning-glass this again upon the removal of a
;

cloud from before the sun this upon the wind the wind
; ;

upon the unequal density of the atmosphere this upon;

 FIUST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 89

other conditions, and so forth in infinitum. When a state

contains all the requisite conditions for bringing about a
new state excepting one, this one, when at last it arrives, is,

in a sense, rightly called the cause icar l^o^rjy, inasmuch

as we here have the final in this case the decisive change
especially in view but if we leave out this consideration,
;

no single condition of the causal state has any advantage

over the rest with reference to the determination of the
causal connection in general, merely because it happens to
be the last. Thus the removal of the cloud in the above
example, is in so far the cause of the igniting, as it took
place later than the direction of the burning-glass towards
the object; but this might have taken place after the
removal of the cloud and the addition of oxygen might
have occurred later still in this respect therefore it is the
:

accidental order of things that determines which is the

cause. On closer inspection, however, we find that it is
the entire statewhich is the cause of the ensuing one,
so that the chronological order in which its single con
ditions were brought about, is in all essential respects
indifferent. With reference to a given case therefore, the
last occurring condition of a state may be called the cause
/car i^o\i]v t because it completes the measure of the necessary
conditions, and its appearance thus becomes the decisive
change. For purposes of general consideration, however,
it isonly the entire state which, by bringing about its suc
cessor, can be regarded as the cause. The single requisites
which, added together, complete and constitute the cause
may be called causal elements (ursdchliche Momente) or even
conditions, and into these accordingly the cause may be
subdivided. On
the other hand, it is quite wrong to call
the objects themselves causes, instead of the states some :

would, for instance, call the burning-glass in the above

example the cause of the ignition while others, again,
;

would call the cloud the cause; others the sun or the
40 THE FOU.atfOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

oxygen, and so on arbitrarily and without order. But it is

absurd to call an object the cause of another object first of ;

because objects not only contain form and quality, but

all,

Matter also, which has neither beginning or end secondly, ;

because the law of causality refers exclusively to changes,

i.e. to the entrance and exit of states in Time, wherein it.

regulates that special relation, in reference to which the

earlier state is called cause, the later effect, and the ne
cessary connection between both, the resulting of the one
from the other.
I here refer the thoughtful reader to the explanations I
1
have given in my chief work. For it is of the highest im
portance that our conception of the true and proper mean-
ing of the law of causality and the sphere of its validity
should be perfectly clear and definite before all things, :

that we should recognize, that this law refers solely and

exclusively to changes of material states and to nothing
else consequently, that it ought not to bo
whatever;
brought in when these are not in question. The law of
causality is the regulator of the changes undergone in
Time by objects of our outer experience; but these objects
are all material. Each change can only be brought about
by another having preceded it, which is determined by a
rule, and then the new change takes place as being neces

sarily induced by the preceding one. This necessity is the

causal nexus.
However simple therefore the law of causality is, we
nevertheless find expressed quite differently in all philo
it

sophical manuals, from the earliest down to the latest

ages namely, in a broader, more abstract, therefore less
:

definiteway. We
are, for instance, informed, now, that it
is that by which something else comes into being now, ;

that it is what produces another thing or gives it reality,

1 "

Die Welt a. W. u. vol. ii. chap. 4, especially p. 42 and

V."
seq. of
the 2nd edition ; p. 46 seq. of the 3rd edition.
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 41

&c. &c. Wolf says: Causa est principium, a quo exis-

tentia, sive actualitas, entis alterius dependet ; whereas it is

obvious that in causality we have only to do with changes

in the form of uncreated, indestructible Matter, and that
a springing into existence of what did not previously exist
is an impossibility. Want of clearness of thought may, no
doubt, in most cases have led to these views of the causal
relation but surely sometimes an arriere-pensee lurks in
;

the background a theological intention coqueting with

the Cosmological Proof, for whose sake it is ready to
falsify even transcendental, a priori truths, the mother s
milk of human understanding. We find the clearest
instance of this in Thomas Brown s book,
"

On the Eela-
tion of Cause and Effect," a work of 460 pages, which, in
1835, had already reached its fourth edition, and has pro
bably since gone through several more, and which, in spite
of its wearisome, pedantic, rambling prolixity, does not
handle the subject badly. Now this Englishman rightly
recognises, that it is invariably with changes that the
causal law has to do, and that every effect is accordingly a
change. Yet, although it can hardly have escaped him, he
is unwilling to admit that every cause is likewise a change t

and that the whole process is therefore nothing but the

uninterrupted nexus of changes succeeding one another in

Time. On the contrary, he persists in clumsily calling the
cause an object or substance, which precedes the change,
and in tormenting himself throughout his tedious book
with this entirely false expression, which spoils all his
explanations, notwithstanding his own better knowledge
and against his conscience, simply in order that his defini
tion may on no account stand in the way of the Cosmo-

logical Proof, which others might hereafter state elsewhere.

But what can a truth be worth which needs devices such
as these to prepare its way ?
And what have our own worthy, honest German pro-
42 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

fessors of philosophy been doing in behalf of their dearly

beloved Cosmological Proof, since Kant dealt it the death
blow in his Critique of Pure Reason? they, who prize
truth above everything. They were, indeed, at their wits
ends, for as these -worthies well know, though they do not
say so causa prima is, just as well as causa sui, a contra-
dictio in adjecto, the former expression is more
albeit

generally used than the latter. It is besides usually

pronounced with a very serious, not to say solemn,

air ; nay, many people, especially English Reverends, turn
up their eyes in a truly edifying way when they im

pressively and emphatically mention that contradictio in

adjecto : the first cause. They know that a first cause
is just as inconceivable as the point at which Space
ends or the moment when Time first began. For every
cause is a change, which necessarily obliges us to ask for
the preceding change that brought it about, and so on in
infinitum, in infinitum ! Even a first state of Matter, from
which, as it has ceased to be, all following states could
have proceeded, is inconceivable. For if this state had in
itself been the cause of the following ones, they must like
wise have existed from all eternity, and the actual state
existing at the present moment could not have only just
now come into being. If, on the other hand, that first
state only began to be causal at some given period, some

thing or other must have changed it, for its inactivity to

have ceased; but then something must have occurred,
some change must have taken place and this again ;

obliges us to ask for its cause i.e. a change which pre

ceded it and here we are once more on the causal ladder,
;

up which we are whipped step by step, higher and higher,

in infinitum, in infinitum ! (These gentlemen will surely
not have the face to talk to me of Matter itself arising out
of nothing If so, they will find corollaries at their service
!

further on.) The causal law therefore is not so acconi-

 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 43

modating as to let itself be used like a hired cab,

which we dismiss when we have reached our destination ;

rather does resemble the broom brought to life by the

it
1
apprentice- wizard in Gothe s poem, which, when once set
in motion, does not leave off running and fetching water
until the old master-wizard himselfstops it, which he
alone has the power to do. These gentlemen, however,
have no master- wizards among them. So what did they
do, these noble, genuine lovers of truth, ever on the alert,
of course, to proclaim the advent of real merit to the
world as soon as it shows itself in their profession, who
far from wishing from the works of
to divert attention
those who are really what they only seem to be, by craftily
ignoring and meanly keeping them dark, are naturally
foremost to acknowledge their worth aye, surely, as surely
as folly loves wisdom above everything ? What did they
do, I say, to help their old friend, the sorely distressed
Cosmological Proof, now at its last gasp ? Oh, they hit
upon a shrewd device.
"

they said, you are in

"

Friend,"

sorry plight since your fatal encounter with that stubborn

old man in Konigsberg, and indeed your brethren, the Onto-
logical and Physico-theological Proofs are in no better
condition. Never mind, you shall not be abandoned by
us (that is what we are paid for, you know) only you ;

must alter your dress and your name there is no help

for it for if we call you by your right name, every
one will take to his heels. Now incognito, on the contrary,
we can take you by the arm, and once more lead you into
society only, as we have just said, it must be incognito !
;

That is sure to answer First of all, your argument must

!

henceforth be called the Absolute. This has a foreign,

dignified, aristocratic ring and no one knows better than;

we do all that can be done with Germans by assuming airs

of importance. Of course all know what the real meaning
1
Gothe,
"

Der Zauberlehrling."
44 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

is,and pique themselves upon that knowledge. But you

yourself must come forward disguised, in the form of an
enthymeme. Be sure and leave behind you all those pro-
syllogisms and premisses, by which you used to drag us
wearily up the long climax, for everyone knows how utterly
useless they are. Come forward with a bold face and a
self-sufficient, supercilious air, like a man offew words,
and at one bound you will reach the goal. Exclaim (and
we will chime in), The Absolute, confound it ! that must
exist, or there would be nothing at all Here, strike !

the table with your fist. Whence does the Absolute

come ? What a silly question ! Did not I tell you
it was the Absolute ? That will do, forsooth ! That
will do Germans are accustomed
! to content themselves
with words instead of thoughts. Do we not train them
to it from Only look at Hegelianism
their cradle? !

What is it but empty, hollow, nauseous twaddle Yet !

how brilliant a career was that of this philosophical

time-server A few mercenary individuals had only to
!

strike up a laudation of this stuff, and they at once

found an echo to their voices in the empty hollow of a
thousand numskulls an echo which still continues to re
sound, and to extend and behold an ordinary intellect, !

a common impostor soon became a sublime thinker. Take

heart, therefore Besides, our friend and patron, we will
!

also second you in other ways, for how, indeed, are we to

? So that carping old faultfinder,
get a living without you
Kant, has been criticizing Reason, and clipping her wings,
has he ? Well, then, we will invent a new sort of Reason,
such as has never been heard of a Eeason that does not
think, but which has direct intuition a Reason which sees
Ideas (a high-flown word, made to mystify), sees them
bodily or which apprehends directly that which you and
;

others seek to prove or, again, a Reason which has

;

forebodings of all this this last for the benefit of those

 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 45

who do not care to make large concessions, but also are

satisfiedwith very little. Let us thus pass off early incul
cated, popular conceptions for direct revelations of this
new kind of Reason, i.e. for inspirations from above. As
for that old-fashioned Eeason, which criticism has criti
cized away, let us degrade it, call it Understanding, and
send it about its business. Well, and what is to become
of real, true Understanding? What in the world have
we todo with real, true Understanding ? You smile in
credulously but we know our listeners, and the harum,
;

horum we see on the students benches before us. Bacon

of Verulam already in his time said :
Young men learn to
believe at Universities. Of this they can learn as much as
they wish from us we have a good stock of articles of
;

faith on hand. Should any misgivings assail you, re

member that we are in Germany, where what would have
been impossible in any other country, has been found
possible: where a dull-witted, ignorant, pseudo-philosopher,
whose ineffably hollow verbiage disorganizes peoples
brains completely and permanently, a scribbler of non
sense I am speaking of our dearly beloved Hegel has
not only been actually proclaimed a profound thinker with
impunity, and even without incurring ridicule, but is
readily accepted as such yes, indeed, for this fiction has
:

found credence for the last thirty years, and is believed to

this day! Once therefore we have this Absolute with
your help, we are quite safe, in spite of Kant and his
Critique. We may then philosophise in a lofty tone,
making the Universe proceed from the Absolute by means
of the most heterogeneous deductions, one more tiresome
than the other this, by the way, being their only point of
resemblance. We can call the world the Finite, and the
Absolute the Infinite thus giving an agreeable variety to
our nonsense and talk of nothing but God, explaining
how, why, wherefore, by what voluntary or involuntary
46 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

process lie created or brought forth the -world, showing

whether he be within or without it, and so forth, as if

Philosophy were Theology, and as if it sought for en
lightenment concerning God, not concerning the Universe!"
The Cosmological Proof, with which we here have to do,
and to which the above apostrophe is addressed, consists
thus, properly speaking, in the assertion, that the principle
of the sufficient reason of becoming, or the law of causality,
necessarily leads to a thought which destroys it and de
clares it to be null and void. For the causa prima (abso-
lutum) can only be reached by proceeding upwards from con
sequence to reason, through a series prolonged ad libitum ;
but it is impossible to stop short at the causa prima with

out at once annulling the principle of sufficient reason.

Having thus briefly and clearly shown the nullity of the
Cosmological Proof, as I had in my second chapter already
shown the nullity of the Ontological Proof, the sympa
thizing reader may perhaps expect me to do the same with
respect to the Physico-theological Proof, which is a great
deal more plausible. As, however, this belongs by its
nature to a different department of philosophy, it would
be quite out of place here. I therefore refer him to Kant s
Critique of Pure Reason, as well as to his Critique of
the Faculty of Judgment, where he treats this subject ex
professo ; I likewise refer him, as a complement to Kant s
purely negative procedure, to my own positive one in The
"

l
Will in Nature," a work which, though small in bulk, is
rich and weighty in content. As for the indifferent reader,
he is free to let this and indeed all my writings pass down
unread to his descendants. It matters not to me for I am ;

here, not for one generation only, but for many.

Now, as the law of causality is known to us a priori, and is
therefore a transcendental law, applicable to every possible
1
The translation of which follows the Fourfold Root in the present

volume.
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 47

as will be
experience and consequently without exception,
shown in 21 as moreover it decides, that upon a given,
;

definite, relatively first state,a second equally definite one

inevitably ensues by rule, i.e., always the relation between ;

cause and effect is a necessary one, so that the causal law

authorizes us to form hypothetical judgments, and thereby
shows itself to be a form of the principle of sufficient
reason, upon which principle all judgments must be founded
and, as will be shown further on, all necessity is based.
This form of our principle I call the principle of ike
sufficientreason of becoming, because its application in
variably pre- supposes a change, the entering upon a new
state :
consequently a becoming. One of its essential charac
teristics is this that the cause always precedes the effect in
:

Time (compare 47), and this alone gives us the original

criterion by which to distinguish which is cause and which
effect, of two states linked together by the causal nexus.

Conversely, in some cases, the causal nexus is known to us

through former experience but the rapidity with which ;

the different states follow upon each other is so great, that

the order in which this happens escapes our perception.
"We then conclude with
complete certitude from causality
to succession : thus, for instance, we infer that the igniting
1
of gunpowder precedes its explosion.
From between causality and
this essential connection
succession follows, that the conception of reciprocity,
it

strictly speaking, has no meaning; for it presumes the

effect to be again the cause of its cause that is, that :

what follows same time what precedes. In a

is at the

Critique of Kantian Philosophy," which I have added to

"

2
my chief work, and to which I refer my readers, 1 have
1
Here I refer my readers to "

Die Welt als Wille und Vorstelluug,"

vol. ii.
chap. 4, p. 41 of the 2nd edition, and p. 45 of the 3rd edition.
2 "

Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. i. pp. 517-521 of the 2nd edition, and
pp. 544-549 of the 3rd edition.
48 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

shown at length that this favourite conception is inadmis

sible. It may be remarked, that authors usually have re
course to it just when their insight is becoming less clear,

and this accounts for the frequency of its use. Nay, it is

precisely when a writer conies to the end of his conceptions,
that the word reciprocity presents itself more readily
than any other ;
it be looked upon as a kind
may, in fact,
of alarm-gun, denoting that the author has got out of his

depth. It is also worthy of remark, that the word Week-

selwirlcung, literally reciprocal action or, as we have pre
ferred translating it, reciprocity is only found in the

German language, and that there is no precise equivalent

for it in daily use in any other tongue.
Fromthe law of causality spring two corollaries which,
in virtue of this origin, are accredited as cognitions a priori,
therefore as unquestionable and without exception. They
are, thelaw of inertia and that of permanence of substance.
The of these laws avers, that every state in which a
first

body can possibly be consequently that of repose as well

as that of any kind of movement must last for ever with
out change, diminution, or augmentation, unless some cause
supervenes to alter or annul it. But the other law, by which
the eternity of Matter is affirmed, results from the fact, that
the law of causality is exclusively applicable to states of
bodies, such as repose, movement, form, and quality, since it
presides over their temporal passing in or out of being but ;

that it is by no means applicable to the existence of that which

endures these states, and is called Substance, in order pre
cisely to express itsexemption from all arising and perish
ing. Substance is permanent means, that it can neither pass
into, nor out of being so that its quantity existing in the
:

universe can neither be increased nor diminished. That

we know this a priori, is proved by the consciousness of
unassailable certainty with which, when we see a body dis
appear whether it be by conjuring, by minute subdivision,
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT. 49

by combustion, volatilisation, or indeed any process what

ever we all nevertheless firmly assume that its sub
stance, i.e. its matter, must still exist somewhere or other
in undiminished quantity, whatever may have become
of its form ; when we perceive a body suddenly in
likewise,
a place where was not before, that it must have been
it

brought there or formed by some combination of invisible

particles for instance, by precipitation but that it, i.e.
its substance, cannot have then started into existence ;

for this implies a total impossibility and is utterly incon

ceivable. The certainty with which we assume this before
hand (a priori) proceeds from the fact, that our Understand
,

ing possesses absolutely no form under which to conceive

the beginning and end of Matter. For, as before said, the
law of causality the only form in which we are able to
conceive changes at all is solely applicable to states of
bodies, and never under any circumstances to the existence
of that which undergoes all changes Matter. This is why I
:

place the principle of the permanence of Matter among the

corollaries of the causal law. Moreover, we cannot have
acquired a posteriori the conviction that substance is per
manent, partly because it cannot, in most instances, be
empirically established; partly also, because every em
piricalknowledge obtained exclusively by means of induc
tion,has only approximate, consequently precarious, never
unconditioned, certainty. The firmness of our persuasion as
to this principle is therefore of a different kind and nature
from our security of conviction with regard to the accuracy
of any empirically discovered law of Nature, since it has an

entirely different, perfectly unshakable, never vacillating

firmness. The reason of this is, that the principle ex
presses a transcendental knowledge, i.e. one
. which deter
mines and fixes, prior to all experience, what in any way
is

possible within the whole range of experience but, pre

;

cisely by this, it reduces the world of experience to a mere

E
50 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

cerebral phenomenon. Even the most universal among

the non-transcendental laws of Nature and the one least
liable to exception the law of gravitation is of empirical
origin, consequently without guarantee as to its absolute
universality wherefore it is still from time to time called
;

in question, and doubts occasionally arise as to its validity

beyond our solar system and astronomers carefully call
;

attention to any indications corroborative of its doubtful

ness with which they may happen to meet, thereby show
ing that they regard it as merely empirical. The question
may of course be raised, whether gravitation takes effect
between bodies which are separated by an absolute vacuum,
or whether its action within a solar system may not be
mediated by some sort of ether, and may not cease alto
gether between fixed stars but these questions only admit
;

of an empirical solution, and this proves that here we have

not to do with a knowledge a priori. If, on the other hand,
we admit with Kant and Laplace the hypothesis, as the
most probable one, that each solar system has developed
out of an original nebula by a gradual process of condensa
tion, we still cannot for a moment conceive the possibility
of that original substance having sprung into being
out of nothing : we are forced to assume the anterior
existence of its particles somewhere or other, as well as
their having been brought together somehow or other,

precisely because of the transcendental nature of the prin

ciple of the permanence of Substance. In Critique my
1
of Kantian Philosophy, I have shown at length, that
Substance is but another word for Matter, the conception of
substance not being realisable excepting in Matter, and
therefore deriving its origin from Matter, and I have also

specially pointed out how that conception was formed

solely to serve a surreptitious purpose. Like many other
1
Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. i.
p. 550 of 2nd, and 580 of 3rd
edition.
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT. 51

equally certain truths, this eternity of Matter (called the

permanence of substance) is forbidden fruit for professors
of philosophy ;
so they slip past it with a bashful, sidelong
glance.
By the endless chain of causes and effects which directs
allchanges but never -extends beyond them, two existing
things remain untouched, precisely because of the limited
range ofits action on the one hand, Matter, as we have
:

just shown on the other hand, the primary forces of

;

Nature. The first (matter) remains uninfluenced by the

causal nexus, because it is that which undergoes all changes,
or on which they take place the second (the primary;

forces), because it is they alone ~by which changes or effects

become possible ;
for they alone give causality to causes,
i.e.the faculty of operating, which the causes therefore
hold as mere vassals a fief. Cause and effect are changes
connected together to necessary succession in Time ;

whereas the forces of Nature by means of which all causes

operate, are exempt from all change in this sense there ;

fore they are outside Time, but precisely on that account

they are always and everywhere in reserve, omnipresent

and inexhaustible, ever ready to manifest themselves, as
soon as an opportunity presents itself in the thread of
causality. A cause, like its effect, is invariably
something
individual, a single change whereas a force of Nature is
;

something universal, unchangeable, present at all times

and in all places. The attraction of a thread by amber,
for instance, at the present moment, is an effect its cause ;

is the preceding friction and actual contact of the amber

with the thread and the force of Nature which acts in,
;

and presides over, the process, is Electricity. The explana

1
tion of this matter is to be found in chief work, and my
there I have shown in a long chain of causes and effects
1
See Die Welt a. W.
"

u. V." vol. i. 26, p. 153 of the 2nd, and

p. 160 of the 3rd edition.
52 THE FOTJEFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

how the most heterogeneous natural forces successively

come into play in them. By this explanation the difference
between transitory phenomena and permanent forms of
operation, becomes exceedingly clear and as, moreover, a
;

whole section ( 26) is devoted to the question, it will be

sufficient here to give a brief sketch of it. The rule, by
which a force of Nature manifests itself in the chain of
causes and effects consequently the link which connects it
with them is the law of Nature. But the confusion
between forces of Nature and causes is as frequent as it
is detrimental to clearness of thought. It seems indeed
as though no one had accurately defined the difference
between these conceptions before me, however great may
have been the urgency for such a distinction. Not only
are forces of Nature turned into causes by such expres
sions as, Electricity, Gravity, &c., are the cause of so-and-
so, but they are even often turned into effects by those wlio
search for a cause for Electricity, Gravity, &c., which
<fec.

isabsurd. Diminishing the number of the forces of Nature,

however, by reducing one to another, as for instance
Magnetism is in our days reduced to Electricity, is a
totally different thing. Every true, consequently really
primary force of Nature and every fundamental chemical
property belongs to these forces is essentially a quali-
tas occulta, i.e. it does not admit of physical, but only of

metaphysical explanation in other words, of an explana

:

tionwhich transcends the world of phenomena. No one has

carried this confusion, or rather identification, of causes
with forces of Nature further than Maine de Biran in his
"Nouvelles considerations des rapports du physique au
moral," for essential to his philosophy.
it is It is besides

remarkable, that when he speaks

of causes, he rarely uses
the word cause but almost always speaks of cause
alone,
ou force, just as we have seen Spinoza above (8) write ratio
sive causa no less than eight times in the same page. Both
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 53

writers are evidently conscious that they are identifying

two disparates, in order to be able to make use of the one
or the other, according to circumstances for this end they ;

are obliged to keep the identification constantly before their

readers mind.
Now Causality, as the director of each and every change,
presents itself in Nature under three distinct forms: as
causes in the strictest acceptation of the word, as stimuli,
and as motives. It is just upon this difference that the
real, essential distinction between inorganic bodies, plants,
and animals is based, and not upon external, anatomical,
let alone chemical, distinctions.
A cause, in its narrowest sense, is that upon which
changes in the inorganic kingdom alone ensue those :

changes, that is to say, which form the theme of Mechanics,

Physics, and Chemistry. Newton s third fundamental
law, Action and reaction are equal to one another," applies
"

exclusively to this cause, and enunciates, that the state

which precedes (the cause) undergoes a change equivalent
to that produced by it (the effect). In this form of
causality alone, moreover, does the degree of the effect
always exactly correspond to the degree of the cause, so as
to enable us accurately to calculate the one by means of
the other.
The second form of causality is the stimulus ; it reigns
over organic life, as such, i.e. over plant life and the vegeta
tive, that is, the unconscious, part of animal life. This
second form is characterized by the absence of the distinc
tive signs of the first. In it accordingly action and re
action are not equal, nor does the intensity of the effect by

any means correspond throughout all its degrees to the

intensity of the causein fact, the opposite effect may even
;

be produced by intensifying the cause.

The third form of causality is the motive. Under this
form causality rules animal life proper : that is, the exte-
54 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

rior, consciously performed actions of all animals. The

medium for motives is knowledge : an intellect is accord

ingly needed for susceptibility to motives. The true

characteristic of the animal is therefore the faculty of
knowing, of representing (Das Vorstelleri). Animals, as
such, always move towards some aim and end, which
therefore must have been recognised by them that is to :

say, it must have presented itself to them as some

thing different from themselves, yet of which they are
conscious. Therefore the proper definition of the animal
would be That which knows
: for no other definition
;

quite hits the mark or can even perhaps stand the test of
investigation. Movement induced by motives is necessarily
wanting where there is no cognitive faculty, and movement
by stimuli alone remains, i.e. plant life. Irritability and

sensibility are therefore inseparable. Still motives evi

dently act in a different way from stimuli ; for the action

of the former may be very brief, nay, need only be
momentary; since their efficacy, unlike that of stimuli,
stands in no relation whatever to the duration of that
action, to the proximity of the object, &c. &c. A motive
needs but to be perceived therefore, to take effect ;
whereas
stimuli always require outward, often even inward, contact
and invariably a certain length of time.
This short sketch of the three forms of causality will
suffice here. They are more fully described in my Prize-
1
essay on Free Will. One thing, however, still remains to
be urged. The difference between cause, stimulus, and
motive, is obviously only a consequence of the various
degrees of receptivity of beings the greater their recepti
;

vity, the feebler may be the nature of the influence a stone :

needs an impact, while man obeys a look. Nevertheless,

both are moved by a sufficient cause, therefore with the

1
See "

Die beiden Grunclprobleme der Etkik," p. 30-34.

 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 55

*
same necessity. For motivation is
only causality pass
ing through knowledge ;
is the medium of the
the intellect
motives, because it is the highest degree of receptivity. By
this, however, the law of causality loses nothing whatever
of its rigour and certainty; for motives are causes and
operate with the same necessity which all causes bring
with them. This necessity is easy to perceive in animals
because of the greater simplicity of their intellect, which is
limited to the perception of what is present. Man s in
double for not only has he intuitive, but abstract,
tellect is :

knowledge, which last is not limited to what is present.

Man possesses Reason he therefore has a power of elective
;

decision with clear consciousness that is, he is able to weigh

:

against one another motives which exclude each other, as

such in other terms, he can let them try their strength on
;

his will. The most powerful motive then decides him, and
his actions ensue with just the same necessity as the roll

ing of a ball after it has been struck. Freedom of Will *

means (not professorial twaddle but) that a given human "

being, in a given situation, can act in two different ways."

But the utter absurdity of this assertion is a truth as
certain and as clearly proved, as any truth can be which
passes the limits of pure mathematics. In my Essay on
Free Will, to which the Norwegian Society awarded the
prize, thistruth is demonstrated more clearly, methodi
cally,and thoroughly than has been done before by anyone
else, and this moreover with special reference to those
facts of our consciousness by which ignorant people

imagine that absurdity to be confirmed. In all that is

essential however, Hobbes, Spinoza, Priestley, Yoltaire,
1
The word "motivation," though it may appear objectionable to the
English reader, seemed unavoidable here, as being Schopenhauer s own
term, for which there is no adequate equivalent in general use in our
language. [Translator s note.]
2
Here usedin theabsolute sense ofliberum arbitriumindiffercnticB.
[Tr.]
56 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IT.

and even Kant l already taught the same doctrine. Our

professional philosophers, of course, do not let this inter
fere with their holding forth on Free Will, as if it were an
understood thing which had never been questioned. But
what do these gentlemen imagine the above-named great
men to have come into the world for, by the grace of
Nature? To enable them (the professors) to earn their
livelihood by philosophy ? Since I had proved this
truth in my prize-essay more clearly than had ever been
done before, and since moreover a Royal Society had
sanctioned that proof by placing my essay among its
memoranda, it surely behoved these worthies, considering
the views they held, to make a vigorous attack upon so
pernicious a doctrine, so detestable a heresy, and thoroughly
to refute it. Nay, this duty was all the more imperative
1
Whatever conception one may form of freedom of the will, for
"

metaphysical purposes, its phenomena, human actions, are neverthe

less determined by universal laws of Nature, just as well as every other
occurrence in Nature." Ideen /u einer allgemeinen Geschichte."
"

Anfang. Kant. I.All the acts of a man, so far as they are phenomena,
"

are determined from his empirical character and from the other con
comitant causes, according to the order of Nature; and if we could investi
gate all the manifestations of his will to the very bottom, there would be
not a single human action which we could not predict with certainty and
recognize from its preceding conditions as necessary. There is no free
dom therefore with reference to this empirical character, and yet it is

only with reference to it that we can consider man, when we are meroly
observing, and, as is the case in anthropology, trying to investigate the
motive causes of his actions physiologically."
"

Kritik. d. r. Vern."

p. 549 of the 1st edition, and p. 577 of the 5th edition. (Engl. Transl.
by M. Miiller, p. 474.)
"It
may therefore be taken for granted, that if we could see far

enough into a man s mode of thinking, as it manifests itself in his inner,

as well as outer actions, for us to know every, even the faintest motive*
and in like manner all the other causes which act upon these, it would
be possible to calculate his conduct in future with the same certainty as
an eclipse of the sun or moon." Kritik. der praktischen Vernunft ed.
" "

Rosenkianz, p. 230 and p. 177 of the 4th edition.

 FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 57
l
other essay On the Foundation of Morality,"
"

as, in my
I had proved the utter groundlessness of Kant s practical
Reason with its Categorical Imperative which, under the
name of the Moral Law, is still used by these gentlemen as
the corner-stone of their own shallow systems of morality.
I have shown to be a futile assumption so clearly and
it

irrefutably, that no one with a spark of judgment can

possibly believe any longer in this fiction. Well, and so
"

they probably did." Oh no They take good care not to

!

venture on such slippery ground Their ability consists in

!

holding their tongues silence is all they have to oppose

;

to intelligence, earnestness, and truth. In not one of the

products of their useless scribblings that have appeared
since 1841, has the slightest notice been taken of my
Ethics undoubtedly the most important work on Moral
Philosophy that has been published for the last sixty
years nay, their terror of me and of my truth is so great,
that none of the literary journals issued by Academies or
Universities has so much as mentioned the book. Zitto,
zitto, the public should perceive anything
lest in this :

consists the whole of their policy. The instinct of self-

preservation may, no doubt, be at the bottom of these
artful tactics. For would not a philosophy, whose sole aim
was truth, and which had no other consideration in view,
be likely to play the part of the iron pot among the
earthen ones, were it to come in contact with the petty
systems composed under the influence of a thousand per
sonal considerations by people whose chief qualification is
the propriety of their sentiments ? Their wretched fear of
my writings is the fear of truth. Nor can it be denied,
that precisely this very doctrine of the complete
necessity
of all acts of the will stands in flagrant contradiction with
all thfe hypotheses of their favourite old- woman s
philo-
1
Published in the same volume with the Prize-Essay on "

Fre6
Will." See Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik."
"
58 THE FOTJEFOLD BOOT. fCHAP. IV.

Sophy cut after the pattern of Judaism. Still, that severely

tested truth, far from being disturbed by all this, as a
sure datum and criterion, as a true SOQ p.oi irov ar&, proves
the futility of all that old- woman s philosophy and the

urgent need of a fundamentally different, incomparably

deeper view of the Universe and of Man no matter ;

whether that view be compatible with the official duties

of a professional philosopher or not,

V
21. A priori character of the conception of Causality.
Intellectual Character of Empirical Perception.

THE UNDERSTANDING.

In the professorial philosophy of our philosophy-pro

fessors we are
taught to this day, that perception of the
still

outer world a thing of the senses, and then there fol

is

lows a long dissertation upon each of the five senses;

whereas no mention whatever is made of the intellectual
character of perception that is to say, of the fact, that it
:

ismainly the work of the Understanding, which, by means

of its own form of Causality, together with the
peculiar
forms of pure Time and Space, which are pos
sensibility,
tulated by Causality, primarily creates and produces the
objective, outer world out of the raw material of a few sen
sations. And yet in its principal features, I had stated
1
this matter in the first edition of the present treatise

and soon after developed it more fully in my treatise On "

Vision and Colours" (1816), of which Professor Rosas has

shown his appreciation by allowing it to lead him into
2
plagiarism. But our professors of philosophy have not
1
Anno 1813, pp. 53-55.
2
For further details see my Will in p. 19 of the 1st edition,
"

Nature,"

and (P. 230 et seqq. of the translation of the Will in "

p. 14 of the 3rd.
Nature," which follows the Fourfold Root" in the present volume.)
"
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 59

thought fit to take the slightest notice either of this, or in

deed of any of the other great and important truths which
it has been the aim and labour of my whole life to set

forth, in order to secure them as a lasting possession to

mankind. It does not suit their tastes, or fit into their
notions it leads to no Theology, nor is it even adapted to
;

drillstudents for higher State purposes. In short, profes

sional philosophers do not care to learn from me, nor do they
even see how much they might learn from me that is, all :

that their children and their children s children will learn

from me. They prefer to sit down and spin a long meta
physical yarn, each out of his own thoughts, for the benefit
of the public; and no doubt, if fingers are a sufficient

qualification, they have it. How right was Macchiavelli

when he said, as Hesiod 1 before him There are three :
"

sorts of heads :
firstly, those which acquire knowledge of

things and comprehend them by themselves secondly, ;

those which recognise the truth when it is shown them by

others and thirdly, those which can do neither the one
;

2
nor the other."

One must indeed be forsaken by all the gods, to imagine

that the outer, perceptible world, filling Space in its three

dimensions and moving on in the inexorable flow of Time,
governed at every step by the laws of Causality, which is
without exception, and in all this merely obeying laws we
can indicate before all experience of them that such a
world as this, we say, can have a real, objective existence
outside us, without any agency of our own, and that it can
then have found its way into our heads through bare sen
sation and thus have a second existence within us like the
one outside. For what a miserably poor thing is mere
sensation, after all ! Even in the noblest of our organs it
is nothing but a local, specific feeling, susceptible of some
1
Hesiod, epya, 293.
8 "

II
Macchiavelli, principe," cap. 22.
60 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

slight variation, still in itself always subjective and, as

such therefore, incapable of containing anything objective,
anything like perception. For sensation is and remains a
process within the organism and is limited, as such, to the
region within the skin it cannot therefore contain any
;

thing which lies beyond that region, or, in other words,

anything that is outside us. A sensation may be pleasant
Or unpleasant which betokens a relation to the Will
but -nothing objective can ever lie in any sensation* In
the organs of the senses, sensation is heightened by the con
fluence of the nerve-extremities, and can easily be excited
from without on account of their extensive distribution
and the delicacy of the envelope which encloses them it is ;

besides specially susceptible to particular influences, such

as light, sound, smell notwithstanding which it is and re
;

mains mere sensation, like all others within our body,

consequently something essentially subjective, of whose
changesWe only become immediately conscious in the form
Of the inner sense, Time that is, successively. It is only
:

when the Understanding begins to act a function, not of

single, delicate nerve-extremities, but of that mysterious,
complicated structure weighing from five to ten pounds,
called the brain only when it begins to apply its sole form,
the causal law, that a powerful transformation takes place,

by which subjective sensation becomes objective perception. Ir

For, in virtue of its own

peculiar form, therefore a priori,
i.e. before all experience (since there could have been none
till then), the Understanding conceives the given corporeal
sensation as an effect (a word which the Understanding
alone comprehends), which effect, as such, necessarily
implies a cause. Simultaneously it summons to its assis
tance Space, the form of the outer sense, lying likewise
ready in the intellect (i.e. the brain), in order to remove
that cause beyond the organism for it is by this that the
;

external world first arises, Space alone rendering it pos-

 FIEST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 61

sible, so that pure intuition a priori has to supply the

foundation for empirical perception. In this process, as
I shall soon show more clearly, the Understanding avails
itself of all the several data, even the minutest, which are

presented to it by the given sensation, in order to construct

the cause of it in Space in conformity with them. This intel
lectual operation (which is moreover explicitly denied both

by Schelling and by Fries 2 ), does not however take place

*

discursively or reflectively, in abstracto, by means of concep

tions and words it is, on the contrary, an intuitive and
;

quite direct process. For by it alone, therefore exclusively

in the Understanding and for the Understanding, does
the real, objective, corporeal world, filling Space in its
three dimensions, present itself and further proceed, ac
cording to the same law of causality, to change in Time,
and tomove in Space. It is therefore the Understanding
itself which has to create the objective world; for this
world cannot walk into our brain from outside all ready
cut and dried through the senses and the openings of their
organs. In fact, the senses supply nothing but the raw
|

materials which the Understanding at once proceeds to

work up into the objective view of a corporeal world, sub
ject to regular laws, by means of the simple forms we have
indicated Space, Time, and Causality. \ Accordingly our
:

every-day empirical perception is an intellectual one and has

a right to claim this predicate, which German pseudo-philo
sophers have given to a pretended intuition of dream-worlds,
in which their beloved Absolute is supposed to perform its
evolutions. And now I will proceed to show how wide is
the gulf which separates sensation from perception, by
pointing out how raw is the material out of which the
beautiful edifice is constructed.
1
Philosophische Schriften" (1809), vol.i. pp.237 and 238.
"

Schelling,
2
Fries,
"

Kritik der VernunfL" vol. i. pp. 52-56 and p. 290 of the 1st
edition.
62 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

Objective perception makes use, properly speaking, of

only two senses touch and sight. These alone supply the
;

data upon which, as its basis, the Understanding constructs

the objective world by the process just described. The
three other senses remain on the whole subjective; for
their sensations, while pointing to an external cause, still
contain no data by which its relations in Space can be de
termined. Now Space is the form of all perception, i.e. of

that apprehension, in which alone objects can, properly

speaking, present themselves. Therefore those other three
senses can no doubt serve to announce the presence of
objects we already know in some other way but no con ;

struction in Space, consequently no objective perception, can

possibly be founded on their data. A

rose cannot be con
structed from its perfume, and a blind man may hear
music his life without having the slightest objective
all

representation either of the musicians, or of the instru

ments, or of the vibrations of the air. On the other hand, the
teense of hearing is of great value as a medium for language,
and through this it is the sense of Reason. It is also valu
able as a medium for music, which is the only way in
which we comprehend numerical relations not only in
abstracto, but directly, in concreto. A musical sound or
tone, however, gives no clue to spacial relations, therefore
it never helps to bring the nature of its cause nearer to us ;

we stop short at it, so that it is no datum for the Under

standing in its construction of the objective world. The
sensations of touch and sight alone are such data there ;

fore a blind manwithout either hands or feet, while able

to construct Space for himself a priori in all its regularity,
would nevertheless acquire but a very vague representation
of the objective world. Yet what is supplied by touch and
sight is not by any means perception,
but merely the raw
material for it, For perception is so far from being con
tained in the sensations of touch and sight, that these sen-
 FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 63

sations have not even the faintest resemblance to the

qualities of the things which present themselves to us

through them, as I shall presently show. Only /what
really belongs to sensation must first be clearly distin
guished from what is added to by the
intellect in per
it

ception. In the beginning this

I not easy, because we are
is

so accustomed to pass from the sensation at once to its

cause, that the cause presents itself to us without our
noticing the sensation apart from it, by which, as it were,
the premisses are supplied to this conclusion drawn by
i^ie Understanding.
Thus touch andsight have each their own special advan
tages, to begin with; therefore they assist each other

mutually. Sight needs no contact, nor even proximity its ;

field is unbounded and extends to the stars. It is more

over sensitive to the most delicate degrees of light, shade,
colour, and transparency so that it supplies the Under
;

standing with a quantity of nicely defined data, out of

which, by dint of practice, it becomes able to construct the
shape, size, distance, and nature of bodies, and represents
them at once perceptibly.On the other hand, touch cer
tainly depends upon contact still its data are so varied
;

and so trustworthy, that it is the most searching of all the

senses. Even perception by sight may, in the last resort,
be referred to touch nay, sight may be looked upon as
;

an imperfect touch extending to a great distance, which

uses the rays of light as long feelers and it is just because
;

limited to those qualities which have light for their

it is

medium and is therefore one-sided, that it is so liable to

deception ;
whereas touch supplies the data for cognising
size, shape, hardness, softness,
roughness, temperature,
&c. &c., quite immediately. In this it is assisted,
partly
by the shape and mobility of our arms, hands, and fingers,
from whose position in feeling objects the Understanding
derives its data for constructing bodies in Space,
partly by
64 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

muscular power, which enables it to know the weight,

solidity, toughness, or brittleness of bodies : all this with
the least possible liability to error.
These data nevertheless do not by any means yet give
perception, which is always the work of the Understanding,
The sensation I have in pressing against a table with niy
hand, contains no representation of a firm cohesion of parts
in that object, nor indeed anything at all like it. It is

only when my Understanding passes from that sensation

to its cause, that the intellect constructs for itself a body
having the properties of solidity, impenetrability, and hard
ness. If in the dark, I put my hand upon a flat surface,
or lay hold of a ball of about three inches in diameter,
the same parts of my hand feel the pressure in both cases ;
it is only by the different position which my hand takes
that, in the one or in the other case, my Understanding
constructs the shape of the body whose contact is the cause
of the sensation, for which it receives confirmation from the

changes of position which I make. The sensations in the

hand of a man born blind, on feeling an object of cubic shape,
are quite uniform and the same on all sides and in every
direction : the edges, it is true,
press upon a smaller portion
of his hand, still a cube is contained in
nothing at all like
these sensations. His Understanding, however, draws the
immediate and intuitive conclusion from the resistance
felt, that this resistance must have a cause, which then

presents itself through that conclusion as a hard body ;

and through the movements of his arms in feeling the

object, while the hand s sensation remains unaltered, he
constructs the cubic shape in Space, which is known to
him a priori. If the representation of a cause and of
Space, together with their laws, had not already existed
within him, the image of a cube could never have proceeded
from those successive sensations in his hand. If a rope be
drawn through his hand, he will construct, as the cause of
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 65

the friction he feels and of its duration, a long cylindrical

body, moving uniformly in the same direction in that

particular position of his hand. But the representation of
movement, i.e. of change of
place in Space by means of
Time, never could arise for him out of the mere sensation
in his hand ;
for that sensation can neither contain, nor
can it ever by itself alone produce any such thing. It is his
intellect which must, on the contrary, contain within itself,
before all experience, the intuitions of Space, Time, and toge
ther with them that of the possibility of movement and it
;

must also contain the representation of Causality, in order to

pass from sensation which alone is given by experience
to a cause of that sensation, and to construct that cause as
a body having this or that shape, moving in this or that
direction. For how great is the difference between a mere
sensation in my hand and the representations of causality,
materiality, and mobility in Space by means of Time !

The sensation in hand, even if its position and its

my
points of contact are altered, is a thing far too uniform
and far too poor in data, to enable me to construct out of
it the representation of Space, with its three dimensions,
and of the influences of bodies one upon another, together
with the properties of expansion, impenetrability, cohe
sion, shape, hardness, softness, rest, and motion: the
basis, in short, of the objective world. This is, on the
contrary, only possible by the intellect containing within
itself,anterior to all experience, Space, as the form of per

ception Time, as the form of change and the law of

; ;

Causality, as the regulator of the passing in and out of

changes. Now precisely the pre-existence before all
it is

experience of all these forms, which constitutes the Intellect.

Physiologically, it is a function of the brain, which the
brain no more learns by experience than the stomach to
digest, or the liver to secrete bile. Besides, no other expla
nation can be given of the fact, that many who were born
F
66 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

blind, acquire a sufficiently complete knowledge of the rela

tions of Space, to enable them to replace their want of eye

sight by it to a considerable degree, and to perform astonish

ing feats. A
hundred years ago Saunderson, for instance,
who was blind from his birth, lectured on Optics, Mathe
1
matics, and Astronomy at Cambridge. This, too, is the
only way to explain the exactly opposite case of Eva Lauk,
who was born without arms or legs, yet acquired an accurate
perception of the outer world by means of sight alone as
2
rapidly as other children. All this therefore proves that
Time, Space, and Causality are not conveyed into us by
touch or by sight, or indeed at all from outside, but that
they have an internal, consequently not empirical, but
intellectual origin. From this again follows, that the per
ception of the bodily world is an essentially intellectual
process, awork of the Understanding, to which sensation
merely gives the opportunity and the data for application
in individual cases.
now prove the same with regard to the sense of
I shall
sight. Here the only immediate datum is the sensation
experienced by the retina, which, though admitting of great
variety, may still be reduced to the impression of light and
dark with their intermediate gradations and to that of
colours proper. This sensation is entirely subjective: that
isto say, it only exists within the organism and under the
skin. Without the Understanding, indeed, we should never
even become conscious of these gradations, excepting as of
peculiar, varied modifications of the feeling in our eye,
which would bear no resemblance to the shape, situation,
proximity, or distance of objects outside us. For sensation,
in seeing, supplies nothing more than a varied affection of
the retina, exactly like the spectacle of a painter s palette
1
Diderot, in his Lettre sur les gives a detailed account
"

Aveugles,"
of Saunderson.
2
See "

Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. ii.

chap. 4.
 FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 67

with divers splashes of colour. Nor would anything more

remain over in our consciousness, were we suddenly deprived
of all our Understanding let us say by paralysis of the
brain at a moment when we were contemplating a rich
and extensive landscape, while the sensation was left un
changed for this was the raw material out of which our
:

Understanding had just before been constructing that

perception.
Now, that the Understanding should thus be able, from
such limited material as light, shade and colour, to produce
the visible world, inexhaustibly rich in all its different
shapes, by means of the simple function of referring effects
to causes assisted by the intuition of Space, depends before
all things upon the assistance given by the sensation itself,

which consists in this first, that the retina, as a surface,

:

admits of a juxtaposition of impressions secondly, that

;

light always acts in straight lines, and that its refraction

in the eye itself is rectilinear ; finally, that the retina pos
sesses the faculty of immediately feeling from which
direction the light comes that impinges upon it, and this
can, perhaps, only be accounted for by the rays of light
penetrating below the surface of the retina. But by this we
gain, that the mere impression at once indicates the direction
of its cause that is, it points directly to the position of
;

the object from which the light proceeds or is reflected.

The passage to this object as a cause no doubt presupposes
the knowledge of causal relations, as well as of the laws of
,

Space but this knowledge constitutes precisely the furni

;

ture of the Intellect, which, here also, has again to create

perception out of mere sensation. Let us now examine its
procedure in doing so more closely.
The first thing it does is to set right the impression of
the object, which is produced on the retina upside down.
That original inversion as we know, brought about in
is,

the following manner. As each point of the visible object

63 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP, IV.

gends forth its rays towards

all sides in a rectilinear direc

tion, the rays from

upper extremity cross those from its
its

lower extremity in the narrow aperture of the pupil, by

which the former impinge upon the bottom, the latter
upon the top, those projected from the right side upon the
and
left, vice versa. The refracting apparatus of the eye,
which consists of the humor aqueus, lens, et corpus vitreum,

only serves to concentrate the rays of light proceeding from

the object, so as to find room for them on the small space
of the retina. Now, if seeing consisted in mere sensation,
we should perceive the impression of the object turned
upside down, because we receive it thus but in that case
;

we should perceive it as something within our eye, for we

should stop short at the sensation. In reality, however,
the Understanding steps in at once with its causal law, and
as it has received from sensation the datum of the direc
tion in which the ray impinged upon the retina, it pursues
that direction retrogressively up to the cause on both
lines ;
so that this time the crossing takes place in the oppo
site direction, and the cause presents itself upright as an
external object in Space, i.e. in the position in which it
originally sent forth its rays, not that in which they reached

the retina (see fig. 1). The purely intellectual nature of

this process, to the exclusion of all other, more especially of

physiological, explanations, may also be confirmed by the

 FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 69

we put our heads "between our legs, or lie down

fact, that if
on a head downwards, we nevertheless see objects in
hill
their right position, and not upside down although the ;

portion of the retina which is usually met by the lower part

met by the upper in fact, everything
of the object is then :

istopsy turvy excepting the Understanding.

The second thing which the Understanding does in con
verting sensation into perception, is to make a single per
ception out of a double sensation for each eye in fact
;

receives its own separate impression from the object we are

looking at ;
each even in a slightly different direction :

nevertheless that object presents itself as a single one.

This can only take place in the Understanding, and the
process by which it is brought about is the following Our :

eyes are never quite parallel, excepting when we look at a

distant object, i.e. one which is more than 200 feet from
us. At other times they are both directed towards the
objectwe are viewing, whereby they converge, so as to
make the lines proceeding from each eye to the exact point
of the object on which it is fixed, form an angle, called the
optic angle; the lines themselves are called optic axes.
Now, when the object lies straight before us, these lines
exactly impinge upon the centre of each retina, therefore
in two points which correspond exactly to each other in
each eye. The Understanding, whose only business it is
to look for the cause of all things, at once recognises
the impression as coming from a single outside point,
although here the sensation is double, and attributes it to
one cause, which therefore presents itself as a single
object. For all that is perceived by us, is perceived as a
cause that to say, as the cause of an effect we have
is

experienced, consequently in the Understanding. As, never

theless, we take in not only a single point, but a consider
able surface of the object with both eyes, and yet perceive
it as a single
object, it will be necessary to pursue this
70 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP, iv.

explanation still further. All those parts of the object

which lieto one side of the vertex of the optic angle no

longer send their rays straight into the centre, but to the
side, of the retina in each eye ; in both sides, however, to the
same, let us say the left, side. The points therefore
upon which these rays impinge, correspond symmetrically to

each other, as well as the centres in other words, they are

Fig. 2,
o

homonymous points. The Understanding soon learns to

know them, and accordingly extends the above-mentioned
rule ofits causal perception to them also consequently it ;

not only refers those rays which impinge upon the centre
of each retina, but those also which impinge upon all the
other symmetrically corresponding places in both retinae,
to a single radiant point in the object viewed that is, it :

sees all these points likewise as single, and the entire

 FIEST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 71

object also. Now, it should be well observed, that in this

process not the outer side of one retina which corre
it is

sponds to the outer side of the other, and the inner to the
inner of each, but the right side of one retina which corre
sponds to the right side of the other, and so forth so that ;

this symmetrical correspondence must not be taken in a

physiological, but in a geometrical sense. Numerous and
very clear illustrations of this process, and of all the
phenomena which are connected with it, are to be found in
Robert Smith s "Optics,"
and partly also in Kastner s

German I only give one (fig. 2), which,

translation (1755).

properly speaking, represents a special case, mentioned

further on, but which may also serve to illustrate the
whole, if we leave the point E out of question. Ac
cording to this illustration, we
invariably direct both eyes
equally towards the object, in order that the symmetrically
corresponding places on both retinas may catch the rays
projected from the same points. Now, when we move our
eyes upwards and downwards, to the sides, and in all
directions, the point in the object which first impinged
upon the central point of each retina, strikes a different

place every time, but in all cases one which, in each eye,
corresponds to the place bearing the same name in the
other eye. In examining (perlustrare) an object, we let our
eyes glide backwards and forwards over it, in order to
bring each" point of it successively into contact with the
centre of the retina, which sees most distinctly we feel it :

all over with our eyes. It is therefore obvious that seeing

singly with two eyes is in fact the same process as feeling

a body with ten fingers, each of which receives a different
impression, each moreover in a different direction: the
totality of these impressions being nevertheless recognised
by the Understanding as proceeding from one object, whose
shape and size it accordingly apprehends and constructs in
Space. This is why it is possible for a blind man to become
72 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

a sculptor, as was the case, for instance, with the famous

Joseph KLeinhaus, who died in Tyrol, 1853, having been a
1
sculptor from his fifth year. For, no matter from what
cause it may have derived its data, perception is invariablv
an operation of the Understanding.
But just as a single ball seems tome double, if I touch
itwith my fingers crossed since my Understanding, at once
reverting to the cause and constructing it according to the
laws of Space, takes for granted that the fingers are in
their normal position and of course cannot do otherwise
than attribute two spherical surfaces, which come in contact
with the outer sides of the first and middle fingers, to two
different balls just so also does an object seem double,
if my eyes, instead of converging symmetrically and en

closing the optic angle at a single point of the object, each

view it at a different inclination in other words, if I
squint. For the rays, which in this case emanate from one
point of the object, no longer impinge upon those symme
trically corresponding points in both retinas with which my
mind has grown familiar by long experience, but upon
other, quite different ones which, in a symmetrical position
of the eyes, could only be affected in this way by different
1
The Frankfort "

1853, gives the

Konversationsblatt," July 22,
following account of this sculptor blind sculptor, Joseph
:
"

The
Kleinhaus, died at Nauders, in Tyrol, on the 10th inst. Having lost
his eyesightthrough small-pox when he was five years old, he began to
amuse himself with carving and modelling, as a pastime. Prugg gave
him some instructions, and supplied him with models, and at the age of
twelve he carved a Christ in life-size. During a short stay in Nissl a

workshop at Fiigen, his progress was so rapid, that, thanks to his good

capacities and talents, his fame as the blind sculptor soon spread far and
wide. His works are numerous and of various kinds. His Chris ts
alone, of which there are about four hundred, bear special witness to his

proficiency, particularly taken into consideration. He

if his blindness is

sculptured many other objects besides, and, but two months ago, lie
modelled a bust of the Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria which has
been sent to Vienna."
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 73

bodies ;
I therefore now see two objects, precisely because

perception takes place by means of,

and within, the Under
standing. The same thing happens without squinting
when, for instance, I look fixedly at the furthest of two
objects placed at unequal distances before me,
and com
plete the optic angle at it ; for then the rays emanating
from the nearer object do not impinge upon symmetrically
corresponding places in both retinas, wherefore my Under
standing attributes them to two objects, i.e. I see the
nearer object double (see fig. 2, page 70). If, on the con
trary, I complete the optic angle at the nearer object, by
looking steadily at it, the further object appears double. It
iseasy to test this by holding a pencil two feet from the
eyes,and looking alternately at it and at some other more
distant object behind it.
But the finest thing of all is, that this experiment may
quite well be reversed: so that, with two real objects
straight before and close to us, and with our eyes wide
open, we nevertheless see but one. This is the most striking

proof that perception is a work of the Understanding and

by no means contained in sensation. Let two cardboard
tubes, about 8 inches long and If inches in diameter, be
fastened parallel to one another, like those of a binocular
telescope, and fix a shilling at the end of each tube. On
applying our eyes to the opposite extremity and looking
through the tubes, we shall see only one shilling sur
rounded by one tube. For in this case the eyes being forced
into a completely parallel position, the rays emanating
from the coins impinge exactly upon the centres of the two
retinas and those points which immediately surround
them, therefore upon places which correspond symmetri
cally to each other; consequently the Understanding,
taking for granted the usual convergent position of the
optic axes when objects are near, admits but one object as
the cause of the reflected rays. In other words, we see but
74 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

one object so direct is the act of causal apprehension in

;

the Understanding.
We have not space enough here to refute one by one the
physiological explanations of single vision which have been
attempted; but their fallacy is shown by the following
considerations :

1. If seeing single were dependent upon an organic

connection, the corresponding points in both retinas, on
which this phenomenon is shown to depend, would corre
spond organically, whereas they do so in a merely geo
metrical sense, as has already been said. For, organically

speaking, the two inner and two outer corners of the eyes
are those which correspond, and so it is with the other
parts also ; whereas for the purpose of single vision, it is
the right side of the right retina which corresponds to the
right side of the left retina, and so on, as the phenomena
just described irrefutably show. It is also precisely on
account of the intellectual character of the process, that
only the most intelligent animals, such as the higher
mammalia and birds of prey more especially owls have
their eyes placed so as to enable them to direct both optic
axes to the same point.
2. The hypothesis of a confluence or partial intersection
of the optic nerves before entering the brain, originated by
Newton, 1 is false, it would then be impos
simply because
sible to by squinting. Vesalius and Caesal-
see double

pinus besides have already brought forward anatomical

instances in which subjects saw single, although neither
fusion nor even contact of the optic nerves had taken
place. A final argument against
the hypothesis of a mixed

impression is supplied by the fact, that on closing our right

eye firmly and looking at the sun with our left, the bright
image which persists for a time is always in the left, never
in the right, eye and vice versa.
:

1
Newton,
"

Optics." Query 15.

 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 75

The third process by which the Understanding converts

sensation into perception, consists in constructing bodies
out of the simple surfaces hitherto obtained that is, in
adding the third dimension. This it does by estimating
the expansion of bodies in this third dimension in Space
which is known to the Understanding a priori through
Causality, according to the degree in which the eye
is

affected by the objects, and to the gradations of light and

shade. In fact, although objects fill
Space in all three
dimensions, they can only produce an impression upon the
eye with two for the nature of that organ is such, that
;

our sensation, in seeing, is merely plauimetrical, not stereo-

metrical. All thatstereometrical in our perception is

is

a/lded by the Understanding, which has for its sole data

the direction whence the eye receives its impression, the
limits of that impression,and the various gradations of light
and dark: these data directly indicate their causes, and
enable us to distinguish whether what we have before us
is a disk or a ball. This mental process, like the preceding

ones, takes place so immediately and with such rapidity,

that we are conscious of nothing but the result. It is this
which makes perspective drawing so difficult a problem,
that it can only be solved by mathematics and has to be
learnt although all it has to do, is to represent the sen
;

sation of seeing as it presents itself to our Understanding

as a datum for the third process : that is, visual sen
sation in its merely planimetrical extension, to the two
dimensions of which extension, together with the said data
in them, the Understanding forthwith adds the third, in

contemplating a drawing as well as in contemplating reality.

Perspective drawing is, in fact, a sort of writing which can
be read as easily as printed type, but which few are able to
write precisely because our intellect, in perceiving, only
;

apprehends effects with a view to constructing their causes,

immediately losing sight of the former as soon as it has
76 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV,

discovered the latter. For instance, we instantly recognise

a chair, whatever position it may be in while drawing a
;

chair in any position belongs to the art which abstracts

from this third process of the Understanding, in order to pre
sent the data alone for the spectator himself to complete.
In its narrowest acceptation, as we have already seen, this is

the art of drawing in perspective in a -more comprehensive

;

sense, it is the whole art of painting. A

painting presents
us with outlines drawn according to the rules of perspec
tive lighter and darker places proportioned to the effect
;

of light and shade; finally patches of colouring, which

are determined as to quality and intensity by the teaching
of experience. This the spectator reads and interprets by
referring similar effects to their accustomed causes. The
painter s art consists in consciously retaining the data of
visual sensation in the artist s memory, as they are before
this third intellectual process ;
while we, who are not artists,
cast them
aside without retaining them in our memory,
as soon as we have made use of them for the purpose
described above. We shall become still better acquainted
with this third intellectual process by now passing on to a
fourth, which, from its intimate connection with the third,
serves to elucidate it.

This fourth operation of the "Understanding consists in

acquiring knowledge of the distance of objects from us :

it is this precisely which constitutes that third dimension

ofwhich we have been speaking. Visual sensation, as we

have said, gives us the direction in which objects lie, but
not their distance from us that is, not their position. It
:

is for the Understanding therefore to find out this dis

tance; or, in other words, the distance must be inferred
from purely causal determinations. Now the most im
portant of these is the visual angle, which objects subtend ;

yet even this is quite ambiguous

and unable to decide
itself. It is like a word of double meaning
anything by :
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 77

the sense, in which it is to be understood, can only be

gathered from connection with the rest. An object

its

subtending the same visual angle may in fact be small

and near, or large and far off and it is only when we have
;

previously ascertained its size, that the visual angle enables

us to recognise its distance : and conversely, its size, when
its distance is known Linear perspective is based
to us.

upon the fact that the visual angle diminishes as the dis
tance increases, and its principles may here be easily de
duced. As our sight ranges equally in all directions, we
see everything in reality as from the interior of a hollow

sphere, of which our eye occupies the centre.

Now in the
first place, an infinite number of intersecting circles pass

through the centre of this sphere in all directions, and

the angles measured by the divisions of these circles are
the possible angles of vision. In the second place, the
sphere itself modifies its size according to the length
of
radius we give to it therefore we may also imagine it as
;

consisting of an infinity of concentric, transparent spheres.

As all radii diverge, these concentric spheres augment in
size in proportion to their distance from us, and the de

grees of their sectional circles increase correspondingly:

therefore the true size of the objects which occupy them
likewise increases. Thus objects are larger or smaller ac
cording to the size of the spheres of which they occupy
similar portions say 10 while their visual angle re
mains unchanged in both cases, leaving it therefore un
decided, whether the 10 occupied by a given object belong
to a sphere of 2 miles, or of 10 feet diameter. Conversely,
if the size of the object has been ascertained, the number

of degrees occupied by it will diminish in proportion to

the distance and the size of the sphere to which we refer
it, and all its outlines will contract in similar proportion.
From fundamental law of all perspective
this ensues the ;

for, as objects and the intervals between them must ne-

78 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. IV.

cessarily diminish in constant proportion to their distance

from us, all their outlines thereby contracting, the result
will be, that with increasing distance, what is above us
will descend, what is below us will ascend, and all that
lies at our sides will come nearer together. This pro
gressive convergence, this perspective, no doubt
linear
enables us to estimate distances, so far as we have before
us an uninterrupted succession of visibly connected objects ;
but we are not able to do this by means of the visual
angle alone, for here the help of another datum is required
by the Understanding, to act, in a sense, as commentary
to the visual angle, by indicating more precisely the share
we are to attribute to distance in that angle. Now
there
are four principal data of this kind, which I am about to
specify. Thanks to these data, even where there is no
linear perspective to guide us, if a man standing at a dis
tance of 200 feet appears to me subtending a visual angle
twenty-four times smaller than if he were only 2 feet off,
I can nevertheless in most cases estimate his size correctly.
All this proves once more that perception is not only a thing
of the senses, but of the intellect also. I will here add the
following special and interesting fact in corroboration of
what I have said about the basis of linear perspective as
well as about the intellectual nature of all perception.
When I have looked steadily at a coloured object with
sharply denned outlines say a red cross long enough
for the physiological image to form in my eye as a green
cross, the further the surface on to which I project it,
the larger it will appear to me and vice versa. For the
:

image itself occupies an unvarying portion of my retina,

i.e.the portion originally affected by the red cross there
;

fore when referred outwards, or, in other words, recognised

as the effect of an external object, it forms an unchanging
visual angle, say of 2. Now if, in this case, where all
commentary to the visual angle is wanting, I remove it to
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 79

a distant surface, with which I necessarily identify it as

to its effect, the cross will occupy 2 of a distant
"belonging

and therefore larger sphere, and is consequently large.

If, on the other hand, I project the image on to a nearer
object, it will occupy 2 of a smaller sphere, and is
therefore small. The resulting perception is in both cases
completely objective, quite like that of an external object ;

and as it proceeds from an entirely subjective reason

(from the image having been excited in quite a different
way), it thus confirms the intellectual character of all

objective perception. This phenomenon (which I dis

tinctly remember to have been the first to notice, in
1815) forms the theme of an essay by Seguin, published in
of the 2nd August, 1858, where it
"

the Comptes rendus

"

is servedup as a new
discovery, all sorts of absurd and
distorted explanations of it being given. Messieurs les
illustres confreres let pass no opportunity for heaping ex

periment upon experiment, the more complicated the

better. watchword; yet how rarely
Experience! is their
do we meet with any sound, genuine reflection upon the
phenomena observed! Experience! experience! followed
by twaddle.
To return to the subsidiary data which act as com
mentaries to a given visual angle, we find foremost among
them the mutationes oculi internee, by means of which the
eye adapts its refractory apparatus to various distances by
increasing and diminishing the refraction. In what these
modifications consist, has not yet been clearly ascertained.
They have been sought in the increased convexity, now of
the cornea, now of the crystalline lens; but the latest
theory seems to me the most probable one, according to
which the lens is moved backwards for distant vision and
forwards for near vision, lateral pressure, in the latter
case, giving it increased protuberance so that the process
;

would exactly resemble the mechanism of an opera-glass.

80 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. IV.

Kepler, however, had, in the main, already expressed this

theory, which may be found explained in A. Hueck s

pamphlet, Bewegung
"Die der
Krystallinse," 1841. If
we are not clearly conscious of these inner modifications
of the eye, we have at any rate a certain feeling of them,
and of this we immediately avail ourselves to estimate
distances. As however these modifications are not avail
able for the purposes of clear sight beyond the range of
from about 7 inches to 16 feet, the Understanding is only
able to apply this datum within those limits.
Beyond them, however, the second datum becomes avail
able that is to say, the optic angle, formed by the two
:

optic axes, which we had occasion to explain when speaking

of single vision. It is obvious that this optic angle be
comes smaller, the further the object is removed : and vice
versa. This different direction of the eyes, with respect to
each other, does not take place without producing a slight
sensation, of which we are nevertheless only in so far
conscious as the Understanding makes use of it, as a
datum, in estimating distances intuitively. By this datum
we are not only enabled to cognize the distance, but the
precise position of the object viewed, by means of the
parallax of the eyes, which consists in each eye seeing the
object in a slightly different direction so that if we close
;

one eye, the object seems to move. Thus it is not easy to snuff
a candle with one eye shut, because this datum is then
wanting. But as the direction of the eyes becomes parallel
as soon as the distance of the object reaches or exceeds
200 feet, and as the optic angle consequently then ceases
to exist, this datum only holds good within the said
distance.

Beyond the Understanding has recourse to atmo

it,

spheric perspective, which indicates a greater distance by

means of the increasing dimness of all colours, of the
appearance of physical blue in front of all dark objects
 FIEST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 81

(according to Gothe s perfectly correct and true

theory of
colours), and also of the growing indistinctness of all out
lines. In Italy, where the atmosphere is very transparent, ,

this datum loses its power and is apt to mislead Tivoli, :

for instance, seems to be very near when seen from Frascati.

On the other hand, all objects appear larger in a mist,
which is an abnormal exaggeration of the datum be ;

cause our Understanding assumes them to be further

from us.

Finally, there remains the estimation of distance by

means of the size (known to us intuitively) of intervening

objects, such as fields, woods, rivers, &c. &c. This mode

of estimation is only applicable where there is uninter

rupted succession in other words, it can only be applied

:

to terrestrial, not to celestial objects. Moreover, we have

in general more practice in using it horizontally than ver

tically: a ball on the top of a tower 200 feet high appears

much smaller to us than when lying on the ground 200
feetfrom us because, in the latter case, we estimate the
;

distancemore accurately. When we see human beings in

such a way, that what lies between them and ourselves is
in a great measure hidden from our sight, they always

appear strikingly small.

