(Routledge Studies in The Modern History of Asia) Cheng Guan Ang - Lee Kuan Yew's Strategic Thought-Routledge (2012)

Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought
Lee Kuan Yew, as the founding father of independent Singapore, has had an enor-
mous impact on the development of Singapore and of Southeast Asia more gener-
ally. Even in his 80s he is a key figure who continues to exert considerable influence
from behind the scenes. This book presents a comprehensive overview of Lee Kuan
Yew’s strategic thought. It charts the development of Singapore over the last six
decades, showing how Lee Kuan Yew has steered Singapore to prosperity and
success through changing times. It analyses the factors underlying Lee Kuan Yew’s
thinking, discusses his own writings and speeches, and shows how his thinking on
foreign policy, security and international relations has evolved over time.
Ang Cheng Guan is Associate Professor and Head of the Humanities and Social
Studies Education Academic Group of the National Institute of Education,
Singapore.
Routledge studies in the modern history of Asia
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52 Pre-Communist Indochina Britain, the United States and
R. B. Smith, edited by Beryl Burma, 1948–1962
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R. B. Smith, edited by Beryl East Asia, 1900–1968
Williams Trade, ideology and the
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A critical biography of Mochtar
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1925–30 David T. Hill
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birth of the Red Army 64 Atrocity and American Military
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Trial by army
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Muslims in Southeast Asia
The Maria Hertogh controversy 65 The Japanese Occupation of
and its aftermath Borneo, 1941–1945
Syed Muhd Khairudin Aljunied Ooi Keat Gin
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Industries East Asia
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Kinnia Shuk-ting 67 Modern China's Ethnic Frontiers
A journey to the West
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in Imperial Japan
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Ang Cheng Guan R. Hall
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State in Modern Asia Southeast Asian States
Edited by Liping Bu, Nicholas Tarling
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77 Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic
72 Russo-Japanese Relations, Thought
1905–1917 Ang Cheng Guan
From enemies to allies
Peter Berton 78 Government, Imperialism
and Nationalism in China
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Occupied Japan, 1945–52 Customs Service and its
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Christopher Aldous and Chihyun Chang
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Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic
Thought
Ang Cheng Guan

First published 2013
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© 2013 Ang Cheng Guan
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Contents
Acknowledgements x
Introduction 1
PART I
The Cold War years 7
1 From the 1950s to the mid-70s 9

2 1975–1979 38
3 The 80s decade 54
PART II
The post-Cold War years 69
4 The 90s decade 71

5 The new millennium 84
Conclusion 101
Notes 105
Bibliography 141
Index 144
Acknowledgements
I wish to express my deepest appreciation most of all to Mr. Mushahid Ali for
his advice and for reading the manuscript as it developed, Irwin See (for his
comments and suggestions for Chapter 1), Peter Sowden, Joey Long, Joseph
Liow, Tan See Seng, Bernard Loo, Chong Yee Ming and Royce Chan. I wish also
to thank the National Institute of Education (NIE) for the research grant and to
Professor Brian Farrell for inviting me to the NUS-Churchill College Cambridge
Symposium: Churchill and the Lion City: Shaping of Modern Singapore (National
University of Singapore, 9 April 2010) where I presented a well-received paper
which eventually formed Chapter 1. A version of Chapter 1 was subsequently
published in the edited volume Singapore in Global History (2011). Last but not
least, I wish to thank Weilun Chia.
Introduction
The “Great Man Theory of History” most eloquently articulated by the Scottish
historian Thomas Carlyle (1797–1881) is perhaps not very fashionable with
historians today.1 It was Carlyle who penned the memorable quote: “the history
of the world is but the biography of great men”.2 Carlyle might have over-exag-
gerated the role of great men and under-rated the social, economic and other
forces that shaped his “heroes”, but I do not think we should completely disregard
the importance and influence of certain individuals. Rather, a more nuanced
approach is called for. Indeed, as the American psychologist and philosopher
William James argued in his October 1880 lecture to the Harvard Natural History
Society, great men do have the capacity to influence and shape the thoughts of
society.3
In 1954, Richard Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin introduced a path-
breaking framework for analyzing foreign policy which focused on human
agency – the decision makers, their beliefs, constraints, thoughts and actions. It
laid the foundation for subsequent foreign policy decision-making research.4
Four decades later, in revisiting this seminal work, Derek H. Chollet and James
M. Goldgeier proposed a new research agenda comprising five areas for further
exploration. One of which is ‘speech-making as policy making’. As the two
scholars explained, speech-making should be recognized as a critical part of the
foreign policy process. Speeches are not just for sending signals to others, but
also for agenda setting and settling intra-government debates. In the policy envi-
ronment, speeches are “often seen as action-forcing events that serve as endpoints
for internal debates… When forced to articulate a policy publicly, senior policy-
makers are forced to clarify their objectives and justify their actions. Deciding
what to say (or not to say) therefore becomes a policy decision”.5
It is with the above views in mind that I believe it is not out of place to
approach the history of Singapore’s foreign policy through the perspective of Lee
Kuan Yew. According to S. Rajaratnam, the first and longest serving foreign
minister of Singapore, Singapore’s foreign policy was shaped principally by him
and Lee Kuan Yew, with contributions from Dr Goh Keng Swee where there
were economic implications.6 Indeed, historians who had perused the archival
documents, both in Singapore and abroad, would attest that it is impossible to
reconstruct the history of Singapore’s foreign policy without constant reference
2 Introduction
to Lee as he figures so prominently in most of the documents. The late Michael
Leifer, one of the most astute scholars of Southeast Asian politics, noted that
Rajaratnam was appointed Foreign Minister after Singapore’s independence
“within parameters set with his senior colleagues, especially Lee Kuan Yew”, and
when he stepped down in 1980, the pattern of Singapore’s foreign policy had
been well established. Subsequent foreign ministers “had little to do by way of
radical innovation although foreign policy had become more proactive …”. They
had, in the main, continued to implement “Lee Kuan Yew’s and Rajaratnam’s
design”.7 Lee’s influence owing to both his strong character and longevity is
without doubt. The Second Generation leaders such as Goh Chok Tong (who
became Singapore’s second Prime Minister) gained much from Lee’s “mentoring
sessions” – usually over lunch. Goh recalled that the lunches were always “seri-
ous affairs”, where “we didn’t discuss light topics. It was always political … what
was happening in the region and how (these events) would affect us”.8 In the
words of another mentee – Lim Chee Onn (Minister and NTUC Secretary-
General), Lee Kuan Yew “passed on a lot of his experience, his way of thinking,
his way of analysis and of course, his own interpretations and assessments of
situations. Not just the related facts, but also the way you look at things”.9 Indeed,
Asad Latif in his recent book described Lee as still a guiding force in Singapore’s
foreign policy.10
The focus of this book is thus the intellectual assumptions underlying
Singapore’s approach to world affairs under the leadership and guidance of Lee
Kuan Yew rather than documenting the execution of foreign policy or diplomatic
exchange; an explanation of the evolution of Singapore’s foreign policy rather
than its application. In explaining a state’s foreign policy, International Relations
scholars adopt what is described as “levels of analysis” – (a) the characteristics/
mindset of the individual leaders (“agency”), (b) the state’s domestic political
system (“structure”), (c) the external environment (“international context”), or
some combination of all three. I have chosen to focus on “agency”, in this case
Lee Kuan Yew, for good reason given the nature of foreign policy decision-
making in Singapore and the general lack of public interest in foreign policy
issues.11 I have, however, weaved into the chapters the “international context” in
broad strokes so that readers can better appreciate Lee’s speeches, talks and inter-
views in their proper context.
As Alexander George noted,
the way in which leaders of nation-states view each other and the nature of
world political conflict is of fundamental importance in determining what
happens in relations among states… The foreign policy of a nation addresses
itself not to the external world, as is commonly stated, but rather to “the image
of the external world” that is in the minds of those who make foreign policy.
As Lee is so influential in the making of Singapore’s foreign policy – indeed one

cannot miss the echoes of Lee’s thinking in every single foreign policy speech
Introduction 3
and interview given by the second and third generation Singapore leadership – an
understanding of his beliefs and premises is imperative for anyone interested in
understanding and analyzing Singapore’s foreign policy because they serve as “a
prism” which shapes “his perceptions and diagnoses” of international politics and
also “provide norms, standards and guidelines” that influences Singapore’s
choice of “strategy and tactics, structuring and weighing of alternative courses of
action”.12
While much has been written about Lee and his leadership role in the develop-
ment of Singapore, almost all of the literature has focused on his domestic poli-
cies and on issues of governance with very little about foreign policy thinking.13
This is somewhat surprising considering that Lee is generally acknowledged as
Asia’s leading strategic thinker,14 one who does not flatter but “who is known,
from time to time to, to speak bluntly”,15 and someone who helps “us find direc-
tion in a complicated world”.16 Nixon recalled Lee as one of the ablest leaders
he had met comparing him to Winston Churchill. The link between the two may
appear on the surface to be tenuous. By the time Lee Kuan Yew embarked on
his political career – he won the Tanjong Pagar seat in the April 1955 election
and became the leader of the opposition – Churchill had ended his tenure as
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. By the time Lee Kuan Yew became
Prime Minister of an independent Singapore in August 1965, Churchill had died.
In his political career, Lee would become Churchillian in his own right, a “big
man on a small stage”, a leader “who, in other times and places, might have
attained the world stature of a Churchill, a Disraeli, or a Gladstone”.17 Although
former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher did not share all of Lee’s
views particularly with regards to China, she described him as “undoubtedly one
of the twentieth century’s most accomplished practitioners of statecraft”.18 Last
but not least, former US President Bill Clinton described Lee as “one of the
wisest, most knowledgeable, most effective leader in any part of the world for
the last 50 years”.19
The well known journalist of international politics Arnaud de Borchgrave
described Lee as “Asia’s senior statesman … also known as Asia’s Henry
Kissinger, the oracle to whom others turn in a crisis”.20 According to Kissinger,
Not only had Mr Lee transformed Singapore economically beyond what

anyone might have imagined in the 1960s, he had also helped ensure the
country’s survival by his shrewd steering of its foreign policy … I don’t
know of anybody who has done this with as much ability and consistency as
Senior Minister Lee.21
His qualities described above coupled with his long and sustained political career.
There is therefore a gap in the literature waiting to be filled and space for a serious
historian’s treatment of the subject without it being described as hagiography.
In studying Lee’s strategic thought, it is imperative to ask: What do I mean by
“strategic thought”? In the words of a strategic studies scholar, Bernard Loo,
4 Introduction
at the end of the day, however, it seems to me that these notions of strategy
really focus on the traditional definitions of security – the absence of external
threats to states, in terms of both sovereignty as well as territorial integrity.
In that regard, conceptions of geopolitics and how it translates into foreign
policy exist quite comfortably within the rubric of security; and strategy
(however defined) can be thought of as the logic that underpins how the use
of instruments of power and force (both military as well as non-military)
helps to ensure this “security”.22
This book is therefore about Lee Kuan Yew’s philosophy of foreign policy, his
thinking of geopolitics, and of war and peace, bearing in mind Raymond Aron’s
dictum that strategic thought “draws its inspiration each century, or rather at each
moment in history, from the problems which events pose”.23 Lee’s tenure as
Prime Minister coincided with the period of the Cold War. His tenure as Senior
Minister (a title that he assumed after stepping down as Prime Minister in
November 1990) and Minister Mentor (August 2004–May 2011) fell rather
neatly into the post-Cold War period. This book will attempt to document and
contextualize the change and continuity of Lee’s strategic thinking and its evolu-
tion from the 1950s when he first embarked on a political career to the present. It
will show that Lee Kuan Yew has a very developed sense of history and a
dynamic grasp of geostrategic reality.
With regards to sources, the documents of the Foreign and Defence Ministries
(MFA and Mindef) as well as the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) remain closed
(indefinitely). Without access to the primary documents, Lee’s two-volume
memoir is possibly the next best source and is a logical starting point for any
research on Lee’ s thoughts and actions. The memoirs, we are told, had drawn
on “unpublished Cabinet papers, archives in Singapore, Britain, Australia, New
Zealand and the United States, as well as personal correspondence”.24 Accurate
though they may be, memoirs cannot substitute and can at best only supplement
the documents of the period under study. I have in previous writings cited
declassified foreign archival documents pertaining to Lee, for example tran-
scripts of conversations and minutes of meetings particularly in the 1960s and
1970s but there is not enough for a study which covers six decades.25 Thus, for
this book, I am focusing my attention only on the transcripts of Lee Kuan Yew’s
speeches, talks and interviews pertaining to international politics from the 1950s
to the present. This source merits some elaboration. Lee delivered many
speeches, gave numerous talks and interviews on the major international geopo-
litical issues of the day. They are easily accessible,26 but surprisingly have not
been fully tapped by scholars. One possible reason is that historians today
consider records of what politicians said publicly as being inferior to archival
documents. Paul Readman reminded us that historians had always made use of
speeches – from the Greek and Roman historians to the historians of the nine-
teenth century.27 And as mentioned above, speech making is a critical part of the
foreign policy process. Decision-makers spend enormous amount of time craft-
ing and delivering speeches.28
Introduction 5
Lee has been described as one “known for his outspoken views”29 and “one of
Asia’s most candid commentators on regional and security issues”.30 This book
will systematically examine Lee’s public statements on international politics over
the years – a valuable but underrated source.31 Interestingly, Lee Kuan Yew indi-
rectly gave some advice on how to interpret his political speeches and related
statements. In his speeches, talks and interviews, Lee said he needed to strike a
balance between (a) “maintaining confidence and stability” with “the need to alert
people” and (b) being polite and also truthful (“I have to be polite but also don’t
want to be untruthful”).32 In an interview not long after the fall of Saigon, Lee
said that any person in office in Southeast Asia, any Minister, any person carrying
responsibilities, had to weigh on the one hand, what he says for his internal and
international audience so as not to shake confidence and on the other hand, if he
says that all was well when everything was not well, risk being discredited in a
few weeks or months.33 Historians seeking to make use of Lee’s public state-
ments to understand his thinking should bear this in mind.
Alongside the Introductory and Concluding chapters, the book comprises five
substantive chapters of which three cover the Cold War years when Lee was the
Prime Minister, and another two cover the post-Cold War years from 1990 to
2012 when Lee was first the Senior Minister and then Minister Mentor. He
stepped down as Prime Minister about a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and
subsequently retired from the cabinet in May 2011. With the exception of
Chapter one, the longest, and Chapter two, the shortest, each subsequent chapter
covers a decade up to the present. Why ten years? I quote from Niall Ferguson
writing in another context when he wrote that “there is always a certain arbitrari-
ness about historical periodization. Scholars generally work with the units of time
to which potential readers are already accustomed”.34 There is not much pre-1965
(independent Singapore) material to form a substantial chapter by itself. The first
decade of independent Singapore was particularly critical or was, in Lee’s words
“vulnerable” years where “the fundamentals of Singapore’s foreign policy were
forged”.35 The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 marks a turning point in the
international politics of Southeast Asia, and thus seems to be an appropriate junc-
ture to begin Chapter two, covering a brief four-year period – from April 1975 to
1979 – which saw a lot adjustments in the region trying to come to terms with the
American defeat and the communist victory in Vietnam. Aside from the two
exceptions, the ten-year interval came about quite naturally. The end of the Cold
War came almost at the end of the 1980s and Lee relinquished his prime minister
title in 1990 which conveniently marks the start of another decade and a new
chapter. The advent of the 21st century is also a natural beginning for the last
substantial chapter which covers the first decade of the 21st century and a little
more. Although Lee retired from cabinet on 14 May 2011 at the age of 88, given
his international stature, his perspective on world affairs continues to carry
weight. He has been giving less speeches and interviews in recent years.
Readers will find that I have deliberately kept any authorial intrusion into the
main chapters to the minimum. The intention is to let Lee’s voice dominate the
book and the important issues of the day or decade to emerge chronologically
6 Introduction
from Lee’s speeches and interviews. The Introduction explains the rationale for
this study and puts it in context. Some of the issues such as the Vietnam War, the
British withdrawal east of Suez and the Cambodia conflict which were critical in
one phase of Lee’s political life, feature very prominently in the early chapters
and no more after. Then there are more recent issues such as the post-Cold War
challenges which emerge in later chapters. Last but not least, there are topics such
as Singapore–Malaysia–Indonesia relations, the role of the United States, of
Japan and the gradual rise of China which recur in all the chapters because they
are perennially important issues to Lee.
Part I
The Cold War years

1 From the 1950s to the mid-1970s
“The foreign policy of Singapore must ensure, regardless of the nature of the
government it has from time to time that this migrant community that brought in
life, vitality, enterprise from many parts of the world should always find an oasis
here whatever happens in the surrounding environment”1
“… a capacity to anticipate, and if the unanticipated takes place, to have enough
resilience to over the ‘unanticipated’ … That’s the most difficult … And it is this
capacity to meet changing circumstances which is critical”2
There is not much information on Lee Kuan Yew’s views on international politics
and foreign affairs before August 1965 as compared to the period after. However,
it is still possible to get some insight into his strategic thought in the earlier
period. He was a law undergraduate in Cambridge between 1946 and 1950.
Returning to Singapore in August 1950, Lee got involved in local politics and
formed the People’s Action Party (PAP) in 1954.3 Singapore achieved internal
self-government in 1959 but foreign policy and defence remained under the
purview of Whitehall until 1963 when Singapore merged with the Federation of
Malaya to form Malaysia. From 1963 until Singapore’s independence in August
1965, foreign policy and defence were controlled by Kuala Lumpur, and not by
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, although Lee did have some leeway in expressing
his views and establishing personal ties with foreign leaders which more often
than not contributed to tensions between him and the federal government.4
On the nature of international politics pre-August 1965

