CIGRE-471 2021 CIGRE Canada Conference & Expo

Toronto, Ontario, October 25-28, 2021

Grid Resilience Strategy – Natural Hazards: High Level Pragmatic Approach

L. LEE, J. PATEL, A. JACKSON, D. WAGNER, P. SHARMA, and J. GE

Hydro One Networks Inc.
Canada

SUMMARY

This paper outlines Hydro One’s (Canadian electricity utility) grid resilience adaptation strategy with
concerned related to extreme natural hazards, but excludes human caused hazards (e.g. cyber).

Electricity utilities in North America and elsewhere, experience disruptions caused by extreme
weather events, with higher intensity and frequency, consistent with the other sectors per reports
issued by the Insurance Bureau of Canada. Climate change causes longer term weather changes. The
Ontario electricity sector “Climate Change Mitigation (CCM)” in the past undertook steps (coal-
electric stations shut-down) to stabilize, or reduce GHG (greenhouse gases) and continues to support
CCM with the purpose of lowing or stalling climate change; and outline the high level Climate Change
Adaptation (CCA) that realizes climate change is inevitable, and steps are taken to reduce the impacts
of extreme natural events on the electricity grid; with the latter being the focus of this paper.

For this initial high-level work for resilience adaptation strategy, Hydro One sought an understanding
of grid “resilience”; examined historical data relevant to “extreme” electricity grid disruptions;
examined existing grid planning, engineering and operational (including emergency) practices; sought
advice from technical subject matter experts regarding grid resilience; examined lessons from other
utilities through published materials; briefly examined the grid changes noting the large amount of
renewable (solar, wind) generation in Ontario; and examined the consideration of Non-Wires
Alternatives (NWAs), as well as potential use of macro/ micro-grids, and energy storage in the future.
Hydro One applies lifecycle principles in grid management, and lifecycle phases are used to “cross
check” CCA options. This portion of the work is qualitative rather than quantitative.

This initial high level, qualitative work outlines Hydro One Grid Resilience Adaptation Strategy for
natural hazards. The lessons from the development of the high-level grid adaptation strategy, call for
further quantitative work with the need to define a CCA framework with focus on the electricity
sector.

KEYWORDS

Transmission & distribution grid resilience, extreme value, climate change, mitigation, adaptation.
[1.0] INTRODUCTION

The purposes of this paper are to: (a ) increase awareness of the risk exposure and vulnerability of an
electricity utility’s, i.e. Hydro One’s transmission and distribution infrastructure to “climate change”
which has resulted in more extreme natural hazards (e.g. weather); (b) outline a strategy and
mitigation measures to address grid impacts of climate change; and, (c) outline higher priority
recommendations. This paper examines extreme natural hazards, and excludes human caused hazards
(e.g. cyber).

Hydro One’s Transmission (T) network, including about 30,000 circuit km of high voltage lines and
more than 300 substations, delivers electricity safely and reliably from generation sources to large
industrial customers and municipal utilities, and provides 98% of Ontario’s transmission capacity.
Hydro One’s Distribution (D) network spans over 123,000 circuit km and more than 1000 stations,
distributing electricity to about 1.4 million residential, business, commercial and industrial customers.

The transmission and distribution system span over 640,000 square kilometers, mostly in heavily
forested and rugged terrain. With Ontario’s large geographic area and complex climatic conditions,
weather has significant impacts on the planning, design, asset management and operation of the
transmission and distribution systems. With the large service territory, the system can be vulnerable to
a variety of extreme weather conditions and other effects which can impact reliability performance.
Changing meteorological conditions, including an increased in frequency of extreme weather events,
may result in increased equipment failures and extended system recovery time. Other adverse impacts
on the management and operations of assets include accelerated corrosion of steel components, more
rapid wood decay, wildfire hazards, mud slides, flooding, reduced opportunity for live line
maintenance, delays in restoration operations, and reduced transmission transfer capability.

The electricity industry is a sub-sector of Energy sector in general per US Dept. of Homeland
Security’s critical infrastructure list which covers 16 sub-sectors, including water system, healthcare,
dams, information technology sectors and so forth. The overall coordination among these sub-sectors
is essential to maintain societal resilience.

