Walter PowerViolence 1964
Walter PowerViolence 1964
Author(s): E. V. Walter
Source: The American Political Science Review , Jun., 1964, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Jun., 1964),
pp. 350-360
Published by: American Political Science Association
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The ancient Greeks rarely fail us when we concepts have two factors in common; namely,
turn to them in a receptive but cautious spirit initiative and causation. Defining dynamics,
for conceptual clarity, and their treatment of Aristotle says, "the beginning of a change or
the abstraction "power" and terms related to it movement is called a power . . ."4 In social
is relevant and suggestive. In Greek, a root interactions, we may say that if the source of an
contained in several words associated with action performed by an individual is to be
political power has two meanings. The verb found in a prior act of another individual, then
archein means both "to rule" and "to start"; the latter has power over the former with re-
the noun archer means both "sovereignty" and spect to that act. By "source" we also mean
"beginning." J. L. Myres, in his analysis of "cause" in the sense that it must be the suffi-
Greek political ideas, suggests: cient condition for the action; if the prior act
did not occur, then the subsequent action would
It is now clear that in compounds the prefix
not take place. When action is "caused" in this
arkhU (as in our words "architect" and "arch-
way, then we can speak of one individual or
bishop") describes not merely the first or chief
group "controlling" the action of another. As I
man of a company or organization, but the initia-
shall explain, however, there is more to power
tory function of him who "starts" the others to
than "control," for power processes frequently
work, and originates the design which they are to
deal with actions that are out of control. If an
complete. And this appeal to Greek practical life
individual or group we shall name "P" intends
confirms the view that what is essential in the
to cause a respondent designated "R" to per-
notion of arkhU is just this initiatory "push" or
form an action "X", and R does not perform X,
"drive" with which the gifted man imposes his
then if P proceeds to change R in some way-
will-and-pleasure on the rest.'
for example, to penalize or to "reform" R-be-
If we follow Myres, we may infer that in the cause of the failure to perform X, this pro-
place where Herodotus reports the wealthy cedure is a form of power, since with respect to
noble, Otanes, to have said he had no wish X, P is the source of changes in R.5
"archein kai archesthai"; as well as where Aristotle states, moreover, that the tend-
Aristotle writes that the good citizen must have ency to resist change is also a kind of power,6
the knowledge and the ability "archesthai kai and the observation that resistance, or the
archein" the words mean "to start and be ability to withstand attempts at control, is a
started" as well as "to rule and be ruled."2 form of counterpower, is a central idea in the
When Aristotle defines terms in The Meta- present investigation.
physics, one of the six meanings of "beginning,"
following the Ross translation, is the group or I Metaph. 1013a, 1046a, trans. Richard Hope
individual "at whose will that which is moved (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1960), pp.
is moved and that which changes changes, e.g. 104, 182. The Hope translation prefers "power" to
the magistracies in cities, and oligarchies and the word "potency," which is found in older
monarchies and tyrannies, are called translations.
archai . . ."I 6 As indicated below, I have extended the con-
"To have power" covers a broader range of ception of power proposed by Felix E. Oppenheim
activity than "to govern, or "to rule," but thein Dimensions of Freedom: An Analysis (New
York, St. Martin's Press, 1961). His scheme is
* This essay is based on materials for a book, more useful than those proposed by Lasswell and
Terror and Society, to be published by Oxford Uni- other contemporary analysts of power. As David
versity Press. I am grateful to the Rockefeller Braybrooke has stated in a recent review, Oppen-
Foundation for a grant in Legal and Political heim has probably "come closer than any previ-
Philosophy, which enabled me to begin the in- ous writer to achieving maximum clarity about
quiry in 1957-58. freedom and such related concepts as power and
1 John L. Myres, The Political Ideas of the control." I agree with Braybrooke that "the next
Greeks (New York, Abingdon Press, 1927), p. 158. order of business" in the analysis of power and
2 Herodotus, Histories III 83; Aristotle, Politics freedom is the critique of this scheme, "for as of
1277b 15. this moment that subject starts with Oppenheim's
3 Aristotle, The Metaphysics V 1013a, trans. account." Philosophical Review, Vol. 72 (1963),
WV. D. Ross, 2d ed. (London, Oxford University p. 525.
Press, 1948). 6 Metaph. 1019a, trans. Hope, p. 105.