Two events in 1956 shed some light on Lee’s thinking on international relations – the
Anglo–French–Israeli invasion of Egypt (also known as the Suez Crisis) and
the Soviet invasion of Hungary. With regards to the former, Lee approved of the
American response to the Anglo–French–Israeli invasion of Egypt which had
“shocked and angered the whole non-European world” and was “a reminder of
the perfidy and ruthlessness of the gun-boat policy of the imperialist powers of a
bygone age”. According to Lee, “fortunately, for the peace of the world, the
Americans refused to support Britain and France, but instead joined the rest of
the world in condemning the blatant act of aggression. … The Egyptian blocking
10 The Cold War years
of the Canal symbolized the end of the gunboat age for Britain and France”. As
for the invasion of Hungary which he described as a “bloody and brutal armed
suppression of Hungarian patriots”, Lee noted that “history may well mark this
event as the turning point of Soviet Communism in the West and perhaps in the
whole world. Never before has any single event in the Communist world split the
Communist parties of Europe as Russia’s cruel action in Hungary has done…”5.
To Lee, foreign or external affairs were “a matter of life and death” and were
“an extension of domestic affairs” – “what we say and what we do in the field of
foreign politics is so often the external manifestation of our domestic politics, our
internal hopes and fears that the embassies that we established … reflected the
affinity and identification of political attitudes and political premises”.6 In a
speech to the International Institute of International Affairs (Australia), which is
perhaps his most substantial discourse on this subject pre-August 1965, he said
that international affairs were as old as the subject of man.
From the first tribes to the modern nations, man may have learned how to use
wood and stone and metal and gunpowder, and now nuclear power. But the
essential quality of man had never altered. You can read the Peloponnesian
wars, you can read the Three Kingdoms of the Chinese classics, and there’s
nothing new which a human situation can devise. The motivations for human
behaviour have always been there. The manifestations of the motivations
whether they are greed, envy, ambition, greatness, generosity, charity, inevi-
tably ends in a conflict of power position. And how that conflict is resolved
depends upon the accident of the individual in charge of a particular tribe or
nation at a given time. But what has changed is the facility with which men
can now communicate and transport not only ideas but also man himself and
his weapons. Therefore, in a very old situation has been introduced a very
alarming possibility which puts the whole problem of international relations
now in a very different perspective.7
To Lee, “no tribe in proximity with another tribe is happy until a state of domi-
nance of one over the other is established. Or until it has tried to establish that
dominance, and failed, and it is quite satisfied that it is not possible, whereupon
it lives in fear that the other tribe will try to assert dominance over it. And the
cavalcade of man will go on …”8.
He was to reiterate this point in another speech in 1967 when he said, “one
constant theme recurs again and again in the history of tribes and nations – the
desire amongst the bigger to compete to become bigger, to extend their influence,
their power and to win support”9 and especially ascendant powers – “those who
are in ascendant want to see the world changed faster and further in their inter-
ests”.10 Developing countries like Singapore which had no “power” would need
to “arrange their relationship with the developed countries in order to exercise
some influence” in one of two ways: (a) pursue appropriate policies/strategies to
tap power and/or (b) coming together to increase their capacity to influence
events.11 There was thus much that could be learned from the study of history.
From the 1950s to the Mid-1970s 11
He did not believe history was bunk for it “has some relevance to tell us some-
thing about the natures of people and their cultures and their societies”12 and “it
should teach us, if we can learn from experience at all, what should be avoided
and what more can be done for a better tomorrow”.13
His education might also have shaped his early ideas on this subject. An
address he delivered in 1967 when he received an honorary doctorate of Law
from the Royal University at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, sheds some light. In his
speech, he recalled being taught international law by the late Hirsch Lauterpacht,
Whewell Professor of International Law, in Cambridge and who later became a
member of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. What stuck in his
mind was the difference between municipal and international law: “The law of
each individual country is binding on all its subjects except the sovereign. The law
of the international community has one missing element: enforceable authority. In
legal theory, every government of every independent nation is sovereign and
supreme”. Recalling the 1962 World Court ruling in favour of Cambodia over the
dispute of the Preah Vihear temple, Lee reminded his audience that the ruling was
possible only because both the governments of Cambodia and Thailand had first
agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the World Court.
Lee also noted that treaties, “however solemnly entered into between sovereign
and independent nations” could be “violated with impunity except where the
United Nations intervenes”. He observed that the United Nations (UN), however,
had only done so when disputes were between smaller nations. “The decisive
sanction is the unpleasant consequence that the other party to the agreement
might inflict in retaliation by the use of superior force”. In his assessment, the
record of the UN charter established in 1945 in an attempt “to do what the League
of Nations at Geneva had failed to achieve” and as “the first steps to covert inter-
national morality into international law”, was one of “varying degrees of
success”. According to Lee, “we see clearly the realities of power behind the
forms of protocol”. If any of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council
were involved in a dispute, no resolution can be passed. Even when they are in
agreement as in the case of Rhodesia, “sanctions have failed to bite”. And where
big powers have a direct or even indirect interest in conflicts between smaller
powers, such as the case of Vietnam, no settlement is possible.14
If the saying “all politics is local” is true, it includes international politics as
well. As Lee reminded us on more than one occasion, “whatever the course of the
world events, it is only natural that we should be more concerned with the events
that will more directly affect our lives”.15 In a speech entitled, “The Role of
Developing Countries in World Politics”, he said:
Inevitably we all see this [changes in the world] in the context of our own
immediate position in Asia. When Japan talks of regional co-operation, she
means Japan, East and Southeast Asia and Oceana, including Australia and
New Zealand. For this is an area in which Japan can play a role. When
America and the West talk of countervailing forces, they mean that larger
crescent stretching from Pakistan, India, Indonesia, up eastwards on to
Japan. When our Indonesian neighbours talk about regional co-operation,
they mean Indonesia, and the smaller countries of South and Southeast Asia,
not including India or Pakistan to the west, nor Japan to the north or Australia
and New Zealand to the south.16
As a young lawyer, Lee assisted in defending the members of the University

Socialist Club (USC)/Fajar editorial board who were charged with sedition for
publishing an article entitled “Aggression in Asia” which condemned the forma-
tion of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO).17 Lee was personally
critical of SEATO. “SEATO is nonsense”.18 When asked whether SEATO was an
adequate framework for Southeast Asian security, Lee noted that SEATO was
inferior to NATO,
… And until you convince Asia that you consider Asia as important to you,
as Americans, as Europe is to America, you are going to find lots of Asians
like me rather critical and really doubting because ninety per cent of you
have come from Europe; you understand Europe better than you understand
Asia.19
In a talk he gave in 1959, Lee observed that since the end of the Second World
War, “the political face of Asia has undergone more change than during any other
equivalent period in Asian history. Events have taken place which are likely in
the next few decades to shift the centre of gravity from Europe and the West to
Asia and the East”. He believed that “the massive potential greatness of India and
China” would dominate the Asian scene” and “what happens to the rest of Asia”
was bound to affect Malaya, including Singapore. In one of his earliest analyses
of the development of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, Lee was of the view that
if there were a free-for-all in Malaya, it might be possible that a movement of the
Chinese urban proletariat could assume power and dictate the course of the revo-
lution. But this was impossible as the British and the Americans “would never
allow a free-for-all in Malaya”. If Communist China and the Soviet Union were
prepared to intervene, as in Indo–China, and throw their weight on the communist
side, then the position would be different and a small militant party might succeed
in capturing power. But they are not “and will never be so stupid as to intervene”.
Beijing wanted to win over 80 million Indonesians, and many more millions of
the uncommitted people in Southeast Asia. “And nothing is more likely to make
the Southeast Asian countries more anti-communist than the spectacle of China
coming to the aid of Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia”.
Thus Lee believed that “the immediate danger to Malaya is not Communism but
Communalism ... There can be no Communist Malaya until there is a Malay-led
Malayan Communist Party” because it was the Malay peasantry and not the
Chinese urban proletariat who determined the pace. And there was no likelihood
of any significant Malay-educated elite becoming disgruntled in the foreseeable
future. In the meantime, the communal tensions could easily increase. In his words,
“there are bound to be groups who are prepared to exploit the dissatisfaction of the
urban Chinese by making communal appeals. On the other hand, the Malay sector
is equally opened to exploitation by communal and, this is more serious, by reli-
gious appeals …”. Answering the question of whether the existence of a left-wing
government elected by a largely urban Chinese population in Singapore would
aggravate or alleviate the situation, he suggested that the answer depended upon
how the Government in Singapore conducted its affairs, whether it pandered to
Chinese chauvinism: “For there is no possible way of ensuring that the Singapore
situation can be isolated from the Federation”.20
On Singapore–Malaya–Indonesia relations
Singapore’s most important relationships are with the Federation of Malaya
(later, Malaysia) and Indonesia which “geography ordains that we shall always
be neighbours”.21 With regards to Singapore’s relations with Indonesia and the
Federation of Malaya, Lee had this to say which is as true today as in 1959:
There is no doubt that with better relations with our neighbours, like
Indonesia our trade may still increase. But we would be blind if we did not
recognize the tremendous change in the pattern of trade and commerce in
Southeast Asia. Both our two closest neighbours – the Federation of Malaya
and Indonesia – have, not unnaturally, since they attained their independ-
ence, set themselves out to build their own industries. They want to establish
their own trade lines with foreign countries without having to go through the
merchants and brokers in Singapore.22 We must adjust our position before
they begin to succeed in doing this. It is unlikely we shall be able to support
our ever increasing population just by trade alone.
In sum, “cooperation and not competition is what is needed between Singapore

and the Federation in the fields of commerce, industry and finance. When our
relationship with the Federation has been settled and improved, as they already
have been with the Republic of Indonesia, we shall be able to formulate our
policy on trade with China, Japan, Australia and New Zealand”.23
To Lee Kuan Yew, “but for the accidents of colonial history”, the relationships
of Singapore–Federation of Malaya–Indonesia “might well have been much
closer together … There is nothing that the people of Singapore would like more
than to have friendly and closer relations in cultural and trade matters with our
second closest neighbour – the Republic of Indonesia. We are a small island at
the tip of the Malay Peninsula. To the north is the Federation of Malaya; to the
south, east and west lie the myriads of islands of the Republic of Indonesia. And,
on a clear day, from my office, I can see across the sea the islands which are part
of Indonesia, just a few miles away”. He assured the Indonesians that “we will
not allow anything detrimental to the security of Indonesia to be committed in
any territory over which we have control”.24
Unfortunately, relations with Indonesia took a dive as a consequence of
Singapore (together with Sabah and Sarawak) merging with the Federation of
Malaya to form Malaysia in 1963. Much has been written on various aspects of
the Confrontation (1963–1966) as well as the roles of Sukarno, Subandrio,
Tengku Abdul Rahman, President Macapagal of the Philippines and US President
Kennedy. Here, the focus is on Lee’s thoughts and analysis of the Confrontation
as it developed. Lee, who was not directly involved in foreign policy at this stage,
remarked that “the coming of age has all happened so quickly for all of us in
Afro–Asian. And we have to learn quickly … How in the space of some four to
five years we find ourselves on non-speaking terms, and with radio stations based
in Jakarta and in Malaysia, hurling abuse at each other as if we had always been
sworn enemies, when in fact only the day before yesterday we were still good
neighbours and good friends, courteous, polite and friendly, contemplating
economic and cultural cooperation in a loose Confederation to be called
MAPHILINDO?”25
In Lee’s view, the situation was far more complex but “sensational headlines
to catch the eye, to make the news bigger news, create this constant habit of
reducing complex truth to simple lies”. In fact, the “disenchantment”, accord-
ing to Lee, was slow and gradual. Indonesia (“a big power”) had always been
regarded as “the elder” in the region by virtue of its independence struggle. But
the prestige of Indonesia’s revolution was “slowly tarnished” because of its
economic problems as a consequence of both Dutch colonial and Japanese poli-
cies and mismanagement by the post-independence leadership. In contrast, the
British left the Malayans, although “far less advanced politically” but more
enlightened in economic management compared to the Indonesians, “a sound
and prosperous economy”. In short, in Lee’s analysis, the crux of the
Confrontation was economic disparity and “geography and history are the two
factors that we have to delve into if we are to work out rationally our long term
relations with our neighbours”. Lee also highlighted the importance of “struc-
ture” and “contingency” in his analysis – “whilst the ingredients for the present
impasse were there, the actual circumstances in which the conflict was in large
measure accidental”. Finally, Lee believed that “a lasting solution must be
found”. The alternative would be “the Balkanisation of Southeast Asia”
because
the alternative to peaceful co-existence is for a very small power in Southeast

Asia to have the backing of a big power. Southeast Asia then becomes the
cockpit for vicious big-power conflicts. It would mean that willy-nilly what-
ever our wishes we in Malaysia must enter into military alliances either
openly or secretly with those who are prepared to help us, because our size
makes the fight unequal.
“In other words”, Lee warned, “the cold war in a very acute form will come right
into the heart of Southeast Asia”. Military alliances, Lee concluded, are “never as
satisfactory nor as advantageous as the general economic prosperity of this region
which friendship and cooperation among non-communist countries can bring to
us all”.26
Confrontation also led to some fine-tuning of Lee’s thinking with regards to
foreign policy and international relations. In his words, “pre-confrontation,
particularly in the good old day of the Federation of Malaya, external affairs was
the gentle game of playing at being independent … Today, post-confrontation,
external affairs means to Malaysia literally a matter of life and death”. He began
to adopt a much more nuanced view of the communists
Pre-confrontation we could afford to say, “Out with all the Communists, the
Russians, Yugoslavia, the Titoists, they are all communists.” Post-
confrontation, I think, there are different kinds of Communists and some
could be useful to us … I am not suggesting that we should invite the
Communists here, but I think our international posture could reflect a little
more subtlety to exploit the very differences between them which can help
us. I think it is not beyond the capacity of our Ministry of External Affairs to
play up the nuances of emphasis and attitudes between the hard Leninist line
and the peaceful co-existence Khrushchev line …
That said, Lee also made it clear that he was not advocating that the Government
“should dilute the purity of its anti-Communist approach”.27 In a March 1965
interview, he explained that it was a “more than a deliberate” decision to identify
Singapore as “non-communist” rather than “anti-communist”. While the West
might see the use of the term “non-communist” as “equivocation, fellow traveler”,
and the Americans for a long while preferred to support only anti-communist
governments as they found it difficult to distinguish socialists from communists,
the communists understood that “non-communism” meant NO communism. But
in fighting the communists, “we don’t necessarily have to become British or
American stooges. We are fighting for ourselves not for America and not for the
free world …”.28
On the non-aligned movement

One of the most important and influential segment of the international community
in the post-World War II years was the newly independent Afro–Asian bloc of
countries (or non-aligned nations) which comprised about one-third of the
world’s population. Lee explained,
They used to be called neutralists since it was believed that in a war they
could remain neutral. But the age of the jet and the hydrogen bomb makes a
mockery of any hope that anyone can escape the consequences of world
conflict. And so, they began to be called non-aligned instead of neutralist.
They do not line up with either the East or the West, either the Communists
or the anti-Communists on any issue. But they take a stand on every issue
that affects them. But unlike the countries within the two blocs, they decide,
not according to the stand of either America or Russia, but according to the
interests of their people, the under-developed peoples of the world.29
Lee believed in the idea of non-alignment but with a caveat: “We are non-aligned
if we are asked to choose between competing power blocs. We are non-aligned if
we are asked to choose between the interests of competing ideologies of
Communism or Capitalism. But, we are not non-aligned, nor can we afford to be
neutral, when our own existence, our happiness, and our future are at stake”. He
recalled how when the Soviet blockade of Berlin occurred (1948), he did not
understand how that conflict had anything to do with him as he was non-aligned.
“Today, I understand that had the fight been lost, I would not perhaps have
emerged in Southeast Asia”.30
Lee noted that almost every passing month in 1961 saw a new nation being
born in Africa to join the expanding group who were “anxious to keep their
newly won independence and not to be drawn into either of the two power blocs,
the West led by America and the East led by Russia”.31 From April to May 1962,
Lee visited some of the countries, namely Burma, India, Egypt and Yugoslavia
to “tell them of the facts of Malaysia and the problems in and around Malaysia”.
Since November 1961, there had been a consistent campaign to discredit
Malaysia even before it was created and Lee felt compelled to visit the key non-
aligned countries to personally correct the misinformation. In his own analysis of
the tour, he assessed that it was politically successful but less so economically.
“We are dependent on the West for our economic development”. “But more, and
more in the future”, Lee predicted, “the Afro–Asian bloc of non-aligned countries
will make a difference to us in our march towards our own machine age … The
Afro–Asian world of newly independent nations will welcome Malaysia into
its ranks as an honourable member. We will not be isolated. Nor can the
Communists use the prestige of the Afro–Asian nations to attack Malaysia for
their Communist ends”.32 During Confrontation, Lee again alluded to the influ-
ence of the Afro–Asian bloc when he told his audience that Malaysia would be
dependent on foreign assistance to protect it from Indonesia for “a long time”.
“But the more the British, Australian and New Zealand forces are used on the
ground either in Sabah and Sarawak or in Malaya, the more Malaysia is thrown
psychologically on the defensive, in having to explain to the Afro–Asian world
why with its nearly 11 million people why we are still unable to do our own
mopping up of just a few odd platoons of guerrilla”.33
One of his top priorities was getting Singapore’s independence recognized by
the Afro–Asian nations. In his press conference on 26 August 1965, Lee revealed
that it took almost two weeks before Egypt’s President Nasser decided to accord
recognition. The African countries in particular, Lee revealed, had their reserva-
tions because of the British bases in Singapore. Lee and his colleagues had to
convince them that he was not a “neo-colonialist stooge” and eventually all,
except Indonesia, recognized Singapore’s independence.34 Indonesia’s influence
was considerable. According to Lee, had Indonesia been willing to welcome
Singapore into the ranks of the Afro–Asian nations, “it would have helped so
much to settle our problems of legitimacy as an Afro–Asian nation”. But as
Indonesia was not forthcoming, Singapore had to “do it the hard way: convince
all Afro–Asian nations, almost one by one in the United Nations and at
Afro–Asian gatherings …”.35 Soon after independence was gained on 9 August
1965, the then-Deputy Prime Minister Toh Chin Chye and Foreign Minister
S. Rajaratnam visited the Afro–Asian countries in September and October 1965.
As Lee explained, “… we must maintain good relations with the Afro–Asian
countries economically, culturally and in the matter of trade”.36
Even so, Lee did not see the Afro–Asian bloc through rose-tinted glasses.
As he told his Canterbury University (Christchurch, New Zealand) audience,
the first bloom of Afro–Asian solidarity against Western domination in the

period between 1945 and 1955, the high-water mark of which the Bandung
Conference [1955] when Pantjasila and solidarity of all former subject
peoples in themselves believe in a new code of Afro–Asian ethics in peace,
non-interference, non-aggression, mutual respect and regardless of size and
power, mutual help. Well, that phase has gone ….37
Lee compared Southeast Asia with South Asia which was in a period of malaise
because the South Asians who actually had much in common were quarrelling
among themselves. He reiterated his concern in the wake of Confrontation that
Southeast Asia could be Balkanized which would play into the hands of the
communists. He argued that the communists had a vested interest in the instabil-
ity of the region because instability generated economic and social discontent,
which in turn undermined confidence in the incumbent regimes and their ability
to produce solutions, thus creating the very situation the communists need to
succeed.38
On the nature of international politics