In order to address aging gird issues, Hydro One implements ongoing “system renewal” projects and
other equipment “sustainment” programs. This includes equipment Asset Condition Assessments and
major equipment overhauls, major repairs, equipment replacement, etc.

[2] RELIABILITY & RESILIENCE

Reliability and resiliency are two different concepts widely used by electricity utilities. In general, (a)
Reliability involves a low impact, high probability situation; and, (b) Resiliency involves high impact,
low probability (HI-LP) events and the ability of the system to recover to an acceptable steady state
condition. For North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), resilience is a critical aspect
of reliability that provides an Adequate Level of Reliability (ALR).

While electricity utilities have a common purpose in addressing the impact of extreme events, utilities
have not adopted common definition of resilience. The North American Transmission Forum (NATF),
resilience (adapted from 2018 NATF Resiliency Summit) is defined as the ability of the system and its
components (both the equipment and human components) to minimize damage and improve recovery
from non-routine disruptions, including high impact, low frequency (HILF) events in a reasonable
amount of time.

The US National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) (2009) defines critical infrastructure
resilience as: “the ability to reduce the magnitude and/or duration of disruptive events. The
effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure… depends upon its ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to,
and/or rapidly recover from a potentially disruptive event." With further consideration of different
perspectives of resilience, NERC Reliability Issues Steering Committee (RISC), breaks the definition
 into: Robustness – ability to absorb shocks and continue operating; Resourcefulness – ability to
detect and manage a crisis as it unfolds; Rapid recovery – ability to get services back as quickly as
possible in a coordinated and controlled manner and taking into consideration the extent of the
damage; and Adaptability – ability to incorporate lessons from past events to improve resilience.

[3] CLIMATE CHANGE, EXTREME WEATHER & PROJECTIONS, & UNCERTAINTY

Climate Change: The concept of “climate change” (CC) and associated effects are increasingly
acknowledged and recognized. In 1988, the United Nations (UN) and World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) jointly established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to
assess CC based on the latest science and technology. Increasingly, there is an enhanced understanding
of how adaptation and mitigation strategies can manage the risks of CC (IPCC, 2014). The "scientific
consensus” is that CC is a by-product of human activities, including GHG emissions from the
combustion of fossil fuels. As the effects of climate change and extreme weather impact on the system
and performance, it is critical to implement appropriate mitigation measures.

Historical Extreme Event Impacts in Canada & Ontario: The impact of extreme weather has increased
over time. According to the Insurance Board of Canada (IBC), severe weather, such as ice storms,
floods, windstorms and tornadoes caused $1.9 B in insured damages in 2018. Unlike single significant
events such as the Quebec ice storm, Calgary floods and Fort McMurray wildfires in 1998, 2013 and
2016 respectively, no single event in 2018 led to a high pay out, rather it was a result of multiple
smaller severe weather events. The rate of occurrence of extreme events has been increasing over the
past 35 years, as measured by catastrophic insurance claims. Figure 3.0-1 provides the historic
catastrophic insurance losses in Canada and Ontario for major natural hazards, while Figure 3.02
provides the frequency of occurrence of extreme events.
Figure 3.0-1: Catastrophic Losses in Canada & Ontario ($Billions, 1983-2018)

Figure 3.0-2: Frequency of Extreme Weather events in Canada & Ontario (1983-2017)
Number of Events
Number of Events

With more occurrences of extreme weather events, Hydro One has two main concerns: [i] impact on
reliability performance; and [ii] impact on resilience of the transmission system.

Climate Change Projection in Ontario: The Canadian and Ontario governments have used the IPCC’s
GHG emissions projections, to estimate in weather patterns, including average and variability for
extreme weather projections. The electricity industry needs to undertake work to develop “reference
scenarios” including weather projection for practical applications within the industry.
Extreme Hazards & Grid: Develop a list of key natural hazards for Ontario includes flooding/ heavy
rains (urban)/ precipitation; forest fires; extreme cold & freezing rain/ icing/ snow; extreme high
temperatures/ heat waves; lightning storms; tornadoes (usually local); high winds (wide area);
earthquakes/ seismic; and geomagnetic disturbances (GMD)/ solar storms.

