Can Classical Confucianism Provide Us

with a Virtue Ethics Synthesisable with

Moral Foundations Theory?

theories lack synthesisability with our moral psychology. Here I will argue both that

adopting relevant parts of Classical Confucianism is a potential solution to this, and that this

is a better normative solution than simply adapting utilitarianism. First, I show that

Classical Confucianism already appeals to (and thus is synthesisable with) the key moral

foundations in Haidt’s psychology. Then I demonstrate that there are key similarities in each

theory’s view of the origin of virtue and its cultivation. Next, I show why this synthesisability

makes Classical Confucianism normatively preferable to consequentialism, before

concluding there is a compelling case for adopting certain relevant aspects of Classical

Confucianism.

Moral foundations theory gradually developed as a theory of moral psychology in journal

articles, like Haidt and Graham (2007), before receiving its best outline in Haidt’s The

Righteous Mind (2013). Haidt’s (2013) central idea is that there are six moral foundations

(innate, modular psychological foundations that inform our moral reasoning). These are:

care/harm, liberty/oppression, authority/subversion, loyalty/betrayal, sanctity/degradation,

and fairness/cheating. Humans are pre-wired with these foundations, which means they

inform our judgements, but we are not hardwired to behave according to them regardless of

circumstances, as environmental factors also matter (Haidt 2013: 152-153). All these

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foundations have certain original triggers, which have evolutionary explanations, but the

number of stimuli has increased over time so that they now also have current triggers, stimuli

to which they respond in modern society.

The care/harm foundation is a product of how our brains have been shaped to respond

caringly to the suffering of our offspring, its original trigger. This sense of care has been

extended beyond the mother-child relationship so all normally developed individuals dislike

seeing suffering in others and have potential to feel compassion in response (Haidt and

Graham, 2007: 104).

The liberty/oppression foundation evolved from the challenge of living in small groups with

individuals who could dominate and constrain others, the original trigger being signs of

attempted domination (Haidt 2013: 200). Current triggers are anything that suggests the

aggressive controlling behaviour of an alpha male; this creates righteous anger that often

unites people to resist their oppressors, a good example being the American War of

Independence (Haidt 2013: 201).

Haidt and Graham (2007: 105) also refer to the authority/subversion foundation. The long

history of hierarchical society has shaped human brains to flexibly navigate hierarchical

communities. Authority in chimpanzees relies heavily on dominance through fear but in

human communities it relies on prestige and voluntary deference. People feel respect, awe

and admiration for a legitimate leader and so have constructed virtues related to good

leadership, like fatherliness, wisdom and magnanimity, current triggers of this foundation.

Additionally, humans have a loyalty/betrayal foundation. Our long history of living in kin-

based groups of dozens has given us special social cognitive abilities, backed up by emotions,

related to trusting, recognising and cooperating with members of one’s group and distrusting

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others. This makes people loyal to their ingroup, valuing those who sacrifice for it and

disliking those who fail to do so (Haidt and Graham, 2007: 105).

In addition, we have a sanctity/degradation foundation. Having a heavily meat-based diet,

which included scavenging carcasses, gave us the emotion of disgust. This sense that

something is untouchable, either because it is polluted or because it is sacred, has given rise

to the social emotion of sacredness. This helps bind individuals into moral communities

where objects (such as flags or crosses), places, people and/or principles are treated as if they

were of infinite value (Haidt 2013: 173-174).

Finally, the fairness/cheating foundation. The long history of alliance formation and

cooperation across unrelated individuals led to a suite of emotions that motivate reciprocal

altruism like anger, guilt and gratitude (Haidt and Graham, 2007: 104). In terms of current

triggers, this manifests itself on the left in concerns about social justice and equality, and on

the right in concerns about proportionality, that people are being rewarded according to the

weight they have pulled in society (Haidt 2013: 159-160).

It is important to note that the foundations can override each other, sometimes people

disregard one because of another. For example, someone could easily lose their sense of

care/harm because they perceive another person as doing something degrading

(sanctity/degradation), or as not being part of their group (loyalty/betrayal).

Many western theories of morality only consider (or appeal to) harm/care, fairness/cheating

and liberty/oppression. For example, Mill’s (2003) harm principle asserts that there should

not be interference in self-regarding action. This automatically precludes interference on the

grounds of sacredness, authority, or group loyalty, as long as the action does not affect others.

Mill (2003: 147) does discuss offence, giving the example of a religious bigot’s claim that

those who oppose his religion disregard his feelings; ultimately though he dismisses the idea

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of giving this any weight in his moral framework. As a modern (and deontological) example,

Rawls’ (1999) original position automatically precludes anything that considers three of the

foundations; people cannot place much emphasis on loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion or

sanctity/degradation if they do not know what the different conceptions of these in their

society are.

Haidt (2013) is critical of the fact that utilitarianism and deontology only give weight to three

of the foundations. However, Haidt (2013: 315-316) only briefly considers the normative

implications of his theory. Essentially, he thinks that utilitarians need to absorb his findings

into their calculus to evaluate net welfare gains in a way that gives a more fair and balanced

weight to the six psychological foundations than traditional utilitarianism does; in other

words, he advocates that his theory should be used as an adjunct to utilitarianism.

I believe this is only a partial and inadequate answer to the failings of utilitarianism and

deontology to account for our moral psychology. My aim here is to show that the results of

moral foundations theory suggest an alternative normative system is more desirable –

Classical Confucian virtue ethics. This is because all six moral foundations are appealed to by

key aspects of Classical Confucianism. Crucially, Classical Confucianism takes into account

loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation, which modern western

liberal-minded moral theories, like utilitarianism, do not give due weight to. Indeed, Haidt

(2013: 114) himself cites (in passing) Confucius as a holistic thinker, whose Analects rely

upon all six of his foundations; however, Haidt does not investigate this claim further. My

aims could be thought of as both investigating this claim further and then examining its

implications for the normative desirability of Classical Confucianism.