Post-August 1965
Singapore became independent on 9 August 1965. Lee Kuan Yew was now fully
responsible for Singapore’s foreign relations and defence. As he told his audience
on 26 September 1965, “we have, on the one hand, to look after the international
relations for our country, and on the other, we have to look after the livelihood of
our people”.39 In subsequent speeches and interviews, he spelt out the rationale
and principles of Singapore’s foreign policy
We are now the arbiters of our foreign and defence policies, and our stra-
tegic importance makes our foreign and defence policies a matter of inter-
est not just to our immediate neighbours but to a larger group of nations
whose ideological and power conflicts have gripped the world in a cold war
since the end of the Second World War … Singapore, first must decide
where its long-term interests lie. And, within that context, a foreign policy
must be designed to bring us the surest guarantee of our survival and our
prosperity.40
Pre- and post-independence was a world of a difference. “This time we are play-
ing for keeps and if, we make a mistake there is no safety net underneath …” To
Lee, Singapore’s survival is not negotiable. “This is something fundamental. We
may be small but we are sovereign [in]... how we ensure our own survival”.41 In
a speech entitled, “Changing Values in a Changing World”, he noted that
economics and politics were closely inter-related and that there was a “sinking
realization” that “good economics must be the basis of good politics”.42
According to Lee (and he reiterated this premise on several occasions), “trade and
industry is as important to us as defence and security”,43 “defence and security is
indivisible from trade and industry”.44 The promotion of trade was thus a key
objective of Singapore’s security (foreign and defence) policy. “I am nobody’s
stooge. I am not here to play somebody else’s game. I have a few million people’s
lives to account for. And Singapore will survive, will trade with the whole world
and will remain non-communist”, he declared.45 He exhorted the leadership in the
business community to pay more attention to international politics. “The idea of
a man being interested only in business – not interested in what is politics;
not interested in relations with other countries; interested only in business – in
profits … I do not say that that attitude was wrong, but it is inadequate in this new
situation …”.46 Lee understood the concept of security very broadly. “There are
other aspects of security which are equally pertinent in the long run (not just
physical security): your economic viability, the capacity of your political struc-
ture to withstand pressures either of a social, cultural or whatever nature. It is a
multi-coloured question”.47
In a 1966 speech entitled “International Relations”48, Lee gave a lesson on the
subject of “foreign policy” when he highlighted “two things which we must
always keep clearly in mind” whenever we talk about the foreign policy of a
particular country. These were: (a) the foreign policy which is designed primarily
for the long-term national interests of a group of people organized into a nation;
(b) the foreign policy which is designed for the specific and special interests of
the type of regime or the type of political leadership that is for the time being in
charge of the destiny of that country. To confuse the two would lead to “grave
misjudgements as to what are likely to be the power situations in various parts of
the world from time to time”. He gave the example of Indonesia. There were,
according to Lee, “certain aspects of policy which any Indonesian Government
must pursue regardless of its particular ideological or political flavour. You can
change governments but there are basic compulsions of a people grouped
together as to the things they want to do. But when you change governments,
there are certain objectives which a previous regime pursued which are aban-
doned as unprofitable”.
Lee further identified two factors which must always be borne in mind when
talking about the foreign policy of Singapore: (a) The juxtaposition of power-
interests in a particular region (which he considered as, if not more crucial than
geography in determining Singapore’s strategic importance); (b) the effects of
human migration over time and space. Bearing in mind these two factors,
Singapore’s foreign policy must firstly “ensure, regardless of the nature of the
government it has from time to time, that this migrant community that brought in
life, vitality, enterprise from many parts of the world should always find an oasis
here whatever happens in the surrounding environment”. Thus a foreign policy
for Singapore must be one as to encourage the major powers to find it, if not in
their interests to help us, at least in their interests to not have us fail. And
secondly, it, “must always offer to the rest of the world a continuing interest in
the type of society we project”.
Finally, Lee placed considerable emphasis on “power”. He said that any
foreign policy must achives two objectives – the right political climate and
power. “For you can have the best of political climates, but if the power to sustain
your position is not there, then you must lose”.
On Singapore–Malaysia–Indonesia relations
Much has been written on Singapore–Malaysia and Singapore–Indonesia rela-
tions, so this chapter will not devote too much space to this subject. One of the
most prominent pioneers of the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs officers
who rose to be the President of Singapore recalled that in the early years since
independence, the primary focus of Singapore’s foreign policy was Malaysia,
Indonesia and Thailand.49
With regards to Malaysia, as Foreign Minister S. Rajaratnam said, “there is
something unreal and odd about lumping our relations with Malaysia under
foreign relations. But then some rather odd things do happen in the history of
peoples and countries”.50 But that was the reality of separation. In the wake of
separation, Lee said that “we do not believe that ties of kinship, history and geog-
raphy can be broken or destroyed just by one constitutional amendment”,51 and
“interdependence makes it inevitable, that maybe in ten years, maybe less, maybe
more, (and) it must come back together again, perhaps under somewhat different
conditions and circumstances. But I have not the slightest doubt that that must be
so”, a point he reiterated a year later – “I don’t see these boundaries as being
immutable”.52 Lee made a distinction between “peoples” and “governments” –
“friction between governments”, he said, “may come and go, (and) may change
with time”.53
The “interdependence” theme was reiterated in his speech during the first
Parliament session in December 1965 when he said
… But I think we would be dishonest to ourselves if we did not express

a profound interest in the policies and the consequences of such policies
upon the relationship between the communities in Malaysia which would, in
turn, help to influence attitudes and relationships between communities
in Singapore. I see the future more fraught with danger than before separa-
tion – the long-term future. For, if there is a failure to understand this nexus
between us, then it is extremely easy for one to embrace and to influence
attitudes and policies in the other which, as I have said, must end in the
polarization of two opposing attitudes based on two opposing assumptions
of superiority of race, language, and culture, which can only spell disaster
for all.54
That there were deep-seated differences between Singapore and Malaysia is obvi-
ous. Otherwise, it would not be necessary to take such a drastic step as separation.
Three and a quarter years after separation, Lee did not think the differences had
been resolved but acknowledged that both sides had moved some way to accept-
ing the difference although there were “compelling almost irresistible pressures
on cooperation”. But the reality was that “the unity of the two in the security
interest of both cannot be willed or wished away and we just have to learn to
cooperate in a very quiet and commonsensical way or we both perish”.55
Fast forward, as Lee said in his welcoming speech for the visiting Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in 1981, because so much of our past was
intertwined with each other, it had been difficult for Lee’s generation to consider
themselves completely different from Malaysians. It took about 10 years before
Malaysia and Singapore were able to establish an equable and less emotional
approach to each other and to begin to have a better understanding of each other’s
differences. “…These differences are manageable and may even bring mutual
benefits if we know how to use the comparative advantage we enjoy in our differ-
ent fields to complement the other’s economic developments. Then we shall
increase the total well-being of both people”, Lee added.56
As for Indonesia, Lee made two points: Singapore would like to have “good
and friendly” relations with Indonesia on the condition that neither side interfered
in the internal affairs of the other. Although what happened within Indonesia is a
matter “entirely for the Indonesian people” to decide, developments in the coun-
try “have the gravest consequences for all of us who live in the region…”.57 With
regards to Confrontation and Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio’s proposal
that there should be bilateral negotiations with Singapore, Malaya and the Borneo
states separately, Lee’s response was that he was prepared “to talk to anybody, at
any place, at any time, to achieve peace and security for Singapore”.58 It did not
matter if Malaysia objected to the proposal. “We want to be friends with
Malaysia, but that does not mean that we have to be unfriendly with all the people
who are unfriendly to Malaysia. Their friends may be our friends … but
Malaysia’s enemies need not be our enemies …”.59 The old aphorism, “Where
you stand is where you sit” is most true as Lee revealed that if Singapore were
still happily part of Malaysia, he would have rejected Subandrio’s offer – “We
would be outraged at the provocativeness of it. But, we are out of Malaysia and
we have got to look at our little sector”.60 That said, Lee also pointed out that it
would be unwise, short-sighted and opportunistic for Singapore to improve rela-
tions with Indonesia at the expense of Malaysia. “Singapore wanted rapport with
Malaysia, regardless of our position with Indonesia; and we want rapport with
Indonesia regardless of our position with Malaysia”. All said, “We must never
forget our abiding destiny as part of the continent of Asia”.61 In his first
Parliament speech, Lee expanded on this point: “We are here in Southeast Asia
for better or for worse and we are here to stay, our policies are designed to ensure
we stay peacefully in Southeast Asia in accord and amity with our neighbours but
with a right to decide how we order our own lives in our own home. And every
action, every policy must be decided by this yardstick. Any policy which endan-
gers our long-term interests as a separate and distinct community in this region
must be eschewed; and any act, any programme, and decision which will help us
secure a more enduring future for ourselves and our progeny in this region must
be pursued whatever the sacrifice”.62
In general, Lee felt that in foreign relations, “your best friends are never your
immediate neighbour”, a point he reiterated on a number of occasions. “Your
neighbours are not your best friend, wherever you are”, Lee declared in a speech
on the subject of “International Relations”. This is because “it gets too close and
your neighbour’s hedge grows and infringes on your part of the garden and the
branch of his fruit tree covers your grass and your roses do not get enough
sunshine and so many things happen. And therefore our best friends, as has
happened with so many other countries, are those who are farther afield with
whom we can talk objectively”.63 Thus, he felt that with Malaysia, both sides
should forget about sentiments and just do business with each other because “if
we go into sentiments, emotions, feeling, there is going to be a great deal of
antipathy … you can go into real orgies of bitterness and hate”.64
As for Indonesia, the abortive coup that took place there on 30 September/1
October 1965, also known as the Gestapu affair, was the beginning of the end
of Confrontation. Towards the end of 1965, there were rumours about the
construction of a new cooperation framework taking into account the new
regional architecture. There was already the ASA (Association of Southeast
Asia) formed in 1961 comprising Thailand, then-Malaya and the Philippines,
which foundered because of the rift between Malaysia and the Philippines over
Sabah and further complicated by the Confrontation which questioned the
legitimacy of Malaysia. The ASA was subsequently replaced by ASEAN in
August 1967. In early 1966, when asked whether Singapore would consider
joining the ASA, Lee said that Singapore was “extremely interested in regional
cooperation”, be it “bilateral or multilateral” for economic, cultural and social
purposes. But he would want to know first, the purpose of the organisation and
the benefits for member-countries. Lee believed that the idea of each small
country being independent economically (“economic autarky”) was “old fash-
ioned and deleterious in its effect”. 65 But he opposed MAPHILINDO which he
felt was exclusively Malay and Islamic and thus did not offer a sufficiently
broad spectrum to Southeast Asian cooperation.66 Any proposal that focused on
regional cooperation for mutual benefit is good but the proposal must also have
“political acceptability”, meaning that it should be presented “in a more realistic
way by a more representative cross-section of Southeast Asian countries” and
that “the objectives are clearly defined as not part of the Cold War conflict”.67
He believed that in the long term, joining or forming a regional association or
group was “the only way in which the smaller and not very viable countries in
Southeast Asia can sustain their separate existence in a world dominated by two
or three superpowers”.68
On the major powers and Southeast Asia
Lee, however, did not think that the future of Southeast Asia could be decided by
Southeast Asians alone. The major powers (specifically, the US, China and the
Soviet Union) in varying degrees would continue to maintain “a profound interest
in the region” because of the region’s sizeable population, minerals and other
natural resources, and it housing one of the most important sea junctions in the
world. All three powers, in Lee’s view, did not really understand the peoples in
Southeast Asia.69 With regards to the Soviet Union, he saw Soviet naval expan-
sion into Southeast Asian waters as a natural extension of their power and influ-
ence and would not pose a threat “unless they are the only naval power in the
area”. If there were several powerful fleets, they could all play a balancing role.70
But he did not think there would be a sizeable Chinese naval presence in the
region for some time.71
Turning to China, Beijing openly supported Indonesia’s confrontation against
Malaysia. In March 1965, Lee Kuan Yew offered one of his most substantial
analyses about China vis-à-vis Southeast Asia to date. In reply to the question
of whether the increase in power and influence of communist China worried
him, Lee said yes if it led to the “miscalculations on the side of the Americans as
to how far the Chinese would go in backing revolution in Southeast Asia”; and
no because he did not believe that the Chinese – “if you read their history – that
they would want to conquer, physically South and Southeast Asia. They are
very big, self-possessed, completely self-confident people with enormous
patience”. With their Middle Kingdom mentality, the Chinese just wanted a
continuation of the tributary system. The problem, accordingly to Lee, was not so
much “Chinese aggression” (meaning: Chinese armed soldiers marching down
Southeast Asia). If that were to happen, “the problem would be much simpler”
because Communism would be equated to Chinese imperialism and
the rest of Asia would certainly cooperate to fight it. Lee noted that the
Chinese were
much more subtle … They believe in revolution. They are going to help
revolution as they help revolution in South Vietnam via North Vietnam.
There is not one single Chinese soldier in South Vietnam. There never will
be, unless there is massive intervention by the Western powers which justi-
fies their massive intervention … They are able to get proxies to carry the
torch of revolution with tremendous fervor and zeal.72
Lee was of the view that the problem in Southeast Asia was that the countries
had not been able “to discern, to define and to collate their collective interests”.
“If they are able to see that in the long term, if we want to survive as ourselves
and not as vassals or satellites of other powers, then it behoves us to act collec-
tively in defence of our larger interests in the region in keeping outside powers
from meddling with us and our affairs than in allowing our immediate frictions
to be exploited by outside powers”, he said.73
Singapore’s attitude towards China was the same as that towards Indonesia.
“We want to be friends with our neighbours in Asia, whether it is the biggest
nation in the world in population like China, or the biggest in Asia like Indonesia”
on the basis of “mutual respect for each other’s internal sovereignty and integrity
and no interference in each other’s internal affairs”. Lee was glad that this time
Beijing did not comment on Singapore’s separation from Malaysia (unlike during
the merger) and thought that the silence augured well for the future. In late-1965,
China’s admission to the UN was being debated at the United Nations. Singapore
supported Chinese admission to the UN by a simple vote or by a two-third major-
ity and “without placing conditions” because in his view, “it is wrong to place
conditions”. Indeed, he believed that China should never have been isolated.74
However, Lee had not yet decided on the “Two Chinas” policy. While he agreed
that the issue was an outstanding one, there was still no hurry to reach a decision.
“Once China is admitted (to the UN), the government takes its place as the repre-
sentative of the Chinese people. And whether the people in Taiwan are part of the
Chinese people, or decide not to part of the Chinese people … that is a matter to
be decided at a later stage. My position is completely open on this”. When the
time comes for Singapore to make that decision, it would be based on three crite-
ria: (1) what is right; (2) how the decision would affect the interests of Singapore;
and (3) how the interests of Singapore could be advanced (meaning: Singapore’s
survival and capacity to prosper and to expand its trading and other relations with
the international community) while doing what was right.75 Almost a year after
Singapore became independent, Beijing had still not recognized Singapore. But
it also did not condemn the country. The Chinese had expressed their wish to
trade with Singapore, to which Lee did not object.76 Singapore was interested in
any country who wanted to trade with it, be it Taiwan or China. Referring to
Taiwan in 1968, he said that Taiwan had a bustling little economy which was
bigger than Singapore, and “we are extremely anxious to increase our coopera-
tion with them”.77 In 1970, Beijing still categorized Singapore as part of British
Malaya. Thus, while economic relations with China were “very good”, political
relations were not.78 The establishment of diplomatic relations between Singapore
and China was however “absolutely inevitable” but taking into account the
concerns of Singapore’s neighbours, Singapore would give them “the honour of
being first in establishing relations”.79
To Lee, one big power that would never lose interest in Southeast Asia was
China and Singapore could not “afford to forget that”. The border regions
surrounding China were “vital to her and they should be neutral, if not positively
friendly. And if you get weak and unstable situations, the manipulation that is
possible – not with any military effort, just sheer economic manipulation and you
know, the carrot and throw in with the ideological subversion, this would become
quite a Balkanised situation”.80 He believed the Chinese were “determined, as a
people, to unify and build a modern, wealthy Chinese nation”. When China
became prosperous, “good luck to me, because I will be much safer”.81 He told
his American audience that having lost China, they “have got to live with it”.
China was now run by a group of men who want China to become a great power.
“Why shouldn’t they be great?” he asked. “You can’t stop them”.82 As for the
suggestion that Southeast Asia should be neutralized (a proposal put forward by
the Malaysians and subsequently adopted by ASEAN in 1971), Lee did not
object. “Of course it is desirable to have a neutral Southeast Asia” but he was sure
that even the Prime Minister of Malaysia did not expect the proposal to become
a reality anytime soon. His own preference: the more the great powers are inter-
ested in this area, the better.83 In a later speech, he would describe the idea of the
neutralization of Southeast Asia as an example of creating a “Shangri-la in our
minds”, “whistling in the dark, through the cemetery of Indochina”. But
“Shangri-la is not for Southeast Asia unless one seeks the poppy variety”. His
preference was for a continued presence of all interested powers in the region
which could “add to a more stable balance of influence”.84
Economic cooperation would not happen without first establishing “stability and
security” which could only be achieved in one of two ways: (a) the superpowers
saw that it was in their own interest to desist from competing with each other in
the region; (b) one superpower had the strength to support all the smaller countries
who want to get on with economic construction and together exclude superpower
rivalries from the region. If the wars of national liberation or people’s war were to
spread beyond Vietnam, then chances of stability and security, economic and
political cooperation would be dim.85 Lee said Southeast Asian countries must
therefore accommodate one another because the worst thing that could happen was
for each to get a backer. 86 He felt strongly that Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia
must quickly resolve their misunderstandings and get along. Addressing a gather-
ing of Singapore and Malaysian students in London in April 1966, he spoke of the
need to make the best use of the window when the Americans were still holding
the fort in Vietnam. He did not expect the US to win in Vietnam. “Nobody is
suggesting that they can win, but that they are not defeated – and that therefore the
battleground cannot be shifted from South Vietnam over Cambodia on to Thailand;
and that we have in Southeast Asia time to sort out our little differences …”.87
In the early years of Singapore’s independence, given the poor relationship with
both Malaysia (following Separation) and Indonesia (on-going Confrontation), it
was not surprising that there were concerns, valid or not, that Singapore could be
threatened if not swallowed up by one or the other, or both. In response to a question
that Singapore was a “nut” and both Malaysia and Indonesia were the “joined-up
nutcracker”, Lee recalled reading an account of a conversation between Stalin and
Tito in Milovan Djilas’s book, Conversations with Stalin. Stalin told Tito, “Why not
swallow Albania?” But the shrewd Tito did not do that because according to Djilas,
if Yugoslavia had done that, it might not be there today. Lee provided a fish allegory.
The big fish says to the medium-sized fish, “Why not swallow up the small
one?”. And the medium-sized fish if it is sufficiently unthinking goes and
does it. Then, the big fish will eat not only the medium one but he will also
have the smaller one! And I think that would be a more satisfactory meal all
around because both will be eaten up in one gulp.88
It is obvious who the small, medium and big fish Lee was referring to.
This was later expanded into one of Lee’s most memorable speeches on
the nature of international relations entitled, “Big and Small Fishes in Asian
Waters”.89 A number of points in this wide-ranging speech are worth highlight-
ing: Lee spoke of the UN which in form and formalities, all countries in the
world, big or small are “independent, sovereign nations with equal voting rights”.
From that perspective, “we are all equal: we all pretend that we are equal. But
we are all acutely conscious of the fact that we are not equal”. Referring to
the five permanent members of the Security Council, “if the five big fish in the
world decide that this should be so, then it must be so”. But the assumption
was that the five would always remain big, and there was no provision for
adjustment. Drawing on history, Lee noted that “the belief that dictating a peace
treaty with unconditional surrender on the Germans and almost unconditional
surrender on the Japanese would be able to determine things for all time is just
not true”.
In short, the UN was designed to achieve certain objectives based on certain
assumptions which were thought to be true but had been proven false. Lee
worked on the assumption that inequality is a fact of life and that has been the
order of nature from time immemorial. The small fish eternally caught between
the medium and the big fish. The best recourse is to be “friends with both medium
and big fish”. He warned that we should never take the future for granted or
believe that decolonization meant reverting to “some idyllic, romantic past; that
before the white man came, we were all Asians together, loving each other, living
in peace and helping each other and that all were happy”. In fact, before the white
man came, “there were bigger fish chasing small fish and smaller fish chasing
shrimps”, borrowing from a Chinese proverb, “Big fish eat small fish; small fish
eat shrimps”. He cited the example of India which “could not any longer afford
to be other than what they believed they could be: big fish”. He mentioned
Thailand as the one country in Southeast Asia that understood realpolitik. The
Thais,
may internally, have a regime which is not quite in keeping with the princi-
ples of modern, democratic government. But if you talk to their ministers and
to their officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you will know that they
really understand all this very well. They were never colonised probably
because of a stroke of good fortune and also because they understood the
mechanics of power.
The Thais had a “keen sense of anticipation of history”.