Deep Uncertainty – Defiant Challenge & Extreme Value Analyses: Figures 3.03 and 3.04 (non-
Ontario specific) illustrate the uncertainty and variability in the intensity of grid hazards as reflected in
a) the range of restoration time versus the amount of warning time before a grid hazard event occurs,
and b) the uncertainty to the causes and detectability using the limited knowledge and technology
regarding natural hazards.
Figure 3.0-3: Range of Restoration Time Figure 3.04: Knowledge of Causes
Versus Warning Time before Hazard Versus Detection for Grid Hazards
Occurrence

[Source: NASEM; Enhancing the Nation’s Electrical System, pg. 51 and 55, 2017]

Experts in resilience analysis, state that with “deep uncertainty” there is insufficient information to
apply conventional risk management analyses approaches which rely on Subjective Expected Utility
(SEU) Theory. In particular, deep uncertainty is characterized by a) uncertainty about the model form
or validity for predicting future conditions; b) ignorance about appropriate assumptions or subjective
beliefs about uncertainty before observing relevant future events; c) disagreement among experts and
decision makers about preferences and priorities for future action. The first 2 factors are prominent as
shown in Figures 3.0-3 and 3.0-4. For Ontario, the knowledge and detection of lightning
(thunderstorms) is better compared to the level noted in Figure 3.04, including lightning information
collected since 1976, at the Toronto CN Tower at 553.3 m height. The third factor is an emerging
consideration which the industry is still examining, and a consensus has not been reached on grid
resilience metrics. This uncertainty calls to Extreme Value Analyses (EVA) for resilience, beyond
usual risk management.

[4.0] GRID RESILIENCE IMPACTS INCLUDING NATURAL HAZARDS

[4.1] Grid Resilience Needs Practicality

Grid resilience experts (Proc. Of the IEEE, vol. 105, No. 7. July 2017, pg. 1254) note that a
comprehensive upgrade of the entire grid is too costly to be practical, and cannot guarantee full
continuity of electricity supply. Utilities worldwide recognize that, based on experience with extreme
natural hazards, they may not manage the immediate impacts of all natural events at all times via
design enhancements. There are practical alternatives to maintain grid resiliency to address the impact
of low-probability, high-consequence extreme hazards. Mitigation, such as selective load shedding
may be a practical operating mode if in “degraded” states following an extreme hazard, and allow
further actions to return the grid to a normal operating level.

[4.2] Grid Resilience Analyses Within Lifecycle Approach - Natural Hazards

Three-Step High Level Approach for Assessing Resilience Options:

a) For each natural hazard, qualitatively consider the consequence on the grid facilities, identify
industry and technical engineering requirements relevant to the impacts, and identify potential
mitigation actions;
b) Consider integrated grid facilities, and system operating impacts, including Ontario Power System
Restoration Plan (OPSRP), emergency preparedness plans, storm response, and potential mitigations;
c) Identify advanced technology, concepts or methodologies to improve grid resiliency.
To ensure key factors are considered, a “cross-check” within a life cycle approach is considered as
part of the analyses as illustrated in Figure 4.2-1.

Figure 4.2-1: Life Cycle Resilience Approach

In this document, mitigation action is grouped into four categories including a) Planning; b)
Engineering and c) Operations & Maintenance (O&M) and d) Grid System Operating; and, this
broadly aligns with a life cycle approach for facilities.

[4.3] Resilience “Threshold”: Transmission 2β Method & Distribution >10,000 Customers method

Transmission: With no industry accepted resilience metrics, transmission reliability based event
definitions based on historical events and reliability data are examined for scale of customer impact. In
statistics, variability is measured by standard deviations. Exploratory work on variance is underway
and one approach to account for uncontrollable events is the exclusion of major events criteria,
referred to as the ‘2β Method’, specifically, the exclusion of any event with 10,000 MW-minutes or
more of unsupplied energy. This threshold is about 1.95 (log normal; and “rounded to 2”) standard
deviations above the average. This is application of EVA. As a cautionary reminder, when developing
resilience statistics, the utility sector only has grid reliability information for less than 50 years; and,
the sample size for “resilience” events can be small, given that HI-LP events usually have return
period of 20, 50, 100 or more years. Data set for evaluating long-time period historical extreme grid
event risks is challenging.