350
One must bear in mind the cases that would be identified with power, and he extends the
be excluded from the conception of power; for latter to mean the ability to influence, to re-
example, instances in which an individual acts strain, or to punish. To have power, in this
on his own, without the act being initiated by sense, means "to be able to subject others to
some other specific person or group. To avoid one's control or to limit their freedom."9
confusion, power should be distinguished from Oppenheim's taxonomy of power relations is
other social transactions similar to it, especially based on the microanalysis of particular trans-
the process that is usually called "social con- actions, but it may still be used to identify
trol" in the more narrow sense. (I am excluding events and processes after we move from the
altogether the very general sense in which interpersonal to the macrosocial level of ob-
social control means regulated behavior of any servation, although it has certain limitations on
kind.) In the course of socialization, the in- that level.
clinations and dispositions of individuals are Control of an individual's act, Oppenheim
shaped in ways that cause them to want to do demonstrates, is exercised in two ways: through
the things that are expected of them-that is, determining his choice or through managing
to act in an institutionalized manner. This his body or environment in such a way that he
social conditioning yields acts which stem from has no choice. The former way is called "influ-
the individual's own initiative. In cases of ence," and its several methods include "per-
deviant behavior, excluding illegal acts, the suasion," which means convincing him in some
right to levy social sanctions such as criticism manner that it is to his advantage to perform
or ridicule is usually exercised by an indeter- (or withhold) the act in question, and "de-
minate number of persons within a given range terrence," which means making him withhold
of social relationship. What differentiates this (or perform) the act out of apprehension for the
kind of social control from power is that first, consequences if he were to refuse.10 All cases of
conventional behavior comes from the indi- control-with the consent of the one who is
vidual's own initiative, and second, deviant controlled as well as against his will-imply a
behavior is not punished by specified persons causal relation, meaning that the act of the
charged with the task of enforcing the socially controller is the sufficient condition for the
prescribed conduct. In contrast, a case of con- response of the individual controlled. "When-
formist behavior caused by the demand for a ever one actor exercises control over another,
conventional act by a specific person, is indeed he causes him to behave in a certain way.""11
an instance of power. So also is a case of legal In addition to "exercising control," Oppen-
punishment carried out by a specific staff. heim introduces the category of "having con-
This is not to deny that social control and trol," a form of potential action which includes
socialization are related to power as auxiliary "having influence" and "preventing." The
forces. Individuals are conditioned to obedience former means that a controller stands in such a
in most societies, with lesser or greater degrees relation to an individual that if the latter were
of rigor, so that in ordinary circumstances to intend performing a given act, then the
when acts of power do come their way, men are controller would dissuade, deter, or otherwise
disposed to obey them. If these acts come under influence him not to perform it. "Preventing"
the aegis of legitimate authority, obedience is means not actually causing an individual to
usually voluntary and resistance minimal. As withhold a specific act, but closing the alterna-
MacIver puts it, "Men obey because they are tive in advance, making it impossible-whether
social beings-or, if you prefer it, because they he decided to act or not-for him to perform the
are socialized beings."7 act. Oppenheim explains:
The concept of power is often confined to acts
Prevention is usually not mentioned among the
of control. or to "the production of intended various forms of control and power; yet, making
effects," as Bertrand Russell defines it.8 These it impossible for others to act in a certain way
notions are too limited. When controls are constitutes the most effective device of gaining
exercised and penalties imposed by individuals control over their actual behavior. Would-be
who did not think of doing so in the first place, controllers usually want to establish control over
or by those who did not foresee the conse-
their respondents in such a way that the latter
quences of their actions, they are unintended make no attempt at evading it.12
acts of power. Moreover, Felix Oppenheim has
shown that "control" is a domain too narrow to Making something impossible, he observes,
ity." In assembly, the king or chief is heard gether in a single political unit several diverse
"more because he has influence to persuade kinship groups.22 Many primitive people have
than because he has power to command." The believed that the power configuration is the
leaders with the largest following are those exclusive property of a royal family, and that a
whose exploits promise the largest advan- single sacred source of control and punishment
tages.'8 Similarly, in many African traditional is the only alternative to internal fighting and
systems, it is the practice for large followings to other kinds of disorder. A. WV. Southall in his
adhere to popular chiefs who rule well and for remarkable study of some traditional political
poor rulers to lose their people. Even among systems in Western Uganda, describes how
the Southern Bantu, where loyalty and pa- power-especially rainmaking and judicial
tience have been cardinal virtues, Eric Walker skill-is a quality exclusively possessed by the
indicates that if a chief "ate up his men" by lineage of Alur chiefs. Members of the chiefly
confiscating their property and otherwise met- family would be invited, bought, or even stolen
ing excessive punishments, he might wake up by neighboring people who yearned for welfare
to find his people gone over to a more moderate and order, but knew of no other method to
rival.'9 establish a political head.23
Whereas the traditional chief typically holds Power may be experienced as inspiring,
power in relatively peaceful conditions, the wholesome, tolerable, or oppressive, depending
king is a figure more often found in conditions on the circumstances. It may release creative
of repetitive, organized warfare. Weber sug- energy, heightening vitality,24 it may destroy
gests, "The king is everywhere primarily a war motivation, generating a pall of depression, or
lord, and kingship evolves from charismatic it may stimulate conflict and rebellion. It may
heroism."20 The Israelites, one will recall, induce a sense of freedom or a sense of tyranny,
according to the King James version, wanted a but deeper than those alternatives, Ortega has
king to "judge us, and go out before us, and shown, sometimes the state may be shaped
fight our battles." The king typically combines after the community's vital preferences and
in his person several functions: military, judic- life within it felt as exhilarating freedom,
ial, religious, and civil executive. Since they whereas at other times the whole weight of
have little division of function and not much regulative institutions is oppressive and life is
constitutional machinery, primitive monarchies converted into "spiritless adaptation of each
resemble one another, despite cultural differ- individual existence to the iron mold of the
ences, in a striking way.2' state."26 From an historical point of view, the
Kingship of the simple kind requires ritual way in which power is experienced is a critical
control over the royal ancestors and other matter, for it determines the motivations of
spirits-making possible the control of nature people to keep or to change the system in which
by magic; military might-involving a staff of they live.
