Introduction
Introduction
To make sure the confidentiality of the data in cloud, people are inclined to encrypt
them before they are uploaded to cloud. But the general encryption algorithms
make the data process become difficult. ABE is a good candidate to overcome this
limitation. ABE was first proposed in 2005 by Sahai and Waters [2], which
guaranteed the data confidentiality and provided the fine-grained access control
policy to the customers. It has been widely accepted as an effective method
encrypting the outsourced data in cloud computing. ABE improves the efficiency
when the data owner (DO) intends to share data contents with multiusers. It
permits DO to specify an access policy to the encrypted files, which can make the
users who match it, access uploaded data. The users who do not satisfy the access
structure cannot get any information about the data contents. For instance, we
consider the data access control for a company. If the CEO intends to submit a
classified file, through the cloud, to the managers in sales department, planning
department, and research and development (R&D) department. Then he/she can
use an ABE scheme. First he/she encrypts the file and specifies an access structure
as ω = manager ∧ (sales department ∨planning department ∨ R&D). Next he/she
uploads the encrypted file and the access structure into the CS. Only the managers
in the three mentioned departments can access the classified file, and the managers
in other departments or the general staff in the three mentioned departments cannot
learn anything about the file even if they collude.
Most of ABE proposals perform very well in secure data sharing. However, the
personal privacy of the DO and the users is ignored in these constructions. For
convenience of recovering data, the access policy is always sent with ciphertexts.
In some scenarios, the access structure may carry sensitive information of users.
For instance, a patient wants to share his/her personal health record (PHR) with
some doctors and family members, but he/she may not want others to know that
he/she is sick. If the patient employs a normal ABE scheme to encrypt the PHR,
although the malicious user cannot get the contents of the PHR, he/she may get
some information about the users as shown in Fig. 2. The access policy contains
“cardiopathy” and “DC hospital” and the malicious third party may guess that the
DO is suffering from a heart attack and is treating in the DC hospital. Hence a
natural problem is how to keep the shared data secure, while the privacy of them is
also protected.