The fact that our Understanding assumes everything it
perceives in a horizontal direction to be farther off, therefore
larger, than what is seen in a vertical direction, must partly
be attributed to this last mode of estimating distances, inas
much as it only holds good when applied horizontally arid
to terrestrial objects ; but partly also to our estimation of
distances by atmospheric perspective, which is subject to
similar conditions. This is why the moon seems so much
larger on the horizon than at its zenith, although its visual
angle accurately measured that is, the image projected by
it on to the
eye is not at all larger in one case than in the
other and this also accounts for the flattened appearance of
;
82 THE FOUEFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

the vault of the sky that is to say, for its appearing to have
:

greater horizontal than vertical extension. Both pheno

mena therefore are purely intellectual or cerebral, not optical.
If it be objected, that even when at its zenith, the moon

occasionally has a hazy appearance without seeming to be

larger,we answer, that neither does it in that case appear
red ;
for its haziness proceeds from a greater density of

vapours, and is therefore of a different kind from that

which proceeds from atmospheric perspective. To this

may be added what I have already said: that we only
apply this mode of estimating distances in a horizontal,
not in a perpendicular, direction besides, in this case,
;

other correctives come into play. It is related of Saussure

that, when on the Mont Blanc, he saw so enormous a
moon rise, that, not recognising what it was, he fainted
with terror.
The properties of the telescope and magnifying glass,
on the other hand, depend upon a separate estimate
according to the visual angle alone : i.e., that of size
by distance, and of distance by size; because here the
four other supplementary means of estimating distances
are excluded. The telescope in reality magnifies objects,
while it only seems to bring them nearer because their
;

size being known

to us empirically, we here account for
its apparent increase by a diminution of their distance
from us. A
house seen through a telescope, for instance,
seems to be ten times nearer, not ten times larger, than
seen with the naked eye. The magnifying glass, on the
-contrary, does not really magnify, but merely enables
us to bring the object nearer to our eyes than would
otherwise be possible so that it only appears as large
;

as it would at that distance even without the magnify

ing glass. In fact, we are prevented from seeing objects
distinctly at less than from eight to ten inches distance
from our eyes, by the insufficient convexity of the ocular
 FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 83

lens and cornea ;

but if we increase the refraction by
substituting the convexity of the magnifying glass for
that of the lens and cornea, we then obtain a clear image
of objects even when they are as near as half an inch from
our eyes. Objects thus seen in close proximity to us and
in the size corresponding to that proximity, are transferred

by our Understanding to the distance at which we naturally

i.e. to about
see distinctly, eight or ten inches from our
eyes, and we then estimate their magnitude according to
this distance and to the given visual angle.
I have entered thus fully into detail concerning all the
different processes by which seeing is accomplished, in
order to show clearly and irrefragably that the predomi
nant factor in them is the Understanding, which, by con
ceiving each change as an effect and referring that effect to
its cause, produces the cerebral phenomenon of the
objec
tive world on the basis of the a priori fundamental intui
tions of Space and Time, for which it receives merely a
few data from the senses. And moreover the Understand
ing effects this exclusively by means of its own peculiar
form, the law of Causality; therefore quite directly and
intuitively, without any assistance whatever from reflec
tion that is, from abstract knowledge by means of concep
tions and of language, which are the materials of secondary
knowledge, i.e. of thought, therefore of Reason.
That knowledge through the Understanding is in
this

dependent of Reason s assistance, is shown even by the

fact, that when, at any time, the Understanding attributes
a given effect to a wrong cause, actually perceiving that
cause, whereby illusion arises, our Reason, however clearly
it may
recognise in abstracto the true state of the matter,
is nevertheless unable to assist the Understanding, and
the illusion persists undisturbed in spite of that better
knowledge. The above-mentioned phenomena of seeing
and feeling double, which result from an abnormal position
84s THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

of the organs of touch and sight, are instances of such

illusions; likewise the apparently increased size of the
rising moon; the image which forms in the focus of a
concave mirror and exactly resembles a solid body floating
in space the painted relievo which we take for real the
; ;

apparent motion of a shore or bridge on which we are

standing, if a ship happens to pass along or beneath it the
;

seeming proximity of very lofty mountains, owing to the

absence of atmospheric perspective, which is the result of
the purity of the air round their summits. In these and
in a multitude of similar cases, our Understanding takes
for granted the existence of the usual cause with which it is

conversant and forthwith perceives it, though our Reason

has arrived at the truth by a different road; for, the
knowledge of the Understanding being anterior to that of
the Eeason, the intellect remains inaccessible to the teaching
of the Eeason, and thus the illusion that is, the deception of
the Understanding remains immovable albeit error
;
that
is,the deception of the Eeason is obviated. That which
is correctly known by the
Understanding is reality : that
which is correctly known by the Eeason is truth, or in other
terms, a judgment having a sufficient reason; illusion
(that which is wrongly perceived) we oppose to reality :
error (that which is wrongly thought) to truth.
The purely formal part of empirical perception that is,
Space, Time, and the law of Causality is contained a
priori in the intellect ; but this is not the case with the
application of this formal part to empirical data, which has
to be acquired by the Understanding through practice and
experience. Therefore new-born infants, though they no
doubt receive impressions of light and of colour, still do
not apprehend or indeed, strictly speaking, see objects.
The first weeks of their existence are rather passed in a
kind of stupor, from which they awaken by degrees when
tnair Understanding begins to apply its function to the
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 85

data supplied by the senses, especially those of touch and

of sight, whereby they gradually gain consciousness of the

objective world. This newly-arising consciousness may be

clearly recognised by the look of growing intelligence in
their eyes and a degree of intention in their movements,
especially in the smile with which they show for the first
time recognition of those who take care of them. They
may even be observed to make experiments for a time
with their sight and touch, in order to complete their
apprehension of objects by different lights, in different
directions and at different distances: thus pursuing a
silent, but serious course of study, till they have succeeded
in mastering all the intellectual operations in seeing which
have been described. The fact of this schooling can be
ascertained still more
clearly through those who, being
born blind, have been operated upon late in life, since they
are able to give an account of their impressions. Chesel-
den s blind man 1 was not an isolated instance, and we
find in
similar cases the fact corroborated, that
all

those who
obtain their sight late in life, no doubt, see
light, outlines, and colours, as soon as the operation is
over, but that they have no objective perception of objects
until their Understanding has learnt to apply its causal
law to data and to changes which are new to it. On first
beholding his room and the various objects in it, Chesel-
den s blind man did not distinguish one thing from
another ;
he simply received the general impression of a
totality all in one piece, which he took for a smooth,
variegated surface. It never occurred to him to recognise
a number of detached objects, lying one behind the other
at different distances. With blind people of this sort, it

isby the sense of touch, to which objects are already

known, that they have to be introduced to the sense of
1
Sec the original report in vol. 35 of the "

Philosophical Transac
tions" as to this case.
86 THE FOUKFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

sight. In the beginning, the patient has no appreciation

whatever of distances and tries to lay hold of everything.
One, when he first saw his own house from outside, could
not conceive how so small a thing could contain so many
rooms. Another was highly delighted to find, some weeks
after the operation, that the engravings hanging on the
walls of his room represented a variety of objects. The
Morgenblatt" of October 23rd, 1817, contains an account
"

of a youth who was born blind, and obtained his sight

at the age of seventeen. He had to learn intelligent
perception, for at first sight he did not even recognise

objects previously known to him through the sense of

touch. Every object had to be introduced to the sense of
sight by means of the sense of touch. As for the distances
of the objects he saw, he had no appreciation whatever of
them, and tried to lay hold indiscriminately of everything,
far or near. Franz expresses himself as follows l :

"
A definite idea of form and size, is only ob
distance, as well as of
tained by sight on the impressions made
and touch, and by reflecting
on both senses; but for this purpose we must take into account the
muscular motion and voluntary locomotion of the individual. Caspar
Ilauser, in a detailed account of his own experience in this respect, states,
that upon his first liberation from confinement, whenever he looked through
the window upon external objects, such as the street, garden, &c., it ap
peared to him as if there were a shutter quite close to his eye, and covered
with confused colours of all kinds, in which he could recognise or distin
guish nothing singly. He says farther, that he did not convince himself till
after some time during his walks out of doors, that what had at first
appeared to him as a shutter of various colours, as well as many other
objects, were in reality very different things; and that at length the
shutter disappeared, and he saw and recognised all things in their just
proportions. Persons born blind who obtain their sight by an opera
tion in later years only, sometimes imagine that all objects touch their

eves, and lie so near to them that they are afraid of stumbling againsfc
them ;
sometimes they leap towards the moon, supposing that they can

1
Franz,
"

The Eye, a treatise on preserving this organ in a healthy

state and improving the sight." London, Churchill, 1839, pp. 34-36.
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 87

lay hold of it ; at other times they run after the clouds moving along
the sky, in order to catch them, or commit other such extravagancies.
Since ideas are gained by reflection upon sensation, it is further neces
sary in all cases, in order that an accurate idea of objects may be

formed from the sense of sight, that the powers of the mind should be
unimpaired, and undisturbed in their exercise. proof of this is A
afforded in the instance related by Haslam, of a boy who had no
1

defect of sight, but was weak in understanding, and who in his seventh

year was unable to estimate the distances of objects, especially as to

height ; he would extend his hand frequently towards a nail on the
towards the moon, to catch it. It is therefore the judgment
ceiling, or
which corrects and makes clear this idea, or perception of visible
objects."

The intellectual nature of perception as I have shown it,

a
is corroborated physiologically by Flourens as follows :

faut faire line grand distinction entre les sens et 1 intelligence.

"

II

L ablation d un tubercule determine la perte de la sensation, du sens de

la vue; la retine devient insensible, 1 iris devient immobile. ablation L
d un lobe cerebral laisse la sensation, le sens, la sensibility de la re tine,
la mobility de 1 iris ; elle ne detruit que la perception seule. Dans un
cas, c est un autre, un fait cerebral ; dans un
fait sensor ial ; et,
1 dans
cas, c est la perte du sens ; dans
autre, c est la perte de la perception.
1

La distinction des perceptions et des sensations est encore un grand

resultat ; et il est demontre aux yeux. II y a deux moyens de faire

perdre la vision par 1 encephale 1 par les tubercules, c est la perte du

:

sens, de la sensation ; 2 par les lobes, c est la perte de la perception, de

1intelligence. La sensibilite n est done pas 1 intelligence; penser n est
done pas sentir ; et voila toute une philosophic rcnversee. L n est ide"e

done pas, la sensation ; et voila encore une autre preuve du vice radical
de cette philosophic." And again, p. 77, under the heading: Separa
tion de la Sensibility et de la Perception II y a une de mes exp6-
"

rences qui separe nettement la sensibilite de la perception. Quand

on enleve le cerveau proprement dit (lobes ou hemispheres cerebraux) a un
animal, Panimal perd la vue. Mais, par rapport a I ceil, rien n est
change les objets continuent a se peindre sur la re tine ; Viris reste
:

contractile, le nerf optique sensible, parfaitement sensible.

Et cepeii-

1
Haslam s "Observations on Madness and Melancholy," 2nd ed.

p. 1921
2
Flourens, "De la vie et de 1 Intelligence," 2nd edition, Paris,
Gamier Freres, 1852, p. 49.
88 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

dant animal ne voit plus il n

1
; y a plus vision, quoique tout ce qui est
sensation subsiste n y a plus vision, parce qu il n y a plus perception.
,
il

Le percevoir, et non le sentir, est done le premier element de V intelli

gence. La perception est partie de ^intelligence, car elle se perd avec
Yintelligence, et par 1 ablation du meme organe, les lobes ou hemispheres
certbraux ; et la sensibility n en est point partie, puisqu elle subsiste

apres la perte de ^intelligence et 1 ablation des lobes ou hemispheres"

The following famous verse of the ancient philosopher

Epicharmus, proves that the ancients in general recog

nized the intellectual nature of perception Novc opij Kal :

VOVQ aKovti Ta\\a *cw^a /cat rv^Xa. (Mens videt, mens audit;
l
ccetera surda et cceca.) Plutarch in quoting this verse,
2
adds : w c TOV Trepl TO. u/^uarct KOI
wra irddovg, av pt] Trapfj TO
fypovovv, ai<rdri<Tiv
ov TTOLOVVTO^ (guia affectio oculorum et

aurium nullum affert sensum, intelligentia absents). Shortly

before too he says 27-parw^oc TOV fyvaiKoii \6yo^ lortV, aVo :

tieiKVvav WQ OV& aiffddvEvdai Toirapdirav avtv TOV voiiv virdp\et.

(Stratonis pliysici exstat ratiocinatio, qua sine intelligentia
"

3
omnino nihil posse
"

sentiri demonstrat.) Again shortly

after he says oOev aVay/CT?, Trdcriv, oTg TO aladdj e&dat, Kal
:

TO votiv virajO^eiv, el TV voiiv aiaBdvtaQcu Tre^vKa^v (quars

necesse est, omnia, quce sentiunt, etiam intelligere, siquidem
intelligendo demum sentiamus)* A. second verse of Epi
charmus might be connected with this, which is quoted
by Diogenes Laertes (iii. 16) :

Efymig, TO GOfyvV iGTIV OV KO.O tV /JLOVOV,

dXX oaa ?rep %

1
"It is the mind that sees and hears j all besides is deaf and
blind."
(Tr. Ad.)
2
Plutarch, De solert. animal." c. 3. For the affection of our
" "

eyes and ears does not produce any perception, unless it be accompanied
by thought." (Tr. Ad.)
3 c
Straton, the physicist, has proved that without thinking
"

it is
"

quite impossible to perceive. (Tr. Ad.)

4
Therefore it is necessary that all who perceive should also think,
"

since we are so constituted as to perceive by means of thinking."

(Tr. Ad.)
 FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 89

(Eumaee, sapientia non uni tantum competit, sed qucecunque

vivunt etiam intellectum Tiabent.) Porphyry likewise endea
vours to show at length that all animals have under
1
standing.
Now, that it so, follows necessarily from the
should be
intellectual character of perception. / All animals, even
down to the very lowest, must have Understanding that
is, knowledge of the causal law, although they have it in

very different degrees of delicacy and of clearness ; at any

rate they must have as much of it as is required for percep
tion by their senses ; for sensation without Understanding
would be not only a useless, but a cruel gift of
Nature.^
No one, who has himself any intelligence, can doubt the
existence of it in the higher animals. But at times it even
becomes undeniably evident that their knowledge of
causality is actually a priori, and that it does not arise
from the habit of seeing one thing follow upon another. A
very young puppy will not, for instance, jump off a table,
because he foresees what would be the consequence. Not
long ago I had some large curtains put up at my bed
room window, which reached down to the floor, and were
drawn aside from the centre by means of a string. The
first morning they were opened I was surprised to see
my
dog, a very intelligent poodle, standing quite perplexed,
and looking upwards and sidewards for the cause of the
phenomenon that is, he was seeking for the change which
:

he knew a priori must have taken place. Next day the

same thing happened again. But even the lowest animals
have perception consequently Understanding down to
the aquatic polypus, which has no distinct organs of sensa
tion, yet wanders from leaf to leaf on its waterplant, while

clinging to it with its feelers, in search of more light.

Nor is there, indeed, any difference, beyond that of

1 -

Porph. "De abstinentia, iii. 21.

90 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

degree, between this lowest Understanding and that of

man, which we however distinctly separate from his
Reason. The intermediate gradations are occupied by the
various series of animals, among which the highest, such
as the monkey, the elephant, the dog, astonish us often by
their intelligence.But in every case the business of the
Understanding is invariably to apprehend directly causal
relations :
first, as we have seen, those between our own
body and other bodies, whence proceeds objective percep
tion; then those between these objectively perceived bodies
among themselves, and here, as has been shown in 20,
the causal relation manifests itself in three forms as
cause, as stimulus, and as motive. All movement in the
world takes place according to these three forms of the
causal relation, and through them alone does the intellect
comprehend it. Now, if, of these three, causes, in the nar
rowest sense of the word, happen to be the object of inves-
gation for the Understanding, it will produce Astronomy,
Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry, and will invent machines
for good and for evil but in all cases a direct, intuitive
;

apprehension of the causal connection will in the last resort

lieat the bottom of all its discoveries. For the sole form
and function of the Understanding is this apprehension, and
not by any means the complicated machinery of Kant s
twelve Categories, the nullity of which I have proved.
(All comprehension is a direct, consequently intuitive,
apprehension of the causal connection ; although this has
to be reduced at once to abstract conceptions in order to be
fixed. To calculate therefore, is not to understand, and,
in itself, calculation conveys no comprehension of things.
Calculation deals exclusively with abstract conceptions of
magnitudes, whose mutual relations it determines. By it
we never attain the slightest comprehension of a physical

process, for this requires intuitive comprehension of

space-relations, by means of which causes take effect.

 FIKST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 91

Calculations have merely practical, not theoretical, value.

It may even be said that where calculation begins, compre
hension ceases ; for a brain occupied with numbers is, as
long as it calculates, entirely estranged from the causal
connection in physical processes, being engrossed in purely
abstract, numerical conceptions. The result, however, only
shows us how much, never what. "

Ij experience et le

calcul," those watchwords of French physicists, are not

therefore by any means adequate [for thorough insight] .)
If, again, stimuli are the guides of the Understanding, it
will produce Physiology of Plants and Animals, Thera

peutics, and Toxicology. Finally, if it devotes itself to

the study of motives, the Understanding will use them, on
the one hand, theoretically, to guide it in producing works
on Morality, Jurisprudence, History, Politics, and even
Dramatic and Epic Poetry; on the other hand, practically,
either merely to train animals, or for the higher purpose of

making human beings dance to its music, when once it has

succeeded in discovering which particular wire has to be
pulled in order to move each puppet at its pleasure. Now,
with reference to the function which effects this, it is quite
immaterial whether the intellect turns gravitation in
geniously to account, and makes it serve its purpose by
stepping in just at the right time, or whether it brings the
collective or the individual propensities of men into play
for its own ends. In its practical application we call the

Understanding shrewdness or, when used to outwit others,

cunning ; when its aims are very insignificant, it is called
slyness and, if combined with injury to others, craftiness.
In its purely theoretical application, we call it simply
Understanding, the higher degrees of which are named
acumen, sagacity, discernment, penetration, while its lower
degrees are termed dulness, stupidity, silliness, &c. &c.
These widely differing degrees of sharpness are innate, and
cannot be acquired although, as I have already shown,
;
92 THE FOTJKFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. IV.

even in the earliest stages of the application of the Under

standing, i.e. in empirical perception, practice and know
ledge of the material to which it is applied, are needed.
Every simpleton has Reason give him the premisses, and
he will draw the conclusion; whereas primary, con
sequently intuitive, knowledge is supplied by the Under
standing: herein lies the difference. The pith of every
great discovery, of every plan having universal historical
importance, is accordingly the product of a happy moment
in which, by a favourable coincidence of outer and inner
circumstances, some complicated causal series., some hidden
causes of phenomena which had been seen thousands of
times before, or some obscure, untrodden paths, suddenly
reveal themselves to the intellect.

By the preceding explanations of the processes in seeing

and feeling, I have incontestably shown that jempirical per
ception is essentially the work of the Understanding ,\ for
which the material only is supplied by the senses in sensa
tion and a poor material it is, on the whole so that] the
;

Understanding is, in fact, the artist, while the senses are

but the under- workmen who hand it the materials. But \

the process consists throughout in referring from given

effects to their causes, which by this process are enabled to

present themselves as objects in Space, The very fact that

j

we presuppose Causality in this process, proves precisely

that this law must have been supplied by the Under
standing itself for it could never have found its way into
;

the intellect from outside. I It is indeed the first condition

of all empirical perception but this again is the form in
;

which all external experience presents itself to us;|how

then can h s law of Causality be derived from experience,
when it is itself essentially presupposed by experience ?-j-It
was just because of the utter impossibility of this, and
because Locke s philosophy had put an end to all a priority,
that Hume denied the whole reality of the conception of
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 93

Causality. He had besides already mentioned two false

hypotheses in the seventh section of his "Inquiry concerning
the Human Understanding," which recently have again been
advanced : the one, that the effect of the will upon the
members of our body; the other, that the resistance
opposed to our pressure by outward objects, is the origin
and prototype of the conception of Causality. Hume refutes
both in his own way and according to his own order of
ideas. I argue as follows, There is no causal connection
j

whatever between acts of the will and actions of the body ;

on the contrary, both are immediately one and the same

thing, only perceived in a double aspect that is, on the
one hand, in our self-consciousness, or inner sense, as acts
of the will; on the other, simultaneously in exterior,
1
spacial brain-perception, as actions of the body. ! The
second hypothesis is false, first because, as I have
already
shown at length, a mere sensation of touch does not yet

give any objective perception whatever, let alone the con

ception of Causality, which never can arise from the feeling
of an impeded muscular effort besides impediments of this
:

kind often occur without any external cause; secondly,

because our pressing against an external object necessarily
has a motive, and this already presupposes apprehension of
that object, which again presupposes knowledge of Cau
sality. But the only means of radically proving the con
ception of Causality to be independent of all experience was
by showing, as I have done, that the whole possibility of
experience is conditioned by the conception of Causality.
In 23 I intend to show that Kant s proof, propounded
with a similar intent, is false.
This is also the proper place for drawing attention to the

1
Compare "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. ii.
p. 41.
[The 3rd edition of Die Welt a. W. u. contains at this place a
"

V."

supplement which is wanting in the 2nd edition, vol. ii. p. 38. Note bj
the Editor of the 3rd edition.]
94 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

fact, that Kant

either did not clearly recognise in empirical

perception the mediation of the causal law which law is

known to us before all experience or that he intentionally
evaded mentioning it, because it did not suit his purpose. In
the Critique of Pure Season," for instance, the relation be-
"

tween causality and perception is not treated in the Doc "

trine of Elements," but in the chapter on the

"

Paralogisms
of Pure Reason," where one would hardly expect to find it ;

moreover it appears in his Critique of the Fourth Para

"

logism of Transcendental Psychology," and only in the

1
first edition. The very fact that this place should have
been assigned to it, shows that in considering this relation,
he always had the transition from the phenomenon to the
thing in itself exclusively in view, but not the genesis of per
ception itself. Here accordingly he says that the existence
of a real external object is not given directly in perception,
but can be added to it in thought and thus inferred.
In Kant s eyes, however, he who does this is a Transcen
dental Realist, and consequently on a wrong road. For by
his outward object" Kant here means the thing in itself.
"

The Transcendental Idealist, on the contrary, stops short

at the perception of something empirically real that is, of

something existing outside us in Space without needing

the inference of a cause to give it reality. For perception,
according to Kant, quite directly accomplished without
is

any assistance from the causal nexus, and consequently

from the Understanding: he simply identifies perception
with sensation. This we find confirmed in the passage
which begins, "

With reference to the reality of external

2
objects, I need as little trust to inference," &c. &c. and
a^ain in the sentence commencing with
"

Now we may well

1
Kant,
"

Krit. d. r. V." 1st edition, p. 367 sqq. (English transla

tion by M. Miiller, p. 318 sqq.)
2
Kant, Krit. d. r. Vern." 1st edition, p, 371.
"

(English translation,
by M. Muller, p. 322.)
 FIEST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 95
1
admit," It is quite clear from these passages that
&c. &C.
perception of external things in Space, according to Kant,
precedes all application of the causal law, therefore that
the causal law does not belong to perception as an element
and condition of it for him, mere sensation is identical
:

with perception. Only in as far as we ask what may, in a

transcendental sense, exist outside of us : that is, when we
ask for the thing in itself, is Causality mentioned as con
nected with perception. Moreover Kant admits the exis
tence, nay, the mere possibility, of causality only in reflec
tion that is, in abstract, distinct knowledge by means of
:

conceptions therefore he has no suspicion that its applica

;

tion is anterior to all reflection, which is nevertheless evi

dently the case, especially in empirical, sensuous perception
which, as I have proved irrefragably in the preceding ana
lysis, could never take place otherwise. Kant is therefore
obliged to leave the genesis of empirical perception unex
plained. With him it is a mere matter of the senses, given
as it were in a miraculous way : that is, it coincides with
sensation. I should very much like my reflective readers
to refer to the passages I have indicated in Kant s work, in
order to convince themselves of the far greater accuracy of
my view of the whole process and connection. Kant s ex
tremely erroneous view has held its ground till now in
philosophical literature, simply because no one ventured to
attack it ;
therefore I have found it necessary to clear the
way in order to throw light upon the mechanism of our
knowledge.
Kant s fundamental idealistic position loses nothing
whatever, nay, it even gains by this rectification of mine,
in as far as, with me, the necessity of the causal law is
absorbed and extinguished in empirical perception as its
product and cannot therefore be invoked in behalf of an
1
1st edition, p. 372.
"

Kant, Krit. d. r. Vern." (English transla

tion, p. 323.)
96 THE FOURFOLD KOOT. [CHAP. IV.

entirely transcendent question as to the thing in itself.

On referring to my theory above concerning empirical per
ception, we find that
its first datum, sensation, is absolutely

subjective, being a process within the organism, because it

takes place beneath the skin. Locke has completely and
exhaustively proved, that the feelings of our senses, even
admitting them to be roused by external causes, cannot
have any resemblance whatever to the qualities of those
causes. Sugar, for instance, bears no resemblance at all to
sweetness, nor a rose to redness. But that they should
need an external cause at all, is based upon a law whose
origin lies demonstrably within us, in our brain ;
therefore
this necessity is not less subjective than the sensations
themselves. Nay, even Time that primary condition
of every possible change, therefore also of the change
which first permits the application of the causal law and
not less Space which alone renders the externalisation
of causes possible, after which they present themselves
to us as objects even Time and Space, we say, are sub
jective forms of the intellect, as Kant has conclusively
proved. Accordingly we find all the elements of em
pirical perception lying within us, and nothing contained
in them which can give us reliable indications as to any
thing differing absolutely from ourselves, anything in
itself.But this is not all. What we think under the con
ception matter, is the residue which remains over after
bodies have been divested of their shape and of all their
specific qualities : a residue, which precisely on that account
must be identical in all bodies. Now these shapes and
qualities which have been abstracted by us, are nothing
but the peculiar, specially defined way in which these bodies
act, which constitutes precisely their difference. If there
fore we leave these shapes and qualities out of considera
tion, there remains nothing but mere activity in general,

pure action as such, Causality itself, objectively thought

 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 97

I that is, the reflection of our own Understanding, the exter-

I nalised image of its sole function ;
and Matter is throughout
1
I pure Causality, its essence is Action in general. This is
S
why pure Matter cannot be perceived, but can only be
I
thought it is a something we add to every reality, as its
:

S basis, in thinking it. For pure Causality, mere action, with-

out any denned mode of action, cannot become perceptible,
||

S therefore it cannot come within any experience. Thus

Matter is only the objective correlate to pure Understand-
|
I
ing for it is Causality in general, and nothing else just as
;
:

I the Understanding itself is direct knowledge of cause and

t effect, Now this again is precisely why
and nothing else.

B the law of causality not applicable to Matter itself that

is :

is to say, Matter has neither beginning nor end, but is and

remains permanent. For as, on the one hand, Causality is

the indispensable condition of all alternation in the acci
dents (forms and qualities) of Matter, i.e. of all passage in
and out of being but as, on the other hand, Matter is
;

pure Causality itself, as such, objectively viewed : it is un

able to exercise its own power upon itself, just as the eye
can see everything but itself. and Mattel
"

Substance "

being moreover identical, we may call Substance, action

viewed in abstracto : Accidents, particular modes of action,
action in concreto. Now these are the results to which true,
transcendental, Idealism leads. In my chief work I have
i.e.

shown that the thing in itself i.e. whatever, on the whole,

exists independently of our representation cannot be got
at that, to reach it, we must
by way of representation, but
follow quite a different path, leading through the inside of
things, which lets us into the citadel, as it were, by
treachery.
But it would be downright chicanery, nothing else, to
1
Compare
"

Die Welt a. W. u. V." 2nd edition ;

vol. i. sect. 4, p. 9 ;

and vol. ii.

pp. 48, 49 (3rd edition, vol. i.
p. 10; vol. ii.
p. 52). English
translation, vol. i.
pp. 9-10 j
vol. ii. p. 218.
H
98 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

try and compare, let alone identify, such an honest, deep,

thorough analysis of empirical perception as the one I have
just given, which proves all the elements of perception to
be subjective, with Fichte s algebraic equations of the Ego
and the Non-Ego ; with his sophistical pseudo-demonstra
tions, which in order to be able to deceive his readers had
to be clothed in the obscure, not to say absurd, language

adopted by him with his explanations of the way in which

;

the Ego spins the Non-Ego out of itself in short, with all ;

1
the buffoonery of scientific emptiness. Besides, I protest
altogether against any community with this Fichte, as Kant
publiclyand emphatically did in a notice ad hoc in the
Jenaer Litteratur Zeitung." Hegelians and similar
"

ignoramuses may continue to hold forth to their heart s

content upon Kant-Fichteian philosophy there exists a :

Kantian philosophy and a Fichteian hocus-pocus, this is

the true state of the case, and will remain so, in spite of those
who delight in extolling what is bad and in decrying what
is good, and of these Germany possesses a larger number

than any other country.

. 22. Of the Immediate Object.

Thus it is from the sensations of our body that we

receive the data for the very first application of the causal
law, and it is precisely by that application that the percep
tion of this class of objects arises. They therefore have
their essence and existence solely in virtue of the intel
lectual function thus coming into play, and of its

exercise.

Wissenschaftsleere (literally, emptiness of science}, a pun of Schopen

1

hauer s on the title of Fichte s Wissenschaftslehre (doctrine of science),

which cannot be rendered in English. (Tr. s Note.)

2 See the
Kant, "Erklarung iiber Fichte s Wissenschaftslehre."
of the Jena Literary Gazette (1799), No. 109.
"
"

Intelligenzblatt
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 99

Now, as far as it is the starting-point, i.e. the mediator,

for our perception of all other objects, I have called the

bodily organism, in the first edition of the present work,

the Immediate Object; this, however, must not be taken
in a strictly literal sense. For although our bodily sensa
tions are all apprehended directly, still this immediate

apprehension does not yet make our body itself perceptible

to us asan object on the contrary, up to this point all
;

remains subjective, that is to say, sensation. From this

sensation certainly proceeds the perception of all other
objects as the causes of such sensations, and these causes
then present themselves to us as objects but it is not so
;

with the body itself, which only supplies sensations to

consciousness. It is only indirectly that we know even
this body objectively, i.e. as an object, by its presenting
itself, like all other objects, as the recognised cause of a

subjectively given effect and precisely on this account

objectively in our Understanding, or brain (which is the

same). Now this can only take place when its own senses
are acted upon by its parts for instance, when the body is
:

seen by the eye, or felt by the hand, &c., upon which data
the brain (or understanding) forthwith constructs it as to
shape and quality in space. The immediate presence in
our consciousness of representations belonging to this
class,depends therefore upon the position assigned to them
in the causal chain by which all things are connected
relatively to the body (for the time being) of the Subject
by which (the Subject) all things are known.

.23. Arguments against Kant s Proof of the a priority of

the conception of Causality.

One of the chief objects of the Critique of Pure

"

Beason" is to show the universal

validity, for all expe
rience, of the causal law, its a priority, and, as a necessary
100 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

consequence of this, its restriction to possible experience,

Nevertheless, I cannot assent to the proof there given of
the a priority of the principle, which is substantially
this The synthesis of the manifold by the imagina
:
"

tion, which is necessary for all empirical knowledge,

gives succession, but not yet determinate succession :

that is, it leaves undetermined which of two states per

ceived was the first, not only in my imagination, but in the
object itself. But definite order in this succession
through which alone what we perceive becomes experience,
or, in other words, authorizes us to form objectively valid

judgments is first brought into it by the purely intel

lectual conception of cause and effect. Thus the principle
of causal relation is the condition which renders experience
l
possible, and, as such, it is given us a priori"
According to this, the order in which changes succeed
each other in real objects becomes known to us as objec
tive onlyby their causality. This assertion Kant repeats
and explains in the Critique of Pure Reason," especially
"

in his Second Analogy of Experience," 2 and again at the

"

conclusion of his Third Analogy," and I request every

"

one who desires to understand what I am now about to

say, to read these passages. In them he affirms every
where that the objectivity of the succession of representa-
tions which he defines as their correspondence with the
succession of real objects is only known through the
rule by which they follow upon one another: that is,
through the law of causality ;
that my mere apprehension
consequently leaves the objective relation between phe
nomena following one another quite undetennined since :

1
1st edition, p. 201
"

Kant, Krit. d. r. Vern."

;
5th edition, p, 246.
(English translation Miiller, p. by M. 176.) This is, however, not a
literal quotation. (Tr. s note. )
2
Ibid. p. 189 of the 1st edition; more fully, p. 232 of the 5th
edition. (English translation by M. Miiller, p. 166.)
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 101

I merely apprehend the succession of my own representa

tions, but the succession in my apprehension does not
authorize me to form any judgment whatever as to the
succession in the object, unless that judgment be based
upon causality and since, besides, I might invert the order
;

in which these perceptions follow each other in my appre

hension, there being nothing which determines them as
objective. To illustrate this assertion, Kant brings forward
the instance of a house, whose parts we may consider in any
order we like, from top to bottom, or from bottom to top ;

the determination of succession being in this case purely

subjectiveand not founded upon an object, because it
depends upon our pleasure. In opposition to this instance,
he brings forward the perception of a ship sailing down a
river, which we see successively lower and lower down the
stream, which perception of the successively varying posi
tions of the ship cannot be changed by the looker-on. In
this latter case, therefore, he derives the subjective follow

ing in his own apprehension from the objective following

in the phenomenon, and on this account he calls it an
event. Now I maintain, on the contrary, that there is no
difference at all between these two cases, that both are events,
and that our knowledge of both is objective that is to say,
:

it is knowledge of changes in real objects recognized as

such by the Subject. Both are changes of relative position

in two bodies. In the first case, one of these bodies is a
part of the observer s own organism, the eye, and the other
is the house, with respect to the different parts of which

the eye successively alters its position. In the second, it

is the ship which alters its position towards the stream ;

therefore the change occurs between two bodies. Both are

events, the only difference being that, in the first, the
change has its starting-point in the observer s own body,
from whose sensations undoubtedly all his perceptions
originally proceed, but which is nevertheless an object
102 THE FOTJEPOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

among objects, and in consequence obeys the laws of the

objective, material world. For the observer, as a purely
cognising individual, any movement of his body is simply
an empirically perceived fact. It would be just as pos
sible in the second as in the first instance, to invert the
order of succession in the change, were it as easy for the
observer to move the ship up the stream as to alter the
direction of his own eyes. For Kant infers the successive

perception of different parts of the house to be neither

objective nor an event, because it depends upon his own
will. But the movement of his eyes in the direction from
roof to basement one event, and in the direction from
is

basement to roof another event, just as much as the sailing

of the ship. There is no difference whatever here, nor is

there any difference either, as to their being or not being

events, between my passing a troop of soldiers and their
passing me. If we fix our eyes on a ship sailing close by
the shore on which we are standing, it soon seems as if it
were the ship that stood still and the shore that moved.
Now, in this instance we are mistaken, it is true, as to the
cause of the relative change of position, since we attribute
it to a wrong cause the real succession in the relative
;

positions of ourbody towards the ship is nevertheless quite

rightly and objectively recognised by us. Even Kant him
self would not have believed that there was any difference,
had he borne in mind that his own body was an object
among objects, and that the succession in his empirical
perceptions depended upon the succession of the impres
sions received from other objects by his body, and was
therefore an objective succession that is to say, one which
:

takes place objects directly (if not indirectly) and

among
independently of the will of the Subject, and which may
therefore be quite well recognised without any causal
connection between the objects acting successively on liis

body.
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 103
x

Kant says, Time cannot be perceived therefore no suc ;

cession of representations can be empirically perceived as

objective i.e. can be distinguished as changes in pheno

:

mena from the changes of mere subjective representations.

The causal law, being a rule according to which states
follow one another, is the only means by which the ob

jectivity of a change can be known. Now, the result of

his assertion would be, that no succession in Time could
be perceived by us as objective, excepting that of cause
and effect, and that every other succession of phenomena
we perceive, would only be determined so, and not other
wise, by our own will. In contradiction to all this I must
adduce the fact, that it is quite possible for phenomena to
follow upon one another without following from one another.
Nor is the law of causality by any means prejudiced by
this ;
for it remains certain that each change is the effect
of another change, this being firmly established a priori ;
only each change not only follows upon the single one
which is its cause, but upon all the other changes which
occur simultaneously with that cause, and with which that
cause stands in no causal connection whatever. It is not
perceived by me exactly in the regular order of causal
succession, but in quite a different order, which is, how
ever, no less objective on that account, and which differs
widely from any subjective succession depending on my
caprice, such as, for instance, the pictures of my imagina
tion. The succession, in Time, of events which stand in
no causal connection with each other is precisely what we
call contingency.
1
Just as I am leaving my house, a tile

happens from the roof which strikes me now, there

to fall ;

is no causal connection whatever between my going out and

1
In German Zufall, a word derived from the Zusammenfallen (falling
together), Zusammentreffen (meeting together), or coinciding of what is
unconnected, just as TO avpfitfiriKos from avufiaiveiv. (Compare Aris
totle,
"

Anal, post.," i. 4.)

104 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

the falling of the tile yet the order of their succession

;

that is, that my going out preceded the falling of the tile
is objectively determined in
my apprehension, not sub
jectively by by which that order would otherwise
my will,
have most been inverted. The order in which tones
likely
follow each other in a musical composition is likewise
objectively determined, not subjectively by me, the lis
tener ;yet who would think of asserting that musical
tones follow one another according to the law of cause and
effect ? Even the succession of day and night is un
doubtedly known to us as an objective one, but we as
certainly do not look upon them as causes and effects of
one another and as to their common cause, the whole
;

world was in error till Copernicus came yet the correct ;

knowledge of their succession was not in the least dis

turbed by that error. Hume s hypothesis, by the wa}
also finds its refutationthrough this since the following;

of day and night upon each other the most ancient of

all successions and the one least liable to exception has
never yet misled anyone into taking them for cause and
effect of each other.
Elsewhere Kant asserts, that a representation only shows
reality (which, I conclude, means that it is distinguished
from a mere mental image) by our recognising its necessary
connection with other representations subject to rule (the
causal law) and its place in a determined order of the
time-relations of our representations. But of how few
representations are we able to know the place assigned to
them by the law of causality in the chain of causes and
effects ! Yet we are never embarrassed to distinguish ob

jective from subjective representations :

real, from imagi
nary objects. When asleep, we are unable to make tliia

distinction, forour brain is then isolated from the peri-

pherical nervous system, and thereby from external in
fluences. In our dreams therefore, we take imaginary for
 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 105

real things, and it is only when we awaken : that is, when

our nervous sensibility, and through this the outer world,
once more comes within our consciousness, that we become
aware of our mistake still, even in our dreams, so long
;

as they last, the causal law holds good, only an impossible

material is often substituted for the usual one. We might

almost think that Kant was influenced by Leibnitz in

writing the passage we have quoted, however much he
differs from him in all the rest of his philosophy ; espe
cially if we consider that Leibnitz
expresses precisely
similar views, when, for instance, he says La verite des :
"

choses sensibles ne consiste qu.e dans la liaison des pheno-

rnenes, qui doit avoir sa raison, et c est ce qui les distingue
des songes. Le vrai Criterion, en matiere des
objets des sens, est la liaison des phenomenes, qui garantit
les verites de fait, a 1 cgard des choses sensibles hors de
1
nous."

It is clear that in proving the a priority and the ne

cessity of the causal law by the fact that the objective

succession of changes is known to us only by means of
that law, and that, in so far, causality is a condition for
all experience, Kant fell into a very singular error, and

one which is indeed so palpable, that the only way we can

account for it is, by supposing him to have become so
absorbed in the a priori part of our knowledge, that he
lost sight of what would have been evident to anyone else.
The only correct demonstration of the a priority of the
causal law is given by me in 21 of the present work.
That a priority finds its confirmation every moment in the
infallible security with which we expect experience to
tally
with the causal law that is to say, in the apodeictic cer
:

tainty we ascribe to it, a certainty which differs from

every other founded on induction the certainty, for in-
1
Leibnitz,
"

Nonveaux Essais sur PEntendement," lib. iv. ch. ii.

sect. 14.
106 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IV.

stance, of empirically known laws of Nature in that we

can conceive no exception to the causal law anywhere
within the world of experience. We can, for instance,
conceive that in an exceptional case the law of gravitation
might cease to act, but not that this could happen without
a cause.
Kant and Hume have fallen into opposite errors in their

proofs. Hume
asserts that all consequence is mere se
quence ; whereas Kant affirms that all sequence must ne
cessarily be consequence. Pure Understanding, it is true,
can only conceive consequence (causal result), and is no
more able to conceive mere sequence than to conceive the
difference between right and left, which, like sequence, is

only to be grasped by means of pure Sensibility. Empirical

knowledge of the following of events in Time is, indeed,
just as possible as empirical knowledge of juxtaposition of
things in Space (this Kant denies elsewhere), but the way
in which things follow upon one another in general in Time
can no more be explained, than the way in which one thing
follows from another (as the effect of a cause) the former :

knowledge is given and conditioned by pure Sensibility ;

the latter, by pure Understanding. But in asserting that

knowledge of the objective succession of phenomena can
only be attained by means of the causal law, Kant commits
*
the same error with which he reproaches Leibnitz that :

of
"

iiitellectualising the forms of Sensibility." My view

of succession is the following one. We
derive our know
ledge of the bare possibility of succession from the form
of Time, which belongs to pure Sensibility. The suc
cession of real objects, whose form
is
precisely Time,
we know empirically, consequently as actual. But it is
through the Understanding alone, by means of Causality,
that we gain knowledge of the necessity of a succession of
1
Kant, Kritik d. r. Vern." 1st edition,
"

p. 275 j
5th edition, p. 331.

(English translation by M. Miiller, p. 236.)

 FIRST CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 107

two states : that is, of a change ;

and even the fact that we
are able to conceive the necessity of a succession at all,
proves already that the causal law is not known to us
empirically, but given us a priori. The Principle of Suffi
cient Reason is the general expression for the fundamental
form of the necessary connection between all our objects,
i.e.representations, which lies in the innermost depths of
our cognitive faculty it is the form common to all repre
:

sentations, and the only source of the conception of ne

cessity,which contains absolutely nothing else in it and no
other import, than that of the following of the consequence,
when its reason has been established. Now, the reason
why this principle determines the order of succession in
Time in the class of representations we are now investi

gating, in which it figures as the law of causality, is, that

Time the form of these representations, therefore the
is

necessary connection appears here as the rule of succession.

In other forms of the principle of sufficient reason, the

necessary connection it always demands will appear under

quite different forms from that of Time, therefore not as

succession still it always retains the character of a neces
;

sary connection, by which the identity of the principle

under all its forms, or rather the unity of the root of all
the laws of which that principle is the common expression,
reveals itself.
If Kant s assertion were correct, which I dispute, our
only way of knowing the reality of succession would be
through its necessity; but this would presuppose an
Understanding that embraced all the series of causes and
effects at once, consequently an omniscient Understand

ing. Kant has burdened the Understanding with an

impossibility, merely in order to have less need of
Sensibility.
How can we reconcile Kant s assertion that our onlv
means of knowing the objective reality of succession is by
108 THE FOTJKFOLD KOOT. [CHAP. IV.

the necessity with which effect follows cause, with his

l
other assertion that succession in Time is our only empi
rical criterion for determining which of two states is
cause, and which effect. Who does not see the most
obvious circle here ?

If we knew objectiveness of succession through Causality,

we should never be able to think it otherwise than as
Causality, and then it would be nothing else than Causality.
Fc r, if it were anything else, it would have other distinc

by which to be recognised now this is just

tive signs ;

what Kant denies. Accordingly, if Kant were right, we

could not say :
"

This state is the effect of that one, where

fore it follows and being an effect,
it ;
"

for following
would be one and the same thing, and this proposition a
tautology. Besides, if we do away with all distinction
between following upon and following from, we once more
Hume, who declared all consequence to
yield the point to
be mere sequence and therefore denied that distinction
likewise.
Kant s proof would, consequently, be reduced to this :

that, empirically, we only know actuality of succession ;

but as besides we recognise necessity of succession in

certain series of occurrences, and even know before all

experience that every possible occurrence must have a

fixed place in some one of these series, the reality and the
a priority of the causal law follow as a matter of course,
the only correct proof of the latter being the one I have
given in 21 of this work.
Parallel with the Kantian theory that the causal nexus :

alone renders objective succession and our knowledge of it

possible, there runs another that coexistence and our :

knowledge of it are only possible through reciprocity. In

the Critique of Pure Reason they are presented under
"
"

1
Kant,
"

Krit. d. r. Vern." vol. i.

p. 203 of the 1st edition ; p. 249 of
the 5th edition. (English translation by M. Miiller, p. 178.)
 FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 109

the title :
"

Third Analogy of Experience." Here Kant

goes so far as to say that the co-existence of phenomena, "

which exercise no reciprocal action on one another, but are

separated by a perfectly empty space, could never become
1
an object of possible perception
"

(which, by the way,

would be a proof a priori that there is no empty space
between the fixed stars), and that the light which plays "

between our eyes and celestial bodies" an expression

conveying surreptitiously the thought, that this starlight
not only acts upon our eyes, but is acted upon by them
also produces an intercommunity between us and them,
"

and proves the co-existence of the latter." Now, even

empirically, this last assertion is false ;
since the sight of a
fixed star by no means proves its coexistence simul
taneously with itsspectator, but, at most, its existence
some years, nay even some centuries before. Besides, this
second Kantian theory stands and falls with the first,

only it is far more

nullity of easily detected ;
and the
the whole conception of reciprocity has been shown in
20.
The arguments I have brought forward against Kant s
proof may be compared with two previous attacks made on
2 3
it by Feder, and by G-. E. Schulze.

Not without considerable hesitation did I thus venture

(in 1813) to attack a theory which had been universally
received as a demonstrated truth, is repeated even now in the
4
latest publications, and forms a chief point in the doctrine
of one for whose profound wisdom I have the greatest
reverence and admiration one to whom, indeed, I owe so
;

1
Kant,
"

Krit. d. r. Vern." pp. 212 and 213 of the 1st edition. (Eng-
lish translation, pp. 185 and 186.)
2
Feder, Ueber Raum und Causalitat." sect. 29.
"

3
G. E. Schulze, Kritik der theoretischen Philosophie,"
"

vol. ii.

p. 422 sqq.
4
For instance, in Fries "

Kritik der Vernunft," yol. ii.

p. 85.
110 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. IV.

much, that his spirit might truly say to me, in the words
of Homer :

1
Ax\vv d av TOI O.TT
6<}>9a\p,&v
e Xov, ?}
Trplv tirfjtv.

24. Of the Misapplication of the Law of Causality.

From
the foregoing exposition it follows, that the appli
cation of the causal law to anything but changes in the
material, empirically given world, is an abuse of it. For
instance, it is a misapplication to make use of it with refe
rence to physical forces, without which no changes could
take place or to Matter, on which they take place or to
; ;

the world, to which we must in that case attribute an

absolutely objective existence independently of our in
tellect ;
indeed in many other cases besides. I refer the
reader to what I have said on this subject in my chief
2
work. Such misapplications always arise, partly, through
our taking the conception of cause, like many other meta
physical and ethical conceptions, in far too wide a sense ;

partly, through our forgetting that the causal law is cer

tainly a presupposition which we bring with us into the
world, by which the perception of things outside us becomes
possible; but that, just on that account, we are not
authorized in extending beyond the range and indepen
dently of our cognitive faculty a principle, which has its
origin in the equipment of that faculty, nor in assuming it
to hold good as the everlasting order of the universe and
of all that exists.
1
I lifted from thine eyes the darkness which covered them before.
(Tr. s Ad.)
* "

Die Welt a. W. u. V." 2nd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p, 42 et seqq. ;

3rd edition, vol. ii.

p. 46 et
 FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. Ill

25. The Time in which a Change takes place.

As the Principle of Sufficient Reason of Becoming is

exclusively applicable to changes, we must not omit to
mention here, that the ancient philosophers had already
raised the question as to the time in which a change takes

place, there being no possibility of it taking place during

the existence of the preceding state nor after the new
one has supervened. Yet, if we assign a special time to it
between both states, a body would, during this time, be
neither in the first nor in the second state : a dying man,
for instance, would be neither alive nor dead; a body
neither at rest nor in movement which would be absurd. :

The scruples and sophistic subtleties which this question

has evoked, may be found collected together in Sextus
Empiricus Adv. Mathem." lib. ix. 267-271, and Hypat."
" "

iii. c. 14 the subject is likewise dealt with by Gellius, 1.

;

vi. c. 13 Plato 1 had disposed somewhat cavalierly of this

knotty point, by maintaining that changes take place
suddenly and occupy no time at all ; they occur, he says,
in the Qaifyvrjc, (in repentino), which he calls an UTOTTOQ

tyvffic, kv \povo) ovcev ovaa ;

a strange, timeless existence
(which nevertheless comes within Time).
Itwas accordingly reserved for the perspicacity of Aris
totle to clear up this difficult point, which he has done
profoundly and exhaustively in the sixth Book of Physics,
chap, i.-viii. His proof that no change takes place sud
denly (in Plato s efaityvrjo) but that each occurs only ,

gradually and therefore occupies a certain time, is based

entirely upon the pure, a priori intuition of Time and of
Space but it is also very subtle. The pith of this very
;

lengthy demonstration may, however, be reduced to the

following propositions. When we say of objects that they
1 "

Plato, Parmenicles," p. 138, ed. Bip.

112 THE FOTJEFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. IY.

limit each other, we mean, that both have their extreme

ends in common ; therefore only two extended things can
be conterminous, never two indivisible ones, for then they
would be one i.e.
only lines, but not mere points, can be
conterminous. He then transfers this from Space to Time.
As there always remains a line between two points, so there
always remains a time between two nows ; this is the time
in which a change takes place i.e. when one state is in the
first, and another in the second, now. This time, like every
other, is divisible to infinity; consequently, whatever is
changing passes through an infinite number of degrees
within that time, through which the second state gradually
grows out of that first one. The process may perhaps be
made more intelligible by the following explanation. Be
tween two consecutive states the difference of which is
perceptible to our senses, there are always several inter
mediate states, the difference between which is not per
ceptible to us because, in order to be sensuously per
;

ceptible, the newly arising state must have reached a

certain degree of intensity or of magnitude it is therefore
:

preceded by degrees of lesser intensity or extension, in

passing through which it gradually arises. Taken collec
tively, these are comprised under the name of change,
and the time occupied by them is called the time of change.
Now, if we apply this to a body being propelled, the first
effect is a certain vibration of its inner parts, which, after

communicating the impulse to other parts, breaks out into

external motion. from the
Aristotle infers quite rightly
infinite divisibility of Time, that everything which fills it,
therefore every change, i.e. every passage from one state to
another, must likewise be susceptible of endless subdivision,
so that all that arises, does so in fact by the concourse of
an multitude of parts accordingly its genesis is
infinite ;

always gradual, never sudden. From these principles and

the consequent gradual arising of each movement, he
 FIRST CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 113

draws the weighty inference in the last chapter of this

Book, that nothing indivisible, no mere point can move.
And with this conclusion Kant s definition of Matter, as
that which moves in Space," completely harmonizes.
"

This law of the continuity and gradual taking place of all

changes which Aristotle was thus the first to lay down
and prove, we find stated three times by Kant: in his
"

Dissertatio de mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma,"

14, in the
"

Critique of Pure Eeason,"

}
and finally in
2
his "Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science." In
all three places his exposition is brief, but also less thorough

than that of Aristotle still, in the main, both entirely ;

agree. We can therefore hardly doubt that, directly or

indirectly, Kant must have derived these ideas from Aris
totle, though he does not mention him. Aristotle s pro
position OVK ttrrt a\\rj\a)v i^o/ueva ra vvv the moment:? ("

of the present are not continuous") we here find expressed

as follows between two moments there is always a
:
"

time," to which may be objected that even between two "

centuries there is none because in Time as in Space, there

;

must always be a pure limit." Thus Kant, instead of men

tioning Aristotle, endeavours in the first and earliest of his
three statements to identify the theory he is advancing
with Leibnitz lex continuitatis. If they really were the
same, Leibnitz must have derived his from Aristotle. Now
3
Leibnitz first stated this Loi de la continuite in a letter to
1

Bayle. There, however, he calls it Principe de Vordrz

general, and gives under this name a very general, vague,
chiefly geometricalargumentation, having no direct bearing
on the time of change, which he does not even mention.
1
Kant,
<c

Krit. d. r. Vern." 1st edition, p. 207 ;

5th edition, p. 253.
(English translation by M. Miiller, p. 182.)
2
Metaphysischc Anfangsgriinde der Naturwissenschaft.
"

Kant,
End of the Allgemeine Anmerkung zur Mechanik."
"

3
According to his own assertion, p. 189 of the
"

Opera philos." eel.

4
Erdmann. Ibid. p. 10^
I
 CHAPTEE V.

ON THE SECOND CLASS OP OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT AND

THE FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.

26. Explanation of this Class of Objects.

only essential distinction between the human raco

THE
and animals, which from time immemorial has been
attributed to a special cognitive faculty peculiar to man
kind, called Reason, is based upon the fact that man owns
a class of representations which is not shared by any
animal. These are conceptions, therefore abstract, as opposed
to intuitive, representations, from which they are neverthe
less derived. The immediate consequence of this is, that
animals can neither speak nor laugh; but indirectly ail
those various, important characteristics which distinguish
human from animal life are its consequence. For, through
the supervention of abstract representation, motivation has
now changed its character. Although human actions result
with a necessity no less rigorous than that which rules the
actions of animals, yet through this new kind of motiva
tion so far as here it consists in thoughts which render
elective decision (i.e. a conscious conflict of motives) pos
sible action with a purpose, with reflection, according to

plans and principles, in concert with others, &c. &c., now

takes the place of mere impulse given by present, perceptible
objects but by this it gives rise to all that renders human
;

life so rich, so artificial, and so terrible, that man, in this

 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 115

Western Hemisphere, where Ms skin lias become bleached,

and where the primitive, true, profound religions of his
first home could not follow him, now no longer recognises

animals as his brethren, and falsely believes them to

differ fundamentally from him, seeking to confirm this
illusion by calling them brutes, giving degrading names to
the vital functions which they have in common with him,
and proclaiming them outlaws and thus he hardens his
;

heart against that identity of being between them and

himself, which is nevertheless constantly obtruding itself
upon him.
Still, as we have said, the whole difference lies in this

that, besides the intuitive representations examined in the

last chapter, which are shared by animals, other, abstract

representations derived from these intuitive ones, are lodged

in the human brain, which is chiefly on this account so
much larger than that of animals. Representations of this
sort have been called conceptions, 1 because each compre
hends innumerable individual things in, or rather under,
itself, and thus forms a complex.
2
We may also defmo
them as representations drawn from representations, For, in
forming them, the faculty of abstraction decomposes the
complete, intuitive representations described in our last
chapter into their component parts, in order to think each
of these parts separately as the different qualities of, or
relations between, things. By this process, however, the
representations necessarily forfeit their perceptibility just ;

as water, when decomposed, ceases to be fluid and visible.

For although each quality thus isolated (abstracted) can
quite well be thought by itself, it does not at all follow that;
itcanbe^ercei-yecZbyitself. We form conceptions by dropping
a good deal of what is given us in perception, in order to be
1

Begriff, comprehensive thought, derived from begreifen, to compre

hend. [Tr.]
2
Inbegriffy comprehensive totality. [Tr.]
116 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

able to think the rest by itself. To conceive therefore, is

to think less than we
perceive. after considering divers
If,

objects of perception, we drop something different belong

ing to each, yet retain what is the same in all, the result
willbe the genus of that species. The generic conception
is accordingly always the conception of every species
comprised under it, after deducting all that does not
belong to every species. Now, as every possible concep
tion may be thought as a genus, a conception is always

something general, and as such, not perceptible. Every

conception has on this account also its sphere, as the sum-
total of what may be thought under it.
l
The higher we
ascend in abstract thought, the more we deduct, the less
therefore remains to be thought. The highest, i.e. the
most general conceptions, are the emptiest and poorest, and
at last become mere husks, such as, for instance, being,
essence, thing, becoming, &c. &c. Of what avail, by the
way, can philosophical systems be, which are only spun out
of conceptions of this sort and have for their substance
mere flimsy husks of thoughts like these ? They must of
necessity be exceedingly empty, poor, and therefore also

dreadfully tiresome.
Now as representations, thus sublimated and analysed
to form abstract conceptions, have, as we have said, forfeited
all perceptibility, they would entirely escape our conscious

ness, and be of no avail to it for the thinking processes to

which they are destined, were they not fixed and retained
in our senses by arbitrary signs. These signs are words.
In as far as they constitute the contents of dictionaries
and therefore of language, words always designate general
representations, conceptions, never perceptible objects ;

whereas a lexicon which enumerates individual things, only

contains proper names, not words, and is either a geo-

Inbegriff.
 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT. 117

graphical or historical dictionary : that is to say, it enume

rates what is separated either by Time or by Space ; for,
as my readers know, Time and Space
are the principium
individuationis. It is only because animals are limited to
intuitive representations and incapable of any abstraction

incapable therefore of forming conceptions that they are

without language, even when they are able to articulate
words whereas they understand proper names. That it
;

is thissame defect which excludes them from laughter, I

have shown in my theory of the ridiculous. 1
On made by a man
analyzing a long, continuous speech
of no education, we find an abundance of logical forms,
in it

clauses, turns of phrase, distinctions, and subtleties of all

sorts, correctly expressed by means of grammatical forms
with their inflections and constructions, and even with a
frequent use of the sermo obliquus, of the different moods,
&c. &c., all in conformity with rule, which astonishes us,
and in which we are forced to recognise an extensive and
perfectly coherent knowledge. Still this knowledge has been
acquired on the basis of the perceptible world, the reduction
of whose whole essence to abstract conceptions is the funda
mental business of the Reason, and can only take place by
means of language. In learning the use of language there
fore, the whole mechanism of Reason that is, all that
is is brought to our consciousness. Now
essential in Logic
this can evidently not take place without considerable
mental effort and fixed attention, for which the desire to
learn gives children the requisite strength. So long as
that desire has before it what is really available and neces
and it only appears weak when we try
sary, it is vigorous,
to force upon children that which is not suited to their
comprehension. Thus even a coarsely educated child, in
learning all the turns and subtleties of language, as well

1
See "Die Welt a, W. u. V." vol. i. sect. 13, and vol. ii. ch. 8.
118 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

through its own conversation as that of others, accomplishes

the development of its Reason, and acquires that really
concrete Logic, which consists less in logical rules than in
the proper application of them just as the rules of
;

harmony are learnt by persons of musical talent simply by

playing the piano, without reading music or studying

thorough-bass. The deaf and dumb alone are excluded
from the above-mentioned logical training through the
acquirement of speech therefore they are almost as un
;

reasonable as animals, when they have not been taught to

read by the very artificial means specially adapted for their
requirements, which takes the place of the natural schooling
of Reason.

27. The Utility of Conceptions.

The fundamental essence of our Reason or thinking

is, as we have seen, the power of abstraction, or the
faculty
faculty of forming conceptions : it is therefore the presence
of these in our consciousness which produces such amazing
results. That it should be able to do this, rests mainly on
the following grounds.
It is just because they contain less than the representa
tions from which they are drawn, that conceptions aro
easier to deal with than representations they are, in fact,
;

to these almost as the formula of higher arithmetic to the

mental operations which give rise to them and which they
represent, or as a logarithm to its number. They only
contain just the part required of the many representations
from which they are drawn; if instead we were to try
to recall those representations themselves by means of
the imagination, we should, as it were, have to lug about

a load of unessential lumber, which would only embarrass

us whereas, by the help of conceptions, we are enabled
;

to think only those parts and relations of all these repre-

 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 119

sentations which arewanted for each individual purpose :

so that their employment may be compared to doing

away with superfluous luggage, or to working with extracts
instead of plants themselves with quinine, instead of
bark. What is properly called thinking, in its narrowest
with conceptions
sense, is the occupation of the intellect :

that the presence in our consciousness of the class of

is,

representations we now have before us. This is also what we

call reflection a word which, by a figure of speech borrowed
:

from Optics, expresses at once the derivative and the

secondary character of this kind of knowledge. Now it is

this thinking, this reflection, which gives man that delibera

tion, which is wanting in animals. For, by enabling him
to think many things under one conception, but always
only the essential part in each of them, it allows him to
drop at his pleasure every kind of distinction, consequently
even those of Time and of Space, and thus he acquires the
power of embracing in thought, not only the past and the
future, but also what is absent ;
while animals are in
every respect strictly bound to the present. This delibera
tive faculty again is really the root of all those theoretical
and practical achievements which give man so great a
superiority over animals; first and foremost, of his care
for the future while taking the past into consideration;
then of his premeditated, systematic, methodical procedure
in all undertakings, and therefore of the co-operation of
many persons towards a common end, and, by this, of law,
order, the State, &c. &c. But it is especially in Science
that the use of conceptions is important; for they are, pro
perly speaking, its materials. The aims of all the sciences
may, indeed, in the last resort, be reduced to knowledge of
the particular through the general; now this is only
possible by means of the dictum de omni et nullo, and this,
again, is only possible through the existence of conceptions.
Aristotle therefore says: civev ptv yap ruv KaQoXov OVK lanv
120 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.
l
ETTKrn/juijv \afie~iv (absque universalibus enim non datur
scientia). Conceptions are precisely those universalia,
whose mode of existence formed the argument of the long
controversy between the Eealists and Nominalists in the
Middle

28. Representatives of Conceptions. The Faculty of

Judgment.

Conceptions must not be confounded with pictures of

the imagination, these being intuitive and complete, there
fore individual representations, although they are not
called forth by sensuous impressions and do not there
fore belong to the complex of experience. Even when
used to represent a conception, a picture of the imagination
(phantasm) ought to be distinguished from a conception.
We use phantasms as representatives of conceptions when
we try to grasp the intuitive representation itself that has
given rise to the conception and to make it tally with
that conception, which is in all cases impossible for ;

there is no representation, for instance, of dog in general,

colour in general, triangle in general, number in general,
nor is there any picture of the imagination which corre

sponds to these conceptions. Then we evoke the phantasm

of some dog or other, which, as a representation, must in
all cases be determined : that is, it must have a certain
size, shape, colour, &c. &c. even though the conception ;

represented by it has no such determinations. When we

use such representatives of conceptions however, we arc
always conscious that they are not adequate to the concep
tions they represent, and that they are full of arbitrary
determinations. Towards the end of the first part of his

1
Aristot.
<c

Metaph/ xii. c. 9,
"

For without universal^ it is impos

sible to have knowledge." (Tr. s Add.)
 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 121

Twelfth Essay on Human Understanding, Hume expresses

himself in agreement with this view, as also Rousseau in
his "Discours sur I Origine de 1 Inegalite." Kant s doc
*

trine, on the contrary, is a totally different one. The

matter is one which introspection and clear reflection can

alone decide. Each of us must therefore examine himself

as to whether he is conscious in his own conceptions of a

Monogram of Pure Imagination a priori ; whether, for

"
"

instance, when he thinks dog, he is conscious of something

entre chien et loup ; or whether, as I have here explained
it, he is either thinking an abstract conception through his

Reason, or representing some representative of that con

ception as a complete picture through his imagination.
All thinking, in a wider sense that is, all inner activity
:

of the mind in general, necessitates either words or pic

tures of the imagination : without one or other of these it
has nothing to hold by. They are not, however, both ne
cessary at the same time, although they may co-operate to
their mutual support. Now, thinking in a narrower sense
that is, abstract reflection by means of words is either

purely logical reasoning, in which case it keeps strictly to

its own sphere or it touches upon the limits of perceptible
;

representations in order to come to an understanding with

them, so as to bring that which is given by experience and
grasped by perception into connection with abstract con
ceptions resulting from clear reflection, and thus to gain
complete possession of it. In thinking therefore, we seek
either for the conception or rule to which a given percep
tion belongs, or for the particular case which proves a

given conception or rule. In this quality, thinking is an

activity of the faculty of judgment, and indeed in the first
subsuming activity. The
case, a reflective, in the second, a

faculty of judgment is accordingly the mediator between

intuitive and abstract knowledge, or between the Under-
1
Part the First, in the middle.
122 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

derstanding and the Eeason. In most men it has merely

l
rudimentary, often even merely nominal existence they ;

are destined to follow the lead of others, and it is as well

not to converse with them more than isnecessary.
The true kernel of all knowledge is that reflection which
works with the help of intuitive representations for it ;

goes back to the fountain-head, to the basis of all concep

tions. Therefore it generates all really original thoughts,
allprimary and fundamental views and all inventions, so
far as chance had not the largest share in them. The
Understanding prevails in this sort of thinking, whilst the
Reason is the chief factor in purely abstract reflection.

Certain thoughts which wander about for a long time in our

heads, belong to this sort of reflection thoughts which :

come and go, now clothed in one kind of intuition, now in

another, until they at last become clear, fix themselves in
conceptions and find words to express them. Some, in
deed, never find words to express them, and these are,

unfortunately, the best of all quce voce meliora sunt, as :

Apuleius says.
Aristotle, however, went too far in thinking that no
reflection possible without pictures of the imagina
is
2
tion. Nevertheless, what he says on this point, ov^Vore
voti avev ^avraoy^aroc ^X^ an^na sine phantasmate nun-
3
>/
(.

quam intelligif), and VTO.V Oewpri, avayKr) apa tydvraafjia.

TI

Oeupelv (qui contemplatur, necesse est, una cum phantasmate

contempletur),* and again, voliv OVK eon avev ^avraa^aroQ
(fieri non potest, ut sine phantasmate quidquam intelli-

1
Let any one to whom this assertion may appear hyperbolical, con
(Farbenlehre), and
"

sider the fate of Gothe s

"

Theory of Colours
should he wonder at my finding a corroboration for it in that fate, he
will himself have corroborated it a second time.
2
Aristot. De anima," iii. c. c. 3, 7, 8.
"

3
The mind never thinks without (the aid of) an image." [Tr.]
"

4
"He who observes anything must observe some image along
with it."
[Tr.]
 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 123
1
gatur), made a strong impression upon the thinkers of the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, who therefore frequently
and emphatically repeat what he says. Pico della Mirandola, 3
for instance, says Necesse est, eum, quiratiocinaturetintelligit,
:

pJiantasmata speculari; Melanchthon 3 says Oportet intel- :

ligentem phantasmata speculari; and Jord. Brunus 4 says,

dicit Aristoteles: oportet scire volentem, phantasmata speculari.
5
Poniponatius expresses himself in the same sense. On
the whole, all that can be affirmed is, that every true and
primary notion, every genuine philosophic theorem even,
must have some sort of intuitive view for its innermost
6
kernel or root. This, though something momentary and
single, subsequently imparts life and spirit to the whole
analysis, however exhaustive it may be, just as one drop
of the right reagent suffices to tinge a whole solution
with the colour of the precipitate which it causes. When
an analysis has a kernel of this sort, it is like a bank note
issued by a firm which has ready money wherewith to back
it ;
whereas every other analysis proceeding from mere
combinations of abstract conceptions, resembles a bank
note which is issued by a firm which has nothing but other
paper obligations to back it with. All mere rational talk
thus renders the result of given conceptions clearer, but
does not, strictly speaking, bring anything new to light.
Itmight therefore be left to each individual to do himself,
instead of filling whole volumes every day.

29. Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing.

But, even in a narrower sense, thinking does not consist

in the bare presence of abstract conceptions in our con-
1 "

De Memoria," c. 1 :
"

It is impossible to think without (the aid

2
of) an image."
<

De imaginatione," c. 5.
8
De anima," p. 130. 4
"
ts
De compositione imaginum," p. 10.
6 "

De immortalitate," pp. 54 et 70.

8 "

Ein Momentancs mid Einheitliches."

124 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

sciousness, but rather in connecting or separating two or

more of these conceptions under sundry restrictions and
modifications which Logic indicates in the Theory of Judg
ments. A
relation of this sort between conceptions dis

tinctly thought and expressed we call a judgment. Now,

with reference to these judgments, the Principle of Suffi
cient Reason here once more holds good, yet in a widely
different form from that which has been explained in the

preceding chapter ;
for here it appears as the Principle of
Sufficient Reason of Knowing, prindpium rationis suf-
ficientis cognoscendi. As such, it asserts that if a judgment
is to express knowledge of any kind, it must have a suffi
cient reason in virtue of which quality it then receives the
:

predicate true. Thus truth is the reference of a judgment

to something different from itself, called its reason or

ground, which reason, as we shall presently see, itself

admits of a considerable variety of kinds. As, however,
this reason is invariably a something upon which the

judgment the German term for it, viz., Grund, is not

rests,
ill chosen. In Latin, and in all languages of Latin origin,
the word by which a reason of knowledge is designated, is
the same as that used for the faculty of Reason (ratio-
cinatio) : both are called ratio, la ragione, la razon, la raison,
the reason. From this it is evident, that attaining know
ledge of the reasons of judgments had been recognised as
Reason s highest function, its business /car ifrxfiv. Now,
these grounds upon which a judgment may rest, may be
divided into four different kinds, and the truth obtained
by that judgment will correspondingly differ. They are
stated in the following paragraph.