There has been a previous attempt to systematically compare moral foundations theory and

Confucianism - that of Shirong Luo (2015). Luo uses Mencius’ four heart-minds as his focus,

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examining them in turn, while identifying aspects of moral foundations theory that overlap

with these. By contrast, I am examining the six foundations in turn, while identifying relevant

aspects of Confucianism appeal to each of these. My focus is also much broader, using all

three of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi. Where my argument has much greater overlap with

Lou’s is in his examination of ‘extension’, the process of broadening the triggers of our heart-

minds from cases with perceptual immediacy to cases without this. Linking Haidt’s and

Mencius’ views on the origin of virtue and its extension is also a subject often mentioned in

more general comparisons of moral psychology and Confucianism, such as Flanagan and

Williams (2010) or Kim (2016), as will be briefly commented on.

My argument proceeds as follows. Firstly, I systematically consider all six moral foundations,

showing how key/relevant concepts from Confucianism explicitly appeal to all six of

these/take them all into account. I conclude that there is a significant degree of

synthesisability between moral foundations theory and Confucianism.

Secondly, I inquire into the origin of virtue. I conclude that the moral psychologies of Haidt

and Mencius are synthesisable because they both assume we are pre-wired with moral

foundations (or sprouts), that give us the potential to be good, subject to the right

environment. Building on this I will then examine how Confucians think virtue is cultivated.

There will be a focus both on the technique of extension (which Lou (2015) has already

linked to moral foundations theory) and on rituals. I conclude both are highly important in

cultivation of virtue. These conclusions are reinforced by using Slingerland (2011) to show

the Confucian view on the origin and cultivation of virtue also has synthesisability with

cognitive science beyond moral foundations theory.

Finally, I will consider why Classical Confucianism’s synthesisability with our moral

psychology increases its normative desirability. This will consist of two comparative

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analysis’ first with western virtue ethics and secondly with western consequentialism

(particularly Singer’s utilitarianism). Firstly, I will use a perfectionist framework to argue that

Confucianism’s synthesisability with our moral psychology can increase its intrinsic

normative desirability, relative to western virtue ethics that are less synthesisable. Secondly, I

argue that, if we take moral foundations theory as a feasibility constraint, there is the

possibility that Confucianism’s synthesisability with this means it will lead to the best

feasible outcomes, and hence may be desirable from a consequentialist perspective. I

conclude that these both constitute powerful arguments for the normative desirability of

Confucianism. In a final sub-section, I hint at some of the implications of this for the west,

offering a few examples of how lessons from Confucianism could be adopted to inform

policy.

Confucianism and Haidt’s Psychology

Here I will examine how each of Haidt’s moral foundations relate to key aspects of

Confucianism.

Liberty/Oppression and Authority/Subversion

Haidt’s liberty/oppression and authority/subversion foundations operate in tension.

Christopher Boehm’s Hierarchy in the Forest (1999) is key to understanding this. In

Boehm’s (1999) view, humans began rather like chimpanzees, with alpha males dominating

groups. This created tensions between the alpha male (and allies) and everybody else, who

was shut out of power. However, due to the development of language, people became capable

of gossiping with each other, identifying behaviour they did not like (often aggressive

domineering behaviour of alpha males); with the additional development of weapons they

became able to collectively depose leaders who were too oppressive. This created reverse-

dominance hierarchies where the rank-and-file could band together to restrain alpha males. In

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these hierarchies, people had to respect group norms and retain the trust of others to survive.

Those who did not were removed from the gene pool by being shunned, expelled or killed.

Hence, those who survived were left with triggers, whereby something that suggests the

aggressive controlling behaviour of an alpha male can potentially create righteous anger - the

liberty/oppression foundation. Diamond (1992: 54) reinforces this, emphasising the

importance of language, citing it as the key ingredient in producing a ‘Great Leap Forward’,

which transformed humans from glorified chimpanzees to modern peoples. But how is this

liberty/oppression foundation reconcilable with the respect for authority the

authority/subversion foundation entails?

They are compatible because hierarchical relationships can be regarded as legitimate if those

nearer to the top of the hierarchy show certain virtues. This idea is supported by the work of

anthropologist Alan Fiske (2020), who observed that in early African societies “people have

asymmetric positions... in which subordinates defer, respect, and (perhaps) obey, while

superiors take precedence and take pastoral responsibility for subordinates”. Crucially, these

relationships “are based on perceptions of legitimate asymmetries [emphasis added], not

coercive power”. Haidt and Graham (2007: 105) show that this emphasis on asymmetries

being perceived as legitimate manifests itself in the fact we trust people who have virtues

related to good leadership, like magnanimity, fatherliness and wisdom, the current triggers of

the authority/subversion foundation. So, authority/subversion is compatible with

liberty/oppression because authority is only regarded as legitimate upon the condition that

those who possess it show certain virtues.

How is this linked with Confucianism? I want to make the case that Confucianism’s

conception of legitimate authority is something akin to Fiske’s idea of legitimate

asymmetries. Given that Haidt (2013: 168) cites Fiske’s idea of legitimate asymmetries as

being the basis for a society that takes the authority/subversion foundation into account,

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making this case successfully will prove a degree of synthesisability between Confucianism

and moral foundations theory in this area.

Mencius (3A4) gives us an idea of the Confucian view of relationships when he states:

“between father and children there is affection; between ruler and ministers there is

righteousness; between husband and wife there is distinction; between elder and younger

there is precedence; and between friends there is faithfulness”. I believe the key to

understanding what this means is the idea that, for Confucians, the purpose of cultivating

virtue is to develop the right mindset: the mindset that allows you to spontaneously know

how to act in different situations and relationships appropriately. Given Confucianism’s

“deeply relational conception of how to live” (Wong 2011: 780), it makes sense that seeing

relationships in the right kind of way, through the acquisition of virtue, is crucial.