Table 4.3-1 provides the percent contribution of each weather/environment hazard to all the major
events, which had over 10,000 MW-minutes unsupplied energy based on 2011 to 2020 data. The
highest contributor to unsupplied energy is flooding, followed by tornado, forest fire, lightning, and
wind. These five weather/natural hazards contribute to about 96.5% of all weather/ natural hazard
related major interruptions. The reader is cautioned of potential “unconscious bias” of the relative
importance of hazards; additional hazards are not unimportant, rather deep uncertainty of certain
hazards calls for fuller analyses, and may be hazards in combination (ice accretion & wind, etc).
Table 4.3-1 – Delivery Point Interruptions by Natural Hazards
Hazard Types % of # of % of interruption % of MW-Minutes
interruptions duration Loss
Forest Fire 3.5 40.4 11.1
Flood 16.9 12.9 50.2
Freezing Rain 1.8 0.0 0.0
Ice 20.8 5.3 3.0
Lightning 21.6 5.3 6.0
Snow 6.1 0.7 0.5
Tornado 11.6 28.4 24.6
Wind 17.6 6.9 4.4
All 100 100 100
Distribution: For Hydro One’s distribution system, the historical extreme or force majeure events,
involving loss of 10% or more of customers during an event, with primary causes that included tree
contacts, defective equipment, unknown/other and loss of supply.

[4.4] Adaptation/ Resilience Risk Reduction Actions & Recommendations

Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) recognizes that climate change is inevitable despite CCM efforts,
and it exerts significant pressure on physical, socio-economic systems, and practices, processes, or
standards, which aims to reduce current and future impacts of extreme natural events (including
weather). Where such hazards are expected (albeit rarely), consequence mitigation measures may be
needed when the hazard exceeds a “coping range” for consequence. Tables 4.4-1, provides for each
natural hazard, an estimate of grid impact (in the past); with identification of grid issues and
adaptation/ resilience /recommendations in three main lifecycle work areas – planning, engineering,
grid operating/ operations & maintenance (O&M) (Collectively “operations”); and for some human
caused hazards.
Table 4.4-1: Natural Hazards – Adaptation/ Resilience Actions
Mitigation Actions
Planning Engineering Operations
Hazard Impact Issue

Natural/Environmental Threats for Hydro One

4.2% of T-SAIFI Weather 115 kV transmission lines 1) Forecast "Dry" period and identify
1) Ensure compliance with conductor sag
Forest Fire 48.2% of T-SAIDI Weather in north-east and north- vulnerable geographic pockets
clearance requirements
13.3% of MW-min loss Weather west are vulnerable 2) Spare transmission line components

1) Identify key transmission stations with poor

14.2% of T-SAIFI Weather Southern Ontario 1) Assess impact of backflash reliability and check if field installation meets
Lightning 8.5% of T-SAIDI Weather experience highest levels 2) Grounding integrity at tower footings of key engineering specifications
11.4% of MW-min loss Weather of lightning in Canada transmission lines 2) Conduct technical review of stations with
missing lightning protection

1) Ensure vegetation clearance on ROWs are

Southern Ontario maintained to standard 1) New bulk supply transmission lines use
16.3% of T-SAIFI Weather 1) Ensure adequate maintenance and provide
experience high winds 2) Replace defective line insulators prone to fail return period of 50 years for design.
Wind 12.9% of T-SAIDI Weather accurate asset condition assessment
and the frequency and under cantilever force exerted by wind 2) Design structure "arms", that can break-
9.9% of MW-min loss Weather information.
magnitude is on increase 3) Considering grid security needs keep away to mitigate cascading tower collapse.
separate ROWs for new lines

1) Identify all critical stations (NERC) that are 1) Update engineering standards for factor in 1) Ensure technical "acceptance" of new
Historically an issue for within water flood plains and check adequacy (100 year return period for rain water storm) equipment, systems for flooding or storm water
8.2% of T-SAIFI Weather
GTA with one major for storm-water drainage, sump-pump systems, 2) Consider temporary off-site storm water draining as per engineering specifications.
Flood 13.3% of T-SAIDI Weather
event in 2013 causing and consistency with municipal storm water holding pool 2) Ensure draining systems are cleared of
49.3% of MW-min loss Weather
outage in multiple cities systems. 3) Change grade profile to hold large quantity debris and equipment such as sump-pump is
of water periodically tested