It was the Greek philosopher Heraclitus of Ephesus who famously said, “You
cannot step twice into the same river”. The only constant is change. And as the
saying goes, “hindsight is always 20/20”. Lee made the same points with regards
to international politics. In 1966, he noted that two of the cardinal axioms in
international politics had disappeared – monolithic communism and Afro–Asian
solidarity. “Who”, he asked, “would have said ten years ago in 1956 that, in fact,
the first beginnings of a split in this monolithic structure – the ever-expanding,
completely unified Communist world – was going to come asunder?”. Similarly
for the Afro–Asian unity, nobody now believes that we could go back to the
Bandung of 1955 – “the highwater-mark of that age” and “it is finished”. To Lee,
changing values was like “styles” – “it is as if you suddenly realise that a style is
not good, and that it doesn’t work and is not comfortable”. As early as 1966, he
warned against being “caught in the cold war concepts of the last 20 years”, of
which the threat of a monolithic communist movement “gobbling up” the whole
world was one of them. Instead, he advised that we should be more concerned
“with the enduring weaknesses of human beings or worse, human leaderships
who have a tendency of wanting to give greater expression to themselves as
against their weaker neighbours …”.90
How then should Singapore, or for that matter, the practitioner of international
affairs prepare for “change” in international politics? According to Lee, there
were three qualities: 1) patience but “without giving away anything fundamental”,
and then “hope for the penny to drop”. 2) “No closing of the options” for “there
are a series of possibilities which could happen in the next 10, 15, 20 years. In
none of these possibilities must we foreclose and say ‘I abjure this particular
alternative’”. Lee explained it could be the next generation that would need to
exercise the options. But, it is not for us to close them. In fact, “it is our duty to
consolidate, to make quite sure that more options are at our disposal”. 3) Never
believe that because Singapore is small geographically and numerically, it there-
fore did not count because history had shown that “there are any number of very
small states but which because mainly of the quality of human organisation vis-
à-vis their neighbours, and secondly, by the accident of geography, have played
very key roles in the development of the whole region”.91 Lee placed much
emphasis on the “quality of human organisation”. In an earlier speech, he
described the qualities that made a nation great – amongst others, “potentials in
natural resources, land, minerals, agriculture and its human resources combined
with organisation brings power”.92
This is perhaps a good point to pause to consider Lee’s thoughts on two
significant events during this period which had strategic implications for
Singapore and the region – the Vietnam War and the British withdrawal east of
Suez. While both events had a dynamic of their own, they are not unrelated.
On the British withdrawal east of Suez93

S. R. Nathan recalled that in the immediate years after independence, much atten-
tion was given to Britain, Australia and New Zealand, and not the United States,
because of Singapore’s reliance on the British/Commonwealth presence for its
security.94 From very early on, Lee had felt very strongly for the need of a British
presence remaining in the region. He said,
British policy will for the foreseeable future be one of the most important
factors in Southeast Asia – one of the most important non-Southeast Asian
factors in Southeast Asia. I, for one, will be sorry to see it supplanted by
American policy; and it is my hope that what has happened and what is
happening in Laos may never find repetition nearer home … To us, who do
not want to see Singapore and Malaya slowly engulfed and eroded by the
Communists, it is an absolute “must”.95
He would make this point again during the Confrontation. “No man in his right
sense doubts that if there were no British bases in Singapore, Confrontation
would not have stopped simply at sporadic guerilla raids, bomb explosions and
subversion”.96 In March 1965, when he was asked whether he expected the possi-
ble shifting of the British naval base in the next four or five years, Lee replied that
the British bases would “last for quite a long time”.97 He was, however, unwilling
to answer a similar question in an interview about a fortnight later.98 However, he
said that it was not a simple question of wanting to get rid of the British bases and
influence in Malaysia. He again cited the ongoing Confrontation. “… As long as
British bases in the region, a British presence in the region, enables us to carry on
being ourselves it’s all right with us”.99
His views of the importance of the British bases in Singapore never changed.
Arthur Cook of the London Daily Mail observed that Lee had “told practically
every journalist” that Singapore could not do without the bases. The Prime
Minister did not dispute this. According to Lee, more than 50,000 people’s liveli-
hoods depended on the bases and that was not counting the “multiplier effect”.
He believed that there would come a time when the physical presence of British
troops would be unnecessary but “we will have an arrangement whereby, in case
of emergency, press button ‘A’ and tanks, helicopters and rockets, and all the rest,
can arrive within a few hours”.100 But Lee also wanted to ensure that the bases
were used only to defend the interests of Singaporeans and Malaysians – “that we
consider one” as well as Australians and New Zealanders – “people who have
been friendly to us, who are very close to us because of geographic proximity and
historic experiences”, and not as “jumping-points for aggression” against China
or Indonesia. Singapore, Lee emphasized, was not Guantanamo.101
He made a similar point when asked the hypothetical question about British
forces using the British bases in Singapore for the Vietnam War: “If taking part in
the Vietnamese war in a given set of circumstance appears an act of aggression, then
naturally we shall not be very happy about it”. He reminded his audience that it was
“qualitative” and not “quantitative” tests meaning: “whether you move here or there
with so many troops; is it aggression or is it not aggression that he was interested
in. The basic question to ask was ‘what the operations are for?’”.102 By mid-1967,
the security of Singapore (and Malaysia) post-British withdrawal appeared to have
been more or less settled if not in detail but at least in principle. Lee told journalists
at a press conference in London on 1 July 1967 that while the British withdrawal
would cause some degree of economic pain, it would not affect Singapore’s defence
and security.103 In a 14 October 1968 interview, Lee said that Singapore faced new
economic and security problems arising out of the British planning and program-
ming for withdrawal east of Suez. “All the things we can do in anticipation of events
that are likely to happen between now and 71 we have done …”.104
The issue of the British bases was more than just their importance for the secu-
rity and economic well being of Singapore. At another level, Lee was concerned
about the emerging danger brought about by “Britain’s growing disillusionment”
of its defence role east of Suez. By relinquishing its role, the British would not
be able to serve as a countervailing role against the United States. Lee was very
wary of the US during this period. He told the foreign correspondents, “… I will
be quite frank with you. If the British withdraw, I am prepared to go with the
Australians and the New Zealanders. But I am not prepared to go on with
Americans”. He repeated this a few times during the interview: “… It is funda-
mental. If the British bases go, there will be no American bases in Singapore.
This is a matter of the utmost importance for Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and
for America to understand that”.105 Lee found Americans to be “highly intelli-
gent” and “often well-meaning” people and that some American leaders such as
the late President Kennedy displayed “growing greatness and depth”. But by and
large, he felt that the American administration lacked depth, a point he reiterated
during the interview, and “wisdom which comes out of an accumulation of
knowledge of human beings and human situations over a long period of time”.106
The Americans had enormous wealth and power “but one thing they cannot buy;
and that is a corps of men who understand human beings and human situations”.
Because of their lack of experience, he was convinced that that the Americans
could not defend nor protect Southeast Asia from the communist threat emanat-
ing from Vietnam (the Domino Theory). He was extremely scathing of the
American management of the situation in Vietnam. “They don’t understand the
overseas Chinese. They don’t understand the Vietnamese. That is what it is such
a mess”. He thought that in 1963 after the death of Diem, the Americans could
have worked towards reaching an accommodation with the Vietnamese commu-
nists in the South. But they did not, and “that was your last get-off point”.107
Lee was adamant that in the long-term interests of the region there should not
be any “permanent occupation or permanent establishment of American occupa-
tion forces or armed forces in South and Southeast Asia”. And the only way to
ensure this was to have a solution which ensured that what was happening in
South Vietnam could not be repeated, even after a lapse of time. If there was a
possibility that the situation in South Vietnam could be repeated, “the countries
in the peripheral regions may well prefer some permanent American military
presence to self-respect”.108 He remained consistent in his view through 1971,
even though his relationship with the US had improved considerably. “We do not
want a US base in Singapore … I do not want a Russian base, nor do I want a US
base”, he stated categorically.109
Lee was very attentive to the psychological dimension of international relations
which he would highlight on a number of occasions. When the British finally
withdrew from east of Suez in 1971 and the security of Singapore, Malaysia,
Australia and New Zealand was replaced by the Five-Power Joint Defence
Arrangement (FPDA), Lee placed greater emphasis on the “psychological impact
more than the realities of the five-power”.110 In a 1999 interview reflecting
on the FPDA, he said that the FPDA “gave nations involved opportunities
for interaction. It also had a psychological value, in that it reminded the US and
the region that other parties too – not just the US – considered this an important
part of the global security map”.111 Another notable instance was after the 1968
Tet Offensive, Lee reminded his audience that “the greatest danger in Southeast
Asia – as in many parts of the world – is that the battle is lost by people, because
the people who could lead and fight the battle do a little bit of arithmetic and
decide that the odds are not worth taking and therefore never lead to fight the
battle”.112
On the United States and the Vietnam War113

It is to the Vietnam War we now turn to, a subject which Lee paid a lot of
attention to. In his words, “Every day, you read the newspapers, and so do I. And
the first page that I turn to is South Vietnam, foreign news, South Vietnam”.114
Lee described the problem facing South Vietnam as “a crucial issue”.115
On another occasion, he said that “the fate of Asia116 – South and Southeast
Asia – will be decided in the next few years by what happens out in Vietnam …
that is the contest …”. S. R. Nathan recalled that when he first joined the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in 1966, everyone was talking about the “domino effect”.117
Although Lee’s views of the Vietnam conflict over the years have been exten-
sively reported, they have not been properly reflected upon by journalists and
political commentators. One of his earliest comments on the conflict in Indochina
was a passing remark he made in a 1962 speech to the Royal Society of
International Affairs (London) in which he was critical of the American handling
of the situation in Laos, which at this time, was more important than what was
happening in Vietnam. He expressed the hope that “what has happened and what
is happening in Laos may never find repetition nearer home”.118 His first direct
comment on Vietnam was in a speech at Canterbury University (Christchurch,
New Zealand) in which he said that South Vietnam was part of the region and if
what happened there could be repeated in all the neighbouring countries,
then in a matter of a decade or even less if some of the intervening states

between Malaysia and South Vietnam decide to anticipate history and be
sure that they are on the side that appears like winning, then the whole region
will be unscrambled and it would not be long before the Australians find
themselves in difficulties.119
He was worried that the West was not “sufficiently alive to the acuteness of the
conflicts which have now shifted to Southeast Asia”. He found the West “in disar-
ray”. He saw the Americans as committed to containment with their military
bases in Formosa, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines but “to contain what
we sometimes fear is the uncontainable”. He saw the British, as playing “a
secondary role, partly committed to contain, and partly hoping to strike out in
some new more positive direction”. He lauded Whitehall for its “intelligent move
when they exchanged diplomatic representation with China …” and posed the
question that had the Americans adopted the same policy, “there might be very
little to choose between President Ho Chi Minh and President Tito of Yugoslavia”.
He found the French solution of neutralism as the panacea for all the ills of
Southeast Asia dubious. As for the Dutch and Germans who were helping
Indonesia recover their economy, he wondered if they could be “so completely
and blissfully unaware” that both Beijing and Moscow were agreed that the
Indonesians should be helped “to put Malaysia into a situation like Vietnam and
Laos”.120
While Lee was sympathetic towards the South Vietnamese cause, he was
equally critical of the regime there. In his speech during the debate on the provi-
sion for the External Affairs Ministry in the Dewan Ra’ayat in 1964, he supported
the Malaysian government in establishing an embassy in South Vietnam (and also
in South Korea) as telling the world that “we believe that if your neighbor is a
Communist, he has no right either by subversion or by military might to over-
come you”. But he also made the point that, “we should also let it be known that
we would prefer to have forms of government far more liberal, far more demo-
cratic, far more tolerant than the regimes in Korea and or South Vietnam, but
such a tolerant democratic regime is only possible when your neighbor leaves you
in peace”.121 While he was careful not to pass judgement on the efforts of the
South Vietnamese in public, he did make the point that it would be more effective
if either the President or Vice-President of South Vietnam or the Prime Minister
come forward to explain to the world their situation and not leave it all to the
Americans to do it for them. At the same time, he also found the Americans
having “a friendly habit of trying to help a person think for himself”, a trait which
he did not particularly like.122 He would prefer more selective use of America’s
enormous range of weapons, more brains and feet, preferably Vietnamese brains
and feet, rather than more power and gadgetry”.123
He believed that Beijing was trying to spread communism in Southeast Asia
“by proxy” and in his assessment, was doing so effectively through the
Vietnamese communists. “It’s not Chinese fighting the South Vietnamese; South
Vietnamese who believe in Communism are fighting on behalf of world
Communism against the South Vietnam Army … ”. In one interview, he said he
did not believe in the simple theory that the Chinese would “send their armies
across and eat up Southeast Asia”. That would be “naked aggression” and the
“whole of Southeast Asia would jell together and meet an incoming invader”.
“But you have got this ‘Make it yourself kind of revolution’ … Wars of national
liberation … Here is the text: ‘We have an instructor. He will teach you how to
organize and will slip you a few guns and more if necessary and, if it gets diffi-
cult, well, surface-to air missiles and so on’”.124
As for the effectiveness of the air strikes by the US in North Vietnam following
the Tonkin Gulf incident in August 1964, Lee thought that it was too difficult to
assess at this point. “Everybody keeps their fingers crossed, and say well, just
how the next piece of retaliation go”.125 Asked whether he had any solution to the
Vietnam problem, he replied that there was “a general lack of optimism about a
peaceful and a happy solution. So I think you’ve just got to try and find some
solution, peaceful or otherwise, which will at least prevent the patterns from
being repeated one after the other in Southeast Asia”.126 Although Lee did not use
the term “Domino Theory” – in fact he once told a journalist when asked for his
opinion of the validity of the theory, “first, I don’t play dominoes. So don’t know
what happens with dominoes”127 – the scenario he painted essentially refers to it:
If the Americans decide to pack it up because the position is untenable in