armed dependents; judicial skill; and the tech- When people do something according to
niques of civil administration. Some ruling their own will, we ordinarily say they are acting
houses tended to develop this configuration of voluntarily. When they act against their will,
abilities as a specialty which they would bring desire, inclination, or intention, we say they are
to any people they could rule by force or by being forced to do something. This is the sense
invitation. During the heroic age of Greece, in which the word "force" will be used here-a
there is evidence, that some Achaean princely general term to include any agency that com-
families moved about, thrust out of one area, pels someone to do something that he does not
winning a throne in another, fleeing vengeance want to do. The term "coercion" will be limited
from one people to establish a dynasty in the to mean any social form of compulsion-usu-
midst of another. Exercising power through a
typical, elementary configuration of control 22 Cambridge Ancient History, II, 1st ed., ch.
and punishment techniques, and by the force of xvii; N. G. L. Hammond, A History of Greece to
their personalities, kings managed to hold to- 322 B.C. (London, Oxford University Press, 1959),
pp. 67, 140.
18 Tacitus, The Complete Works (New York, 23 Aidan W. Southall, Alur Society: A Study in
Modern Library, 1942), pp. 712, 714. Processes and Types of Domination (Cambridge,
19 Eric A. Walker, A History of Southern W. Heffer, 1953).
Africa, 3d ed. (London, Longmans, Green, 1957), 24 Dorothy Emmet, "The Concept of Power,"
p. 112; cf. Cambridge History of the British Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 54
Empire, VIII, p. 41 ff. (1954), p. 13.
20 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, p. 251. 25 Jos6 Ortega y Gasset, Concord and Liberty,
21 A. Andrewes, Probouleusis (London, Oxford trans. Helene Weyl (New York, 1946), pp. 34,
University Press, 1954), pp. 6, 9. 35.
ally some kind of institutionalized force. The punishment, according to the practices familiar
term "violence" will be restricted to the sense to us, the destructive harm is measured and the
of destructive harm; hence, a destructive kind of limits made clear. Social definition as an
force. As a general term, it would include not authorized method often extracts it from the
only physical assaults that cause damage to the category of violence-at least from the stand-
person, but also magic, sorcery, and the many point of the society-and places it in the same
techniques of inflicting harm by mental or domain with other socially approved coercive
emotional means. It includes psychic and techniques. In this study, however, any kind of
spiritual harm as well as physical damage, and destructive harm to the person will be taken as
one may turn to anthropological literature for violence-but specified as legitimate or ille-
accounts of magical and spiritual terrorism gitimate in its social definition.