Mencius’ (3A4) view makes more sense in light of this emphasis on building the right

mindset. We can now see that what he is trying to do is to give us a guide of how someone

with the ideal Confucian mindset would act in different relationships. For example, between

friends there is/should often be a high degree of reciprocity in the relationship, whereas in

many other relationships this is not appropriate; the elder for instance should have precedence

over the younger because they are wiser and more experienced. This suggests Mencius is

reasoning in a similar way to those Fiske (2020) studied in early African societies, in that he

is basing relationships on legitimate asymmetries, as opposed to the relative reciprocity we

often see in modern, liberal western societies.

What is legitimately asymmetrical? A specific example helps illustrate. When Zeng Sen (a

disciple of Confucius) tells Confucius he showed filial piety (something crucial to

Confucianism) by letting his angry father beat him for damaging some plants, Confucius

replied by telling him that he has put his father in an immoral situation and should have run

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away instead (Kongzi Jiayu 15: 103). This relationship is clearly one that is oppressive rather

than legitimately asymmetrical. In the ideal father-son relationship the father has authority

over the son but, as this passage makes clear, to be legitimate this authority cannot constitute

oppression, instead the father must keep up his side of the bargain by displaying the key

virtues for someone in his position, like care, fatherliness, and magnanimity. These very

virtues are the ones Haidt and Graham (2007: 105) emphasise as key when discussing the

current triggers of our authority/subversion foundation. Hence through its essential

incorporation of legitimate asymmetries, the current triggers of the authority/subversion

foundation are certainly appealed to by Confucianism.

This conception of legitimate authority as being based on showing the appropriate virtues

extends to governance. Confucius greatly admires leaders who rule by virtue, stating: “Guide

them with policies and align them with punishments and the people will evade them and have

no shame, guide them with virtue and align them with li (ritual propriety/custom) and the

people will have a sense of shame and fulfil their roles” (Analects 2.3). This notion of ruling

through virtue may seem alien in modern times but I believe there are still examples of where

this is important in modern life.

For instance, a report for British Future (2020) found multi-partisan disapproval when

Dominic Cummings broke lockdown rules and a resultant decline of trust in the government.

When government figures appeared to be obeying the lockdown rules, guiding the people

with virtue, people had faith in the government and followed the lockdown rules. By contrast

after news of the Cummings scandal broke, despite the law (and the virus) being the same,

some people lost faith in the government and the lockdown rules. Therefore, this

contemporary example shows virtue among leaders really is an important factor in guiding

the conduct of their people.

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This is also further evidence of synthesisability with Haidt. In accordance with our

liberty/oppression foundations we reject attempts by those in power to impose heavy

restrictions when they only use the law, something that can be used as a modern technocratic

means of oppression. But this rejection is not unconditional. In accordance with the

authority/subversion foundation, we are prone to trust and follow authorities when they

display key virtues like wisdom (which has been shown by leaders who follow the lockdown

rules). Confucianism thus shows a strong degree of synthesisability with the

authority/subversion and liberty/oppression foundations, in both personal and political

contexts.

Loyalty/Betrayal and Sanctity/Degradation

There is also synthesisability with regard to the loyalty/betrayal and sanctity/degradation

foundations. The loyalty/betrayal foundation was defined in the intro: cognitive abilities

backed up by emotions related to trusting, recognising and cooperating with members of

one’s group. Biologically this evolved due to group selection, because groups that made a

unified effort to survive had a better chance of surviving. Gradually the most individualistic

sets of people died out in favour of the more groupish people (Darwin 1998: 134). This

evolution has made us psychologically groupish, fiercely loyal to those we feel are in our

own group and distrustful of those outside it. This ‘groupishness’ has given humans the

ability to do what Haidt (2013: 258) defines as flipping the hive switch - to enter a state

where we “transcend self-interest and lose ourselves, (temporarily and ecstatically), in

something larger than ourselves”. Haidt (2013: 260-262) identifies the state flipping the hive

switch brings about as extremely similar to what Durkheim termed ‘collective effervescence’.

Hence to understand these moral foundations we must understand Durkheim.

In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1995) Durkheim investigates the difference

between ordinary life and states of collective effervescence (in Haidt’s language states where

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the hive switch has flipped), by studying aboriginal Australian society. Here these different

states of mind/life had a clear divide. The vast majority of the time each family lived by itself

to survive, but for a month or so whole populations came together for ceremonies and rituals,

which generated collective effervescence, a feeling in individuals that they are no longer

themselves and are instead part of a larger collective consciousness (Durkheim, 1995: 220).

For Durkheim (1995: 211) both religion and morality originated as a result of the social

forces present in these states of collective effervescence, which Gods are symbols to

represent; our perceptions of moral or divine (and the moral authority and respect generated

based on this) are essentially created by the ‘psychic energy’, which the social feeling of

collective effervescence creates/inspires. Hence collective effervescence plays a key part in

both the loyalty/betrayal and sanctity/degradation foundations.

Why are these social feelings so relevant if they are generated in states of collective

effervescence, a state most people, especially in the modern world, are not in most of the

time? Durkheim (1995: 232) shows that these feelings persist when they are inscribed and

emblemised, in a form that reminds people of them. Hence symbols, customs and practices,

such as displaying the flag (loyalty/betrayal) or wearing a cross (sanctity/degradation), that

may seem pointless to some, have value through bringing social “feelings to individual

minds” keeping “them perpetually aroused” (Durkheim 1995: 232). Given how key

Durkheim’s findings are to the loyalty/betrayal and sanctity/degradation foundations an

ethical system that wants to be synthesisable with moral foundations theory must account for

them.

There is significant evidence that Confucianism does this. Confucius recognises the effects of

purer states of collective effervescence, endorsing rituals that arguably create this. For

example, Analects (10.14) highlights the importance of the nuo ceremonies, where entire

villages and towns would have exorcists leading the common people around to perform

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purifying ceremonies (Slingerland, 2003: 105). Perhaps more importantly though, Confucius

recognises these feelings can play a role in promoting societal harmony when they are

triggered by an emblem, symbol or practice that reminds people of them. Indeed, he devotes

the entirety of Book 10 of the Analects to setting out how to conduct yourself in a propitious

way, with various examples, such as bowing twice to a messenger before sending them off

(10.15), a sign of respect at the time, and giving a tiny part of every meal as a sacrificial

offering to his ancestors (10.11). This ritual behaviour, if performed properly, is seen as the

key method of making harmony emerge from a state with infinite wants but scarce resources

(Xunzi: 19.1-11). If the rituals flip the hive switch and the hive switch encourages a mindset

of ‘one for all, all for one’ this suggests there really is a psychological basis for thinking this.