Line insulators lose their 1) The power system and customer electricity 1) The power system and customer electricity
1) Hydro One engineering requirements
55.3% of T-SAIFI Weather dielectric strength in security requirements needs to be adequately security requirements needs to be adequately
Freezing exceed industry requirements (CSA and IEEE
15.6% of T-SAIDI Weather progressive ways as the considered and specified in planning considered and specified in planning
Rain/Icing/Snow 13.8% of MW-min loss Weather leakage distance on specifications by system planning staff.
for transmission lines and station design).
specifications by system planning staff.
insulator shrinks
1) Hydro One is undertaking research work
In Canada most of the
with the University of Western Ontario to
tornadoes are observed
0.8% of T-SAIFI Weather assess ways to mitigate the impacts of high
in Ontario. Southwestern
Tornado 1.63% of T-SAIDI Weather intensity wind events, based on new theoretical
Ontario is one of the two
2.36% of MW-min loss Weather work; followed by computerized analytical
tornado "alleys" in
work; and, further validation in a scaled three
Canada.
dimensional purpose-built laboratory.
1) Hydro One has already revised technical 1) Hydro One has already revised technical
Ontario is in low seismic specification for auto transformers and specification for auto transformers and
Seismic activity zone, except a bushings based on expected seismic bushings based on expected seismic
No Statistics
Distrubance small geo-pocket in acceleration. acceleration.
Ottawa and North Bay. 2) Ensure planning specifications identify 2) Ensure planning specifications identify
seismic concerns when situating equipment seismic concerns when situating equipment
1) Hydro One's existing work program on
GMD/GIC augments earlier work on major
power transformers and now includes GIC
GICs can damage and
monitoring. (new and replacement planned in
Geo-magnetic No Statistics distrupt power system as
2019-2020) at 13 trasnformer stations.
in Quebec in 1989.
2) IESO studies to identify equipment with GIC
concerns and accordingly Hydro One plans to
implement mitigation plans.
1) Hydro One's planning specifications already
When the maximum
incorporate rise in ambient temperatures for 1) Factor in "real-time" information on weather
temperature is 32°C or
power transformers to maximum of 55 or 65˚C for grid operations to ensure full use of system
more and persists for
Heat Wave & above pre-specified loading. equipment capabilities and continuity of
No Statistics three or more
Drought consecutive days –it
2) Plan and provide load transfers if certain electricity supply.
transmisison assets are expected to be 2) Operationally implement load transfer or
impacts thermal loading
overloaded where practical or provide load shedding schemes if necessary.
limits of critical assets.
electrical load shedding scheme.

This table are applicable to both the transmission and distribution systems. For the distribution system,
modernization work programs emphasize “reliability first”, and concurrently provide for “resilience
indirectly”. Investments include (i) Distribution Automation (DA) – upgraded impedance-based
protective relays for distribution, use of faulted current indicators (FCIs) at distribution lines to
provide visual aids to enable faster restorations; more line sectionalizers/ reclosers to provide
appropriate isolation when an electrical fault occurs; and, where practical design ”fault location,
isolation, service restoration” (FLISR) systems where multiple distribution sources may permit
enhancing availability; (ii) upgraded telecommunications to permit enhanced protection & control (as
above); and (iii) other priority recommendations related to design similar to transmission system
concerns.

[4.5] Integrated Grid Operating & Resilience

For the bulk transmission system, the need to maintain real-time generation-load balance, satisfy
regulatory requirements to handle system contingencies, and provide continue customer supply, has
resulted in embedded resilience. This resilience is supported by following electricity sector industry
standards (e.g. NERC, NPCC) to allow for grid undergoing “contingencies”, with the design of a
“meshed” bulk grid, station configuration for enhanced operating flexibility, dual feeds above certain
load and embedded generation thresholds, , and a grid architecture which allows other electricity
pathways after a contingency or maintenance outage(s); planned capability of certain components such
as power transformers, lines and cables to be temporarily overloaded for times to permit system re-
dispatch; and possible support from neighboring interconnections. Some resilience comes from
provision for mobile equipment, and adequate strategic equipment spares to avoid lengthy replacement
or repair delays.