30. Logical Truth.

A judgment may have for its reason another judgment ;

in this case it has logical or formal truth. Whether it has

 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 125

material truth also, remains an open question and depends

on whether the judgment on which it rests has material
whether the series of judgments on which it is
truth, or
founded leads to a judgment which has material truth, or
not. This founding of a judgment upon another judgment
always originates in a comparison between them which
takes place either directly, by mere conversion or contra
position, or by adding a third judgment, and then the truth
of the judgment we are founding becomes evident through
their mutual relation. This operation is the complete
syllogism. It is brought about either by the opposition or

by the subsumption. of conceptions. As the syllogism,

which is the founding of one judgment upon another by
means of a third, never has to do with anything but judg
ments and as judgments are only combinations of concep
;

tions, and conceptions again are the exclusive object of our

Reason syllogizing has been rightly called Reason s special
:

function. The whole syllogistic science, in fact, is nothing

but the sum-total of the rules for applying the principle of
sufficient reason to the mutual relations of judgments ;

consequently it is the canon of logical truth.

Judgments, whose truth becomes evident through the
four well-known laws of thinking, must likewise be regarded
as based upon other judgments ;
for these four laws are
themselves precisely judgments, from which follows the
truth of those other judgments. For instance, the judg
ment :
"

A
triangle is a space enclosed within three lines,"

has for its last reason the Principle of Identity, that is to

say, the thought expressed by that principle. The judg
ment, No body is without extension," has for its last
"

reason the Principle of Contradiction. This again, Every "

judgment is either true or untrue," has for its last reason

the Principle of the Excluded Middle and
finally, No;
"

one can admit anything to be true without

knowing
why," has for its last reason the Principle of Sufficient
126 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

Eeason of Knowing. In the general employment of our

Reason, we do not, it is true, before admitting them to be
true, reduce judgments which follow from the four laws of
thinking to their last reasons, as premisses for most men ;

are even ignorant of the very existence of these abstract laws.

The dependence of such judgments upon them, as their
premisses, is however no more diminished by this, than the
dependence of the first judgment upon the second, as its
premiss, is diminished by the fact, that it is not at all ne
cessary for the principle, all bodies incline towards the
"

centre of the earth," to be present in the consciousness of

any one who says, this body will fall if its support is
"

removed." That in Logic, therefore, intrinsic truth should

hitherto have been attributed to all judgments founded
exclusively on the four laws of thinking that is to say,
:

that these judgments should have been pronounced directly

true, and that this intrinsic logical truth should have been

distinguished from extrinsic logical truth, as attributed

to all judgments which have another judgment for their
reason, I cannot approve. Every truth is the reference of
a judgment to something outside of it, and the term in
trinsic truth is a contradiction.

31. Empirical Truth.

A judgment may be founded upon a representation of

the a perception by means of the senses,
first class, i.e.

consequently on experience. In this case it has material

truth, and moreover, if the judgment is founded imme
on experience, this truth is empirical truth.
diately
When we say, "A judgment has
material truth" we
mean on the whole, that its conceptions are connected,
separated, limited, according to
the requirements of the
intuitive representations through which it is inferred. To
attain knowledge of this, is the direct function of the
 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 127

faculty of judgment, as the mediator between the intuitive

and the abstract or discursive faculty of knowing in
other words, between the Understanding and the Reason.

32. Transcendental Truth.

The forms of intuitive, empirical knowledge which lie

within the Understanding and pure Sensibility may, as con
ditions of all possible experience, be the grounds of a judg
ment, which is in that case synthetical a priori. As neverthe
less this kind of judgment has material truth, its truth is
transcendental ; because the judgment is based not only on

experience, but on the conditions of all possible experience

lying within us. For it is determined precisely by that
which determines experience itself namely, either by the :

forms of Space and of Time perceived by us a priori, or by

the causal law, known to us a priori. Propositions such
as two straight lines do not include a space nothing
:
;

happens without a cause; matter can neither come into

being nor perish 3 x 7 = 21, are examples of this kind
;

of judgment. The whole of pure Mathematics, and no

1
less my tables of the Prcedicabilia a priori, as well as
most of Kant s theorems in his Metaphysische Anfangs-
"

griinde derNaturwissenschaft," may, properly speaking, be

adduced in corroboration of this kind of truth.

. 33. Metalogical Truth.

Lastly, a judgment may be founded on the formal con

ditions of all thinking, which are contained in the Eeason ;
and in this case its truth is of a kind which seems to me best
denned as metalogical truth. This expression has nothing
at all to do with the
"

Metalogicus written by Johannes

"

1
See "

Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 55.
128 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. Y.

Sarisberriensis in the twelfth century, for he declares in

his prologue, "

quia Logicce suscepi patrocinium, Metalogicus

mscriptus est liber," and never makes use of the word again.
There are only four metalogically true judgments of this
sort, which were discovered long ago by induction, and
called the laws of all thinking although entire uniformity
;

of opinion as to their expression and even as to their

number has not yet been arrived at, whereas all agree
perfectly as to what they are on the whole meant to indi
cate. They are the following :

1. A subject is equal to the sum total of its predicates,

or a = a.
2. No predicatecan be attributed and denied to a sub
ject at the same time, or a = a = o.
3. One of two opposite, contradictory predicates must
belong to every subject.
4. Truth is the reference of a judgment to something
outside of it, as its sufficient reason.
It is by means of a kind of reflection which I am in
clined to call Reasonself-examination, that we know that
s

these judgments express the conditions of all thinking,

and therefore have these conditions for their reason.
For, by the fruitlessness of its endeavours to think in
opposition to these laws, our Eeason acknowledges them
to be the conditions of all possible thinking : we then find
out, that it is just as impossible to think in opposition
to them, as it is to move the members
of our body in a

contrary direction to their joints. If were possible for it

the subject to know itself, these laws would be known to

us immediately, and we should not need to try experi
ments with them on objects, i.e. representations. In this
respect it is just the same with the reasons of judgments
which have transcendental truth for they do not either ;

come into our consciousness immediately, but only in

concreto, by means of objects, i.e. of representations. In
 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 129

endeavouring, for instance, to conceive a change without a

preceding cause, or a passing into or out of being of
Matter, we become aware that it is impossible more ;

over werecognise this impossibility to be an objective

one, although its root lies in our intellect for we could not
:

otherwise bring it to consciousness in a subjective way.

There is, on the whole, a strong likeness and connection
between transcendental and metalogical truths, which
shows that they spring from a common root. In this
chapter we see the Principle of Sufficient Reason chiefly as
metalogical truth, whereas in the last it appeared as
transcendental truth and in the next one it will again be
seen as transcendental truth under another form. In the
present treatise I am taking special pains, precisely on
this account, to establish the Principle of Sufficient Reason,
as a judgment having a fourfold reason ; by which I do
not mean
four different reasons leading cont ngently to
the same judgment, but one reason presenting itself under
a fourfold aspect: and this is what I call its Fourfold
Root. The other three metalogical truths so
strongly
resemble one another, that in considering them one is
almost necessarily induced to search for their common
expression, as I have done in the Ninth Chapter of the
Second Volume of chief work. On the other hand, they
my
differ considerably from the Principle of Sufficient Reason.
If we were to seek an analogue for the three other meta

logical truths among transcendental truths, the one I should

choose would be this Substance, I mean Matter, is per
:

manent.

34. Reason.

As the class of representations I have dealt with in

this chapter belongs exclusively to Man, and as all that

distinguishes human life so forcibly from that of animals

K
130 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

and confers so great a superiority on man, is, as we have

shown, based upon his faculty for these representations,
this faculty evidently and unquestionably constitutes that
Reason, which from time immemorial has been reputed
the prerogative of mankind. Likewise all that has been
considered by all nations and in all times explicitly as
the work or manifestation of the Reason, of the Xdyoc,
Aoytjuoy, \oytffriK6v, ratio, la ragione, la razon, la raison,

reason, may evidently also be reduced to what is only

possible for abstract, discursive, reflective, mediate know
ledge, conditioned by words, and not for mere intuitive,
immediate, sensuous knowledge, which belongs to animals
1
also. Cicero rightly places ratio et oratio together, and de
scribesthem as quce docendo, discendo, communicando, discep-
2
tando, judicando, conciliat inter se homines, &c. &c., and
rationem dico, et, si placet, pluribusverbis, mentem, consilivm,
cogitationem, prudentiam, qua una prcestamus And 3
ratio,

beluis, per quam conjectura valemus, argumentamur, refelli-

mus, disserimus, conficimus aliquid, concludimus. But, in all
ages and countries, philosophers have invariably expressed
themselves in this sense with respect to the Reason, even to
Kant himself, who
as the faculty for prin
still defines it

ciples and for inference

although cannot be denied that;
it

he first gave rise to the distorted views which followed. In

4
my principal work, and also in the Fundamental Pro
blems of Ethics, I have spoken at great length about the
agreement of all philosophers on this point, as well as
about the true nature of Reason, as opposed to the dis
torted conceptions for which we have to thank the pro-

2
1
Cicer.
"

De Offic." i. 16. Idem,

"

De nat. deor." ii. 7.

3
Idem,
"

De Leg." i.
10.
4
See "Die Welt a. W. u. V." 2nd edition, vol. i. 8, and also in
the Appendix, pp. 577-585 (3rd edition, pp. 610-620), and again vol. ii.

ch. vi. ; finally

"

Die b. G-P. d. Ethik," pp. 148-154 (2nd edition,

pp. 146-151).
 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 131

fessors of philosophy of this century. I need not therefore

repeat what has already been said there, and shall limit
myself to the following considerations.
Our professors of philosophy have thought fit to do away
with the name which had hitherto been given to that faculty
of thinking and pondering by means of reflection and con

ceptions, which distinguishes man from animals, which

necessitates language while it qualifies us for its use,
with which all human deliberation and all human achieve
ments hang together, and which had therefore always been
viewed in this light and understood in this sense by all
nations and even by all philosophers. In defiance of all
sound taste and custom, our professors decided that this
faculty should henceforth be called Understanding instead of
Reason, and that all that is derived from it should be named
intelligent instead of rational, which, of course, had a strange,
awkward ring about it, like a discordant tone in music.
For in all ages and countries the words understanding,
acumen, perspicacia, sagacitas, &c. &c., had been
intellectus,
used to denote the more intuitive faculty described in our
last chapter and its results, which differ specifically from
;

those of Reason here in question, have always been called

intelligent, sagacious, clever, &c. &c. Intelligent and rational
were accordingly always distinguished one from the other,
as manifestations of two entirely and widely different mental
faculties. Our professional philosophers could not, how
ever, take this into account; their policy required the
sacrifice, and in such cases the cry is Move on, truth
:
"

for we havehigher, well-defined i ;i:ns in view Make way !

for us, truth, in majorem Dei gloriam, as thou hast long-

ago learnt to do Is it thou who givest fees and pensions ?
!

Move move on; betake thyself to merit and

.on, truth,
crouch in the corner The fact was, they wanted Reason s
!
"

place and name for a faculty of their own creation and

fabrication, or to speak more correctly and honestly, for a
132 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

completely fictitious faculty, destined to help them out of

the straits to which Kant had reduced them a faculty ;

for direct, metaphysical knowledge: that to say, one is

which transcends all possible experience, is able to grasp

the world of things in themselves and their relations, and
is therefore, before all, consciousness of G-od (Gottesbewusst-
sein) : knows G-od the Lord immediately, con
that is, it

strues a priori the way in which he has created the Universe,

or, should this sound too trivial, the way in which he has pro
duced it out of himself, or to a certain degree generated it

by some more or less necessary vital process, or again as

the most convenient proceeding, however comical it may
"

dismissed it, according to the custom

"

appear simply
of sovereigns at the end of an audience, and left it to get

upon its legs by itself and walk away wherever it liked.

Nothing than the impudence of a scribbler of nonsense
less
like Hegel, could, it is true, be found to venture
upon this
last step. Yet it is torn-foolery like this which, largely
amplified, has filled hundreds of volumes for the last fifty
years under the name of cognitions of Reason (Vernunfter-
kenntnisse), and forms the argument of so many works
called philosophical by their authors, and scientific by others
one would think ironically this expression being even
repeated to satiety. Reason, to which all this wisdom
is falsely and audaciously imputed, is pronounced to be
a sensuous or a faculty
" " "

super faculty," for ideas ;

in short, an oracular power lying within us, designed

directly for Metaphysics. During the last half-century,
however, there has been considerable discrepancy of opinion
among the adepts as to the way in which all these super-
sensuous wonders are perceived. According to the most
audacious, Eeason has a direct intuition of the Absolute,
or even ad libitum of the Infinite and of its evolutions to
wards the Finite. Others, somewhat less bold, opine that
its mode of receiving this information partakes rather of
 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 133

audition than of vision since it does not exactly see, but

;

merely hears (vernimmt), what is going on in cloud-cuckoo-

"

land"
(vetytXoKOKKvyia.), and then honestly transmits what
it has thus received to the Understanding, to be worked up

into text-books. According to a pun of Jacobi s, even the

German name Vernunft" is derived from
for Eeason, "

Vernehmen ; whereas it evidently comes

"

this pretended "

from that VerneJimen

"

which is conveyed by language

"

and conditioned by Eeason, and by which the distinct per

ception of words and their meaning is designated, as opposed
to mere sensuous hearing which animals have also. This
miserable jeu de mots nevertheless continues, after half a
century, to find favour; it passes for a serious thought,
nay even for a proof, and has been repeated over and over
again. The most modest among the adepts again assert,
that Eeason neither sees nor hears, therefore it receives
neither a vision nor a report of all these wonders, and has
a mere vague AJindung, or misgiving of them but then ;

they drop the d, by which the word (Ahnung) acquires a

peculiar touch of silliness, which, backed up as it is by the
sheepish look of the apostlefor the time being of this wisdom,
cannot fail to gain it entrance.
My readers know that I only admit the word idea in its
primitive, that is Platonic, sense, and that I have treated
this point at length and exhaustively in the Third Book of

my chief work. The French and English, on the other

hand, certainly attach a very commonplace, but quite clear
and definite meaning to the word idee, or idea ; whereas
the G-ermans lose their heads as soon as they hear the word
Ideen; all presence of mind abandons them, and they feel
l

as they were about to ascend in a balloon.

if Here there
forewas a field of action for our adepts in intellectual intui
tion so the most impudent of them, the notorious charlatan
;

1
Here Schopenhauer adds, "especially when pronounced Uedahen"

[Tr.]
134 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

Hegel, without more ado, called his theory of the universe

and of all things "Die Idee," and in this of course all
thought that they had something to lay hold of. Still, if
we inquire into the nature of these ideas for which Reason is
pronounced to be the faculty, without letting ourselves be
put out of countenance, the explanation usually given is an
empty, high-flown, confused verbiage, in set periods of such
length, that if the reader does not fall asleep before he
has half read it, he will find himself bewildered rather than
enlightened at the end nay, he may even have a suspicion
;

that these ideas are very like chimaeras. Meanwhile, should

anyone show a desire to know more about this sort of ideas,
he will have all kinds of things served up to him. Now it
will be the chief subjects of the theses of Scholasticism
I allude here to the representations of God, of an immortal
Soul, of a real, objectively existent World and its laws
which Kant himself has unfortunately called Ideas of
Reason, erroneously and unjustifiably, as I have shown in
my Critique of his philosophy, yet merely with a view to
proving the utter impossibility of demonstrating them and
their want of all theoretical authority. Then again it will
be, as a variation, only God, Freedom, and Immortality at ;

other times it will be the Absolute, whose acquaintance we

have already made in 20, as the Cosmological Proof, forced
to travel incognito or the Infinite as opposed to the Finite ;
;

for, on the whole, the German reader is disposed to con

tent himself with such empty talk as this, without perceiving
that the only clear thought he can get out of it is, tliat
which has an end and that which has none. The
G-ood, the True, and the Beautiful, moreover, stand high
in favour with the sentimental and tender-hearted as
pretended ideas, though they are really only three very wide
and abstract conceptions, because they are extracted from
a multitude of things and relations wherefore, like many
;

other such dbstracta, they are exceedingly empty. As regards

 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 135

their contents, Ihave shown above ( 29) that Truth is a

quality belonging exclusively to judgments that is, a logical
:

quality and as to the other two dbstracta, I refer my readers

;

partly to 65 of the first volume, partly to the entire Third

Book of my chief work. If, nevertheless, a very solemn and

mysterious assumed
air is and the eyebrows are raised up
to the wig whenever these three meagre dbstracta are
mentioned, young people may easily be induced to believe
that something peculiar and inexpressible lies behind them,
which entitles them to be called ideas, and harnessed to
the triumphal car of this would-be metaphysical Eeason.
When therefore we are told, that we possess a faculty
for direct, material (i.e., not only formal, but substantial),

supersensuous knowledge, (that is, a knowledge which

transcends all possible experience), a faculty specially de
signed for metaphysical insight, and inherent in us for
thispurpose I must take the liberty to call this a down
right lie. For the slightest candid self-examination will
suffice to convince us that absolutely no such faculty re
sides within us. The result at which all honest, competent,
authoritative thinkers have arrived in the course of ages,
moreover, tallies exactly with my assertion. It is as fol
lows: All that is innate in the whole of our cognitive
faculty, all that is therefore a priori and independent of
experience, is strictly limited to the formal part of know
ledge that is, to the consciousness of the peculiar functions
:

of the intellect and of the only way in which they can

possibly act; but in order to give material knowledge,

these functions one and all require material from out
side. Within us therefore lie the forms of external, ob
jective perception Time and Space, and then the
: law of
Causality as a mere form of the Understanding which
enables it to construct the objective, corporeal world
finally, the formal part of abstract knowledge this last is
:

deposited and treated of in Logic, which our forefathers

136 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

therefore rightly called the Theory of Reason. But this

very Logic teaches us also, that the conceptions which con-
stitute those judgments and conclusions to which all logical
laws refer, must look to intuitive Imowled ge for their material
and their content; just as the Understanding, which creates
this intuitive knowledge, looks to sensation for the material
which gives content to a priori forms.
its

Thus
all that is material in our knowledge
that is to say,
:

allthat cannot be reduced to subjective/orw, to individual

mode of activity, to functions of our intellect, its whole
material therefore, comes from outside that is, in the last
;

resort, from the objective perception of the corporeal world,

which has its origin in sensation. Now it is this intuitive

and, so far as material content isconcerned, empirical

knowledge, which Reason real Reason works up into con
ceptions, which it fixes sensuously by means of words these ;

conceptions then supply the materials for its endless combi

nations through judgments and conclusions, which constitute
the weft of our thought-world. Reason therefore has abso
lutely no material, but merely a formal, content, and this is
the object-matter of Logic, which consequently contains only
forms and rules for thinking operations. In reflecting,
Reason is absolutely forced to take its material contents
from outside, i.e., from the intuitive representations which
the Understanding has created. Its functions are exercised
on them, first of all, in forming conceptions, by dropping
some of the various qualities of things while retaining others,
which are then connected together to a conception. Repre
sentations, however, forfeit their capacity for being intui
tively perceived by this process, while they become easier to
deal with, as has already been shown. It is therefore in
this, and in this alone, that the efficiency of Reason consists ;
whereas itcan never supply material content from its own re
sources. It has nothing but forms its nature is feminine
:
;

it only conceives, but does not generate. It is not by mere

 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 137

chance that the Reason is feminine in all Latin, as well as

Teutonic, languages whereas the Understanding is in ;

variably masculine.
In using such expressions as sound Eeason teaches
this/ or Eeason should control passion, we by no means
imply that Eeason furnishes material knowledge out of its
own resources but rather do we point to the results of
;

is, to logical inference from prin

rational reflection, that

ciples which abstract knowledge has gradually gathered

from experience and by which we obtain a clear and com-
prehensive view, not only of what is empirically necessary,
and may therefore, the case occurring, be foreseen, but
even of the reasons and consequences of our own deeds also.
Reasonable or rational is everywhere synonymous with con

sistent or logical, and conversely for Logic is only Eeason s ;

natural procedure itself, expressed in a system of rules ;

therefore these expressions (rational and logical) stand in

the same relation to one another as theory and practice.
Exactly in this same sense too, when we speak of a
reasonable conduct, we mean by it one which is quite con
sistent, one therefore which proceeds from general con

ceptions, and is not determined by the transitory impres

sion of the moment. By this, however, the morality of
such conduct is in no wise determined : it
may be good
or bad indifferently. Detailed explanations of all this are
x
to be found in my
"

Critique of Kant s Philosophy," and

also in Fundamental Problems of Ethics." 2 Notions
my
"

derived from pure Eeason are, lastly, those which have

their source in the/ormaZ part, whether intuitive or reflective,
of our cognitive faculty ; those, consequently, which we are
able to bring to our consciousness a priori, that is, without
1
Die Welt a. "VV. u. Y." 2nd edition, vol. i. p. 576 ct 3rd
scqq. ;

edition, p. 610 et seg.

2
Schopenhauer, "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik," p. 152.
2nd edition, p. 149 et scg.
138 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

the help of experience. They are invariably based upon

principles which have transcendental or metalogical truth.
A Eeason, on the other hand, which supplies material
knowledge primarily out of its own resources and conveys
positive information transcending the sphere of possible
experience ; a Reason which, in order to do this, must
necessarily contain innate ideas, is a pure fiction, in
vented by our professional philosophers and a product
of the terror with which Kant s Critique of Pure Eeason
has inspired them. I wonder now, whether these gentle
men know a certain Locke and whether they have ever
read his works? Perhaps they may have done so in
times long gone by, cursorily and superficially, while look
ing down complacently on this great thinker from the
heights of their own conscious superiority may be, too, in
:

some inferior German translation for I do not yet see that

;

the knowledge of modern languages has increased in pro

portion to the deplorable decrease in that of ancient ones.
How could time besides be found for such old croakers as
Locke, when even a real, thorough knowledge of Kant s

Philosophy at present hardly exists excepting in a very few,

very old heads ? The youth of the generation now at its
maturity had of course to be spent in the study of
"Hegel
s gigantic mind," of the "sublime Schleiermacher,"
and of the acute Herbart." Alas alas the great mis
"

! !

chief in academical hero-worship of this sort, and in the

glorification of university celebrities by worthy colleagues

in office or hopeful aspirants to it, is precisely, that

ordinary intellects Nature s mere manufactured ware

are presented to honest credulous youths of immature
judgment, as master minds, exceptions and ornaments of
mankind. The students forthwith throw all their energies
into the barren study of the endless, insipid scribblings of
such mediocrities, thus wasting the short, invaluable period
allotted to them for higher education, instead of using it
 SECOND CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 139

to attain the sound information they might have found in

the works of those extremely rare, genuine, truly excep
tional thinkers, nantes in gurgite vasto, who only rise to the
surface every now and then in the course of ages, because
Nature produced but one of each kind, and then "destroyed
the mould." For this generation also those great minds
might have had life, had our youth not been cheated out
of its share in their wisdom by these exceedingly pernicious
extollers of mediocrity, members of the vast league and
brotherhood of mediocrities, which is as nourishing to-day
as it ever was and still hoists its flag as high as it can in
persistent antagonism to all that is great and genuine,
as humiliating to its members. Thanks to them, our age
has declined to so low an ebb, that Kant s Philosophy,
which took our fathers years of study, of serious appli
it

cation and of strenuous

effort to understand, has again
become foreign to the present generation, which stands
before it like OVOQ Trpo^ \vpav, at times attacking it coarsely
and clumsily as barbarians throw stones at the statue of
some Greek god which is foreign to them. Now, as this is
the case, I feel it incumbent upon me to advise all cham
pions of a Reason that perceives, comprehends, and knows
directly in short, that supplies material
knowledge out of
its own resources new to them, the
to read, as something
First Book of Locke s work, which has been celebrated

throughout the world for the last hundred and fifty years,
and in it especially to peruse 21-26 of the Third Chap
ter, expressly directed against all innate notions. For
although Locke goes too far in denying all innate truths,
inasmuch as he extends his denial even to our formal
knowledge a point in which he has been brilliantly recti
fied by Kant he is nevertheless perfectly and undeniably
right with reference to all material knowledge : that is, all

knowledge which gives substance.

I have already said in my Ethics what I must never-
140 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

theless repeat here, because, as the Spanish proverb says,

No Tiuy peor sordo que quien no quiere oir (None so
" "

deaf as those who will not hear) namely, that if Reason

:

were a faculty specially designed for Metaphysics, a faculty

which supplied the material of knowledge and could re
veal that which transcends all possible experience, the
same harmony would necessarily reign between men on
4

metaphysical and religious subjects for they are iden

tical as on mathematical ones, and those who differed in

opinion from the rest would simply be looked upon as not

quite right in their mind. Now exactly the contrary takes
place, for on no subject are men so completely at variance
with one another as upon these. Ever since men first
began to think, philosophical systems have opposed and
combated each other everywhere; they are, in fact,
often diametrically contrary to one another. Ever since
men first began to believe (which is still longer), religions

have fought against one another with fire and sword, with
excommunication and cannons. But in times when faith
was most ardent, it was not the lunatic asylum, but the
Inquisition, with all its paraphernalia, which awaited in
dividual heretics. Here again, therefore, experience flatly
and categorically contradicts the false assertion, that
Reason is a faculty for direct metaphysical knowledge, or,
to speak more clearly, of inspiration from above. Surely
it high time that severe judgment should be passed
is

upon this Reason, since, horribile dictu, so lame, so

palpable a falsehood continues after half a century to
be hawked about all over Germany, wandering year by
year from the professors chair to the students bench,
and from bench to chair,and has actually found a few
simpletons, even in France, willing to believe in it, and
carry it about in that country also. Here, however, French
bon-sens will very soon send la raison transcendentale about
itsbusiness.
 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 141

But where was this falsehood originally hatched ? How

did the fiction first corne into the world ? I am bound to
confess that it was first originated by Kant s Practical

Reason with its Categorical Imperative. For when this

Practical Eeason had once been admitted, nothing further
was needed than the addition of a second, no less sove
reign Theoretical Reason, as its counterpart, or twin- sister :
a Eeason which proclaims metaphysical truths ex tripode.
I have described the brilliant success of this invention
l
in my Fundamental Problems of Ethics to which
work I refer my reader. Now, although I grant that
Kant first gave rise to this false assumption, am, never
theless, bound to add, that those who want ^o dance are
not long in finding a piper. For it is surely as though
a curse lay on mankind, causing them, in virtue of a
natural afiinity for all that is corrupt and bad, to prefer
and hold up to admiration the inferior, not to say down

right defective, portions of the works of eminent minds,

while the really admirable parts are tolerated as merely
accessory. Very few in our time know wherein the pecu
liar depth and true grandeur of Kant s philosophy lies;
for hisworks have necessarily ceased to be comprehended
since they have ceased to be studied. In fact, they are
now only cursorily read, for historical purposes, by those
who are under the delusion that philosophy has advanced,
not to say begun, since Kant. We
soon perceive there
fore, that in spite of all their talk about Kantian philoso

phy, these people really know nothing of it but the husk,

the mere outer envelope, and that if perchance they may
here or there have taught up a stray sentence or brought
away a rough sketch of it, they have never penetrated to
the depths of its meaning and spirit. People of this sort
have always been chiefly attracted, in Kant s Philosophy,
1
Schopenhauer, "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik,
5
p. 148
and sqq. (p. 146 et scg. of 2nd edition.)
142 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

first of allby the Antinomies, on account of their oddity,

but stillmore by his Practical Eeason with its Cate
gorical Imperative, nay even by the Moral Theory he placed
on the top of it, though with this last he was never in
earnest ;
for a theoretical dogma which has only practical
validity, is very like the wooden guns we allow our children
to handle without fear of danger properly speaking, it :

belongs to the same category as Wash my skin, but

:
"

without wetting Now, as regards the Categorical Im

it."

perative, Kant never asserted it as a fact, but, on the con

trary, protests repeatedly against this being done he ;

merely served it up as the result of an exceedingly curious

combination of thoughts, because he stood in need of a
sheet-anchor for morality. Our professors of philosophy,
however, never sifted the matter to the bottom, so that it
seems as if no one before me had ever thoroughly investi
gated it. Instead of this, they made all haste to bring the
Categorical Imperative into credit as a firmly established
fact, calling it in their purism the moral law" which,
"

by the way, always reminds me of Biirger s zelle

"

Mam
indeed, they have made out of it something as
"

Laregle ;
massive as the stone tables of Moses, whose place it
entirely takes, for them. Now
in my Essay upon the
Fundament of Morality, have brought this same
I
Practical Eeason with its Categorical Imperative under the
anatomical knife, and proved so clearly and conclusively
that they never had any life or truth, that I should like
to see the man who can refute me with reasons, and so

help the Categorical Imperative honestly on its legs again.

Meanwhile, our professors of philosophy do not allow
themselves to be put out of countenance by this. They
can no more dispense with their moral law of practical
"

Eeason," as a convenient deus ex machina, on which to

found their morality, than with Free Will both are essen :

tial points in their old woman s philosophy. No matter if

 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE, THE SUBJECT. 143

I have made an end of both, since, for them, both continue

to exist, like deceased sovereigns who for political reasons
are occasionally allowed to continue reigning for a few

days after their death. These worthies simply pursue

their tactics of old against my merciless demolition of those
two antiquated fictions : and so they glide
silence, silence ;

past noiselessly, feigning ignorance, to make the public

believe that I and the like of me are not worth listening to.
Well, to be sure, their philosophical calling comes to them
from the ministry, while mine only comes from Nature.
True, we may at last perhaps discover that these heroes act
upon the same principle as that idealistic bird, the ostrich,
which imagines that by closing its eyes it does away with
the huntsman. Ah well! we must bide our time if the ;

public can only be brought to take up meantime with the

barren twaddle, the unbearably tiresome repetitions, the
arbitrary constructions of the Absolute, and the infant-
school morality of these gentlemen say, till I am dead and
they can trim up my works as they like we shall then
see.

Morgen babe denn das Eechte

Seine Freunde wohlgesinnet,
Wenn nur heute noch das Scblechte
Vollen Platz und Gunst gewinnet.
GoTHEj West-Oestlichcr Divan.

But do these gentlemen know what time of day it is ?

A long predicted epoch has set in the church is beginning

;

to totter, nay it totters already to such a degree, that it

is doubtful whether it will ever be able to recover its centre

of gravity for faith is lost.

;
The light of revelation, like
other lights, requires a certain amount of darkness as an
indispensable condition. The number of those who have been
unfitted for belief by a certain degree and extent of know

ledge, is already very large. Of this we have evident signs

in the general diffusion of that shallow Rationalism which
144 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

is showing its bulldog face daily more and more overtly.

It quietly sets to work to measure those profound mys
which centuries have brooded
teries of Christianity over
and disputed with its draper s ell, and thinks itself
wondrous wise withal. It is, however, the very quintes
sence of Christianity, the dogma of Original Sin, which
these shallow-brained Rationalists have especially singled
out for a laughing-stock precisely because nothing seems
;

clearer or more
certain to them, than that existence should

begin for each of us with our birth nothing therefore so

:

impossible as that we can have come into the world already

burdened with guilt. How acute And just as in times
!

of prevailing poverty and neglect, wolves begin to make

their appearance in villages so does Materialism, ever
;

lying in wait, under these circumstances lift up its head

and come to the front hand in hand with Bestialism,
itscompanion, which some call Humanism. Our thirst
afterknowledge augments with our incapacity for belief.
There comes a boiling-point in the scale of all intellectual
development, at which all faith, all revelation, and ail
authority evaporate, and Man claims the right to judge for
himself; the right, not only to be taught, but to be convinced.
The leading-strings of his infancy have fallen off, and
henceforth he demands leave to walk alone. Yet his
craving for Metaphysics can no more be extinguished than
any physical want. Then it is, that the desire for philo
sophy becomes serious and that mankind invokes the
spirits of all the genuine
thinkers who have issued from
its ranks. Then, too, empty verbiage and the impotent
endeavours of emasculated intellects no longer suffice the;

want of a serious philosophy is felt, having other aims

in view than fees and salaries, and caring little therefore
whether it meets the approbation of cabinet-ministers, or
councillors, whether it serves the purposes of this or that
religious faction, or not a philosophy which, on the con-
;
 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 145

shows that it has a very different mission in

trary, clearly
view from that of procuring a livelihood for the poor in
spirit.
But I return to my argument. By means of an amplifica
tion which only needed a little audacity, a theoretical oracle
had been added to the practical oracle with which Kant
had wrongly endowed Reason. The credit of this inven
tion is no doubt due to F. H. Jacobi, from whom the

professional philosophers joyfully and thankfully received

the precious gift, as a means to help them out of the straits
to which Kant had reduced them. That cool, calm, de
liberate Reason, which Kant had criticized so mercilessly,
was henceforth degraded to Understanding and known by
this name; while Reason was supposed to denote an

entirely imaginary, fictitious faculty, admitting us, as it

were, to a little window overlooking the superlunar, nay,
the supernatural world, through which all those truths
are handed to us ready cut and dried, concerning which
old-fashioned, honest, reflective Reason had for ages
vainly argued and contended. And it is on such a mere
product of the imagination, such a completely fictitious
Reason as this, that G-erman sham philosophy has been
based for the last fifty years ; first, as the free construction
and projection of the absolute Ego and the emanation
from it of the non-Ego ; then, as the intellectual intuition
of absolute identity or indifference, and its evolutions to
Nature or again, as the arising of G-od out of his dark
;

depths or bottomless pit a la Jakob Bohme lastly, as the

*
;

pure, self -thinking, absolute Idea, the scene of the ballet-

dance of the self -moving conceptions still, at the same
time, always as immediate apprehension (Vemehmen) of the
Divine, the supersensuous, the Deity, verity, beauty and as
may be desired, or even as a mere
"

many other as
"

-ties

1
Aits seinem Grrund oder Ungrund"
"

L
146 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

1
vague presentiment of all these wonders. So this is Season,
is it ? Oh no, it is simply a farce, of which our professors
of philosophy, who are sorely perplexed by Kant s serious

critiques, avail themselves in order to pass off the subjects

of the established religion of their country somehow or
other, per fas aut nefas, for the results of philosophy.
For
behoves all professorial philosophy, before all
it

things, to establish beyond doubt, and to give a philoso

phical basis to, the doctrine, that there is a God, Creator,

and Ruler of the Universe, a personal, consequently in
dividual, Being, endowed with Understanding and Will,
who has created the world out of nothing, and who rules
it with sublime wisdom, power and goodness. This obli
gation, however, places our professors of philosophy in
an awkward position with respect to serious philosophy.
For Kant had appeared and the Critique of Pure Reason,
was written more than sixty years ago, the result being,
that of all the proofs of the existence of God which had
been brought forward during the Christian ages, and
which may be reduced to three which alone are possible,
none are able to accomplish the desired end. Nay, the
iuipossibity of any such proof, and with it the impossibility
of all speculative theology, is shown at length a priori
and not in the empty verbiage or Hegelian jargon now
in fashion, which may be made to mean anything one
likes, but quite seriously and honestly, in the good old-
fashioned way wherefore, however little it may have been
;

"to the taste of many people, nothing cogent could be

it for the last sixty years, and
brought forward in reply to
the proofs of the existence of God have in consequence
and are no longer in use. Our professors of
lost all credit,

philosophy have even begun to look down upon them and

treat them with decided contempt, as ridiculous and super
fluous attempts to demonstrate what was self-evident.
1
Ahnung without the See above, p. 133. (Tr. s note.)
"

d."
 .
SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 147

Ho ! what a pity this was not found out sooner! How

ho !

much trouble might have been spared in searching whole

centuries for these proofs, and how needless it would have
been for Kant to bring the whole weight of his Critique
of Eeason to bear upon and crush them Some folks, !

will no doubt be reminded by this contempt of the

fox with the sour grapes. But those who wish to see a
slight specimen of it will find a particularly characteristic
one in Schelling s Philosophische Schriften," vol. i., 1809,
"

p. 152. Now, whilst others were consoling themselves with

Kant assertion, that it is just as impossible to prove the
s

non-existence, as the existence, of God as if, forsooth, the

old wag did not know that affirmanti incumbit probatio
Jacobi admirable invention came to the rescue of our per
s

plexed professors, and granted G-erman savants of this cen

tury a peculiar sort of Eeason that had never been known
or heard of before.
Yet these artifices were quite unnecessary.
all For the
impossibility of proving the existence of God by no means
interferes with that existence, since it rests in unshakeable
security on a much firmer basis. It is indeed a matter
of revelation, and this is besides all the more certain,
because that revelation was exclusively vouchsafed to a
single people, called, on this account, the chosen people of
G-od. This is made evident by the fact, that the notion
of God, as personal Euler and Creator of the world, or
daining everything for the best, is to be found in no other
religion but the Jewish, and the two faiths derived from
it, which might consequently in a wider sense be called

Jewish sects. We find no trace of such a notion in anv

other religion, ancient or modern. For surely no one
would dream of confounding this Creator God Almignty
with the Hindoo Brahm, which is living in me, in you,
in my horse, in your dog or even with Brahma, who is
born and dies to malic way for other Brahmas, and to whom
148 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V.

moreover the production of the world is imputed as sin and

1
guilt least of all with beguiled Saturn s voluptuous son,
towhom Prometheus, defiant, prophesies his downfall. But
ifwe finally direct our attention towards the religion which
numbers most followers, and in this respect may therefore
be said to rank foremost that is, Buddhism, we can :

no longer shut our eyes to the fact that it is as

decidedly
and explicitly atheistic, as it is idealistic and ascetic and ;

this moreover to such a degree, that its priests express

the greatest abhorrence of the doctrine of pure Theism
whenever it is brought to their notice. Therefore, in a
treatise handed to a Catholic bishop by the High Priest
2
of the Buddhists at Ava, the doctrine that there is a "

Being who has created the world and all things, and who
alone is worthy of worship," is counted among the six

damnable heresies. 8 This is entirely corroborated by

I. J. Schmidt, a most excellent and learned authority*

whom I consider as having undoubtedly the deepest know

ledge of Buddhism of any European savant, and who, in his
work "

Upon the connection between Gnostic doctrines and

Buddhism," p. 9, says :

In the writings of the Buddhists not a trace is to be

"

found of any positive indication of a Supreme Being as the

principle of Creation. Whenever this subject presents
itself consistently in the course of argument, it seems,
indeed, to be intentionally evaded." And again The :
"

system of Buddhism knows of no eternal, uncreated,

1
Brimha be unceasingly employed in the creation of worlds
"If

how cantranquillity be obtained by inferior orders of being ? Prabodh "

Chandro Daya, translated by J. Taylor, p. 23. Brahma is also part of

the Trimurti, which is the personification of nature, as procreation,
preservation, and death that is, he represents the first of these.
:

2
See "

Asiatic Researches," vol. vi. p. 268, and Sangennano s

"

De
scription of the Burmese Empire," p. 81.
3
See I. J. Schmidt, Forschungen im Gebiete der alteren Bildungs-
"

geschichte Mittelasiens." St. Petersburg, 1824, pp. 276, and 180. %

 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 149

one and only Being, having existed before Time and

created all that is visible and invisible. This idea is quite
foreign to Buddhism, and not a trace of it is to be found
in Buddhist works. And just as little mention do we find
of Creation. True, the visible Universe is not without a be
ginning, but itarose out of empty Space, according to con
sistent, immutable, natural laws. We should however err,
were we to assume that anything call it Fate or Nature
is regarded or revered
by the Buddhists as a divine principle;
on the contrary, it is just this very development of empty
Space, this precipitate from it or this division into count
less parts, this Matter thus arising, which constitutes the
Evil of Jirtintschi, or of the Universe in its inner and outer
relations, out of which sprang Ortschilang, or continuous

change according to immutable laws, which the same Evil

*
had established." Then again The expression Creation
:
"

is foreign to Buddhism, which only knows Cosmogony ;

"

and, We must comprehend that no idea of a creation of

"

divine origin is compatible with their system." I could

bring forward a hundred corroborative passages like these;
but will limit myself to one more, which I quote on account
of its popular and official character. The third volume of
a very instructive Buddhist work, "Mahavansi, E-aja-
2
ratnacari, and Raja-Vali," contains a translation of the
interrogatories to which the High Priests of the five chief
Pagodas were separately and successively subjected by the
Dutch Governor of Ceylon about the year 1766. It is
exceedingly amusing to see the contrast between the inter
locutors, who have the greatest difficulty in understanding
one another s meaning. In conformity with the doctrines
of their faith, these priests, who are penetrated with love

1
I. J. Schmidt, Lecture delivered in the Academy at St. Petersburg

en the 15th Sept. 1830, p. 26.

2
Mahavansi, Raja-ratnacari, and Kaja- Vali, from the Singhalese, by
E. Upham. London, 1833.
150 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. V,

and compassion for all living beings, not excepting even

Dutch Governors, spare no pains to satisfy him by their
answers. But the artless, na ive Atheism of these priests,
whose piety extends even to practising continence, soon comes
into conflict with the deep convictions founded on Judaism,
imbibed by the Governor in his infancy. This faith has
become a second nature for him he cannot in the least ;

understand that these priests are not Theists, therefore

he constantly returns to his inquiries after a Supreme
Being, asking them who created the world, and so forth.

Whereupon they answer that there can be no higher

being than Buddha Shakia-Muni, the Victorious and
the Perfect, who, though a king s son by birth, volun
tarily lived the life of a beggar, and preached to the
end his sublime doctrine, for the Redemption of mankind,
and for our salvation from the misery of constant re
nascence. They hold that the world has not been made by
anyone/ that it is self-created, that Nature spreads it out,
and draws it in again but that it is that, which existing,
;

does not exist that it is the necessary accompaniment of

:

renascence, and that renascence is the result of our sinful

conduct, &c. &c. &c. I mention such facts as these chiefly
on account of the really scandalous way in which G-erman
savants still universally persist, even to the present day, in

looking upon Religion and Theism as identical and sy

nonymous whereas Religion is, in fact, to Theism as the
;

genus to the single species, and Judaism and Theism are

alone identical. For this reason we stigmatize as heathen
all nations who are neither Jews, Christians, nor Mahome
tans. Christians are even taxed by Mahometans and Jews
with the impurity of their Theism, because of the dogma
of the Trinity. For, whatever may be said to the contrary,

1
Kooyiov TOV$() 0rj<r(V Hpa/c\ro, OVTZ rig Oeutv ovrz av9ptt)7Td)v
CTTOITJOW. (Neither a God nor a man created this world, says Hera-
clitus.) Plut. De animse procreatione," c. 5.
(<
 SECOND CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 151

Christianity lias Indian blood in its veins, therefore it con

stantly tends to free itself from Judaism. The Critique
of Pure Reason is the most serious attack that has ever
been made upon Theism and this is why our professors
of philosophy have been in such a hurry to set Kant
aside but had that work appeared in any country where
;

Buddhism prevailed, it would simply have been regarded

as an edifying treatise intended to refute heresy more
thoroughly by a salutary confirmation of the orthodox doc
trine of Idealism that is, the doctrine of the merely appa
rent existence of the world, as it presents itself to our
senses. Even the two other religions which coexist with
Buddhism in China those of Taotsee and of Confu
cius are just as Atheistic as Buddhism itself ;
wherefore
the missionaries have never been able to translate the first

verse of the Pentateuch into Chinese, because there is no

word in the language for God and Creation. Even the
missionary Giitzlaff, in his "History of the Chinese Empire,"
p. 18,
has the honesty to say :It is extraordinary that
"

none of the (Chinese) philosophers ever soared high enough

to reach the knowledge of a Creator and Lord of the
Universe, although they possessed the Light of Nature in
full J. F. Davis likewise quotes a passage,
measure."

which is
quite in accordance with this, from Milne s Pre
face to his translation of the Shing-yu, where in speaking
of that work, he says that we may see from it that the "

bare Light of Nature, as it is called, even when aided by

all the light of Pagan philosophy, is totally incapable of

leading men to the knowledge and worship of the true

God." All this confirms the fact that revelation is the sole
foundation on which Theism rests indeed, it must be so,
;

unless revelation is to be superfluous. This is a good oppor

tunity for observing that the word Atheism itself implies a
surreptitious assumption, since it takes Theism for granted
as a matter of course. It would be more hon&t to
say
152 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. V.

Non-Judaism instead of Atheism, and Non-Jew instead of

Atheist.
Now as, according to the above, the existence of God
belongs to revelation, by which it isfirmly established, it
has no need whatever of human authentication. Philo

sophy, however, is properly speaking only an idle, super

fluous attempt to let Reason that is, the human power of
thinking, reflecting, deliberating once in a while, try its
own powers unassisted, as a child is now and then allowed
to run alone on a lawn and try its strength without leading-

strings, just to see what will come of it. Tests and experi
ments of this kind we call speculation ; and it lies in the nature
of the matter that it should, for once, leave all authority,
human or divine, out of consideration, ignore it, and go its
own way in search of the most sublime, most important
truths. Now, if on this basis it should arrive at the very same
results as those mentioned above, to which Kant had come,
speculation has no right on that account to cast all honesty
and conscience forthwith aside, and take to by-ways, in
order somehow or other to get back to the domain of
Judaism, as its conditio sine qua non ; it ought rather
henceforth to seek truth quite honestly and simply by any
road that may happen to lie open before it, but never to
allow any other light than that of Reason to guide it thus :

advancing calmly and confidently, like one at work in his

vocation, without concern as to where that road may lead.
If our professors of philosophy put a different construc
tion on the matter, and hold that they cannot eat their
bread in honour, so long as they have not reinstalled G-od
Almighty on his throne as if, forsooth, he stood in need
of them this already accounts for their not relishing my
writings, and explains why I am not the man for them ;
for I certainly do not deal in this sort of article, nor have
I the newest reports to communicate about the Almighty
every Leipzig fair-time, as they have.
 CHAPTER YI.

ON THE THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT AND

THAT FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.

35. Explanation of this Class of Objects.

is the formal part of complete representations that
ITis to say, the intuitions given us a priori of the forms
of the outer and inner sense, i.e. of Space and of Time
which constitutes the Third Class of Objects for our repre
sentative faculty.
As pure intuitions, these forms are objects for the
faculty of representation by themselves and apart from
complete representations and from the determinations of
being empty or filled which these representations first add to
them since even pure points and pure lines cannot be
;

brought to sensuous perception, but are only a priori in

tuitions, just as the infinite expansion and the infinite

divisibility of Space and of Time are exclusively objects of

pure intuition and foreign to empirical perception. That
which distinguishes the third class of representations, in
which Space and Time are pure intuitions, from the first
class, in which they are sensuously (and moreover con

jointly) perceived, is Matter, which I have therefore de

fined, on the one hand, as the perceptibility of Space and
Time, on the other, as objectified Causality.
The form of Causality, on the contrary, which belongs
to the Understanding, is not separately and by itself
154 THE FOTJBFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VI.

an object for our faculty of representation, nor have we

consciousness of it, until it is connected with what is

material in our knowledge.

36. Principle of the Sufficient Reason of Being. .

Space and Time are so constituted, that all their parts

stand in mutual relation, so that each of them conditions
and is conditioned by another. We call this relation in

Space, position ; in Time, succession. These relations are

peculiar ones, differing entirely from all other possible
relations of our representations neither the Understand
;

ing nor the Reason are therefore able to grasp them by

means of mere conceptions, and pure intuition a priori
alone makes them intelligible to us for it is impossible ;

by mere conceptions to explain clearly what is meant by

above and below, right and left, behind and before, before
and after. Kant rightly confirms this by the assertion,
that the distinction between our right and left glove can
not be made intelligible in any other way than by intui
tion. Now, the law by which the divisions of Space and
of Time determine one another reciprocally with reference
to these relations (position and succession) is what I call

the Principle of the Sufficient Reason of Being, principium

rationis sufficientis essendi. I have already given an example
of this relation in 15, by which I have shown, through
the connection between the sides and angles of a triangle,
that this relation is not only quite different from that
between cause and effect, but also from that between
reason of knowledge and consequent wherefore here the ;

condition may be called Reason of Being, ratio essendi.

The insight into such a reason of being can, of course, be
come a reason of knowing just as the insight into the law
:

of causality and its application to a particular case is the

reason of knowledge of the effect but this in no way
;
 THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 155

annuls the complete distinction between Reason of Being,

Reason of Becoming, and Reason of Knowing. It often
happens, that what according to one form of oar principle
is consequence, is, according to another, reason. The rising
of the quicksilver in a thermometer, for instance, is the

consequence of increased heat according to the law of

causality, while according to the principle of the sufficient
reason of knowing it is the reason, the ground of know-
ledge, of the increased heat and also of the judgment by
which this is asserted.

37. Reason of Being in Space.

The position of each division of Space towards any

other, say of any given line and this is equally ap
plicable to planes, bodies, and points determines also
absolutely its totally different position with reference to
any other possible line so that the latter position stands
;

to the former in the relation of the consequent to its

reason. As the position of this given line towards any
other possible line likewise determines its position to
wards all the others, and as therefore the position of the
first two lines is itself determined by all the others, it is

immaterial which we consider as being first determined

and determining the others, i.e. which particular one we
regard as ratio and which others as rationata. This is so,
because in Space there is no succession for it is precisely
;

by uniting Space and Time to form the collective re

presentation of the complex of experience, that the repre

sentation of coexistence arises. Thus an analogue to so-
called reciprocity prevails everywhere in the Reason of
Being in Space, as we shall see in 48, where I enter
more fully into- the reciprocity of reasons.
Now, as every
determined by all the others just as much as it de
line is
termines them, it is arbitrary to consider any line merely
156 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VI.

as determining and not as being determined, and the posi

tion of each towards any other admits the question as to
its position with reference to some other line, which second

position necessarily determines the first and makes it that

which it is. It is therefore just as impossible to find an
end aparte ante in the series of links in the chain of Eeasons
of Being as in that of Reasons of Becoming, nor can we find

any a parte post either, because of the infinity of Space and

of the lines possible within Space. All possible relative
spaces are figures, because they are limited and all these
;

figures have their Eeason of Being in one another, because

they are conterminous. The series rationum essendi in
Space therefore, like the series rationum fiendi, proceeds in
infinitum ; and moreover not only in a single direction, like
the latter, but in all directions.
Nothing of all this can be proved for the truth of these
;

principles is transcendental, they being directly founded

upon the intuition of Space given us a priori.

38. Reason of being in Time. Arithmetic.

Every instant in Time is conditioned by the preceding

one. The Sufficient Reason of Being, as the law of conse
quence, is so simple here, because Time has only one dimen
sion, therefore it admits of no multiplicity of relations.
Each instant is conditioned by its predecessor we can only
;

reach it through that predecessor only so far as this was

:

and has elapsed, does the present one exist, All counting
rests upon this nexus of the divisions of Time, numbers

only serving to mark the single steps in the succession ;

upon it therefore rests all arithmetic likewise, which teaches

absolutely nothing but methodical abbreviations of nume

ration. Each number pre-supposes its predecessors as the
reasons of its being we can only reach the number ten by
:

passing through all the preceding numbers, and it is only

 THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT. 157

in virtue of this insight that I know, that where ten are,

there also are eight, six, four.

39. Geometry.

The whole science of Geometry likewise rests upon the

nexus of the position of the divisions of Space. It would,
accordingly, be an insight into that nexus only such an
;

insight being, as we have already said, impossible by means

of mere conceptions, or indeed in any other way than by in
tuition, every geometrical proposition would have to be
brought back to sensuous intuition, and the proof would
simply consist in making the particular nexus in question
clear; nothing more could be done. Nevertheless we
find G-eometry treated quite differently. Euclid s Twelve
Axioms are alone held to be based upon mere intuition,
and even of these only the Ninth, Eleventh, and Twelfth
are properly speaking admitted to be founded upon diffe
rent, separate intuitions ;
while the rest are supposed to
be founded upon the knowledge that in science we do not,
as in experience, deal with real things existing for themselves
side by side, and susceptible of endless variety, but on the

contrary with conceptions, and in Mathematics with normal

intuitions, i.e. figures and numbers, whose laws are binding
for all experience, and which therefore combine the compre
hensiveness of the conception with the complete definite-
ness of the single representation. For although, as intuitive
representations, they are throughout determined with com
plete precision no room being left in this way by anything
remaining undetermined still they are general, because
they are the bare forms of all phenomena, and, as such,
applicable to all real objects to which such forms belong,
What Plato says of his Ideas would therefore, even in
Geometry, hold good of these normal intuitions, just as
well as of conceptions, i.e. that two cannot be
exactly
158 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. VI.

similar, for then they would be but one.

This would, I 1

say, be applicable also to normal intuitions in Geometry,

if it were not that, as exclusively spacial objects, these

differ from one another in mere juxtaposition, that is, in

place. Plato had long ago remarked this, as we are told
2
by Aristotle : tri (He, Trapa TO. alaQt]ra KCti TO. udr), TO.
padrj-
uartKa Tutv irpayfjiar^v tival jutrav, ^m^t povra rwv
(j)i](Ti JJLEV

alcrdriTwr ry aidia feat aKtvrjTa etVcu, rwv f) EiCwv ry ra /uej>

7roX/V ctrra opoia etVat, TO ^e eldoQ avru v tKaarov {JLOVOV

(item, prceter sensibilia et species, matJiematica rerum ait
media esse, a sensibilibus quidem differentia eo, quod per-
petua et immobilia sunt, a speciebus vero eo, quod illorum
quidem multa qucedam similia sunt, species vero ipsct,
unaquceque sola). Now the mere knowledge that such a
difference of place does not annul the rest of the identity,

might surely, it seems to me, supersede the other nine

axioms, and would, I think, be better suited to the nature
of science, whose aim is knowledge of the particular through
the general, than the statement of nine separate axioms
all based upon the same insight. Moreover, what Aristotle
cV TOVTOLQ ^ laoTrjQ kvorijg (in illis cequalitas unites
says:
3
est) then becomes applicable to geometrical figures.
But with reference to the normal intuitions in Time, i.e.

Platonic ideas may, after all, be described as normal intuitions,

1

which would hold good not only for what is formal, but also for what is
material in complete representations therefore as complete representa
tions which, as such, would be determined throughout, while compre

hending many things at once, like conceptions that is to say, as repre :

sentatives of conceptions, but which are quite adequate to those

conceptions, as I have explained in 28.

2 "

with which compare x. 1. "Further, says

Aristot. Metaph." i. 6,

he, besides things sensible and the ideas, there are things mathematical
coming in between the two, which differ from the things sensible, inas
much as they are eternal and immovable, and from the ideas, inasmuch
as many of them are like each other; but the idea is absolutely and

only one."
(Tr. s Add.)
* "

In these it is equality that constitutes unity." (Tr. s Add.)

 THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 159

to numbers, even this distinction of juxtaposition no longer

exists. Here, as with conceptions, absolutely nothing but the
identitas indiscernibiliumremains for there is but one five:

and one seven. And in this we may perhaps also find a reason
why 7 + 5 = 12 is a synthetical proposition a priori,
founded upon intuition, as Kant profoundly discovered,
and not an identical one, as it is called by Herder in his
12 = 12 is an identical proposition.
"

Metakritik
"

In Geometry, it is therefore only in dealing with axioms

that we appeal to intuition. All the other theorems are
demonstrated that is to say, a reason of knowing is given,
:

the truth of which everyone is bound to acknowledge.

The logical truth of the theorem is thus shown, but not its
transcendental truth (v. 30 and 32), which, as it lies in
the reason of being and not in the reason of knoivvng,
never can become evident excepting by means of intuition.
This explains why this sort of geometrical demonstration,
while it no doubt conveys the conviction that the theorem

which has been demonstrated is true, nevertheless gives no

insight as to why that which it asserts is what it is. In
other words, we have not found its Reason of Being but ;

the desire to find it is usually then thoroughly roused.

For proof by indicating the reason of knowledge only
effects conviction (convictio), not knowledge (cognitio) there :

fore it might perhaps be more correctly called elenchus

than demonstratio. This is why, in most cases, therefore, it
leaves behind it that disagreeable feeling which is given

by all want of insight, when perceived and here, the ;

want of knowledge why a thing is as it is, makes itself all

the more keenly felt, because of the certainty just attained,
that it is as it is. This impression is very much like the

feeling we have, when something has been conjured into or

out of our pocket, and we cannot conceive how. The
reason of knowing which, in such demonstrations as
these, is given without the reason of being, resembles
160 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VI.

certain physical theories, which present the phenomenon

without being able to indicate its cause: for instance,
Leidenfrost s experiment, inasmuch as it succeeds also in a
platina crucible whereas the reason of being of a geo
;

metrical proposition which is discovered by intuition, like

every knowledge we acquire, produces satisfaction. When
once the reason of being is found, we base our conviction
of the truth of the theorem upon that reason alone, and no

longer upon the reason of knowing given us by the demon

stration. Let us, for instance, take the sixth proposition
of the first Book of Euclid :

"If two angles of a triangle are equal, the sides also

which subtend, or are opposite to, the equal angles shall

be equal to one another." (See fig. 3.)
Which Euclid demonstrates as follows :

Let a b c be a triangle having the angle a b c equal to

"

the angle a c b, then the side a c must be equal to the side

a b also.

For, if side a b be not equal to side a c, one of them is

"

greater than the other. Let a b be greater than a c ; and

from b a cut off b d equal to c a, and draw d c. Then, in the
triangles d b c, a b c, because d b is equal to a c, and b c is
common to both triangles, the two sides d b and b c are

equal to the two sides a c, a b, each to each and the angle ;

d b c is equal to the angle a c b, therefore the base d c is

equal to the base a b, and the triangle d b c is equal to the
 THIRD CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 161

triangle a be, the less triangle equal to the greater, which

is absurd. Therefore a b is not unequal to a c, that is, ab
is equal to a c"

Now, in this demonstration we have a reason of know

ing for the truth of the proposition. But who bases his
conviction of that geometrical truth upon this proof?
Do we not rather base our conviction upon the reason of
being, which we know intuitively, and according to which
(by a necessity which admits of no further demonstration,
but only of evidence through intuition) two lines drawn
from both extreme ends of another line, and inclining
equally towards each other, can only meet at a point which
is equally distant from both extremities since the two
;

arising angles are properly but one, to which the opposite-

ness of position gives the appearance of being two where ;

fore there is no reason why the lines should meet at any

point nearer to the one end than to the other.

It is the knowledge of the reason of being which shows
us the necessary consequence of the conditioned from its
condition in this instance, the lateral equality from the
angular equality that is, it shows their connection whereas ;

the reason of knowing only shows their coexistence. Nay,

we might even maintain that the usual method of proving
merely convinces us of their coexistence in the actual
figure given us as an example, but by no means that
they are always coexistent for, as the necessary con
;

nection is not shown, the conviction we acquire of this

truth rests simply upon induction, and is based upon
the fact, that we find it is so in every figure we make.
The reason of being is certainly not as evident in all cases
as it is in simple theorems like this 6th one of Euclid ;
still I am persuaded that it might be brought to evidence in
every theorem, however complicated, and that the proposi
tion can always be reduced to some such simple intuition.
Besides, we are all just as conscious a priori of the necessity
M
162 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. vi.

of such a reason of being for each relation of Space, as we are

of the necessity of a cause for each change. In complicated
theorems it will, of course, be
very difficult to show that
reason of being and this is not the place for difficult geo
;

metrical researches. Therefore, to make my meaning some

what clearer, I will now try to bring back to its reason of

being a moderately complicated proposition, in which

nevertheless that reason is not immediately evident.
Passing over the intermediate theorems, I take the 16th :

In every triangle in which one side has been produced,

"

the exterior angle is greater than either of the interior

opposite angles."

This Euclid demonstrates in the following manner (see

fig. 4) :-
Let a b c be a triangle and let the side I c be produced
"

to d then the exterior angle a c d shall be greater than

;

either of the interior opposite angles bacorcba. Bisect the

side a c at e, and join b e ; produce b e to /, making e f

equal to and join / c. Produce a c to g. Because a e

e b,

isequal to e c, and be to e f ; the two sides a e, e b, are

equal to the two sides c e, e f, each to each ; and the angle

a e b is equal to the angle c e f, because they are opposite
vertical angles ;
therefore the base a b is equal to the base

e f, and thetriangle a e b is equal to the triangle c e f, and

tiie remaining angles of one triangle to the remaining angles
 THIED CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 163

of tlie other, each to each, to which the equal sides are

opposite therefore the angle I a e is equal to the angle

;

e c f. But the angle

e c d is greater than the angle e c /
Therefore the angle a c d is greater than the angle a b c"

In the same manner, if the side b c be bisected, and the

"

side a c be produced to g, it may be demonstrated that the

angle beg, that is, the opposite vertical angle a
c d is

greater than the angle ab e."

My demonstration of the same proposition would be as

follows (see fig. 5) :

For the angle b a c to be even equal to, let alone greater

than, the angle a c d, the line b a toward c a would have to
lie in the same direction as b d (for this is
precisely what
is meant by equality of the angles), i.e., it must be parallel

Fig. 5.

with b d is to say, b a and b d must never meet

;
that but ;

in order to form a triangle they must meet (reason of

being), and must thus do the contrary of that which would
be required for the angle b a c to be of the same size as
the angle a c d.
For the angle a b c to be even equal to, let alone greater

than, the angle a c d, line b a must lie in the same direction

towards b d as a c (for this is what is meant by equality of
the angles), i.e., it must be parallel with a c, that is to say,

b a and a c must never meet but in order to form a triangle

;

b a and a c must meet and must thus do the contrary of

that which would be required for the angle a b c to be
of the same size as a c d.

By all this I do not mean to suggest the introduction of

164 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. vi.

a new method of mathematical demonstration, nor the

substitution of my own proof for that of Euclid, for which
its whole nature unfits it, as well as the fact that it pre

supposes the conception of parallel lines, which in Euclid

comes much later. I merely wished to show what the
reason of being is, and wherein lies the difference between
it and the reason of knowing, whichlatter only effects con-
victio,a thing that differs entirely from insight into the
reason of being. The fact that Geometry only aims at
effecting convictio, and that this, as I have said, leaves
behind it a disagreeable impression, but gives no insight
into the reason of being which insight, like all knowledge,

Fig. 6.

is satisfactory and pleasing may perhaps be one of the

reasons for the great dislike which many otherwise eminent
heads have for mathematics.
I cannot resist again giving fig. 6, although it has already
been presented elsewhere because the mere sight of it
;

without words conveys ten times more persuasion of the

truth of the Pythagorean theorem than Euclid s mouse
trap demonstration.
Those readers for whom this chapter may have a special
interest will find the subject of it more fully treated in my
chief work, Die Welt als Wille
"

und Vorstellung," vol. i.

15 ;
vol. ii.
chap. 13.
 CHAPTEE VII.

ON THE FOURTH CLASS OF OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT,

AND THE FORM OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT
REASON WHICH PREDOMINATES IN IT.

40. General Explanation.

our representative faculty

last Class of Objects for

THE
which remains to be examined is a peculiar but
highly important one. It comprises but one object for
each individual: that is, the immediate object of the inner
sense, the Subject in volition, which is Object for the Know
ing Subject wherefore it manifests itself in Time alone,
;

never in Space, and as we shall see, even in Time under an

important restriction.

41. Subject of Knowledge and Object.

All knowledge presupposes Subject and Object. Even

self-consciousness (Selbstbewusstsein) therefore is not abso

lutely simple, but, like our consciousness of all other

things (i.e., the faculty of perception), it is subdivided into
that which is known and that which knows. Now, that
which is known manifests itself absolutely and exclusively
as Will.
The Subject accordingly knows itself exclusively as
willing, but not as knowing. For the ego which repre
sents, never can itself become representation or Object,
since it conditions all representations as their necessary
166 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VII.

correlate ;
rather may the following beautiful passage
from the Sacred Upanishad be applied to it Id videndum :

non est : omnia videt ; et id audiendum non est omnia :

audit ; sciendum non est : omnia scit : et intelligendum non

est: omnia intelligit. Prceter id, videns, et sciens, et
audiens, et intelligens ens aliud non est.
1

There can therefore be no knowledge of knowing, because

this would imply separation of the Subject from knowing,
while it nevertheless knew that knowing which ia im
possible.
My answer to the objection, "I not only know, but
know also that I know," would be, Your knowing that "

you know only differs in words from your knowing. I

know that I know means nothing more than I know,
and this again, unless it is further determined, means
y

nothing more than ego. If your knowing and your

knowing that you know are two different things, just try
to separate them,and firstto know without knowing that

you know, then to know that you know without this

knowledge being at the same time knowing." No doubt,
by leaving all special knowing out of the question, we may

at last arrive at the proposition I know the last ab "

"

straction we are able to make but this proposition is ;

identical with Objects exist for me," and this again is

"

identical with I am Subject," in which nothing more is

"

contained than in the bare word

"

I."

Now, it may still be asked how the various cognitive

faculties belonging to the Subject, such as Sensibility,

Understanding, Reason, are known to us, if we do not

know the Subject. It is not through our knowing having
become an Object for us that these faculties are known to
us, for then there would not be so many conflicting judg
ments concerning them ; they are inferred rather, or

1
p. 202.
"

Oupnekhat," vol. i.
 FOTJETH CLASS OF OBJECTS FOB THE SUBJECT. 167

more correctly, they are general expressions for the esta

blished classes of representations which, at all times, have
been more or less clearly distinguished in those cognitive
faculties. But, with reference to the necessary correlate
of these representations as their condition, i.e., the Sub
ject, these faculties are abstracted from them (the repre

sentations), and stand consequently towards the classes

of representations in precisely the same relation as the

Subject in general towards the Object in general. Now,

just as the Object is at once posited with the Subject (for
the word itself would otherwise have no meaning), and
conversely, as the Subject is at once posited with the
Object so that being the Subject means exactly as much
as having an Object, and being an Object means the same
thing as being known by the Subject so likewise, when
an Object assumed as being determined in any par
is

ticular way, do we also assume that the Subject knows

precisely in that particular way. So far therefore it is
immaterial whether we say that Objects have such and
such peculiar inherent determinations, or that the Subject
knows in such and such ways. It is indifferent whether
we say that Objects are divided into such and such classes,
or that such and such different cognitive faculties are
peculiar to the Subject. In that singular compound of
depth and superficiality, Aristotle, are to be found traces
even of insight into this truth, and indeed the critical
philosophy lies in embryo in his works. He says :
l

/ <u\>)
TO. OVTO. TTWC tan itcLVTO. (anima quammodo est uni-

versa, quce sunt). And again: 6 VOVQ eari tifiog eidtiv, i.e.,

the understanding is the form of forms, KO.I rj aiadrja-ic

tiSog aiffdrjTwv, and sensibility the form of sensuous
objects. Accordingly, it is all one whether we say, sen "

sibility and understanding are no more or,

;
"

the world is
"

1
Aristot.,
"

De anima," iii. 8.
"

In a certain sense the intellect is all

that exists."
(Tr. s Add.)
168 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VII.

at an end." It comes to the same thing whether we say,

There are no conceptions," or
"

Reason is gone and "

animals alone remain."

The dispute between Realism and Idealism, which ap
peared for the last time in the dispute between the Dog
matists and Kantians, or between Ontology and Meta
physics on the one hand and Transcendental JEsthetic
and Transcendental Logic on the other, arose out of the
misapprehension of this relation and was based upon its
misapprehension with reference to the First and Third
Classes of representations as established by me, just as
the mediaeval dispute between Realists and Nominalists
rested upon the misapprehension of this relation with
reference to the Second Class.