Hence, through rituals, the Confucians discovered a key way in which social harmony could

be realised organically.

To reinforce the idea that rituals are about generating social feelings that aid social harmony,

we can contrast it with the idea of performing rituals solely for the sake of conformity.

Confucius condemns conformity as what petty-minded people pursue when observing custom

(Analects 13.23). Ni (2011: 33) develops this point, emphasising that rituals mean “people in

harmonious relations participate in social activities and construction” rather than “merely

being constituents of them”. This makes sense conceptualised in the framework of Durkheim

and Haidt. Someone who observed ritual propriety purely for the sake of conformity is likely

to be someone “more concerned with the appearance of virtue than the reality” (Haidt 2013:

258), a mindset Haidt emphasises people are often in without the presence of any collective

consciousness. The fact that rituals, when done properly, instead create a societal

environment where people have the mindset that makes them genuinely inclined to

participate/play their role shows that the Confucians really are trying to harness the social

force of collective effervescence, both through rituals which generate it directly, and those

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that remind people of these social feelings through symbolism. This makes Confucianism

synthesisable with the loyalty/betrayal and sanctity/degradation foundations.

Fairness/Cheating

There is also synthesisability with regard to the fairness/cheating foundation. This foundation

arose because prospective benefits from mutual cooperation created potential for reciprocal

altruism (Trivers 1971). It was originally triggered by acts of selfishness or cooperation, but

current triggers can now be anything that is culturally or politically attached to the dynamics

of reciprocity and cheating (Haidt 2013: 159). The left is motivated by the fairness

foundation to seek equality and social justice, whereas it motivates the right to be concerned

about proportionality, the idea that people get rewarded by society proportional to their

contribution towards it (Haidt 2013: 161).

Confucianism takes into account both these sets of current triggers. Firstly, there is a degree

of synthesisability with a left-leaning person’s fairness/cheating triggers. Mencius (1B5)

advocates for giving priority to vulnerable people, such as old people without children and

children without parents, when implementing “benevolent measures”; these measures would

have an equalising effect and ensure a basic degree of justice for the most vulnerable.

Secondly, the right’s concern with proportionality is arguably addressed by Confucianism’s

emphasis on meritocracy. Xunzi (9.1-15) states that the worthy should be promoted at once

and the incapable “dismissed without waiting for even a single moment” and further

emphasises that this should not depend on class: a commoner that “can submit to ritual”

should be made a minister, whereas a king that does not should be made a commoner. This

meritocratic emphasis shows that Confucianism regards fairness as being promoted to a

position in society (with its associated renumeration and benefits) proportional to your talents

and effort. Hence there is a degree of synthesisability with a right-leaning person’s

fairness/cheating foundation.

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Care/Harm

Finally, the care/harm foundation is accounted for in Confucianism. Perhaps the most famous

illustration of this is Mencius’ example of the child in the well. Mencius (2A6) claimed that

anyone who saw a child about to fall into a well would have an innate feeling of alarm and

compassion, motivating them to try to stop the child falling in. For Mencius (2A6), this is

because we have a moral sprout that cannot bear to see the suffering of others; this sprout

then gives rise to the virtue of compassion. This foundation (and how it can be cultivated and

extended) will be discussed more extensively next. For now, it suffices to say that care/harm

does play a key role in Confucianism, meaning a Confucian virtue ethics would be

synthesisable with this part of moral foundations theory.

I have now established that there is a high degree of synthesisability between the six moral

foundations and key aspects of Classical Confucianism. This is a promising start with regard

to Confucianism’s potential to provide a virtue ethics synthesisable with moral foundations

theory. Importantly, this proves that Confucianism is already (one might say naturally) a

system that responds to all six of Haidt’s moral foundations, something utilitarianism would

have to be heavily adapted to be. I now move to considering where the virtues come from and

how they are cultivated, aiming both to show a degree of synthesisability and to consider

more practical implications of this for society.

The Origin and Cultivation of Virtue

Where does virtue originate? Firstly I will examine the overlap between Mencius and moral

foundations theory on this issue. Then I move on to considering the implications of this for

cultivating virtue. I focus on Luo’s (2015) argument that extension involves extending

original triggers to current triggers, while also covering the Confucian emphasis on ritual.

Finally I use Slingerland (2011) to argue that the synthesisability between Confucianism and

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our psychology on this extends beyond just moral foundations theory to much of modern

cognitive science.

The Origin of Virtue

Mencius’ view is that humans have “innate but incipient tendencies towards goodness, which,

if cultivated properly, would develop into moral virtues” (Luo 2015: 79). Mencius (2A6)

famously illustrates this by claiming that anyone who saw a child about to fall into a well

would have an innate feeling of alarm and compassion. One might think this view naïve

given the occurrence of atrocities, such as mass genocides. But, as Van Norden (2009:

XXVI-XXVII) says, Mencius is not claiming humans are always good, he claims human

nature has the potential to be good, a crucial distinction. Mencius (2A6) sees our potential for

goodness as emerging from what he calls our moral sprouts. A sprout of a pear tree is not yet

a tree but has the potential to develop into one under the right conditions, and morality works

in an analogous way. Most people with a reasonable degree of moral development would

have a feeling of alarm and compassion in response to a child about to fall into a well. But if

someone were kept in a cage their entire childhood, depriving them of human contact, they

are unlikely to have the same kind of responses (as unfortunately happened in the case of

feral child Genie Wiley (Carroll 2016)). This makes clear that Mencius' meaning of 'nature' is

the ideal state an organism has an innate tendency towards (and can achieve under the right

conditions/environment) (Graham 1989: 117-32), not some quality we automatically have at

birth.