practiced by shamans, magicians, and priests.26 Aristotle does not distinguish between force
Historically, however, physical violence is more and violence, but uses the term bia, which, like
ponderable, extensive, and is the type that is the German word Gewalt, may mean both. In
organized on the widest scale. his works, bia is used in a very general way,
Forms of "influence" such as "persuasion" standing for the physical concept referring to
are, then, not instances of force, for by them inanimate nature as well as for "compulsion"
the controller changes intentions, causing in human behavior. As he defines it in the fifth
people to choose to perform acts initiated by book of The Metaphysics, bia is a kind of neces-
him. Deterrence, prevention, restraint, and sity which hinders and impedes the course of
punishment, when they work against the will impulse and purpose.28 The notion of force "as
of the respondent are, of course, instances of an agent of compulsory motion," Max Jammer
force. If people are forced in ways that are shows, is the core of Aristotle's system of me-
destructive and injurious, they are being chanics.29 To force something means to make a
treated with violence. Although the term may thing move against its own "natural internal
also be applied to property, I shall restrict its tendency," and the same conception appears in
meaning to events that cause undesirable his ethical theory as well as in his theory of
changes in the condition of the person, includ- physics. In human conduct, bia refers to cases
ing processes that threaten his life or substanti- where the cause of action lies in things outside
ally diminish his physical or psychic wellbeing the actor, and when the actor contributes
and safety. nothing.30 Jammer explains that in physics, the
Violence is generally understood as unmeas- notion of force evolved through the Peripatetic
ured or exaggerated harm to individuals, either and Scholastic stage, where it was encumbered
not socially prescribed at all or else beyond the by animistic formulations. In this stage, the
limits established for its use.27 Thus, it is often notion of force was rooted in the everyday ex-
socially defined to include processes that may perience of push and pull, but it is easy to see
originate as authorized, measured force, but how close it was as well to the sociological
which go beyond the prescribed conditions and notions of conflict and power.3" Paul Tillich, too,
limits. For example, in systems such as ours, a has indicated that the notions of power and
police officer may be authorized to exercise force when expressed in words by physicists are
physical restraint in making an arrest, but he anthropomorphic metaphors. "Power is a
will be said to act in a violent manner if, with- sociological category and from there it is trans-
out acceptable reasons, he attacks and injures ferred to nature ..." he observes." Indeed,
a fugitive. In some cases, however, police when the concept of force in physics is liberated
brutality may be officially condemned as vio- from confusion with the sociological notion, it
lence, yet socially expected and used unoffici- tends to disappear, and although modern me-
ally as means of control. chanics still tolerates it as a "methodological
When a violent process is socially prescribed intermediate," Jammer argues, "the theory of
and defined as a legitimate means of control or fields would have to banish it even from this
humble position.""3
26 Cf. Paul Radin, The World of Primitive Man
(New York, 1960), chs. 6, 8. 28 Metaph. 1015a, b.
27 David Cooperman takes a different approach 29 Max Jammer, Concepts of Force: A Study in
in Power, Force, and Violence (unpublished Ph.D. the Foundations of Dynamics (New York, 1962),
dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1954). p. 37.
Working out the problem in a conceptual frame- 30 Nichomachean Ethics 111Ob.
work that follows Talcott Parsons, he deals with 31 Jammer, op. cit., p. Viii.
effects on the normative structure and defines 32 Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice (New
violence as destructive harm not to persons, as I York: Galaxy Books, 1961), p. 7.
have defined it, but to boundaries of action. 33 Jammer, op. cit., p. 264.
Another Greek term associated with political sense of Might is similar in some way to leader-
power, kratos, often appears in the same con- ship, since it employs persuasion. But persua-
text with archer, which was discussed above. It sion for what? If leadership induces voluntary
signifies "strength" or "might," and just as action, how can Might exhort involuntary
archer is found in terms such as "monarchy" action? If the content of Kratos' speeches is
and "oligarchy," kratos appears in the suffix of examined, an answer emerges: the persuasive
such terms as "aristocracy," "democracy," mission of Might is to manage the impression of
and "plutocracy"-which mean systems in irresistibility and to diminish resistance. No
which the best-born, the people, and wealth, one can escape obedience and service; only
respectively, are the strongest element. In other Zeus is free. Resistance is foolish and dangerous.
contexts, however, where archer suggests initia- The message of Kratos is that one should learn
tive and the voluntary side of obedience, kratos endurance and resignation in the face of supe-
indicates force and the involuntary side.34 rior strength.39 Violence, the other instrument
The poetic tradition, differing from Aristotle of tyrannical power, acts, but has nothing to
in this respect, offers a provocative distinction say.
between force and violence. As mythological Although men universally agree that vio-
personifications, Kratos (Might) and Bia lence and other kinds of force are perennially
(Violence) are individuated spirits, but they are associated with the exercise of power, there is
both forms of force, and they appear together anything but agreement over the question of
on the same team, servants of divine power. In the proper-in both a technical and a moral
Hesiod's genealogy of the gods, Kratos and Bia sense-relation between such methods and the
are the "wonderful children" of Pallas-whose power system. Among the several ideas of
name perhaps means the "brandisher" or political power in the vast literature on the
"shaker" thereby representing threat-and subject, two prominent conceptions appear,
Styx, who represents horror. Kratos and Bia superficially at least, to contradict each other.
dwell only in the house of Zeus and go where he One, considering violence as the failure of
directs them.35 In Prometheus Bound, they are power, would exclude it from the definition; the
the first to appear on stage, dragging Pro- other, considering violence as the specific
metheus to his rock. In this play, Aeschylus property of political associations, makes it
conveys that Zeus is ruling as a tyrant who has central to the definition of political power.