South Vietnam and the arena of conflict moves from South Vietnam across
to Cambodia into Thailand; and if the Thais with their very keen sense of
anticipation of history, decide not to resist the irresistible – or what they
deem to be irresistible – then, it is very pertinent what happens to the 500
armed Communists wandering around the borders of Thailand and Malaysia.
And, if Malaysia cannot be held, then Singapore must make adjustments
accordingly. These then, are the major imponderables.128
He subsequently elaborated on this conundrum in a May 1965 speech which is

his most detailed comment on the Vietnam problem to date:
We know that if the Communists are able to advance their frontiers to

envelop South Vietnam it will be only a matter of time before the same
process of emasculation by military and political techniques will overtake
the neighbouring countries. On the other hand, we know that any extension
or escalation of the war is dangerous and contrary to the ideals we claim to
espouse. We have been unable to advance a more constructive alternative
than to talk of unconditional negotiations hoping that negotiations may lead
to a neutral South Vietnam. However, we know that this is hardly likely to
be the end-result of negotiations. For what is required to keep the rest of
Southeast Asia free from going through similar tribulations is not just a
neutral South Vietnam. As Asians we must uphold the right of the
Vietnamese people to self-determination. As democratic socialists we must
insist that South Vietnamese have the right not to be pressured through
armed might and organized terror and finally overwhelmed by Communism.
So we must seek a formula that will first make it possible for South Vietnam
to recover their freedom of choice which at the moment is limited to either
Communist capture or perpetual American military operations. Then after
the South Vietnamese are able to exercise their collective will without duress
from either side, ultimately, be it after five, ten or twenty years, they must
have to right to decide their final destiny, whether or not they choose to be
reunited with North Vietnam and on what terms.129
From August to December 1965, the situation in Vietnam changed considera-

bly as the American commitment increased. Lee’s views on the situation,
however, remained the same. Lee felt that the situation was “very grim” because
both the will and the capacity to resist were largely imported. He hoped that the
Americans were not just buying time but would be able to “do something besides
just shooting everybody up”. He hoped that “a coherent self will emerge consist-
ing of Vietnamese” and that the South Vietnamese could determine whether to
merge with the North or stay distinct and separate. “The first prerequisite is that
nobody should impose a solution on South Vietnam as to what South Vietnam
should do”.130
It is worth comparing Lee’s May 1965 speech on Vietnam with another long
response he gave about six years later in 1971 (which was almost a year after the
war expanded into Cambodia) quoted in full here: “… now if South Vietnam is
gone, so too goes Cambodia and Laos. Then the heat is immediately on the Thais,
much faster than if only South Vietnam had gone with Cambodia and Laos as
buffers for some time still to come”. Asked whether that would mean a Chinese
communist takeover of Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, Lee replied,
I do not think things happen in that way. This is not a war that is lost or won
decisively in pitched battles. It is relentless process of attrition. Which side
has got the greater stamina? Who has the most patience? Whose weight is
going to bear in the long run? I don’t see Russia or China reaching the tech-
nological levels and wealth of the Americans. But it does not mean that
because you have the wealth and technology, your power is therefore felt all
around the world … if China decides that they should concentrate their
power and influence on the littoral states of Asia, they can bring considerable
bear in these areas. It is a gradual and relentless process. It is not going to
happen overnight. There are many ponderables….131
In almost every interview, Lee had had to respond to the, by now de rigueur,
questions on the Vietnam War. During the dialogue session of his major speech
on international relations, “Big and Small Fishes in Asian Waters”132, he said that
big and small nations would want to work towards a “new power structure in
which the legitimate interests of the big powers are conceded, and the legitimate
interests of the middle and small powers are respected” because this arrangement
would be “in the interests of the big powers in Asia” and even more so “in the
interests of the bigger powers in the world”. Based on this reasoning, he did not
think there would be a premature or precipitate American withdrawal from
Vietnam. But at the same time, one could not assume that the United States would
always consider South Vietnam fundamental to their prestige and to the security
of Southeast Asia. It was therefore unrealistic to believe that the Americans
would keep pouring in troops and resources indefinitely because of American
domestic opposition or pressure. He reckoned that if the Americans were not
pressured to pull out before 1968, there would be another election in 1972. “Even
if it didn’t happen in 1972, it would come in 1976, which is only 10 years away”.
Thus, it was necessary to be realistic and think beyond that. “But whilst we buy
time, if we just sit down and believe people are going to buy time for ever after
for us, then we deserve to perish”, he concluded.133
Lee also noted the significance of the “China factor” in the Vietnam War and
in American consideration. Another reason why he thought the present US
administration would not and could not withdraw yet was because they were
watching the developments in China which might have “immense repercussions
in the next few years on the shape of things to come, not just in Asia, but through-
out the world”. In his analysis, if there was a major shift of policy after the current
struggles (the Cultural Revolution) in China, South Vietnam might no longer be
important. “New forms to secure big-power interests can be arrived at, and big-
power interests do not necessarily coincide with your and my interests”. At
present, there happened to be a coincidence of interests, but one must not assume
that things would not change.134
Meanwhile, the present Chinese threat could be contained if the Americans
could “stick it out until Hanoi can be persuaded to negotiate a settlement of
the war”. That said, Lee also “profoundly” disagreed with the hawkish view that
the US should escalate the conflict even if it meant drawing China directly into
the war.135 He feared the widening of the ground war because it could engulf the
whole region.136 In his assessment, neither Beijing nor Moscow could coerce
the North Vietnamese communists to do anything against their national aspira-
tions. But if China and the Soviet Union were to stop supplying North Vietnam
with the means to carry on the war, “then they will have to re-assess what they
can do on only their own strength”.137
Lee was rather disparaging about the various attempts to broker a peaceful end
to the Vietnam War – “no amount of peace missions as of now (1966) is going to
produce even a sausage” because the war was “a contest of wills”. He expected
the “process of attrition” to continue138 until such time when both sides were
convinced that they were “just bleeding to death on a stalemate”. Hanoi’s non-
negotiable pre-condition for talks was that the Americans must first stop bombing
the North. Should the United States cease the bombing of the North? Lee’s
answer was that: “All moral, right-thinking human beings would want all bomb-
ing to stop. And, it will be inhuman of me to say I want the bombing to go on – it
is just utter madness. But, I think a lot of people must ask themselves “what is the
end of this road? Is the bombing the end of the road?” The bombing cannot
be the end of the road. Therefore, we must know whether the cessation of bomb-
ing – the beginning of the stalemate had been reached – recognition by both
sides …”.139 In Lee’s assessment, bombing North Vietnam would not end the war
as the Vietnamese communists would run to the mountains. The bombing could
be reduced or stopped without any decisive change in the course of the war and
it is not a given that the North Vietnamese would go to the conference table once
the bombing stopped. 140
While Lee remained consistently critical of American management of the
Vietnam War and opposed the idea of a permanent US base in Singapore to
replace the British, he also realized the need for an American presence in
Vietnam and Southeast Asia because of the British pull-out from the region. As
he put it, while “the smaller countries in Southeast Asia would prefer the comfort
of their own separate selves”, that would only be possible “if there are counter-
vailing forces to enable them not to fall into the orbit of the larger powers in the
continent”.141 He did not think that Vietnam was “the best place in Asia or
Southeast Asia to have taken a stand”. The Americans drew the line in South
Vietnam because, as he noted in 1965, they were ignorant of Vietnam and the
region. Furthermore, an open society like the United States was not suited to fight
a protracted war. As he told the journalists Peter Simms and Louis Kraal,
you’ve gone in and raised the stakes with every commitment, increasing the
price that you will have to pay for failure to live up to your declared objec-
tives. The worry is whether your open society will allow you to conduct the
kind of battle the South Vietnamese war is going to become – a protracted,
bitter battle with no prospects of spectacular or decisive victory. The danger
of popular pressures growing up around your institutions of power, your
Presidency and your Congress for swift and decisive victory, is the greatest
danger in your Vietnamese situation. If you can just hold the situation and
prevent the other side from winning, you would have made a valuable contri-
bution to the long-term stability of the region. If you cannot resist pressures
for more intense effort and quicker results, then I see grave trouble for the
whole of Asia, for the whole world.142
Citing what happened in Aden as an example, Lee was of the view that it was not
wise to have a timetable for American withdrawal as “it is better to have these
things assessed quietly in qualitative terms and not in quantitative time-tables”.143
In 1968, Lee already anticipated that “long before 1975, there would be a
decisive change in the situation in South Vietnam, and depending on how
the Vietnam War was resolved, the rest of Southeast Asia would “fall into
place…”.144 Indeed, the decisive change came in less than a year after Lee made
his forecast. The Tet Offensive which began on 30 January 1968 is one of the
turning points of the Vietnam War. On 13 May 1968, the opening session of
the peace talks was convened in Paris. Lee was of the view that the best one can
hope for was a solution which would enable the South Vietnamese – communist
and non-communists – to express their will freely in choosing their government.
This could only be achieved after a stage-by-stage withdrawal of both North
Vietnamese and American troops and “perhaps with the help of some interna-
tional peace-keeping force”.145 When President Nixon said that he would make
peace in Vietnam with honour, Lee said in an interview, “How can you have
honour unless you do not abandon those whom you have persuaded to go into
battle with you?” In another interview on this topic of peace with honour, Lee
said that while the US might have disengaged from Vietnam in an honourable
way, “whether there is peace in Vietnam is another matter”.146 But Lee never
expected the Vietnam War to end the way it did in April 1975 – “But I would like
frankly to say that perhaps never in all our scenarios that we envisaged such a
catastrophic collapse of will and morale which led to this terrible disaster”.147
Lee saw Thailand as the critical buffer which the US could not abandon because
“between communists and non-communist countries in Southeast Asia are the
uncertainties of a non-communist government’s ability to survive in South
Vietnam, and the doubtfulness of Cambodia and Laos assuming a buffer role”.
Without Thailand as a buffer region, he saw “the spread of indigenous commu-
nism supported by fraternal parties” in neighbouring countries as “almost a fore-
gone conclusion”. Communism, he explained, had always expanded through
“accretion from contiguous areas…” Beijing would at least provide moral support,
and so would Hanoi. The Vietnam War showed how far China was prepared to
go in support of her contiguous neighbor. Bangkok thus needed to be “psycho-
logically reassured” that Thailand would not be abandoned.148 That said, Lee also
did not think that Thailand or the other Southeast Asian countries would go
communist because “the mood today is very different from the mood in 1954 after
Dien Bien Phu when everybody believed that it was invincible, the communist
movement, the wave of the future”.149 “On the whole”, Lee said, “it is unlikely that
the communist insurgent movement or liberation-type movement could find suffi-
cient followers to overthrow established governments in Southeast Asia”.150
In a 4 April 1975 speech, Lee said that there was little anyone could do except
to “watch the tragedy in Indochina work itself to its bitter end”. He hoped
Thailand (now under a popularly-elected civilian administration) might resolve
its economic and social problems faster than communist subversion could be
fomented. The rest of Southeast Asia would have to live with whatever political
accommodation Bangkok made. He believed that Malaysia, Singapore and
Indonesia (“the secondary areas to the conflict in Indochina”) had become more
stable and viable in the last decade. The Philippines was still beset by insurgency
problems but he hoped that that could be resolved in time. Also, the five countries
were now linked into “a cooperative framework” which was ASEAN.151 Lee’s
views above may appear contradictory. So would there be or would there not be
a communist threat to the non-communist Southeast Asia countries post-US with-
drawal from Vietnam? If one reads Lee’s speeches carefully, the answer could
not be a simple yes or no but would have to depend on whether both North and
South Vietnam observed the terms of the Paris Peace Agreements, and to what
extent. The course of events and scenarios could not be easily predictable but the
bottom line was that the continued American presence in the region post-with-
drawal from Vietnam was absolutely essential. “The countries in Southeast Asia
watching the mood in America and reading Senator McGovern’s policy to quit
Southeast Asia immediately, started reexamining their security positions”, Lee
revealed.152
If the Vietnam War was so important to the security of Southeast Asia, why
did Lee not send troops to Vietnam? This was Lee’s reply: “… Because I thought
the intervention in Vietnam by Foster Dulles was a mistake. But the mistake
having been committed, it affected the whole of Southeast Asia … Having made
a start, having dug their toes in Vietnam, to scuttle out means to jeopardize the
rest of us in Southeast Asia”.153
On the nature of international politics (1971–1975)

There were signs that the international architecture of Southeast Asia was at the
cusp of change beginning with the July 1971 announcement of Henry Kissinger’s
(until then) secret visits to Beijing and Nixon’s impending trip to China; China’s
admission to the UN in October 1971; Nixon announcement in January 1972 of
the withdrawal of another 70,000 troops from South Vietnam by 1 July 1972,
thereby bringing down the number of US troops there to 69,000 and his revelation
of the on-going secret meetings between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho; Nixon’s visit
to Beijing and Moscow in February and May 1972 respectively; and the signing
of the Paris Peace Agreement in January 1973 which all combined to make it
possible for the US to disengage from Vietnam. By the 1970s, the region had also
become more integrated and “the survival and political integrity of each country
will affect the security and perhaps even the survival of the others”.154 “The
world”, Lee said, “is too inter-dependent for any country to insulate itself from
the rest of the world …”.155
Lee expected that for “the next few years, survival under ever changing
economic, political and security conditions” would be one of the major concerns
for the region. “The disengagement of American forces from Indochina ends one
phase in the history of the region ... For all of us in ASEAN, this is a period of
intermission, waiting for the end of one phase of history, and the start of another,
we hope, more promising era”, he said.156 He saw the end of the Vietnam War
marking a new phase in the politics of Southeast Asia and indeed of the world. In
his analysis, the Paris Peace Agreement was a consequence of “the new direct rela-
tions the great powers are establishing between themselves, over the heads of small
nations”.157 Lee also drew attention to Moscow giving Nixon a red carpet welcome
despite American bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in spring 1972.158 For small
nations, the great powers were no longer “moved by ideological considerations”.
Their main concern was “the safeguarding and maximising of their national inter-
ests”. This fundamental change therefore required a “rethinking and reformulation
of the content of the concepts of non-alignment”, and for small countries, such as
Singapore, “the question now is not how to avoid being sucked into the warring
camps of the two great powers, but how to have their interests taken into consid-
eration when the great powers reach their compromises”.159 All the above ideas
were expanded and fleshed out in a series of three Jacob Blaustein lectures on
international relations which Lee delivered in March-April 1973 at Leigh University
(Bethlehem, Pennsylvania).160 Most memorably, Lee recalled the African proverb:
when elephants fight, the grass suffers, and added that when elephants flirt, the
grass also suffers. “And, when they make love, it is disastrous”.161
The central question was thus how the Southeast Asian countries should act to
secure their interests in a multi-polar world. Much would depend on Washington’s
“political nerve and diplomatic skill” in not reducing her influence in the region
faster than necessary. Equally important, the ASEAN countries must recognise
that they have common interests and not do anything that could harm these
common interests and allow the great powers to exploit. “If the countries of
Southeast Asia, whatever the differences and conflicts between themselves, can
place their group interest beyond such interventions”, then non-communist
Southeast Asia would have “a fair chance of preserving the maximum of freedom
of choice provided by a balance between the great powers”, Lee concluded.162
In a speech he delivered about a fortnight before the fall of Saigon, Lee noted
that an era had come to an end. The United States which had been the dominant
power in Southeast Asia for thirty years since the end of the Second World War
had now acknowledged that she could no longer intervene in Southeast Asia, thus
leaving the “contest for influence over the peoples in the region” to China and
the Soviet Union, “both of whom openly avow their duty to help communists
everywhere and to promote revolution”. The fear of Southeast Asian countries
was to be caught in the competitive clash between the two. Because of historical
memories and geographical proximity, none of the Southeast Asian countries
wanted to take sides with the Soviet Union against China, even though the Soviet
Union is militarily ahead of China. Most hope to maintain “equable relations”
with both but Lee thought this might not be possible unless both Moscow and
Beijing ceased to compete with each other for ideological and nationalist suprem-
acy, “a prospect which appears remote”. He hoped (and he would reiterate this
point on a number of other occasions) that a continued American naval presence
and increased economic relations “will help the rest of Southeast Asia to adjust
less abruptly and to make the task of learning with a communist Indochina less
painful”.163
On the same day that Saigon fell (on 30 April 1975), bringing the Vietnam War
finally to an end, Lee in his speech at the Commonwealth Heads of Government
meeting (Kingston, Jamaica) described 1973–1974 as “two of the most momen-
tous years of the history of the world since World War II” and “a turning point in
history”. He declared that “it is power, and the use or non-use of power” that
would decide the destiny of the world. It is the power of the Americans and the
Russians, and later of the Chinese, and “how they restrain themselves and their
allies, that will decide the framework of peace plus competition for influence”.
And within this context, Southeast Asia would have to chart its future post-
Vietnam.164
2 1975–1979
“But I would like frankly to say that perhaps never in all our scenarios that we
envisaged such a catastrophic collapse of will and morale which led to this terrible
disaster”1
“I think it would be dishonest to say that we or I feel elated. Nor would I say that
I am in the depths of depression because as I said this became a distinct probabil-
ity, it has happened, we have got to live with it …”2
“We are witnessing the start of a new era. Political posture will change. Policies
will be adjusted”3
“Regional stability post-Vietnam is one of the most important subjects in the minds
of all the governments in the area and, indeed, in the minds of the great powers”4
The fall of Saigon was a watershed in the international politics of Southeast Asia.
It marked the beginning of a prolonged period of waning American interest in
the region and the emergence of China into the global community. It also jolted
ASEAN to get its act together – the first ASEAN summit of heads of state met in
Bali in February 1976, almost a decade after the sub-regional organization was
formed in August 1967. Even before the region could come to terms with the
communist victory in Vietnam, the open conflict within the communist camp culmi-
nating in the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 followed by the
Sino–Vietnamese war in February 1979 tested the new-found cohesion of ASEAN.
On the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saigon