Multiple authors, such as Flanagan and Williams (2010), Slingerland (2011) and Kim (2016),

have identified that Haidt’s psychology is similar to Mencius’. As Kim (2016: 476-477) puts

it, what they hold in common is that humans have “certain moral inclinations”, and that

morality largely consists in developing these basic moral dispositions. Haidt (2013: 152-153)

believes nature provides us with prewiring, a first draft of morality, which is then revised by

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experience. Mencius’ sprouts could be regarded as something we are prewired with, they

inform our judgements, but we are not hardwired to behave according to them all the time. In

this framework unvirtuous behaviour is explainable because this prewired template can be

flexible and subject to change through experience (a poor upbringing for instance could mean

these sprouts do not grow).

Cultivating Virtue

Mencius and Xunzi offer a number of ways in which virtue can be cultivated. I will focus on

what is arguably the most important one – extension, whilst also commenting on ritual.

Firstly, extension. Mencius believes “we can develop our innate moral sprouts into virtues by

extending them from the circle of near and dear to outsiders” (Luo, 2015: 84). Mencius (1A7)

illustrates this principle when he tells the King of Qi he can cultivate virtue by extending the

kindness he felt towards an Ox he spared from sacrifice, to the rest of his people. As Luo

(2015: 84) comments, the problem for the King is the lack of perceptual immediacy to his

people. Some of the King’s people will be suffering as much as the Ox was, but because their

suffering is not visible to the King it does not act as a current trigger for his care/harm

foundation.

This scenario is very similar to Singer’s (1972) argument in Famine, Affluence and Morality.

Singer (1972: 231-232) says that, if a child was drowning in a shallow pond nearby, the idea

that you have an obligation to help the child would be uncontroversial for most people. Then

Singer points out that there is no reason for this principle to take into account proximity,

which means everyone should be obligated to give a lot more than most currently are to

charity, to alleviate the suffering of people in similar situations (such as the Bengal Famine at

the time of Singer’s article). What is needed to achieve this goal is for people to cultivate

their feelings of compassion to others beyond perceptual proximity. However, Singer does

not provide any psychological formula as to how people should achieve this.

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By contrast, Mencius does have a psychological formula in the form of extension, which is

reinforced by moral foundations theory. As Luo (2015: 80) points out, Haidt develops a very

similar idea to extension, namely that people’s moral modules can be extended from original

to current triggers. For example, the original trigger of the care/harm foundation is your

children (Haidt 2013: 155). However, as is evident from the fact that most people do not want

to see the children of others suffer either, the current triggers for these modules have already

extended far beyond their original triggers. What has already happened in this case is what

Mencius wants to extend even further. This shows there is a psychological basis for extension

within moral foundations theory. The question is how can extension be deliberately cultivated

over the course of a lifetime, rather than in a gradual and limited evolutionary way over

thousands of years?

For Confucians, extending virtuous feelings to those in your immediate vicinity is seen as the

key element to eventual extension beyond this. This is exemplified when Confucius (Analects

1.2) says filial piety and fraternal deference are “the roots of becoming human-hearted”. Ni

(2011: 31) illuminates this further saying, “If we do not start our love from the immediate

context of our life and with those whom we immediately encounter, it will not start at all”.

Given this emphasis on compassion starting in the family, it is plausible to argue that the

Confucians essentially recognise that our moral foundations are more easily triggered by

those we are closest to; also, crucially, they recognise that the frequent triggering of these

modules will create more moral people, who are more likely to extend their compassion to

like cases not in their perceptual immediacy. Hence, they offer us a practical method for how

we can start to be motivated by like cases; be good to those in your perceptual vicinity

because this is where the moral sprout of compassion takes its root from. So, through

extension, Confucianism (reinforced by moral foundations theory) gives us a psychological

case that beginning charity at home will often lead to more charity outside home.

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This prompts a re-evaluation of Singer’s (1972: 237) argument against Sidgwick’s (1981:

220-221) idea that we need to have a moral code not too far from the capacities of the

average person. Singer (1972: 237) argues that this would result in less societal pressure for

people to be generous, thereby decreasing our overall generosity. However what Singer’s

analysis ignores is the possibility that initially adopting a more moderate moral code could be

an important psychological step towards a gradually more generous moral code, something

extension suggests would occur, particularly if someone’s wealth is increasing, as it has

gradually been for many people in developed countries. Hence, our moral psychology

suggests that initially starting with a much more moderate principle than giving away wealth

up to the point where marginal utilities are equalised, is both the moral and rational thing to

do. This is because the former is a necessary first step towards something closer to the latter.

Rituals are also important for cultivating virtue because participation in them nurtures our

desires through inculcating certain dispositions (Xunzi 19.1-12). Hutton (2014: XXVII)

expands on Xunzi’s claim, arguing ritual standards display attitudes and emotions, which

means that even if people do not initially feel the particular attitude the ritual/standard aims to

inculcate, these attitudes are cultivated over the long run. For example, when made to say

‘thank you’ toddlers do not initially have a feeling of gratitude but come to develop it;

because they are repetitively made to say it, they eventually recognise the importance of it

and the attitude that underlies it. So, rituals are a key part of moral cultivation because they

inculcate attitude and feelings; and by doing this they are a key part of the path towards the

ability to extend these very attitudes and feelings they inculcate.

This Confucian picture of the origin and cultivation of virtue also has synthesisability with

other parts of cognitive science. Slingerland (2011) examines the general synthesisability of

cognitive science with different moral theories, arguing that a virtue ethics model,

particularly that of Mencius, is most synthesisable with cognitive science. Two related points

18
he makes are relevant to the next section. Slingerland (2011: 98) exalts the idea, in Mencius,

that “morality involves the selective strengthening and extending of urges arising from

ourselves”, as opposed to obligations that are welded on us from the outside. This will be

returned to when Confucianism, Mohism and Utilitarianism are compared. Secondly,

Slingerland emphasises that these urges inside ourselves are emotional, morality is heavily

dependent on our emotional sentiments, if anything more so than reason. To illustrate this

Slingerland (2011: 80) cites the research of psychologist Antonio Damásio in Descartes

Error (1994).