seized power, having overthrown the old order When the concepts, "power" and "political"
of gods and having displaced the previous king, are disentangled and examined separately, the
Kronos. Whenever rule is new it is harsh, we points of view may be discerned with greater
are told. A tyrant's orders are his own private clarity.
business, and the new steersman on Olympus One position considers "authority" as the
controls by rules which have no law in them.36 authentic form of power, based on consent,
Kratos (Might) is the first to speak in the play; voluntary obedience, and persuasion, and con-
he discusses the fate of Prometheus and later siders violence as a symptom attending the
rebukes him for rebellion. Bia (Violence) is breakdown of authority. The nuclear ideas in
silent throughout the play.37 The words of this venerable notion may be found far back in
Kratos are consistently tough and bitter, and the Western tradition-in Homer's and
he is told that he is always ruthless and without Hesiod's beliefs about the antagonism between
pity.38 Even though both are instruments of violence and right, in the Socratic opposition
force in the service of tyrannical power, the to Thrasymachus, and in Plato's conviction
difference between the roles of Might and that persuasion is morally superior to force, to
Violence is instructive. Might uses words and mention only a few sources. The notion is held
directs itself to reasoning processes. Violence by many writers in the modern period-by
remains mute. It suggests that force in the Rousseau in The Social Contract, for instance-
and expressed in the recent literature of social
34 In Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus 373, Ismene science by writers such as Charles Merriam and
tells exiled Oedipus that at Thebes, each of his R. M. MacIver. Merriam protests that many
sons is attempting to grasp both arch6 and kratos observers "make the same fundamental error
of the throne. in analysis of the power situation in society, of
36 Hesiod, Theogony 385. overstating the role of violence." He argues:
36 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound 34, 402, 150.
37 The fact that the official rules limited speech In most communities the use of force is relatively
to only two persons on stage, it should go without uncommon in proportion to the number of regula-
saying, is hardly a complete or sufficient ex- tions, and the success of the organization is not
planation for Bia's silence.
38 Aesch. Pr. 42. 39 Ibid., 50, 10.
measured by the amount of violence in specific throne, and served as his chief minister. In this
cases, but by the extent to which violence is book, an introductory section on the personal
avoided and other substitutes discovered. The conduct of the saintly king is followed by an
monopoly of force, which is so often declared to elaborate handbook of systematic deception,
be the chief characteristic of the political associa- violence, and internal espionage.44 Max Weber
tion, is not meant for daily use, but as a last resort observed, "In contrast with this document
when all other measures of persuasion and con- Machiavelli's Principe is harmless."45 It is
ciliation have failed.40 useful to select this kind of writing in the Indian
tradition to illustrate the point of view under
Similarly, MacIver declares:
discussion because the contrary Indian strain
Without authority force is destructive violence, with its idealism and nonviolence is more
spasmodic, undirected, futile. Authority is re- familiar.
sponsive to the underlying social structure. The In India's Code of Manu, which tradition
force of government is but an instrument of places at the dawn of civilization,46 violence is
authority, vindicating the demands of an order described as an instrument of punishment,
that force alone never creates.4' which in turn is declared to be the most im-
Though writers who hold this point of view portant technique of power. The chapter on
kingship goes so far as to state that "Punish-
recognize that violence may be used as an in-
ment is (in reality) the king ... 4 Fear of
strument of force by men in authority, they
think of it as a last resort and tend to diminish punishment maintains social order and holds all
its significance in the organization of controls. beings, including the gods, to their duties.
They are inclined to deny not only its moral Above all, social order depends on the integrity
of the caste system, and, indeed, "The king has
value but also its effectiveness as an instru-
ment. been created (to be) the protector of the castes
The contrary idea was expressed recently by (varna) and orders, who, all according to their
rank, discharge their several duties."48 The
C. Wright Mills, who states succinctly, "All
picture Manu paints of what the world would
politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate
kind of power is violence.'"42 Although Mills be like if the ranking system were violated re-
minds one of the speech Shakespeare gives to
and others who view power in this fashion may
deplore the bitter reality they perceive, a Ulysses in Act 1, Scene iii of Troilus and
number of writers holding similar points of Cressida:
view have drawn more positive conclusions. 0, when degree is shaked,
The tradition that includes many of the Which is the ladder to all high designs,
Sophists, Machiavelli, and Hobbes is a familiar The enterprise is sick!
one, and writers within it may not only de-
scribe the instrumental worth of violence but Take but degree away, untune that string,
also defend its moral value, arguing that it And hark what discord follows!