For integrated grid system operating, Hydro One’s system controllers in coordination with the IES O,
operate and control the entire Hydro One transmission grid from the Ontario Grid Control Centre
(OGCC). Backup Control Centre (BUCC) facilities are also provided at a different location. To
monitor and control Hydro One’s transmission assets and the system as a whole, OGCC has a
centralized system with a suite of specific grid operating tools, together with access to a province-wide
telecommunication and station control infrastructure. In addition to managing huge numbers of grid
system maintenance outages and restore forced outages, OGCC staff must address the impact of
hazards (weather, fire, etc), equipment failure and human-actions which could potentially result in
major grid disruptions. The grid covers a large geographic area for all of Ontario and interconnected
grid neighbors. Hydro One has significant distribution modernization and at the OGCC also has a
distribution management system (DMS) with comparable operating capabilities to the transmission
system.

Further, the OGCC has [i] qualified people (e.g. experienced system controllers certified as NERC
Reliability Coordinators); [ii] technology/ tools, including Network Management System (NMS)
includes real time monitoring and control (RTMC); grid state estimation, equipment limit calculator
(ELC); real time contingency analysis (RTCA – power load flow analyses tool); training simulator;
and operating flexibility tools including rotational load shedding (RLS); automatic voltage reduction
tools; and other systems including real-time post contingency limits rating calculation, automatic and
manually-armed special protection schemes, SCADA rehearsal mode/ drills/ training; space weather
tool (SWT) for monitoring the GMD impact from solar storms; separately, with IESO draw on
interconnections support via the neighbouring utilities; [iii] Processes and Co-ordination to respond to
major grid disruptions, including: Hydro One’s Storm Response (first developed mid-1990s &
continually enhanced) to address major events (“storms”); other action plans including Emergency
Management, Business Continuity, Cyber Security Emergency Preparedness; IESO’s OPSRP; & other
tools/processes.

Such embedded resilience is difficult to evaluate, when the grid technical planning base is focused on
reliability. With the wide range of climate change projections, and a broader range of natural and other
hazards, continual assessments of adequacy are needed.

[4.6] Lifecycle Phases & Resilience Planning

Table 4.6-1 provides linkages among the key lifecycle phases and key high-level actions for
Reliability & Resilience planning, and Operational Response.
 Table 4.6-1: Lifecycle & Reliability/ Resilience Planning & Operational Resilience Response
Reliability & Resilience Planning Operational Resilience Response to Hazards
LIFE CYCLE ⬇
Grid System  Reliability Standards (Regulatory)  If required, use backup/ spare equipment
Planning  Grid Requirements (Electrical Security; ROW (right of way) needs)  Provide Support As Needed, Particularly If Significant
 Configuration System Assessments: DESN; flexible break & half Grid Disruption/ Damage Has Occurred
station circuit breaker config;
 System Analysis (Capability & Constraints)
 Critical Load/ Electrical Bus
 Resilience Metrics (e.g. N-k contingencies and load cuts)
 Emergency Voice Communications (e.g. use of ionosphere);
continue direct telecom connect for key devices to OGCC SCADA
 Advanced Technical Plans, Innovation, Validation Projects (
Macro/ Microgrid; Adv. Grid Re-Config, NWA/Non-Wires-Alt; Adv.
Tech Concept; +)
Engineering  Equipment Standards  Equipment Substitution (e.g. Towers)
 Standardization  “Virtual” Protection & Control (P&C) Team for P&C
 Asset Configuration setting for adequate grid operations (for major grid
 Advance Technology Standards disruption, with long duration repairs)
Procurement  Multi-year Equipment/ Services Contracts (including equipment for  Emergency Purchases
“normal” annual storm response)  Preposition Mobile Transformers/ Equipment As
 Backup/ Spares for Long Lead-time Equipment At Needed
Central/Regional Locations
Construction  Ensure Built to Specifications and Functioning  Prepare Active Construction Sites If Hazard
 Use of special construction materials (e.g. concrete, grout) under Forecast(e.g. Equipment Tie-down, Materials Stored In
extreme temperatures (e.g. cold); and guides to defer construction Enclosures)
(e.g. temperature is outside technically acceptable range).
Operating  Operating Procedures  Damage Assessment
 Emergency Outage & Incident Command, Continual Management  OMS (Outage Management)
to Support Guides/Procedures  Set Priorities (Crews/Materials)
 Incident Management
 MUS (mobile unit stations)/transformers
 Load Reduction (System Voltage Reduction)
 Load Shedding
 Interruptible load/load shifting
Operating –  Emergency Outage & Incident Command, Continual Management  See Items above (under Operating)
Emergency & to Support Guides/Procedures  Co-ordinate with Provincial Emergency Mgt. Entities
 Mutual Assistance Agreements (MAAs)  Back-up Control Centres
Major Incident  Provision for “paper” copies of Key System Diagrams,
 Multi-hazard, ,multi--day, multi- party Major Grid Incident
“Simulation” Maps, Procedures
O&M  Consistent O&M; (ACA) Asset Condition Assessments  MAAs
 T&D Veg Mgt, OCP (Optimal Cycle Protocol)
 Insulator Washing (e.g. road salt spray, dust accumulation)
System Renewal /  Major equipment overhauls, major repairs, replacement, with ACAs  Enable Focus On Equipment (Planned For System
Sustainment & factor future system needs Renewal), If Related To Grid Facility Potentially
Impacted By Oncoming Hazard
Evaluate, & Learn  As Needed  As Needed
<<Feedback Grid  < <Feedback Loop: Grid Planning  << Feedback Loop: Grid Planning
Planning