On the same day that Saigon fell (on 30 April 1975) bringing the Vietnam War
finally to an end, Lee in his speech at the Commonwealth Heads of Government
meeting (Kingston, Jamaica), described 1973–1974 as “two of the most momen-
tous years of the history of the world since World War II” and “a turning point in
history”. In Lee’s analysis, the old “Cold War” was over and was replaced by
“detente” or more precisely “Detente Minus” – minus real peace and cooperation
in the Third World. During the Cold War period, developing countries could
“plead misery and the danger of going communist, and aid will come”. He
anticipated that inequalities within nation states, particularly poor and developing
1975–1979 39
ones, would be the “greatest spur to revolution, with more and more of the third
world going communist”. In another interview, he said that “what happened in
Vietnam is a precursor of what will happen in other parts of the world unless
countries within themselves can eradicate or lessen tensions which internal
inequalities, gross odious inequalities of wealth and opportunity generates into
hatred and bitterness and finally insurgency and revolution”.5 Indeed, he was of
the view that the failure in Indochina must rest squarely on “the lack of leadership
of sufficient integrity and competence in the states of Indochina” and “if there is
one lesson we have learned out of Vietnam, it is that internally-stimulated insur-
rections, externally-aided, can only be fought, beaten and won by the peoples in
these countries”.6
Of more immediate concern was the fact that with the fall of Indochina, some
US$2–3 billion worth of American weaponry might become “a source of incal-
culable mischief, not just for the rest of Southeast Asia but for the rest of the
world”. The Americans and Russians did not want to fight each other. The
Russians also did not want to fight the Chinese who now possessed sufficient
nuclear capacity to protect themselves. So, “collision will be through third parties,
their proxies”. Lee hoped that Third World countries would not be “foolish prox-
ies”. Lee concluded that “it is power, and the use or non-use of power” that would
decide the destiny of the world. It is the power of the Americans and the Russians,
and later of the Chinese, and “how they restrain themselves and their allies, that
will decide the framework of peace plus competition for influence”. And within
this context, Southeast Asia would have to chart its future post-Vietnam.7
Although not one to wallow in the past, Lee has always believed in learning
from history – “What has happened is part of history. It should teach us, if we can
learn from experience at all…”8. He said in an interview early May 1975,
We got to live with it (fall of Saigon). Yesterday is over and is important

only now in so far as it can teach us what to do today so that it is a better
tomorrow, and that we do not go through this mincing machine … It should
not be allowed to happen in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia
and the Philippines.
Lee believed that the changed circumstances in Indochina would bound to bring
the ASEAN countries closer
if nothing else because the countries are confronted with what everybody
knew at the back of his mind was a distinct possibility, but which has become
a distinct probability now … They are communists and we are not. We
(ASEAN) have a problem of establishing a correct if possibly a cordial rela-
tionship because we got to live with each other.
He hoped that the ASEAN countries could coordinate their relationship with the
Indochina countries (including Laos which he expected the coalition government
to fall to the Pathet Lao anytime):9
a little bit of time must pass for them to perceive us as accurately as we need
to perceive them. Then they will understand just how useful to their reha-
bilitation we can be and how peaceful and secure and prosperous Southeast
Asia can become if insurgency is not exported or at least arms are not
exported, at least to Southeast Asia.10
Lee emphasized the fact that there was “no desire on the part of any of the
ASEAN countries to have an antagonistic relationship” with any of the
Indochinese states. All the ASEAN countries “with varying degrees of speed,
warmth or intensity of expression, have made it clear that they want constructive
economic and other relations with the countries of Indochina”.11 In late-1975, Lee
did not see the Indochinese states as a “confederation or a federation”.12 Asked
whether Singapore would support Vietnam’s application to join the UN, Lee said
that on principle yes because Singapore wanted “everybody to be members of the
United Nations to abide by the Charter of the United Nations to maintain peace
and orderly relations with all nations in the world especially those who happen to
live near them”.13
The Vietnamese had made it clear in their broadcast that they fully supported
the communist struggles in Southeast Asia as a top priority over government-to-
government relations. As Lee put it, Vietnam intended “as the last torch bearer of
revolution, successful revolution, to pass the flame on”.14 As to whether the
success of the communists in Indochina would have influence on the communist
insurgents in Southeast Asia, Lee was of the view that the actual extent and the
manner of the influence would depend on: Firstly, the kind of relationships those
communist groups have with Indochina, but the most important factor and rela-
tionship was China. It would be a slow process and would take several years to
see how it actually begins to affect the other countries – “the technique is never
for armies to invade, to cross national territories and take over a country, but to
pass over arms and instruction manuals, and if that’s not understood, then perhaps
a few instructors to help”.15 Lee estimated that it would take some six to twelve
or perhaps even as long as eighteen months “when the flush of victory has
subsided” in Indochina to be able to know how “swiftly China, Vietnam and the
Soviet Union have moved to consolidate their respective positions to increase
their influence, and diminish that of the other”.16 But ever so prescient, Lee noted
that (a) Vietnam with a thousand years of resistance against Chinese domination
and in spite of absorbing Sinic culture was “really a bigger Yugoslavia …” and
that Vietnam–Soviet Union relationship was comparable to Albania–China rela-
tions17; and (b) there was a very strong Chinese influence in Cambodia that might
not see eye-to-eye with the North Vietnamese. This would not only buy the
ASEAN countries considerable time but also give an indication of the shape of
the interaction between Hanoi and Beijing.
He elaborated on the dynamics of Hanoi–Beijing–Moscow relations in a later
interview. He said he was “a bit hopeful” for Southeast Asia in that there was not
one communist power interested in the region but possibly three and their interests
did not necessarily coincide, each having its own long-term interests to protect.
1975–1979 41
Thus, he did not think the Southeast Asian situation was like Angola and Vietnam
similar to “a Cuba”. Lee did not think the Russians believed that their relationship
with Vietnam was like that of Moscow–Havana. Beijing–Havana relations were
also different from Beijing–Hanoi. Of course, both Moscow and Beijing would
try to influence Hanoi but citing the Vietnam War experience, Hanoi got help
from both sides in order to achieve its own goals and not those of Beijing or
Moscow.18 In his analysis, he also believed that “for historic reasons, of old
memories of tribute from Southeast Asia to Beijing that Thailand would find it in
the end useful to have Beijing’s presence, the PRC presence in Thailand and
thereby diminish the influence of the Vietnamese communists”, precisely what
happened in the not too distant future19.
Second, the extent and manner of influence that the Vietnamese communists
would have on communist insurgents in the region would also depend on whether
the Vietnamese revolutionary zeal could be tempered by their desire to develop
good state-to-state relations with the non-communist Southeast Asian countries,
which would depend on “how the various countries in Southeast Asia react at this
dual or twin approach, and whether we can collectively and individually make it
more profitable for the Vietnamese to have good state-to-state relations in return
for less people-to-people interference”.20
Looking ahead 20–30 years, Lee was of the view that if things go on as they
are and there is no war between the Soviet Union and China and/or China and the
United States, then China would be the most dominant force in Asia “and
Southeast Asia is to her what the Caribbean is to America or Eastern Europe is to
the USSR”. Lee‘s preference was to have the kind of relationship with China
“more like the Caribbean and Mexico and Venezuela … have with America then
the Eastern European states have with COMECON and the Warsaw Pact”.
Meanwhile, while no one expect that the United States would fight another
Vietnam War in an Asian country, “an American naval presence to balance a
Russian presence will help to act as counter-weight the PRC’s weight on the rest
of Southeast Asia ...”.21
Two speeches Lee delivered on 5 and 12 May 1975 respectively, provides his
perspective of the broad security situation in Southeast Asia, particularly
Thailand and Malaysia. He noted that before the fall of Phnom Penh, Sihanouk
had said that China would be “Cambodia’s No. 1 friend”. Lee believed that
Cambodia would choose China ahead of Vietnam, and Vietnam ahead of the
Soviet Union. As for Thailand, Bangkok’s one worry was her border with Laos
in the northeast where some 4000–5000 Lao insurgents, trained and backed by
Hanoi, were active. As Thailand now controlled part of the Mekong in the north-
east, which was once Laotian territory, she now had some four million Laotians
in Thailand, twice as many as in Laos itself – “a classic situation for concealing
externally aided insurgency”. In Lee’s assessment, insurgency would not succeed
in Thailand except perhaps in northeast Thailand. Thailand, in his words, was “in
no danger of becoming either a Vietnam or a Cambodia” as long as the insur-
gency was not supplemented by the infiltration of foreign troops.22 Hanoi had also
notified Bangkok that they had to pay compensation for the damage of large parts
of Vietnam caused by American bombers (that had been using bases in Thailand).
So, “it is understandable were the Thais to seek the friendship, later, the support,
and eventual protective shield of China” as the Americans had given notice that
they would be cutting their aid to Thailand. Lee believed the Thais could manage
the situation “provided there are no dramatic statements from the American
Congress or Administration that will intensify anxiety or increase alarm”. In
Malaysia, there were about 1500–2000 remnants of the Malayan Communist
Party (MCP), mostly ethnic Chinese who knew that they could not win the revo-
lution without sufficient Malay support, who flit in and out of the borders between
the Thai–Malaysian border. They had found secure supply lines extremely diffi-
cult to establish and in Lee’s analysis, “provided Malaysian politics do not
increase Soviet influence, especially when China’s interests are at stake, China
may be content to leave things as they are for a long time”. Insurgency or terror-
ism, according to Lee, was “improbable in Singapore”, “not likely in the foresee-
able future” in Indonesia and manageable in the Philippines. According to Lee, it
was generally believed that it was in everyone’s interests, including China’s, to
have the Americans withdraw more gradually from their military bases on the
Asian mainland. If the withdrawal was too quick, it could give Moscow the
chance to move into areas Beijing considered vital to her and “force China’s
hands”.
Lee hoped that whoever won the next US Presidential elections, the Presidency
and Congress would reach a modus vivendi and recognize that for the security and
stability of America and the world, “the isosceles triangular balance of power in
the Western Pacific must be kept”. If America’s naval presence and economic
contributions were to be trimmed, he expected more conflicts would take place
because China’s answer to Soviet naval and economic power would be to inten-
sify local insurgency which would in turn “imperil the stability of America’s
allies in the western Pacific, affecting the balance between the great powers, and
affecting peace and stability in the rest of the Pacific Basin”.23 As Lee put it,
Southeast Asian countries wanted to avoid being caught “in any competitive
clash of interests” between the two communist powers and “any country that
wishes to avoid intensified insurgency may well be advised not to give the
balance of advantage to the Soviet Union as against the People’s Republic of
China”.24
Meanwhile, the most important thing, Lee pointed out, was for “everyone to
keep their cool and let the dust of battle settle”.25 He added that readers should
“discount 60 percent of what is being said in press reports” as statements were
being made, partly for internal consumption and partly for international pride.
The best service the Western press could render, Lee felt, was “to report events
calmly and objectively, and to help keep tempers cool”.26
While the Vietnam experience, to paraphrase Lee, made friends dismayed and
enemies jubilant, he was optimistic that “nothing continues in a straight curve
either upwards and downwards. There must be a reversal of the mood. You can’t
just give ground more and more all over the world …”.27 1976 was however very
much a year of flux. There was uncertainty in China with the passing of
1975–1979 43
Mao Zedong in September 1976. Asked for his view of China post-Mao, Lee’s
reply was that he did not think anybody really knew but he expected Beijing to
continue to give moral support to the Maoist parties in the region. He observed
that tensions between Moscow and Beijing had not lessened (and he did not
expect the relationship to improve in the short or medium term as nobody could
imagine any leader or group of leaders being able to swing policies around
quickly from “anti-hegemonism to camaraderie and solidarity”),28 relations
between Moscow and Washington were “muted” but not “relaxed” and Beijing
and Washington also did not have a “happy relationship” (although he did think
the relationship could remain “static” indefinitely).29 Lee believed that the picture
would be clearer after the American Presidential elections in November 1976 as
Washington was one of the important components in the triangular balance of
forces. In his view, even if there were no basic differences between the presiden-
tial contenders as some believed, there were fundamental differences of character
and approach – “How a President reacts to a situation, reacts to a crisis or a chal-
lenge, depends as much upon his character as upon the hard-headed calculation
of national self-interest in an inter-dependent world”.30
On ASEAN
Although formed in 1967, it took 10 years before the association developed a
sense of cohesion and direction.31 The fall of Saigon gave ASEAN a jolt – “we
have never been at a more important moment than now to summon that political
will”.32 In a 1977 speech, Lee recalled that the fall of Saigon had made the
ASEAN countries determined to preserve themselves from a similar catastrophe.
Without this shock, Lee doubted that ASEAN “could have been more than just
another organization for Ministers and other officials to go conferencing” and the
member countries would have continued with their territorial claims and prob-
lems with minorities. The seriousness of purpose came only with “the shock of
the terrible alternatives”. There was “a sense of urgency for greater economic
cooperation, to accelerate growth, to reduce poverty and lessen recruits for
communist guerillas band”.33
The economy was the most critical factor and this would remain a constant
theme of Lee in his speeches and interviews in the post-Vietnam war period. Lee
had been reminding his audience on a number of occasions that the world had
become too inter-dependent and inter-related for any country to insulate itself
from the rest of the world and that “we are interlocked in our economic well-
being” especially the non-communist bloc.34 In his words,
… the future of all these five (ASEAN) countries will be influenced most of
all by the economic health of the industrial world, by their own capacities to
attract capital and investment, their access to markets for commodities, agri-
cultural and mineral, and their exports of their simpler manufactured goods
to America, Japan and Western Europe. Healthy economies, with decreasing
unemployment, reducing birth-rates, and increasing per capita income, must
be felt by the majority of the people, especially if there is a more equitable
distribution of the GDP. These factors will determine whether insurgencies
can succeed outside Indochina.35 (emphasis added)
When Lee was in Tokyo in May 1975, he explained that the greater the economic
activity between Japan and Southeast Asia, the more employment and wealth it
would generate and the less the unemployed and disaffected who were likely to
want to take up arms and upset the stability and progress. It was in this context
that the Japanese government and people had an interest in the continuing
economic progress in the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia.36
Asked for his comment on the development of ASEAN in an October 1975
interview, Lee said that there had been
a more cohesive view between the five governments of the position of the
great powers in this region and of the possible developments that will follow
as a result of the diminution of the American military presence in Southeast
Asia … And this cohesiveness may extend towards closer economic coordi-
nation … in trade policies and our desire to foster more rapid economic
growth attracting investments from America, Japan and Western Europe and
to increase trade with these Western countries and Japan.37
He believed that the will existed in most of the ASEAN countries although he
expected a great deal of arguments between economic planners and officials in
charge of working out the details.38 He also did not think there would be a
defence pact amongst the ASEAN members in the near term – “I don’t think there
is any need to, and further, how does that help(?)”. What was important was
“quiet understanding of each other’s difficulties and how we can re-establish
under new circumstances a climate of stability and confidence” which would
promote economic development.39 In Lee’s assessment, first there would be
cooperation in the economic field, then foreign policy fields, “then it will natu-
rally develop into other areas … To put security and self-defence before you’ve
got common economic interests to defend doesn’t make sense” citing as an exam-
ple the countries of the European Economic Community (EEC) which could not
adopt a common security position (despite being members of NATO) because
they still lacked united and common economic interests.40 In one interview, Lee
described ASEAN using the analogy of a coin – ASEAN is important both
politically and economically, as politics and economics are two sides of the same
coin. Defence is the rim of the coin. “When we get the two sides of the coin
minted, we can then mill the coin”, he said.41
The first highpoint of ASEAN since its inception in August 1967 was its inau-
gural summit in Bali (23–24 February 1976), one year shy of its tenth anniversary.
ASEAN meetings so far had been attended by foreign ministers and officials. This
was the first ASEAN meeting which brought together the Heads of State, an indi-
cation that the Association had been raised to the highest level. Lee noted that the
summit had been hyped up by both the regional and international media and
1975–1979 45
cautioned that “it was important that we should not have a Summit seen as an
exercise in the forms of international cooperation without the substance of it”.
Whether the summit would deliver anything concrete boiled down to “the will of
the political leadership”.42 To Lee, the first most important objective of ASEAN
was to “find greater strength in preventing a manipulation of one country against
the other within the region by outside powers to the disadvantage of the region”.43
Lee placed a lot of premium on economics. As he said, “with the economic
strength comes all the other things – comes the political clout”.44 In his address
at the opening session of the inaugural summit, Lee recalled that the first objec-
tive of the ASEAN Declaration signed in 1967 was (and is) to accelerate
economic growth which rested on “the promise of regional peace and security”.
The basic question/issue confronting the ASEAN leaders remained the same. It
was “how to ensure continuing stability by stimulating economic growth to
resolve social and political problems” as “increasing disaffection and discontent
will fuel insurgencies into full-scale revolutions”. As never before, the future of
non-communist Southeast Asia was in the hands of the leaders and peoples of the
ASEAN countries. He believed ASEAN was “at a crossroad” and the future
would depend on whether the leaders had “the will and vision” to reconcile short-
term interests with long-term objectives.45 That said, Lee however did not expect
the proposed free trade area to materialize in the next five or six years – “within
20 years, maybe”, he speculated.46
Lee, however, warned against underrating the Marxist socialist governments of
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia which “have proven themselves as tough-minded,
hardly, determined …” and backed by the Soviet Union. He anticipated that
within four to five years when the damage of the war had been repaired, “given
the kind of people that they are and the kind of injections of machinery, know-
how and the export markets which the USSR and the COMECON countries can
provide them, I think they are off the ground”. That, to Lee, was the “most serious
common problem” of the ASEAN countries.47
There were a number of stumbling blocks which ASEAN countries had to
overcome to become more inter-related, such as the diverse backgrounds of the
different countries, the different stages of economic growth, different perceptions
and national aspirations. But the member countries, in Lee’s words, “are often
brought back to earth by the realities of the common dangers we face, the
awesome alternative if we do not work together”.48
Recognizing the constraints, Lee was realistic about ASEAN as can be seen
from his reply to a question about the slow pace of cooperation amongst ASEAN
countries: “For the present, that is what is possible and this we must achieve.
When we have achieved this, then we will have to decide what is the next
step (?)”.49 Referring to the ASEAN Summit, he said that “an important step was
taken forward from land to bridge and the bridge has got to take us to the other
side …”. He believed that on the political side, things would begin to move much
more smoothly but on the economic side, it would be slower “because everybody
wants to get the best possible”. All said, “We can go only as far and as fast as
each of the members can economically and politically afford …”.50
A strong, vigorous and thriving ASEAN would become a desirable economic
and trading partner, Lee told the ASEAN Economic Ministers and officials.51 At
the 2nd ASEAN Summit in August 1977, the Heads of Governments of Australia,
Japan and New Zealand were invited to discuss ways in which ASEAN and the
three countries could intensify economic cooperation.52 Lee believed that it
would take 10–15 years before the economic cooperation could have an impact
on regional development and stability.53 Also, in 1977, the ASEAN–US dialogue
was inaugurated to explore how to promote trade and investment led by the
private sector.54 In sum, ASEAN was moving in the right direction as there is “a
clear correlation between close trade and economic ties, and long-term political
interests”.55 Lee believed that being closely identified with the United States was
now “not embarrassing” unlike in the past as “American influence no longer
compromises the sovereignty of Asian nations”. A more sensitive issue for
ASEAN was how to avoid taking sides between the Soviet Union and China, or
Vietnam and China.56
On Changing power relations and Southeast Asia