contributes to the termination of discord, the
maintenance of order, or the safety of the ruler. Then everything includes itself in power,
The "Mirror of Princes" genre, which is to be Power into will, will into appetite;
found in many civilizations, frequently com- And appetite, an universal wolf,
bines advice in the form of rules for cultivating So doubly seconded with will and power,
personal virtue with a manual of refined violent Must make perforce an universal prey,
techniques.43 In the literature of India, the And last eat up himself.
combination is seen in the classic Kautilya
44 Kautilya Arthasastra, trans. R. Shamasastry,
Arthasastra, probably written at the end of the
7th ed. (Mysore, Mysore Printing and Publishing
fourth century B.C. shortly after the death of
House, 1961).
Alexander, composed, according to the tradi-
46 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans.
tion, by the Brahman who engineered the
H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York,
downfall of the low-caste Nanda dynasty,
1946), p. 124.
placed the great Maurya Chandragupta on the
46 For a brief summary of the controversy over
40 Political Power (Glencoe, Ill., 1950), p. 21. the date of Manu, see D. Mackenzie Brown, The
41 The Web of Government, p. 16. White Umbrella: Indian Political Thought from
42 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York, Manu to Gandhi (Berkeley, Univ. of California
1956), p. 171. Press, 1953), p. 27.
43 I am grateful for several references furnished 47 The Laws of Manu, trans. G. Bfthler, The
by Larry Gross in his unpublished paper, "Polit- Sacred Books of the East, vol. XXV (London,
ical Institutions of Organized Violence in Oxford University Press, 1886), p. 219.
Several Ancient and Modern States." 48 Ibid., p. 221.
shall not, even for a moment, neglect (to punish) They set forth, with ruthless clarity and astrin-
the man who commits violence. gent logic, a system of totalitarian depotism. Han
Fei Tzui recognizes the supremacy of nothing but
He who commits violence must be considered as
force, and aims at making the ruler rich and
the worst offender, (more wicked) than a defamer,
powerful. The people are to be used completely
than a thief, and than he who injures (another)
as instruments of the ruler's designs, living or
with a staff.
dying as suits his purpose.... The ruler need
Official violence, however, is indispensable, and only keep [his ministers] and all of his subjects in
in the scale of punishments, the degree of such a state of fear that they will dare to do no
violence administered is proportional to the wrong.63
Manu.55 However, the purpose of the king, then defines power as "the probability that one
according to Manu is to maintain the estab- actor within a social relationship will be in a
lished order; he is not interested in absolute position to carry out his own will despite resist-
control. The ideal ruler of Han Fei-tzu, on the ance, regardless of the basis on which this
other hand, is content, the historian Fung probability rests."60 Thus, it is clear that ac-
Yu-lan indicates, with nothing less than cording to Weber, two kinds of power are pos-
celestial omnipotence. The "methods" guaran- sible: one kind in conditions where conflict and
tee strict enforcement, "and nothing that he resistance are absent; the other, a conflict in
encounters resists him."56 which one party successfully overcomes resis-
The extreme attitudes concerning the proper tance. Since Weber is careful to distinguish
place of violence in the power system-one power from other forms of social control in
minimizing, the other maximizing its impor- which cooperation is more crucial, his approach
tance-may be understood, as usual, as oppo- at least suggests that in the exercise of power,
site poles of a continuum, with several alterna- resistance and conflict in one degree or another
tive positions between them. Among the an- are highly probable, and perhaps even ex-
cient Greeks, for example, Solon of Athens pected. This idea of power, therefore, tends to
apparently believes that good order is based on imply a process of overpowering. Reinhard
the concord of classes and that the state is a Bendix has perceptively observed "that
cooperative venture, but, disagreeing with Weber's definition of power is very similar to
Hesiod, he does not think that violence and Clausewitz's definition of war.""