42. The Subject of Volition.

According to what has preceded, the Subject of know

ledge can never be known it can never become Object or
;

representation. Nevertheless, as we have not only an

outer self-knowledge (in sensuous perception), but an inner
one also and as, on the other hand, every knowledge, by
;

its very nature, presupposes a knower and a known, what

is known within us as such, is not the knower, but the

wilier, the Subject of Volition the Will. Starting from:

knowledge, we may I know" is an analytical,

assert that
"

"

I on the contrary, a synthetical, and moreover an

will,"

a posteriori proposition, that is, it is given by experience

in this case by inner experience (i.e., in Time alone). In
so far therefore the Subject of volition would be an
Object for us. Introspection always shows us to ourselves
as willing. In this willing, however, there are numerous
degrees, from the faintest wish to passion, and I have
*
often shown that not only all our emotions, but even all
1
See "Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik," p. 11, and in several
other places.
 FOURTH CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 169

thosemovements of our inner man, which are subsumed

under the wide conception of feeling, are states of the
will.

Now, the identity of the willing with the knowing Sub

in virtue of which the word I includes and desig
"
"

ject,
nates both, the nodus of the Universe, and therefore
is
1

inexplicable. For we can only comprehend relations be

tween Objects ;,but two Objects never can be one, except
ing as parts of a whole. Here, where the Subject is in
question, the rules by which we know Objects are no longer
applicable, and actual identity of the knower with what is
known as willing that is, of Subject and Object is imme
diately given. Now, whoever has clearly realized the utter
impossibility of explaining this identity, will surely concur
with me in calling it the miracle KUT t&yyv.
Just as the Understanding is the subjective correlate
to our First Class of representations, the Reason to the
Second, and pure Sensibility to the Third, so do we find
that the correlate to this Fourth Class is the inner sense,
or Self-consciousness in general.

43. Willing. The Law of Motives (Motivation).

It is just because the willing Subject is

immediately
given in self-consciousness, that we are unable further to
what willing is properly speaking, it
define or to describe ;

isthe most direct knowledge we have, nay, one whose im-

mediateness must finally throw light upon every other
knowledge, as being very mediate.
At every resolution that we take ourselves, or that we
Bee others take, we deem ourselves justified in asking,
why ? That is, we assume that something must have pre
viously occurred, from which this resolution has resulted,
1
Weltlcnotcn.
170 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. VII.

and we call this something its reason, or, more correctly, the
motive of the action which now follows. Without such a
reason or motive, the action is just as inconceivable for us,
as the movement of a lifeless body without being pushed or
pulled. Motives therefore belong to causes, and have also
been already numbered and characterized among them in
form of Causality. But all Causality
20, as the third
is only the form of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in
the First Class of Objects that is, in the corporeal world
:

given us in external perception. There it forms the link

which connects changes one with another, the cause
being that which, coming from outside, conditions each
occurrence. The inner nature of such occurrences on the
contrary continues to be a mystery for us for we always
:

remain on the outside. We

certainly see this cause neces
sarily produce that effect ;
but we do not learn how it is

actually enabled to do so, or what is going on inside.

Thus we see mechanical, physical, chemical effects, as
well as those brought about by stimuli, in each in
stance follow from their respective causes without on
that account ever completely understanding the process,
the essential part of which remains a mystery for us;
so we attribute it to qualities of bodies, to forces of
Nature, or to vital energy, which, however, are all quali-
tates occultce. Nor should we be at all better off as to

comprehension of the movements and actions of animals

and of human beings, which would also appear to us
as induced in some unaccountable way by their causes
(motives), were it not that here we are granted an insight
into the inward part of the process we know, that is, by
;

our own inward experience, that this is an act of the will

called forth by the motive, which consists in a mere re

presentation. Thus the effect produced by the motive, un

like thatproduced by all other causes, is not only known
by us from outside, in a merely indirect way, but at the
 FOURTH CLASS OP OBJECTS FOR THE SUBJECT. 171

same time from inside, quite directly, and therefore accord

ing to its whole mode of action. Here we stand as it were
behind the scenes, and learn the secret of the process by
which cause produces effect in its most inward nature for ;

here our knowledge comes to us through a totally different

channel and in a totally different way. From this results
the important proposition The action of motives (motiva
:

tion) is causality seen from within. Here accordingly

causality presents itself in quite a different way, in quite
a different medium, and for quite another kind of know
ledge therefore it must now be exhibited as a special and
;

peculiar form of our principle, which consequently here

presents itself as the Principle of the Sufficient Eeason of
Acting, principium rationis sufficients agendi, or, more
briefly, as the Law of Motives (Law of Motivation).
As a clue to my philosophy in general, I here add, that
this Fourth Class of Objects for the Subject, that is, the
one object contained in it, the will which we apprehend
within us, stands in the same relation towards the First
Class as the law of motives towards the law of causality, as
I have established it in 20. This truth is the corner
stone of my whole Metaphysic.
As to the way in which, and the necessity with which,
motives act, and as to the dependence of their action upon
empirical, individual character, and even upon individual
capacity for knowledge, &c. &c., I refer my readers to my
Prize-essay on the Freedom of the Will, in which I have
treated all this more fully.

44. Influence of the Will over the Intellect.

It is not upon causality

proper, but upon the identity of
the knowing with the willing Subject, as shown in 42,
that the influence is based, which the will exercises over
172 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VII.

the intellect, when it obliges it to repeat representations

that have once been present to it, and in general to turn
its attention in this or that direction and evoke at plea

sure any particular series of thoughts. And even in this,

is determined by the law of motives, in accordance
the will
with which it also secretly rules what is called the associa
tion of ideas, to which I have devoted a separate chapter
(the 14th) in the second volume of my chief work. This
association of ideas is itself nothing but the application of
the Principle of Sufficient Reason in its four forms to the
subjective train of thought that is, to the presence of re ;

presentations in our consciousness. But it is the will of

the individual that sets the whole mechanism in motion,
by urging the intellect, in accordance with the interest, i.e.,
the individual aims, of the person, to recall, together with
itspresent representations, those which either logically or
analogically, or by proximity in Time or Space, are nearly
related to them. The will s activity in this, however, is so
immediate, that in most cases we have no clear conscious
ness of it and so rapid, that we are at times even uncon
;

scious of the occasion which has thus called forth a repre

sentation. In such cases, it appears as if something had
come into our consciousness quite independently of all con
nection with anything else that this, however, is impos;

sible, is precisely the Root of the Principle of Sufficient

Reason, which has been fully explained in the above-men
1
tioned chapter of my chief work. Every picture which
suddenly presents our imagination, every judg
itself to

ment even that does not follow its previously present

reason, must be called forth by an act of volition having a
motive although that motive may often escape our percep
;

tion owing toits insignificance, and although such acts of

volition are often in like manner unperceived, because they

1
See "

Die Welt, a. W. u. V." vol. ii. ch. XIY.

 FOURTH CLASS OF OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 173

take place BO easily, that wish and fulfilment are simul

taneous.

45. Memory.
That peculiar faculty of the knowing Subject which
enables to obey the will the
it more readily in repeating
representations, the of tener they have already been present
to it in other words, its capacity for being exercised is

what we Memory. I cannot agree with the customary

call

view, by which it is looked upon as a sort of store-house

in which we keep a stock of ready-made representations

always at our disposal, only without being always con

scious of their possession. The voluntary repetition of re
presentations which have once been present becomes so
easy through practice, that one link in a series of represen
tations no sooner becomes present to us, than we at once
evoke all the rest, often even, as it were, involuntarily. If
we were to look for a metaphor for this characteristic
quality of our representative faculty (such as that of Plato,
who compared it with a soft mass that receives and retains
impressions), I think the best would be that of a piece of
drapery, which, after having been repeatedly folded in the
same folds, at last falls into them, as it were, of its own
accord. The body learns by practice to obey the will, and
the faculty of representing does precisely the same. re A
membrance is not by any means, as the usual view sup
poses, always the same representation which is, as it were,
fetched over and over again from its store-house a new ;

one, on the contrary, arises each time, only practice makes

this especially easy. Thus it comes to pass that pictures
of our imagination, which we fancy we have stowed away
in our memory, become imperceptibly modified: a thing
which we realize when we see some familiar object again
after a long time, and find that it no longer
completely
corresponds to the image we bring with us. This could
174 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VII.

not be if we retained
ready-made representations. It is
just for this reason too, that acquired knowledge, if left
unexercised, gradually fades from our memory, precisely
because it was the result of
practice coming from habit
and knack thus most scholars, for instance, forget their
;

Greek, and most artists their Italian on their return from

Italy. This is also why we find so much difficulty in re-
calling to mind a name or a line of poetry formerly familiar
to us, when we have ceased to think of it for several years ;
whereas when once we succeed in remembering it, we have
itagain at our disposal for some time, because the practice
has been renewed. Everyone therefore who knows several
languages, will do well to make a point of reading occa
sionally in each, that he may ensure to himself their
possession.
This likewise explains why the surroundings and events
of our childhood impress themselves so deeply on our
memory ;
it is because, in childhood we have but few, and

those chiefly intuitive, representations so that we are in

:

duced to repeat them constantly for the sake of occupation.

People who have for original thought do
little capability

this all their lives (and moreover not only with intuitive
representations, but with conceptions and words also) ;

sometimes therefore they have remarkably good memories,

when obtuseness and sluggishness of intellect do not act as
impediments. Men of genius, on the contrary, are not
always endowed with the best of memories, as, for instance,
Eousseau has told us of himself. Perhaps this may be
accounted for by their great abundance of new thoughts
and combinations, which leaves them no time for frequent
repetition. Still, on the whole, gemus is seldom found
with a very bad memory because here a greater energy
;

and mobility of the whole thinking faculty makes up for

the want of constant practice. Nor must we forget that
Mnemosyne was the mother of the Muses. may ac- We
 FOTTRTH CLASS OP OBJECTS FOE THE SUBJECT. 175

cordingly say, that our memory stands under two contend

ing influences, that of the energy of the representative
faculty on the one hand, and that of the quantity of repre
sentations occupying that faculty on the other. The less
energy there is in the faculty, the fewer must be the repre
sentations, and conversely. This explains the impaired
memory of habitual novel-readers, for it is with them as
withmen of genius : the multitude of representations fol
lowing rapidly upon each other, leaves no time or patience
for repetition and practice ; only, in novels, these repre
sentations are not the readers own, but other people s
thoughts and combinations quickly succeeding each other,
and the readers themselves are wanting in that which, in
genius, counterbalances repetition. The whole thing be
sides is subject to the corrective, that we all have most

memory for that which interests us, and least for that which
does not. Great minds therefore are apt to forget in an
incredibly short time the petty affairs and trifling occur
rences of daily life and the commonplace people with whom

they come in contact, whereas they have a wonderful recol

lection of those things which have importance in them
selves and for them.
It is, however, on the whole, easy to understand that
we should more readily remember such series of represen
tations as are connected together by the thread of one
or more
of the above-mentioned species of reasons and

consequences, than such as have no connection with one

another, but only with our will according to the law of
motives ; that is to say, those which are arbitrarily
grouped. For, in the former, the fact that we know the
formal part a priori, saves us half the trouble and this ;

probably gave rise to Plato s doctrine, that all learning is

mere remembering.
As far as possible we ought to try and reduce all that we
wish to incorporate in our memory to a perceptible image,
176 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. VII.

either directly, or as an example, a mere

simile, or an ana

logue, or indeed in any other way because intuitive per

;

ceptions take a far firmer hold than any abstract thoughts,

let alone mere words. This is why we remember things we
have ourselves experienced so much better than those of
which we read.
 CHAPTEE
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS.

46. The Systertiatic Order.

order of succession in which I have stated the

THE various forms of the Principle of Sufficient Eeason in
this treatise, is not systematic it has been chosen for the;

sake of greater clearness, in order first to present what is

better known and

least presupposes the rest. In this I
have followed Aristotle s rule : rai ^uaflr/o-fwe OVK euro TOV
,
KCU TtJQ TOV Trpdy/LiaTOG apyjig evioTe apKriov, d\\ odev
doctrina non a primo, ac reiprincipio ali-
j-ddot (et
1
quando inchoanda est, sed unde quis facilius discat). But
the systematic order in which the different classes of reasons
ought to follow one another is the following. First of all
should come The Principle of Sufficient Eeason of Being ;

and in this again first its application to Time, as being the

simple schema containing only what is essential in all the
other forms of the Principle of Sufficient Eeason, nay, as
being the prototype of all finitude. The Eeason of Being
in Space having next been stated, the Law of Causality
would then follow after which would come the Law of
;

Motives, and last of all the Principle of Sufficient Eeason

of Knowing for the other classes of reasons refer to imme-
;

1
Aristot. "Metaph." iv. 1. "Sometimes too, learning must start,
not from what is really first and with the actual beginning of the thing
concerned, but from where it is easiest to learn." [Tr. s add.]
N
178 THE FOURFOLD HOOT. [CHAP. VIII.

diate representations, whereas this last class refers to

representations derived from other representations.
The truth expressed above, that Time is the simple schema
which merely contains the essential part of all the forms of
the Principle of Sufficient Eeason, explains the absolutely
perfect clearness and precision of Arithmetic, a point in
which no other science can compete with it. For all sciences,
being throughout combinations of reasons and consequences,
are based upon the Principle of Sufficient Eeason. Now, the
series ofnumbers is the simple and only series of reasons
and consequences of Being in Time on account of this ;

perfect simplicity nothing being omitted, no indefinite

relations left this series leaves nothing to be desired as re

gards accuracy, apodeictic certainty and clearness. All the

other sciences yield precedence in this respect to Arithmetic ;
even G-eometry because so many relations arise out of the
:

three dimensions of Space, that a comprehensive synopsis

of them becomes too difficult, not only for pure, but even
for empirical intuition complicated geometrical problems
;

are therefore only solved by calculation that is, Geo ;

metry quick to resolve itself into Arithmetic. It is not

is

necessary to point out the existence of sundry elements of

obscurity in the other sciences.

47. Relation in Time between Reason and Consequence.

According to the laws of causality and of motivation, a

reason must precede its consequence in Time. That this is
absolutely essential, I have shown in my chief work, to
*
which I here refer my readers in order to avoid repeating
myself. Therefore, if we only bear in mind that it is
not one thing which is the cause of another thing, but
one state which is the cause of another state, we shall not
1
See "Die Welt a. W. u. V.,"
vol. ii. ch. iv. p. 41, 42 of the 2nd
edition, and p. 44 of the 3rd.
 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS. 179

allow ourselves to be misled by examples like that given

1
by Kant, that the stove, which is the cause of the
warmth of the room, is simultaneous with its effect. The
state of the stove : that is, its being warmer than its sur
rounding medium, must precede the communication of its
surplus caloric to that medium now, as each layer of air
;

on becoming warm makes way for a cooler layer rushing

in, the first state, the cause, and consequently also the

second, the effect, are renewed until at last the temperature

of stove and room become equalized. Here therefore we
have no permanent cause (the stove) and permanent effect
(the warmth of the room) as simultaneous things, but a
chain of changes that is, a constant renewing of two states,
;

one of which is the effect of the other. From this example,

however, it is obvious that even Kant s conception of
Causality was far from clear.
On the other hand, the Principle of Sufficient Eeason of
Knowing conveys with it no relation in Time, but merely
a relation for our Eeason here therefore, before and after
:

have no meaning.
In the Principle of Sufficient Eeason of Being, so far
as it is valid in Geometry, there is likewise no relation in
Time, but only a relation in Space, of which we might say
that all things were co-existent, if here the words co
existence and succession had any meaning. In Arithmetic,
on the contrary, the Eeason of Being is nothing else but
precisely the relation of Time itself.

48. Reciprocity of Reasons.

Hypothetical judgments may be founded upon the

Principle of Sufficient Eeason in each of its significations, as
1
Kant, Krit. d. r. Vern.," 1st edition, p. 202 j
5th edition, p. 248
(English translation by M. Muller, p. 177.)
180 THE FOURFOLD ROOT. [CHAP. VIII.

indeed every hypothetical judgment is ultimately based

upon that principle, and here the laws of hypothetical
conclusions always hold good: that is to say, it is right
to infer the existence of the consequence from the existence
of the reason, and the non-existence of the reason from
the non-existence of the consequence but it is wrong to ;

infer the non-existence of the consequence from the non-

existence of the reason, and the existence of the reason
from the existence Now it is singular
of the consequence.
that in Geometry we are nevertheless nearly always able
to infer the existence of the reason from the existence
of the consequence, and the non-existence of the conse
quence from the non-existence of the reason. This pro
ceeds, as I have shown in 37, from the fact that, as each
line determines the position of the rest, it is quite indiffe
rent which we begin at : that is, which we consider as the
reason, and which
as the consequence. may easily We
convince ourselves of this by going through the whole of
the geometrical theorems. It is only where we have to do
not only with figures, i.e., with the positions of lines, but
with planes independently of figures, that we find it in
most cases impossible to infer the existence of the reason
from the existence of the consequence, or, in other words,
to convert the propositions by making the condition the
conditioned. The following theorem gives an instance of
this Triangles whose lengths and bases are equal, include
:

equal areas. This cannot be converted as follows Triangles :

whose areas are equal, have likewise equal bases and

lengths for the lengths may stand in inverse proportion
;

to the bases.
In 20 it has already been shown, that the law of
causality does not admit of reciprocity, since the effect
never can be the cause of its cause ;
therefore the concep
tion of reciprocity is, in its right sense, inadmissible.

Reciprocity, according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason

 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS. 181

of knowing, would only be possible between equivalent

conceptions, since the spheres of these alone cover each
other mutually. Apart from these, it only gives rise to a
vicious circle.

49. Necessity.

The Principle of Sufficient Reason in all its forms is the

sole principle and the sole support of all necessity. For
necessity has no other true and distinct meaning than that
of the infallibility of the consequence when the reason is
posited. Accordingly every necessity is conditioned : abso
lute, unconditioned, necessity therefore is a contradicto
i.e.,

in adjecto. For to be necessary can never mean anything

but to result from a given reason. By denning it as
wlmt cannot not
"

on the other hand, we give a mere

be,"

verbal definition, and screen ourselves behind an extremely

abstract conception to avoid giving a definition of the
thing. But it is not difficult to drive us from this refuge
by inquiring how the non-existence of anything can be
possible or even conceivable, since all existence is only
given empirically. It then comes out, that it is only
possible so far as some reason or other is posited or present,
from which it follows. To be necessary and to follow from
a given reason, are thus convertible conceptions, and may
always, as such, be substituted one for the other. The
conception of an ABSOLUTELY necessary Being
"

which "

finds so much favour with pseudo-philosophers, contains

therefore a contradiction : it annuls by the predicate
"absolute" (i.e., by anything else") the
"unconditioned

only determination which makes the

"

necessary con "

ceivable. Here again we have an instance of the improper use

of abstract conceptions to play off a metaphysical artifice such

as those I have already pointed out in the conceptions "im
material substance"
"

cause in general"
"

absolute reason"
182 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VIII.

1
&c. &c. I can never insist too much upon all abstract
conceptions being checked by perception.
There exists accordingly a fourfold necessity, in con
formity with the four forms of the Principle of Sufficient
Reason :

1. Logical necessity, according to the principle of sufficient

reason of knowing, in virtue of which, when once we have
admitted the premisses, we must absolutely admit the
conclusion.
2. Physical necessity, according to the law of causality,
in virtue of which, as soon as the cause presents itself, the
effect must infallibly follow.
3. Mathematical necessity, according to the principle of
sufficient reason of being, in virtue of which, every relation
which is stated in a true geometrical theorem, is as that
theorem affirms it to be, and every correct calculation
remains irrefutable.
4. Moral necessity, in virtue of which, every human
being, every animal even, is compelled, as soon as a motive
presents itself, to do that which alone is in accordance
with the inborn and immutable character of the individual.
This action now follows its cause therefore as infallibly as

every other effect, though it is less easy here to predict

what that effect will be than in other cases, because of the
difficulty we have in fathoming and completely knowing
the individual empirical character and its allotted sphere
of knowledge, which is indeed a very different thing from
ascertaining the chemical properties of a neutral salt and
predicting its reaction. I must repeat this again and
again on account of the dunces and blockheads who, in
defiance of the unanimous authority of so many great

a. W. u. V.,* vol. i. p. 551 et seq. of the 2nd

1
Compare "Die Welt
edition (i. p. 582 of 3rd edition) as to
et seq. immaterial substance,"
"

and 52 of the present work as to reason in general." (Editor s

"

note.)
 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS. 183

thinkers, still persist in audaciously maintaining the con

trary, for the benefit of their old woman s philosophy. I

am not a professor of philosophy, forsooth, that I need
bow to the folly of others.

50. Series of Reasons and Consequences.

According to the law of causality, the condition is itself

always conditioned, and, moreover, conditioned in the same
way; therefore, there arises a series in infinitum a part e
ante. It is just the same with the Reason of Being in

Space each relative space is a figure

: it has its limits,
;

by which it is connected with another relative space, and

which themselves condition the figure of this other, and so
on throughout all dimensions in infinitum. But when we
examine a single figure in itself, the series of reasons of
being has an end, because we start from a given relation,
just as the series of causes comes to an end if we stop at
pleasure at any particular cause. In Time, the series of
reasons of being has infinite extension both a parte ante,
and a parte post, since each moment is conditioned by a
preceding one, and necessarily gives rise to the following.
Time has therefore neither beginning nor end. On the
other hand, the series of reasons of knowledge that
is, a series of judgments, each of which gives logical
truth to the other always ends somewhere, i.e., either in

an empirical, a transcendental, or a metalogical truth. If

the reason of the major to which we have been led is an
empirical truth, and we still continue asking why, it is no
longer a reason of knowledge that is asked for, but a
cause in other words, the series of reasons of knowing
passes over into the series of reasons of becoming. But if
we do the contrary, that is, if we allow the series of reasons
of becoming to pass over into the series of reasons of
knowing, in order to bring it to an end, this is never brought
184 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VIII.

about by the nature of the thing, but always by a special

purpose it is therefore a trick, and this is the
:
sophism known
by the name of the Ontological Proof. For when a cause, at
which it seems desirable to stop short in order to make it
the first cause, has been reached by means of the Cosmo-
logical Proof, we find out that the law of causality is not
so easily brought to a standstill, and still persists in asking
why : so it is simply set aside and the principle of sufficient
reason of knowing, which from a distance resembles it,
is substituted in its stead; and thus a reason of know

ledge is given in the place of the cause which had been

asked for a reason of knowledge derived from the concep

tion itself which has to be demonstrated, the reality of
which is therefore still problematical : and this reason, as
after all it is one, now has to figure as a cause. Of course
the conception has been previously arranged for this
itself

purpose, and reality slightly covered with a few husks just

for decency s sake has been placed within it, so as to give
the delightful surprise of finding it there as has been
shown in Section 7. On the other hand, if a chain of
j udgments ultimately
rests upon a principle of transcen
dental or of metalogical truth, and we still continue to ask
why, we receive no answer at all, because the question has
no meaning, i.e., it does not know what kind of reason it

is asking for.
For the Principle of Sufficient Reason
is the principle of

all explanation: to explain a thing means, to reduce its

given existence or connection to some form or other of
the Principle of Sufficient Reason, in accordance with which
form that existence or connection necessarily is that which
it is. The Principle of Sufficient Season itself, i.e., the
connection expressed by it in any of its forms, cannot
therefore be further explained; because there exists no
principle by which to explain the source of all explanation :

just as the eye is unable to see itself, though it sees every-

 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS. 185

thing else. There are of course series of motives, since

the resolve to attain an end becomes the motive for the
resolve to use a whole series of means ;
still this series

invariably ends a parte priori in a representation belonging

to one of our two first classes, in which lies the motive
which originally had the power to set this individual will
in motion. The fact that it was able to do this, is a
datum for knowing the empirical character here given, but
it is
impossible to answer the question why that particular
motive acts upon that particular character; because the
intelligible character lies outside Time and never becomes
an Object. Therefore the series of motives, as such, finds its
termination in some such final motive and, according to the
nature of its last link, passes into the series of causes, or
that of reasons of knowledge: that is to say, into the
former, when that last link is a real object ; into the
latter, when it is a mere conception.

51. Each Science has for its Guiding Thread one of the
Forms of the Principle of Sufficient Reason in preference
to the others.

As the question why always demands a sufficient reason,

and as it is the connection of its notions
according to the
principle of sufficient reason which distinguishes science
from a mere aggregate of notions, we have called that
why the parent of all science (4). In each science,
moreover, we find one of the forms of that principle
predominating over the others as its guiding-thread.
Thus in pure Mathematics the reason of being is the
chief guiding-thread (although the exposition of the

proofs proceeds according to the reason of knowing only) ;

in applied Mathematics the law of causality appears

together with it, but in Physics, Chemistry, Geology, &c.,

that law entirely predominates. The principle of sufficient
186 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VIII.

reason in knowing finds vigorous application throughout

all the sciences, for in all of them the particular is known

through the general but in Botany, Zoology, Mineralogy,

;

and other it is the chief guide and

classifying sciences,
predominates absolutely. The law of motives (motiva
tion) is the chief guide in History, Politics, Pragmatic
Psychology, &c. &c., when we consider all motives and
maxims, whatever they may be, as data for explaining
actions but when we make those motives and maxims the

object-matter of investigation from the point of view of

their value and origin, the law of motives becomes the

guide to Ethics. In my chief work will be found the

highest classification of the sciences according to this
1
principle.

52. Two principal Results.

I have endeavoured in this treatise to show that the

Principle of Sufficient Reason is a common expression for
four completely different relations, each of which is founded
upon a particular law given a priori (the principle of suffi
cient reason being a synthetical a priori principle). Now,
according to the principle of homogeneity, we are compelled
to assume that these four laws, discovered according to the
principle of specification, as they agree in being expressed
by one and the same term, must necessarily spring from
one and the same original quality of our whole cognitive
faculty as their common root, which we should accordingly
have to look upon as the innermost germ of all dependence,
relativeness, instability and limitation of the objects of our
consciousness itself limited to Sensibility, Understanding,

E-eason, Subject and Object or of that world, which the

divine Plato repeatedly degrades to the ael yiyvoptvov ptv

1 "

Die Welt a. W. u. V.,"

vol. ii. ch. 12, p. 126 of the 2nd edition
(p. 139 of the 3rd edition).
 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND BEST7LTS. 187

KCti arroXXviuerov, OVTUQ Se ov^iiroTE ov (ever arising and

perishing, but in fact never existing), the knowledge of

which is merely a oa per aiadiiffewg a Xoyov, and which
Christendom, with a correct instinct, calls temporal, after
that form of our principle (Time) which I have denned as
itssimplest schema and the prototype of all limitation.
The general meaning of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
may, in the main, bebrought back to this : that every
thing existing no matter when or where, exists ~by reason of

something else. Now, the Principle of Sufficient Eeason is

nevertheless a priori in all its forms that is, it has its root :

in our intellect, therefore it must not be applied to the

totality of existent things, the Universe, including that in

tellect in which it presents itself. For a world like this,
which presents itself in virtue of a priori forms, is just on
that account mere phenomenon consequently that which ;

holds good with reference to it as the result of these forms,

cannot be applied to the world itself, i.e. to the thing in
itself, representing itself in that world. Therefore we can
not say, "

the world and all things in it exist by reason of

something else ;
"

and this proposition is precisely the Cos-

mological Proof.
If, by the present treatise, I have succeeded in deducing
the result just expressed, it seems to me that every specu
lative philosopher who founds a conclusion upon the Prin

ciple of Sufficient Eeason or indeed talks of a reason at all,

is bound to specify which kind of reason he means. One
might suppose that wherever there was any question of a
reason, this would be done as a matter of course, and that
all confusion would thus be impossible. Only too often,
however, do we still find either the terms reason and cause

confounded in indiscriminate use; or do we hear basis and

what is based, condition and what is conditioned, principia
and principiata talked about in quite a general way without
any nearer determination, perhaps because there is a secret
188 THE FOURFOLD BOOT. [CHAP. VIII.

consciousness that these conceptions are being used in an

unauthorized way. Thus even Kant speaks of the thing
1
in itself as the reason of the phenomenon, and also of a
2
ground of the possibility of all phenomena, of an intelligible
cause of phenomena, of an unknown ground of the possi

bility of the sensuous series in general, of a transcendental

3
object as the ground of all phenomena and of the reason
why our sensibility should have this rather than all other
supreme conditions, and so on in several places. Now all
this does not seem to me to tally with those weighty, pro
4 5
found, nay immortal words of his, the contingency of "

things is itself mere phenomenon, and can lead to no other

than the empirical regressus which determines phenomena."
That since Kant the conceptions reason and conse
quence, principium and principiatum, &c. &c., have been
and still are used in a yet more indefinite and even quite
transcendent sense, everyone must know who is acquainted
with the more recent works on philosophy.
The following is my objection against this promiscuous
employment of the word ground (reason) and, with it, of the
Principle of Sufficient Keason in general it is likewise the ;

second result, intimately connected with the first, which the

present treatise gives concerning its subject-matter proper.
The four laws of our cognitive faculty, of which the Prin-

1
Or ground.
Vern.," 1st edition, pp. 561, 562, 564; p. 590 of
a d. r.
Kant, "Krit.
the 5th edition. (Pp. 483 to 486 of the English translation by M.
Miiller.)
3
Ibid. p. 540 of 1st edition, and 641 of 5th edition. (P. 466 of
English translation.)
4 Ibid.
p. 563 of the
1st and 591 of the 5th edition. (P. 485 of

English translation.)
5
Empirical contingency is meant, which, with Kant, signifies as much
as dependence upon other things. As to this, I refer my readers to my
censure in my Critique of Kantian Philosophy," p. 524 of the 2nd,
"

and p. 552 of the 3rd edition.

 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS. 189

ciple of Sufficient Eeason is the common

expression, by
their common character as well asby the fact that all
Objects for the Subject are divided amongst them, proclaim
themselves to be posited by one and the same primary
quality and inner peculiarity of our knowing faculty, which
faculty manifests itself as Sensibility, Understanding, and
Reason. Therefore, even if we imagined it to be possible
for a new Fifth Class of Objects to come about, we should
in that case likewise have to assume that the Principle of
Sufficient Reason would appear in this class also under a
different form. Notwithstanding all this, we still have no
right to talk of an absolute reason (ground), nor does a
reason in general, any more than a triangle in general, exist
otherwise than as a conception derived by means of discur
sive reflection, nor is this conception, as a representation
drawn from other representations, anything more than a
means of thinking several things in one. Now, just as
every triangle must be either acute-angled, right-angled,
or obtuse-angled, and either equilateral, isosceles or scalene,
so also must every reason belong to one or other of the
four possible kinds of reasons I have pointed out. More
over, since we have only four well-distinguished Classes o
Objects, every reason must also belong to one or other of
these four, and no further Class being possible, Reason
itself is forced to rank it within them for as soon as we
;

employ a reason, we presuppose the Four Classes as well

as the faculty of representing (i.e. the whole world), and
must hold ourselves within these bounds, never transcend
ing them. Should others, however, see this in a different
lightand opine that a reason in general is anything but a
conception, derived from the four kinds of reasons, which
expresses what they all have in common, we might revive
the controversy of the Realists and Nominalists, and then
I should side with the latter.
 f

A-l
C L. c^ -iU ^-C
^W&4*f.> %

&***-&
 ON THE WILL IN NATURE.

AN ACCOUNT OF THE COEEOBOEATIONS

RECEIVED BY THE ATJTHOB S
PHILOSOPHY
SINCE ITS FIEST APPEARANCE

FROM THE EMPIRICAL SCIENCES.

BY

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.

Translated from the Fourth Edition published by JCLIUS FRAUENSTADT.

Xoyotcrii/ iZ
OVK r),iw(Tav ovci 7rpocr/3Aipai ro
AAX* t/c^toa(T/ctt TrdvO o y^pda/caj
AESCTI.
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION.

great joy I have lived to revise even this little

TO mywork, after a lapse of nineteen years, and that joy is
enhanced by the special importance of this treatise for my
philosophy. For, starting from the purely empirical, from
the observations of unbiassed physical investigators
themselves following the clue of their own special sciences
I here immediately arrive at the very kernel of my Meta-
physic I establish its points of contact with the physical
;

sciences and thus corroborate my fundamental dogma, in

a sense, as the arithmetician proves a sum for by this I :

not only confirm it more closely and specially, but even

make it more clearly, easily, and rightly understood than
anywhere else.
The improvements in this new edition are confined almost

entirely to the Additions for scarcely anything that is

;

worth mentioning in the First Edition has been left out,

while I have inserted many and, in some cases, important
new passages.
But, even in a general sense, it may be looked upon as a
good sign, that a new edition of the present treatise should
have been found necessary ;
since it shows that there is an
interest in serious philosophy and confirms the fact that
the necessity for real progress in this direction is now more
strongly felt than ever. This is based upon two circum
stances. The first is the unparalleled zeal and activity
displayed in every branch of Natural Science which, as
o
194 THE WILL IN NATURE.

this pursuit is mostly in the hands of people who have

learned nothing else, threatens to lead to a gross, stupid
Materialism, the more immediately offensive side of which
the moral bestiality of its ultimate results, than the
is less

incredible absurdity of its first principles for by it even ;

yital force is denied, and organic Nature is degraded to a

1
mere chance play of chemical forces. These knights of
the crucible and retort should be made to understand, that
the mere study of Chemistry qualifies a man to become an
apothecary, but not a philosopher. Certain other like-
minded investigators of Nature, too,must be taught, that
a man may be an accomplished zoologist and have the
sixty species of monkeys at his fingers ends, yet on the
whole be an ignoramus to be classed with the vulgar, if he
has learnt nothing else, save perhaps his school-catechism.
But in our time this frequently happens. Men set them
selves up for enlighteners of mankind, who have studied
Chemistry, or Physics, or Mineralogy and nothing else
under the sun to this they add their only knowledge of
;

any other kind, that is to say, the little they may remember
of the doctrines of the school-catechism, and when they
find that these two elements will not harmonize, they

straightway turn scoffers at religion and soon become

2
shallow and absurd materialists. They may perhaps have
heard at college of the existence of a Plato and an Aristotle,
of a Locke, and especially of a Kant but as these folk ;

never handled crucibles and retorts or even stuffed a

1
And this infatuation has reached sucli a point, that people seriously
imagine themselves to have found the key to the mystery of the essence
and existence of this wonderful and mysterious world in wretched
chemical affinities! Compared with this illusion of our physiological
chemists, that of the alchymists who sought after the philosopher s stone,
and only hoped to find out the secret of making gold, was indeed a mere
trifle. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
2 "

Aut (xtfechisnws, Q&t materials mus," is their watchword. [Add. to

3rd ed.]
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 195

monkey, they do not esteem them worthy of further acquain

tance. They prefer calmly to toss out of the window the
intellectual labour of two thousand years and treat the
public to a philosophy concocted out of their own rich
mental resources, on the basis of the catechism on the one
hand, and on that of crucibles and retorts or the catalogue
of monkeys on the other. They ought to be told in plain
language that they are ignoramuses, who have much to
learn before they can be allowed to have any voice in the
matter. Everyone, in fact, who dogmatizes at random,
with the naive realism of a child on such arguments as
G-od, the soul, the world s origin, atoms, &c. &c. &c., as if
the Critique of Pure Reason had been written in the moon
and no copy had found its way to our planet is simply one
of the vulgar. Send him into the servants hall, where his
1
wisdom will best find a market.
The other circumstance which calls for a real progress
in philosophy, is the steady growth of unbelief in the face
of all the hypocritical dissembling and the outward con

formity to the Church. This unbelief necessarily and un

avoidably goes hand in hand with the growing expansion
of empirical and historical knowledge. It threatens to

destroy not only the form, but even the spirit of Christianity
(a spiritwhich has a much wider reach than Christianity
and to deliver up mankind to moral materialism a
itself),

thing even more dangerous than the chemical materialism

already mentioned. And nothing plays more into the
hands of this unbelief, than the Tartuffianism de rigueur

1
There too he will meet with people who fling about words of foreign
origin,which they have caught up without understanding them, just as
readily as he does himself, when he talks about "Idealism" without
knowing what it means, mostly therefore using the word instead of
Spiritualism (which being Eealism, is the opposite to Idealism). Hundreds
of examples of this kind besides other quid pro quos are to be found
in books, and critical periodicals. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
196 THE WILL IN NATTJKE.

impudently flaunting itself everywhere just now, whose

clumsy disciples, fee in hand, hold forth with such unction
and emphasis, that their voices penetrate even into learned,
critical reviews issued by Academies and Universities, and
into physiological as well as philosophical books, where
however, being quite in their wrong place, they only damage
1
their own cause by rousing indignation. Under such cir
cumstances as these, it is gratifying to see the public betray
an interest in philosophy.
I have nevertheless one sad piece of news to communi
cate to our professors of philosophy. Their Caspar Hauser

(according to Dorguth) whom they had so carefully

secreted, so securely walled up for nearly forty years, that
no sound could betray his existence to the world their
Caspar Hauser I say, has escaped He has escaped and !

is running about in the world some even say he is ;

a prince. In plain language, the misfortune they feared

more than anything has come to pass after all. In spite of
their having done their best to prevent it for more than a

generation by acting with united force, with rare constancy,

secreting and ignoring to a degree that is without example,
my books are beginning and henceforth will continue to be
read. Legor et legar : there is no help for it. This is
really dreadful and most inopportune nay, it is a positive ;

fatality, not to say calamity. Is this the recompense for

all their faithful, snug secrecy; for having held so firmly
and unitedly together ? Poor time-servers What becomes !

of Horace s assurance :

"

Est et fideli tuta silentio

"

Merces, ?

For verily they have not been deficient in faithful reticence ;

rather do they excel in this quality wherever they scent

1
to be shown that their belief is not believed
They ought everywhere
in. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 197

merit. And, after all, it is no doubt the cleverest artifice ;

for what no one knows, is as though it did not exist.

Whether the merces will remain quite so tuta, seems rather
doubtful unless we are to take merces in a lad sense and ;

for this the support of many a classical authority might

certainly be found. These gentlemen had seen quite rightly
that the only means to be used against my writings, was
to secrete them from the public by maintaining profound
silence concerning them, while they kept up a loud noise at
the birth of every misshapen offspring of professorial
philosophy as the voice of the new-born Zeus was drowned
;

in days of yore by the clashing of the cymbals of the

Corybantes. But this expedient is now used up ;

the
secret is out the public has discovered me. The rage of
our professors of philosophy at this is great, but powerless ;
for their only effective resource, so long successfully em

ployed, being exhausted, no snarling can avail any longer

against my influence, and in vain do they now take this, or
that, or the other attitude. They have certainly succeeded,
so far as the generation which was properly speaking con
temporaneous with my philosophy, went to the grave in
ignorance of it. But this was a mere postponement, and
Time has kept its word, as it always does.
Now there are two reasons these gentlemen
why in "

the philosophical trade" as they call themselves with

incredible naivete hate my philosophy. The first of
them is, that spoil the taste of the public for
my writings
tissues ofempty phrases, for accumulations of unmeaning
words piled one upon another, for hollow, superficial,
brain-racking twaddle, for Christian dogmatics under the
disguise of the most wearisome Metaphysics, for sys
tematized Philistinism of the flattest kind made to repre
sent Ethics and even accompanied by instructions for
card-playing and dancing in short, they unfit my readers
for the whole method of philosophising a- la vwille
198 THE WILL IN NATTJRE.

has scared so many for ever from the puysnit of

philosophy.
The second reason is, that our gentlemen in the trade "
"

are absolutely bound in conscience not to let my philosophy

pass and are therefore debarred from using it for the
benefit of the trade
"

and this they even heartily regret

;
"

for myabundance might have been admirably turned to

account for the benefit of their own needy poverty. But
even if it contained the greatest hoards of human wisdom
ever unearthed, my doctrine could never find favour with
them either now or in the future
for it is absolutely ;

wanting in Speculative Theology and Eational Psycho

all

logy, and these, just these, are the very breath of life to
these gentlemen, the sine qua non of their existence. For
they are anxious before all things in heaven and on earth,
to hold their official appointments, and these appointments
demand before all things in heaven and on earth a Specu
lative Theology and a Eational Psychology extra Twee non :

datur solus. Theology there must and shall be, no matter

whence it come ;
Moses and the Prophets must be made
out to be in the right: this is the highest principle in
philosophy ;
and there must be Kational Psychology to
boot, as is proper. Now there is nothing of the sort to be
found either in Kant s philosophy or in mine. For, as
we all know, the most cogent theological argumentation
shivers to atoms like a glass thrown at a wall, when it is

brought into contact with Kant s Critique of all Specula

tive Theology, and under his hands not a shred remains
entire of the whole tissue of Eational Psychology As to !

myself, being the bold continuer of Kant s philosophy, I

have entirely done away with all Speculative Theology and
1
all Eational Psychology, as is only consistent and honest.

On the other hand, the task incumbent upon University

1
For revelation goes for nothing in philosophy therefore a philo
;

sopher must before all things be an unbeliever. [Add. to 3rd. ed.].

 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 199

Philosophy is at "bottom this to set forth the chief funda

:

mental truths belonging to the Catechism under the veil

of some very abstract, abstruse and difficult, therefore
painfully wearisome formulas and sentences wherefore, ;

however confused, intricate, strange and eccentric the

matter may seem at first sight, these truths invariably
reveal themselves as its kernel. This proceeding may be
useful, though to me it is unknown. All I know is, that
philosophy, i.e. the search after truth I mean the truth
KCIT e^o^v, by which the most sublime and important dis
closures, more precious than anything else to the human
race, are understood will never advance a step, nay, an
inch, by means of such manoeuvring, by which its course
is on the contrary impeded ;
therefore I found out long
ago that University philosophy is the enemy of all genuine
philosophy. Now, this being the state of the case, when a
really honest philosophy arises, which seriously has truth
for its sole aim, must not these gentlemen of the philo "

"

sophical trade feel as might stage-knights in paste-board

armour, were a knight suddenly to appear in the midst of

them clad in real armour, who made the stage-floor creak
under his ponderous tread ? Such philosophy as this must
therefore be bad and false and consequently places these
the trade under the painful obligation of
"

gentlemen "of

playing the part of him who, in order to appear what he

is not, cannot allow others to pass for what they really are.

Out of all this however there unrolls itself the amusing

spectacle we enjoy, when these gentlemen, now that ignoring
has unfortunately come to an end, after forty years, at
last begin to measure me by their own puny standard and

pass judgment upon me from the heights of their wisdom,

as though they were amply qualified to do so by their
office but they are most amusing of all when they assume
;

airs of superiority towards me.

Their abhorrence of Kant, though less op enly expressed,
200 THE WILL IN NATURE.

is
scarcely less great than their hatred of me ; precisely
because Theology and all Rational Psycho
all speculative

logy the bread-winners of these gentlemen have been

undermined, not to say irrevocably ruined, by him in the
eyes of all serious thinkers. What ! Not hate him ? him,
who has made their
"

trade in philosophy
"

so difficult to
them, that they hardly see how to pull through honourably !

So Kant and I are accordingly both bad, and these gentle

men quite overlook us. For nearly forty years they have
not deigned to cast a glance upon me, and now they look
down condescendingly upon Kant from the heights of their
wisdom, smiling in pity at hiserrors. This policy is both
very wise and very profitable since they are thus able to
;

hold forth at their ease volume after volume upon God

and the soul, as if these were personalities with whom
they were intimately acquainted, and to discourse upon the
relation in which the former stands to the world and the
latter to the body, just as if there had never been such a
thing as a Critique of Pure Eeasoii. When once the
Critique of Pure Reason isdone away with, all will go on
splendidly ! Now it is for this end that they have been

endeavouring for many years quietly and gradually to set

Kant aside, to make him obsolete, nay, to turn up their
noses at him, and one being encouraged by the other in
1
this, they are becoming bolder every day. They have no
opposition to fear from their own colleagues, since they all
have the same aims and the same mission and all together
form a numerous coterie, the brilliant members of which,
coram populo, bow and
scrape to each other on all sides.
Thus by degrees things have come to such a point, that
the wretchedest compilers of manuals have the presumption
to treat Kant s grand, immortal discoveries as antiquated
errors, nay, calmly to set them aside with the most
1
One always says the other is right, so that the public in its simplicity
at last imagines them really to be right. [Add. to 3rd ed.j
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 201

ludicrous arrogance and most impudent dicta of their own,

which they nevertheless lay down under the disguise of
argumentation, because they know they may count upon a1
credulous public, to whom Kant s writings are not known,
And this is what happens to Kant on the part of writers,
whose total incapacity strikes us in every page, not to
say every line, we read of their unmeaning, stupefying

verbiage Were this to go on much longer, Kant would

!

kicked by the
present the spectacle of the dead lion being
Even in France there is no lack of fellow- workers
donkey.
inspired by a similar orthodoxy, who are labouring towards
the same end. A certain M. Barthelemy de St. Hilaire,
for instance, in a lecture delivered in the Academie des
Sciences Morales in April, 1850, has presumed to criticize
Kant with an air of condescension and to use most im
proper language in speaking of him; luckily however in
such a way, that no one could fail to see the underlying
2
purpose.
Now others among our German "traders in philosophy"

again try to get rid of the obnoxious Kant in a different

way instead of attacking his philosophy point-blank, they
:

rather seek to undermine the foundations on which it is

built. These people however are so utterly forsaken by all
the gods and by all power of judgment, that they attack
a priori truths that is to say, truths as old as the human
:

understanding, nay, which constitute that understanding

1
Here it is especially Ernst Reinhold s "System of Metaphysics"
(3rd edition, 1854) that I have in my eye. In my Parerga I have
"
"

explained how it comes, that brain-perverting books like this go through

several editions. See "Parerga,"
vol. i.
p. 171 (2nd edition, vol. i.

p. 194).
2
Nevertheless, by Zeus, all such gentlemen, inFrance as well as
Germany, should be taught that Philosophy has a from
different mission
that of playing into the hands of the clergy. We must let them clearly
see before all things that we have no faith in their faith from this
follows what we think of them, [Add. to 3rd ed.]
202 THE WILL IN NATURE.

itself,and which it is therefore impossible to contradict

without declaring war against that understanding also.
So great however is the courage of these gentlemen. I am
sorry to say I know of three, and I am afraid there are a
1

good many more at work at this undermining process,

who have the incredible presumption to maintain the a
posteriori origin of Space as a consequence, a mere rela
tion, of the objects within it ; for they assert that Space
and Time are of empirical origin and attached to those
bodies, so that [according to them] Space first arises

through our perception of the juxtaposition of bodies and

Time likewise through our perception of the succession of
changes (sancta simplicitas ! as if the words collateral
"
"

and successive would have any sense for us without the

"
"

antecedent intuitions of Space and of Time to give them a

meaning) consequently, that if there were no bodies, there
;

would be no Space, therefore if they disappeared Space

also must lapse, and that if all changes were to stop, Time
2
also would stop.
And such stuff as this is gravely taught fifty years after
Kant s death The aim of it is, as we know, to undermine
!

Kantian philosophy, and certainly if these propositions

were true, one stroke would suffice to overthrow it. For-
1
(a) Eosenkranz, "Meine Keform der Hegelschen Philosophie," 1852,
I have explicitly said,
especially p. 41, in a pompous, dictatorial tone :
"

that Space and Time would not exist if Matter did not exist. JEther

spread out within itself first constitutes real Space, and the movement
of this sether and consequent real genesis of everything individual and
separate, constitutes real Time." (6) L. Noaok, "Die Theologie als
1853, pp. 8, 9.
Keligionsphilosophie," (c) V. Keuchlin-Meldegg.
Two reviews of Oersted s Geist in der "

Natur" in the Heidelberg

Annals, Nov.-Dec., 1850, and May-June, 1854.
2
Time is the condition of the possibility of succession, which could
neither take place, nor be understood by us and expressed in words,
without Time. And Space is likewise the condition of the possibility of
juxtaposition, and Transcendental ^Esthetic is the proof that these con
ditions have their seat in the constitution of our head. [Add. to 3rd e(L]
 PEEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 203

innately however these assertions are of a kind which

is

met by derision rather than by serious refutation. For, in

them, the question is one of heresy, not so much against
Kantian philosophy, as against common sense and they ;

are not so much an attack upon any particular philoso

phical dogma, as upon an a priori truth which, as such,
constitutes human understanding itself, and therefore
must be instantaneously evident to every one who is in his

senses, just as much as that 2x2 = 4. Fetch me a peasant

from the plough make the question intelligible to him
; ;

and he will tell you, that even if all things in Heaven and
on Earth were to vanish, Space would nevertheless remain,
and that if all changes in Heaven and on Earth were to
cease, Time would nevertheless flow on. Compared with
German pseudo-philosophers like these, how estimable
does a manlike the French physicist Pouillet appear, who,

though he never troubles his head about Metaphysics, is

careful to incorporate two long paragraphs, one on VEspace,
the other on le Temps, in the first chapter of his well-
known Manual, on which public instruction in France is
based, where he shows that if all Matter were annihi
lated, Space would still remain, and that Space is infinite ;

and that if all changes ceased, Time would still pursue its
course without end. Now here he does not appeal, as in
all other cases, to experience, because in this case expe
rience is not possible ; yet he speaks with apodeictic cer

tainty. For, as a physicist, professing a science which is

absolutely immanent i.e. limited to the reality that is

empirically given never comes into his head to inquire

it

whence he knows all this. It did come into Kant s head,

and it was this very problem, clothed by him in the severe
form of an inquiry as to the possibility of synthetical a
priori judgments, that became the starting-point and the
corner-stone of his immortal discoveries, or in other words,
of Transcendental Philosophy which, precisely by answering
204 THE WILL IN NATURE.

this question and others related to it, shows wh&t is the

1
nature of that empirical reality itself.
And seventy years after the Critique of Pure Reason
had appeared and filled the world with its fame, these

gentlemen dare to serve up such gross absurdities, which

were done away with long ago, and to return to former
barbarism. If Kant were to come back and see all this
mischief, he would feel like Moses on returning from
Mount Sinai, when he found his people worshipping the
golden calf, and dashed the Tables to pieces in his anger.
But if Kant were to take things as tragically as Moses, I
2
should console him with the words of Jesus Sirach He :
"

that telleth a tale to a fool speaketh to one in a slumber ;

1
In the Scholium to the eighth of the definitions he has placed at the
top of his
"

Principia,"
Newton quite rightly distinguishes absolute, that
is, empty, from relative, or Time, and likewise absolute from relative
filled

Space. He says, p. 11 Tempus, spatium, locum, motum, ut omnibus

:

notissima, non definio. Notandum tamen quod VULGUS (that is, professors
like those I have been mentioning) quantitates hasce non aliter quam ex
relatione ad sensibilia concipiat. Et inde oriuntur praejudicia quacdam,
quibus tollendis convenit easdem in absolutas et rclativas, veras et ap-

parentes, mathematical et vulgar es distingui. And again (p. 12):

I. Tempus absolutum, verum et mathematicum, in se et natura ma
sine relatione ad externum quodvis, aequabiliter fluit, alioque nomine
dicitur Duratio: relativwn, apparens et vulgare est sensibilis et extem-a

quaevis Durationis per motum mensura (seu accurata seu inaequabilis]

qud vulgus vice veri temporis utitur ; ut Hora, Dies, Mensis, Annus.
II. Spatium absolutum, natura sua sine relatione ad externum quod-

vis, semper manet similare et immobile: relativum est spatii hujus men-
sura seu dimensio quaelibet mobilis, quae a sensibus nostris per situm
suum ad corpora definitur, et a vulgo pro spatio immobili usurpatur :
per situm suum
uti dimensio spatii subterranei } acrei vel coelestis definita
ad terram.
But even Newton never dreamt of asking how we know these two
infinite entities, Space and Time since, as he here impresses on us, they
;

do not fall within the range of the senses and how we know them more ;

over so intimately, that we are able to indicate their whole nature and
rule down to the minutest detail. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
2
Bcclesiasticus xxii. 8.
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 205

when lie hath told his tale, he will say, What is the
matter?
"

For that diamond in Kant s crown, Transcen

dental ^Esthetic, never has existed for these gentlemen
as non-avenue.
it is tacitly set aside, I wonder what they
think Nature means by producing the rarest of all her
works, a great mind, one among so many hundreds of mil
lions, if the worshipful company of numskulls are to be
able at their pleasure and by their mere counter-assertion
to annul the weightiest doctrines emanating from that
mind, let alone to treat them with disregard and do as if

they did not exist.

But this degenerate, barbarous state of philosophy which,
in the present day, emboldens every tyro to hold forth at
random upon subjects that have puzzled the greatest
minds, precisely a consequence still remaining of the
is

impunity with which thanks to the connivance of our pro

fessors of philosophy that audacious scribbler, Hegel, has
been allowed to flood the market with his monstrous
vagaries and so to pass for the greatest of all philosophers
for the last thirty years in Germany. Every one of course
now thinks himself entitled to serve up confidently any
thing that may happen to come into his sparrow s
brain.
Therefore, as I have said, the gentlemen of the philo
sophical trade are anxious before all things to obliterate
Kant s philosophy, in order to be able to return to the
muddy canal of the old dogmatism and to talk at random
to their heart s content upon the favourite subjects which
are speciallyrecommended to them just as if nothing had
:

happened and neither a Kant nor a Critical Philosophy

1
had ever come into the world. The affected veneration
for, and laudation of, Leibnitz too, which has been showing
itself everywhere for some years, proceed from the same

1
For Kant has disclosed the dreadful truth, that philosophy must h<?

quite a different thing from Jewish mythology. [A.dd to 3rd ed.]

206 THE WILL IN NATURE.

source. They like to place him in a line with, nay above,

Kant, having at times the assurance to call him the
greatest of all G-erman philosophers. Now, compared with
Kant, Leibnitz is a poor rushlight. Kant is a master
mind, to whom mankind is indebted for the discovery of
never-to-be-forgotten truths. One of his chief merits is
precisely, to have delivered us from Leibnitz and his subtle
ties : from pre-established harmonies, monads and identitas
indiscernibilium. Kant has made philosophy serious and I
am keeping it so. That these gentlemen should think dif
ferently explained for has not Leibnitz a central
is easily ;

Monad and a Theodicee also, with which to deck it out ?

Now this is quite to the taste of my gentlemen of the
philosophical trade. It does not stand in the way of
it allows one to subsist
earning a honest livelihood ; ;

whereas such a thing as Kant s Critique of all Speculative

"

Theology,"
makes one s hair stand on end. Kant is con
sequently a wrong-headed man and one to be set aside.
Vivat Leibnitz ! Vivat the philosophical trade ! Vivat
old woman philosophy These gentlemen really imagine
s !

that, according to the standard of their own petty aims, they

can obscure what is good, disparage what is great, and
accredit what is false. They may perhaps succeed in
doing so for a time, but certainly not in the long run, nor
with impunity. Notwithstanding all their machinations
and spiteful ignoring of me for forty years, have not
even I at last made my way ? During those forty years
however I have learnt to appreciate Chamfort s words :

"En examinant la ligue des sots contre les gens d* esprit, on

croirait voir une conspiration de valets pour ecarter les

maitres"

We do not care to have much to do with those whom we

dislike. One
of the consequences of this antipathy for
Kant, therefore, has been an incredible ignorance of his
doctrines. I can scarcely believe my eyes at times, when
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 207

I see certain proofs of this ignorance, and must here sup

port my assertion by a few examples. First let me present
a very singular specimen, though it is now some years old.
In Professor Michelet s Anthropology and Psychology
"
"

(p. 444), he states Kant

s Categorical Imperative in the

thou must, for thou canst (du sollst,

"

following words
"

denn du Jcannsf). This cannot be a lapsus calami, for he

again states it in the same words in his History of the
"

*
Development of Modern German Philosophy" (p. 38),

published three years later. Letting alone the fact that he

appears to have studied Kantian philosophy in Schiller s
epigrams, he has thus turned the thing upside down, and
expressed exactly the opposite of Kant s argument evidently ;

without having the slightest inkling of what Kant meant

by that postulate of Freedom on the basis of his Categorical
Imperative. None of Professor Michelet s colleagues, to
my knowledge, have pointed out this mistake, but hanc
"

veniam damns, petimusque vicissim" Another more recent

instance. The above mentioned reviewer of Oersted s book
(see note 1 (c), p. 202), to whose title the present treatise un
fortunately had to stand godfather, comes in that work on
bodies are spaces filled with force
"
"

the sentence that

(krafterfiilUe Edume). This is new to him; so without
the faintest suspicion that he has to do with a far-famed
Kantian dogma, and taking this for a paradoxical opinion
of Oersted s, he attacks it and argues against it bravely,
his reviews, which ap
persistently and repeatedly in both
peared at an interval of three years from one another,
using arguments like these :
"

Force cannot fill Space without

something substantial, Matter ; then again three years "

later Force in Space does not yet constitute any thing.

:
"

1
Another instance of Michelet s ignorance is to be frund io Schopen

hauer posthumous writings, see Aus Arthur Schopenhauer s hand-

"

schriftlichem Nachlass," Leipzig, A. Brockhaus, 1864, p. 327. [Editor s

note.]
 208 THE WILL IN NATURE.

For Force to fill Space, there must be Substance, Matter. A

mere force cap never fill. Matter must be there for it to
Bravo my cobbler would use just such arguments
fill." !

as these. 1
When I see specimina eruditionis of this sort, I
begin to have my misgivings whether I did not do the man
injustice by naming him among those who endeavour to
undermine Kant but in this, to be sure, I had in view his
;

assertions that Space is but the relation, the juxtaposition

"

2
of things," and that Space is a relation in which things
"

stand, a juxtaposition of things. This juxtaposition ceases

to be a conception as soon as the conception of Matter
3
ceases." For he might possibly have penned these sen
tences in sheer innocence, since he may have known no more
of the Transcendental Aesthetic than of the Meta
" "
"

physical First Principles of Natural Science

"

though to ;

be sure, this would be rather extraordinary for a professor of

philosophy. Now-a-days however we must not be surprised
at anything. For all knowledge of Critical Philosophy has
died out, in spite of its being the latest true philosophy that
has appeared, and a doctrine withal, that has made a revolu
tion and epoch in human knowledge and thought. Now
therefore, since it has overthrown all previous systems, and
since the knowledge of it has died out, philosophising no

longer proceeds on the basis of any of the doctrines pro

pounded by the great minds of the past, but becomes a
mere random untutored process, having an ordinary educa
tion and the catechism for its foundation. Now that I have
startled them however, our professors may perhaps take to

studying Kant s works again. Still Lichtenberg says :

The same reviewer (Von Reuchlin-Meldegg) when he expounds the

1

doctrines of the philosophers concerning God in the August number of

the Heidelberg Annals (1855), p. 579, says: Kant, God is a thing "In

in- itself which cannot be known." lu his review of Frauenstadt s

"

Letters
"

Annals of May and June (1855) he says that

in the Heidelberg
there is no knowledge a priori. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
2 8
C. 1. p. 899. p. 908.
 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 209
"

Past a certain age, I think it as impossible to learn

Kantian Philosophy as to learn rope-dancing."
I should certainly not have condescended to record the
sins of these sinners had not the interests of truth
required that I should do so, in order to show the state
of degradation at which German Philosophy has arrived

fifty years after Kant s death in consequence of the

machinations of the gentlemen of the trade/ and also to
show what would result, if these puny minds, who know
nothing but their own ends, were to be suffered without
hindrance to check the influence of the great geniuses who
have illumined the world. I cannot look on at this in
silence ;
it is rather a case to which G-othe s exhortation
applies :
"

Du Kraftiger, sei nicht so still,

Wenn auch sich Andre scheuen :

Wer den Teufel erschreeken will,

Der muss laut schreien."

Dr. Martin Luther thought so also.

Hatred against Kant, hatred against me, hatred against
truth, all however in majorem Dei gloriam, is what inspires
these worthies who live on philosophy. Who can be so
blind as not to see that University philosophy is the enemy
of all true, serious philosophy, whose progress it feels
bound to withstand ? For a philosophy which deserves the
name, pure service of truth, therefore the most sub
is

lime of human endeavours but, as such, it is not

all ;

adapted for a trade. Least of all can it have its seat in

Universities, where a theological Faculty predominates
and things are irrevocably decided beforehand ere philo
sophy comes to them. With Scholasticism, from which
University philosophy descends, it was quite a different
thing. Scholasticism was avowedly the ancilla theologies,
so that here the name corresponded to the thing. Our
University philosophy of to-day, on the contrary, disclaims
210 THE WILL IN NATURE.

the connection, and professes independent research yet in ;

reality it is only the ancilla disguised, and it is intended no

less than its predecessor to be the servant of Theology.
Thus genuine, sincerely meant philosophy has an adversary
under the guise of an ally in University philosophy. There
fore I said long ago, that nothing would be of greater bene
fit to
philosophy than for it to cease altogether to be taught
at Universities ;
and if at that time I still admitted the
propriety of a brief, quite succinct course of History of
Philosophy accompanying Logic which undoubtedly ought
to be taught at Universities I have since withdrawn that
hasty concession in consequence of the following disclosure
made to us in the Gottingischen Gelehrten Anzeigen of the
1st January, 1853, p. 8, by the Ordinarius loci (one who
writes History of Philosophy in thick volumes) It could :
"

not be mistaken that Kant s doctrine is ordinary Theism,

and that has contributed little or nothing towards trans
it

forming the current views on G-od and his relation to the

world." If this is the state of the case, Universities are in

my opinion no longer the right place even for teaching

History of Philosophy. There designs and intentions reign
paramount. I had indeed long ago begun to suspect, that
History of Philosophy was taught at our Universities in
the same spirit and with the same granum sails as Philo
sophy itself, and it needed but very little to make my sus
picions certainty. Accordingly it is my wish to see both
Philosophy and its History disappear from the lecture-list,
because I desire to rescue them from the tender mercies of
1
our court-councillors. But far be it from me, to wish to see
our professors of philosophy removed from their thriving
business at our Universities. On the contrary, what I
should like would be, to see them promoted three degrees
higher in dignity and raised to the highest faculty, as pro-
1
Hofrathe. A
title of honour often given for literary and scientific

merit in Germany, and common among University professors. [Tr. s note.]

 PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 211

fessors of Theology. For at the bottom they have really

been this for some time already, and have served quite
long enough as volunteers.
Meanwhile and kindly advice to the young
my honest
generation is, any time with University
not to waste
philosophy, but to study Kant s works and my own
instead. I promise them that there they will learn some
thing substantial, that will bring light and order into their
brains : so far at least as they may be capable of receiving
them. It is not good to crowd round a wretched farthing
rushlight when brilliant torches are close by ;
still less

to run after will o the wisps. Above all, my truth-

seeking young friends, beware of letting our professors
tell you what is contained in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Bead it yourselves, and you will find in it
something
very different from what they deem it advisable for you
to know. In our time a great deal too much study is
generally devoted to the History of Philosophy for this ;

study, being adapted by its very nature to substitute know

ledge for reflection,is just now cultivated downright with

a view to making philosophy consist in its own history. It

is not only of doubtful necessity, but even of questionable

profit, to acquire a superficial half-knowledge of the

opinions and systems of all the philosophers who have

taught for 2,500 years yet what more does the most
;

honest history of philosophy give ? real knowledge of A

philosophers can only be acquired from their own works,
and not from the distorted image of their doctrines as it is
1
found in the commonplace head. But it is really urgent
that order should be brought into our heads by some sort
of philosophy, and that we should at the same time learn

1
Potius de rebus ipsis judicare debemus, qiiam pro magno habere,
"

de hominibus quid quisque senserit scire" says St. Augustine De civ. ("

Dei" 1. 19, c.
3). Under the present mode of proceeding, however, the
philosophical lecture-room becomes a sort of rag-fair for old worn-out,
212 THE WILL IN NATURE.

to look at the world with a really unbiassed ere. Now

no philosophy is so near to us, both as regards time and
language, as that of Kant,and it is at the same time a
philosophy, compared with which all those which went
before are superficial. On this account it is unhesita
tingly to be preferred to all others.
But I perceive that the news of Caspar Hauser s escape
has already spread among our professors of philosophy ;

for I see that some of them have already given vent to

their feelings in bitter and venomous abuse of me in
various periodicals, making up by falsehoods for their
1
deficiency of wit. Nevertheless I do not complain of all
this, because I am rejoiced at the cause and amused by
the effect of it, as illustrative of Grothe s verse :
"

Es will der Spitz aus unserm Stall

Uns immerfort begleiten :

Doch seines Bellens lauter Schall

Beweist nur, dass wir reiten."

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER.
FRANKFURT AM MEIN,
August, 1854.

cast-off opinions,which are brought there every six months to be aired

and beaten. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
1
I take this opportunity urgently to request that the public will not
believe unconditionally any accounts of what I am supposed to have said,
even when they are given as quotations but will first verify the existence
;

of these quotations in my works. In this way many a falsehood will be

detected, which can however only be stamped as a direct forgery when
accompanied by quotation marks [Add. to 3rd ed.]
(" ").
 EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE THIRD
EDITION.

has left an interleaved copy of his

SCHOPENHAUER
work On the Will "

in Nature," as well as of his

other writings, and has inserted in it those Corrections
and Additions which he intended to use for the Third
Edition. I have therefore included them in this Third
Edition.
The Corrections chiefly concern the style, here and
there an expression being changed, and a word inserted or
omitted. The Additions, on the contrary, concern the
matter of the book they amplify it more or less consider
;

ably, and are tolerably numerous.

The Corrections are incorporated by Schopenhauer with
the text whereas the Additions are designated by him ad
;

Notes (Anmerkungen) to be placed at the foot of the

"
"

pages with the words, added to the third edition." "

They will therefore be found at the places indicated by

him for them, as foot-notes and thus the reader will be ;

enabled easily to discern how much has been added in this

edition.
As to the value of the present work, Schopenhauer has
expressed himself as follows in the World as Will and "

"

Representation :

It would be a great mistake to consider the foreign

"

deliverances with which I have connected my own exposi

tion there (in the work On the Will in Nature as the "

")

real substance and argument of that work which, though

214 THE WILL IN NATURE.

small in size, is weighty in import. They are rather a

mere occasion which I take starting-point in order
as my
to expound the fundamental truth of my doctrine more
clearly there than has been done anywhere else, and to
apply way down even to the empirical knowledge
it all the
of Nature. This I have done most exhaustively and
stringently under the heading Physical Astronomy," nor
"

can I ever hope to find a more correct or accurate expres

sion for the kernel of my doctrine than the one given
x
there."

I have nothing to add to testimony thus given by

Schopenhauer himself.
JULIUS FRAUENSTADT.
Berlin, March, 1867.

1 "

Die Welt a. W. u. V.,"

vol. ii., c. 18, p. 213.

EDITOR S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH

EDITION.

present Fourth Edition is an identical reprint of

THE Thirdthe it therefore contains the same Corrections
:

and Additions which I had already inserted in the Third

Edition from Schopenhauer s own manuscript.
JULIUS FRAUENSTADT.
Berlin, September, 1877.
 THE WILL IN NATURE.