[4.7] Advanced Resilience Adaptation Options For Transmission & Distribution Systems
Table 4.7-1 is a summary of the high level grid resilience adaptation strategy for natural hazards.
Table 4.7-1: Lifecycle & Advanced Adptation Options For Transmission & Distribution Systems
Priority Recommendations Transmission Focus Distribution Focus
1 Advance grid system resiliency N-k mesh analyses; multiple islands & restoration; Practicality of existing DERs (after FIT, microFIT
analyses tools extreme value analyses; resilience metrics contracts close out), & potential energy storage, to
examination create microgrids for Distribution restoration, with
OGCC/IESO).
2 Impact prediction for natural hazards Meshed system ✔ [= applicable here] Radial system ✔ ; Leverage recent installation -
with GIS & equipment withstand weather prediction tool
capabilities for pre-disruption & post
disruption work plans
3 Prepare high-level restoration plans TSs (E.g. only 2 underground cable supplies to TS) Selective “rental” generation use (e.g.,
“containerized” natural gas/ diesel/ fuel oil/ veg oil
engine-generator or micro-turbine-generator; or
Planning /

Maintenance Engineering Operating

portable PVs to the extent available; or energy

storage equipment) under extreme weather
conditions, particularly for vulnerable customers
(e.g. old age homes)
4 Back-up inventory for major ✔ ; considering mobile circuit breakers ✔
equipment, including mobile units
Operations & Planning &

5 Last resort - voice comm. (e.g. ✔ ✔

Ionosphere) & continue direct
telecom device to SCADA

6 Vegetation management for Right Of ✔ ; Continue OCP (optimum cycle protocol) For ✔ ; Continue OCP (optimum cycle protocol) For
Ways (ROW) ROWs – Reliability1st/Resilience indirect ROWs – Reliability1st/Resilience indirect
7 Insulation washing for salt/dry dust; ✔ Generally not applicable ✗
effective grounding; and soil moisture
for U/G cable
8 Reliable and sufficient real-time data e.g. PMUs/ Synchro-phasors e.g. leverage DMS for restoration with appropriate
telecom (& continue AMI/ advanced meter
infrastructure analytics)
9 P&C-T re-setting for entire TS ✔ Generally not applicable ✗
Planning /
Operating

outages (recall floods): Agile–virtual

team; consider selective remote-reset
of P&C-T for major disruption
10 System Operating Training & Drills ✔ ✔

[5.0] REMARKS – CHALLENGES FOR A RESILIENCE PLAN

Building on qualitative resilience strategy work, a resilience implementation plan needs quantitative
analyses, with rationalized options for economic resilience investments. The latter poses a dilemma:
for resilience /adaptation options, funds/ investments are “invested” now/ near-term, and the “benefits”
(e.g. avoided costs of damage) may/may not be realized between now and long-time horizons (10s to
100s of years), with high uncertainty of HI-LP events. The economic evaluations is further challenged
with the grid “architecture” facing significant change, due to more decentralized renewable energy
sources (with more grid operational issues) and multi-area operations (e.g. different grid operational
“rules” involving macro/ microgrids with availability of energy storage technology).