The 8 June 1977 speech by Lee Kuan Yew at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting is worth highlighting for what it reveals of his worldview
in 1977.57 According to Lee, the first decade after World War Two (1945–1955)
were “optimistic years” and the second decade (1955–1965) witnessed increasing
prosperity, the beginning of the affluent society and economic growth seemed
unlimited. In both decades, the United States led the way. He described the third
decade (1965–1975) as one of decline marked by political turmoil (particularly in
the United States) and periodic economic crisis. Indeed, an era of optimism about
economic growth and prosperity ended with the October 1973 oil crisis. In the
present/current decade, the economies of the United States, Western Europe and
Japan were in “a state of malaise” and there was uncertainty in both the strategic
and economic fields. In contrast, he noted that the Soviet Union and the commu-
nist bloc were in the ascendant; by 1971, the United States had accepted the
Soviet Union as an equal nuclear power. Based on the theory of socialist sover-
eignty (as manifested in Czechoslovakia in 1968), the Eastern European states
were “inviolate allies” of the Soviet Union. It was also easier for communist
powers to influence the internal affairs of non-communist countries compared to
what the West could do within communist societies – “The rule is, once gone
communist, it stays communist”. Last but not least, “one mistakable trend” was
that the Soviet Union was dedicated to increasing its military strength whereas
the West was unable to spend more than the minimum on defence. Lee was also
sceptical of detente. In Lee’s analysis, Moscow might be sincere in wanting
detente with Washington to avoid any accidental conflict between them. But the
contest between the two systems continues unabated – “Although they intend no
nuclear war between the superpowers, they will contest for the control of hearts,
minds, lives, property and territory of other countries, whenever and wherever the
opportunity presents itself ”, he said. 58
1975–1979 47
It was, however, not all doom and gloom. Lee noted that however strong the
Soviet Union might be militarily, its record in accelerating economic develop-
ment was poor. The Soviet Union was “not a good generator for economic trans-
formation”, and even the Chinese and the Vietnamese communists knew that. Lee
believed that in the long-term, the Chinese in the process of absorbing Western
technology and knowledge would also be exposing themselves to new ideas and
influences, and this might lead them to “change their intellectual habits, and
maybe modify the nature of their system”.59 Meanwhile, the non-communist
Southeast Asian countries were aware that to make economic progress, they had
to work with the United States, Western Europe and Japan. But the difficulty was
how to translate the economic strength and wealth of the United States, Japan and
Western Europe into geopolitical influence. As Lee put it, “economic and indus-
trial sinews require the backing of military power and diplomatic clout before
they exert political influence …”.60
Ever so prescient, Lee noted that the communists
have gone in for military strength. They have mobilized their human and
scientific research for military purposes. This has left their economies
distorted. It is difficult to keep political discontent from surfacing, however
comprehensive their control of men’s minds. Sooner or later their peoples
will realize the awful price they have to pay to achieve military dominance.
In the test of stamina and will between the communist and the competitive non-
communist systems, he urged the latter to get their act together and cooperate
with each other. “The future”, Lee concluded, “is not pre-determined. It is what
we make of it”.
Turning specifically to the situation in Southeast Asia in late-1977, Lee was
of the view that the repercussions of the collapse of South Vietnam in April
1975 on the region were “one or two shades better” than what most people,
including himself, expected for two reasons: (a) the impact of the atrocity reports
transmitted by the Indochinese refugees particularly to Thailand, and (b) the
newly-established communist governments of Indochina had been preoccupied
with the problems of restoring their devastated economies and solving domestic
problems. However, what the situation would be like in five to seven years would
depend on how quickly and effectively they overcome their difficulties and
whether they could tap sources of development capital such as the World Bank
and the Asian Development Bank which required a minimum standard of peace-
ful and cooperative conduct. There was also the factor of Sino–Soviet rivalry
to consider. The Chinese currently could not challenge the Soviet naval pres-
ence in the region so they would want the Japanese, the United States or some
other power to balance the Russians until such time when they have the naval
capacity to do so on their own. Beijing did not want to see American influence
in the countries along its periphery, particularly in South and Southeast Asia,
displaced by Soviet influence. Lee assumed that in the ongoing discussions
with Manila, the Americans would continue to stay at Clark and Subic Bay.
In a later response on whether the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA),
which he described “as the residue of what was a substantial arrangement in the
1950s and 1960s”, had outlived its usefulness, he said that as long as the United
States continued to be seen as a force in the region, “these residual token forces
are not irrelevant as tokens”.61 But a Japanese force playing a wider role outside
their home waters would be contrary to the Japanese Constitution. He was also
uncertain whether the rest of Asia would be reassured by a greater military effort
by Japan to take up some of the slack in Asia. While the Chinese could not chal-
lenge the Russians at sea, if Sino–Soviet rivalry intensified, they could do so on
land through supporting guerilla insurgent movements in the various Southeast
Asian countries which, according to Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng, was
currently confined to moral support. Lee did not think the China was presently
seeking to push out beyond its borders and was not in a position to do so even
if she wanted to.62
Much as Lee recognized the strategic significance and rise of China, he made
clear that Singapore’s future depended on Southeast Asia and “not on China’s
future amongst the front rank of industrial nations”. China’s industrialization
would inevitably affect the future of Southeast Asia, including Singapore but
“Singaporeans have come to recognize that just as they cannot afford to sacrifice
their national interests for China, so they cannot expect China to sacrifice her
national interests for Singapore”.63 On more than one occasion, he explained why
Singapore would not establish diplomatic relations with China before Indonesia
(even though the United States had already done so). “There is an almost innate
belief that since Singapore is 75% ethnic Chinese, therefore she must inevitably
be drawn into support of China. It is worth registering the point with our neigh-
bours, with China, and with our own chauvinists that the government of
Singapore can decide to be the last of the ASEAN states to exchange diplomatic
missions”, Lee said.64
On Vietnam and Kampuchea conflict

Lee’s earliest view of the implication of the conflict between Vietnam and
Kampuchea for non-communist Southeast Asia was that it was “ominous” for the
region – “if two communist states cannot live peacefully and settle their differ-
ences peacefully, what happens when there are border differences between
communist and non-communist countries?”, he asked rhetorically in early 1978.
While he was cognizant of the fact that the Soviet Union was the closest ally and
supporter of Vietnam and China that of Kampuchea, he was not convinced that
the Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict was a proxy war between Moscow and Beijing.
In his analysis, “too much is at stake for the two great powers for them to choose
two such unequal proxies to slog their differences through”.65 He also did not
think that the conflict could be resolved by any disinterested third party.66 By
December 1978, Lee was startled by how the conflict had spiralled. He could not
believe that one communist government had set out deliberately to subvert and
overthrow another communist government.67
1975–1979 49
The Vietnamese invaded and occupied Kampuchea in December 1978/January
1979. In a February interview soon after, Lee described what had happened as
“startling, so unexpected, so bold, so audacious that the significance and implica-
tions of what had has been done is only being gradually grasped”.68 In his analy-
sis, the invasion and occupation was different from that of the Soviet Union in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 which was a case of Moscow forcing its will on a satel-
lite. In the Vietnam-Kampuchea case, it was two contestants both ideologically
Marxist but championing different forms of communism. It was
an instance, for the first time, where one country has set up a front organiza-
tion which everybody else in the region assumed would be played in accord-
ance with precious rules -… – gradual subversion, sanctuaries, probably
even direct help. But it has not turned out to be the case. It’s a new funda-
mental shift in the ground rules with very long-term implications. And we’ve
got to think this problem through.69
While it was common knowledge that there was nothing the Southeast Asian
countries could do to stop the Vietnamese armed forces built up over 30 years of
war, they had assumed that Hanoi would use their military strength/force “as a
psychological factor to back up insurgency” and not directly. “We had never
imagined that they would be used directly”, Lee admitted.
As to whether the Vietnamese having established themselves on the Thai
border would lead to increased communist insurgency within the non-communist
countries in the region, Lee’s reply was that it was “a possibility that will become
a probability” when the mopping up operations in Kampuchea had been
completed. The best-case scenario would be that the Vietnam’s occupation of
Kampuchea was a one-off affair but Lee said it would be most unwise to work on
that assumption.70 After the Sino-Vietnamese War (17 February 1979) and by
March 1979 however he was a little more optimistic that the Vietnamese would
be preoccupied with the pacification of Kampuchea and their problems at the
Sino-Vietnamese border to embark on further expansionist operations in the next
five years. He hoped that the ASEAN countries could make use of the “breathing
space” to modernize their societies and improve their economies.71
In February 1979, ASEAN had yet to agree on how to respond if the war in
Kampuchea spilled over into Thailand. According to Lee, Thailand’s response
would decide the range of options open to ASEAN.72 Lee revealed during a
March 1979 interview, that ASEAN leaders had been rethinking their positions
since December 1978. Until then, the rules of the game were that you do not cross
international boundaries openly but surreptitiously by arms, instructors and
supplies. But as the rules had changed, they were reviewing their options.73 One
point worth considering, Lee thought, was that there might be “a psychological
advantage if Thailand or for any other country that may be openly attacked to
be seen by the rest of the world to have been attacked not only as Thailand per se
but attacked as the member of a group (in this case, ASEAN), provided that
by doing this we are creating an international climate of opinion that makes
sanctions more likely against the aggressor”.74 It was therefore useful for ASEAN
to work closely and take a united approach though not necessarily as a military/
security bloc.
Even though Lee did not subscribe to the view that the Vietnamese invasion
had been directed by Moscow, he felt that had Moscow not signed a treaty of
friendship and cooperation with the Vietnamese, the region would have been
more peaceful and stable. Soviet policy had been to project her strength and
extend her influence whenever and wherever the opportunity offered itself in any
strategic area. Vietnamese ambitions in Kampuchea and conflict with China
provided the opportunity for the Soviet Union to extend her influence in Vietnam
and through Vietnam into Southeast Asia with minimal risk to herself.75 For the
first time in history, the Soviet navy and air force had access to air and naval
facilities in Vietnam, right in Southeast Asia.76 The presence of a pro-Soviet bloc
in Indochina would inevitably increase tension in the region. According to Lee,
it was not in the interest of ASEAN to be involved in the Sino–Soviet conflict and
to take sides. However difficult, “we must try. We must try to defend our interest
and if it means from time to time taking sides or appearing to take sides with one
as against the other, it must not be consistently on one side against the other”.77
On another occasion, he said “ASEAN must consistently be on the side of
ASEAN. That does not mean being consistently on the side of America, or the
Soviet Union, or China. It is not in our interests to be unquestioningly allied with
any contending side”.78
On 17 February 1979, the Chinese launched an invasion of Vietnam “to teach
Vietnam a lesson”, (as Deng Xiaoping put it in January 1979), and then subse-
quently withdrew. In Lee’s analysis, the current situation in Southeast Asia was
one of the consequences of American failure in Vietnam.79 The contest between
the Soviet Union and China for influence in Southeast Asia was precipitated by a
triumphant Vietnam which saw itself as a “middle power” wanting to fill the
vacuum vacated by the United States. This in turn “triggered an acute urgency
among the bigger powers or specifically in China, who sees Vietnam as an exten-
sion of Soviet influence”. If not for what Vietnam did, the Sino–Soviet competi-
tion in the region would have been conducted “at a more measured pace”.80 The
Vietnamese unnecessarily accelerated the process when they could have adopted
more “orthodox methods” to extend their influence and an Indochina grouping
would have evolved naturally.
As for US policy towards Southeast Asia and particularly Indochina, Lee noted
Vice-President Walter Mondale’s statement of 27 August 1979 that “any nation
which seeks to weaken or isolate China in world affairs assumes a stance counter
to American interests”. He could only wish that the United States and Western
Europe have not allowed Soviet strategic and conventional military supremacy to
become such that “China’s weight in numbers has to be brought into the equa-
tion”.81 In a keynote speech he delivered at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting at Lusaka, he spoke of the emergence of a “new balance of
sorts” which was a “sorry admission of the limits of America’s power and the
growing strength of the Soviet Union”. ASEAN did not rejoice in the intervention
1975–1979 51
of China in Kampuchea. But he conceded that ASEAN countries were the “bene-
ficiaries, for the time being”.82
Lee could not yet be sure how important a turning point December 1978 and
February 1979 was in the history of Southeast Asia, he was certain that the region
would not be what the ASEAN leaders had expected it would likely to be in
November 1978 – “The projections we had assumed as probable – that there
would be more trade, more economic interchange with Vietnam … now that’s all
changed”.83 In another interview, he said that “the hope that we could have a
system of independent nation states with different ideologies co-existing and
cooperating in Southeast Asia” had evaporated.84 The Vietnamese invasion of
Kampuchea had also brought ASEAN even closer together, if not yet economi-
cally, at least politically. In Lee’s words, “the unexpected has taken place in
political cooperation; the pressure of events have brought us much closer
together; our views of our common problems have become more vivid; because
they are common problems we are seeking common solutions”.85
He was also not optimistic that the Kampuchea problem could be resolved
quickly – “I have very high regard for the Vietnamese threshold of pain. Their
leaders are not men, who, having embarked such a historic mission, will lightly
give up unless it becomes manifest that the price is very much higher than they
originally estimated”.86 Indeed, Lee was rather pessimistic about the future of
Kampuchea – “The last of the Kampucheans may find a more lonely future than
the last of the Mohicans in Indian reservations”, he told Derek Davies of the Far
Eastern Economic Review.87
The Kampuchean issue would take another decade to resolve and this is not the
place to go into the twists and turns over the days, months and years. To Lee, the
fundamental issue was the presence of troops in foreign territory. As he put it, “if
you have established this as a new form of settling difficulties in the world, than
it will become a very unstable place …”88. The immediate danger was always the
worry that Vietnam might violate Thai territory – shelling and bombing and even
sending troops in hot pursuit of Kampuchean fighters who had moved across the
Thai border into Thailand. Lee proposed that more United Nations observer
teams be sent to the Thai-Kampuchean border to inhibit Vietnamese violations of
Thai territory or at least bear witness to Vietnam’s extension of the war into
Thailand. The longer-term danger would be a scenario whereby Vietnam was
able to win world-wide recognition of its occupation of Kampuchea which Hanoi
had insisted was “irreversible”. Then, in Lee’s words, “the future bodes ill for
peace and stability in all of Southeast Asia”. ASEAN’s aim for the next decade
was therefore to end the aggression in Kampuchea by the withdrawal of foreign
troops and allowing the Kampuchean people to elect/choose their own govern-
ment that was not beholden to Vietnam or to China. He hoped that Japan, the
United States and Europe would not give political support or economic succor to
Vietnam until Hanoi “first observe the minimum decencies of civilized conduct
between peaceful nations”.89 But he also felt that by just weakening Vietnam
economically, isolating it diplomatically and tying it down militarily to
force Hanoi to crumble would not succeed. While the ASEAN countries, Lee
acknowledged, did not have the collective economic or political clout, the US,
Japan, and the EEC had the strength to show the Vietnamese that it was worth-
while to be at peace and to concentrate their energy on rebuilding their country.
Vietnam must also be persuaded/convinced that the Soviet Union and the
COMECON did not have the dynamism to help Vietnam propel into the 21st
century. Lee pinned much hope on the US, Japan and Western Europe which he
believed would play “the major roles in China’s four modernisations”. Singapore’s
role, he opined, was “secondary”.90
On the Indochinese refugees problem

One of the consequences of the Kampuchea problem was the outflow of refugees
to the non-communist Southeast Asian countries. The international media criti-
cized Singapore for turning away refugees. Lee’s response is worth quoting:
It is impossible to be detached when faced with human tragedy. After the

first shock, my mind tells me that if I accept one boatload, I will have to
accept a hundred, then a thousand … Then as a government we decided we
had to say no more whatever our personal feelings were. Our density of
population is such that we cannot absorb these refugees without serious
social dislocation. So we either grow callouses or we will die of bleeding
hearts.91 (emphasis added)
On another occasion, Lee was accused of having “a very unsentimental attitude”

to which he retorted, “If we were sentimental and confused in our thinking, there
will be no Singapore such as you see today”.92
The refugee problem is, in his words, “a world problem” and the first thing that
needed to be done was to try to nip it at the bud, “to try and staunch this deliber-
ate outflow”. Lee conceded that no country could ignore world opinion. He was
critical of the mass media for only focusing on “one particular ship or one
particular cargo of human beings” and not the “perpetrator of the crime” and the
“pitiless, cruel, barbaric method of political blackmail on the countries of
Southeast Asia and indeed the industrialized world”. In his analysis, the refugee
was a political method or technique used by the communist guerrillas to over-
whelm the cities of South Vietnam and Cambodia. Now, the refugees were
pushed out into the neighbouring Southeast Asian countries to put pressure on the
social infrastructure and political fabric of the societies. Lee explained the serious
implication of the refugee problem for Southeast Asia: 75 percent of the refugees
were ethnic Chinese, and in each of the non-communist Southeast Asian coun-
tries, with the exception of Singapore, ethnic Chinese were a minority. So to
absorb these refugees would aggravate the minority problems of these countries.
Lee suspected that that was one of the intentions/objectives of the refugee
outflow. The Vietnamese accordingly to Lee were “past masters at the use of
refugees as a political weapon”.93 ASEAN might not have influence over Vietnam
but the international community has and must exert influence over Vietnam.
1975–1979 53
Vietnam does not exist alone in this world. She is as much a part of the inter-
dependent world as anybody else.94
Lee drew a number of conclusions from the Kampuchea episode: 1) “Like all
other great, unifying religions or ideals, Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity,
Islam, Communism, there are deeper urges and instincts in men and nations
which cannot be submerged and obliterated”.95 2) Small nation-states could find
stability and security only by “rafting with each other” otherwise they would end
up as the “arenas” of the contest for supremacy by the larger powers. The
dilemma for the ASEAN countries was “acute” – If there had not been Chinese
intervention, the ASEAN countries would be faced with Vietnamese supremacy,
“which in this case means Soviet supremacy”. If the intervention was “over-
successful”, it meant that in 10–15 years, there would be “an assertion of influ-
ence, perhaps not amounting to hegemony, by a communist power that has
influence over all guerilla movements in the countries of Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia”. To Lee, a stalemate was the best as it would give
“more years in which to consolidate our security, increase our cooperation and
widen our options to choose our partners in economic development and
progress”.96
In closing this section on the Kampuchea episode, it is perhaps worth quoting
in full an extract from Lee’s keynote address at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government Meeting at Lusaka in August 1979 in which he extrapolated “his
experience of Southeast Asia in the context of a changing power balance” in the
world. This is what he said,
One tentative conclusion from my experience in Southeast Asia: For the first
time in human history, we are not fighting isolated battles. We are part of one
inter-reacting world. Whether it is American’s committing atrocities on the
Vietnamese, or whether it is Vietnamese inhumanities on others
(Kampucheans and refugees), it is no longer a world in which events are
isolated from the world. The Vietnamese did not want to go to Geneva. They
had to go. They pretended that world opinion did not matter. But it does
matter. The number of refugees slowed down just prior to the conference.
And I believe it will not resume before Havana (in September 1979). And I
ask my African friends: Do not acquiesce in this conquest and the installation
of a puppet regime. If you do, you are not our friends. We know better than
anybody else what is at stake because it is our future. When the foreign
ministers of the five countries of ASEAN met in Bali at the end of June 1979,
they asked that all Vietnamese troops be withdrawn from Kampuchea and
that the Kampuchean people be allowed to decide their own future. If in fact,
Heng Samrin does represent the Kampuchean people and is their savior from
the atrocities of Pol Pot, then so be it. Underneath this nuclear arch, we are
dicing with each other’s future.97
3 The 1980s
“All in all, the 1980s promise to be an intensely exciting decade”1