INTRODUCTION.
1
silence after seventeen years, in order to
IBEEAK
point out to the few who, in advance of the age, may
have given their attention to my philosophy, sundry cor-
roborations which have been contributed to it by unbiassed
empiricists, unacquainted with my writings, who, in pur
suing their own road in search of merely empirical know
ledge, discovered at its extreme end what my doctrine has
propounded as the Metaphysical (das Metaphysische), from
which the explanation of experience as a whole must come.
This circumstance is the more encouraging, as it confers
upon my system a distinction over all hitherto existing
ones ;
for all the other systems, even the latest that of
Kant still leave a wide gap between their results and

experience, and are far from coming down directly to, and
into contact with, experience. By this Metaphysic my
proves itself to be the only one having an extreme point
in common with the physical sciences a point up to which
:

these sciences come to meet it by their own paths, so as

1
So had I written in 1835, when the present treatise was first com
posed, having published nothing since 1818, before the close of which
year Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung had appeared. For a Latin
"
;

version, which I had added to the third volume Scriptores ophthalmo- of"

logici minores" edentc J. Radio, in 1830, for the benefit of my foreign

readers, of my treatise "On Vision and Colours" (published in 1816),
can hardly be said to break the silence of that pause.
216 THE WILL IN NATURE.

really to connect themselves and to harmonize with it.

Moreover this is not brought about by twisting and strain-
in g the empirical sciences in order to adapt them to Meta-

physic, nor by Metaphysic having been secretly abstracted

from them beforehand and then, a la Schelling, finding
a priori what it had learnt a posteriori. On the contrary,
both meet at the same point of their own accord, yet with
out collusion. My system therefore, far from soaring above
all reality and all experience, descends to the firm ground
of actuality, where its lessons are continued by the Phy
sical Sciences.
Now the extraneous and empirical corroborations I am
about to bring forward, all concern the kernel and chief
point of my doctrine, its Metaphysic proper. They con
cern, that is, the paradoxical fundamental truth,

that what Kant opposed as thing in itself to mere pheno

menon called more decidedly by me representation
and what he held to be absolutely unknowable, that
itself, this substratum of all phenomena,
this thing in
and therefore of the whole of Nature, is nothing but
what we know directly and intimately and find within
1
ourselves as the will ;

that accordingly, this will, far from being inseparable from,

and even a mere result of, knowledge, differs radically
and and is quite independent of, know
entirely from,
ledge, secondary and of later origin and can
which is ;

consequently subsist and manifest itself without know

ledge a thing which actually takes place throughout the
:

whole of Nature, from the animal kingdom downwards ;

that this will, being the one and only thing in itself, the

1
As will be seen by the following detailed exposition, Schopenhauer
attaches a far wider meaning to the word than is usually given, and
regards the will, not merely as conscious volition enlightened by Season
and determined by motives, but as the fundamental essence of all that
occurs, even where there is no choice. [Tr.]
 INTRODUCTION. 217

sole truly real, primary, metaphysical thing in a world

in which everything else is only phenomenon i.e. mere

representation gives all things, whatever they may

be, the power to exist and to act ;

that accordingly, not only the voluntary actions of animals,

but the organic mechanism, nay even the shape and
quality of their living body, the vegetation of plants
and finally, even in inorganic Nature, crystallization,
and in general every primary force which manifests
physical and chemical phenomena, not ex
itself in

cepting Gravity, that all this, I say, in itself, i.e.

independently of phenomenon (which only means,

independently of our brain and its representations),
is
absolutely identical with the will we find within
us and know as intimately as we can know any
thing ;

that further, the individual manifestations of the will are

set in motion by motives in beings gifted with an
but no less by stimuli in the organic life of
intellect,
animals and of plants, and finally in all inorganic
Nature, by causes in the narrowest sense of the word
these distinctions applying exclusively to pheno
mena;
that, on the other hand, knowledge with its substratum,
the intellect,is a merely secondary phenomenon, dif

fering completely from the will, only accompanying

its higher degrees of objectification and not essential

to it which, as it depends upon the manifestations of

;

the will in the animal organism, is therefore physical,

and not, like the will, metaphysical ;

that we are never able therefore to infer absence of will

from absence of knowledge; for the will may be
pointed out even in all phenomena of unconscious
Nature, whether in plants or in inorganic bodies ; in
short,
218 THE WILL IN NATURE.

that the will is not conditioned by knowledge, as lias

hitherto been universally assumed, although know
ledge is conditioned by the will.
Now this fundamental truth, which even to-day sounds
so like a paradox, is the part of my doctrine to which, in
all its chief points, the empirical sciences themselves ever
eager to steer clear of all Metaphysic have contributed
just as many confirmations forcibly elicited by the irresis
tiblecogency of truth, but which are most surprising on
account of the quarter whence they proceed and although;

they have certainly come to light since the publication of

my chief work, it has been quite independently of it and as
the years went on. Now, that it should be precisely this
fundamental doctrine of mine which has thus met with
confirmation, is advantageous in two respects. First,
because it is the main thought upon which my system is
founded secondly, because it is the only part of my phi
;

losophy that admits of confirmation through sciences which

are alien to, and independent of, it. For although the last
seventeen years, during which I have been constantly
occupied with this subject, have, it is true, brought me
many corroborations as to other parts, such as Ethics,
still these, by their
^Esthetics, Dianoiology ; very nature,
pass at once from the sphere of actuality, whence they
arise, to that of philosophy itself so they cannot claim
:

to be extraneous evidence, nor can they, as collected by

me, have the same irrefragable, unequivocal cogency as
those concerning Metaphysics proper which are given
by its correlate Physics (in the wide sense of the word
which the Ancients gave it). For, in pursuing its own
road, Physics, i.e., Natural Science as a whole, must in
all its branches finally come to a point where physical ex

planation ceases. Now this is precisely the Metaphysical,

which Natural Science only apprehends as the impassable
barrier at which it stops short and henceforth abandons its
 INTRODUCTION. 219

subject to Metaphysics. Kant therefore was quite right

in saying It is evident, that the primary sources of
:
"

Nature s agency must absolutely belong to the sphere of

Metaphysics."
l
Physical science is wont to designate this

unknown, inaccessible something, at which its investigations

stop short and which is taken for granted in all its expla
nations, by such terms as physical force, vital force, forma
tive principle, &c. &c., which in fact mean no more than
x, y, z. Now if nevertheless, in single, propitious instances,
specially acute and observant investigators succeed in
casting as were a furtive glance behind the curtain
it

which bounds off the domain of Natural Science, and

are able not only to feel it is a barrier but, in a sense, to
obtain a view of its nature and thus to peep into the meta
if moreover, having acquired this
physical region beyond ;

privilege, they explicitly designate the limit thus explored

downright as that which is stated to be the true inner
essence and final principle of all things by a system of
Metaphysics unknown to them, which takes its reasons from
a totally different sphere and, in every other respect, re
cognises all things merely as phenomena, i.e., as represen
tation then indeed the two bodies of investigators must
feel like two mining engineers driving a gallery, who,

having started from two points far apart and worked for
some time in subterranean darkness, trusting exclusively
to compass and spirit-level, suddenly to their great joy
catch the sound of each other s hammers. For now indeed

these investigators know, that the point so long vainly

sought for has at last been reached at which Metaphysics
and Physics meet they, who were as hard to bring to
gether as Heaven and Earth that a reconciliation has
been initiated and a connection found between these two
sciences. But the philosophical system which has wit
nessed this triumph receives by it the strongest and most
1
Kant,
"

Von der wahren Scliat/uiig der lebendigen Krafte," 51.

220 THE WILL IN NATURE.

satisfactory proof possible of its own truth and accuracy.

Compared with such a confirmation as this, which may, in
fact, be looked upon as equivalent to proving a sum in
arithmetic, the regard or disregard of a given period of
time loses all importance, especially when we consider what
has been the subject of interest meanwhile and find it to
be the sort of philosophy we have been treated to since
Kant. The eyes of the public are gradually opening to
the mystification by which it has been duped for the last
forty years under the name of philosophy, and this will be
more and more the case. The day of reckoning is at hand,
when it will see whether all this endless scribbling and
quibbling since Kant has brought to light a single truth of
any kind. I may thus be dispensed from the obligation of
entering here into subjects so unworthy the more so, as I ;

can accomplish my purpose more briefly and agreeably by

narrating the following anecdote. During the carnival,
Dante having lost himself in a crowd of masks, the Duke
of Medici ordered him to be sought for. Those coin-
missioned to look for him, being doubtful whether they
would be able to find him, as he was himself masked, the
Duke gave them a question to put to every mask they
might meet who resembled Dante. It was this: "Who
knows what
"

is good ? After receiving several foolish

answers, they finally met with a mask who replied He :
"

that knows what is bad," by which Dante was immediately

"What is meant by this here is, that I have
recognised.
seen no reason to be disheartened on account of the want
of sympathy of my contemporaries, since I had at the same
time before my eyes the objects of their sympathy. What
those authors were, posterity will see by their works what ;

the contemporaries were, will be seen by the reception they

gave to those works. My doctrine lays no claim whatever
1
Baltazar Gracian, "

El Criticon," iii. 90, to whom I leave the

responsibility for the anachronism.

 INTRODUCTION. 221

Philosophy of the present time which was

name "

to the "

disputed to the amusing adepts of Hegel s mystification ;

but it certainly does claim the title of "Philosophy of
time to come that is, of a time when people will no
"

longer content themselves with a mere jingle of words

without meaning, with empty phrases and trivial paral
lelisms, but will exact real contents and serious disclosures
from philosophy, while, on the other hand, they will exempt it
from the unjust and preposterous obligation of paraphrasing
the national religion for the time being. For it is an "

1
extremely absurd thing," says Kant to expect to be en
"

lightened by Reason and yet to prescribe to her beforehand

on which side she must incline." It is indeed sad to live
in an age so degenerate, that it should be necessary to
appeal to the authority of a great man to attest so obvious
a truth. But it is absurd to expect marvels from a phi
losophy that is chained up, and particularly amusing to
watch the solemn gravity with which it sets to work to
accomplish grea,t things, when we all know beforehand
2
the short meaning of the long speech."
"

However the
keen-sighted assert that under the cloak of philosophy they
can mostly detect theology holding forth for the edification
of students thirsting after truth, and instructing them
own fashion
after its and this again reminds us forcibly ;

of a certain favourite scene in Faust. Others, who think

that they see further into the matter, maintain that
still

what is thus disguised is neither theology nor philosophy,

but simply a poor devil who, while solemnly protesting
that he has lofty, sublime truth for his aim, is in fact only
striving to get bread for himself and for his future young
family. This he might no doubt obtain by other means
with less labour and more dignity meanwhile however for ;

1
Kant,
"

Krit. d. r. V." 5th edition, p. 755. (English translation by

M. Muller, p. 640.)
2
Schiller, der langen Kede kurzer Sinn."
[Tr.]
222 THE WILL IN NATURE.

this price he is ready to do anything he is asked to do,

even to deduce a priori, nay, should it come to the worst,
to perceive, the Devil and his dam/ by intellectual intui
tion and here indeed the exceedingly comical effect is
brought to a climax by the contrast between the sublimity
of the ostensible, and the lowliness of the real, aim. It
remains nevertheless desirable, that the pure, sacred pre
cincts of philosophy should be cleansed of all such traders,
as was the temple of Jerusalem in former times of the

buyers and sellers. Biding such better times therefore,

may our philosophical public bestow its attention and
interest as it has done hitherto. May it continue as before

invariably naming Fichte as an obligate accompaniment to,

and in the same breath with, Kant that great mind, pro
duced but once by Nature, which has illumined its own depth
as if forsooth they were of the same kind and this without ;

a single voice being heard to exclaim in protest HpaK\ij$

KUI iridrjKOQ !
May Hegel s philosophy of absolute nonsense
three-fourths cash and one-fourth crazy fancies con
tinue to pass for unfathomable wisdom without anyone
suggesting as an appropriate motto for his writings Shake
speare s words Such stuff as madmen tongue and brain
:
"

not," or, as an emblematical vignette, the cuttle-fish with

its ink-bag, creating a cloud of darkness around it to pre

vent people from seeing what it is, with the device mea :

caligine tutus. May each day bring us, as hitherto, new

systems adapted for University purposes, entirely made up
of words and phrases and in a learned jargon besides,
which allows people to talk whole days without saying
anything and may these delights never be disturbed by
;

the Arabian proverb I hear the clappering of the mill,

:
"

but I see no flour." For all this is in accordance with the

age and must have its course. In all times some such thing
occupies the contemporary public more or less noisily then ;

it dies off so completely, vanishes so entirely, without

 INTRODUCTION. 223

leaving a trace behind, that the next generation no longer

knows what it was. Truth can bide its time, for it has a
long life- before it. Whatever is genuine and seriously
meant, is always slow to make its way and certainly
attains its end almost miraculously for on its first appear ;

ance it as a rule meets with a cool, if not ungracious, re

ception : and this for exactly the same reason that, when
once it is fully recognised and has passed on to pos
terity, the immense majority of men take it on credit,
in order to avoid compromising themselves, whereas the
number of genuine appreciators remains nearly as small
as it was at -first. These few nevertheless suffice to make
the truth respected, for they are themselves respected.
And thus it is passed from hand to hand through centuries
over the heads of the inept multitude: so hard is the
existence of mankind s best inheritance! On the other
hand, if truth had to crave permission to be true from
such as have quite different aims at heart, its cause might
indeed be given, up for lost for then it might often be
;

dismissed with the witches watch-word fair is foul, :

"

and foul is Luckily however this is not the case.

fair."

Truth depends upon no one s favour or disfavour, nor

does it ask anyone s leave it stands upon its own feet, and
:

has Time for its ally its power is irresistible, its life in
;

destructible.
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY.

classifying the above-mentioned empirical corrobora-

INtions of doctrine according to the sciences from
my
which they come, while I take the graduated order of
Nature from the highest to the lowest degree as a guiding-
thread to my expositions, I must first mention a very
striking confirmation lately received by my chief dogma in
the physiological and pathological views of Dr. J. D.
Brandis, private physician to the King of Denmark, a
veteran in science, whose
"

Essay on Vital Force (1795)

"

had received Kail s hearty commendation. In his two

Experiences in the Application of Cold in
"

latest writings :

Nosology and Therapeutics and "

Disease" (Berlin, 1833),

of Cachexise
"

(1834), we
in the most emphatic find him
and striking manner stating the primary source of all vital
functions to be an unconscious will, from which he derives
all processes in the machinery of the organism, in health as
well as in disease, and which he represents as the primum
mobile of life. I must support this by literal quotations
from these essays, since few save medical readers are
likely to have them at hand.
In the first of them, p. viii., we find: "The essence of
every living organism consists in the will to maintain its
own existence as much as possible over against the
macrocosm Only one living entity, one will can
" "

p. x.
;
:

be in an organ at the same time therefore if there is a ;

diseased will in disagreement with the rest of the body in

the organ of the skin, we may hold it in check by applying
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 225

cold as long as the generation of warmth, a normal will,

can be induced by P. 1 If we are forced to the con
it." :
"

viction that there must be a determining principle a will,

in every vital action, by which the development suited to
the whole organism is occasioned, and each metamorphosis
of the parts conditioned, in harmony with the whole indi

viduality, and likewise that there is a something capable

of being determined and developed," &c. &c. P. 11: "With

respect to individual life,the element which determines,

the organic will, if it is to rest satisfied, must be able to
attain what it wants from that which has to be determined.
This occurs even when the vital movements are over
excited, as in inflammation :
something new is formed, the
noxious element is expelled ;
new plastic materials are
meanwhile conveyed through the arteries, more venous
blood is carried off, until the process of inflammation is
finished and the organic will satisfied. It is however

possible to excite this will to such a degree, as to make

satisfaction impossible. This exciting cause (or stimulus)
either acts directly upon the particular organ (poison, con

tagion) or it affects the whole life ; and this life then begins
to make the most strenuous efforts to rid itself of the
noxious element or to modify the disposition of the organic
will, and provokes critical vital activity in particular
parts (inflammations) or yields to the unappeased will"-
P. 12 The insatiable will acts destructively upon the
:
"

organism unless either (a) the whole life, in its efforts to

attain unity (tendency to adapt means to end), produces
other activities requiring satisfaction (crises et lyses) which
hold that will in check called decisive (crises complete?)
when quite successful; crises incomplete, when only partially
so or (ft) some other stimulus (medicine) produces another
willwhich represses the diseased one. If we place this in
one and the same category with the will of which we have
become conscious through our own representations, and
Q
226 THE WILL IN NATURE.

bear in mind that here there can be no question of more or

less distant resemblance, we gain the conviction that we have

grasped the fundamental conception of the one unlimited,

therefore indivisible, life which, according to its different
manifestations in various more or less endowed and exer
cised organs, is just as able to make hair grow on the
human body as to combine the most sublime representa
tions. We see that the most violent passion unsatisfied
will may be checked by more or less strong excitement,"

&c. &c. P. 18 The determining element

:
"

this organic
will without representation, this tendency to preserve the
organism as a unity is induced by outward temperature
to modify its activity now in the same, now in a remoter

organ. Every manifestation of life, however, whether in

health or in disease, is a manifestation of the organic
will : this will determines vegetation : in a healthy condi
tion, inharmony with the unity of the whole ; in an un
healthy one .... it is induced not to will in harmony
with that unity "... .P. 23 Cold suddenly applied
:
"

to the skin suppresses function (chill) ; cold drinks

its

check the organic will in the digestive organs and thereby

intensify that of the skin and produce perspiration ; just
so with the diseased organic will: cold checks cutaneous
&c. &c.
eruptions,"
P. 33 : Fever is the complete parti
"

cipation of the whole vital process in a diseased will, i.e. it

is to the entire vital process what inflammation is to

particular organs the effort of our vitality to form some

thing definite, in order to content the diseased will and
remove the noxious element. We
call this process of forma

tion crisis or lysis (turning-point or release). The first per

ception of the pernicious element which causes the diseased

will, affects the individuality just in the same way as a
noxious element apprehended by our senses, before we
have brought to clear representation the entire relation
in which it stands to our individuality and the means of
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 227

removing it. It creates terror and its consequences, a

standstill of the vital process in the parenchyma, especially
in the parts directed towards the outer world ; in the skin,
and in all the motor muscles belonging to the entire
individuality (outer body) :
shuddering, chills, trembling,
pains in the limbs, &c. &c. The difference between them
is,that in the latter case the noxious element, either at
once or gradually, becomes clear representation, because it
is compared with the individuality by means of all the
senses, so that its relation to that individuality can be
determined, and the means of protection against it (dis
regard, flight, warding off, defence, &c.) be brought to
a conscious will; whereas, in the former case, we remain
unconscious of that noxious element, and it is life alone
(or Nature s curative power) which is striving to remove
the noxious element and thereby to content the diseased
will. Nor must this be taken for a simile; it is, on
the contrary, a true description of the manifestation of
life." P. 58 :
"

We
must however always bear in mind,
that cold acts here as a powerful stimulus to check or
moderate the diseased will and to rouse in its place a
natural will, accompanied by general warmth."
In almost every page of this book similar expressions are
to be found. In the second of the Essays I have named,
Brandis no longer combines the explanation by the will
so universally with each separate analysis, probably in
consideration that this explanation is properly speaking, a

metaphysical one. Nevertheless he maintains it entirely

and completely, giving it even all the more distinct and
decided expression, wherever he states it. Thus, for in
stance, in 68 et seq. he speaks of an unconscious will, "

which cannot be separated from the conscious one," and is

the primum mobile of all
life, as well in plants as in
animals ;
a desire and aversion manifesting
for, in these, it is
itself in all the organs which determines all their vital
228 THE WILL IN NATURE.

processes, secretions, &c. &c. 71 : All convulsions

.
"

prove that the manifestation of the will can take place

without distinct power of representation." 72 : Every .
"

where do we meet with a spontaneous, unconimunicated

activity, now determined by the sublimest human free
will, now by animal desire and aversion, now again by

simple, more vegetative requirements which activity, in ;

order to maintain itself, calls forth several other kinds of

.activity in the unity of the individual." P. 96 "A :

creative, spontaneous, uncomrnunicated activity shows itself

in every vital manifestation." The third factor in
. .
"

this individual creation is the will, the individual s life

.
itself."
. The nerves are the conductors of this indi
"

vidual creation: by their means form and mixture are

varied according to desire and aversion." P. 97 Assimi :
"

lation of foreign substance .makes the blood

. . . . .

an absorption or an exudation of organic matter

It is not ;

... on the contrary, here the sole factor of the phe

nomenon is in all cases the creative will, a life which
cannot be brought back to any sort of imparted move
ment.

When I wrote this (1835) I was still naif enough

seriously to believe that Brandis was unacquainted with
my work, or I should not allude here to his writings ; for
they would then be merely a repetition, application and
carrying out of my own doctrine on this point, not a corro-
boration of it. But I thought I might safely assume that
he did not know me, because he has not mentioned me
anywhere and because if he had known me, literary honesty
would have made it his imperative duty not to remain
silent concerning the man from whom he had borrowed his
chief fundamental thought, the more so as he saw that man
then enduring unmerited neglect, by his writings being
generally ignored a circumstance which might be con-
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 229

strued as favourable to fraud. Add to this, that it lay in

Brandis own interest as a writer, and would therefore have
shown sagacity on his part, to have appealed to me as an
authority. For the fundamental doctrine propounded by
him is so striking and paradoxical, that even his Gottingeii
reviewer is amazed and hardly knows what to think of it ;

yet such a doctrine as this was left without foundation

either through proof or induction, nor did Dr. Brandis
establish its relation to the whole of our knowledge of
Nature he simply asserted it. I imagined therefore that
:

it was by the peculiar gift of divination, which enables emi

nent physicians to see and do the right thing in cases of

illness, that he had been led to this view, without being able
to give a strict and methodical account of the grounds
of this really metaphysical truth, although he must have
seen how greatly it is opposed to the generally received
views. Had
he, thought I, been acquainted with my
philosophy, which gives far greater extension to this truth,
makes it valid for the whole of Nature and founds it both
by proof and induction in close connection with Kant s
teaching, from which it proceeds as a final result of ex
cogitation how gladly must he have availed himself of such
confirmation and support, rather than to stand alone by an
unheard-of assertion which was never further carried out
and, with him, never went beyond bare assertion. Such
were the reasons that led me to believe myself entitled to
take for granted Dr. Brandis ignorance of my book.
Since then however I have become better acquainted
r
v, ith German scientists and Copenhagen Academicians,
to which body Dr. Brandis belonged, and have gained
the conviction that he knew me very well indeed. I stated
my reasons for arriving at this conviction already in 1844l
in the 2nd vol. of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,"
"

so that, as the subject is by no means edifying, it is need-

1

Chapter 20, p. 263 j p. 295 of the 3rd edition.

230 THE WILL IN NATURE.

less to repeat them here I will merely add that I have

;

since been assured on trustworthy authority that Dr.

Brandis not only knew my work but even possessed it, as
it was found among his property after his death. The un
merited obscurity to which writers like myself are long
condemned, encourages such people to appropriate their
thoughts without so much as naming them.
Another medical authority has carried this even farther ;

for, not content with the thought alone, he has appropriated

to himself the expression of it also. I allude to Professor
Anton Rosas of the University of Vienna, whose entire
2
507 in the 1st vol. of his Textbook of Ophthalmology
(1830) copied word for word from pp. 14-16 of my
is

treatise
"

On
Vision and Colours (1816) without any
"

mention whatever of me, or even the slightest hint that he

is using the words of another. This sufficiently accounts
for the care he has taken not to mention my treatise among
the twenty-one writings on Colours and forty on the
lists of

Physiology of the Eye, which he gives in 542 and 567 ;

a caution which was however all the more advisable, as he

had appropriated to himself a good deal more out of that
pamphlet without mentioning me. All that is referred, for
instance, in 526 to them (man), is only applicable to me.
His entire 527 is copied almost literally from my pp. 59
and 60. The theory which he introduces without further cere
mony in 535 by the word "evidently" that is, that yellow :

is f and violet i of the eye s activity, never was evident

to anyone until I made it so even to this day it is a truth
;

known to few and acknowledged by fewer still, and much is

yet wanting for example, that I should be dead and
buried ere it be possible to call it evident without
further ceremony. The matter will even have to wait till
after my death to be seriously sifted, since a close investi
gation might easily bring to evidence the real difference
1
JIumlbuch der Augenheilkunde
"
"

Rosas, (1830).
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 231

between Newton s theory of colours and my own, which is

that his is false, and mine true a discovery which

simply :

could not fail to mortify my contemporaries. Wherefore,

according to ancient custom, all serious examination into
the question is wisely postponed for these few years. Pro
fessor Rosas knew no such policy as this and, as the matter
was not alluded to anywhere, thought himself entitled, like
the Danish Academician, to claim it as lawful prey (de bonne
prise) Evidently North and South German honesty had
.

not yet come to a satisfactory understanding. Moreover

the whole contents of 538, 539 and 540 in Professor
Rosas book are taken from my pamphlet, nay even in
great part copied word for word from my 13. Still

once, where he stands in need of a voucher for a fact,

he finds himself obliged to refer to my treatise that is,
:

in his 531 and it is most amusing to see the way in

;

which he even brings in the numerical fractions used by

me, as a result of my theory, to express all colours. It had
probably occurred to him, that appropriating them quite
sans fa^on might be a delicate matter, so he says, p. 308:
If we wished to express in numbers the first-mentioned
"

relation in which colours stand to white, assuming white to

be = 1, the following scale of proportion might by the way
be adopted (as has already been done by Schopenhauer) :

yellow
= J blue = i
orange = -| violet = J
red = i black =
green =
~

Now I should like to know how anyone could do this by

the way, without having first thought out whole colour-
my
theory, to which alone these numbers refer, and apart
from which they are mere abstract numbers without
meaning; above all, how anyone could do it who, like
Professor Eosas, professes to be a follower of Newton s
232 THE WILL IN NATURE.

colour-theory, with which these numbers are in direct con

tradiction ? Finally, I should like to know how it came,
that during the thousands of years in which men have
thought and written, no one but myself and Professor
Rosas should ever have thought of using just these parti
cular fractions to denote colours ? For the words 1 have

quoted above tell us, that he would have stated those frac
tions precisely as he has done, even had I not chanced to
do it already fourteen years before and thus needlessly
anticipated his statement they also tell us, that all that is
;

required is to wish, in order to do so. Now it is pre

cisely in these numerical fractions that the secret of colours
lies by them alone can we rightly solve the mystery of
:

their nature and of their difference from one another.

I should however be heartily glad, were plagiarism the
worst kind of dishonesty that denied German literature ;

there are others far more mischievous, which penetrate

more deeply, and to which plagiarism bears the same pro
portion as picking pockets in a mild way to capital crime.
I allude to that mean, despicable spirit, whose loadstar is
personal interest, when it ought to be truth, and in which
the voice of intention makes itself heard beneath the mask
of insight. Double-dealing and time-serving are the order of
the day. Tartuffe comedies are performed without rouge ;
nay, Capuchin sermons are preached in halls consecrated
to Science enlightenment, that once revered word, has
;

become a term of opprobrium ;

the greatest thinkers of
the past century, Yoltaire, Rousseau, Locke, Hume, are
slandered those heroes, ornaments and benefactors of
mankind, whose fame, diffused throughout both hemi
spheres, can only be increased, if by anything, by the fact
that wherever and whenever obscurantists show them
selves, it is as their bitterest enemies and with good rea
son. Literary coteries and associations are formed to deal
out praise and blame, and spurious merit is then trumpeted
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 233

forth and extolled, while sterling merit is slandered or, aa

Gothe says, secreted, by means of an inviolable silence, in
"

vi,ich sort of inquisitorial censure the Germans have attained

great proficiency." The motives and considerations how

l

ever from which all this proceeds, are of too low a nature
for me to care to enumerate them in detail. But what a
difference there is between periodicals such as the Edin "

burgh Review," in which gentlemen of independent means

are induced to write by a genuine interest in the subjects
treated,and which honourably upholds its noble motto taken
from Publius Syrus Judex damnatur cum nocens absolvitur,
:

and our mean- spirited, disingenuous, G-ermaii literary jour

nals, full of considerations and intentions, that are mostly

compiled for the sake of pay by hired editors, and ought

properly to have for their motto: Accedas socius laudes,
lauderis, ut absens. Now, after twenty years, do I understand
what Gothe said to me at Berka in 1814. As I found him
reading Madame de StaeTs De TAllemagne" I remarked
"

in course of conversation that she had given too exag

gerated a description of German honesty and one that
might mislead foreigners. He laughed and said: "Yes,

to be sure, they will not secure their baggage behind and

will have it cut off." He then added in a graver tone:
"

But one has to know German literature in order to realise

the full extent of German dishonesty." All well and
good ! But the most revolting kind of dishonesty in Ger
man literature is that of the time-servers, who pass them
selves off for philosophers, while in reality they are obscu
rantists. The word time-serving no more needs explana
tion than the thing needs a proof ; for anyone who had the
face to deny it would furnish strong evidence in support of

1
Gothe, "Tag-und Jahreshefte," 1812.
7
This 1 wrote in 1836. The Edinburgh Review
"

"has since however

greatly deteriorated, and is no longer its old self. I have even seen
clerical time-serving in its pagos, written down to the level of the mob.
234 THE WILL IN NATURE.

my present argument. Kant taught, that man ought to

use his fellow-man only as an end, never as a means he :

did not think necessary to say, that philosophy ought

it

only to be dealt with as an end, never as a means. Time

serving may after all be excused under every garb, the
cowl as well as the ermine, save only the philosopher s
cloak (Triboniori) for he who has once assumed this, has
;

sworn allegiance to truth, and from that moment every

other consideration, no matter of what kind, becomes base
treachery. Therefore it was that Socrates did not shun
the hemlock, nor Bruno the stake, while for a piece of
bread these men will transgress. Are they too short
sighted to see posterity close at hand, with the history of
philosophy at its side, recording two lines of bitter con
demnation with unflinching hand and iron pen in its im
mortal pages ? Or has this no sting for them ? Well to
be sure, comes to the worst, apres moi le deluge may be
if it

pronounced but as to apres moi le mepris, that is a more

;

difficult matter. Therefore I fancy they will answer that

austere judge as follows Ah, dear posterity and history
"

of philosophy you are quite wrong to take us in earnest we

!
;

are not philosophers at all, Heaven forbid No, we are only

!

professors of philosophy, mere servants of the state, mere

philosophers in jest. You might as well drag puppet-knights
in pasteboard armour into a real tournament." Then the
judge will most likely see how matters stand, erase all their

names, and confer upon them the beneficiumperpetui silentii.

From this digression to which I had been led away
eighteen years ago, by the cant and time-serving I then
witnessed, though they were not nearly as flourishing then
as they are now I return to that part of my doctrine whieh
Dr. Brandis has confirmed, though he did not originate
it, in order to add a few explanations with which I shall

then connect some further corroborations it has since

received from Physiology.
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 235

The three assumptions which are criticised by Kant in his

Transcendental Dialectic under the names of Ideas of
Reason, and have in consequence since been set aside in
theoretical philosophy, had always stood in the way of a

deeper insight into Nature, until that great thinker brought

about a complete transformation in philosophy. That sup
posed Idea of Eeason, the soul that metaphysical being, in
:

whose absolute singleness knowing and willing were knit

and blended together to eternal, inseparable unity, was an
impediment of this sort for the subject-matter of this
chapter. As
long as it lasted, no philosophical Physiology
was possible the less so, as its correlate, real, purely pas
:

sive Matter, had necessarily also to be assumed together

1
with it, as the substance of the body. It was this Idea
of Reason, the soul, therefore, that caused the celebrated
chemist and physiologist, George Ernest Stahl, at the
beginning of the last century to miss the discovery of
the truth he so nearly approached and would have quite
reached, had he been able to put that which is alone meta
physical, the bare will as yet without intellect in the place
of the anima rationalis. Under the influence of this Idea
of Reason however, he could not teach anything but that
it is this simple, rational soul which builds itself a body, all

whose inner organic functions it directs and performs, yet

has no knowledge or consciousness of all this, although
knowledge is the fundamental destination and, as it were,
the substance, of its being. There was something absurd in
this doctrine which made it utterly untenable. It was super
seded by Haller s Irritability and Sensibility, which, to be
sure, are taken in a purely empircial sense, but, to make
up for this, are also two qualitates occultce, at which all ex

planation ceases. The movement of the heart and of the

intestineswas now attributed to Irritability. But the
anima rationalis still remained in undiminished honour
1
As a being existing by itself, a tiling in itself. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
236 THE WILL IN NATURE.

and dignity as a visitor at the house of the body.

1
Truth
"

lies at the bottom of a well," said Democritus ;

and the
centuries with a sigh, have repeated his words. But small
wonder, if it gets a rap on the knuckles as soon as it tries
to come out !

The fundamental truth of my doctrine, which places

that doctrine in opposition with all others that have ever
existed, is the complete separation between the will and
the intellect, which all philosophers before me had looked
upon as inseparable or rather, I ought to say that they
;

had regarded the will as conditioned by, nay, mostly even

as a mere function of, the intellect, assumed by them to be
the fundamental substance of our spiritual being. But this
separation, this analysis into two heterogeneous elements,
of the ego or soul, which had so long been deemed an indi
visible unity, is, for philosophy, what the analysis of water
has been for chemistry, though it may take time to be ac
knowledged. With me, that which is eternal and inde
structible in man, therefore, that which constitutes his vital

principle, is not the soul, but if I may use a chemical term

its radical : and this is the will. The so-called soul is

already a compound : it is the union of the will and the

intellect (VOVQ). This intellect is the secondary element, the
posterius of the organism and, as a mere cerebral function,
isconditioned by the organism whereas the will is what is
;

primary, the prius of the organism, which is conditioned

by it. For the will is that tiling in itself, which only be
comes apparent as an organic body in our representation
(that mere function of the brain) it is only through the
:

forms of knowledge (or cerebral function), that is, only in

our representation not apart from that representation, not
immediately in our self-consciousness that our body is
given to each of us as a thing which has extension, limbs

1
Iii which it is lodged in the garret. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 237

and organs. As the actions of our body are only acts

of volition portraying themselves in representation, so
likewise is their substratum, the shape of that body, in the
main the portrait of the will so that, in all the organic
:

functions of our body, the will is just as much the agent

as in its external actions. True Physiology, at its highest,
shows the spiritual (the intellectual) in man to be the
product of the physical in him, and no one has done this
so thoroughly as Gabanis but true Metaphysic teaches
;

us, that the physical in man is itself mere product, or

rather phenomenon, of a spiritual (the will) nay, that ;

Matter itself is conditioned by representation, in which

alone it exists. Perception and reflection will more and
more find their explanation through the organism but ;

not the will, by which conversely the organism is ex

plained, as I shall show in the following chapter. First
of all therefore I place the will, as thing in itself and quite

primary secondly, its mere visibility, its obj edification

; :

i.e. the body ; thirdly, the intellect, as a mere function of

one part of that body. This part is itself the objectified

will to know(the will to know having entered into repre
sentation), since the will needs knowledge to attain its
own ends. Now the entire world as representation, to
gether with the body itself therefore, inasmuch as it is a
perceptible object, nay, Matter in general as existing only
in representation, all this, I say, is again conditioned
by
that function for, duly considered, we cannot possibly
;

conceive an objective world without a Subject, in whose

consciousness it is present. Thus knowledge and matter
(Subject and Object) exist only relatively one for the
other and constitute phenomenon. The whole thing there
fore, owing to the radical change made by me, stands in a
different light from that in which it has hitherto been
regarded.
As soon as it is directed outwardly and acts upon a
238 THE WILL IN NATURE.

recognised object, as soon therefore as it has passed

through the medium of knowledge, we all recognise the
will at once to "be the active principle, and call it by its
right name. Yet it is no less active in those inner pro
cesses which have preceded such outward actions as their
conditions in those, for instance, which create and main
:

tain organic life and its substratum and the circulation ;

of the blood, secretion, digestion, &c. &c., are its work

likewise. But just because the will was only recognised
as the active principle in those cases in which it abandons
the individual whence it proceeds, in order to direct itself
towards the outer world now presenting itself pre
cisely for this end, as perception knowledge has been
taken for its essential condition, its sole element, nay,
as the substance of which it consists and hereby was :

perpetrated the greatest varepov Trporepov that has ever

been.
But before all things we must learn to distinguish will
1
[TFiZZe] (voluntas) from free-will [Willkulir] (arbttrium)
and to understand that the former can subsist without the

latter; this however presupposes my whole philosophy.

The will is called free-will when it is illumined by know
ledge, therefore when the causes which move it are motives :

that is, representations. Objectively speaking this means:

when the influence from outside which causes the act,
has a brain for its mediator. motive may be defined A
Schopenhauer means the distinction between the
1 will in its
By this
widest sense, regarded as the fundamental essence of all that happens,
even where there is no choice, even where it is unconscious, and
conscious will, implying deliberation and choice, commonly called free
will. We must however carefully guard against confounding this relative
free-will, with absolute free-will (libcmm arbitrium indiffcrentics), which

Schopenhauer declares to be inadmissible. The sense in which I have

used the expression free-will throughout this treatise, is that of rela
tive freedom, i.e. power to choose between different motives, free of all
outward restraint ( Willkuhr). (Tr.)
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 239

as an external stimulus, whose action first of all causes

an image to arise in the brain, through the medium of
which the will carries out the effect proper an outward
action of the body. Now, in the human species however,
the place of such an image as this may be taken by a
conception drawn from former images of this kind by
dropping their differences, which conception consequently
isno longer perceptible, but merely denoted and fixed by
words. As the action of motives accordingly does not
depend upon contact, they can try their power on the will
against each other in other words, they permit a certain
:

choice which, in animals, is limited to the narrow sphere

of that which has perceptible existence for them whereas, ;

in man, its range comprises the vast extent of all that is

thinkable: that is, of his conceptions. Accordingly we
designate as voluntary those movements which are occa
sioned, not by causes in the narrowest sense of the word,
as in inorganic bodies, nor even by mere stimuli, as in
1
plants, but by motives. These motives however pre
suppose an intellect as their mediator, through which
causality here acts, without prejudice to its entire neces
sity in all other respects. Physiologically, the diffe
rence between stimulus and motive admits also of the
following definition. The stimulus provokes immediate
reaction, which proceeds from the very part on which
the stimulus has acted whereas the motive is a stimulus
;

that has to go a roundabout way through the brain,

where its action first causes an image to arise, which
then, but not till then, provokes the consequent reaction,
which is now called an act of volition, and voluntary. The
distinction between voluntary and involuntary movement
does not therefore concern what is essential and primary
1
I have shown the difference between cause in its narrowest sense,
stimulus, and motive, at length in my Grund-probleme der Ethik .*
"

p. 29 et scq.
240 THE WILL IN NATURE.

for this is in both cases the will but only what is secon
dary, the rousing of the will s manifestation: it has to

do with the determination whether causes proper, stimuli

or motives (i.e. causes having passed through the medium
of knowledge) are the guidance under which that manifesta
tion takes place. It is in human consciousness, differing
from that of animals by not only containing perceptible
representations but also abstract conceptions independent
of time-distinctions, which act simultaneously and col

laterally, whereby deliberation, i.e. a conflict of motives,

becomes possible it is in human consciousness, I say, that
free-will (arbitrium) in its narrowest sense first makes its

appearance and this I have called elective decision. It

;

nevertheless merely consists in the strongest motive for a

given individual character overcoming the others and thus
determining the act, just as an impact is overcome by a
stronger counter-impact, the result thus ensuing with
precisely the same necessity as the movement jof a stone
that has been struck. That all great thinkers in all
ages were decided and at one on this point, is just
as certain, as that the multitude will never understand,
never grasp, the important truth, that the work of our
freedom must not be sought in our individual actions but
in our very existence and nature itself. In my prize-
essay on Freedom of the Will, I have shown this as
clearly as possible. The liberum arbitrium indifferentice
which is assumed to be the distinctive characteristic of
movements proceeding from the will, is accordingly quite
inadmissible : for it asserts that effects are possible without
causes.
therefore as we have got so far as to distinguish
As soon
will \Wille\ from free-will [Willkuhr], and to consider
the latter as a particular kind or particular phenomenon
of the former, we shall find no difficulty in recognising the
will, even in unconscious processes. Thus the assertion,
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 241

that all bodily movements, even those which are purely

vegetative and organic, proceed from the will, by no means
implies that they are voluntary. For that would mean
that they were occasioned by motives but motives are
;

representations, and their seat is the brain: only those

parts of our body which communicate with the brain by
means movement by the brain,
of the nerves, can be put in

consequently by motives, and this movement alone is what

is called voluntary. The movement of the inner economy
of the organism, on the contrary, is directed, as in plant-
life, by stimuli; only as, on the one hand, the complex
nature of the animal organism necessitated an outer sen-
sorium for the apprehension of the outer world and the
will s reaction on that outer world, so, on the other hand,
did it necessitate a cerebrum abdominale, the sympathetic
nervous system, in order to direct the will s reaction upon
inner stimuli likewise. We may compare the former to a
Home Ministry, the latter to a Foreign Office but tho ;

will remains the omnipresent Autocrat.

The progress made in Physiology since Haller has placed

beyond doubt, that not only those actions which are con
sciously performed (functiones animales), but even vital
processes that take place quite unconsciously (functiones
vitales et naturales), are directed throughout by the nervous

system. Likewise that their only difference, as far as

our consciousnessof them is concerned, consists in
the former being directed by nerves proceeding from the
brain, the latter by nerves that do not directly com
municate with that chief centre of the nervous system
mainly directed towards the outside but with sub
ordinate, minor centres, with the nerve-knots, the ganglia
and their net-work, which preside as it were like vice
gerents over the various departments of the nervous
system, directing those internal processes that follow upon
internal stimuli, just as the brain directs the external
242 THE WILL IN NATURE.

actions that followupon external motives, and thus receiv

ing impressions from inside upon which they react corre
spondingly, just as the brain receives representations
on the strength of which it forms resolutions only each ;

of these minor centres is confined to a narrower sphere of

action. Upon this rests the vita propria of each system,
in referring to which Van Helmont said that each organ
has, as it were, its own ego. It accounts also for life con

tinuing in parts which have been cut off the bodies of

insects, reptiles, and other inferior animals, whose brain has
no marked preponderance over the ganglia of single parts ;

and it likewise explains how many reptiles are able to live

for weeks, nay even months, after their brain has been re
moved. Now, if our surest experience teaches us that the
will, which is known to us in most immediate conscious
ness and in a totally different way from the outer world, is
the real agent in actions attended by consciousness and
directedby the chief centre of the nervous system how ;

can we help admitting that those other actions which, pro

ceeding from that nervous system but obeying the direc
tion of its subordinate centres, keep the vital processes

constantly going, must also be manifestations of the will ?

Especially as we know perfectly well the cause because of
which they are not, like the others, attended by con
sciousness : we know, that is to say, that all consciousness
resides in the brainand therefore is limited to such parts
as have nerves which communicate directly with the brain ;

and we know also that, even in these, consciousness ceases

when those nerves are severed. By this the difference
between all that is conscious and unconscious and together
with it the difference between all that is voluntary and in
voluntary in the movements of the body is perfectly ex
plained, and no reason remains for assuming two entirely
different primary sources of movement especially as prin-
:

cipia prceter necessitatem non sunt multiplicanda. All this is

 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 243

on impartial reflection from this standpoint,

so obvious, that,
itseems almost absurd to persist in making the body serve
two masters by deriving its actions from two radically dif
ferent origins and then ascribing on the one hand the
movements of our arms and legs, of our eyes, lips, throat,
tongue and lungs, of the facial and abdominal muscles, to
the will ;
while on the other hand the action of the heart,
the movements of the veins, the peristaltic movements of
the intestines, the absorption by the intestinal villi and
glands and all those movements which accompany secre
tion, are supposed to proceed from a totally different, ever
mysterious principle of which we have no knowledge, and
which is designated by names such as vitality, archeus,
spiritus animales, vital energy, instinct, all of which mean
1
no more than a?.
It is curious and instructive to see the trouble that
3
excellent writer, Treviranus takes, to find out in the
lower animals, such as infusoria and zoophyta, which
movements are voluntary, and which are what he calls auto
matic or physical, i.e. merely vital. He founds his inquiry
upon the assumption that he has to do with two primarily
different sources of movement whereas in truth they all
;

proceed from the and the whole difference consists in

will,
1
It is especially in secretive processes that we cannot avoid re

cognising a certain selection of the materials fitted for each purpose,

consequently a free will in the secretive organs, which must even be
assisted by a certain dull sensation, and in virtue of which each secreting

organ only extracts from the same blood that particular secretion which
suits it and no others for instance, the liver only absorbs bile from the
:

blood flowing through it, sending the rest of the blood on, and likewise
the salivary glands and the pancreas only secrete saliva, the kidneys
only urine, &c. &c. We
may therefore compare the organs of secretion
to different kinds of cattle grazing on one and the same pasture-land,
each of which only browses upon the one sort of herb which suits its own
particular appetite. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
2
Treviranus, Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen
"

Lebens," vol. L pp. 178-185.

244 THE WILL IN NATURE.

their being occasioned by stimuli or by motives, i.e. in their

having a brain for their medium or not ; and the stimulus

may again be merely interior or exterior. In several
animals of a higher order crustaceans and even fishes
he finds that the voluntary and vital movements, for in
stance locomotion and respiration, entirely coincide: a
clear proof that their origin and essence are identical.
He says p. 188 In the family of the actinia, star
:

fishes, sea-urchins, and holothurice (echinodermata pedata

Cuv.), it is evident that the movement of the fluids de

pends upon the will of the animals and that it is a
means of locomotion." Then again p. 288: "The gullet
of mammals has at its upper end the pharynx, which

expands and contracts by means of muscles resembling

voluntary muscles in their formation, yet which do not
obey the will." Here we see how the limits of the move
ments proceeding from the will and of those assumed
to be foreign to it, merge into one another. Ibid., p. 293 :
"Thus movements having all the appearance of being
voluntary, take place in the stomachs of ruminants. They
do not however always stand in connection with the rumi
nating process only. Even the simpler human stomach
and that of many animals only allows free passage to what
is digestible through its lower orifice, and rejects what is

indigestible by vomiting."
There is moreover special evidence that the movements
induced by stimuli (involuntary movements) proceed from
the will just as well as those occasioned by motives
(voluntary movements) for instance, when the same
:

movement follows now upon a stimulus, now again

is the case when the
upon a motive, as pupil of the
eye is contracted. This movement, when caused by in
creased light, follows upon a stimulus; whereas, when
occasioned by the wish to examine a very small object
minutely in close proximity, it follows upon a motive ; be-
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 245

cause contracting the pupil enables us to see things dis

tinctly even when quite near to us, and this distinctness
may be increased by our looking through a hole pierced
in a card with a pin conversely, the pupil is dilated when
;

we look at distant objects. Surely the same movement of

the same organ is not likely to proceed alternately from
two fundamentally different sources. E. H. Weber 1 re
lates that he discovered in himself the power of dilating
and contracting at will the pupil of one of his eyes, while
looking at the same object, so as to make that object
appear now distinct, now indistinct, while the other eye
remained closed. Joh. Miiller 2 also tries to prove that the
will actsupon the pupil.
The truth that the innermost mainspring of uncon
sciously performed vital and vegetative functions is the
will,we find moreover confirmed by the consideration, that
even the movement of a limb recognised as voluntary, is
only the ultimate result of a multitude of preceding changes
which have taken place inside that limb and which no more
enter into our consciousness than those organic functions.
Yet these changes are evidently that which was first set
inmotion by the will, the movement of the limb being merely
their remote consequence nevertheless this remains so;

foreign to our consciousness that physiologists try to reach it

by means of such hypotheses as these that the sinews and :

muscular fibre are contracted by a change in the cellular

tissuewrought by a precipitation of the blood-vapour in
that tissue to serum but that this change is brought
;

about by the nerve s action, and this by the will. Thus,

even here, it is not the change which proceeded originally
from the will which comes into consciousness, but only its
remote result and even this, properly speaking, only through
;

1
E. H. Weber, "

Additamenta ad E. H. Weberi tractatum de motn

iridis."
Lipsia, 1823.
2
Joh. Miiller, "

Handbuch der Physiologic," p. 764.

246 THE WILL IN NATURE.

the special perception of the brain in which it presents

itself together with the whole organism. Now by follow
ing the path of experimental research and hypotheses phy
siologists would never have arrived at the truth, that the
last link in this ascending causal series is the will; it is
known to them, on the contrary, in quite a different way.
The solution of the enigma comes to them in a whisper
from outside the investigation, owing to the fortunate cir
cumstance that the investigator is in this case at the same
time himself the object of the investigation and by this
learns the secret of the inward process, his explanation of
which would otherwise, like that of every other phenomenon,
be brought to a standstill by an inscrutable force. And
conversely, if we stood in the same inward relation towards
every natural phenomenon a.s towards our own organism,
the explanation of every natural phenomenon, as well as of
all the properties of every body, would likewise ultimately
be reduced to a will manifesting itself in them. For the
difference does not reside in the thing itself, but in our re
lation to the thing. Wherever explanation of the physical
comes to an end, it is met by the metaphysical and where-
;

ever this last is accessible toimmediate knowledge, the

result will be, as here, the will. That even those parts of
the body whose movements do not proceed from the brain,
do not follow upon motives, and are not voluntary, are
nevertheless ruled and animated by the will, is also shown
by their participation in all unusually violent movements of
the will, i.e. emotions and passions. We see, for instance,
the quickened pulse in joy or alarm, the blush in embarass-
ment, the cheek s pallor in terror or in suppressed anger,
the tears of sorrow, the difficult breathing and increased
activity of the intestines in terror, watering of the mouth
at the sight of dainties, nausea occasioned by that of loath
some objects, strongly accelerated circulation of the blood
and even altered quality of bile through wrath, and of
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 247

saliva through violent rage this last even to the degree,

:

that an excessively irritated dog may communicate hydro

phobia by its bite without being itself affected with rabies,
or even then contracting the disease and the same is also
asserted of cats and of cocks. The organism is further
deeply undermined by lasting grief, and may be mortally
affectedby fright as well as by sudden joy. On the other
hand, all those inner processes and changes which only
have to do with the intellect and do not concern the will,
however great may be their importance, remain without
influence upon the machinery of the organism, with the
one exception, that mental activity, prolonged to excess,
fatigues and gradually exhausts the brain and finally under
mines the organism. This again confirms the fact that the
intellect is of a secondary character, and merely the organic
function of a single part, a product of life not the inner
;

most kernel of our being, not the thing in itself, not meta
physical, incorporeal, eternal, like the will the will never
:

tires, never grows old, never learns, never improves by

practice, is in infancy what it is in old age, eternally one
and the same, and its character in each individual is un
changeable. Being essential moreover, it is likewise im
mutable, and therefore exists in animals as it does in us ;

for it does not, like the intellect, depend upon the perfection
of the organisation, but is in every essential respect in
all animals the same thing which we know so intimately.

Accordingly animals have all the feelings which belong to

man: joy, grief, fear, anger, love, hate, desire, envy, &c. &c.
The great difference between man and the brute creation
consists exclusively in the degrees of perfection of the in
tellect. This however is leading us too far from our sub
ject, so I refer my readers to my chief work, vol. ii.
chap.
19, sub. 2.
After the cogent reasons just given in favour of the
primary agens in the inward machinery of the organism
248 THE WILL IN NATURE.

being the very same will which rules the outward actions
of the body and only reveals itself as the will in this

passage through consciousness because here it needs the

mediation of outwardly directed knowledge, we shall not
be astonished to find that other physiologists besides
Brandis had, by means of strictly empirical research, also
1
recognised this truth more or less clearly. Meckel, in
his "Archiv fur die Physiologic," arrives quite empiri

cally and impartially at the conclusion, that vegetative

existence [in animals], the first growth of the embryo, the
assimilation of nourishment and plant-life, ought properly
to be considered as manifestations of the will, nay, that
even the inclination of the magnetic needle seems to be
something of the same kind. The assumption," he says, "

of a certain free will in every vital movement may per

"

haps be justified." Plants appear to seek light volun

"

tarily,"
&c. &c. This book is dated 1819 just after the
appearance of my work and as, to say the least, it is doubt
;

ful whether it had any influence upon him or whether he

was even aware of its existence, I class these utterances
among the independent empirical confirmations of my doc
trine. Burdach also, 2 in his great work on Physiology,
arrives by a completely empirical road at the conclusion,
that self-love is a force belonging to all things indiscrimi
"

nately."
He points it out, first in animals, then in plants,
and lastly in inanimate bodies. But what is self-love after
all, if not the will to preserve our existence, the will to

live ? Under the heading

Comparative Anatomy," I shall
"

quote a passage from the same book, which confirms my

view still more decidedly. That the doctrine, which teaches
that the will is the vital principle, has begun to spread even
to the wider circles of medical science and to meet with a
favourable reception from its younger representatives, t
1
A. vol. 5, pp. 195-198.
"

Meckel, f. d. P."

2
Burdach, Physiologic," vol. i. 259, p. 383.
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 249

notice with particular pleasure in the theses sustained by

Dr. Von Sigriz on taking his degree at Munich (August,
1835), which commence as follows : 1. Sanguis est deter-

minansformam organismi se evolventis. 2.Evolutio organicd

determinatur vitce internee actione et voluntate.
Lastly, a very remarkable and unexpected corroboration
of this part of doctrine has to be mentioned, which has
my
recently been communicated from ancient Hindoo philo
sophy by Colebrook. In his exposition of the philosophical
1
schools of the Hindoos, he quotes the following as the
doctrine of the Nyaga school :
"

Volition, Yatna, effort or

manifestation of the Will, is a self-determination to act
which gives satisfaction. Desire is its occasion, perception
its motive. Two kinds of perceptible effort of the will
are distinguished that which springs from desire which
:

seeks the agreeable, and that which springs from aversion

which shuns the repulsive. Another species, which escapes
sensation and perception, but is inferred from analogy of
spontaneous acts, comprises animal functions, having for
a cause the vital, unseen power." Here the words animal "

are evidently used, not in a physiological,

functions"

but in a popular sense so that here organic life is un

:

questionably derived from the will. find a similar We

2
statement in Colebrook Eeport on the Vedas where he
s

says :
"

Asu is unconscious volition, which occasions an act

necessary to the support of life, as breathing, <fec."

Moreover my reduction of vital energy to the will by no

means interferes with the old division of its functions into
reproductive force, irritability and sensibility. This divi
sion remains a deep view of their difference, and gives
occasion for interesting observations.
The faculty of reproduction, objectified in the cellular
tissue of plants, constitutes the chief characteristic of
1 "

Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Great Britain," 1824,

p. 110.
8 3
"

Asiatic Researches, vol. 8, p. 426.

250 THE WILL IN NATURE.

plants and the vegetative element in Man. Where we find

it predominant to excess in human beings, we assume them

to be phlegmatic, dull, indolent, obtuse (Boeotians) though ;

this assumption does not always meet with confirmation.

Irritability, objectified in the muscular tissue, constitutes

the chief characteristic of Animals and the animal element
in Man. Where it predominates to excess, dexterity,
strength, bravery, that is, fitness for bodily exertion arid
for war, is usually to be found (Spartans). Nearly all
warm-blooded animals and even insects far surpass Man
in irritability. It is by irritability that animals are most
vividly conscious of their existence wherefore they exult
;

in manifesting it. There is even still a trace of that exul

tation perceptible in Man, in dancing. Sensibility, objec
tified in the nerves, is Man s chief characteristic, and con
stituteswhat is properly human in him. In this no animal
can in the remotest degree compare with Man. Where it
predominates to excess, it produces genius (Athenians).
Accordingly a man of genius is in a higher degree a man.
This explains why some men of genius have been unwilling
to recognise other men, with their monotonous physiog
nomies and universal stamp of commonplace mediocrity,
as human beings for in them they did not find their
:

equals and naturally came to the erroneous conclu

sion that their own was the normal standard. Diogenes
sought for men with a lantern in this sense ;
in that work
x
of genius, the Koheleth (Ecclesiastes) it is said : One
"

man among a thousand have I found, but one woman

among all those have I not found and Gracian in his
;
"

Criticon perhaps the grandest and most beautiful alle

gory ever written says But what was strangest of
:
"

all, in the whole country, even in the most populous cities,

they did not meet with a single man ; on the contrary these
cities were inhabited by lions, tigers, leopards, wolves,
1
Ecclesiastes, ch. 7, v. 28.
 PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY. 251

foxes, apes, oxen, asses, pigs, nowhere was there a man !

They only made out after a time that the few existing
human beings, in order to hide themselves and not to wit
ness what was going on, had retired to those desert places
which ought to have been the dwellings of wild beasts."

The same reason indeed accounts for the peculiar inclina

tion of all men of genius for solitude, to which they are
driven by their difference from the rest, and for which their
own inner wealth qualifies them. For, with humanity it

is as with diamonds, the extraordinarily great ones alone

are fitted to be solitaires, while those of ordinary size have
to be set in clusters to
produce any effect.
Even the three Gunas,or fundamental qualities of the
Hindoos, tally with the three physiological fundamental
forces. Tamas-Guna, obtuseness, stupidity, corresponds
to reproductive power; Rajas- Guna, passionateness, to

irritability; and Sattwa-Guna, wisdom and virtue, to sen

sibility.When however they add to this, that Tanias-
Guna the fate of animals, Bajas-Guna the fate of man,
is

and Sattwa-Guna that of the Gods, this is to be taken in a

mythological, rather than physiological sense.
In Chapter 20th of the 2nd Yol. of my chief work en
titled
"

Ob j edification of the Will in the Animal Organism,"

I have likewise treated the argument of the present
chapter therefore I advise my readers to read
;
it after this,
1
as a complement to what is here given.
I may observe, that the passages I have quoted from
pp. 14 and 15 of my Essay on Colours, refer to the first
edition.

1
In my Parerga," 94 of the 2nd vol. (
96 in the 2nd edition)
belongs also to the above.
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY.
from my proposition: that the Will is what
NOW,
Kant calls the thing in itself
" "

or the ultimate
substratum of every phenomenon, I had however not
only deduced that the will is the agent in all inner, un
conscious functions of the body, but also that the organism
itself is nothing but the will which has entered the

region of representation, the will itself, perceived in the

cognitive form of Space. I had accordingly said that, just
as each single momentary act of willing presents itself
at once directly and infallibly in the outer perception of
the body as one of its actions, so also must the collective
2
volition of each animal, the totality of its efforts, be faith-

fully portrayed in its whole body, in the constitution of its

organism; and that the means supplied by its organisa
tion for attaining the aims of its will must as a whole

exactly correspond to those aims in short, that the same

relation must exist between the whole character of its
volition and the shape and nature of its body, as between
each single act of its will and the single bodily action
which carries it out. Even this too has recently been
recognised as a fact, and accordingly been confirmed a
posteriori, by thoughtful zootomists and physiologists from
their own point of view and independently of my doctrine :
their judgments on this point make Nature testify even
here to the truth of my theory.
1 a
Ding an sick, Inlc-griff.
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 253

In Pander and d Alton s admirable illustrated work we

l

find :Just as all that is characteristic in the formation of

"

bones springs from the character of the animals, so does

that character, on the other hand, develop out of their
tendencies and desires. These tendencies and desires
of animals, which are so vividly expressed in their whole
organisation and of which that organisation only appears
to be the medium, cannot be explained by special primary
forces, since we can only deduce their inner reason from
the general life of Nature." By this last turn the author
shows indeed that he has arrived at the point where, like
all other investigators of Nature, he is brought to a stand
still by the metaphysical; but he also shows, that up
to this point beyond which Nature eludes investiga
tion, tendencies and desires (i. e. will) were the utmost
thing knowable. The shortest expression for his last
conclusion about animals would be As they will, so they "

*
are.
The learned and thoughtful Burdach, 2 when treating of
the ultimate reason of the genesis of the embryo in his
great work on Physiology, bears witness no less explicitly
to the truth of my view. I must not, unfortunately, con
ceal the fact that in a weak moment, misled Heaven knows

by what or how, this otherwise excellent man brings in

just here a few sentences taken from that utterly worthless,
tyrannically imposed pseudo-philosophy, about thought
being what is primary (it is just what is last and most
conditioned of all) yet no representation (that is to say,
a wooden iron). Immediately after however, under the
returning influence of his own better self, he proclaims the
real truth (p. 710) The brain curves itself outwards to
:
"

the retina, because the central part .of the embryo desires
1
Pander and d Alton, "

Ueber die Skelette der Eaubtliiere," 1822,

p. 7.
2
Burdach, Pbysiologie," vol. 2, 474.
254) THE WILL IN NATURE.

to take in the impressions of the activity of the world the ;

mucous membrane of the intestinal canal develops into the

lung, because the organic body desires to enter into relation
with the elementary substances of the universe organs of ;

generation spring from the vascular system, because the

individual only lives in the species, and because the life
which has commenced in the individual desires to multiply."
This assertion of Burdach s, which so entirely agrees
with my doctrine, reminds me of a passage in the ancient
Mahabharata, which it is really difficult not to regard as a
mythical version of the same truth. It is in the third
Canto of Sundas and Upasunda in Bopp s Ardschuna s
"
" "

l
Eeise zu Indra s Himmel" (1824); Brahma has just
created Tilottama, the fairest of women, who is walking
round the circle of the assembled gods. Shiva conceives
so violent a longing to gaze at her as she turns successively
round the circle, that four faces arise in him according to
her different positions, that is, according to the four
cardinal points. This may account for Shiva being repre
sented with five heads, as Pansh Mukhti Shiva. Count
on every part of Indra s body likewise
less eyes arise
2
on the same In fact, every organ must be
occasion.
looked upon as the expression of a universal manifes
tation of the will, i.e. of one made once for all, of a
fixed longing, of an act of volition proceeding, not from
1
Bopp, Ardschuna s Keise zu Indra s Himmel, nebst anderen
"

Episoden des Mahabharata (Ardshuna s Journey to Indra s Heaven

"

together with other episodes from the Mahabharata), 1824.

2
The Matsya Parana attributes a similar origin to Brahma s fou
countenances. It relates that, having fallen in love with his daughte
Satarupa, and gazed fixedly at her, she stepped aside to avoid his eye ;
he being ashamed, would not follow her movement 5 whereupon a new
face arose on him directed towards the side where she was and, on her
once more moving, the same thing occurred, and was repeated, until at
last he had four faces. Asiatic Researches," vol. 6, p. 473.) [Add. to
("

3rd ed.]
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 255

the individual, but from the species. Every animal form

is a longing of the will to live which is roused by circum
stances ;
for instance, the will is seized with a longing to
live on trees, to hang on their branches, to devour their
leaves, without contention with other animals and without
ever touching the ground: this longing presents itself
throughout endless time in the form (or Platonic Idea) of
the sloth. It can hardly walk at all, being only adapted
for climbing ; helpless on the ground, it is agile on
trees and looks itself like a moss-clad bough in order to

escape the notice of its pursuers. But now let us consider

the matter from a somewhat more methodical and less
poetical point of view.
The manifest adaptation of each animal for its mode of
lifeand outward means of subsistence, even down to the
smallest detail, together with the exceeding perfection of its
organisation, form abundant material for teleological con
templation, which has always been a favourite occupation
of the human mind, and which, extended even to inanimate
Nature, has become the argument of the Physico-theological
Proof. The universal fitness for their ends, the obviously
intentional design in all the parts of the organism of the
lower animals without exception, proclaim too distinctly
for it ever tohave been seriously questioned, that here no
forces ofNature acting by chance and without plan have
been at work, but a will. Now, that a will should act
otherwise than under the guidance of knowledge was in
conceivable, according to empirical science and views. For,
up to my time, as has been shown in the last chapter, will
and intellect had been regarded as absolutely inseparable,
nay, the will was looked upon as a mere operation of the
intellect, that presumptive basis of all that is spiritual.
Accordingly wherever the will acted, knowledge must have
been its guide; consequently it must have been its guide here
also. But the mediation of knowledge, which, as such, is
256 THE WILL IN NATURE.

exclusively directed towards the outside, brings with it, that

a will acting by means of it, can only act outwardly, that
is, only from one being upon another. Therefore the will,
of which unmistakable traces had been found, was not
sought for where these were discovered, but was removed
to the outside, and the animal became the product of a
will foreign to it, guided by knowledge, which must
have been very clear knowledge indeed, nay, the deeply ex
cogitated conception of a purpose and this purpose must ;

have preceded the animal s existence, and, together with

the will, whose product the animal is, have lain outside that
animal. According to this, the animal would have existed
in representation before existing in reality. This is the
basis of the train of thought on which the Physico-theo-

logical Proof is founded. But this proof is no mere

scholastic sophism, like the Ontological Proof nor does it :

contain an untiring natural opponent within itself, like the

Cosmological Proof, in that very same law of causality to
which it owes its existence. On the contrary, it is, in
l
reality, for the educated, what the Keraunological Proof
2
isfor the vulgar, and its plausibility is so great, so potent,
that the most eminent and at the same time least preju
diced minds have been deeply entangled in it. Voltaire,
for instance, who, after all sorts of other doubts, always
comes back to sees no possibility of getting over it and
it,

even places its evidence almost on a level with that of a

1
I should like under this name to add a fourth to the three proofs

brought forward by Kant, i.e. the proof a terrore, which the ancient
saying of Petronius primus in orbe Decs fecit timer, designates and of
:

which Hume s incomparable

"

Natural History of Religion may be

"

considered as the critique. Understood in this sense, even the theologist

Schleiermacher s attempted proof might have its truth from the feeling
of dependence, though perhaps not exactly that truth which its originator
imagined it to have.
2
Socrates propounded it already in detail in Xenophon. ("
Mem."

i. 4.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]

 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 257

mathematical demonstration. Even Priestley too declares it

to be irrefutable. 1 Hume s reflection and acumen alone stood

the even in this case
in his Dialogues on Natural
"

test, ;

2
which are so well worth reading, this true pre
"

Religion,
cursor of Kant calls attention to the fact, that there is no
resemblance at all between the works of Nature and those
of an Art which proceeds according to a design. Now it
is
precisely where he cuts asunder the nervus probandi of
this extremely insidious proof, as well as that of the two
others in his Critique of Judgment and in his Critique of
Pure Reason that Kant s merit shines most brilliantly.
A very brief summary of this Kantian refutation of the
3
Physico-theological Proof may be found in my chief work.
Kant has earned for himself great merit by it for nothing ;

stands so much in theway of a correct insight into Nature

and into the essence of things as this view, by which they
are looked upon as having been made according to a precon
ceived plan. Therefore, if a Duke of Bridgewater offers
a prize of high value for the confirmation and perpetuation
of such fundamental errors, let it be our task, following in
the footsteps of Hume
and Kant, to work undauntedly at
their destruction, without any other reward than truth.
Truth deserves respect not what : is opposed to it. Never
theless here, as elsewhere, Kant has confined himself to
negation but a negation only takes full effect when it has
;

been completed by a correct affirmation, this alone giving

entire satisfaction and in itself dislodging and superseding
error, according to the words of Spinoza Sicut lux se ipsa :

et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est.