Damásio (1994) conducted an examination of the preferences and choices of patients who

had suffered damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, giving them a significant loss of

emotionality and gut instinct. Damásio (1994) found that patients spent so much time

weighing the pro’s and cons of every single option using conscious verbal reasoning, they

were hardly capable of making even very basic decisions at all and their lives fell apart. As

Haidt (2013: 39-40), who also cites Damásio, comments, the crucial lesson from this is that

reason/rationality isn’t hindered by the passion/emotions – it actually requires them. Gut

feeling and bodily reactions are necessary to think rationally. As both Slingerland (2011: 81)

and Haidt (2013: 40) comment, this fact raises doubts about the validity of approaches (like

utilitarianism deontology and some virtue ethics) that emphasise acting in accordance with a

certain conception of rationality (and discipling your emotions/passions to affirm this) as the

key to acting morally. Conversely it reinforces the view of Mencius, because, in his view,

morality originates from our natural psychological sentiments. As the next sections show, this

has profound normative implications.

So, it has been shown that Mencius’ psychology is synthesisable with Haidt’s and together

they provide a coherent account of the origin of virtue. From this emerges the implication that

extension and ritual are the ways to cultivate this virtue. This has two crucial implications for

19
Confucianism’s normative desirability. Firstly, if this account of the origin and cultivation of

virtue is accurate it strengthens Confucianism’s appeal as a perfectionist virtue ethics.

Secondly, as shown in the case of Singer, there is a case that adopting relevant aspects of a

Confucian-style virtue ethics can lead to better outcomes; this constitutes a powerful

argument that adapting relevant parts of Confucianism is a better response to moral

foundations theory than adding it as an adjunct to utilitarianism. As we shall see

Slingerland’s emphasis on an appropriate morality being one that appeal to our moral

spouts/sentiments, rather than one that generates obligations from a certain conception of

rationality, reinforces this consequentialist case. I move onto exploring these normative

implications in the next section.

Is Confucianism Normatively Desirable?

Finally, I will consider the impact Confucianism’s synthesisability with moral foundations

theory has on Confucianism’s normative desirability. I will explore two arguments here.

Firstly, there is a perfectionist argument that a Confucian virtue ethics is best intrinsically;

this argument is reinforced through Confucianism’s synthesisability with our moral

foundations because they are a key part of our human nature, that which perfectionist theories

seek to develop. Secondly there is an instrumental, consequentialist argument that acting

upon the moral theory that most closely aligns with our moral psychology will lead to better

outcomes. I end the section by briefly examining some of the policy implications

Confucianism’s synthesisability and normative desirability have for the west.

The Perfectionist Argument

Confucianism can be defended intrinsically as a perfectionist philosophy. Hurka (1996: 3)

defines a perfectionist moral theory as one that “starts from an account of the good human

life” then “characterizes this life in a distinctive way”, with certain properties constitutive of

20
human nature and the good life; the good life then “develops these properties to a high

degree”. Wong (2011: 780) identifies Confucianism as a perfectionist philosophy with “a

deeply relational conception of how to live” as central to human nature; this means that “the

life of fulfilling relationship” is to be promoted because this characterises the good human

life for Confucians. Hence Confucianism meets Hurka’s definition of a perfectionist

philosophy.

This perfectionist interpretation is reinforced when we consider that, for the Confucians, the

anthropological origin of our goodness comes from our humanity. In Confucianism the

defining characteristic of humans, as opposed to all other animals, is their capacity for virtue

(Huang 2013: 48) and the fact we can cultivate virtue in a way they cannot; as the previous

sections hinted at, the Confucians believe that humans fulfil their function and telos when

they cultivate these virtues This shows that, for the Confucians, virtue is the key part of what

constitutes our uniquely human nature. Goodness in our relationships with each other

originates from this humanity and is hence constitutive of the good life for Confucians.

Because of perfectionism’s emphasis on developing what constitutes our uniquely human

nature, a perfectionist virtue ethics that works must be synthesisable with our moral

psychology, given that it is a key part of this uniquely human nature. So long as we

presuppose moral foundations theory to be a reasonably good model of our moral

psychology, Confucianism is a good candidate for a theory that aligns well with this. This

shows Confucianism is one legitimate form of perfectionist virtue ethics.

There is also a more tentative case that Confucianism’s greater degree of synthesisability

with our psychology than many other types of virtue ethics, makes it normatively preferable

to them. For many western virtue ethics, what constitutes our humanity and distinguishes us

from other animals is our capacity to live according to rational principle. For example,

21
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics 1097b–1098a) takes this view when he identifies the function

of a human being as the activity of the rational part of the soul in association with virtue. By

contrast, Haidt (2013: 103) adopts something akin to the Humean view of rationality, where

the primary purpose served by reason is to develop arguments to justify post hoc the initial

intuitions people have and explicitly attacks the counterview that acting in accordance with

reason is what leads to good/virtuous behaviour. Indeed Haidt (2013: 32-34) explicitly

attacks the Ancient Greeks for placing too much emphasis on rationality as key to morality.

As mentioned, Confucian virtue ethics bypasses this problem by identifying virtue itself as

what directly distinguishes us from animals; there is no rational part of the soul necessary to

make us capable of virtue. So, if we assume the findings of Haidt (plus other cognitive

scientists like Damasio) are broadly correct, Confucian virtue ethics has a greater congruence

with our moral psychology than many (more rationalist-oriented) western virtue ethics, such

as Platonism and Aristotelianism. As Slingerland (2007: 380) puts it, “Mencius is arguably a

much better resource as a moral psychologist than Aristotle”. Thus, it can be argued that

Confucianism’s more accurate conception of our uniquely human nature, and hence more

accurate picture of what to means to develop this, increases Confucianism’s normative

desirability, relative to the types of perfectionist virtue ethics to which reason is

indispensable.