right are irreconcilable opposites. Instead, he The contrary points of view reflected in the
thinks they are coordinate elements in the concept of power are similarly manifested in
power system, working together in the cause of concepts of political association including, of
good order, and that violent force is sometimes course, the definition of the state, one view
necessary, because it separates warring factions emphasizing cooperation, authority, and peace-
and prevents them from destroying one another ful methods of control; the other, conflict, coer-
and the state.57 cion, and violence. Among the social scientists
The extreme positions are based on presup- who hold the latter viewpoint, the anthropolo-
positions which may be expressed as two differ- gist, A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, reasons that coer-
ent social models. The viewpoint that min- cive processes lie at the heart of political or-
imizes violence reasons from a model of co- ganization, and he states in his Preface to
operation,58 and seeing violence as an indica- African Political Systems:
tion that cooperative activity has broken down,
infers that violence signifies the breakdown of In studying political organization, we have to
power as well. The other viewpoint begins with deal with the maintenance or establishment of
a model of social conflict and reasons that in social order, within a territorial framework, by
many cases if conflict were absent, then power the organized exercise of coercive authority
would be unnecessary. Violence from this through the use, or the possibility of use, of phys-
perspective may be seen as a decisive form of ical force. In well-organized states, the police and
power responding to conflict. the army are the instruments by which coercion
This point of view is classically expressed by is exercised. Within the state, the social order,
Max Weber, who stipulates: "A social relation- whatever it may be, is maintained by the punish-
ship will be referred to as 'conflict' in so far as ment of those who offend against the laws and by
action within it is oriented intentionally to the armed suppression of revolt. Externally the
carrying out the actor's own will against the state stands ready to use armed force against other
resistance of the other party or parties."59 Weber states, either to maintain the existing order or to
create a new one. ...
The conception is frequently challenged by is no task that some political association has
those who believe that other activities are not taken up, and since there are no special
much more essential to political associations ends that are exclusively political, the state and
than the use of force and violence. Thus, David its historical antecedents can be defined in
Easton, a political scientist who views the polit- sociological terms:
ical structure as a distributive system, authori-
only by a specific means peculiar to it as to every
tatively allocating values for the entire society,
political association: that of physical violence.
protests that Radcliffe-Brown "over-empha-
"Every state is founded on force (Gewalt)," de-
sizes the role of coercive sanctions, especially
clared Trotsky duly at Brest-Litovsk. That is in
force." He argues:
point of fact correct. If there existed only social
In selecting the organized use of force as the structures for which violence were unknown as a
gross distinguishing quality of political systems, means, then would the concept, "state" be
neither Radcliffe-Brown nor those who share his abolished, and then would emerge what is de-
point of view can be considered adventurous fined as "anarchy" in this special sense of the
pioneers. Rather they have been following a word. Violence is naturally not the normal or only
course laid down by Thomas Hobbes, well means of the state-that goes without saying-
marked out by later utilitarianism, reinforced by but indeed a means specific to it. Today the rela-
Max Weber, and validated by many generations tion between the state and violence is especially
of professional students of politics. It is an ap- intimate. In the past, all kinds of different associa-
proach that research in American political science tions-beginning with the sib-have known phys-
has all but abandoned, although it still has enough ical violence as an altogether normal means. On
vitality to raise its head from time to time.63 the contrary, today we have to say that a state is
that human community which, within a given
Easton agrees that at one time or another all
territory-"territory" is one of its characteristics
kinds of different organized groups "have used
-claims for itself (successfully) the legitimate
both violent and non-violent means of per-
monopoly of physical violence. Specifically, at
suasion with varying degrees of legitimacy
present the right of physical violence is assigned
attached to this use," but whereas Weber
to all other associations or individuals only to the
claims that when they do employ violence, the
extent permitted by the state; it is supposed to be
use of this method gives such groups a "politi-
the exclusive source of the "right" to use vio-
cal" character, Easton comes to the opposite
lence.65
conclusion that "governmental institutions can
no longer be differentiated from others merely Instead of the more felicitous version in the
by virtue of the sanctions that they are able to volume edited by Gerth and Mills, I use my
impose."64 own translation here because it renders more
Max Weber is often held responsible for the precisely the terms under discussion. In this
line of thought that identifies political action passage, Weber uses the word, "Gewaltsamkeit"
with violent techniques, and although he is -which means "violence" -eight times,
hardly the originator of the idea, as Easton modifying the noun four times with the word
points out, his work nevertheless provides a meaning "physical." Only at one point in the
classic modern statement of it. In the encyclo- passage, and in a quote from Trotsky, does he
pedic Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, he ascribes to use the term, "Gewalt," which may be trans-
the state certain formal characteristics; namely lated either as "violence" or as "force."
compulsory membership, territorial jurisdic- "Gewaltsamkeit" is less equivocal. The Gerth
tion, continuous organization, and coercive translation diminishes the impact of the pas-
enforcement, but he clearly singles out the use sage by translating "Gewaltsamkeit" five times
of violence as a specific characteristic giving an as "force" and three times as "violence."66
organization political identity. In the text of a In the section from Wirtschaft und Gesell-
celebrated address given in Munich in the schaft on political and hierocratic associations,
revolutionary year, 1918, he makes his ideas on which Weber takes up immediately after the
this subject clear. section in which he defines power ("Macht"),
In that address, he observes that since there these associations, from their aspect as struc-
tures of domination, are treated as different
63 David Easton, "Political Anthropology," species of the same genus; namely, groups with
Biennial Review of Anthropology 1959, ed.