First of all therefore we say the world is not made with
:

the help of knowledge, consequently also not from the out-

"Disqu. on Matter and

1
Priestley, Spirit,"
sect. 16, p. 188.
2 and in other places.
Part 7,
3
See "Die Welt ak W. u. vol.
V." i. p. 597. (Yol. i.
p. 631 of the
3rd ed.)
a
258 THE WILL IN NATURE.

side, but from the inside ;

and next we endeavour to point
l
out the punctum saliens of the world-egg. The physico-
theological thought, that Nature must have been regu
lated and fashioned by an intellect, however well it may
suit the untutored mind, is nevertheless fundamentally

wrong. For the intellect is only known to us in animal

nature, consequently as an absolutely secondary and
subordinate principle in the world, a product of the latest
origin it can never therefore have been the condition of
;

the existence of that world.Now the will on the contrary,

2

being that which fills every thing and manifests itself

immediately in each thus showing each thing to be its
phenomenon appears everywhere as that which is primary.
It is just for this reason, that the explanation of all teleo-

logical facts is to be found in the will of the being itself in

which they are observed.
Besides, the Physico -theological Proof may be simply
invalidated by the empirical observation, that works pro
duced by animal instinct, such as the spider s web, the bee s
honeycomb and its cells, the white ant s constructions, &c,
&c., are throughout constituted as if they were the result
of an intentional conception, of a wide-reaching providence
and of rational deliberation; whereas they are evidently
the work of a blind impulse, i.e. of a will not guided by
knowledge. From this it follows, that the conclusion from
such and such a nature to such and such a mode of coming
into being, has not the same certainty as the conclusion
from a consequent to its reason, which is in all cases a
sure one. I have devoted the twenty- seventh chapter of the
second volume of my chief work to a detailed consideration

1
The point at which the life -spark is kindled. [Tr.]
8
Nor can a mundus tntelligibilis precede a mundus sensibilis; since it

receives its material from the latter alone. an intellect which

It is not
has brought forth Nature j
it is, on the contrary, Nature which has
brought forth the intellect. [Add. to 3rd ed.
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 259

of the mechanical instincts of animals, which may be used,

together with the preceding one on Teleology, to complete
the whole examination of this subject in the present chapter.
Now, if we enter more closely into the above-mentioned
fitness of every animal s organisation for its mode of life
and means of subsistence, the question that first presents
itself is, whether that mode of life has been adapted to the
organisation, or vice versa. At first sight, the former as
sumption would seem to be the more correct one ; since,
in Time, the organisation precedes the mode of life, and
the animal is thought to have adopted the mode of
existence for which its structure was best suited, making
the best use of the organs it found within itself thus, for :

instance, we think that the bird flies because it has wings,

and that the ox butts because it has horns ;
not conversely.
This view is shared by Lucretius (always an ominous sign
for an opinion) :

"

Nil ideo quoniam natum est in corpore, ut uti

l
Possemus ; sed, quod natum est, id procreat us urn."

Only this assumption does not explain how, collectively, the

quite different parts of an animal s organism so exactly

correspond to its way of lif e ; how no organ interferes with
another, each rather assisting the others and none re
maining unemployed; also that no subordinate organ
would be better suited to another mode of existence, while
the life which the animal really leads is determined by the
principal organs alone, but, on the contrary, each part of
the animal not only corresponds to every other part, but
also to its mode of life: its claws, for instance, are in
variably adapted for seizing the prey which its teeth are
suited to tear and break, and its intestinal canal to digest :

its limbs are constructed to convey it where that prey is to

be found, and no organ ever remains unemployed. The

1
This is
expanded, vol. iy. pp. 825-843.
260 THE WILL IN NATURE.

ant-bear, for instance, is not only armed with long claws

on its fore-feet, in order to break into the nests of the

white ant, but also with a prolonged cylindrical muzzle,

in order to penetrate into them, with a small mouth and a

long, threadlike tongue, covered with a glutinous slime,

which it inserts into the white ants nests and then with
draws covered with the insects that adhere to it on the :

other hand it has no teeth, because it does not want them.

Who can fail to see s form stands in the
that the ant-bear
same an act of the will to its
relation to the white ants, as
motive ? The contradiction between the powerful fore-feet
and long, strong, curved claws of the ant-bear and its com
plete lack of teeth, is at the same time so extraordinary,
that if the earth ever undergoes a fresh transformation,
the newly arising race of rational beings will find it an
insoluble enigma, if white ants are unknown to them.
The necks of birds, as of quadrupeds, are generally as
long as their legs, to enable them to reach down to the
ground where they pick up their food but those of aquatic
;

birds are often a good deal longer, because they have to

fetch up their nourishment from under the water while
1
swimming. Moor-fowl have exceedingly long legs, to
enable them to wade without drowning or wetting their
bodies, and a correspondingly long neck and beak, this last
being more or less strong, according to the things (reptiles,
fishes or worms) which have to be crushed ;
and the
intestines of these animals are invariably adapted likewise
to this end. On the other hand, moor-fowl are provided
neither with talons, like birds of prey, nor with web-feet,

1
I have seen (Zooplast. Cab. I860) a humming-bird (colibri) with a
beak as long as the whole bird, head and tail included. This bird must
certainly have had to fetch out its food from a considerable depth, were
it only from the calyx of a flower (Cuvier, "Anat. Comp." vol. iv.

p. 374) otherwise it would not have given itself the luxury, or submitted
;

to the encumbrance, of such a beak.

 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 261

like ducksfor the lex parsimonice natures admits of no

:

superfluous organ. Now, it is precisely this very law,

added to the circumstance, that no organ required for its
mode of life is ever wanting in any animal, and that
all,even the most heterogeneous, harmonize together and
are, as it were, calculated for a quite specially determined

way of life, for the element in which the prey dwells, for
the pursuit, the overcoming, the crushing and digesting of
that prey, all this, we say, proves, that the animal s
structure has been determined by the mode of life by
which the animal desired to find its sustenance, and not
vice versa. It also proves, that the result is exactly the
same as if a knowledge of that mode of life and of its
outward conditions had preceded the structure, and as if
therefore each animal had chosen its equipment before it
assumed a body; just as a sportsman before starting
chooses his whole equipment, gun, powder, shot, pouch,
hunting-knife and dress, according to the game he intends
chasing. The latter does not take aim at the wild boar
because he happens to have a rifle he took the rifle with
:

him and not a fowling-piece, because he intended to hunt

the wild boar and the ox does not butt because it happens
;

to have horns: it has horns because it intends to butt.

Now, to render this proof complete, we have the additional
circumstance, that in many animals, during the time they
are growing, the effort of the will to which a limb is
destined to minister, manifests itself before the existence
of the limb itself, its employment thus anticipating its
existence. Young he-goats, rams, calves, for instance,
butt with their bare polls before they have any horns ;

the young boar tries to gore on either side, before its

tusks are fully developed which would respond to the
intended effect, while on the other hand, it neglects to use
the smaller teeth it already has in its mouth and with
which it might really bite. Thus its mode of defending
262 THE WILL IN NATURE.

itselfdoes not adapt itself to the existing weapons, but

1
vice versa. This had already been noticed by Galenas
2
and by Lucretius before him. All these circumstances
give us complete certainty, that the will does not, as a
supplementary thing proceeding from the intellect, employ
those instruments which it may happen to find, or use the
parts because just they and no others chance to be there ;

but that what is primary and original, is the endeavour to

live in this particularway, to contend in this manner, an
endeavour which manifests itself not only in the employ
ment, but even in the existence of the weapon so much :

so indeed, that the use of the weapon frequently precedes

its existence, thus denoting that it is the weapon which

arises out of the existence of the endeavour, not, con

versely, the desire to use it out of the existence of the

weapon. Aristotle expressed this long ago, when he said,
3
with reference to insects armed with stings : Sia. TO Qvnov
t\eiv oir\ov t
^a (quia, iram Jiabent, arma habent), and further
*
on, generally speaking : Ta tT opyava TT^OQ TO epyov / 0vVtc
TToiel, aXX ov TO tpyov ir/oog TO. ooyava. (Natura enim instru-

inenta ad qfficium, non officium ad instrumenta accommodaf).

From which it follows, that the structure of each animal
is adapted to its will.
upon thoughtful zoologists and
This truth forces itself
zootomists with such cogency, that unless their mind is at
the same time purified by a deeper philosophy, it may lead
them into strange errors. Now this actually happened to
a very eminent zoologist, the immortal De Lamarck, who
has acquired everlasting fame by his discovery of the clas-

1
Galenus,
"

De Usu Partium Anim.," i. 1.

2
Lucretius, pp. 1032-1039.
v.
3
Aristot., "De Part. Animal.," 6 They have a weapon because
"

iv. :

they have passion." [Tr.]

4
Ibid. c. 12 : "Nature makes the tools for the work, not the work
for the tools."
[Tr.]
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 263

sification of animals in vertebrata and non-vertebrata, so

admirable in depth of view. For he quite seriously main
x
tains and tries to prove at length, that the shape of each
animal species, the weapons peculiar to it, and its organs
of every sort destined for outward use, were by no means

present at the origin of that species, but have on the

contrary come into being gradually in the course of time
and through continued generation, in consequence of the
exertions of the animal s will, evoked by the nature
of its position and surroundings, through its own re

peated efforts and the habits to which these gave rise.

Aquatic birds and mammalia that swim, he says, have
only become web-footed through stretching their toes
asunder in swimming moor-fowl acquired their long legs
;

and necks by wading; horned cattle only gradually acquired

horns because as they had no proper teeth for combating,
they fought with their heads, and this combative propen
sity in course of time produced horns or antlers
the snail ;

was originally, like other mollusca, without feelers but ;

out of the desire to feel the objects lying before it, these
gradually arose the whole feline species acquired claws
;

only in course of time, from their desire to tear the flesh

of their prey, and the moveable coverings of those claws,
from the necessity of protecting them in walking without
being prevented from using them when they wished the ;

the barren, grassless African deserts, being re

giraffe, in
duced for its food to the leaves of lofty trees, stretched
out neck and forelegs until at last it acquired its sin
its

gular shape, with a height in front of twenty feet, and thus

De Lamarck goes on describing a multitude of animal
species as arising according to the same principle, in doing
which he overlooks the obvious objection which may be
made, that long before the organs necessary for its preser-
1
De Lamarck, Philosophie Zoologique," vol. c. 7, and Histoire
"

i.
"

Naturelle des Auimaux sans Vertebres," vol. i. Introd. pp. 180-212.

264 THE WILL IN NATURE.

vation could have been produced by means of such endea

vours as these through countless generations, the whole
species must have died out from the want of them. To
such a degree may we be blinded by a hypothesis which
has once laid hold of us Nevertheless in this instance the
!

hypothesis arose out of a very correct and profound view

of Nature : it is an error of genius, which in spite of all
the absurdity it contains, still does honour to its originator.
The true part of it belongs to De Lamarck, as an investi
gator of Nature he saw rightly that the primary element
;

which has determined the animal s organisation, is the will

of that animal itself. The false part must be laid to the
account of the backward state of Metaphysics in France,
where the views of Locke and of his feeble follower, Con-
dillac, in fact still hold their ground and therefore bodies
are held to be things in themselves, Time and Space quali
ties of things in themselves and where the great doctrine
;

of the Ideal nature of Space and of Time and of all that

is represented in them, which has been so
extremely fertile
in its results, has not yet penetrated. De Lamarck there
fore could not conceive his construction of living beings
otherwise than in Time, through succession. Errors of
this sort, as well as the gross, absurd, atomic theory of the
French and the edifying physico-theological considerations
of the English, have been banished for ever from Germany

by Kant s profound influence. So salutary was the effect

produced by this great mind, even upon a nation capable of

subsequently forsaking him to run after charlatanism and

empty bombast. But the thought could never enter into
De Lamarck s head, that the animal s will, as a thing in
itself, might lie outside Time, and in this sense be prior to
the animal itself. Therefore he assumes the animal to
have first been without any clearly defined organs, but also
without any clearly defined tendencies, and to have been
equipped only with perception. Through this it learns to
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 265

know the circumstances in which it has to live and from

that knowledge arise its desires, i.e. its will, from which
again spring its organs or definite embodiment this last ;

indeed with the help of generation and therefore in bound

less Time. If De Lamarck had had the courage to carry
out his theory fully, he ought to have assumed a primary
l
animal which, to be consistent, must have originally had
neither shape nor organs, and then proceeded to trans
form itself according to climate and local conditions into
myriads of animal shapes of all sorts, from the gnat to
the elephant. But this primary animal is in truth the
will to live ; as such however, it is metaphysical, not phy
sical. Most certainly the shape and organisation of each
animal species has been determined by its own will accord
ing to the circumstances in which it wished to live not ;

however as a thing physical in Time, but on the contrary

as a thing metaphysical outside Time. The will did not
proceed from the intellect, nor did the intellect exist,
together with the animal, before the will made its appear
ance as a mere accident, a secondary, or rather tertiary,
thing. It is on the contrary the will which is the prius,
the thing in itself its phenomenon (mere representation
:

in the cognitive intellect and its forms of Space and Time)

is the animal, fully equipped with all its organs which
represent the will to live in those particular circumstances.
Among these organs is the intellect also knowledge itself
which, like the rest of those organs, is exactly adapted to
the mode of life of each animal; whereas, according to
De Lamarck, it is the will which arises out of
knowledge.
Behold the countless varieties of animal shapes how en ;

tirely is each of them the mere image of its volition, the

evident expression of the strivings of the will which con
stitute its character ! Their difference in shape is
only the
portrait of their difference in character. Ferocious animals,
1
Urthier.
266 THE WILL IN NATURE.

destined for combat and rapine, appear armed with for

midable teeth and claws and strong muscles their sight ;

is adapted for great distances, especially when they have

to mark their prey from a dizzy height, as is the case with

eagles and condors. Timid animals, whose will it is to

seek their safety in flight instead of contest, present them
selves with light, nimble legs and sharp hearing in lieu of
all weapons ;
a circumstance which has even necessitated a
etr iking prolongation of the outer ear in the most timid of
them all, the hare. The interior corresponds to the exte
rior : carnivorous animals have short intestines herbivo ;

rous animals long ones, suited to a protracted assimilation.

Yigorous respiration and rapid circulation of the blood,
represented by appropriate organs, always accompany
great muscular strength and irritability as their necessary
conditions, and nowhere is contradiction possible. Each
particular striving of the will presents itself in a particular
modification of shape. The abode of the prey therefore
has determined the shape of its pursuer : if that prey takes
refuge in regions difficult of access, in remote hiding
places, in night or darkness, the pursuer assumes the form
best suited to those circumstances, and no shape is rejected
as too grotesque by the will to live, in order to attain its
ends. The with
cross-bill (loxia curvirostra) presents itself
this abnormal form of organ of nutrition, in order to
its

be able to extract the seeds out of the scales of the fir

cone. Moor-fowls appear equipped with extra long legs,
extra long necks and extra long beaks, in short, the
strangest shapes, in order to seek out reptiles in their
marshes. Then we have the ant-bear with its body four
feet long, its short legs, its strong claws, and its long,
narrow, toothless muzzle provided with a threadlike, gluti
nous tongue for the purpose of digging out the white ants
from their nests. The pelican goes fishing with a huge
pouch under its beak in which to pack its fish, when
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 267

caught. In order to surprise their prey while asleep in

the night, owls fly out provided with enormous pupils
which enable them to see in the dark, and with very soft
feathers to their flight noiseless and thus permit
make
them unawares upon their sleeping prey without
to fall

awakening it by their movements. Silurus, gymnotus and

torpedo bring a complete electric apparatus into the world
with them, in order to stun their prey before they can
reach it and also as a defence against their own pursuers.
;

For wherever anything living breathed, there immediately

1
came another to devour it, and every animal is in a way
designed and calculated throughout, down to the minutest
detail, for the purpose of destroying some other animal.
Ichneumons, for instance, among insects, lay their eggs in
the bodies of certain caterpillars and similar larvce, in
which they bore holes with their stings, in order to ensure
nourishment for their future brood. Now those kinds which
feed on larvce that crawl about freely, have short stings not
more than about one-third of an inch long, whereas pimpla
manifestator, which feeds upon chelostoma maxillosa, whose
hidden in old trees at great depth and are not
larvce lie

it, has a sting two inches long

accessible to and the sting ;

of the ichneumon strobillce which lays its eggs in larvcp,

dwelling in fir-cones, is nearly as long. With these stings

they penetrate to the larva in which they bore a hole
and deposit one egg, whose product subsequently de-
1
Animated by the feeling of this truth, Kobert Owen, after passing
in review the numerous and often very large Australian fossile marsupi-
alia sometimes as big as the rhinoceros came as early as 1842 to the
conclusion, that a large beast of prey must have contemporaneously
existed. This conclusion was afterwards confirmed, for in 1846 he
received part of the fossile skull of a beast of prey of the size of the lion,
which he named thylacoleo, i.e. lion with a pouch, since it is also a
Times of the 19th of 1866, where there
"

(See the
"

marsupial. May,
is an article on "

Palaeontology," with an account of Owen s lecture

at the Government School of Mines. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
268 THE WILL IN NATURE.
1
vours this larva. Just as clearly does the will to escape
their enemies manifest itself in the defensive equipment
of animals that are the objects of pursuit. Hedgehogs
and porcupines raise up a forest of spears; armadillos,
scaly ant-eaters and tortoises appear cased from head to
foot in armour which is inaccessible to tooth, beak or
claw ;
and so it is, on a smaller scale, with the whole class
of Crustacea. Others again seek protection by deceiving
their pursuers rather than by resisting them physically:
thus the sepia has provided itself with materials for
surrounding itself with a dark cloud on the approach of
danger. The sloth is deceptively like its moss-clad bough,
and the frog its leaf; and many insects resemble their
2
dwelling-places. The negro s louse is black; so, to be
sure, is our flea also ;
but the
latter, in providing itself
with an extremely powerful apparatus for making irregular
jumps to a considerable distance, trusted to these for pro
tection. We can however make the anticipation in all

these arrangements more intelligible to ourselves by the

same anticipation which shows itself in the mechanical
instincts of animals. Neither the young spider nor the
ant-lion know the prey for which they lay traps, when
they do it for the first time. And it is the same when
they are on the defensive. According to Latreille, the
insect bombex kills the parnope with its sting, although it
neither eats it nor is attacked by it, simply because the
parnope will lay its eggs in the bombex*s nest, and by
doing this will interfere with the development of its eggs ;
yet it does not know this. Anticipations of this kind once
more confirm the ideal nature of Time, which indeed
always becomes manifest as soon as the will as thing
1
Kirby and Spence, "Introduction to Entomology," vol. i.
p. 355.

[Add. to 3rd ed.]

2
Blumenbach, "De hum. gen. variet. nat."
p. 50. Sommeriog,
On the Negro," p. 8.
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 269

in itselfis in question. Not only with" respect to the

points here mentioned, but to many others besides, the
mechanical instincts and physiological functions of animals
serve to explain each other mutually, because the will
without knowledge is the agent in both.
As the will has equipped itself with every organ and
every weapon, offensive as well as defensive, so has it like
wise provided itself in every animal shape with an intellect,
as a means of preservation for the individual and the

species. It was precisely in this account that the ancients

called the intellect the ^yf/zovt/coV, i.e. the guide and leader.

Accordingly the intellect, being exclusively destined to

serve the will, always exactly corresponds to it. Beasts
of prey stood in greater need of intellect, and in fact
have more intelligence, than herbivorous animals. The
elephant certainly forms an exception, and so does even
the horse to a certain extent but the admirable in
;

telligence of the elephant was necessary on account of the

length of its life (200 years) and of the scantiness of its
progeny, which obliged it to provide for a longer and surer
preservation of the individual and this moreover in coun
:

triesteeming with the most rapacious, the strongest and

the nimblest beasts of prey. The horse too has a longer life

|
and a scantier progeny than the ruminants, and as it has
neither horns, tusks, trunk, nor indeed any weapon save

perhaps its hoofs, it needed greater intelligence and swift

ness in order to elude pursuit. Monkeys needed their extra

ordinary intelligence, partly because of the length of their

which even in the moderate-sized animal extends to
life,

fifty years partly also because of their scanty progeny,

;

which is limited to one at a time, but especially because of

their hands, which, to be properly used, required the direc

tion of an understanding. For monkeys depend upon
their hands, not only for their defence by means of outer

weapons such as sticks and stones, but also for their

270 THE WILL IN KATUBE.

nourishment, this last necessitating a variety of artificial

means and a social and artificial system of rapine in general,
the passing from hand to hand of stolen fruit, the placing
of sentinels, &c. &c. Add to this, that it is especially in
their youth, before they have attained their full muscular

development, that this intelligence is most prominent. In

the pongo or ourang-outang for instance, the brain plays
a far more important part and the understanding is much
greater during its youth than at its maturity, when the
muscular powers having attained full development, they
take the place of the proportionately declining intellect.
This holds good of all sorts of monkeys, so that here there
fore the intellect acts for a time vicariously for the yet un

developed muscular strength. We

find this process dis
cussed at length in the "

Eesume des Observations de Fr.

Cuvier sur 1 instinct et intelligence des animaux," par
1

Mourens (1841), from which I have quoted the whole pas

sage referring to this question in the second volume of my
chief work, at the end of the thirty-first chapter, and this is

my only reason for not repeating it here. On the whole, intel

ligence gradually increases from the rodents x to the rumi
nants, from the ruminants to the pachyderms, and from
these again to the beasts of prey and finally to the quad-
rumana, and anatomy shows a gradual development of the

1
That the lowest place should be given to the rodents, seems however
to proceed from & priori rather than from & posteriori considerations :
that is to say, from the circumstance, that their brain has extremely
faint or small convolutions ; so that too much weight may have been

given to this point. In sheep and calves the convolutions

are numerous
and deep, yet how is it with their intelligence ? The mechanical instincts
of the beaver are again greatly assisted by its understanding, and even
rabbits show remarkable intelligence (see Leroy s beautiful work :
[

"Letters Intelligence des Animaux," lettre 3, p.J

Philosophiques sur 1

149). Even rats give proof of quite uncommon intelligence, of which

some remarkable instances may be found in the Quarterly RerieWjH
"

No. 201, Jan.-March, 1857, in a special article entitled

"

Rats."
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 271

brain in similar order which corresponds to this result of

external observation. (According to Flourens and Fr.
l
Cuvier.) Among the reptiles, serpents are the most intelli
gent, for they may even be trained this is so, because they
;

are beasts of prey and propagate more slowly than the rest
especially the venomous ones. And here also, as with the
physical weapons, we find the will everywhere as the prius ;
its equipment, the intellect, as the posterius. Beasts of prey

do not hunt, nor do foxes thieve, because they have more

intelligence on the contrary, they have more intelligence,
;

just as they have stronger teeth and claws too, because

they wished to live by hunting and thieving. The fox even
made up at once for his inferiority in muscular power and
strength of teeth by the extraordinary subtility of his un
derstanding. Our thesis is singularly illustrated by the case
of the bird dodo or dronte (didus ineptus) on the island
of Mauritius, whose species, it is well known, has died out,
and which, as its Latin name denotes, was exceedingly
stupid, and this explains its disappearance ;
so that here
it seems indeed as Nature had for once gone too far
if

in her lex parsimonice and thereby in a sense brought

forth an abortion in the species, as she so often does in the
individual, which was unable to subsist, precisely because
it was an abortion. If, on this occasion, anyone were to
raise the question as to whether Nature ought not to have

provided insects with at least sufficient intelligence to pre

vent them from flying into the flame of a candle, our
answer would be most certainly only she did not know
:
;

that men would make candles and light them, and natura
nihil agit frustra. Insect intelligence is therefore only in
2
sufficient where the surroundings are artificial.

1
The most intelligent birds are also birds of prey, wherefore many ot
them,especially falcons, are highly susceptible of training. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
a
That the negroes should have become the special victims of the
slave-trade, is evidently a consequence of the inferiority of their intelli
 272 THE WILL IN NATURE.

Everywhere indeed intelligence depends in the first in

stance upon the cerebral system, and this stands in a ne
cessary relation to the rest of the organism therefore cold ;

blooded animals are greatly inferior to warm-blooded ones,

and invertebrate animals to vertebrata. But the organism is
precisely nothing but the will become visible, to which, as
that which is absolutely prius, everything constantly refers.
The needs and aims of that will give in each phenomenon
the rule for the means to be employed, and these means
must harmonize with one another. Plants have no self-
consciousness because they have no power of locomotion ;
for ofwhat use would self-consciousness be to them unless
it enabled them to seek what was salutary and flee what
was noxious to them And
conversely, of what use could
?

power of locomotion be to them, as they have no self-con

sciousness with which to guide it. The inseparable duality
of Sensibility and Irritability does not yet appear there
fore in the plant they continue slumbering in the repro
;

ductive force which is their fundament, and in which alone

the will here objectifies itself. The sun-flower, and every
other plant, wills for light but as yet their movement to
;

wards light is not separate from their apprehension of it,

and both coincide with their growth. Human understand
ing, which is so superior to that of all other beings, and is
assisted by Eeason (the faculty for non-perceptible repre
sentations, i.e. for conceptions
reflection, thinking faculty),
;

is nevertheless only just proportionate, partly to Man s

requirements, which greatly surpass those of animals and
multiply to infinity ; partly to his entire lack of all natural
weapons and covering, and to his relatively weaker mus
cular strength, which is greatly inferior to that of monkeys
l
of his own size lastly also, to the slowness with which his
;

gence compared with that of other human races j though this by no means
[Add. to 3rd ed.]
justifies the fact.
1
As is likewise his capacity for escaping from his pursuers ;
fbr in
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 273

race multiplies and the length of his childhood and life,

which demand secure preservation of the individual. All
these great requirements had to be satisfied by means of
intellectual powers, which, for this reason, predominate in
him. But we find the intellect secondary and subordinate
everywhere, and destined exclusively to serve the purposes
of the will. As a rule too, it always remains true to its
destiny and subservient to the will. How nevertheless,
it frees itself in particular instances from this bondage

through an abnormal preponderance of cerebral life, whereby

purely objective cognition becomes possible which may be
enhanced to genius, I have shown at length in the aesthetic
1
part of my chief work.
Now, after all these reflections upon the precise agree
ment between the will and the organisation of each animal,
if we
inspect a well-arranged osteological collection from
this point of view, it will certainly seem to us as if we
saw one and the same being (De Lamarck s primary
animal, or, more properly, the will to live) changing its
shape according to circumstances, and thus producing all
this multiplicity of forms out of the same number and

arrangement of its bones, by prolonging and curtailing,

strengthening and weakening them. This number and
arrangement of the bones, which Geoffrey de St. Hilaire 2
called the anatomical element, continues, as he has tho

roughly shown, in all essential points unchanged: it

is a constant magnitude, something which is absolutely
given beforehand, irrevocably fixed by an unfathomable
necessity an immutability which I should compare with
the permanence of matter in all physical and chemical

this respect all the four-footed mammalia surpass him. [Add. to

3rd ed.]
1
[See Third Book of the W. a. W. u. V. ; later also, in my
"

Parerga,"

vol. ii. 50-57 and 206. ( 51-58, and 210 of the 2nd edition.)
2
Principes de Philosophic 1830.
"

Zoologique,"

T
274 THE WILL IN NATURE.

changes : but to this I shall soon return. Conjointly with

this immutability of the anatomical element, we have the

greatest susceptibility to modification, the greatest plas

ticity and flexibility of these same bones with reference
to size, shape and adaptation to different purposes, all
which we see determined by the will with primary
strength and freedom according to the aims prescribed
to it by external circumstances: it makes out of these
materials whatever its necessity for the time being
requires.
If it desires to climb about in trees, it catches at the

boughs at once with four hands, while it stretches the ulua

and radius to an excessive length and immediately prolongs
the os coccygis to a curly tail, a yard long, in order to hang
by it to the boughs and swing itself from one branch to
another. If, on the other hand, it desires to crawl in the
mud as a crocodile, to swim
as a seal, or to burrow as a
mole, these same arm-bones are shortened till they are no
longer recognisable in the last case the metacarpus and
;

phalanges are enlarged to disproportionately large shovel-

paws, to the prejudice of the other bones. But if it wishes
to fly through the air as a bat, not only are the os humeri,
radius and alnus prolonged in an incredible manner, but
the usually small and subordinate carpus, metacarpus and
2^halanges digitorum expand to an immense length, as in
St. Anthony outmeasuring the length of the
s vision,
animal s body, in order to spread out the wing-membrane.
If, in order to browse upon the tops of very tall African
a giraffe, placed itself upon extraordinarily
trees, it has, as

high fore-legs, the same seven vertebra? of the neck, which

never vary as to number and which, in the mole, were con
tracted so as to be no longer recognisable, are now pro
longed to such a degree, that here, as everywhere else, the
neck acquires the same length as the fore-legs, in order to
enable the head to reach down to drinking-water. But where,
as is the case when it appears as the elephant, a long neck
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 275

could not have borne the weight of the enormous, unwieldy

head a weight increased moreover by tusks a yard long
the neck remains short, as an exception, and a trunk
is let down as an expedient, to lift up food and draw
water from below and also to reach up to the tops of
trees. In accordance with these transformations, we see
in all of them the skull, the receptacle containing the
understanding, at the same time proportionately expand,
develop, curve itself, as the mode of procuring nourish
ment becomes more or less difficult and requires more
or less intelligence and the different degrees of the under
;

standing manifest themselves clearly to the practised eye

in the curves of the skull.
Now, in all this, that anatomical element we have men
tioned above as fixed and invariable, certainly remains in
so far an enigma, as it does not come within the teleolo-

gical explanation, which only begins after the assump

tion of that element ; since the intended organ might
in many cases have been rendered equally suitable for its
purpose even with a different number and disposition of
bones. It is easy to understand, for instance, why the
human skull should be formed out of eight bones: that
is, to enable them to be drawn together by the fontanels

during birth but we do not see why a chicken which

;

breaks through its egg-shell should necessarily have the

same number of skull-bones. We must therefore assume
this anatomical element to be based, partly on the unity
and identity of the will to live in general, partly on the
circumstance, that the archetypal forms of animals have
1
proceeded one from the other, wherefore the fundamental
type of the whole race was preserved. It is this ana
tomical element which Aristotle means by his dvceyxata
and the mutability of its shapes according to diffe-

1 "

Parerga," vol. ii. 91 ;

93 of the 2nd edition.
276 THE WILL IN NATURE.

rent purposes lie calls TJJV /caret \6yov fyvai*? and explains
by it how the material for upper incisors has been employed

for horns in horned cattle. Quite rightly : since the only

ruminants which have no horns, the camel and the musk-
ox, have upper incisors, and these are wanting in all
horned ruminants.
No other explanation or assumption enables us nearly as
well to understand either the complete suitableness to

purpose and to the external conditions of existence I have

here shown in the skeleton, or the admirable harmony and
fitness of internal mechanism in the structure of each.
animal, as the truth I have elsewhere firmly established :

that the body of an animal is precisely nothing but the will

itself ofthat animal brought to cerebral perception as

representation through the forms of Space, Time and

Causality in other words, the mere visibility, objectivity
of the Will. For, if this is once pre-supposed, everything
in and belonging to that body must conspire towards the
final end : the life of this animal. Nothing superfluous,
nothing nothing inappropriate, nothing insuffi
deficient,
cient or incomplete of its kind, can therefore be found in
it on the contrary, all that is required must be there,
;

and just in the proportion needed, never more. For

here artist, work and materials are one and the same.
Each organism is therefore a consummate master-piece of
exceeding perfection. Here the will did not first cherish
the intention, first recognise the end and then adapt the
means to it and conquer the material its willing was ;

rather immediately the aim and immediately the attain

ment of that aim; no foreign appliances needing to be
overcome were wanted willing, doing and attaining were
here one and the same. Thus the organism presents itself
as a miracle which admits of no comparison with any work

1
See Aristotle, "

De Partibus Animalium," iii. c, 2 sub fin&m : irwg

t
T~IC avayKdiaQ (pvaewg K. T, X.
 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 277

of human artifice wrought by the lamplight of know

1
ledge.
Our admiration for the consummate perfection and fit

ness for their ends in all the works of Nature, is at the

bottom based upon our viewing them in the same light as
we do our own works. In these, in the first place, the will
to do the work and the work are two different things ;

then again two other things between these two firstly, lie :

the medium of representation, which, taken by itself, is

foreign to the will, through which the will must pass
before it realizes itself here; and secondly the material

foreign to the will here at work, on which a form foreign

to it has to be forced, which it resists, because the
material already belongs to another will, that is to say,
to its own nature, its forma substantialis, the (Platonic)
idea,expressed by it therefore this material has first
:

to be overcome, and however deeply the artificial form

may have penetrated, will always continue inwardly resist-

1
The appearance of every animal therefore presents a totality, a

unity, a perfection and a rigidly carried out harmony in all its parts
which is so entirely based upon a single fundamental thought, that even
the strangest animal shape seems to the attentive observer as if it were
the only right, nay, only possible form of existence, and as if there
could be no other than just this very one. The expression
"

natural "

used to denote that a thing is a matter of course, and that it cannot be

otherwise, is in its deepest foundation based upon this. Gothe himself
was struck by this unity when contemplating whelks and crabs at Venice,
and it caused him to exclaim :
"

How delightful, how glorious is a living

thing ! how well adapted for its condition ;
how true, how real !
"

(" Life,"
vol. iv. p. 223). No artist therefore, who has not made it bis
business to study such forms for years and to penetrate into their meaning
and comprehension, can rightly imitate them. Without this study his
work will seem as if it were pasted together the parts no doubt will be
:

there, but the bond which unites them and gives them cohesion, the
spirit, the idea, which is the objectivity of the primary act of the will

presenting itself as this or that particular species, will be wanting.

[Add. to 3rd ed.]
278 THE WILL IN NATURE.

ing. It is quite a different thing with Nature s works,

which are not, like our own, indirect, but on the contrary,
direct manifestations of the will. Here the will acts in its

primordial nature, that is, unconsciously. No mediating

representation here separates the will and the work they :

are one. And even the material is one with them : for
matter is the mere visibility of the will. Therefore here
we find Matter completely permeated by Form ; or, better

they are of quite the

still, same origin, only existing
mutually one for the other and in so far they are ;

one. That we separate them in works of Nature as

well as in works of Art, is a mere abstraction. Pure
Matter, absolutely without Form or quality, which we
think as the material of a product of Nature, is merely
an ens rationis and cannot enter into any experience;
whereas the material of a work of Art is empirical
Matter, consequently already has a Form. The [distinc
tive] character of Nature s products is the identity of
form
and substance; that of products of Art the diversity of
1
these two. It is because Matter is the mere visibility of
Form in Nature s products, that, even empirically, we see
Form appear as a mere production of Matter, bursting
forth from, its inside in crystallisation, in vegetable and
animal generatio cequivoca, which last cannot be doubted,
2
at any rate in the epizoa. For this reason we may even
assume that nowhere, either on any planet or satellite, will
Matter come to a state of endless repose, but rather that
1
It is a great truth which Bruno expresses De Immense et Innu- ("

merabili," 8, 10) Ars tractat materiam alienam : natura materiam

:
"

propriam. Ars circa materiam est ; natura interior matcrics" He treats

ts
this subject much more fully, Delia Causa," Dial. 3, p. 252 et seqq. Page
255 he declares the forma substantiate to be the form of every product

of Nature, which is the same as the soul. [Add. to 3rd ed.]

a
Thus the saying of the Schoolmen Materia appetit
"

is verified :

formam." See "

Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. ii.

p. 352.

[Add. to 3rd ed.]

 COMPARATIVE ANATOMY. 279

(i.e. the will, whose mere visibility

inherent forces
its it

is) willalways put an end again to the repose which has

commenced, always awaking again from their sleep, to
resume their activity as mechanical, physical, chemical,
organic forces since at all times they only wait for the
;

opportunity to do so.

But if we want to understand Nature s proceeding, we

must not try to do it by comparing her works with our
own. The real essence of every animal form, is an act of
the will outside representation, consequently outside its
forms of Space and Time also; which act, just on that
account, knows neither sequence nor juxtaposition, but has,
on the contrary, the most indivisible unity. But when our
cerebral perception comprehends that form, and still more
when its inside is dissected by the anatomical knife, then

that which originally and in itself was foreign to know

ledge and its laws, is brought under the light of know
ledge but then also, it has to present itself in conformity
;

with the laws and forms of knowledge. The original unity

and indivisibility of that act of the will, of that truly
metaphysical being, then appears divided into parts lying
side by side and functions following one upon another,
which all nevertheless present themselves as connected to
gether in closest relationship one to another for mutual
help and support, as means and ends one to the other.
The understanding, in thus apprehending these things, now
perceives the original unity re-establishing itself
out of a mul

tiplicity which its own form of knowledge

had first brought
about, and involuntarily taking for granted that its own
way of perceiving this is the way in which this animal form
comes into being, it is now struck with admiration for the
profound wisdom with which those parts are arranged,
those functions combined. This is the meaning of Kant s
great doctrine, that Teleology is brought into Nature by
our own understanding, which accordingly wonders at a
280 THE WILL IN NATURE.
1
miracle of its own creation. If I may use a trivial simile
to elucidate so sublime a matter, this astonishment very
much resembles that of our understanding when it discovers
that multiples of 9, when their single figures are added
all

together, give as their product either the number 9 or one

whose single figures again make 9 yet it is that very ;

understanding itself which has prepared for itself this sur

prise in the decimal system. According to the Physico-
theological argument, the actual existence of the world has
been preceded by its existence in an intellect if the world :

is designed for an end, it must have existed as representa

tion before it came into being. Now I say, on the con

trary, in Kant s sense if the world is to be representation,
:

it must present itself as designed for an end; and this

only takes place in an intellect.
It undoubtedly follows from my doctrine, that every
being is its own work. Nature, which isincapable of false
hood and is as native as genius, asserts the same thing down
right since each being merely kindles the spark of life at
;

another exactly similar being, and then makes itself before

our eyes, taking the materials for this from outside, form
and movement from its own self: this process we call
growth and development. Thus, even empirically, each
being stands before us as its own work. But Nature s
language is not understood because it is too simple.
1
Compare
"

Die Welt a. W. u. V." 3rd edition, vol. II. p. 375.

[Add. to 3rd edj

 PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS.

corroborations I am now about to bring forward

THE of the phenomenon of the will in plants, proceed

chiefly from French sources, from

a nation whose tenden
cies are decidedly empirical and which is reluctant to

go a step beyond what is immediately given. The infor

mant moreover is Cuvier, whose rigid adherence to the
purely empirical gave rise to the famous dispute between
him and Geoffroy de St. Hilaire. So we must not be as
tonished if the language we meet with here is less decided
than in the preceding German corroborations and if we find
each concession made with cautious reserve.
In his "Histoire des Progres des Sciences Naturelles
l

depuis 1789 jusqu a ce jour," Cuvier says Plants have

:
"

certain apparently spontaneous movements, which they

show under certain circumstances and which at times so
closely resemble those of animals, that a sort of feeling
and will might almost be attributed to plants on this
account, especially by those who think they can perceive
something of the same kind in the movements of the
inward parts of animals. Thus the tops of trees always
have a vertical tendency, excepting when they incline
towards the light. Their roots seek out good earth
and moisture and, in order to attain these, deviate from
the straight course. Yet these different tendencies can
not be explained by the influence of external causes,
1
Vol. i. p. 245. 1826.
282 THE WILL IN NATTJEE.

unless we also assume the existence of an inner natural

disposition, susceptible of being roused, which differs from
the mere mechanical force in inorganic bodies
Decandolle made some remarkable experiments that proved
to him the existence of a sort of habit in plants which
may be overcome by artificial light, but only after a certain
time. Plants that had been shut up in a cellar which was
continually lit by lamps, did not on this account leave off
closing in the evening and opening again in the morning
for several days. And there are other habits besides which

plants are able to adopt and to abandon. Flowers that

habitually close in wet weather, finish by remaining open
ifthe wet weather lasts too long. When M. Desfontaines
took a sensitive -plant with him in his carriage, the jolting
movement at first caused it to contract, but at last it ex
panded again as when in complete repose. Therefore
even in these cases, light, moisture, &c., &c., only act in
virtue of an inner disposition, which may be neutralized or
modified by the continuation of that very activity itself ;

and the vital energy of plants, like that of animals, is sub

ject to fatigue The hedysarum gyrans is
and exhaustion.
singularly characterized by the movements of its leaves
which continue day and night without needing any sort of
stimulus. Surely, if any phenomenon can cause illusion
and remind us of the voluntary movements of animals, it
is this. Broussonet, Silvestre, Gels and Halle have fully
described it, and have shown that the plant s action depends
entirelyupon its own healthy condition."
Again, in the third volume of the same work, p. 166
(1828), Cuvier says M. Dutrochet adds some physiolo
:
"

gical considerations to which his own experiments had led

him, and which in his opinion prove that the movements of
plants are spontaneous,i.e. that
they depend upon an inner
principle which immediately receives the influence of outer

agencies. As he is however reluctant to admit that plants

 PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS.

word nervimotilite.
"

have feeling, lie makes use of the

Here I must observe, that when we come to examine it
closely, what we think to ourselves in the conception
of

spontaneity, is in the end always the same thing as manifes

tation of will, with which spontaneity would therefore be

simply synonymous. The only difference -between them

consists in the conception of spontaneity being derived from
outer perception, while that of manifestation of will is
drawn from our own consciousness. I find a remarkable
instance of the impetuous violence of this spontaneity, even
in plants, in the following communication contained in the
x
Cheltenham Examiner Last Thursday four enor
"
" "

mous mushrooms performed a heroic feat of a new kind, in

one of our most crowded streets, by lifting up a huge block
of stone in their strenuous effort to make their way into
the visible world."

In the "

Mem. de 1 Acad. d.
annee (1821), Sciences de 1
"

2
Cuvier says For centuries botanists have been search
:
"

ing for the reason why in a seed which is germinating the

root invariably grows downwards, while the stalk as
invariably grows upwards, no matter what be the posi
tion in which the seed is placed. M. Dutrochet put some
seeds into holes bored in the bottom of a vessel filled
with damp mould, which he hung up to a beam in his
room. Now, in this case, the stem might have been
expected to grow downwards. Not at all the roots found :

their way to the air below, and the stems were prolonged
so as to traverse the damp mould until they reached its

upper surface. According to M. Dutrochet, the direction

in which plants grow, is determined by an inner principle
and not at all by the attraction of the bodies towards
which they direct themselves. A mistletoe seed that was
fastened to the point of a perfectly moveable needle fixed
1
Repeated in the
"

Times" of June 2nd, 1841.

2
Vol. v. p. 171. Paris, 1826.
284 THE WILL IN NATURE.

on a peg, with a small plank placed near it, was induced

to germinate. It soon began to send out shoots towards
the plank, which it reached in five days without having
communicated the slightest movement to the needle. The
stems of onions and leeks with their bulbs, deposited in
dark places, grow upwards, although more slowly than in
light ones they grow upwards even if placed in water a
: :

fact which suffices to prove that neither light nor moisture

determines the direction of their growth." Still C. II.
l
Schultz asserts that he made seeds germinate in a dark
box with holes bored in the bottom, and succeeded in
inducing the plants to grow upside down, by means of
a mirror fastened to the box, which reflected the sun
light.
In the "

Dictionnaire des Sciences Naturelles" (article

Animal) we find: on the one hand, animals show

"If,

avidity in their search after nourishment as well as power

of discrimination in the selection of it, roots of plants may,
on the other hand, be observed to direct themselves
towards the side where the soil contains most nourish
ment, nay, even to seek out the smallest crevices in rocks
which may contain any food. If we twist a bough so as
to make the upper surface of its leaves the under one,
these leaves even will twist their stems in order to regain
the position best suited for the exercise of their functions
(i.e. so as to have the smooth side uppermost).
Is it quite
"

certain that this takes place unconsciously ?

F. J. Meyen has devoted a chapter, entitled
"

Of the
movements and sensations of plants,"
to a full investiga
tion of the subject now before us. In this he says 2 :
Not unfrequently potatoes, stored in deep, dark cellars,
"

1 dans
C. H. Schultz, "

Sur la Circulation les Plantes," a prize-essay,

1839.
8
F. J. Meyen," Neues System der Pflanzenphysiologe "

(1839), vol. iii,

p. 585.
 PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS. 285

may be observed towards summer to shoot forth stems

which invariably grow in the direction of the chinks
through which the light comes into the cellar, and to con
tinue thus growing until they at last reach the aperture
which receives the light directly. In such cases potato-
stalks have been known to reach a length of twenty feet ;

whereas under ordinary circumstances, even such as are

most favourable to the growth of the potato, the stalk is
seldom longer than from three to four feet. It is inte
resting to watch closely the course taken by a potato-
stalk thus growing in darkness, in its endeavours to reach
the light. It tries to do so by the shortest road, but not
being firm enough to grow straight across through the air
without support, it lets itself drop on to the floor, and
thus creeps along the ground till it reaches the nearest
wall,up which it then climbs." Even this botanist too is
led by his facts to the following assertion (p. 576) On :
"

observing the freedom of movement of oscillatoria and

other inferior plants, we may perhaps have no alternative
but to attribute a species of will to these beings."
Creepers bear distinct evidence as to manifestation of
will in plants for, when they find no support near
;

enough for their tendrils to cling to, they invariably direct

their growth towards the shadiest place, or even towards a

piece of dark-coloured paper, wherever it may be placed ;

whereas they avoid glass, on account of its glitter. In the
Philosophical Transactions of 1812, Th. Andrew Knight
"
"

relates some very pleasing experiments on this subject

1
(especially with ampelopsis quinquefolia,) although he
strives hard to explain the matter mechanically, and will
not admit that itis a manifestation of will. I appeal to his

experiments, not to the conclusions he draws from them.

A good test might be, to plant several free creepers in a
1
These have been translated for the "

Bibliotheque Britanniquc,
Section des Sciences et Arts," vol. Hi
286 THE WILL IN NATURE.

circle round a tree-trunk and to observe whether they all

crept towards the trunk centripetally. On the 6th Nov.

1843, Dutrochet read a treatise on this subject in the
"

Acad. de Sciences
"

called
"

Sur les Mouvements E-evolutifs

spontanes chez les Vegetaux," which, notwithstanding its
great length, is well worth reading, and is published
among the "Cornptes rendus des Seances de 1* Academic
des Sciences
"

for Nov. 1843. The result is, that in pisum

sdtivum (green pea), in bryonia alba (wild bryony) and in
cucumis sativus (cucumber) the stems of those leaves
which bear the tendrils, describe a very slow circular
movement in the air, the time in which they complete an

ellipsis varying from one to three hours according to tem

perature. By this movement they seek at random for
solid bodies round which, when found, they twine their
tendrils these then support the plant, it being unable to
;

stand by itself without help. That is, they do the same

thing as the eyeless caterpillar, which when seeking a leaf
describes circles in the air with the upper part of its body.
Dutrochet contributes a good deal of information too con-
cerning other movements in plants in this treatise for :

instance, that stylidium graminifolium in New Holland,

has a column in the middle of its corolla which bears the
anthers and stigma and alternately folds up and unfolds
again. What Treviranus adduces is to the same effect :*
In parnassia palustris and in ruta graveolens, the stamina
incline one after the other, in saxifraga tridactylites in

pairs, towards the stigma, and erect themselves again in.

the same order." Shortly before however, we read in
Treviranus with reference to this subject Of all appa :
"

rently voluntary movements of plants, the direction of

their boughs and of the upper surface of their leaves
towards the light and towards moist heat, and the twining
1
Treviranus, Die Erscheinungen und Gesetze des Organischen
"

Lebens (Phenomena and Laws of Organic Life), vol. i. p. 1 73.

"
 PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS. 287

movements of creepers round their supports, are the most

universal. In this last phenomenon especially there is
something which resembles animal movements. While
growing, creepers, it is true, if left to themselves, describe
circles with their tips and by this means reach an object
near at hand. But it is no merely mechanical cause that
induces them to adapt their growth to the form of the
object they have thus reached. The cuscuta does not
twine round every kind of support for instance, limbs of :

animals, dead vegetable matter, metals and inorganic sub-

stances are not used for this purpose, but only living

plants, and not even all kinds not mosses, for instance
only those from which it can extract nourishment by its
1

papillae;and these attract it from a considerable distance."

The following special observation, communicated to the
Farmer s Magazine," and reproduced by the Times " "
"

(13th July 1848) under the title "Vegetable Instinct," is

however still more to the point : "If a basin of water be
placed within six inches of a young pumpkin- stalk, or of a
stem of the large garden pea, no matter on what side, the
stalk will approach the basin during the night and it will be
found next morning with one of its leaves floating on the
water. This experiment may be renewed every night till
the plant begins to fructify. Even if its position be
1
Brandis, On Life and Polarity," 1836, p. 88, says : The roots
"
"

of rock-plants seek nourishing mould in the most delicate crevices of

rocks. These roots cling to a nourishing bone in dense clusters. I saw
a root whose growth was intercepted by the sole of an old shoe : it

divided itself into as many fibres as the shoe-sole had holes those by
which it had been stitched together but as soon as these fibres had
overcome the obstruction apd grown through the holes, they united
again to a common stem." And p. 87 If Sprengel s observations are
"

confirmed, even mediate relations are perceived (by plants) in order to

obtain this end (fructification) that is to say, the anthers of the nigdla,
:

bend down in order to put the pollen on the bees backs, and the pistils
bend in like manner to receive it from the bees. [Add. to 3rd ed.l
288 THE WILL IN NATURE.

changed every day, a stick fixed upright; within six inches

of a young convolvulus is sure to be found by the plant.

If, after having wound itself for a certain distance round

the stick, it is unwound and wound round again in the

opposite direction, it will return to its original position

or lose its life in the endeavour to do so. Nevertheless,
iftwo such plants grow close to one another without
having any stick near enough for them to cling to it,
one of them will change the direction of its winding and
they will twine round each other. Duhamel placed some
Italian beans in a cylinder filled with moist earth ; after a
little while they began to germinate and naturally sent

their plumula upwards in the direction of the light and

their radicula downwards into the mould. After a few
days the cylinder was turned round to the extent of a
quarter of its circumference and the same process was
repeated until it had been turned completely round. The
beans were then removed from the earth, when it was
found that both plumula and radicula had twisted at
each turn that had been given, in order to adapt them
selves to it, the one endeavouring to rise perpendicularly,
the other to descend, so that they had formed a complete
spiral. Yet, notwithstanding this natural tendency to
descend, when the soil below is too dry, roots will grow
upwards in order to reach any moist substance which may
be lying higher than themselves."
In Froriep s Memoranda for 1833 (No. 832) there is
"
"

a short article upon the locomotivity of plants in poor :

soil, where good mould lies near at hand, many plants will
send out a shoot into the good mould after a time the ;

original plant then withers, but the offshoot prospers and

itself becomes the plant. By means of this process, a
plant has been known to climb down from a wall.
In the same periodical (1835, No. 981) is to be found a
communication from Professor Daubeny, of Oxford (taken
 PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS. 289

from the Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal," April-

"

July, 1835), in which he shows with certainty, by means of

new and very careful experiments, that roots of plants
have, at any rate to a certain degree, the power to make
choice from those substances in the soil which present
1
themselves to their surface.
1
In this connection I may mention an analysis of an entirely different
kind, given by the French Academician Babinet in an article in which
he treats of the seasons on the planets. It is contained in the No, of
the 15th January, 1856, of the "Kevue des Deux Mondes," and I will
give the chief substance of it here in translation. The object of it is to
refer to its direct cause the well-known fact, that cereals only thrive in
temperate climates. If grain did not necessarily perish in winter, if it
"

were perennial, it would not bear ears, and there would be no harvest.
In the hotter portions of Africa, Asia and America, where no winter
kills the grain, these plants grow like grass with us they multiply by :

means of shoots, remain always green, and neither form ears nor run to
seed. In cold climates, on the contrary, the organism of these plants
seems by some inconceivable miracle to feel, as it were by anticipation,
the necessity of passing through the seed-phase in order to escape dying
off in the winter season (L organisme de la plante, par un inconcevable

miracle, semble presscntir la necessity de passer par Vttat de graine, pour

ne pas prir compUtement pendant la saison rigoureiise). In a similar
way, districts which have a droughty season," that is to say a season
"

in which all plants are parched up with drought tropical countries, for
"

instance Jamaica, produce grain j because there the plant, moved by the
same organic presentiment (par le meme pressentiment organique), in

order to multiply, hastens to bear seed at the approach of the season in

which it would have to dry up." In the fact which this author describes
as an inconceivable miracle, we recognise a manifestation of the plant s
will in increased potency, since here it appears as the will of the species,
and makes preparations for the future in a similar way to animal instinct,
without being guided by knowledge of that future in doing so. Here
we see plants in warmer climates dispensing with a complicated process
to which a cold climate alone had obliged them. In similar instances
animals do precisely the same thing, especially bees. Leroy in his
admirable work Lettres Philosophiques sur 1 Intelligence des Animaux
" "

(3rd letter, p. 231) relates, that some bees which had been taken to
South America continued at first to gather honey as usual and to build
their cells just as when they were at home ; but that when
they gradually
U
290 THE WILL IN NATURE.

Finally I will not omit to observe, that even so early an

1
authority as Plato had attributed desires, EirtdvpCac, i.e.
will, to plants. In my chief work, 2 however, I have entered
into the doctrines of the Ancients on this point, and the

chapter there which treats of this subject may on the

whole serve to complete the present one.
The reluctance and reserve with which we see the
authors here quoted make up their minds to acknowledge
the will, which nevertheless undoubtedly manifests itself
in plants, comes from their being still hampered by the
old opinion, that consciousness is a requisite and con
dition of the will: now it is evident that plants have
no consciousness. The thought never entered into the
heads of these naturalists, that the will might be the prius
and therefore independent of the intellect, with which,
as the posterius, consciousness first makes its appear
ance. As for knowledge or representation, plants have
something merely analogous to it, a mere substitute for it ;

whereas they really have the will itself quite directly for, :

as the thing in itself, it is the substratum of their phe

nomenal being as well as of every other. Taking a rea
listic view, starting accordingly from the objective, the
matter might even be stated as follows That which lives
:

and moves in plant-nature and in the animal organism,

became aware that plants blossom there all the year round, they left off

working. The animal world supplies a fact analogous to the above

mentioned change in the mode of multiplying in cereals. This is the
abnormal mode of propagation for which the aphides have long been
noted. The female aphide, as is well known, propagates for 10-12
generations without any pairing with the male, and by a variety of the
ovoviviparous process. This goes on all summer; but in autumn the
maks appear, impregnation takes plaee, and eggs are laid as winter
quarters for the whole species, since it is c*nly in this shape that it is
able to outlive the winter. (Add. to 3rd ed.)
1
Plat. p. 403.
"

Tim."
Bip.
a
Die Welt. a. W. u. V," vol. ii. chap. 23.
 PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS. 291

when it lias gradually enhanced itself in the scale of beings

sufficiently for the light of knowledge to fall directly upon
it, presents itself in this newly arising consciousness as

will, and is here more immediately, consequently better,

known than anywhere else. This knowledge therefore
must supply the key for the comprehension of all that is
lower in the scale. For in this knowledge the thing in
itself isno longer veiled by any other form than that of the
most immediate apprehension. It is this immediate appre
hension of one s own volition which has been called the
inner sense. In itself the will is without apprehension, and
remains so in the inorganic and vegetable kingdoms. Just
as the world would remain in darkness, in spite of the sun,
if there were no bodies to reflect its light or as the mere
;

vibration of a string can never become a sound without air

or even without some sort of sounding-board so likewise :

does the will first become conscious of itself when know

ledge is added to it. Knowledge is, as it were, the
sounding-board of the will, and consciousness the tone it
produces. This becoming conscious of itself on the part of
the will, was attributed to a supposed inner sense, because
it is the first and most direct knowledge we have. The
various emotions of our own will can alone be the object of
this inner sense; for the process of representation itself
cannot over again be perceived, but, at the very utmost,
only be once more brought to consciousness in rational
reflection, that second power of representing that is, in :

abstracto. Therefore also, simple representation (intui

tion) is to thinking proper that is, to knowing by
means of abstract conceptions what willing in itself is to

becoming aware of that willing, i.e. to consciousness. For

this reason, a perfectly clear and distinct consciousness, not
only of our own existence but also of the existence of
others, only arises with the advent of Reason (the faculty
for conceptions), which raises Man as far above the brute,
292 THE WILL IN NATURE.

as the merely intuitive faculty of representation raises the

brute above the plant. Now beings which, like plants,
have no faculty for representation, are called unconscious,
and we conceive this condition as only slightly differing
from non-existence since the only existence such beings
;

have, is in the consciousness of others, as the representation

of those others. They are nevertheless not wanting in
what isprimary in existence, the will, but only in what is
secondary still, what is primary and this is after all the
;

existence of the thing in itself appears to us, without

that secondary element, to pass over into nullity. We are*
unable directly and clearly to distinguish unconscious exis
tence from non-existence, although we have our own ex
perience of it in deep sleep.

Bearing in mind, according to the contents of the last

chapter, that the faculty of knowing, like every other organ,
has only arisen for the purpose of self-preservation, and
that it therefore stands in a precise relation, admitting
of countless gradations, to the requirements of each
animal species; we shall understand that plants, having
so very much fewer requirements than animals, no

longer need any knowledge at all. On this account pre

cisely, as I have often said, knowledge is the true charac
teristic which denotes the limits of animality, because of the
movement induced by motives which it conditions. Where
animal life ceases, there knowledge proper, with whose
essence our own experience has made us familiar, disap
pears and henceforth analogy is our only way of making
;

that which mediates between the influence of the outer world

and the movements of beings intelligible to us. The will,
on the other hand, which we have recognised as being the
basis and kernel of every existing thing, remains one and
the same at all times and in all places. Now, in the lower
degree occupied by plant-life and by the vegetative life of
animal organisms, it is the stimulus which takes the place
 PHYSIOLOGY OP PLANTS. 293

of knowledge as a means of determining the individual

manifestations of this omnipresent will and as a mediator
between the outer world and the changes of such a being ;

finally, ininorganic Nature, it is physical agency in general ;

and when, as here, observation takes place from a higher
to a lower degree, both stimulus and physical agency

present themselves as substitutes for knowledge, therefore

as mere analogues to it. Plants cannot properly be said
to perceive light and the sun yet we see them sensitive
;

in various ways to the presence or absence of both. We

see them incline and turn towards the light and though ;

this movement no doubt generally coincides with their

growth, just as the moon s rotation on its axis coincides

with its movement round the earth, it nevertheless exists,
as well as that of the moon, and the direction of that
growth is determined and
systematically modified by
light, just as an action is determined by a motive, and
as the direction of the growth of creeping and clinging
plants determined by the shape and position of the sup
is

ports they may chance to find. Thus because plants on

the whole, still have wants, though not such wants as
demand the luxury of a sensorium and an intellect, some
thing analogous has to take the place of these, in order to
enable the will to lay hold of, if not to seek out, the satis
factions which offer themselves to it. Now, this analogous
substitute is susceptibility for stimuli, and I would express
the difference between knowledge and this susceptibility
as follows in knowledge, the motive which presents itself
:

as representation and the act of volition which follows from

it,remain distinctly separate one from the other, this separa
tion moreover being the more distinct, the greater the per
fection of the intellect ; whereas, in mere susceptibility
for stimuli, the feeling of the stimulus can no longer be
distinguished from the volition it occasions, and they
coalesce. In inorganic nature finally, even susceptibility
294 THE WILL IN NATURE.

for stimuli, the analogy of which to knowledge is unmis

takable, ceases, but the diversity of reaction of each body
upon divers kinds of action remains now, when the matter ;

is considered, as we are doing, in the descending scale,

this reaction still presents itself, even here, as a substitute
for knowledge. If a body reacts differently, it must have
been acted upon differently and that action must have
roused a different sensation in it, which with all its dull
ness has nevertheless a distant analogy to knowledge.
Thus when water that is shut up finds an outlet of which
it eagerly avails itself, rushing vehemently in that direction,
it certainly does not recognise that outlet any more than the
acid perceives the alkali approaching it which will induce
itto abandon its combination with a metal, or than the

strip of paper perceives the amber which attracts it after

being rubbed yet we cannot help admitting that what
;

brings about such sudden changes in all these bodies, bears

a certain resemblance to that which takes place within us,
when an unexpected motive presents itself. In former
times I have availed myself of such considerations as these
in order to point out the will in all things I now em ;

ploy them to indicate the sphere to which knowledge

presents itself as belonging, when considered, not as is
usual from the inside, but realistically, from a standpoint
outside itself, as were something foreign that is, when
if it :

we gain the objective point of view for it, which is so

extremely important in order to complete the subjective
one.
1
We find that knowledge then presents itself as the
mediator of motives, i.e. of the action of causality upon beings
endowed with intellect in other words, as that which
receives the changes from outside upon which those in the
inside must follow, as that which acts as mediator between
both. Now upon this narrow line hovers the world as
1
Compare
"

Die Welt. a. W. u. Y." vol. ii.

chap. 22 :
"

Objective
View of the Intellect."
 PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS. 295

representation that is to say, the whole corporeal world,

stretched out Space and Time, which as such can
in
never exist anywhere but in the brain any more than
dreams, which, as long as they last, exist in the same way.
What the intellect does for animals and for man, as the
mediator of motives, susceptibility for stimuli does for
plants, andsusceptibility for every sort of cause for in
organic bodies and strictly speaking, all this differs merely
:

in degree. For, exclusively as a consequence of this suscep

outward impressions having enhanced itself in
tibility to
animals proportionately to their requirements till it has
reached the point where a nervous system and a brain be
come necessary, does consciousness arise as a function of that
brain, and in it the objective world, whose forms (Time,
Space, Causality) are the way in which that function is per
formed. Therefore we find the intellect originally laid out
entirely with a view to subjectivity, destined merely to serve
the purposes of the will, consequently as something quite
secondary and subordinate ; nay, in a sense, as something
which appears only per accidens ; as a condition of the action
of mere motives, instead of stimuli, which has become neces

sary in the higher degree of animal existence. The image

of the world in Space and Time, which thus arises, is only
1
the map on which the motives present themselves as
ends. It also conditions the spacial and causal connection
in which the objects perceived stand to one another never ;

theless it is only the mediating link between the motive

and the act of volition. Now, to take such an image as
this of the world, arising in this manner,
accidentally, in
the intellect, i.e. in the cerebral function of animal beings,
through the means to their ends being represented and the
path of these ephemera on their planet being thus illumined
to take this image, we say, this mere cerebral phenome
non, for the true, ultimate essence of things (thing in itself),
1
Plan.
296 THE WILL IN NATTJKE.

to take the concatenation of its parts for the absolute order

of the Universe (relations between things in themselves),
and to assume all this to exist even independently of the
brain, would indeed be a leap Here in fact, an assumption
!

such as this must appear to us as the height of rashness

and presumption yet it is the foundation upon which all the
;

systems of pre -Kantian dogmatism have been built up for ;

it is
tacitly pre- supposed in all their Ontology, Cosmology
and Theology, as well as in the ceternce veritates to which
they appeal. But that leap had always been made tacitly
and unconsciously, and it is precisely Kant s immortal
achievement, to have brought it to our consciousness.
By our present realistic way of considering the matter
therefore, we unexpectedly gain the objective stand-point for
Kant sgreat discoveries; and, by the road of empirico-physio-

logical contemplation, we arrive at the point whence his trans

cendental-critical view starts. For Kant s view takes the
subjective for its standpoint and considers consciousness as
given. But from consciousness itself and its law and
order, given a priori, that view arrives at the conclusion,
that all which appears in that consciousness can be nothing
more than mere phenomenon. From our realistic, exterior

standpoint, on the contrary, which assumes the objective

all that exists in Nature to be absolutely given, we see
what the intellect is, as to its aim and origin, and to
which class of phenomena belongs, and we recognise (so
it

far a priori) that it must be limited to mere phenomena.

We see too, that what presents itself in the intellect can at
all times only be conditioned chiefly subjectively that
is,can, together with the order of the nexus of its parts,
only be a mundus phenomenon, which is likewise subjectively
conditioned ;
but that it can never be a knowledge of things
as they may be in themselves, or as they may be connected
in themselves. For, in the nexus of Nature, we have
found the faculty of knowing as a conditioned faculty,
 PHYSIOLOGY OP PLANTS. 297

whose assertions, precisely on that account, cannot claim

unconditioned validity. To anyone who has studied and
understood the Critique of Pure Reason to which our
standpoint is essentially foreign it must nevertheless still

appear as if Nature had intended the intellect for a puzzle-

glass to mislead us and were playing at hide-and-seek with
us. But by our realistic objective road, i.e. by starting
from the objective world as given, we have now come to
the very same result at which Kant had arrived by the
idealistic, subjective road, i.e. by examining the intellect
itself and the way in which it constitutes consciousness.
We now see that the world as representation hovers on the
narrow line between the external cause (motive) and the
effect evoked (act of the will), in beings having knowledge

(animals), in which beings for the first time there occurs a

distinct separation between motive and voluntary act.
Ita res accendent lumina rebus. It is only when it is
reached by two quite opposite roads, that the great result
attained by Kant is distinctly seen and when light is thus
;

thrown upon it from both sides, his whole meaning be

comes clear. Our objective standpoint is realistic and
therefore conditioned, so far as, in taking for granted the
existence of beings in Nature, it abstracts from the fact
that their objective existence postulates an intellect, which
contains them as its representation but Kant s subjective
;

and idealistic standpoint is likewise conditioned, inasmuch

as he starts from the intelligence, which itself, however,

presupposes Nature, in consequence of whose development

as far as animal life that intelligence is for the first time
enabled to make its appearance. Keeping steadily to this
standpoint of ours, we may also define
realistic, objective
Kant theory as follows After Locke, in order to know
s :

things in themselves, had abstracted the share of sen

suous functions called by him secondary qualities from
things as they appear, Kant with infinitely greater depth
 08 THE WILL IN NATURE.

deducted from them tlie incomparably larger share of the

cerebral function, which includes precisely what Locke
calls primary qualities. But all I have done here has
been to show why all this must necessarily be as it is,
by indicating the place occupied by the intellect in the
nexus of Nature, when we start realistically from the
objective as given, but, in doing so, take the only thing of
which we are quite directly conscious, the will that true
TTOV arS) of Metaphysics for our support, as being what
is primarily real, everything else being merely its phe

nomenon. What now follows serves to complete this.

I have mentioned already, that where knowledge takes
place, the motive which appears as representation and the
act of volition resulting from it, remain the more clearly

separated one from the other, the more perfect the intellect ;
that is, the higher we ascend in the scale of beings. This
calls for fuller explanation.As long as the will s activity
is roused by stimuli alone, and no representation as yet
takes place that is, in plants there is no separation at
all between the receiving of impressions and the being
determined by them. In the lowest order of animal in
telligence, such as we find it in radiaria, acalepha,
acephala, &c., the difference is still small ;
a feeling of
hunger, a watchfulness roused by this, an apprehending
and snapping at their prey, still constitute the whole con
tent of their consciousness; nevertheless this is the first
twilight of the dawning world as representation, the back
ground of which that is to say, everything excepting the
motive which acts each time still remains shrouded in
impenetrable darkness. Here moreover the organs of the
senses are correspondingly imperfect and incomplete, having
exceedingly few data for perception to bring to an under
standing yet in embryo. Nevertheless wherever there is
sensibility, it is always accompanied by understanding,
i.e. with the faculty for referring effects experienced to
 PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS. 299

external causes ;
without would be super
this, sensibility
fluous and a mere source of aimless suffering. The higher
we ascend in the scale of animals, the greater number and
perfection of the senses we find, till at last we have all

five these are found in a small

;
number of invertebrate
animals, but they only become universal in the vertebrata.
The brain and its function, the understanding, develop pro
portionately, and the object now gradually presents itself
more and more distinctly and completely and even already
in connection with other objects; because the service of
the will requires apprehension of the mutual relations of
objects. By this the world of representation acquires
some extent and background. Still that apprehension
never goes beyond what is required for the will s service:
the apprehending and the being roused to reaction by
what is apprehended, are not clearly held asunder: the
object is only perceived in as much as it is a motive.
Even the more sagacious animals only see in objects what
concerns themselves, what has reference to their will or, at
the utmost, what may have reference to it in future : of
this last instance in cats, who take pains to
we have an
acquire an accurate knowledge of localities, and in foxes,
who endeavour to find hiding-places for their future prey.
But they are insensible towards everything else no ;

animal has perhaps ever yet seen the starry sky my dog :

started in terror when for the first time he accidentally

caught sight of the sun. A

first faint sign of a disin

terested perception of their surroundings may at times be

observed in the most intelligent animals, especially when
they have been trained by taming. Dogs go so far as to
stare at things we may often see them sit down at the
;

window and attentively watch all that passes. Monkeys

look aboutthem at times, as if trying to make up their
mind about their surroundings. It is in Man that the
separation between motive and action, between representa-
300 THE WILL IN NATURE.

tion and will, first becomes quite distinct. But this does
not immediately put an end to the subservience of the
intellect to the will. Ordinary human beings after all only

comprehend quite clearly that which, in some way or

other, refers directly or indirectly to their own selves (has
an interest for them) ; with respect to everything else,
their understanding continues to be unconquerably inert ;
the rest therefore remains in the back-ground and does
not come into consciousness under the radiant light of
complete distinctnees. Philosophical astonishment and
artistic emotion occasioned by the contemplation of
phenomena, remain eternally foreign to them, whatever
they may do for at the bottom, everything appears to
;

them to be a matter of course. Complete liberation and

separation of the intellect from the will and its bondage is
the prerogative of genius, as I have fully shown in the
aesthetic part of my chief work. G-enius is objectivity. The
pure objectivity and distinctness with which things present
themselves in [intuitive] perception that fundamental and
most substantial source of knowledge actually stands
every moment in inverse proportion to the interest which
the will has in those things and knowing without willing
;

is the condition, not to say the essence, of all gifts of

aesthetic intelligence. Why does an ordinary artist produce
so bad a painting of yonder landscape, notwithstanding all
the pains he has taken ? Because he sees it so. And why
does he see so little beauty in it ? Because his intellect has
not freed itself sufficiently from his will. The degrees of
this separation give rise to great intellectual distinctions
between men; for the more knowledge has freed itself
from the will, the purer, consequently the more objective
and correct, it is just as that fruit is best, which has no
;

after-taste of the soil on which it has grown.