The Consequentialist Argument

Secondly, there is an argument that synthesisability makes adopting/adapting Confucianism

(or at least key/relevant parts of it) optimal for consequentialists. Consequentialists want to

achieve the outcome with the best consequences. To do so, feasibility constraints need to be

considered and the formula for reaching the best outcomes adapted accordingly. Hence a

consequentialist perspective should presuppose the feasibility constraint of human

psychology and advocate the outcome that maximises utility given this constraint.

22
How consequentialism responds to this constraint can involve going beyond a purely

consequentialist mindset. As Parfit (1984: 24-25) points out, a consequentialist theory can be

self-effacing – it can tell us to believe some other theory because the dispositions inculcated

as a result of this would lead to the best outcomes. This means there is the possibility that it

would be optimal if everyone changed their dispositions to adopt relevant parts of a

Confucian-style virtue ethics, rather than consequentialism. This would be the case if

Confucianism’s greater synthesisability with our moral psychology means this would lead to

better outcomes relative to a purely consequentialist mindset.

To illustrate how this might be the case we can return to Singer’s (1972) child in the pool

example. Moral foundations theory agrees with Singer that perceptual immediacy means

people would be more inclined to help the child in the pool directly than help a child in

another part of the world indirectly. But it also offers a method (extension) whereby we could

encourage people to be more charitable to those with less perceptual immediacy. If the

Confucians are correct about this being more effective in persuading people to be more

charitable than a simple consequentialist appeal to the consequences (and moral psychology

suggests they are), a better outcome would be achieved by changing our dispositions to adopt

relevant parts of a Confucian-style virtue ethics as a society. In this case, Singer’s

utilitarianism would be self-effacing in favour of a Confucian-style virtue ethics.

Similar arguments have been made in different cases, for example Jamieson (2007) in ‘When

Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists’, with regard to the environment. Jamieson argues

that if we all adopt a purely utilitarian outlook the utility-maximising option for each single

individual is to not care about their environmental impact, given it would not make any

difference on its own. By contrast virtue ethics’ emphasis on individual acts and character

traits uncouples our behaviour from others and encourages each individual to take action on

23
the environment regardless of what others do. So, with regard to environmental action

utilitarianism may be self-effacing in favour of virtue ethics.

It is insightful to think about the implications of this final argument for Haidt’s (2013: 315-

316) position that moral foundations theory should be used as an adjunct to utilitarianism. If

we were to adopt Haidt’s position we would still be operating from a fundamentally

utilitarian mindset. This fact means that, even if some relevant aspects of Confucianism were

adopted in this new version of utilitarianism, there are reasons to think that this option is not

optimal, even purely on utilitarian terms.

McDowell’s (1979) conception of virtue ethics illuminates why this is. McDowell (1979:

347) states: “Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not by applying

universal principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a certain

distinctive way”. The mindset necessary to see things in this certain distinctive way is

developed through acquisition of virtue. Because of the necessity of performing virtue for

virtue’s sake in the development of this mindset, we must genuinely be virtue ethicists,

changing our dispositions to believe in virtue for virtue’s sake (and not for utility’s sake) to

access the increase in utility that being virtue ethicists could bring about. Trying to act like a

virtue ethicist while consciously possessing a utilitarian disposition is a bit like someone

performing rituals for the sake of conformity – it doesn’t work (Analects 13.23); this

approach simply does not allow you to build up the mindset necessary to get to the state

where virtue manifests spontaneously. So, if consequentialism is self-effacing in favour of a

Confucian-style virtue ethics, then Haidt’s idea of using his theory as an adjunct to

utilitarianism is sub-optimal to attempting to genuinely adopt relevant parts of a Confucian-

style virtue ethics.

24
This sheds new light on Mencius’ debate with the Mohists, essentially a proto-utilitarian

school of thought that existed in Ancient China in the period of the warring states (480 BCE

– 221 BCE) (Shun 1997: 34). This can be illustrated through Mencius’ debate with Yi Chin,

in Mencius (3A5), where Yi Chin seems, on the face of it, to be suggesting/conceding to

some extent that a consequentialist argument of the kind just outlined is accurate. Yi Chin

claims that, ideally, “one should love all without distinction” but then suggests that, in

practice, because you have more frequent interactions with them, this “should begin with

one’s parents”. Hence Yi Chin defends a lavish burial for his parents based on this rationale

(Shun 1991: 206-210). This would seem to have parallels to the argument just outlined.

However, there are significant differences, especially regarding the origin and cultivation of

virtue. Shun (1991: 206-207) argues Mohists did not believe humans had innate affection for

each other and that, because of this, they believed we can only achieve love without

distinction after a lengthy process of cultivation which proceeds in stages, beginning with the

family. This shows that Yi Chin wants us to love those we encounter frequently more for the

explicit conscious aim of cultivating love towards others.

In contrast to Yi Chin, Mencius believes that we are naturally predisposed to have affection

for others and that these predispositions should determine the form of affection. To fully

develop these predispositions we are sometimes required to love with distinction, such as that

form of affection which requires we show filial piety to our parents. As Chapter Two showed,

moral foundations theory (plus a lot of cognitive science) shows we do indeed have these

moral foundations/spouts that the cultivation of virtue consists in developing. And as I just

showed using McDowell, it might be morally damaging to the Mohists own goals to ignore

this. Utilitarianism may be self-effacing in favour of virtue ethics, precisely because virtue

ethics allows us to develop our moral spouts better and thus allows us to be more ethical

people even from a utilitarian perspective, and this applies to Mohism too. Thus, the

25
synthesisability of moral foundations theory (and in this case much other cognitive science)

with Classical Confucianism helps to illustrate its normative preferability to both Mohism

and modern-day utilitarianism.