Bernard J. Siegel (Stanford, Stanford University 65 Max Weber, "Politik als Beruf," Gesammelte
Press, 1959), pp. 213, 218-19. Politische Schriften, 2. Aufl. (Tubingen, J. C. B.
64 David Easton, The Political System (Now Mohr, 1958), S. 494.
York, 1953), p. 153, n. 2. 16 From Max Weber; Essays in Sociology, p. 78.
a head, staff, and members, organized accord- One should not infer from this truism that
ing to a coercive principle. In this section, "society" always precedes, logically and his-
Henderson and Parsons translate "Gewalt- torically, the state, or that social trust and
samkeit" each time as "force, " obscuring cooperation precede without exception the
Weber's meaning, especially since they render mutual acceptance of coercion. Georg Simmel
"Zwang"-m-eaning "coercion"- as "force" at shows that purely antagonistic, coercive rela-
the same time, losing the distinction which tions have often been transformed into social
Weber apparently wishes to make. At the tissue, that conflict can evolve into cooperation,
beginning of the section, he identifies both and that coercive power can create a social tie
hierocratic and political associations with the which did not previously exist.69
threat or practice of coercion-the former em- The stale controversy over whether violence
ploying a psychic kind, the latter, physical- is a defective or an ultimate form of power, and,
naming violence as the specific form of coercion similarly, whether it is factitious or "essential"
used by political groups exclusively. He makes to the political system cannot be ignored be-
it clear that other methods besides physical cause it invades the ordinary usage as well as
coercion are widely used by political groups, the technical usage of crucial terms. Neverthe-
including the state, insisting, nevertheless, that less, it is not useful to pursue the point of de-
the threat or use of violence is a special charac- ciding whether coercion or consent is the
teristic that identifies associations as "po- "essence" of the state. The relative amounts of
litical." Of course, translating terms such as coercion and consent in any political structure
"Macht," "Kraft," "Zwang," "Gewalt," and are problematic and a matter for empirical
"Gewaltsamkeit" is a subtle problem of style judgment in each case.
with ample latitude for interpretation. But if a The most useful concept of power would not
stranger to historical reality were to read the exclude from its domain either persuasion or
Henderson and Parsons translation, he might coercion, nor would it consider either authority
never guess that states were acquainted with or violence to be more essential or ultimate.
violence. One could not receive that impression Similarly, a useful concept of the state would
from reading Weber's own words.67 not be restricted either to moderate or to vio-
Few writers will commit themselves to an lent states, for history is full of both. Nor is it
exclusive choice between authority and vio- reasonable to confine ideas of the political sys-
lence as the essential principle of political ac- tem to organized negotiation, bargaining, ex-
tion, for it appears more sound to work out change, competition, and other peaceful proc-
formulas that keep them both in some pref- esses, omitting violent methods. Both ex-
erential ratio. Likewise, few would, in the tremes should be included, and conceptions
manner of Heinrich von Treitschke and Franz framed in a manner that will lead the investiga-
Oppenheimer, insist on force as the primary tor to uncover the empirical conditions deter-
principle in formulas of the state; it is more mining the presence or absence of violence.
usual to balance the principles of coercion and Merely to declare that political organizations
consent. Thus, MacIver writes: may resort to violence because this kind of
action is one of their characteristics is a circular
force holds nothing together. Force is a substitute
line of reasoning without much consequence.
for unity....
More fruitful would it be to trace the processes,
Coercive power is a criterion of the state, but not mark the structures of violent action, discern
its essence.... When force is much in evidence it the conditions in which it takes place, and
is a pathological symptom. ... examine the various methods in use. Exploring
in this way how and why organizations use
It is true that there is no state where there is no
violence may be crucial to a better understand-
overruling force. This is the differentia between
ing of the political system and its various forms.
the state and all other associations. There is no
state where other associations arrogate to them-
selves the exercise of compulsion. There is no 68 R. M. MacIver, The Modern State (London,
state where there is anarchy. But the exercise of Oxford University Press, 1926), pp. 222, 223, 225,
force does not make a state. ...68 230.
69 The Sociology of Georg Simnmel, trans. Kurt H.
67 Compare The Theory of Social and Economic Wolff (Glencoe, Ill., 1950), p. 192; "Conflict,"
Organization, pp. 154-56 with Max Weber, Wirt- trans. Kurt H. Wolff, in Georg Simmel's Conflict
schaft und Gesellschaft, 4. Aufl. (TUbingen, J. C. B. and The Web of Group-Affiliations (Glencoe, Ill.,
Mohr, 1956), I. Hbd. K. i. ? 17, S. 29-30. 1955), p. 26.