This relation, as important as it is interesting, deserves

surely to be made still clearer by a retrospective view of the

 PHYSIOLOGY OP PLANTS. 301

whole scale of beings, and by recalling the gradual transition

from absolute subjectivity to the highest degrees of objec
tivity in the intellect. Inorganic Nature namely, is abso
lutely subjective, no trace whatever of consciousness of an
outer world being found in it. Stones, boulders, ice-blocks,
even when they fall upon one another, or knock or rub
against one another, have no consciousness of each other
and of an outer world. Still even these are susceptible to
external influence, which causes their position and move
ment to change and may therefore be considered as a first
step towards consciousness. Now, although plants also
have no consciousness of the outer world, and although the
mere analogue of a consciousness which exists in them
must, on the contrary, be conceived as a dull self -enjoyment ;
yet we see that they all seek light, and that many of them
turn their flowers or leaves daily towards the sun, while
creepers find their way to supports with which they are
not in contact; and finally we see individual kinds of
plants show even a sort of irritability. Unquestionably
therefore, there is a connection and relation between their
movements and surroundings, even those with which they
are not in immediate contact and this connection we must
;

accordingly recognise as a faint analogue to perception.

With animal life first appears decided perception that
is,consciousness of other things, as opposed to that clear
consciousness of ourselves to which that consciousness of
other things first gives rise. This constitutes precisely
the true character of animal-nature, as opposed to plant-
nature. In the lowest animals, consciousness of the outer
world very limited and dim each increasing degree of
is :

understanding extends it and makes it clearer, and this

gradual increase of the understanding again adapts itself
to the gradually increasing requirements of the animal, and
thus the process continues through the whole long ascend
ing scale of the animal series up to Man, in whom conscious-
302 THE WILL IN NATTJKE.

ness of the outer world reaches its acme, and in whom the

world accordingly presents itself more distinctly and com

pletely than in any other being. Still, even here, there are
innummerable degrees in the clearness of consciousness,
from the dullest blockhead to genius. Even in normal
heads there still remains a considerable tinge of subjec
tivity in their objective perception of external objects,
knowledge bearing throughout the character of existing
still

merely for the ends of the will. The more eminent the
head, the less prominent is this character, and the more
purely objective does the representation of the outer world
become; till in genius finally it attains completely objec

tivity, by which the Platonic ideas detach themselves from

the individual things, because the mind which comprehends
them enhances itself to the pure subject of knowledge.
Now, as perception is the basis of all knowledge, all think
ing and all insight must be influenced by this fundamental
difference in the quality of it, from which arises that com

plete difference between the ordinary and the superior

inind in their whole way of viewing things, which may
be noticed on all occasions. From this also proceeds the
dull gravity, nearly resembling that of animals, which
characterizes common-place heads whose knowledge is
acquired solely for the benefit of the will, as opposed to
the constant play of exuberant intellect which brightens
the consciousness of the superior mind. The consideration
of the two extremes in the great scale which we have here
exhibited, seems to have given rise to the German hyper
Slock (Klotz), as applied to human
"
"

bolical expression

beings, and to the English blockhead."

"

But another different consequence of the clear separa

tion of the will from the intellect therefore of the mo
tive from the action, which first appears in the human
race, is the deceptive illusion of freedom in our individual
actions. Where, as in inorganic nature, causes, or, as in
 PHYSIOLOGY OP PLANTS. 303

the vegetable kingdom, stimuli, call forth, the effect, the

causal connection is so simple, that there is not even the
slightest semblance of freedom. But already in animal
where that which till then had manifested itself as
life,

cause or as stimulus, now appears as a motive and a new

world, that of representation, consequently presents itself,
and cause and effect lie in different spheres the causal
connection between both, and with it the necessity, are less
evident than they were in plants and in inorganic Nature.
Nevertheless they are still unmistakable in animals, whose
merely intuitive representation stands midway between
organic functions induced by stimuli and the deliberate acts
of Man. The animal s actions infallibly follow as soon
as the perceptible motive is present, unless counter
acted by some equally perceptible counter-motive or by
training; yet here representation is already distinct from
the act of volition and comes separately into consciousness.
But in Man whose representation has enhanced itself even
to abstract conception and who now derives motives and
counter-motives for his actions from a whole invisible
thought-world which he carries about with him in his
brain and which makes him independent of presence and of
perceptible surroundings this connection no longer exists
at all for observation from outside, and even for inward
observation it is only knowable through abstract and
mature reflection. For these abstract motives, when ob
served from outside, give an impress of deliberation to all
his movements, by which they acquire a semblance of inde

pendence that manifestly distinguishes them from those of

animals, yet which after all only bears evidence to the fact,
that Man is actuated by a class of representations in which
animals do not share. Then again, in self-consciousness,
the act of volition is known to us in the most immediate
way, but the motive in most cases very indirectly, being
often even intentionally veiled, out of consideration for
304 THE WILL IN NATURE.

our self-knowledge. This process therefore, in coincidence

with the consciousness of that true freedom which belongs
to the will, as thing in itself outside
phenomenon, produces
the deceptive illusion that even the single act of volition
is unconditioned and free : that is, without a reason ;

whereas, when the character is given and the motive recog

nised, every act of volition really follows with the same
strict necessity as the changes of which mechanics teach us
the laws, and, to useKant s words, were character and
motive exactly known, might be calculated with precisely
the same certainty as an eclipse of the moon ; or again, to
place a very heterogeneous authority by the side of Kant,
as Dante says, who is older than Buridan :

"

Intra duo cibi distant! e moventi

D un modo, prima si morria di fame
Che liber uomo 1 un recasse a denti."

1
Paradiso, iv. I.

1
Between two kinds of food, both equally
Remote and tempting, first a man might die
Of hunger, ere he one could freely chuse. (Gary s TV.)
 PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY.

part of my doctrine could I have less hoped to see

NO corroborated by empirical science than that, in which
the fundamental truth, that Kant s thing in itself (Ding an
sich) is the Will, is applied by me even to inorganic Nature,
and in which I show the active principle in all fundamental
forces of Nature to be absolutely identical with what is
known to us within ourselves as the Will. It has therefore
been particularly gratifying to me to have found that an
eminent empiricist, yielding to the force of truth, had
gone so far as to express this paradox in the exposition of
his scientific doctrine. I allude to Sir John Herschel and
to his Treatise on Astronomy," the first edition of which
"

appeared in 1833, and a second enlarged one in 1849,

under the title Outlines of Astronomy." Herschel, who,
"

as an astronomer, was acquainted with gravity, not only in

the one-sided and really coarse part which it acts on earth,
but also in the nobler one performed by it in universal
Space, where the celestial bodies play with each other,
betray mutual inclination, exchange as it were amorous
glances, yet never allow themselves to come into rude con
tact, and thus continue dancing their dignified minuet to
the music of the spheres, while they keep at a respectful
distance from one another when he comes to the state
ment of the law of gravitation in the seventh chapter, 1
I expresses himself as follows :

1
Herschel,
"

Treatise on Astronomy," chap. 7, 371 of the 1st edition,

1833.
X
306 THE WILL IN NATURE.
"

All bodies with which we are acquainted, when raised

into the airand quietly abandoned, descend to the earth s
surface in lines perpendicular to it. They are therefore
urged thereto by a force or effort, the direct or indirect
result of a consciousness and a will existing somewhere,

though beyond our power to trace, which force we term

l
gravity"

The writer who reviewed Herschel s book in the October

number of the Edinburgh Review of 1833, anxious, as a
"
"

true Englishman, before all things to prevent the Mosaic

2
record from being imperilled, takes great umbrage at this
passage, rightly observing that it cannot refer to the will
of God Almighty, who has called Matter and all its proper
ties into being; he utterly refuses to recognise the validity of
the proposition itself, and denies that it follows consistently
from the preceding upon which Herschel wishes to found
it.
My
opinion is, that it undoubtedly would logically
follow from that (because the contents of a conception
are determined by its origin), but that the antecedent
itself is false. It asserts namely, that the origin of the

conception of causality is experience, more especially such

experience as we ourselves make in acting by means of our
1
Even Copernicus had said the same thing long before :
"

Equifom
existimo Gravitatem non aliud esse quam appetentiam quandam natu-
ralem, partibus inditam a divina providentia opificis universorum, ut in
unitatem integritatemgue steam, se conferant, in for mam Globi coeuntes.
Quam affectionem credibile est etiam Soli, L/unae caeterisque errantiwn
fulgoribus, inesse, ut eyus efficacia, in ea qua se repraesentant rotunditate
permaneant; quae nihilominus multis modis suos efficiimt circuittis"
("Nicol. Copernici revol." Lib. I,Cap. IX. Compare "Exposition des
Decouvertes de M. le Chevalier Newton par M. Maclaurin traduit de
;

1
Anglois par M. Paris, 1749, p. 45). Kerschel evidently saw,
Lavirotte,"

that if we hesitate to explain gravity, as Descartes did, by an impulse

from outside, we are absolutely driven to admit a will inherent in bodies..
Non datur tertium. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
2
Which he has more at heart than all the wisdom and truth in the
world. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
 PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 807

own efforts upon bodies belonging to the outer world. It

is only in countries like England, where the light of
Kantian philosophy has not yet begun to dawn, that the
Conception of causality can be thought of as originating in
experience (professors of philosophy who pooh-pooh Kant s
doctrines and think me beneath their notice being left out
of the question) least of all can it be thought of by those
;

who are acquainted with my proof of the a priority of that

conception, which differs completely from Kant s proof
and rests upon the fact, that knowledge of causality must
necessarily precede all perception of the outer world it
self as its condition since perception is only brought about
;

through the transition effected by the understanding

from the sensation in the organ of sense to its cause, which
cause now presents itself as an object in Space, itself like
wise an a priori intuition. Now, as the perception of objects
mast be anterior to our conscious action upon them, the ex
perience of that conscious action cannot be the origin of the
conception of causality; for, before I can act upon things,
they must first have acted upon me as motives. I have
entered fully into all that has to do with this in my chief
1
work, and in the second edition of my treatise on the
2
Principle of Sufficient Season, 21, where the assumption
adopted by Herschel finds special refutation it is therefore ;

useless to enter into it once more here. But it would be

even quite possible to refute this assumption empirically,
fcince it would necessarily follow from it, that a man who
came into the world without arms or legs, could never
attain any knowledge of causality or perception of the
outer world. Now Nature has effectually disproved this
by a case, of which I have reproduced the account from its
original source in the above-mentioned chapter of my chief
1
See "

Die Welt a. W. u. V." vol. ii. ch. 4, pp. 38-42 (3rd edition,

pp. 41-46).
9
P. 74 (3rd edition, p. /9), p. 92 of the translation in the present, volume
 03 THE WILL IN NATURE.

work, p. 40. In tliis assertion of Herschel s therefore, we

1

have another instance of a right conclusion drawn from

wrong premisses. Now this always happens when we
have obtained immediate insight into a truth by a right
aperqu, but are at a loss to find out and clearly define our
reasons for knowing it, owing to our inability to bring
them to clear consciousness. For, in all original insight,
conviction exists before proof : the proof being invariably
excogitated afterwards.
The immediate manifestation of gravity is more evident
in each part of liquid, than of solid, matter, owing to the

perfect freedom of motion of the parts among each other.

In order therefore to penetrate into this aper^u, which is
the true source of Herschel s assertion, let us look atten
tively at a torrent dashing headlong over rocks and ask
ourselves whether so determined an impetus, so boisterous
a vehemence, can arise without an exertion of strength, and
whether an exertion of strength is conceivable without
will. And so it is precisely in every case in which we
become aware of anything moving spontaneously, of any
primary, uncommunicated force we are constrained to
:

think its innermost essence as will. This much at any

rate is certain, that Herschel, like all the empiricists in so

many different branches of science whose evidence I have

quoted above, had arrived here at the limit where nothing
more is left behind the Physical but the Metaphysical ;

that this had brought him to a standstill, and that he, as

well as the rest of them, was unable to find anything
beyond that limit, but the will.
Herschel moreover, like most of these empiricists, is

here still hampered by the opinion that will is inseparable

from conciousness. As I have expatiated enough above
upon this fallacy, and its correction through my doctrine,
it is needless for me to enter into it here again.
1
3rd edition, p. 44,
 PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 309

The attempt lias repeatedly been made, since the beginning

of this century, to ascribe vitality to the inorganic world.
Quite wrongly: for living and inorganic are convertible
conceptions, and with death the organic ceases to be
organic. But no limit in the whole of Nature is so sharply
drawn as the line which separates the organic from the in
organic that is to say, the line between the region in which
:

Form isthe essential and permanent, Matter the accidental

and changing, and the region in which this relation is
entirely reversed. This is no vacillating boundary like
that perhaps between animals and plants, between solid
and liquid, between gas and steam : to endeavour to
destroy it therefore, is intentionally to bring confusion into
our ideas. On the other hand, I am the first who has
asserted that a will must be attributed to all that is lifeless
and inorganic. For, with me, the will is not, as has
hitherto been assumed, an accident of cognition and there
fore of life but life itself is manifestation of will.
;

Knowledge, on the contrary, is really an accident of life,

and life of Matter. But Matter itself is only the percepti
bility of the phenomena of the will. Therefore we are
compelled to recognise volition in every effort or tendency
which proceeds from the nature of a material body, and
properly speaking constitutes that nature, or manifests
itself as phenomenon by means of that nature and there ;

can consequently be no Matter without manifestation of

will. The lowest and on that account most universal
manifestation of will is gravity, wherefore it has been
called a primary and essential property of Matter.
The usual view of Nature assumes two fundamentally
different principles of motion, therefore it supposes that
the movement of a body may have two different origins :
i.e., that it proceeds either from the inside, in which
case it is attributed to the will; or from the outside,
and then it is occasioned by causes. This principle is gene-
310 THE WILL IN NATURE.

rally taken for granted as a matter of course and only

occasionally brought explicitly into prominence never ;

theless, in order to make the case quite certain, I will point

out a few passages from the earliest to the latest authors
1
in which specially stated. it is In Phaedrus, Plato makes
the distinction between that which moves spontaneously
from inside (soul) and that which receives movement only
from outside (body) TO v<f>
iavrov Kivov/uevov KO.I TO, <

2
efoOw TU KivtlffOai. Aristotle establishes the principle
in precisely the same way : airav TO Qepopevov >/
v^ eavrov

KtvEirai, fj i>V d\\ov (quidquid fertur a se movetur, aut

3
db alio~). He returns to the subject in the next Book,
chap. 4 and 5, and connects it with some explanatory de
tails which lead him into considerable perplexity, on ac
4
count precisely of the fallacy of the antithesis. In more
recent times again J. J. Eousseau brings forward the same
antithesis with great naivete and candour in his famous
5
"Profession de foi du vicaire Savoyard:" "Fa/p&rfois
dans les corps deux sortes de mouvement, savoir : mouvement
communique et mouvement spontane ou volontaire dans le :

premier la cause motrice est etrangere au corps mu ; et dans

le second elle est en lui-meme" But even in our time and
in the stilted, puffed-up style which is peculiar to it, Bur-
6
dach holds forth as follows The cause that determines :
"

a movement lies either inside or outside of that which

1
Plato, Phfed."
p. 319 Bip.
2 "

That which is moved by itself and that which is moved from out
side."
[Tr.] And we find the same distinction again in the 10th Book De "

Legibus," p. 85. [After him Cicero repeats it in the two last chapters
of his "

Somnium Scipionis." Add. to 3rd ed.]

3 "

All that is moved, is moved either by itself or by something else."

[Tr.] Aristotle, "Phys."

vii. 2.
4
Maclaurin, too, in his account of Newton s discoveries, p. 102, lavs
down this principle as his starting-point. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
6
Kmile, iv. p. 27. Bip.
"

Burdach, Physiologic," vol. iv. p. 323.

 PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 311

moves. Matter is external existence; it has powers of

motion, but it only brings them into play under certain
spacial conditions and external oppositions the soul alone
:

is an ever active and internal

thing, and only those bodies
which have souls find within themselves inducement to
move, and move of their own free will, independently of
outer mechanical circumstances."
Now here however I must say, as Abelard once did si :

omnespatres sic, at egonon sic : for, in opposition to this prin

ciple, however great may be its antiquity and universality,

my doctrine maintains, that there are not two origins of
movement differing fundamentally from one another that ;

movement does not proceed either from inside, when it is

ascribed to the will, or from outside, when it is brought
about by causes but that both things are inseparable and
;

take place simultaneously with every movement made by

a body. For movement which is admitted to arise from
the will, always presupposes a cause also: this cause, in

beings that have knowledge, is a motive ; but without it,

even in these beings, movement is impossible. On the
other hand, the movement of a body which is admitted to
have been brought about by an outward cause, is never
theless in itself a manifestation of the will of that body
which has only been evoked by that cause. Accordingly
there is only one, uniform, universal and exceptionless
principle of all movement, whose inner condition is will
and whose outer occasion is cause, which latter may also
take the form of a stimulus or of a motive, according to
the nature of the thing moved.
All that is known to us of things in a merely empi
rical or a posteriori way, is in itself will ; whereas, so far
as they can be determined a priori, things belong ex

clusively to representation, to mere phenomenon. Natural

phenomena therefore become proportionately less easy to
comprehend, the more distinctly the will manifests itself
312 THE WILL IN NATURE.

in them, i.e. the higher they stand on the scale of beings ;

whereas, they become more and more comprehensible

the smaller the amount of their empirical content, be
cause they remain more and more within the sphere of
mere representation, the forms of which, known to us a.
priori, are the principle of comprehensibility. Accordingly,
it is only so long as we limit ourselves to this sphere

that is when we have before us mere repre

to say, only
sentation,mere form without empirical content that our
comprehension is complete and thorough that is, in the :

a priori sciences, Arithmetic, Geometry, Phoronorny and

Logic. Here everything is in the highest degree compre
hensible; our insight is quite clear and satisfactory: it
leaves nothing to be desired, since we are even unable to
conceive that anything could be otherwise than it is. This
comes from our having here exclusively to do with the
forms of our own intellect. Thus the more we are able to
comprehend in a relation, the more it consists of mere
phenomenon and the less it has to do with the thing in
itself. Applied Mathematics, Mechanics, Hydraulics, &c.
&c., deal with the lowest degrees of objectification of the
will, in which the largest part still remains within the

sphere of mere representation nevertheless even here there

;

is already an empirical element which stands in the way of

entire comprehension, which makes the transparency less

complete, and in which the inexplicable shows itself. For

the same reason, only few departments of Physics and of
Chemistry continue to admit of a mathematical treat
ment whereas higher up in the scale of beings this has to
;

be entirely done away with, precisely because of the pre

ponderance of content over form in these phenomena. This
content is will, the a posteriori, the thing in itself, the free,
the causeless. Under the heading Physiology of Plants," I
"

have shown how in beings that live and have knowledge

motive and act of will, representation and volition, separate
 PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 313

and detach themselves more and more distinctly one from

the other, the higher we ascend in the scale of beings.
Now, in inorganic Nature also, the cause separates itself
from the effect in just the same proportion, and the
purely empirical which is precisely phenomenon of the
will detaches itself more and more prominently but, just ;

with this, comprehensibility diminishes. This point merits

fuller investigation, and I request my readers to give their
whole and undivided attention to what I am about to say,
as it is calculated to
place the leading thought of my
doctrine in the strongest possible light, both as to compre
hensibility and cogency. But this is all I can do for ;

it is beyond my power to induce my contemporaries to

prefer thoughts to verbiage I can only console myself for
;

not being the man of the age.

On the lowest step of the scale of Nature, cause and
effect are quite homogeneous and quite equivalent. Here
therefore we have perfect comprehension of the causal con
nection : for instance, the cause of the movement of one
ball propelled by impact, is the movement of another,
which loses just as much movement as the first one
receives. Here causality is in the highest degree intelli
gible. What notwithstanding still remains mysterious, is
restricted to the possibility of the passage of movement
of a thing incorporeal from one body to another.
The receptivity of bodies in this mode is so slight, that the
effect to be produced has to pass over completely from its
cause. The same holds good of all purely mechanical
influences ;
and if they are not alljust as instantaneously
understood, it is either because they are hidden from us by
accessory circumstances, or because we are confused by the
complicated connection of many causes and effects. In
itself,mechanical causality is everywhere equally, that is,
in the highest degree, comprehensible ; because cause and
effect do not differ here as to
quality, and because where
314 THE WILL IN NATURE.

they differ as to quantity, as in the lever, mere Space ancl

Time relations suffice to make the thing clear. But as
soon as weights come also into play, a second mysterious
element supervenes, gravity : and, where elastic bodies are
concerned, elasticity also. Things change as soon as we
begin to ascend in the scale of phenomena. Heat, con
sidered as cause, and expansion, liquefaction, volatilization
or crystallization, as effects, are not homogeneous there ;

fore their causal connection is not intelligible. The com-

prehensibility of causality has diminished what a lower :

degree of heat caused to liquefy, a higher degree makes

evaporate that which crystallizes with less heat, melts
:

when the heat is Warmth softens wax and

augmented.
hardens clay ;
wax and blackens chloride of
light whitens
silver. And, to go still further, when two salts are seen to

decompose each other mutually and to form two new ones,

elective affinity presents itself to us as an impenetrable
mystery, and the properties of the two new bodies are not
a combination of the properties of their separate elements.
Nevertheless we are still able to follow the process and
to indicate the elements out of which the new bodies are
formed ;
we can evenwhat has been united and
separate
restore the Thus noticeable hetero-
original quantities.
geneousness and incommensurability between cause and
effect have here made their appearance: causality has
become more mysterious. And this becomes still more
apparent when we compare the effects of electricity or of
the Voltaic pile with their causes, i.e. with the friction of
glass, or the piling and oxidation Here all
of the plates.

similarity between cause and effect at once vanishes ;

causality becomes shrouded in a thick veil, which men like

Davy, Faraday and Ampere have strenuously endeavoured
to lift. The only thing now discernible through that veil,

are the laws ruling its mode of action, which may bo

brought into a schema such as E E, communica- +
 PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 315

tion, distribution, shock, ignition, analysis, charging,

isolation, discharging, electric current, &c. &c., to this
schema we are able to reduce and even to direct the effect ;

but of the process itself we know nothing that remains

:

an x. Here therefore cause and effect are completely

heterogeneous, their connection is unintelligible, and we
see bodies show great susceptibity to causal influences, the
nature of which remains a secret for us. Moreover in pro
portion as we mount higher in the scale, the effect seems
to contain more, the cause less. When we reach organic
Nature therefore, in which the phenomenon of life presents
itself, this is the case in a far higher degree still. If, as is
done in China, we fill a pit with decaying wood, cover it
with leaves from the same tree as the wood, and pour a
solution of sulphur repeatedly over it, an abundant crop of
edible mushrooms will spring up. A world of rapidly
moving infiisoria will arise from a little hay well watered.
"What a difference lies here between effect and cause !

How much more does the former seem to contain than the
latter ! When we compare the seed, sometimes centuries,
nay even thousands of years old, with the tree, or the soil
with the specifically and strikingly different juices of in
numerable plants some healthy, some poisonous, some
again nutritious which spring from the same earth, upon
which the same sun shines and the same rain falls, all
resemblance ceases, and with it all comprehensibility for
us. For here causality already appears in increased
potency that is, as stimulus and as susceptibility for
:

stimulus. The schema of cause and effect alone has re

mained we know that this is cause, that effect but we
; ;

know nothing whatever of the nature and disposition of

causality. Between cause and effect there is not only no
qualitative resemblance, but no quantitative relation the :

relatively greater importance of the effect as compared with

its cause increases more and more; the effect of the
316 THE WILL IN NATURE.

stimulus too does not augment in proportion with the en

hancement of that stimulus in fact just the contrary often
;

takes place. Finally, when we come to the sphere of beings

which have knowledge, there is no longer any sort of re
semblance or relation between the action performed and
the object which, as representation, evokes it. Animals,
however, as they are restricted to perceptible representa
tions, still need the presence of the object acting as a
motive, which action is then immediate and infallible (if
we leave training, i.e. habit enforced by fear, out of the
question). For animals are unable to carry about with
them conceptions that might render them independent
of present impressions, enable them to reflect, and qualify
them for deliberate action. Man can do this. There
fore when at last we come to rational beings, the motive is
even no longer a present, perceptible, actually existing, real
thing, but a mere conception having its present existence
only in the brain of the person who acts, but which is
extracted from many multifarious perceptions, from the
experience of former years, or has been handed down in
words. Here the separation between cause and effect is so
wide, the effect has grown so much stronger as compared
with the cause, that the vulgar mind no longer perceives
the existence of a cause at all, and the acts of the will
appear to it to be unconditioned, causeless that is to say,
:

free. This is just why, when we reflect upon them from

outside, the movements of our own body present them
selves as if they took place without cause, or to speak more

properly, by a miracle. Experience and reflection alone

teach us that these movements, like all others, are only
possible as the effects of causes, here called motives,
and that,
on this ascending scale, it is only as to material reality that
the cause has failed to keep pace with the effect ;
whereas it

has kept pace with it as to dynamical reality, energy. At

this degree of the scale therefore the highest in Nature
 PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 317

causality has become less intelligible to us than ever.

Nothing but the bare schema, taken in a quite general
sense, now remains, and the ripest reflection is needed to
recognise its applicability and the necessity that schema
brings with it everywhere.
In the Grotto of Pausilippo, darkness continues to aug
ment as we advance towards the interior but when once
;

we have passed the middle, day-light again appears at the

other end and shows us the way so also in this case just
;
:

at the point where the outwardly directed light of the

understanding with its form of causality, gradually yield

ing to increasing darkness, had been reduced to a feeble,
flickering glimmer, behold !we are met by a totally diffe
rent light proceeding from quite another quarter, from
our own inner self, through the chance circumstance, that
we, the judges, happen here to be the very objects that are
to be judged. The growing difficulty of the comprehen
sion of the causal nexus, at first so clear, had now become
so great for perception and for the understanding the
agent in it that, in animal actions, the very existence
of that nexus seemed almost doubtful and those actions
appeared to be a sort of miracle. But, just at this point,
the observer receives from hisown inner self the direct in
formation that the agent in them is the will that very
will, which he knows better and more intimately than any

thing that external perception can ever supply. This

knowledge alone must be the philosopher s key to an
insight into the heart of all those processes in unconscious
Nature, concerning which causal explanation although,
more satisfactory than in the processes
here, to be sure,
last considered,and the clearer, the farther those pro
cesses were removed from these nevertheless had still
left an unknown x, and could never quite illumine the
inside of the process, even in a body propelled by impact or
attracted by gravity. This x had continued expanding till
318 THE WILL IN NATTTEE.

finally, on the highest degrees of the scale, it had wholly

repelled causal explanation. But then, just when the

power of causal explanation had been reduced to a mini
mum, that x revealed itself as tine will reminding us of
Mephistopheles when, yielding to Faust s learned exor
cisms, he steps forth out of the huge grown poodle whose
kernel he was. In consequence of the considerations I
have here set forth at length, we can surely hardly avoid
recognising the identity of this x, even on the lowest
degrees of the scale, where it was but faintly perceptible ;

then higher up, where it extended its obscurity more and

more and finally on the highest degrees, where it cast a
;

shadow upon all things till, at the very top, it reveals itself
to our consciousness in our own phenomenal being, as the
will. The two primarily different sources of our knowledge,
that is to say the inward and the outward source, have to
be connected together at this point by reflection. It ia

quite exclusively out of this connection that our compre

hension of Nature, and of our own selves arises but then ;

the inner side of Nature is disclosed to our intellect, which

by itself alone can never reach further than to the
mere outside and the mystery which philosophy has so
;

long tried to solve, lies open before us. For then indeed
we clearly see what the Real and the Ideal (the thing in
itself and the phenomenon) properly are and this settles
;

the principal question which has engaged the attention

of philosophers since Descartes: that is to say, the
question as to the relation between these two, whose com
plete diversity Kant had shown most thoroughly and with
unexampled depth, yet whose absolute identity was imme
diately afterwards proclaimed by humbugs on the credit of
intellectual intuition. But if we decline to avail ourselves
of this insight, which is really the one strait gate to truth,
we can never acquire comprehension of the intrinsic
essence of Nature, to which absolutely no other road leads ;
 PHYSICAL ASTEONOMY. 319

for then indeed we fall into an irremovable error. Then,

as I have already said, we maintain the view, that motion
has two radically different primary principles with a solid
partition-wall between them i.e. movement by means of
:

causes, and movement by means of the will. The first of

these must then remain for ever incomprehensible as to its
innermost essence, because, after all its explanations, there
is still left that unknown x which contains the more, the

higher the object under consideration stands in the scale of

beings while the second, movement by the will, presents
;

itself entirely disconnected from the principle of

as

causality; as without reason; as freedom in individual

actions : in other words, as completely opposed to Nature
and utterly unexplainable. On the other hand, if the
above-mentioned union of our external and internal know
ledge has once been accomplished at the point where both
meet, we then recognise two identities in spite of all
accidental differences. That is to say, we recognise the
identity of causality with itself on every degree of the

scale of beings, and the identity of the x, which at

firstwas unknown (i.e. of physical forces and vital phe
nomena), with the will which is within us. We recognise,
I say, firstly the essential identity of causality under
the various forms it is forced to assume on the different
degrees of the scale, as it may manifest itself, now as a
mechanical, chemical, or physical cause, now as a stimulus,
and again as a perceptible or an abstract motive : we
know it to be one and the same, not only when a pro
pelling body loses as much movement as it imparts by im
pact, but also when in the combats of thought against
thought, the victorious one, as the more powerful motive,
sets Man in motion, a motion which follows with no less

necessity than that of the ball which is struck. Where we

ourselves are the things set in motion, where therefore the
kernel of the process is well and intimately known to us,
320 THE WILL IN NATURE.

instead of allowing ourselves to dazzled and confused by

"be

this light and thereby losing sight of the causal connection

as it lies before us everywhere else in the whole of
Nature; instead of shutting out this insight for ever, we now
apply the new knowledge we have acquired from within
as a key to the knowledge of things outside us, and then
we recognise the second identity, that of our will with the
hitherto mysterious x that remains over after all causal
explanation as an insoluble residue. Consequently we
then say: even in cases in which the effect is brought
about by the most palpable cause, the mysterious x in the
process, the real innermost core of it, the true agent, the
in-itself of all phenomena which, after all, is only given
us as representation and according to the forms and laws
of representation is essentially one and the same with
what is known to us immediately and intimately as the
own body, which body is likewise
will in the actions of our

given us as intuition and representation. This is (say

what you will) the basis of true philosophy, and if the
present age does not see this, many following ages
will. Tempo e galant uomo ! (se nessun altro). Thus,
just as, on the one hand, the essence of causality, which
appears most clearly only on the lowest degree of the
objectification of the will, is recognised by us again
at
so also, on
every ascending step, even at the highest ;

the other hand, is the essence of the will recognised by us

at every descending step in that ladder, even at the lowest,
although this knowledge is only immediately acquired
at the very highest. The old error asserts, that where
there is will, there is no causality and that where there ;

is causality, there is no will. But we say everywhere :

where there is causality, there is will and no will acts

;

without causality. The punctum controversice therefore, is,

whether will and causality can and must subsist together
in one and the same process at the same time. What
 PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY. 321

makes the knowledge, that this is indeed the case, so diffi

cult, is the circumstance, that we know causality and will
in two fundamentally different ways causality entirely:

from outside, quite indirectly, quite through the under

standing will entirely from inside, quite directly and that
; ;

accordingly the clearer the knowledge of the one in each

given instance, the less clear is the knowledge of the other.
Therefore we recognise the essence of the will least readily,
where causality is most intelligible and, where the will is
;

most unmistakably evident, causality becomes so obscured,

that the vulgar mind could venture to deny its existence
altogether. Now, as Kant has taught us, causality is

nothing but the form of the understanding itself, knowable

a priori : that is, the essence of representation, as such,
which is one side of the world; the other side is will:
which is the thing in itself. That relative increase and
decrease of clearness in inverse proportion of causality and
of the will, that mutual advancing and receding of both,

depends consequently upon the fact, that the more a thing

isgiven us as mere phenomenon, i.e. as representation, the
more clearly does the a priori form of representation, i.e.
causality, manifest itself: this is the case in inanimate
Nature ; conversely, the more immediate our knowledge of
the will, the more does the form of representation recede
into the background: this is the case with ourselves.
That is : the nearer one side of the world approaches to
us, the more do we lose sight of the other.
 LINGUISTIC.

that I have to record under this head is an obser

ALL own, made within the last few years,
vation of my
which seems hitherto to have escaped notice. Yet, that it
is worthy of consideration, is attested by Seneca s utter
l
ance Hira in quibusdam rebus verborum proprietas est, et
:

consuetude sermonis antiqui qucedam efficacissimis not is

signat. Lichtenberg too says "If one thinks much one :

self, one finds a good deal of wisdom deposited in lan

guage. It is hardly likely that we have laid it all there

ourselves, but rather that a great deal of wisdom really
lies there."

In many, perhaps in all, languages, the action even of

those bodies which are without intellect, nay of inanimate
bodies, is expressed by the words to will, so that the exis
tence of a will in these bodiesis thus taken for granted ;

but they are never credited with a faculty for knowing,

representing, perceiving or thinking I know of no ex :

pression which conveys this.

Seneca, when speaking of lightning shot down from
2
heaven, says In his, ignibus accidit, quod arbor ibus :
:
"

cacumina, si tenera sunt, ita deorsum trahi pos-

quaruwi
sunt ut etiam terram attingant ; sed quum permiseris, in
t

locum suum exsilient. Itaque non est quod eum species

cujusque rei Jiabitum, qui illi non ex voluntate est. Si
ignem permittis ire quo velit, c&lum repetet" In a more
1 "
* "

Seneca, Epist." 81. Ibid. Quaest. nat." ii. 24.

 LINGUISTIC. 323

general sense Pliny says : nee qucerenda in ulla parte natures

1
ratio, sed voluntas. Nor do we find Greek less fertile in
instances. Aristotle, when explaining gravity, says /uiKpbv :

pev (j.6piov riJQ y?iic>

eav ptrewpiadiv atytOrj, fyeptTcii,
Kcti
pivtiv
OVK cdA.ec (parva quo&da/m terras, pars, si elevata dimittitur,
2
neque vult manere). And: Ael fie Itaaarov Xeyfti/ TOIOVTOV
ft vac, o (j>vaet(3ov\rai elrai, KO.I o vVa(0)(ft, a XXa prj o /3/p KCU

irapa tyvaiv (unumquodque autem tale dicere oportet, quale

naturd sud quod est ; sed non id quod violentid
esse vult, et
et prceter naturam est). 3 Of great and more than merely
linguistic importance is what Aristotle says in his "

Ethica
4
magna," where not only animals, but inanimate beings (fire

striving upwards and earth downwards) are explicitly in

question, and he asserts that they may be obliged to do
something contrary to their nature or their will :
irapa
fyvaiv rt, 17 Trap a /3 ovXovrai TTUIEIV, and therefore rightly
places Trap a /3ouAovrcu as a paraphrase of irapa. tyvaiv.
Anacreon, in his 29th Ode, Ba 0/XXov, in ordering the <e

portrait of his lady-love, says of her hair "EXt/cac & e\evde- :

povg pot TrXoKra^Ltwv, araicra ffvvdetQ, a^)fe, ug Xwo-i, Kflvdai

(capillorum cirros incomposite jungens, sine utut volunt
5
jacere) . In Grerman, Burger says : hinab will der Bach, "

niclithinan"
(the brook will go downwards not upwards).
In daily life we constantly hear the water boils, it will :
"

run over," the glass will break," the ladder will not
" "

feu ne veuipas
"

stand;" le bruler."
"

la corde, unefois
tordue,VQuttoujours se retordre" In Engh sh, the verb to

1
Plin. Hist, nat."
37, 15.
2
Aristot. "

De Ccelo." ii. c. 13,

"

If a small particle of earth is lifted

and away and will not rest." [Tr. s add.]

let loose, it is carried
3
Ibid. c. 14, But each thing ought to be named as it wills to be and
"

really is according to its nature, not as it is by force and contrary to its

nature." [Tr. s add.]
4 Arist. "

Eth. c. 14.
Mag." i.
5 "

Let the freely curling locks fall unarranged as they will [UJce\."

[Tr. s add]
324 THE WILL IN NATURE.

will is even the auxiliary of the future of all the other

verbs, thus expressing the notion, that there lies a will at

the bottom of every action. In English moreover, the en
deavours of inanimate and unconscious things, are ex
all

pressly designated by the word want, which denotes every

sort of human desire or endeavour the water wants to "

get out,"
"

the steam wants to find an issue." In Italian

1
too we have vuol piovere ; "
"
"

quest orologio non vuol

andare" The conception of willing is besides so deeply
rooted in this last language, that it seems to indicate every
thing that is requisite or necessary: ci vuol un con-
"

"

trappeso ;
"

ci vuol pazienza."
A very striking instance of this is to be found even in
Chinese a language which differs fundamentally from all
those belonging to the Sanskrit family it is in the commen
1
tary to the Y-King, accurately rendered by Peter Kegis as
follows : Tang, sen materia coelestis, vult rursus ingredi, vel
"

(ut verbis doctoris Tsching-tse utar) vult rursus esse in supe-

riore loco ; scilicet illius naturce ratio ita fert, seu innata lex.

The following passage from Liebig has decidedly much

more than a linguistic signification, for it expresses an inti
mate feeling and comprehension of the way in which a
chemical process takes place. Aldehyd arises, which with
"

the same avidity as sulphurous acid, combines directly with

oxygen to form, acetic acid." And again:
3
"Aldehyd,
which absorbs oxygen from the air with great avidity"
As Liebig uses this expression twice in speaking of the
same phenomenon, it can hardly be by chance, but rather
because it was the only adequate expression for the thing. 4

1
Y-King," ed. J. Mohl, TO!, i. p. 341.
2
Liebig, Die Chemie in ihrer Anwendung auf Agrikultur,"
"

p. 394.
3
Ibid.
"

Die Chemie in Anwendung auf Physiologie.

*
French chemists likewise say :
"

II est Evident que Us mtaux ne

sont pas tous tgalement abides d oxygene" . . . . "

La difficult^ de la
reduction devait correspond ntcessairement a une avidit<S
fort grande
 LINGUISTIC. 325

That most immediate stamp of our thoughts, language,

shows us therefore, that every inward impulse must neces
sarily be conceived as volition but it by no means ascribes ;

knowledge to things as well. The agreement on this point

between all languages, perhaps without a
single exception,
proves that here we have to do with no mere figure of
speech, but that the verbal expression is determined by a
deeply-rooted feeling of the inner nature of things.

du mttal pour Voxygtne" (See Paul de Remusat,

"

La Chimie a 1 Ex-
position."
"

L Aluminium," "

Revue des Deux Mondes," 1855, p. 649).

Vaninus ("De Amirandis Naturae Arcanis," p. 170) had said:
Argentum vivum etiam in aqua, conglobatur, quemadmodum et in
"

plumbi scobe etiam: at a scobe non refugit (this is directed against an

opinion expressed by Cardanus) imo ex ea quantum potest colligit :
quod nequit (scil. colligere), ut censeo, invitum relinquit: natura enim
et sua appetit, et vorat." This is evidently more than a form of words.
He here quite decidedly attributes a will to quicksilver. And thus it
will invariably be found that where, in physical and chemical processes,
there is a reference to elementary forces of Nature and to the primary

qualities of bodies which cannot be further deduced, these are always

expressed by words which belong to the will and its manifestations.
[Add. to 3rd ed.]
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC.
1818, when my chief work firstappeared, Animal
INMagnetism had only begun to struggle into existence.
But, as to its explanation although, to be sure, some light
had been thrown upon the passive side of it, that is, upon
what goes on within the patient, by the contrast between
the cerebral and the ganglionic systems, to which Eeil had
drawn attention, having been taken for the principle of
explanation the active side, the agent proper by means of
which the magnetiser evokes all these phenomena, was
still completely shrouded in darkness. People groped
about among all sorts of material principles of explanation,
such as Mesmer s all-permeating ether, or the exhalations
from the magnetiser s skin, assumed by Stieglitz to be

the cause, &c. &c. At the utmost a nerve- spirit had been
recognised and, after all, this was but a word for an un
known thing. The truth had scarcely begun to dawn upon
a few persons, whom
practice had more deeply initiated.
But I was stillfrom hoping for any direct corroboration
far
of my doctrine from Magnetism.
Dies diem docet however, and the great teacher, expe
rience, has since brought to light an important fact con
cerning this deep-reaching agent which, proceeding from
the magnetiser, produces effects apparently so contrary to
the regular course of Nature that the long lasting doubt as
to their existence, the stiff-necked incredulity, the condemna
tion of a Committee of which Lavoisier and Franklin were
members, in short, the whole opposition that Magnetism
encountered both in its first and second period (with the sola
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 327

exception of the coarse, unintelligent condemnation without

inquiry, which till very lately, prevailed in England) is quite
excusable. The fact I allude to is, that this agent is nothing
but the will of the magnetiser. To-day not a doubt exists
on this point, I believe, among those who combine practice
with insight ;
therefore I think it superfluous to quote the
numerous assertions of magnetisers in corroboration of it. 1

Time has thus not only verified Puysegur s watchword and

that of the older French magnetisers Veuillez et croyez :
"

!"

i.e. Will with belief

"

but this very watchword has even !

"

2
developed into a correct insight of the process itself.
From Kieser s Tellurismus," still the
"

probably most
thorough and detailed text book of Animal Magnetism we
have, clearly results, that no act of Magnetism can take
it

effect without the will on the other hand the bare will, with ;

out any outward action, is able to produce every magnetic

effect. Manipulation seems to be only a means of fixing,
and so to say incorporating, the will and its direction. In
this sense Kieser says Inasmuch as the human hand :
"

being the organ by which Man s outward activity is most

visibly expressed is the efficient organ in magnetising,
manipulation arises." De Lausanne, a French magnetiser,
pronounces himself with still greater precision on this
point in the Fourth Book of his Annales du Magnetisme
"

Animal (1814-1816), where he says

"

L action du mag- :
"

netisme depend de la seule volonte, il est vrai ; mais Vhomme

ayant une forme exte*rieure et sensible, tout ce qui est a
son usage, tout ce qui doit agir sur lui, doit necessairement
1
I only mention one work which has recently appeared, the explicit

object of which is to show that the magnetiser s will is the real agent :
Qu est par E. Gromier.
"
"
ce que le Magnetisme ? (Lyon, 1850.)
2
Puysegur himself in the year 1784:
"

says Lorsque vous aves

magn6tis6 le malade, votre but tait de I endormir, et vous y avez rtussi
par le seul acte de votre volonU ; c est dc memepar un autre acte de volontt

que vous Magnet. Anim." 2me

"

le rtveillez." edit.
(Puysegur, 1820,
Cate"chisme Magne"tique," p. 150-17L) [Add. to 3rd ed.]
328 THE WILL TN NATURE.

en avoir une, et pour que la volonte agisse,ilfautqu elle em

ploye un mode d As, according to ray doctrine, the
action."

organism is but the mere phenomenon, the visibility, the

objectivity of the will; nay, as it is properly speaking
only the will itself, viewed as representation in the brain :

so also does the outward act of manipulation coincide with

the inward act of the will. But where magnetic effects
are produced without manipulation, they take place as it
were artificially, in a roundabout way, the imagination
taking the place of the outer act and even occasionally that
of personal presence wherefore it is much more diffi
:

cult and succeeds less frequently. Kieser accordingly

alleges that the word Sleep or You must"

said I
"
"

!
"

aloud, has a more powerful effect upon a somnabulist than

the mere inward willing of the maf letiser. On the other
hand manipulation, and in general outward action, is
really an infallible means of fixing the magnetiser s will
and promoting its activity precisely because outward acts ;

are quite impossible apart from all will, the body and
itsorgans being nothing but the visibility of the will
itself. This explains the fact, that magnetisers at
times magnetise without any conscious effort of volitio
and almost without thinking, and yet produce the de
sired effect. On the whole, it is not the consciousness of
volition, reflection upon it, that acts magnetically, but pure
volition itself, as detached as possible from all representa
tion. In Kieserdirections to magnetisers therefore, 1 we
s

find all thinking and reflecting upon their respective doing

and suffering, all conversation between them, forbidden
both to physician and patient also all outward impres ;

sions which arouse representations, the presence of strangers,

and even daylight. He advises that everything should
proceed as unconsciously as possible, as is likewise recom
mended in charm-cures. The true reason of all this is, that

1 ;

Kieser,
"

Tellur. vol. i.
p. 400,
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 329

here the will operates in its primariness, as thing in itself ;

and this demands the exclusion, as far as possible, of repre

sentation, as a different sphere, as secondary to the will.
Facts to prove that the real agent in magnetising is the
willand each outward act only its vehicle, may be found
more recent and more trustworthy writings upon
in all the

Magnetism, and it would be needless prolixity to repeat

them here. Nevertheless I will quote one case, not as
being especially striking, but as furnished by a remarkable
person and having a peculiar interest as his testimony.
Jean Paul says in a letter x Twice in a large company I
:
"

have made Frau von K. nearly go to sleep by merely look

ing at her with a firm will, no one else knowing anything
about it, and before that, I had brought on palpitation of
the heart and pallor to such a degree that Dr. S. had to
2
be summoned to her assistance." Nowadays too, merely
laying and keeping hold of the patient s hands while fixing
1
See Wahrheit aus Jean Paul s Leben," vol. viii. p. 120.
"

2
had the good fortune in the year 1854 myself to witness soms
I
extraordinary feats of this kind, performed here by Signor Regaz-
zoni from Bergamo, in which the immediate, i.e. magical, power of his
will over other persons was unmistakeable, and of which no one,

excepting perhaps those to whom Nature has denied all capacity for appre
bending pathological conditions, could doubt the genuineness. There
are nevertheless such persons they ought to become lawyers, clergymen,
:

merchants or soldiers, but in heaven s name not doctors ; for the result
would be homicidal, diagnosis being the principal thing in medicine.
Regazzoni was able at will to throw the somnambulist who was under
his influence into a state of complete catalepsy, nay, he could make her
fall down backwards, when he stood behind her and she was walking

before him, by his mere will, without any gestures. He could paralyze
her, give her tetanos, with the dilated pupils, the complete insensi
bility, and in short, all the unmistakeable symptoms of complete
catalepsy. He made one of the lady spectators first play the piano ; then
standing fifteen paces behind her, he so completely paralyzed her by his
will and gestures, that she was unable to continue playing. He next
placed her against a column and charmed her to the spot, so that she
\vas unable to move in spite of the strongest efforts. According to my
own observation, nearly all his feats are to be explained by his isolating
330 THE WILL IN NATURE.

the eye steadily upon him, is frequently substituted with

complete success for the customary manipulation precisely ;

because even this outward act is suited to fix the will in a

determined direction. But this immediate power which
the will can exercise over other persons, is brought to light
best of all by the admirable experiments made, even in
public, by M. Dupotet and his pupils in Paris, in which
a stranger is guided and determined at pleasure by the
magnetiser s mere will, aided by a few gestures, and is
even forced into the most extraordinary contortions. An
apparently quite honestly written pamphlet, entitled First
"

glance into the wonder- world of Magnetism," by Karl

Scholl (1853). contains a brief account of this.
In the Communications concerning the somnambulist,
"

Auguste K. in Dresden" (1843),we find the truth in ques

tion confirmed in another way by what the somnambulist
herself says, p. 53 :
"

I was half asleep and my brother

the brain from the spinal
marrow, either completely, in which case the
sensible and motor nerves become paralyzed, and total catalepsy ensues ;

or partially, by the paralysis only affecting the motor nerves while

sensibility remains in other words, the head keeps its consciousness,
while the body is apparently lifeless. This is precisely the effect of
strychnine it paralyzes the motor nerves only, even to complete tetanos,
:

which induces death by asphyxia ; but it leaves the sensible nerves, and
with them consciousness, intact. Eegazzoni does this same thing by the
magic influence of his will. The moment at which this isolation takes
place is distinctly visible in a peculiar trembling of the .patient. I
recommend a small French publication entitled Antoine Regazzoni "

de
Bergame & Francfort sur Mein," by L. A. V. Dubourg (Frankfurt,
Nov. 1854, 31 pages in 8vo.) on Regazzoni s feats and the unmistakeably
genuine character they bear for everyone who is not entirely devoid of
all sense for organic Nature.
In the "

Journal du Magnetisme," edit. Dupotet, of the 15th August,

1856, in criticizing a treatise: "De la Catalepsie, memoire couronne","
1856, in 4to, the reviewer, Morin, says : La plupart des caracteres qui
"

distinguent la catalepsie, peuvent etre obtenus artinciellement et sans

danger sur les sujets magne tiques, et c est meme la une des experiences
les plus ordinaires des stances magn6tiques." [Add. to 3rd ed,}
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 331

wished to play a piece he knew. As I did not like it, I re

quested him not to play it; nevertheless he tried to
do so and then, by means of my firm will that he
should not, I succeeded in making him unable to remem
ber the piece, in spite of all his endeavours." The thing
is however brought to a climax when this immediate

power of the will is extended even to inanimate bodies.

However incredible this may appear, we have nevertheless
two accounts of it coming from entirely different quarters.
1
In the book just mentioned, it is related and testified by
witnesses, that Auguste K. caused the needle of the com
pass to deviate at one time 7 and at another 4, this ex
periment moreover being repeated four times. She did
this moreover without any use of her hands, through her
mere will, by looking steadily at it. The Parisian som
nambulist, Prudence Bernard, again in a public seance in
London, at which Mr. Brewster, the physicist s son and
two other gentlemen from among the spectators acted as
jurors, made the compass needle deviate and follow her
movements by simply turning her head round. 2
Now, if we thus see the will stated by me to be the
thing in itself, the only real thing in all existence, the
kernel of Nature accomplish through the human indi
vidual, in Animal Magnetism and even beyond it, things
which cannot be explained according to the causal nexus,
i.e.in the regular course of Nature; if we find it in a
sense even annulling Nature s laws and actually perform
ing actio in distans, consequently manifesting a super
natural, that is, metaphysical, mastery over Nature
what corroboration better founded on fact could I desire
formy doctrine ? Was not even Count Szapary, a magne-
1
Mittheilungen iiber die Somnambiile, Auguste K., in
"

Dresden."

1845, pp. 115, 116, and 3 16.

2
See extract from the English periodical "

Britannia," in "

Galignani s

Messenger," of the 23rd October, 1851.

332 THE WILL IN NATURE.

tiser who certainly did not know my philosophy, led by

the results of his own experience, after writing the title
of his book :
"

A word about Animal Magnetism, soul-

l
bodies and vital to add the following remark essence,"

able explanatory words or physical proofs that

"

: th<3

current of Animal Magnetism is the element, and the

2
will the principle of all spiritualand corporeal life ?"

According to this, Animal Magnetism presents itself

directly as practical Metaphysic, which was the term use!
3
by Bacon of Yerulam to define Magic in his classifica
tion the
sciences: it is empirical or experimental
of

Metaphysic. Further, because the will manifests itself

in Animal Magnetism downright as the thing in itself,
we see the principium individuationis (Space and Time),
which belongs to mere phenomenon, at once annulled :

its limits which separate individuals from one another,

are destroyed; Space no longer separates magnetiser

and somnambulist community of thoughts and of motions ;

of the will appears the state of clairvoyance overleaps ;

the relations belonging to mere phenomenon and con

ditioned by Time and Space, such as proximity and dis
tance, the present and the future.
In consequence of these facts, notwithstanding many
reasons and prejudices to the contrary, the opinion has
gradually gained ground, nay almost raised itself to cer
tainty, that Animal Magnetism and its phenomena are
identical with part of the Magic of former times, of that
ill-famed occult art, of whose reality not only the Chris
tian ages it was so cruelly persecuted, but all, not
by which
excepting even savage, nations on the whole of the earth,
1
Szapa.ry, Ein Wort iiber Animalischen Magnetismus, Seelenkorper
"

und Lebensessenz (1840).

"

2
Oder physische Beweise, dass der Animalisch-magnetiseke Strom
"

das Element, und der Wille das Princip alles geistigen und Korperlichen
Lcbens sei."

3
Bacon,
"

Instaur. Magna," L. III.

 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 333

have been equally convinced throughout all ages. The

1
Twelve Tables of the Eomans, the Books of Moses, and
even Plato s Eleventh Book on Laws, already made its
practice punishable by death, and Apuleius beautiful
2
speech before the court of justice, when defending himself
against the charge of practising magic by which his life
was menaced, proves how seriously this matter was taken
even in the most enlightened Roman period, under the
Antouines; since he merely tries to clear himself person
ally from the charge in question, but by no means contests
the possibility of witchcraft and even enters into a host of
absurd details such as are wont to figure in all the me-
diseval trials for witchcraft. The eighteenth century
makes an exception as regards this belief in Magic, and this
is mainly because Balthasar Becker, Thorn asius and some

others, with the good intention of putting an end once for

all tothe cruel trials for witchcraft, declared all magic to
be impossible. Favoured by the philosophy of the age,
this opinion soon gained the upper hand, although only

among the learned and educated classes. The common

people have never ceased to believe in witchcraft, even in
England; though here the educated classes contrive to
unite a degrading religious bigotry with the firm incredu
lity of a Saint Thomas (or of a Thomasius) as to all facts
transcending the laws of impact and counter-impact, acids
and alkalis, and refuse to lend an ear to their great coun
tryman, when he tells them that there are more things in
heaven and earth than are dreamt of in their philosophy/
One branch of Magic is still notoriously preserved and prac
tised among the lower orders, being tolerated on account
of its beneficent purpose. This is curing by charms (sym-
pathetische Kuren, as they are called in German), the reality
of which can hardly be doubted. Charming away warts,
1
Plin. hist. nat. L. 30, c. 3. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
2
Apuleius,
"

Oratio cle Magia,"

p. 104. Bip.
334 THE WILL IN NATURE.

is one of the commonest forms of this practice, and of this

Bacon of Yerulam, cautious and empirical though he was,
1
attests the efficacy from personal experience. The charm
of in the face by a is another
ing away erisypelas spell,
instance, and so often succeeds, that it is easy to con
vince oneself of its existence. Fever too is often success
2
fully combated by spells, &c. &c. That, in all this, the
real agents are not the meaningless words and ceremonies,
but that it is the will of the operator which acts, as in

Animal Magnetism, needs no further explanation after

what has been said above. For such as are still unac
quainted with charm-cures, instances may be found in
3
Kieser. These two facts therefore, Animal Magnetism and
Charm-curing, bear empirical evidence to the possibility of
magical, as opposed to physical, influence, which possi
bility had been so peremptorily rejected by the past
cen

tury ;
since it refused to recognise as possible any other
1
Bacon, Silva Silvarura," 997.
2
In the "Times" of June the 12th, 1855, we find, p. 10, the fol

lowing :

"

A Horse-charmer.
On
the voyage England the ship Simla experienced some heavy
to
"

weather in the Bay of Biscay, in which the horses suffered severely, and
some, including a charger of General Scarlett, became unmanageable.
A valuable mare was so very bad, that a pistol was got ready to shoot
her and to end her misery ; when a Eussian officer recommended a
Cossak prisoner to be sent for, as he was a juggler and could, by
charms, cure any malady in a horse. He was sent for, and immediately
said he could cure it at once. He was closely watched, but the only
thing they could observe him do was to take his sash off and tie a knot
in it three several times. However the mare, in a few minutes, got on her
feet and began to eat heartily, and rapidly recovered." [Add. to 3rd ed.]
2 Archiv. fur den thierischen Magnetismus," vol. v. heft 3,
"

Kieser,
p. 106 ;
vol. viri. heft 3, p. 172 and vol. ix. heft
145 ;
vol. ix. heft 2, p. ;

1, Most s book likewise:

p. 128; Dr.
Uber Sympathetische Mittel "

und Kuron," 1842, may be used as an introduction to this matter. (And

even Pliny indicates a number of charm-cures in the 28th Book, chaps.
6 to 17. [Add. to 3rd ed.])
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 335

than physical influences brought about in the way of the

intelligible nexus of causality.
It is a fortunate circumstance, that the rectification of
this view in our time should have come from medical science;
because it ensures us at the same time against the danger
of the pendulum of opinion receiving too strong an impulse
in the contrary direction, and thus carrying us back to
the superstition of ruder ages. Besides, as I have said,
Animal Magnetism and Charm- curing only save the reality
of a part of Magic, which included a good deal more, a
considerable portion of which must, for the present at
least,remain under the old sentence of condemnation or be
left in uncertainty whereas another portion will at any
;

rate have to be conceived as possible, through its analogy

to Animal Magnetism. For Animal Magnetism and
Charm-cures are but salutary influences exercised for cura
tive purposes, like those recorded in the "History of
Magic" as practised by the so-called (Spanish) Saluda-
1
dores, who
nevertheless were also condemned by the
Church whereas Magic was far oftener practised with an
;

evil intent. Nevertheless, to judge by analogy, it is more

than probable, that the same inherent force which, by
acting directly upon another individuality, can exercise a
salutary influence, will be at least as powerful to exercise
a prejudicial and pernicious one. If therefore there was
any part of ancient Magic beyond what may be
reality in
referred toAnimal Magnetism and curing by charms, it
must assuredly have been in that which is called male-
ficium and fascinatio, the very thing that gave rise to
most of the trials for witchcraft. In Most s book, too,
2
already mentioned, a few facts are related which must
1
Delrio. "

Disqu. L. III. P. 2, q. 4, s. 7 and Bodinus, "

Mag." Mag.
Daemon," iii. 2.
2 2
See note , p. 334, especially pp. 40, 41, and Nos. 89, 91, and
97 of Most s book.
336 THE WILL IN NATTTEE.

*
undoubtedly be ascribed to maleficium ; in Kieser also
we find instances of diseases which had been transmitted,
especially to dogs, who died of them. In Plutarch 2 we
find that fascinatio was already known to Democritus,
who tried to explain it as a fact. Now admitting these
stories to be true, they give us the key to the crime of

witchcraft, the zealous persecution of which would there

fore not have been quite without reason. For even if in
most cases it may have been founded upon error and
abuse, we are still not authorized to look upon our fore
fathers as having been so utterly benighted, as to persecute
with the utmost vigour and cruelty for so many ages an abso
lutely impossible crime. From this point of view moreover,
we can also understand that the common people should
still even to the present day persist in attributing certain

cases of illness to a maleficium, and are not to be dissuaded

from this conviction. Now if we are thus induced by the
progress of the age to modify the extreme view adopted by
the last century concerning the absolute nullity of this ill-
famed art at any rate with respect to some part of it
stillnowhere is caution more necessary than here, in order
to fish outfrom the chaos of fraud, falsehood and absurdity
contained in the writings of Agrippa von Nettesheim,
Wierus, Bodinus, Delrio, Bindsfeldt, &c. &c., the few
isolated truths that may lie in them. For, frequent
though they may be throughout the world, nowhere have
lies and deceit freer play than where Nature s la^ re

avowedly set aside, nay declared invalid. Here there re

we find the wildest fictions, the strangest freaks of the

imagination worked up into an edifice, lofty as the sides,
on the narrow foundation of the slight particle of truth there
may have been in Magic, and in consequence of this, the

1
Kieser, "Archiv. f. t. M." See the account of Bende Bensen s

illness, vol. ix. to vol. xii.

2
qu. v. 7.
"

Plutarch, Symposiacse qusestionis,"

6.
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC.

most sanguinary atrocities perpetrated age after age. In

contemplating such things, the psychological reflection on
the unlimited capability of the human intellect for accept
ing the most incredible absurdities and the readiness of
the human heart to set its seal to them by cruelty, prevails
over every other.
Yet the modification which has taken place of late in the
views of German savants respecting magic, is not due
exclusively to Animal Magnetism. The deep foundations
of it had already been laid by the change in philosophy

wrought by Kant, which makes German culture differ

fundamentally from that of the rest of Europe, with
respect to philosophy as well as to other branches of
knowledge. For a man to be able to smile beforehand at
all occult sympathies, let alone magical influences, he must
find the world very, nay completely, intelligible. But this
is only possible if he looks at it with the utterly superficial

glance which puts away from it all suspicion that we

human beings are immersed in a sea of riddles and mys
teries and have no exhaustive knowledge or understanding
either of things or of ourselves in any direct way. Nearly
all
greatmen have been of the opposite frame of mind
and therefore, whatever age or nation they belonged to,
have always betrayed a slight tinge of superstition. If
our natural mode of knowing were one that handed over
to us things in themselves immediately and consequently

gave us the absolutely true relations and connections of

things, we might then, no doubt, be justified in rejecting a
priori, therefore unconditionally, all prescience of future
events, all apparitions of absent, of dying, let alone of
deceased persons, and all magical influence. But if all

that we know is, as Kant teaches, mere phenomenon, the

forms and laws of which do not extend to things in them
selves, it must be obviously premature to reject all fore

knowledge, all apparitions and all magic; since that

338 THE WILL IN NATTJKE.

rejection is basedupon laws, whose a, priori character pre

cisely restrictsthem to phenomena; whereas things in
themselves, to which even our own inner self must belong,
remain untouched by them. But it is quite possible for
these very things in themselves to have relations with us
from which the above-mentioned occurrences may have
arisen, concerning which accordingly we have to wait for the
decision a posteriori, and must not forestall it. That the
English and French should persist in denying a priori all
such occurrences, comes at the bottom from the influence
of Locke s philosophy, under which these nations still
stand as to all essential points, and by which we are taught
that, aftermerely subtracting sensation, we know things
in According to this view therefore, the
themselves.
laws of the material world are held to be ultimate, and
no other influence than influxus physicus is admitted.
Consequently these nations believe, it is true, in a phy
sical, but not in a metaphysical, science, and there
fore reject all other than so-called "Natural Magic:"
a term which contains the same contradictio in adjecto as
Supernatural Physics," but is nevertheless constantly
"

used quite seriously, while the latter was used but once,
and then in joke, by Lichtenberg. On the other hand, the
common people, with their universal readiness to give
credit to supernatural influences, express by it in their own
way the conviction, that all things which we perceive and
comprehend are mere phenomena, not things in themselves ;

although, with them, conviction is only I quote the

felt.

following passage from Kant s Grundlegung zur Meta-

"

physik der Sitten," as a proof that thisis not saying too

much There is an observation requiring no great subtlety

:
"

of reflection, which we may on the contrary suppose the most

ordinary understanding capable of making, albeit in its

own way and by an obscure distinction of the faculty of
judgment, which it calls feeling. It is this : that all our
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 339

involuntary representations (such as those of the senses)

give us no further knowledge of objects than as they affect
us, whereby we are left in ignorance as to what those
objects be in themselves that, as far as this sort of
may ;

representation is concerned therefore, we are still only

able by this means to attain knowledge of phenomena, but
never of things in themselves, even by dint of the utmost
clearness and the most strenuous attention the under
standing is able to give to this point. When once this
distinction is made, however, it stands to reason, that the
existence of something else behind these phenomena,
something which is not phenomenon, i.e. the thing in
itself, has still to be admitted and assumed."
*

When we read D. Tiedemann s History of Magic," a

"

we are astonished at the persistency with which mankind

have clung to the thought of Magic in all places and at all
times, notwithstanding frequent failure and we come to ;

the conclusion, that this thought must, to say the least, be

deeply rooted in human nature,, if not in things in general,
and cannot be a mere arbitrary creation of the fancy. Al
though Magic is differently denned by the various authors
who have treated of it, the fundamental thought which
predominates in all its definitions is nevertheless unmis-
takeable. For the opinion, that there must be another quite
different way of producing changes in the world besides
the regular one through the causal nexus between bodies,
and one moreover which is not founded at all upon that
nexus, has found favour in all ages and countries. There
fore also the means belonging to this second way appeared
absurd, when they were viewed in the same light as the
first; since the cause applied was obviously not suited
1
Kant, "First Principles of Ethical Metaphysic," 3rd edition, p. 105.
8
D. Tiedemann, Disputatio de qusestione, quse fuerit artum magi
"

carum origo." Marb. 1787. A prize-essay written for the Gottingen

Society.
340 THE WILL nr NATTFEE.

and a causal nexus between them

to the effect intended
was impossible. But here it was assumed, that apart
from the outer connection between the phenomena of
this world on which the nexus physicus is founded, there
must exist another besides, passing through the very
essence in itself of all things a subterranean connection as
:

it were, by means of which immediate action was possible

from one point of the phenomenon on to every other point,

through a nexus metaphysicus ;
that accordingly, it must be possible to act upon things
from inside, instead of from outside, as is usual ;

that it must be possible for phenomenon to act upon

phenomenon by means of that being in itself, which is one

and the same in all phenomena ;

that, just as we
act causally as natura naturata, we

might probably be able to act also as natura naturans, and

momentarily to enable the microcosm to play the part of
the macrocosm ;

that, however firm the partition walls of individuation

and separation might be, they might nevertheless occa
sionally permit a communication to take place as it were be
hind the scenes, or like a secret game under the table and ;

that, just as a neutralisation of individual isolation takes

place in somnambulistic clairvoyance, so likewise might a

neutralisation of the will in the individual be possible. Such
a thought as this cannot have arisen empirically, nor can
it have been confirmation through experience that has pre

served it throughout all ages and in all countries for in

:

the majority of cases experience must result downright un

favourably to it. I opine therefore, that the origin of this
thought, which has universally held its ground with the
whole of mankind and, in spite of so much conflicting
experience, in defiance of common sense, has never been
eradicated,must be sought at great depth namely in the
:

inward feeling of the omnipotence of the will in itself- of

 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 341

that which constitutes at once the inner essence of

will,
Man and whole of Nature and in the assumption
of the
connected with it that, somehow or other, this omnipotence
might possibly for once make itself felt, even when pro
ceeding from the individual. People were unable to in
vestigate and distinguish the difference between the capa
bilities of the will as thing in itself and the same will in its
individual manifestation but they assumed without fur
;

ther ado, that under certain circumstances, the will might

be enabled to break through the barriers of individuation.
For the above-mentioned feeling rebelled obstinately
against the knowledge forced upon it by experience, that
"

Der Gott der mir im Busen wohnt,

Kann tief mein Innerstes erregen,
Der iiber alien meinen Kraften thront,
Er kann nach Aussen nichts bewegen."