Lessons for the West

These arguments generate some crucial implications for the West. Importantly they would

suggest that morality (based on our moral spouts) must be initially learnt, first acted upon and

extended from our immediate environment. Consequently, a crucial lesson we can learn from

Confucianism is that, if we want to nurture a moral population, we should strengthen the

institution of the family. Empirical evidence is certainly there to reinforce Confucius’

(Analects 1.2) claim that the (two parent) family contains the roots of becoming human

hearted. For example, Manning and Lamb (2003) find children from single parent families

were far more likely to commit crime than children from any other family structure. Even

more starkly Cornish (2017) finds evidence that orphans, those with no family to gain

human-heartedness from at all, are 40 times more likely to get a criminal record. Of course,

the negative effects of a bad upbringing extent well beyond crime, for instance Goodhart

(2017: 213) highlights that 80% of educational attainment reflects “has nothing to do with

school but reflects pupils’ home and neighbourhood experiences”. Hence, one thing the

synthesisability of Confucianism with moral foundations theory would imply the west should

adopt is policies to strengthen two parent families and encourage their stability (in a way

compatible with modern liberalism, for instance with same gender parents treated equally to

opposing gender parents). I will not comment extensively on policy details, but several

authors have put forward suggestions as to how to do this. Goodhart (2017: 211-212) for

instance (commenting on Britain) suggests introducing fully transferable tax allowances

between married or cohabiting couples with children and giving parents allowances to look

26
after their own children, as opposed to spending government money on external day-care

centres.

As well as the family, we should adopt policies friendly to local communities. Indeed, there is

explicit evidence that strengthening local communities encourages people to extend virtues,

not just to those in these communities, but towards those beyond them. In Bowling Alone

(2001) Robert Putnam laments the decline in social capital, networks of relationships among

people who live and work in a particular society. One important point Putnam (2001: 22-23)

makes is that there are two types of capital, bonding capital (trust within groups with similar

people, with regard to age, race religion etc) and bridging capital (trust between groups that

have different identities) and these two kinds of capital actually strengthen each other. Hence

policies that support communities, ensuring that people build trust with their immediate

neighbours actually strengthens bridging capital and also creates trust between people with

different identities. This reaffirms a finding of this article, that if people learn virtues like

tolerance and generosity towards the people in their perceptual immediacy (who usually tend

to be more similar to them), this increases their ability to extend these virtues when it comes

to people not in their perceptual immediacy. Again, I will refrain from commenting in depth

on precise policies to address this. One thing I would emphasise though is that these findings

reinforce the idea that it is important to revitalise communities which have been damaged by

globalisation. As well as helping communities economically, evidence reviewed suggests it

will help them culturally. The bonding capital fraternal organisations can create increases

people’s virtue towards those close to them; this then creates bridging capital, extending

people’s virtue towards their less immediate neighbours, both perceptually and ideologically.

27
Concluding Comments

I have shown that Classical Confucianism can provide us with a virtue ethics synthesisable

with moral foundations theory and investigated why this might be normatively desirable.

Firstly, I showed that key concepts and doctrines of Confucianism align with the six moral

foundations. Then I demonstrated how, from its origin, virtue can be cultivated through

extension, whilst briefly touching on rituals and Confucianism’s synthesisability with

cognitive science. Finally, I examined explicitly why synthesisability with moral foundations

theory makes Confucianism a normatively desirable moral theory, both on intrinsic grounds

as a system of perfectionist virtue ethics and on consequentialist grounds because it may lead

to better outcomes; I then ended by briefly considering the practical implications of this.

My conclusions have implications for other forms of perfectionist virtue ethics. A theory

cannot be said to have correctly identified what constitutes our uniquely human nature if key

elements of that theory are in contradiction with our moral psychology. Haidt’s psychology

casts doubt on the psychological validity of any virtue ethics to which reason and rational

principle are indispensable. This means that theories of virtue ethics, like Confucianism, that

identify our uniquely human nature directly with virtue, are currently in a better position than

those, like Aristotelianism, that rely on rationality; this suggests aspects of the latter theories

should be reformulated to be more synthesisable with our moral psychology.

This investigation suggests mainstream utilitarianism must be adapted to account for our

moral psychology. Through extension and rituals Confucianism outlines ways to cultivate

virtue over time towards others. Moral foundations theory suggests these methods have some

basis in psychological reality. This means adopting relevant parts of Confucianism could lead

to the utility maximising outcome, making this option an improvement on Singer’s (1972)

purely rationalist utilitarianism, even on utilitarian terms.

28
This implies Haidt’s (2013: 315-316) suggestion of simply using his theory as an adjunct to

utilitarianism is suboptimal. While Haidt’s suggestion would likely be an improvement on

purely rationalist utilitarianism, I have shown both that Confucianism provides an alternative

system synthesisable with moral foundations theory, and that the adoption of relevant aspects

of this could lead to better outcomes. Crucially these outcomes are not accessible when

operating from a purely utilitarian mindset, because of the necessity of cultivating virtue for

virtue’s sake to build a virtuous mindset. Simply using moral foundations theory as an adjunct

to utilitarianism necessarily involves operating from a fundamentally utilitarian mindset.

Thus, it cannot be the best normative response to moral foundations theory, given the

conclusions I have established.

This flaw in the utilitarian mode of thinking can be vividly illustrated with reference to the

institutions of the family and the community. Thinking of these institutions in a utilitarian

and/or contractualist way, as relationships of convenience that allow greater aggregate

preference satisfaction is clearly inappropriate and undermines their value. This is true both

on the perfectionist grounds that this wouldn’t develop our moral spouts and on the

consequentialist grounds, that this mindset produces worse outcomes than the mindset of a

Confucian virtue ethicist. Thus, developing our moral spouts to adopt a mindset where think

of familial and community relationships as intrinsically good is a something important we

can adopt from Confucian virtue ethics.

So, Classical Confucianism can provide us with a virtue ethics synthesisable with moral

foundations theory and this synthesisability increases its normative desirability. This gives us

good reasons to strongly consider adopting relevant aspects of a Confucian-style virtue

ethics.

29
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