According to the fundamental thought just expounded, we

find that the physical medium used in all attempts at

magic, never was regarded in any other light than in thnt

of a vehicle for a thing metaphysical otherwise it coukl ;

evidently stand in no relation whatever to the effect con

templated. These media consisted in cabalistic words, sym
bolical actions, traced figures, wax images, &c. &c. We see
too that, according to the original feeling, what this vehicle

conveyed, was in the last resort always an act of volition

that had been connected with it. The very natural induce
ment to do this, was theobservation, that every moment men
became aware of a completely unaccountable, that is, evi
dently metaphysical, agency of the will, in the movements
or their own bodies. Might not this agency, they thought,
be extended to other bodies also ? To find out a way to
annul the isolation in which the will finds itself in each in
dividual, and to extend the immediate sphere of the will s
action beyond the organism of the person willing, was the
nim of Magic.
342 THE WILL IN NATURE.

A great deal was nevertheless still wanting ere this fun

damental thought, from which Magic seems properly to
have sprung, could pass over at once into distinct con
sciousness and be recognised in abstracto, and ere Magic
could at once understand itself. Only a few thoughtful
and learned writers of former ages as I mean soon to prove
by quotations express the distinct thought, that it is in the
will itself that the magic power lies, and that the strange
signs and acts together with the senseless words that

accompanied them, which passed for the means of exorcis

ing and the connecting link with demons, are in fact merely
vehicles and means for fixing the will, by which the act of
volition, which is to act magically, ceases to be mere wish
and becomes deed, or, to use the language of Paracelsus,
receives a corpus" and the individual will in a sense dis
"

tinctly proclaims that it is now acting as general will, as

will in itself. For in every act of Magic charm-cure or
whatever else it may be the outward action (the connect
ing link) is exactly what the passes are in magnetising :

i.e. not what is really essential, but the mere vehicle,

that by which the will, the only real agent, is directed and
fixed in the material world and enters into reality. As a
rule therefore, it is indispensable. From the rest of the
writers of those times we gather that, in conformity with
that fundamental thought of Magic, their only aim was to
obtain absolute, arbitrary power over Nature. But they
were unable to elevate themselves to the thought that this
power must be a direct one they conceived it, on the con
;

trary, absolutely as an indirect one. For all religions in

all countries had placed Nature under the dominion of

gods and of demons. Now, it was the magician s endea

vour to subject these gods and demons to his will, to in
duce, nay, to force them to serve him and he attributed
;

all that he succeeded in achieving to their agency, just as

Mesmer attributed the success of his Magnetism to the mag-

 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 343

netic rods he held in his hands, instead of to his will which

was the real agent. It was in this sense that all poly
1
theistic nations took the matter, and even Plotinus, but
more especially lamblichns, understood Magic that is, as :

Theurgy, an expression which Porphyry was the first to

use. That divine aristocracy, Pantheism, was favourable to
this interpretation, since it distributed the dominion over
the different forces of Nature among as many gods and
demons mostly mere personifications of natural forces
and the magician, by persuasion or by force, subjected now
one, now the other of these divinities to his power and
made them do his bidding. But in a Divine Monarchy,
where all Nature obeys a single ruler, the thought of con
tracting a private alliance with the Almighty, let alone of
exercising sovereignty over him, would have been too auda
cious. Therefore where Judaism, Christianity or Islam
prevailed, the omnipotence of the one God stood in the
way of this interpretation of Magic : an omnipotence which
the magician could not venture to attack. He had no
alternative therefore, but to take refuge with the Devil,
and with this rebellious spirit perhaps even direct de
scendant of Ahriman to whom some power over Nature
was still attributed, he now entered into a compact, by
which he ensured to himself his assistance. This was
"necromancy" (the black art ). Its antithesis, white
Magic, was opposed to it by the circumstance that, in it,
the magician did not make friends with the Devil, but
rather solicited the permission, not to say co-operation,
of the to intercede with the angels
Almighty himself, ;

oftener he invoked devils by pronouncing the rarer

still,

Hebrew names and titles of the One God, such as Adon-Ai,

&c. &c., and compelled them to obey him, without promising
1
Here and there, Plotinus betrays a more correct knowledge, for
" "

instance, Enn." ii. lib. iii. c. 7 j Enn." iv. lib. iii. c. 12, et lib. ix.

c.3.
344 THE WILL IN NATURE.

them anything in return for their services, in a hell-com

1
pulsion But all these mere interpreta
(Hollenzwang).
tions and outward trappings of the thing were received so
entirely as its essence and as objective processes, that
writers like Bodinus, Delrio, Bindsfeldt, &c., whose know
ledge of magic was second-hand and not derived from per
sonal experience, all assert the essential characteristic of
Magic to be, that it does not act either through forces of
Nature or in a natural way, but through the assistance of
the Devil. This view was, and long remained, current
everywhere, locally modified according to the religions
which prevailed in different countries. The laws against
sorcery and the trials for witchcraft were based upon it ;

likewise, wherever the possibility of Magic was contested,

the attacks were generally directed against this opinion.
An objective view, such as this, was an inevitable conse
quence of the decided Realism which prevailed throughout
ancient and mediaeval Europe and which Descartes was the
first to disturb. Till then, Man had not learnt to direct
the light of speculative thought towards the mysterious
depths of his own inner self, but, on the contrary, had
sought everything outside himself. Above all the thought
of making the will he found within him rule over Nature,
was so bold, that people would have been alarmed by it :

therefore it was made

to rule over fictitious beings, sup

posed by the prevailing superstition to have command over

Nature, in order through them to obtain at least indirect
mastery over Nature. Every sort of god or demon more
over, is always a hypostasis, by which believers of all sects
and colours bring to their own comprehension the Metaphysi
cal, that which lies behind Nature, that which gives her
existence and consistence and consequently rules over her.
Thus, when it is said, that Magic acts by the help of demons,
1
Delrio, Disq. mag." L.
"

ii. qu. 2. Agrippa a Nettesheym,

"

De
Vanit. Scient." c. 45.
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 345

the meaning which lies at the bottom of this thought still

is, thatit is an agency which is not physically, but metaphy

sically exercised that it is not a natural, but a supernatural,

:

agency. Now if, in the small amount of fact which speaks

in favour of the reality of Magic: that is, in Animal Mag
netism and charm-cures, we still do not recognise anything
but an immediate action of the will which here manifests its
direct power outside, instead of inside, the individual ;
if

moreover, as I am
about to show and to substantiate by de
cisive, unequivocal citations, those who are more deeply
initiated into ancient Magic, derive all its effects from the

magician s will alone this is surely strong empirical evi

:

dence in support of my doctrine, that the Metaphysical in

general, that which alone exists apart from representation,
the thing in itself of the universe is nothing but what is
known to us within ourselves as the will.
Now, if the direct power which may occasionally be
exercised over Nature by the will, was conceived by those
magicians as a merely indirect one, acquired by the help of
demons, this still could not prevent its efficiency wherever
and whenever it may have taken place. For, precisely
because, in things of this kind, the will acts in itself, in
its primariness, therefore apart from representation, its

efficiency cannot be frustrated by erroneous conceptions of

the intellecton the contrary, the distance here is a wide
;

one between theory and practice the errors of the former

:

do not stand in the way of the latter, nor does a correct

theory qualify for practice. Mesmer, in the beginning,
attributed his agency to the magnetic rods he held in his
hands and later on explained the wonders of Animal
Magnetism by a materialistic theory of a subtle, all-
permeating fluid; nevertheless he produced wonderfully
powerful effects. I once myself knew the proprietor of an
estate, whose peasants were wont by tradition to have their
feverish attacks dispelled by a spell of their master s. Now,
346 THE WILL IN NATURE.

although he "believed he had convinced himself of the im

possibility of all such things, yet he continued good-
naturedly to comply with their wish as usual, and indeed
often succeeded in relieving them. This success he ascribed
to his peasants firm belief, forgetting that a similar faith

ought also to bring success to the medical treatment which

is so often applied with complete
inefficacy to believing
patients.
Now, if Theurgy and Demonomagic, as described above,
were but the mere interpretation and outward trappings of
the thing, the mere husk, at which the majority were con
tent to stop short there were nevertheless some, who went
;

below the surface and quite recognised that the agent in

influences supposed to proceed from magic, was absolutely
nothing but the will. We must not however look for such
deeper observers as these among the discountenancers and
antagonists of Magic, and the majority of the writers on
this subject belong precisely to these they derived their
:

knowledge exclusively from Courts of Justice and from

the examination of witnesses, so that they merely describe
the outside of the matter and, if at any time they chanced,
;

through confessions, to gain an insight into the inner

processes, they took good care not to betray that knowledge,
lest, by doing they should contribute to diffuse the
so,
terrible vice of sorcery. To this class belong Bodinus,
Delrio, Bindsfeldt, and others. For information as to the
real nature of the thing, we must on the contrary go to

philosophers and investigators of Nature, who wrote in

those times of prevailing superstition. Now, from wliat
they say, it clearly follows, that the real agent in Magic,
just asin Animal Magnetism, is nothing but the will.

Here I must quote some passages in support of this

1
assertion. Theophrastus Paracelsus especially discloses
1
Roger Bacon already in the thirteenth century said :...." Quod si
ultcrius aligua anima maligna cogitat ftrtiter de infectione altcrius,
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 347

perhaps more concerning the inner nature of Magic than

any other writer, and does not even hesitate to give a
minute description of the processes used in it.
1
He says a :

To be observed concerning wax images if I bear malice

"

in my will against anyone, that malice must be carried out

by some medium or corpus. Thus it is possible for my
spirit to stab or wound another person without help from
my in using a sword, merely by
body fervent desire. my
Therefore it is also possible for me to convey opponent s my
spirit into the image by will and then to deform my
or paralyze it at pleasure. You must know, that the
influence of the will is a great point in medicine. For if a

man hate another and begrudge him anything good, it is

possible that if he curse him, that curse may take effect.
This occurs also with animals and more easily than with
men ;
for the spirit of man has far greater power of resis
tance than that of animals."

And It follows from this, that one image has

p. 375 :
"

magic power over another, not by virtue of the characters

or anything of that kind impressed on the virgin wax;
but the imagination overcomes its own constellation, so as
to become a means for fulfilling the will of its heaven, i.e.
of its man."

p. 334: "All the imagining of man comes from his

heart. The heart is the sun of the microcosm. And all
the imagining of man passes from the small sun of the
microcosm into the sun of the great Universe, into the heart
of the macrocosm. Thus the imaginatio of the microcosm
is a seed which becomes material," &c.

atgue ardenter desideret et certitudinaliter intendat, atque vehementer con-

sideret se posse nocere, non est dubiwm, guin natura obediet cogitationibiis
"

(See Kogeri Bacon,

anlm<B."
Opus Majus," Londini, 1733, p. 252.)
1
Theophrastus Paracelsus, Strassburg edition in two folio vols., vol. i.

pp. 91, 353, et segq. and p. 789 j vol. ii. pp. 362, 496.
2
Vol. i.
p. 19.
348 THE WILL IN NATURE.

364 It suffices for you to know what rigorous

"

:
p.
imagination does, which is the beginning of all magical
works."

p. 789 :
"

Even my thought
is a looking at a therefore
mark. Now I must not turn
my eye with my hands in
this or that direction but my imagination turns it as I
;

wish. And this is also to be understood of walking I :

desire, I propose to myself, therefore my body moves, and

the firmer my thoughts, the more sure it is that I shall run.
Thus imaginatio alone is an impulse for my running."
p. 837 Imaginatio used against me may be em
"

ployed with such rigour, that I may be killed by the

imaginatio of another person."
Vol. ii. p. 274 Imagination comes from longing
"

and desire envy, hatred, proceed from longing, for they

:

do not arise unless you long for them. As soon as you

wish, the act of the imagination follows. This long-
ing must be quick, ardent, lively, as that of a pregnant
woman, A general curse is commonly verified.
&c. &c.

Why ? from
It coniesthe heart, and the seed lies and is
born in that coming from the heart. Thus parents curses
also come from the heart. The curse of the poor is like
wise imaginatio. The prisoner s curse, also mere imagi
natio, corn.es from the heart Thus too, when one
man wishes to stab or paralyze, &c., another by means of
his imaginatio, he must first attract the thing and instru
ment to himself and then he can impress it (with his
wish) : for whatever enters into it, may also go out of it

again by the medium of thought as well as by that of the

hands In such imagining, women outdo men ....
for they are more ardent in revenge."

p. 298: "

Magica is a great occult wisdom; just a;3

Eeason is a great, open folly No armour avails

against sorcery, for it wounds the inner man, the vital

spirit Some magicians make an image in the shape
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 3-19

of a man they intend [to harm], knock a nail into the sole
of its foot, and the man is invisibly struck with lameness,
until the nail is removed."

p. 307 :
"

We ought to know, that we may convey the

spirit of any man into an image, solely by faith and by our

strong imagination. No incantation is needed, and the

ceremonies, drawing of circles, fumigations, seals, &c. <fcc.

are mere humbug to mislead. Homunculi and images are

made, &c. &c by which all the operations, powers

and will of man are carried out The human heart

isindeed so great a thing, that no one can express it as :

God is eternal and imperishable, so also is the heart of

man. If we men thoroughly recognised our heart, nothing
would be impossible for us on earth Perfect imagina
tion, coming from the stars (astris) arises from the heart."

p. 513 Imaginatio is confirmed and rendered perfect

"

by the belief that it really takes place for every doubt :

injures the effect. Faith must confirm the imagination,

for faith decides the will But just the fact that
man does not always perfectly imagine, perfectly believe,
causes acts to be called uncertain, which nevertheless may
certainly and quite well exist." passage from Campa- A
nella s book,
"

De sensu rerum et magia," may serve to

elucidate this last sentence. Efficiunt alii ne homo possi
futuere, si tantum credat : non enim potest facere quod non
credit posse facer e (1.
iv. c. 18).
1
Agrippa von Nettesheim speaks in the same sense.
Non minus subjicitur corpus alieno animo, quam alieno
"

corpori;"
and: 2 Quidquid dictat animusfortissime odientis
"

habet efficaciam nocendi et destruendi ; similiter in ceteris,

quce affectat animus fortissimo desiderio. Omnia enim quce

tune agit et dictat ex characteribus, figuris, verbis, gestibus

et ejusmodi, omnia sunt adjuvantia appetitum animce et

acquirunt mirdbiles quasdam virtutes, turn ab anima labo~
2
1 "

De occulta philosophia," lib. 1,

c. 66. Ibid. c. 67.
350 THE WILL IN NATURE.

rantis in ilia Jiora, quando ipsum appetitus ejusmodi

maxime invadit, turn ab injluxu coelesti animum tune
1
taliter movente" virtus qucedam
"Inest hominum animis
immutandi et ligandi homines ad id quod desiderat,
res et
et omnes res obediunt illi, quando fertur in magnum exces-

sum alicujus passionis, vel virtutis, in tantum, ut superet

eos,quos ligat. Radix ejusmodi ligationis ipsa est affectio
animce vehemens et exterminata"
And likewise Jul. Cses. Vanniims, "De admir. naturae
arcan." L. iv. dial. 5, 435 Vehementem imagina-
:
"

tionem, cui spiritus et sanguis obediunt, rem mente concep-

2
tam realiter efficere, non solum intra, sed et extra"
Just so Job. Bapt. Van Helmont, who takes great
pains to explain away as much as possible of the Devil s
influence, in order to attribute it to the will. I quote a
few passages from the voluminous collection of his works,
Ortus Medicince :

Recepta injecta. 12. Quum hostis naturce (diabolus)

1 "

De occulta philosophia," lib. 1, cc. 66, 67 et 68.

2
Ibid. p. 440 : Addunt Avicenna dictum : "

Ad validam alicujus imagi-

nationem cadit camelus." Ibid. p. 478, speaking of charms :
fascinations
guis cum muliere coeat, he says Eguidem in Germania complures
: allo-
cutus sum vulgari cognomento Necromantistas, qui ingenue confessi sunt,
se firme satis credere, meras fabulas esse opiniones, qua de dcsmonibus
tiulgo circumferuntur, aliquid tamen ipsos operari, vel vi herbarum com-
movendo phantasiam^ vel vi imaginationis et fidei vehementissimce, quam
ipsorum nugacissimis confictis excantationibus adhibent ignarce iwilieres,

quibus persuadent, recitatis magna cum devotione aliquibus preculis,

statim effici fascinum, quare credulce ex intimo cordis effundunt excanta-
tiones, atque ita, non vi verborum, neque caracterum, ut ipsce existimant, sed

spiritibus *), fascini inferendi percupidis exsufflatis proximos effascinant.

Hincfit, ut ipsi Necromantici, in causa propria, vel aliena, si soli sint
operarii t nihil unquam mirabile pr<sstiterint : carent enim fide, quce cuncta

operatur. [Add. to 3rd ed.j

*
Schopenhauer has added to spiritibus in parenthesis (sc. vitalibus et

animalibus).
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 351

ipsam applicationem complere ex se nequeat, suscitat ideam

fortis desiderii et odii in saga, ut, mutuatis istis mentalibus
et liberis mediis, transferat suum velle per quod quodque
1
afficere intendit). Quorsum imprimis etiam execrationes,
cum idea desiderii et terroris, odiosissimis suis scrofis prce-
scribit, 13. Quippe desiderium istud, ut estpassio imagi-
nantis, ita quoque creat ideam, non quidem inanem, sed exe-
cutivam atque incantamenti motivam. 19. prout jam
demonstravi, quod vis incantamenti potissima pendeat ab idea
naturali sagce.
Deinjectis materialibus. 15. Saga, per ens natu-
rale, imaginative format ideam liberam, naturalem et nocuam.
. . .
Sagce operantur virtute naturali. Homo etiam . . .

dimittit medium aliud executivum, emanativum et manda-

tivum ad incantandum hominem ; quod medium est Idea fortis
desiderii. Est nempe desiderio inseparable ferri circa optata.
De sympatheticis mediis. 2. Idea? scilicet desiderii,

per modum inftuentiarum ccelestium, jaciuntur in proprium

objectum, utcunque localiter remotum. Diriguntur nempe a
desiderio objectum sibi specificante.
De magnetica vulnerum curatione. 76. Igitur
in sanguine est qumdam potestas exstatica, quce, si quando
ardenti desiderio excita fuerit, etiam ad absens aliquod ob

jectum, exterioris hominis spiritu deducenda sit: ea autem

potestas in exteriori homine latet, velut in potentia; nee
ducitur ad actum, nisi excitetur, accensa imaginationeferventi
desiderio, vel
aliqua pari. arte
98. Anima, prorsum

nequaquam posset spiritum vitalem (corpbreum equi-

spiritus,
dem), multo minus carnem et ossa movere aut concitare, nisi
vis illi qucepiam naturalis, magica tamen et epiritualis, etc

anima in spiritum corpus descenderet.et Cedo, quo pacto

obediret spiritus corporeusjussui animce, nisi jussus spiritum,

1 "

Der Teufel hat sie s zwar gelehrt j

Allein der Teufel kann s nicht machen." Faust.
[Add. to 3rd ed.]
352 THE WILL IN NATURE.

et deinceps corpus movendo foret ? At

extemplo contra hanc
magicam motricem objicies, istam esse intra concretum sihi,
suumque hospitium naturale, idcirco hanc etsi magam vocite*-
mus, tantum erit nominis detorsio et dbusus, siquid&m vcra
et superstitiosa magica non ex anima basin desumit ; cum,
eadem hcec nil quidquam valeat, extra corpus suum movere,
alterare aut ciere. Hespondeo, vim et magicam illam natu-
ralem animce, quce extra se agat, virtute imaginis Dei, latere
jam obscuram in Jiomine, velut obdormire (post prcevarica-
tionem), excitationisque indigam: quce eadem, utut somno-
lenta, ac velut ebria, alioqui sit in nobis quotidie : sufficit
tamen ad obeunda munia in corpore suo : dormit itaque
scientia et potestas magica, et solo nutu actrix in homine.
102. Satan itaque vim magicam hanc excitat (secus dor-
mientem et scientia exterioris hominis impeditam) in suis
mancipiis, et inservit eadem illis, ensis vice in manu poteniis,
id est sagce. Nee aliud prorsus Satan ad homicidium affcrt,
prceter excitationem dictce potestatis somnolentce. 106.
Saga in stabulo absente occidit equum :
quondam naiu-
virtus
ralis a spiritu sagce, et non a Satana, derivatur, quce opprimat

vel strangulet spiritum vitalem equi. 139. Spiritus voco

magnetismi patronos, non qui ex coelo demittuntur, multoque

minus de infernalibus sermo est ; sed de Us, qinfiunt in i]>so

Jiomine, sicut ex silice ignis : ex voluntate hominis nempe

aliquantillum spiritus vitalis influentis desumitur, et id
ipsum assumit idealem entitatem, tanquam formam ad
complementum. Qua nacta perfectione, spiritus mediam
sortem inter corpora et non corpora assumit. Mittilur
autem eo, quo voluntas ipsum dirigit ; idealis igitur entifas
. .nullis stringitur locorum, temporum aut dimcn-
.

sionum imperiis, ea nee daemon est, nee ejus ullus effectus ;

sed spiritualis qucedam est actio illius, nobis plane natu-
raUs et vernacula. 168. Ingens mysterium propalare
hactenus distuli, ostendere videlicet, ad manum in homine
sit am esse energiam, qua, solo nutu et phantasia sua, qut-at
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 353

agere extra se et imprimere virtutem aliquam, influentiam

deinceps perseverantem, et agentem in objectum longissime

P. Pomponatius also says Sic contigit, tales esse homines, :

qui habeant ejusmodi vires in potentia, et per vim imaginati-

vam et desiderativam cum actu operantur, talis virtus exit
ad actum, sanguinem et spiritum, quce per evapora-
et afficit
1
tionempetunt ad extra et producunt tales effectus.

Jane Leade, an English mystic visionary of Cromwell s

time and pupil of Pordage, has given us some very curious
disclosures of this kind. She is led to Magic in a very
singular way. For, as the doctrine of their becoming one
with the G-od of their religion is a fundamental cha
racteristic of all Mystics, so is it with Jane Leade also.

Now, with her however, the human will has its share in the
omnipotence of the Divine will as a consequence of the
two having become one, and accordingly acquires magic
power. What other magicians therefore believe to be due
to a compact with the Devil, she attributes to her becom

ing one with her G-od. Her Magic is therefore in the

highest sense white Magic. Besides, this alters nothing
as to the practice and results. She is reserved and mys
terious, as people had to be in those times; still it is

easy to see that the thing is not a mere theoretical corol

lary, but that it has sprung from knowledge and expe
rience obtained in another way.
2
It is in her Revelation of Revelations "
"

that we find
the chief passage but the following one, which is rather
;

an abridgment than a literal quotation and is contained

3
in Horst s comes from the same
"

Zauberbibliothek,"
book Magic power enables its possessor to rule over
:
"

1
De incantationibus. Opera Basil. 1567, p. 44.
2
German translation, Amsterdam, 1695, pp. 126 to 151, especially
the pages headed
"

the power of calm will."

8 "

Zauberbibliothek (Library of Magic),

"

Horst, vol. i. p. 325.

A A
854 THE WILL IN NATURE.

and to renew the creation i.e. the animal, vegetable and

mineral kingdoms were many to co-operate in one
so that,

magical power, Nature might be created anew as a paradise.

. How is this magic power to be acquired ? By renas
. .

cence through faith that is, by our will harmonizing with

:

the divine wiW." For faith subjects the world to us, inasmuch
as our own will, when it is in harmony with the divine
will, results, as St. Paul tells us, in making everything
submit to and obey Thus far Horst. p. 131 of the
us."

Revelation, &c.," Jane Leade shows that it was by the

"

force of his will that Christ worked miracles, as, for in

stance, when he said to the leper I will ; be thou "

clean." Sometimes however he left it to the will of those

who, he saw, believed in him, saying to them : What " *

will ye that I shall do unto you ? in which cases no

less was done for them than they had desired in their
will that the Lord should do. These words of our
Saviour s are well deserving of notice, since the highest
Magia lies in the will, so far as it is in union with the will
of the Almighty: when these two wheels fit into each
other, becoming in a sense one, they are, &c."
Again,
p. 132, she says: which is
"For what could resist that
united with the will of God ? The power of such a will is
so great, that it always achieves its end. It is no naked
will deprived of its clothing, or power on the contrary, it ;

brings with it an irresistible omnipotence, which enables it

to uproot, to plant, to put to death and to bring to life, to
bind and to loose, to heal and to injure, which power will
be collected and concentrated in its entirety in the royal,
free-born will. Of this power we shall attain knowledge,
when we shall have been made one with the Holy Q-host,
or when we shall be united in one spirit and being."
Again, p. 133 We must quench or drown altogether the
:
"

many multifarious wills which arise out of the mixed

essence of souls, and they must lose themselves in the
 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 355

abysmal depth from winch there will then arise and pre
sent itself the virgin will, which was never the slave of
anything belonging to degenerate man on the contrary, ;

it stands in connection with the Almighty Power, quite free

and pure, and will infallibly produce fruits and results
quite similar to those of the divine will . . . wherefrom
the burning oil of the Holy Grhost flows up in Magic, as it

emits its fiery sparks."

*
Jacob Bohme too speaks of Magic precisely in the sense
here described. Among other things he says
"

Magic is :

the mother of the essence of all beings for it creates itself :

and understood in desire

is True Magic is not a
being, but the desiring spirit of the being. In fine: Magic
is action in the will s spirit."

In corroboration, or at any rate in explanation, of the

above view of the will as the real agent in magic, a curious
and interesting anecdote, related by Campanella, from
2
Avicenna, may here find its place. Mulieres qucedam "

condixerunt, ut irent animi gratia in viridarium. Una

earum non ivit. Ceterce colludentes arangium acceperunt
et perforabant eum stilis acutis, dicentes : ita perforamus
mulierem talem, quce nobiscum venire detrectavit, et, pro-
jecto arangio intra fontem, dbierunt. Postmodum mulierem
iUam dolentem invenerunt,. quod se transfigi quasi clavis
acutis sentiret, db ea hora, qua arangium ceterce perforarunt :
et cruciata est valde donee arangii elavos extraxerunt impre-
cantes bona et salutem."
3
Krusenstern gives a very curious and minute descrip-

1
Erklarung von sechs under Punkt
"

J. Bohme, Punkten," v.
* "

De sensu return et
Campanella, magia," 1. iv. c. 18.
8
Krusenstern s words are :
"

A universal belief in witchcraft, which

is held to be very important by all islanders, seems to me to be connected
with their religion j for they assert that the priests alone possess magic
power, although some of the common people also, it is said, profess to have
the secret, probably in order to make themselves feared, and to exact pre-
356 THE WILL IN NATTJEE.

tion of maleficent sorcery as practised, it is said success

fully,by the priests of the savage tribes on the island of

Nukahiva, the procedure in which is exactly similar to that
of our cures by charms. This fact is especially remark
able on account of the identity of the thing, notwithstand
ing the distance from all European tradition. With it

ought to be compared Bende Bendsen s account of a head-

acH he caused in another person by sorcery, through the
medium of some of that person s hair which had been cut
off. He concludes with the following words As far as :
"

I can learn, what is called witchcraft consists simply in

preparing and applying noxious magnetic charms com
bined with a maleficent influence of the will: this is the
l
detestable league with Satan."
The agreement of all these writers, not only among
themselves, but with the convictions to which Animal
Magnetism has led in latter years, and finally even with
what might be concluded from my speculative doctrine on
most remarkable phenomenon. This
this point, is surely a

sents. This sorcery, which they call Kaha, consists in inflicting a linger
ing death upon those to whom they bear a grudge, twenty days being how
ever fixed as the term for this. They go to work as follows. Whoever wishes
to practise revenge by means of sorcery, seeks to procure either saliva
or urine or excrements of his enemy in some way or other. These he
mixes with a powder, lays the compound in a bag which is woven in a
special manner, and buries it. The most important secret is in the art
of weaving the bag in the right way and of preparing the powder. As
soon as it is buried, the effects show themselves in the person who is the
object of this witchcraft. He sickens, becomes daily weaker, loses at
and in twenty days is sure to die. If, on the other
last all his strength,

hand, he attempts to divert his enemy s revenge from himself by offering

up a pig, or making some other valuable present in order to save his
life, he may yet be saved, even on the nineteenth day, and no sooner is

the bag unburied, than the attacks of illness cease. Ho recovers gradually,
and after a few days is quite restored to health." Reise um die "

Welt." Ed. in 12mo, 1812, Part i., p. 249 et seq. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
1
Kieser, "Archiv fiir thierischen Magnetismus," vol. ix. s. i. in the

note, pp. 128-132.

 ANIMAL MAGNETISM AND MAGIC. 357

much is at any rate certain, that at the bottom of all the

experiments, successful or unsuccessful, which have ever
been made in Magic, there lies an anticipation of my Meta-
physic. For in them is expressed the consciousness, that
the causal law only connects phenomena, while the inner
nature of things remains independent of it; and also,
that if any on Nature be possible from
direct influence

within, it can only take place through the will itself. But
even if Magic were to be ranked as practical Metaphysic,
according to Bacon s classification, it is certain that no
other theoretical Metaphysic would stand in the right
relation to it but mine, by which the world is resolved into
and Representation.
"Will

The zealous cruelty with which Magic has always been

persecuted by the Church and to which the papal malleus
maleficarum bears terrible evidence, seems not to have for
its sole basis the criminal purposes often associated with

the practice of Magic or the part assumed to be played

by the Devil, but rather to proceed partly from a vague
foreboding and fear lest Magic should trace back its
original power to its true source whereas the Church has ;

1
assigned to it a place outside Nature. The detestation
shown by the cautious clergy of England towards Animal
2
Magnetism tends to confirm this supposition, and also
the active zeal with which they oppose table-turning,
which at any rate is harmless, yet which, for the same
1
They scent something of the
"

Nos habitat, non tartara sed nee sidera coeli :

Spiritus in nobis qui viget, ilia facit."

(Not in the heavens it lives, nor yet in hell ;

The spirit that does it all, doth in us dwell.)

Compare Johann Beaumont,

"

Historisch-Physiologisch-und Theolo-
gischer Tractat von Geistern, Erscheinungen, Hexereyen und andern
Zauber-Handeln, Halle im Magdeburgischen, 1721," p. 281. [Add. to
3rd ed.]
a
Compare Parerga, vol. i. p. 257 (2nd ed. vol. i.
p. 286).
358 THE WILL IN NATURE.

reason, has been violently assailed by the anathemas of the

1
French, and even of the German, clergy.
1
On the 4th of August, 1856, the Roman Inquisition issued a circular
to all the bishops, in which it called upon them in the name of the
Church to use their utmost influence against the practice of Animal
Magnetism. The reasons for this are given with striking want of lucidity
and great vagueness, and even here and there are not unmixed with
falsehood and it is easy to see that the Church is reluctant to own the
;

real reason. This circular is published in the "Turin Journal" of

December, 1856, and again in the French Univers," and reprinted from
"

this in the Journal desDSbats" of January 3rd, 1857. [Add. to 3rd ed,]
"
 SINOLOGY.

perhaps points more directly to a high

NOTHING
degree of civilization in China than the almost in
credible density of its population, now rated, according
to Giitzlaff, at 367 millions of inhabitants. 1 For whether
we compare countries or ages, we find on the whole that
civilizationkeeps pace with population.
The pertinacious zeal with which the Jesuit missionaries
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries strove to in
culcate their own relatively new doctrines into the minds
of this very ancient nation, and their futile endeavours to
discover early traces of their own faith in that country,
left them no time
for a profound study of the belief which

prevails there. Therefore Europe has only lately obtained

some slight knowledge of the religious state of the Chinese.
We now know, that is to say, that in China there exists
first of all a worship of Nature, which is universally
professed, and dates from the earliest times, even, it
is alleged, from before the discovery of fire, wherefore
1
According to a Chinese official Report on the census, printed in
Pekin, and found by the English in the Chinese Governor s palace on
entering Canton, China had 396 millions of inhabitants in 1852, and
allowing for a constant increase, may now have 400 millions. ("
Moni-
teur de la Flotte," end of May, 1857.)
The Reports of the Russian Clerical Mission in Pekin give the returns
of 1842 as 414,687,000.
According to the tables published by the Russian Embassy at Pekin,
the population, in 1849, amounted to 415 millions. Post-Zeitung,"
("

1858.) [Add. to 3rd ed.]

360 THE WILL IN NATTJEE.

animals were sacrificed raw. The sacrifices offered up

publicly at certain seasons or after great events by the
Chinese Emperor and the chief dignitaries of the Empire,
belong to this worship. These sacrifices are dedicated
first and foremost to the blue sky and to the earth to the
blue sky in the winter solstice, to the earth in the summer
solstice and, after these, to every possible power of Nature :
the sea, mountains, rivers, winds, thunder, rain, fire, <fcc.

&c. A genius presides over each of these, and each genius

has several temples. On the other hand, each genius pre
siding over every single province, town, village, or street,
nay over family funerals and even sometimes over a mer
chant s warehouse, has also temples; only, in the two
last cases they are destined exclusively for private wor
ship. But public worship is besides offered up to former
illustrious Emperors, founders of dynasties and to heroes,
i.e. to all such as have benefited (Chinese) mankind by
word or deed. Even these have their temples Confucius :

alone having no less than 1,650 dedicated to him. This

therefore accounts for the great number of small temples
found throughout the Empire. With this hero-worship
too, is associated the private worship offered up by every

respectable family on the tombs of their ancestors. Now

besides this worship of Nature and of heroes, which is
universal, there are three other prevailing religious doc
trines in China, more with a dogmatical intent. First
among these the doctrine of Taossee, founded by Laotse,
is

an older contemporary of Confucius. This is the doctrine

of Reason, as the inner order of the Universe or inherent

principle of all things, of the great One, the sublime

Gable-Beam (Taiki) which supports all the Eafters, yet is
above them (properly the all-pervading Soul of the World)
and of Tao, i.e. the Way, namely to salvation : that is, to

redemption from the world and its misery. We have an

exposition of this doctrine taken from the fountain-head in
 SINOLOGY. 861

Stanislas Julien s translation (1842) of Laotse s Taotelring,

inwhich we find that theTao-doctrine completely harmonizes
with Buddhism both in meaning and in spirit. This sect
however seems to have fallen very much into the background,
and its teachers to be now looked down upon. Secondly, we
find the wisdom of Confucius, which has special attractions
for Chinese savants and statesmen. Judging from trans
lations, it is a rambling, commonplace, predominantly

political, moral philosophy, without any metaphysical

support, which has something peculiarly insipid and tire
some about it. Finally, there exists for the bulk of the
nation Buddha s sublime doctrine full of love. The name,
or rather title, of Buddha in China is Fo or Fhu, whilst in

Tartary the "Victoriously-Perfect" is more frequently

called by his family-name, Shakia-Muni, and also Burkhan-
Bakshi; in Birma and Ceylon, he is generally called
Gotama or Tagdtata, but his original name was Prince
1
Siddharta. This religion which, on account of its intrinsic
For the benefit of those who wish to acquire a fuller knowledge of
1

Buddhism, I here note down those works belonging to its literature, and
written in European languages, which I can really recommend, for I
possess them and know them well ; the omission of a few others, for
instance of Hodgson s and A. Remusat s books, is intentional.
Dsanglun, or the Sage and the Fool," in Tibetan and German,
"

1.

by I. J. Schmidt, Petersburg, 1843, 2 vols. in 4to, con tains in the preface

to vol. i. (i.e. the Tibetan volume), from
pp. xxxi to xxxviii, a very brief,
but excellent, sketch of the whole doctrine, admirably calculated for a
introduction to the knowledge of it
first the whole book even, as a part
:

of the Kandshur (canonical books), may be recommended. 2. In the

Memoranda of the Academy of St. Petersburg are to be found several
lectures by the same excellent author
Schmidt), which were (I. J.
delivered in German in that As they are of
Academy in 1829-1832.

very great value for the knowledge of this religion, it is to be hoped

that they will be collected and published all together in
Germany.
3. By the same writer :
"

Forschungen iiber die Tibeter und

Mongolen." Petersb. 1829, in 4to. (Investigations concerning the
Tibetans and Mongols). 4. By the same writer: Uber die Verwandt-
"

schaft der gnostisch-theosophischen Lehren mit dem Buddhaismus,"

362 THE WILL IN NATURE.

excellence and truth, as well as of the great number of its

followers, may be considered as ranking highest among all
religions on earth, prevails throughout the greater part of
Asia, and according to the latest investigator, Spence

1828. (On the relation between the Gnostic-Theosophic Doctrines and

5. By the same: Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen," Petersb. "

Buddhism.)
1 829, in 4to.
(History of the Eastern Mongols.) [This
is very instructive,

especially the explanations and appendix, which give long extracts from
writings on Religion, in which many passages clearly show the deep
meaning and breathe the genuine spirit of Buddhism. Add. to Srded.]
6. Two treatises by Schiefner in German, in the
"

Melanges Asiatiques
tire s du Bulletin Historico-Philol. de 1 Acad. d. St.
Petersburg," Tome 1,
1851. 7. Samuel Turner s Journey to the Court of the Teshoo-
"

Lama (at the end), 1801. 8. Bochinger, La Vie ascdtique chez lea
"
"

Indous et les Bouddhistes," Strasbourg, 1831. 9. In the 7th vol. of

the "Journal Asiatique," 1825, an extremely beautiful biography of
Buddha by Deshauterayes. 10. Bournouf, Introd. a PHist. d. Boud-
"

dhisme," vol. i. in 4to, 1844. 11.

"

Rgya Tsher Kolpa,"

traduit da
par Foucaux, 1848, in 4to. This is the Lalita Vistara," i.e.
"

Tibe"tain,

life of Buddha, the gospel of the Buddhists. 12. Foe Koue Ki, relation "

desroyaumes Bouddhiques," traduit du Chinois par Abel Re"musat, 1836,

in 4to. du Tubet," traduit du Chinois en Russe par
13. "Description

Bitchourin, et du Russe enFrancais par Klaproth, 1831. 14. Klaproth,

"

Fragments Bouddhiques," printed separately from the Nouveaa "

Journal Asiatique," Mars, 1831. 15. Spiegel, "De officiis sacerdotum

Buddhicorum," PaliceetLatine, 1841. 16. The same author s "Anecdote

Palica," 1845.
Dhammapadam," palice edidet et latine vertit
[17.
"

Fausboll, Hovnise, 1855. Add. to 3rd ed.] 18. Asiatic Researches,

vol. vi. Buchanan, On the Religion of the Burmas," and vol. xx.
"

(Calcutta, 1839), Part 2, contains three important articles by Csoma

Korosi, including Analyses of the Books of the Kandshur. 19.

Sangermano,
"

The Burmese Empire," Rome, 1833. 20. Turnour,

"The Mahawanzo," Ceylon, 1836. 21. Upham, "The Mahavansi,
Raja Ratnacari et Rajavali,"
3 vols. 1833. 22. ejusd. "Doctrine of
Buddhism," 1839, fol. 23. Spence Hardy, "Eastern Monachism,"
1850. 24. ejusd. Manual of Buddhism," 1853. The two last books,
"

written after a twenty years stay in Ceylon and from oral information
supplied by the priests there, have given me a deeper insight into the
essence of the Buddhist dogma than any other work. They deserve to
be translated into German, but without abridgement, for otherwise the
best part might be left out. [25. C. F. Koppen, Die Religion des "
 SINOLOGY. 363

Hardy, numbers 369 millions of believers: that is, far

more than any other. These three religions, the most
widely diffused of which, Buddhism, subsists without any
protection whatever from the State, by its own power
alone a circumstance which speaks greatly in its favour
are far from being hostile to one another, and exist quietly
side by side, nay, harmonize even to a certain extent,

perhaps by reciprocal influence, so that the sentence:

The three doctrines are only one has become proverbial.
"

",

The Emperor, as such, professes all three ; still many of

the Emperors, even up to the most recent times, have been
especially devoted to Buddhism. This is shown by their
profound respect for the Dalai-Lama, nay, even for the
TesJioo-Lama, to whom they unhesitatingly yield prece
dence. These three religions are neither monotheistic nor
polytheistic, nor are they even pantheistic Buddhism, at
any rate, is not since Buddha did not look upon a world
;

sunk in sin and suffering, whose tenants, all subject to

death, only subsist for a short time by devouring each
other, as a manifestation of G-od. Moreover the word
Pantheism, properly speaking, contains a contradiction for ;

it denotes a self-destroying conception, and has therefore

never been understood otherwise than as a polite term of

expression by those who know what seriousness means.
It accordingly never entered into the heads of the clever,
acute philosophers of the eighteenth century, not to take
Spinoza for an Atheist, on account of his having called the
world Deus ; on the contrary, this discovery was reserved for
the sham philosophers of our own times, who know nothing
1857, a complete compendium of Buddhism, compiled not only
Buddha,"
with great erudition and serious industry but also with intelligence and
insight from all the other works I have mentioned above and from many
more besides, which contains all that is essential on the subject. 26.
The Life of Buddha," from the Chinese of Palladji, in the
" "

Archiv
fur wissenschaftliche Kunde von Kussland," edited by Ennan, vol. xv.
Heft 1, 1856. Add. to 3rd ed.J
364 THE WILL IN NATUKE.

but words: they even pique themselves on the achieve

ment and accordingly talk about Acomism, the wags !

But I would humbly suggest leaving their meanings to

words in short, calling the world, the world; and gods,
gods.
In their endeavours to acquire knowledge of the state of
Religion in China, Europeans began as usual, and as the
Greeks and Romans under similar circumstances had done,
by first searching for points of contact with their own
belief. Now as, in their own way of thinking, the concep
tions of Religion and of Theism were almost identified, or
at any rate had grown together that they
so closely,
could only be separated with great difficulty as moreover,
;

till a more accurate knowledge of Asia had reached

Europe, the very erroneous opinion had been disseminated

for the purpose of argument e consensu gentium that all

nations on earth worship a single, or at any rate a highest,

*
God, Creator of the Universe when they found them
:

selves in a country where temples, priests and monasteries

abounded, they started from the firm assumption that
Theism would also be found there, though in some very un
usual form. On seeing these expectations disappointed
however, and on finding that the very conceptions of
such things, let alone the words to express them, were
unknown, it was but natural, considering the spirit in
which their inquiries were made, that their first reports of
these religions should refer rather to what they did not,
than to what they did, contain. Besides, for many reasons,
it can be no easy task for European heads to enter fully

into the sense of these faiths. In the first place, they

are brought up in Optimism, whereas in Asia, existence
itself is looked upon as an evil and the world as a scene of

1
This is equivalent to imputing to the Chinese the thought, that
all princes on earth are tributary to their Emperor. [Add. to 3rd
ed.]
 SINOLOGY. 365

misery, where it were better not to find oneself. Another

reason is to be found in the decided Idealism which is
essential to Buddhism and -to Hindooism : a view only
known Europe as a paradox hardly worth a serious
in
thought, advanced by certain eccentric philosophers whereas ;

in Asia it is even For in Hin-

embodied in popular belief.
doostan it prevails universally as the doctrine of Maja, and
in Thibet, the chief seat of the Buddhist Church, it is

taught in an extremely popular way, a religious comedy

being performed on occasions of special solemnity, in which
the Dalai-Lama is represented arguing with the Arch-fiend.
The former defends Idealism, the latter Realism, and
among other things the Devil says ; What is perceived "

through the five sources of all knowledge (the senses), is

no deception, and what you teach is not true." After a
long argumentation the matter is decided by a throw of
the dice: the Realist (the Devil) loses, and is dismissed
amid general jeering. 1 Keeping this fundamental diffe
rence in the whole way of thinking steadily in view, we
shall find it not only excusable, but even natural, that in
their investigation of the Asiatic religions Europeans
should at first have stopped short at the negative stand
point; though, properly speaking, it has nothing to do
with the matter. We therefore find a great deal re
ferring to this negative stand-point which in no way ad
vances our positive knowledge ; it all however amounts
to this: that Monotheism an exclusively Jewish doc
trine, to be sure is alien to Buddhists and in general to

the Chinese. For instance, in the Lettres Edifiantes a " "

we find :
"

The Buddhists, whose views on the migration of

1
Description du Tubet," traduite du Chinois enRusse par Bitchourin,
"

et du Russe en Francais par Klaproth, Paris, 1831, p. 65. Also in the

"Asiatic Journal" new series, vol. i.
p. 15. [Koppen, "Die

Lamaische Hierarchie," p. 315. Add. to 3rd ed.]

2 "

Lettres Edifiantes," Edit, de 1819, vol. viii. p. 46.

 366 THE WILL IN NATURE.

souls are universally adopted, are accused of Atheism."

In the "Asiatic Kesearches" (vol. vi. p. 255) we find:

"The
religion of the Birmans (Buddhism) shows them to
be a nation far advanced beyond the barbarism of a
wild state and greatly influenced by religious opinions,
but which nevertheless has no knowledge of a Supreme
Being, Creator and Preserver of the world.Yet the sys
tem of morality recommended in their fables is perhaps
as good as any other taught by the religious doctrines
which prevail among mankind. And again, p. 258 : The "

followers of Gotama (i.e. of Buddha) are strictly speaking

Atheists." Ibid., p. 258 :
"

Gotama s sect consider the

belief in a divine Being, Creator of the world, to be highly
impious." Ibid., p. 268, Buchanan relates, that Atuli, the
Zarado or High-Priest of the Buddhists at Ava, in an
article upon his religion which he presented to a Catholic

bishop, counted the doctrine, that there is a Being who

"

has created the world and all things in it and is alone

worthy of adoration, among the six damnable heresies."
1
Sangennano relates precisely the same thing, and closes
the list of the six grave heresies with the words The last :
"

of these impostors taught, that there is a Supreme Being,

the Creator of the world and of all things in it, and that he
8
alone is worthy of adoration." Colebrooke too says:
"

The and Buddha are really atheistic, for

sects of Jaina

they acknowledge no Creator of the world, nor any

3
Supreme ruling Providence." I. J. Schmidt likewise

says The system of Buddhism knows no eternal, un

:
"

created, single, divine Being, having existed before all

Time, who has created all that is visible and invisible.

1
Description of the Burman Empire," Eome, 1833, p. 81.
"

2
Colebrooke, Transactions of the Eoyal Asiatic Society," vol. i. j
"

Essay on the Philosophy of the Hindoos," published also among his

"

"

Miscellaneous Essays," p. 236.

* "

Investigations concerning the Tibetans and Mongols," p. 180.

 SINOLOGY. 367

This idea is quite foreign to Buddhism and there is not the

slightest trace of it anywhere in Buddhistic books." We

l
find the learned sinologist Morrison too not less desirous
to discover traces of a God in the Chinese dogmas and
ready to put the most favourable construction upon every
thing which seems to point in that direction; yet he is
finally obliged to own that nothing of the kind can be
clearly discovered. Where he explains the words Thung and
Tsing, i.e. repose and movement, as that on which Chinese
cosmogony is based, he renews this inquiry and concludes
it with the words It is perhaps impossible to acquit
"

this system of the accusation of Atheism." And even

2
recently Upham says :
"

Buddhism presents to us a world

without a moral ruler, guide or creator." The G-erman
3
sinologist Neumann too, says in his treatise mentioned
further on China, where neither Mahometans nor
: "In

Christians found a Chinese word to express the theological

conception of the Deity The words God, soul,
spirit, as independent of Matter and ruling it arbitrarily,
are utterly unknown in the Chinese language. . This . .

range of ideas has become so completely one with the lan

guage itself, that the first verse of the book of G-enesis
cannot without considerable circumlocution be translated
into genuineChinese." It was this very thing that led Sir

George Staunton to publish a book in 1848 entitled An :

"

Inquiry into the proper mode of rendering the word God

in translating the Sacred Scriptures into the Chinese lan
*
guage."

1
Chinese Macao, 1815, and following years,
"

Morrison, Dictionary,"
vol. i. p. 217.
8
Upham, "History and Doctrine of Buddhism," London, 1829,
p. 102.
3
Neumann, "Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophic der Chinesen, nacn
den Werken des Tchu-hi," pp. 10, 11.
4
The following account given by an American sea-captain, who had
come to Japan, is very amusing from the naivete with which he assumes
368 THE WILL IN NATURE.

My intention in giving the above quotations and expla

nations, is merely to prepare the way for the extremely re
markable passage, which it is the object of the present
chapter to communicate, and to render that passage more
intelligible to the readerby first making him realize the
standpoint from which these investigations were made, and
thus throwing light upon the relation between them and
their subject. For Europeans, when investigating this
matter in China in the way and in the spirit described,
always inquiring for the supreme principle of all things,
the power that rules the world, &c. &c., had often been re
ferred to that which is designated by the word Tien (Engl.
T heen). Now, the more usual meaning of this word is
"

as Morrison also says in his dictionary still it

Heaven," ;

is a well-known thing that Tien is used in a figurative

sense also, and then has a metaphysical signification. In
l
the Lettres Edifiantes
"

we find the following explana

"

tion Hing-tien
: the material, visible heaven Chin-tien
"

is ;

the spiritual and invisible heaven. Sonnerat too, 2 in his

travels in East-India and China, says When the Jesuits :
"

disputed with the rest of the missionaries as to the mean

ing of the word Tien, whether it was Heaven or God, the

that mankind consists exclusively of Jews. For the "

Times "

of the
18th October, 1854, relates that an American ship, under command of
Captain Burr, had arrived in Jeddo Bay, and gives his account of the
favourable reception he met with there, at the end of which we find :
"

He likewise
asserts the Japanese to be a nation of Atheists, denying
the existence of a God and selecting as an object of worship either the
spiritual Emperor at Meaco, or any other Japanese. He was told by
the interpreters that formerly their religion was similar to that of
China, but that the belief in a supreme Being has latterly been entirely
discarded (this is a mistake) and he professed to be much shocked at
Deejunoskee (a slightly Americanised Japanese), declaring his belief in
the Deity. [Add. to 3rd ed.]
1
Edition de, 1819, vol. xi. p. 461.
*
Book iv. ch. i.
 SINOLOGY. 369

Chinese looked upon these foreigners as restless folk and

drove them away to Macao." It was at any rate through
this word that Europeans could first hope to find the track
of that Analogy of Chinese Metaphysic with their own
faith, which had been so persistently sought for and it was ;

doubtless owing to investigations of this kind that the

results we find communicated in an Essay entitled
Chinese "

1
Theory of the Creation were attained. As to Choo-foo-
"

tze, called also Choo-hi, who is mentioned in it, I observe

that he lived in the twelfth century according to our

chronology, and that he is the most celebrated of all the
Chinese men of learning because he has collected to
;

gether all the wisdom of his predecessors and reduced

it to a system. His work is in our days the basis of
all Chinese instruction, and his authority of the greatest

weight. In the passage I allude to, we find The word "

Teen would seem to denote the highest among the great

or above all what is great on earth but in practice its :

vagueness of signification is beyond all comparison greater,

than that of the term Heaven in European languages. . . .

Choo-f oo-tze tells us that to affirm, that heaven has a man

(i.e. a sapient being) there to judge and determine crimes,

should not by any means be said nor, on the other hand, ;

must it be affirmed, that there is nothing at all to exercise

a supreme control over these things.
The same author being asked about the heart of heaven,
"

whether it was intelligent or not, answered it must not be :

said that the mind of nature is unintelligent, but it does

not resemble the cogitations of man. . . .

According to one of their authorities, Teen is call d

"

ruler or sovereign (Choo), from the idea of the supreme

control, and another expresses himself thus Had heaven :

(Teen) 110 designing mind, then it must happen, that the

1
To be found in the "

Asiatic Journal," vol. xxii. anno 1826, pp. 41

and 42.
B B
370 THE WILL IN NATURE.

cow might bring forth a horse, and on the peach-tree be

produced the blossom of the pear/ On the other hand it
is said, that the mind of Heaven is deducible from what is

the Will of mankind !

"

The agreement between this last sentence and my doc

and so astonishing, that if this passage
trine is so striking
had not been printed full eight years after my own work
had appeared, I should no doubt have been accused of
having taken my fundamental thought from it. For there
are three well-known modes of repelling the attack of new
thoughts firstly, by ignoring them, secondly by denying
:

them, and lastly by asserting that they are not new, but
were known long before. But the fact that my funda
mental thought was formed quite independently of this
Chinese authority, is firmly established by the reasons I
have given for I may hope to be believed when I affirm,
;

that I am unacquainted with the Chinese language and

consequently unable to derive thoughts for my own use
from original Chinese sources unknown to others. On
further investigation I have elicited the fact, that the
passage I have quoted, was most probably, nay almost
certainly, taken from Morrison s Chinese Dictionary,"
"

where it may be found under the sign Teen only I have :

no opportunity of verifying it. In an article by Neumann 2

1
Anote of Schopenhauer s referring to this says "

According
:

to lettersfrom Doss" (a friend of S. s), "dated 26th February and

8th June, 1857, the passages I have here quoted are to be found in
Morrison s Chinese Dictionary, Macao, 1815, vol. i. p. 576, under
^C
Teen, although in a slightly different order, in nearly the same words.
The important passage at the end alone differs and is as follows:
Heaven makes the mind of mankind its mind: in most ancient dis
cussions respecting Heaven, its mind, or will, was divined (it stands
thus, and not derived) from what was the will of mankind. Neumann
translated this passage for Doss, independently of Morrison s rendering,
and the end was Through the heart of the people Heaven is usually
:

"

revealed. [Editor s Note.]

3
Neumann, "Die Natur-und Religions-Philosophic der Chinten,
 SINOLOGY. 371

there are some passages which have evidently a common

source with those here quoted from the Asiatic Journal." "

But they are written with the vagueness of expression which

isso frequent in Germany, and excludes clear comprehen
sion. Besides, this translator of Choo-hi evidently did not
himself quite understand the original though by this no ;

blame need be implied, when we consider the enormous diffi

culty of the Chinese language for Europeans, and the
insufficiency of the means for studying it. Meanwhile
it does not give us the enlightenment desired. We must
therefore console ourselves with the hope, that as a
freer intercourse withChina has now been established,
some Englishman may one day give us more minute and
thorough information concerning the above-mentioned
dogma, of which we have hitherto received such deplorably
imperfect accounts.

nach dera Werke des Tschu -hi,"

an article in Illgen s "

Periodical
for Historical Theology," vol. vii. 1837, from pp. GO to 63.
 REFERENCE TO ETHICS.
reasons I have stated in the beginning, confirma-
FOE,
mations of the rest of my doctrine are excluded from
my present task. Still, in concluding, I may perhaps be
allowed to mate a general reference to Ethics.
From time immemorial, all nations have acknowledged
that the world has a moral, as well as a physical, import.
Everywhere nevertheless the matter was only brought to
an indistinct consciousness, which, in seeking for its ade
quate expression, has clothed itself in various images and
myths. These are the different Religions. Philosophers,
on their side, have at all times endeavoured to attain clear
comprehension of the thing and, notwithstanding their
differences in other respects, all, excepting the strictly
materialistic, philosophical systems, agree in this one point :
that what is most important, nay, alone essential, in our
whole existence, that on which everything depends, the real
meaning, pivot or point (sit venia verbo) of it, lies in the
morality of human actions. But as to the sense of this, as to
the ways and means, as to the possibility of the thing, they
all again quite disagree, and find themselves before an abyss

of obscurity. Thus
it follows, that it is easy to preach,

but found, morality. It is just because that

difficult to

point is determined by our conscience, that it becomes the

touchstone of all systems since we demand, and rightly
;

demand, that Metaphysic should give support to Ethics :

and now arises the difficult problem to show that, con
trary to all experience, the physical order of things
 KEFERENCE TO ETHICS. 373

depends upon a moral one, and to find out a connection

between the force which, by acting according to eternal
laws of Nature, gives the world stability, and the morality
which has its seat in the human breast. This is therefore
the rock on which the best thinkers have foundered.
Spinoza occasionally tacks a moral theory on to his Pan
theistic Fatalism by means of sophisms, but more often
leaves morality terribly in the lurch. Kant, when theo
retical Eeason is exhausted, sends his Categorical Im
1
perative, laboriously worked out of mere conceptions, on
the stage, as deus ex machina, with an absolute ought. But
the mistake he made by it only became quite clear when
Fichte, who always took outbidding for outdoing, had spun
itout with Christian Wolfian prolixity and wearisomeness
to a complete system of moral fatalism in his System of
"

Moral Doctrine," and subsequently presented it more

2
briefly in his last pamphlet.
Now, from this point of view, a system which places the
reality of all existence and the root of the whole of Nature
in the Will, and in this will places the root of the
world, must undeniably carry with it, to say the least, a
strong prejudice in its favour. For, by a direct and
it reaches, nay, already holds in its hand
simple way,
before coming to Ethics, what other systems try to reach

by roundabout, ever dubious by-paths. Nor indeed can

any other road ever lead to this but the insight, that the
active and impulsive force in Nature which presents this

perceptible world to our intellect, is identical with the

will within us. The only Metaphysic which really and
immediately supports Ethics, is that one which is itself

primarily ethical and constituted out of the material of

Ethics. Therefore I had a far greater right to call my
1
See my prize-essay
"

On the Fundament of Morality," 6.

2
Wissenschaftslehre in allgemeinen Umrisse
"

"Die
(The Doctrine
of Science in a general outline), 18, 10.
374 THE WILL IN NATURE.

Metaphysic "Ethics," than Spinoza, with whom the word

sounds almost like irony, and whose Ethics might be
"
"

said to bear the name like lucus a non lucendo ; since it is

only by means of sophistry that he has been able to tack his

morality on to a system, from which it would never logi
cally proceed. In general, moreover, he disavows it down
1
right with revolting assurance. On the whole, I can
confidently assert, that there has never yet been a philo
sophical system so entirely cut out of one piece, so com
pletely without any joins or patches, as mine. As I have
said in preface, it is the unfolding of a single thought,
my
2
by which the ancient dirXovQ b pi/doc rrjg a\r]0elag etyv is again
confirmed. Then we must still take into consideration here,
that freedom and responsibility those pillars on which all
morality rests can certainly be asserted in words without
3
the assumption of the aseity of the will but that it is ;

absolutely impossible to think them without it. Whoever

wishes to dispute this, must first invalidate the axiom,
stated long ago by the Schoolmen operari sequitur esse :

(i. e. the acts of each being follow from the nature of that

being), or we must demonstrate the fallacy of the inference

to be drawn fromunde esse, inde operari. Respon
it:

sibility has for its condition freedom but freedom has for ;

its condition primariness. For I will according to what I

am ; therefore I must be according to what I will. Aseity
of the will therefore the first condition of any Ethics
is

based on serious thought, and Spinoza is right when he says :

JEa res libera dicetur, quce ex sola suce naturce necessitate exis-
tit, et a se sola ad agendum determinatur* Dependence,
as to existence and nature, united with freedom as to action,
is a contradiction. Were Prometheus to call the creatures
of his making to account for their actions, they would be
1
For instance, Eth." iv. prop. 37, Schol. 2.
"

3 The language of truth is simple. [Tr. s add.]

8 4 "

Self-existence 5 self-dependence. Elk." i. def. 7. [Tr.]

 REFERENCE TO ETHICS. 375

quite justified in answering :

"

We could only act according

to our being for actions arise : from nature. If our actions
were bad, the fault lay in our nature this is thine own :

work punish thyself."

;
l
And it is just the same with
the imperishableness of our true being in death for this ;

cannot be seriously thought without the aseity of that

being, and can even hardly be conceived without a funda
mental separation of the will from the intellect. This last
point is peculiar to my philosophy but Aristotle had ;

already proved the first thoroughly, by showing at length

how that alone can be imperishable which has not arisen,
and that the two conceptions condition each other 2 Tavra :

CL\\{]\OLQ aKoXovdet, /cat TO re dyivr]Tov afyQapTOv, KCLL TO

evriTor. . . . TO yap yf.vt}Tov KOI TO tyQapTov
3
d\\ri\oiQ. d yevrjTOV TI, tydapTov avayKij (hcec
mutuo se sequuntur, atque ingenerabile est incorruptibile, et

incorruptibile ingenerabile. . . .
generabile enim et corruptible
mutuo se sequuntur. si generabile est, et corruptibile esse
necesse
est). among the ancient philosophers who
All those
taught an immortality of the soul, understood it in this
way nor did it enter into the head of any of them to assign
;

infinite permanence to a being having arisen in any way.

We have evidence of the embarrassment to which the con
trary assumption leads, in the ecclesiastical controversy
between the advocates of Pre-existence, Creation and Tra-
duction.
The Optimism moreover of all philosophical systems is
a point closely allied to Ethics which must never fail in
any of them, as in duty bound for the world likes to hear :

that it is commendable and excellent, and philosophers like

1
Compare "Parerga,"
i.
p. 115, et seqg. (p. 133 of 2nd ed.).
8
Aristot. "De Ccelo," i. 12.
3 "

These two go together, the uncreated is imperishable, and the

imperishable is uncreated. For the created and the perishable go
. . .

together. . . . If a thing is created it is

necessarily perishable." [Tr.]
376 THE WILL IN NATURE.

to please the world. With me it is different : I have seen

what pleases the world, and therefore shall not swerve a
step from the path of truth in order to please it. Thus
in this point also my system varies from all the others
and stands by itself. But when all the others have com
pleted their demonstrations to the song of the best of
worlds, quite at the last, at the background of the system,
like a tardy avenger of the monster, like a spirit from
the tomb, like the statue in Don Juan, there comes the
question as to the origin of evil, of the monstrous, name
less evil, of the awful, heartrendingmisery in the world :

and here they are speechless, or can only find words, empty,
sonorous words, with which to settle this heavy reckoning.
On the other hand, a system, in whose basis already the
existence of evil is interwoven with the existence of the

world, need not fear that apparition any more than a

vaccinated child need fear the smallpox. Now this is
the case when freedom is placed in the esse instead of in
the operari and sin, evil and the world then proceed from
that esse. Moreover it is fair to let me, as a serious
man, only speak of things which I really know and only
make use of words to which I attach a quite definite
meaning since this alone can be communicated with se
;

curity to others, and Yauvenargues is quite right in

"

saying :
"

la clarte est la There

bonne foi des philosophies
fore if I use the words Will, Will to live, this is no
mere ens rationis, no hypostasis set up by me, nor is it a
term of vague, uncertain meaning on the contrary, I ;

refer him, who asks what it is, to his own inner self,

where he will find it entire, nay, in colossal dimensions, as

a true ens realissimum. I have accordingly not explained
the world out of the unknown, but rather out of that
which is better known than anything, and known to us
moreover in quite a different way from all the rest. As
to the paradoxical character finally, with which the ascetic
 REFERENCE TO ETHICS. 377

results of my Ethics have been reproached, these results

had given umbrage even to Jean Paul, otherwise so
favourably disposed towards me, and had induced Herr
Riitze also (not knowing that the only course to be

adopted against me was silence) to write a book against

me in 1820, with the best intentions. They have since
become the standing rock of offence in my philosophy;
but I beg my readers to take into consideration, that it is
only in this north-western portion of the ancient con
tinent,and even here only in Protestant countries, that the
term paradoxical can be applied to such things whereas ;

throughout the whole of vast Asia everywhere indeed,

where the detestable doctrine of Islam has not prevailed
over the ancient and profound Religions of mankind by dint
of fire and sword they would rather have to fear the re
proach of being commonplace. I console myself therefore
with the thought that, when referred to the Upanishads
1
of the Sacred Vedas, my Ethics are quite orthodox, and
that even with primitive, genuine Christianity they stand
in no contradiction. As to all other accusations of heresy,
I am well armoured and my breast is fortified with triple
steel.

1
I refer those who may wish
to be briefly, yet thoroughly, informed
on Pasteur Bochinger s work :
this point, to the late La vie contem
"

plative, ascetique et monastique chez lez peuples Bouddhistes," Stras

bourg, 1831.

OC
 CONCLUSION.
r I "

HE undoubtedly striking confirmations recorded in

JL this treatise, which have been contributed to my
doctrine by the Empirical Sciences since its first appearance,
but independently of it, will unquestionably have been
followed by many more for how small is the portion :

which the individual can find time, opportunity and

patience to become acquainted with, of the branch of litera
ture dedicated to Natural Science which is so actively culti
vated in all languages Even what I have here mentioned
!

however, inspires me with confidence that the time for my

philosophy is ripening and it is with heartfelt joy that I
;

see the Empirical Sciences gradually come forward in the

course of time, as witnesses above suspicion, to testify to
the truth of a doctrine, concerning which a politic, inviolable
silence has been maintained for seventeen years by our
(some of them give them
"
"

philosophers by profession
selves this characteristic name, nay even that of philoso
"

phers by trade so that it had been left to Jean Paul, who

") ;

was ignorant of their tactics, to draw attention to it. For

it may have appeared to them a delicate matter to praise

it, and, on due consideration, they may have thought it not

altogether safe to blame it either, and may have judged it

unnecessary besides to show the public, as belonging neither
to the profession nor to the trade, that it is quite possible
to philosophize very seriously without being either unin

telligible or wearisome. compromise themselves there Why

fore with it, since no one betrays himself by silence and
 CONCLUSION. 379

the favourite secretive method was ready at hand, the ap

proved specific against merit ; this much was besides soon
agreed upon: that, considering the circumstances of the
times, my philosophy did not possess the right qualifica
tions for being taught professionally. Now the true, ulti
mate aim of all philosophy, with them, is to be taught
professionally, so much and so truly is it so, that were
Truth to come down stark naked from lofty Olympus, but
were what she brought with her not found to correspond
to the requirements called for by the circumstances of the

times, or to the purposes of their mighty superiors, these

gentlemen the profession and trade" would verily
"of

waste no time with the indecent nymph, but would hasten

to bow her out again to her Olympus, then place three

fingers on their lips and return quietly to their compendia.

For assuredly he who makes love to this nude beauty, to
this fascinating syren, to this portionless bride, will have
to forego the good fortune of becoming a Government and

University professor. He may even congratulate himself

if he becomes a garret-philosopher. On the other hand,
his audience will consist, not of hungry undergraduates
anxious to turn their learning to account, but rather of
those rare, select thinkers, thinly sprinkled among the
countless multitude, who arise from time to time, almost as
a freak of Nature. And a grateful posterity is beckoning
from afar. But they can have no idea of the beauty and
loveliness of Truth, of the delight there is in pursuing her
track, of the rapture in possessing her, who can imagine
that anyone who has once looked her in the face can ever
desert, deny, or distort her for the sake of the venal
approval, of the offices, of the money or the titles of such
people. Better to grind spectacle- glasses like Spinoza or
draw water like Cleanthes. Henceforth they may take
whatever course they like Truth will not change her nature
:

to accommodate the trade." Serious philosophy has now

"
380 CONCLUSION.

really outgrown Universities, where Science stands under

State-guardianship. It may however some day perhaps come
to be counted among the occult sciences while the spurious ;

kind, that ancilla theologice in Universities, that inferior

counterfeit of Scholasticism, for which the highest criterion
of philosophical truth lies in the country catechism, will
make our Lecture-halls doubly re-echo.
"

You, that way :

*
we, this way."

1
Shakespeare,
"

Love s Labour s Lost."

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