“In an imperfect world, we have to seek the best accommodation possible. And no
accommodation is permanent. If it lasts long enough for progress to be made until
the next set of arrangements can be put in place, let us be grateful for it”2
“To look five years ahead is a reasonable planning assumption. To look 10 years
ahead can become crystal gazing. The speed of change in geopolitics has acceler-
ated as a result of the speed of technological changes”3
“People and governments learn more from experience than from theory. If there is
no profit from aggression, they will not commit the next act of aggression”4
The 1980s has been described as the “Second Cold War”. Much of this chapter
revisits Lee's thoughts on the Cambodian issue which was an important focus for
Singapore and the other ASEAN countries throughout the decade. The Cambodian
issue was more than just a bilateral problem between Vietnam and Cambodia; it
was a manifestation of the Sino–Soviet rivalry played out in the Southeast Asian
neighbourhood. Two of the most significant transformations in the decade were the
normalization of Sino–US relations which was very much in response to the grow-
ing assertiveness of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of Japan as an economic
powerhouse and with it Tokyo’s new assertiveness in security matters. During the
1980s also, as the East Asian economies continued to achieve strong economic
growth, tensions between developed and developing countries on issues such as
access to raw materials and energy, trade imbalances and protectionism emerged
which had to be managed. Lee was quick to notice that the world was changing:
becoming less bipolar, less ideological and more integrated and inter-dependent.
Most significant is the relationship between economics and international politics or
globalization which today is a defining feature of the international economy. By the
end of the decade, the Soviet empire had disintegrated and the Cold War was over.
On Resolving the Kampuchea Issue

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978 triggered a
reappraisal of the geostrategic situation in the Asia-Pacific by Lee Kuan Yew.
The 1980s 55
He viewed the conflict against the backdrop of the rivalry between the Soviet
Union and China for the allegiance of communist parties in the region and
beyond.
Vietnam could continue to occupy Kampuchea as long as the Soviet Union
was willing to supply her with arms and economic aid.5 And as long as the
Vietnamese military forces remained in Kampuchea, there would be a threat to
the security of Thailand and of ASEAN. The immediate danger was to Bangkok
because Thailand bore “the brunt of the repercussions of Vietnamese forces on
her border”. The longer term danger was a Vietnam equipped with Soviet mili-
tary hardware, including aircrafts and naval vessels, which would pose a threat
to the whole region. Between China and the Soviet Union, he felt China’s “capac-
ity to make mischief” in the ASEAN region to be less than that of the Soviet
Union as the former was economically and militarily far behind that of the Soviet
Union and the United States for the next 20 years at least. What China could do
in the next 10 years was “confined to the instigation and support of communist
guerilla insurgents and the mischievous nuisances of appealing to the ethnic
Chinese …”.6
In an August 1980 interview, Lee took pains to clarify that Singapore, though
vocal in its policy regarding Kampuchea, was not adopting “a policy of confron-
tation against Vietnam”. In 1990, Lee remarked to his audience at the World
Economic Forum at Davos that once the Cambodian conflict was resolved, there
was no reason why Singapore and Vietnam could not have better bilateral rela-
tions. In fact, relations had been good prior to the invasion. “For small countries
like Singapore, it was crucial to stick to the principle that national boundaries
cannot be marched across at will”, Lee explained.7
Singapore staunchly stood by the ASEAN-sponsored November 1979 UN
resolution on Kampuchea which called for all Vietnamese forces to be withdrawn
from Kampuchea and to allow the Kampucheans to form their own government.
This, as Lee put it, was “the way to a peaceful settlement of the problem”.
Singapore’s (and ASEAN’s) position was for the continued recognition of the
Democratic Kampuchea (DK) Government in order to deny the Vietnamese-
installed Heng Samrin regime any political advantage from the de-recognition of
the DK.8 As Thailand was bearing the brunt of the pressures from Kampuchea –
the flood of refugees, incursions and attacks at the border – “it is in the interest
of ASEAN, including Singapore, to support the Thai Government to defend its
integrity and sovereignty”, Lee said.9 Lee reiterated Singapore Foreign Minister
S. Rajaratnam’s words that “the obsession with Pol Pot’s past, to the relative
exclusion of the possible decimation of a whole people through Vietnamese
aggression and the destabilization of the ASEAN region, is not a manifestation of
moral sense as an evasion of it”.10
The French Catholic priest, Francois Ponchaud, had compared the recognition
of the DK to the recognition of “a rump Nazi government in 1945 then coming
to terms with the Soviet occupation of East Germany, and that the best way to
ensure a continued Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea was to give backing to
Pol Pot”. Lee’s response is worth quoting:
The French Catholic priest who used the illustration … was moved by deep
humanitarian considerations for the Khmer people. He is deeply compas-
sionate and devout. To serve the Kampucheans as a people, alas, require a
certain Machiavellian understanding of the ways of nation states. I have not
the same personal experience of the sufferings of the Kampuchean people as
Francois Ponchaud. Nevertheless, I too want the Kampucheans to survive
not only because they deserve it, but also because their survival as a distinct
national is in the interests of Southeast Asia. They have a better chance of
survival if we support the Democratic Kampuchea. The conventions of inter-
national diplomacy make de-recognition of the Government of Democratic
Kampuchea a backhand legitimizing of the Heng Samrin regime propped up
by 200,000 Vietnamese troops. Such a step damages the hopes of a separate
and independent Kampuchea. ASEAN does not want Pol Pot and the Khmer
Rouge to be in power ever again; to achieve this we must preserve the
Democratic Kampuchea seat in the UN and alter the nature of leadership of
the Government of Democratic Kampuchea. Both PRC and Khmer Rouge
leaders must recognize that the alternative to this is the eventual legitimizing
of Vietnamese puppet regime in Kampuchea. Surely Sihanouk, Lon Nol,
Son Sann, and Im Tan are more representative of the Kampuchean people
and can better express their aspirations. The communists have brought inde-
scribable tragedy to the Kampucheans. The Kampuchean people deserve
peace under their own government, free to receive aid and succor from the
non-communist countries of the world who alone can heal their wounded
nation and save them from extinction.11
Lee explained the benefits of forming a coalition government: By forming a

coalition, and by receiving ASEAN support, Sihanouk’s and Son Sann’s forces
could offer the Kampuchean people alternative leaderships to Pol Pot or
Heng Samrin. Although a Democratic Kampuchean coalition government would
help the Khmer Rouge gain international acceptability, in the longer term, it
would increase the likelihood of the non-communist forces returning to Phnom
Penh through free elections and a political settlement acceptable to both Vietnam
and China and diminish the chances of the Khmer Rouge returning to power by
force. Lee emphasized that ASEAN would not be a party to any plan to restore the
Khmer Rouge to power by force and against the will of the Cambodian people.12
On the interests of China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam

Referring to the convening of a UN-sponsored conference on Kampuchea in
1981, Lee said such a conference, which included all the powers involved, would
be a first step towards a solution to the Kampuchean problem. Lee projected
that the likely outcome of a free and fair election would be an independent and
neutral Kampuchea, neither anti-China, anti-Vietnam, nor anti-Thai. If an
Indochina Federation was indeed established by free choice, ASEAN would
accept it as a counterpart economic grouping.13 In keeping with his view that
The 1980s 57
ASEAN countries should not take sides, Lee believed that ASEAN should jointly
and separately urge China, Vietnam and the Soviet Union to leave it to the
Kampuchean to resolve their problems themselves.14 The three major protagonists
must be parties to any peaceful solution in Kampuchea. Lee believed that it was
only a matter of time when there would be discussions for a solution. In Lee’s
analysis, Vietnam did not want to be indefinitely dependent on Soviet aid and
protection. At some point, Hanoi would have to decide whether it was not better
to seek an accommodation and reconciliation with China, one in which Vietnam’s
interests in Kampuchea and Laos were recognized. Vietnam could then be more
independent in her policies and have closer ties with the United States, Japan and
Western Europe for her economic development. China’s objective was to have a
Vietnam “like North Korea which is not an ally of the Soviet Union, China’s
biggest threat”. The Kampuchean problem is also not central to Soviet global
priorities and strategic objectives compared to Afghanistan and the Middle East.15
Lee believed that Moscow had the ability to exert influence over Hanoi – “I
have no doubt that if Moscow decides that a compromise in Kampuchea is neces-
sary, it can and will signal that it favours a compromise solution, for example,
through cut-backs on military and economic aid to Vietnam”. In a 1981 speech at
the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, Lee told his audience that if
only the Vietnamese could have guessed in December 1978 that a year later, in
December 1979, their Soviet guarantor and supplier would be entangled
in Afghanistan, and less than a year after that, in August 1980, confronted by
a Polish upheaval, they might never have attacked Kampuchea. Now they face a
bleak future, as more urgent claims are made on Soviet military and economic
resources.16 Similarly, Beijing being “the sole supporter of the Khmer Rouge”
could control the Khmer Rouge if the Chinese wanted to – “If it does not accept
Peking’s views, it has nowhere else to turn to”.17
Thus what ASEAN must try to do was to work to create a situation in which
the Soviet Union, Vietnam and China would find it in their respective interests
not to pursue their aims and jeopardize their good relations with ASEAN and “so
induce them to settle for an interim compromise, a compromise which enables a
stable system of communist and non-communist states to live in peace and stabil-
ity in Southeast Asia”. In sum, for Lee,
our best policy is to demonstrate to the three communist countries directly

involved in the conflict, and the Western powers who are not, that ASEAN’s
proposals for a compromise settlement offers the best long-term prospects
for peace, stability and cooperation between communist and non-communist
countries in Southeast Asia. This region has suffered from war for so long.
It needs a period of peace to reconstruct. All countries benefit from co-exist-
ence and cooperation which will help rehabilitation and reconstruction of
war savaged Indochina.18
He anticipated that Vietnam would try very hard to wean individual ASEAN
countries from the united ASEAN position as there were differing views within
ASEAN regarding the dangers of the Chinese and Soviet threats. It was common
knowledge that Indonesia and Malaysia were more concerned about the Chinese
threat. Lee’s analysis was that for the next 20 years, if not more, China would not
have the industrial muscle to threaten the region. China’s only means of exerting
pressure on the Southeast Asian countries was through guerilla insurgency and
through appealing to ethnic Chinese in the region. These, in his view, were “trou-
blesome but not insurmountable problems”. China’s weakness also made her
vulnerable to the overwhelming armour and nuclear weapons of the Soviet
Union. In comparison, the Soviet Union now had sea and air bases in Vietnam
and the potential to be a formidable force that only the American Seventh Fleet
could counter-balance. China thus did not pose a military threat like the Soviet
Union.19 And, so long as Thailand remained independent and non-communist,
China would not be a threat to Singapore.20
On ASEAN and Kampuchea

Lee succinctly described China’s views of the Kampuchean problem vis-à-vis
ASEAN’s (and Singapore’s) in a number of interviews he gave in November
1980. Both China and Singapore (as well as ASEAN) viewed the world through
different lenses. For China, the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea was “only
fragment of a much larger whole”, the Soviet Union being the central problem
and the main threat. Any settlement of the conflict with Vietnam, however impor-
tant in itself, was only “peripheral” to the larger conflict. In contrast, the
Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea was the “major preoccupation of all
ASEAN countries”. If the problem could be resolved through a political settle-
ment, “a major threat to the peace of the region would have been removed, and
the involvement in great power conflict avoided, at least in Southeast Asia”. Thus
ASEAN had a greater interest in bringing about a political settlement. The
Chinese did not think the Vietnamese would agree to a total withdrawal from
Kampuchea unless military, economic and political pressures become unbeara-
ble. Singapore, on the other hand, believed that the Vietnamese would tough it
out for as long as Soviet military and economic aid was forthcoming, even though
at the back of their minds, they were aware that Kampuchea was not the foremost
priority of Moscow. Both China and ASEAN were also not in total agreement on
the details of what would follow post-Vietnamese withdrawal.21 But there was
consensus that the Kampuchean problem would take “several years to resolve”
and there could be no solution in the immediate future.
Lee told the Chinese that the ASEAN position towards the Vietnamese and the
Soviet Union was “bedevilled by the suspicion that through weakening Vietnam,
ASEAN may be in fact be acting against its own longer-term interests by helping
the restoration of Chinese influence through a Khmer Rouge regime in
Kampuchea, besides weakening Vietnam as another Southeast Asian counter-
weight to any Chinese push southwards”.22 Lee believed that there was merit in
this viewpoint which ASEAN took seriously but regardless, the Vietnamese must
still withdraw from Kampuchea.23 From his talks in China, he had grounds to
believe that Beijing was aware that for China–ASEAN relations to improve,
The 1980s 59
China must discontinue their support for the affiliated communist parties in the
region. The Chinese were re-examining and re-formulating their policies but any
change would take time.24 As he told a group of journalists during his 1980 visit
to China, “I do not expect China to disavow these communist parties whose lead-
ers she had cultivated and supported for so long and whose members she had
daily exhorted and instigated to insurrection. Nevertheless, I gained the impres-
sion, by the different words and phrases the Chinese leaders used, the nuances of
tone, gestures, and expressions that China wants to suspend, or to discontinue,
active involvement with these parties …”.25 Whenever the opportunity arose,
Lee would remind the Chinese that China’s relations with the ASEAN countries
could only improve if party-to-party relations between the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) and the illegal communist parties of the ASEAN countries were
discontinued.26
In his assessment of China’s foreign policy in the 1980s, Lee believed that
Beijing wanted to concentrate all her “energies and resources” to meet the over-
riding Soviet threat. All other issues could be resolved, postponed or submerged.
As long as this threat is staved off, the four modernizations could continue. By
the year 2000, China hoped to be “industrially and technologically less unequal
to the Soviets”.27 To prevent superpower intrusion into Southeast Asia, both
China and ASEAN must continue to build trust and cooperate even after the
Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea had ended.28
Lee saw no signs (as yet) that ASEAN countries were divided because member
countries identified their immediate and intermediate threats differently. Lee was
philosophical about this – “It is a question of different perceptions, whether the
Soviet Union or China is the greater threat or the main threat. Perceptions are
often influenced by subjective factors like past experience … Eventually, the
facts can be determined because they cannot be obscured forever”. With regards
to the Kuantan principle/declaration which had given rise to the impression that
ASEAN was divided, Lee said that he appreciated the explanation given to him
by Prime Minister Hussein Onn and President Suharto that “any formula to solve
the Kampuchean conflict must move Vietnam away from the influence of China,
the Soviet Union, and the United States. The objective of the principle is to
exclude big power conflicts from the region, because of Kampuchea. I support his
objective”. But he added that if Vietnam consistently and systematically rejected
solutions which would free Hanoi from its dependency on the Soviet Union,
“then we must draw our own conclusions as to the future. We cannot be unmind-
ful of the consequences of Vietnam’s dependency on the Soviet Union”.29
Lee did not object to Indonesia and Malaysia maintaining a dialogue with
Hanoi. In his view, “there are as many perimeters on voluntary representation as
a volunteer wishes to place upon himself”. But there is only one which he consid-
ered fundamental – “a dialogue must be held without prejudice to prevailing
ASEAN policy”. Expanding on this point, Lee said that
no one can commit ASEAN to a change of policy through bilateral dialogue.

To be sure, ASEAN will be under many more stresses and strains as Vietnam
attempts to inveigle members away from the group. Nevertheless, an unspoken
commitment to support the majority view, whatever the tentative results of
any bilateral dialogue, will keep ASEAN together. We are all in consensus
that ASEAN countries share common long-term objectives.30
Lee believed that ASEAN had made much progress in political solidarity since
1976 compared to economic consolidation (which was a well known fact) and
Lee was quick to admit in numerous speeches and interviews. He always called
for patience and flexibility, an appreciation of each member state’s domestic
constraints and to accommodate different national practices.31 In 1986, Lee
publicly credited the “character and outlook” of Indonesia’s President Suharto
whose policies “made it possible for ASEAN to become an organization for
constructive and cooperative relationships between members, and for the solidar-
ity of its members in meeting external problems”.32
Returning to the Kampuchea situation, the agreement between Sihanouk, Son
Sann and Khieu Samphan in Singapore in September 1981 to form a coalition
government, in Lee’s words, represented “an advance in the Cambodian strug-
gle”. By agreeing to put aside their differences and rivalry to resist the
Vietnamese, Lee hoped that the coalition would make Vietnamese occupation of
Cambodia more costly and also harder for Hanoi to convince the world that they
are fighting only against the Khmer Rouge. It would take time – “months and
years” – for the non-communist Cambodian groups (the forces of Sihanouk and
Son Sann) to build themselves up as a credible non-communist alternative to the
Khmer Rouge.
Lee’s advice was for patience and to wait for the Vietnamese to recognize that
their position in Kampuchea was not “irreversible” as they insisted. It would take
time because the top leaders – all aged in their 70s – were unlikely to admit they
were wrong that easily and quickly.33 Lee projected that several more years of
privation which could not be relieved by Soviet aid would make the Vietnamese
“slowly and reluctantly come to terms with the rest of the world”. “If we believe
that the Heng Samrin regime is firmly entrenched and we accept the situation,
then we have allowed the Soviets to get away with a military cum diplomatic
coup. We shall store up trouble for the future”, he emphasized. Lee was thus
critical of Australia who allowed the Vietnamese (which he described as “master
manipulators of the mass media”34) to manipulate its media and to get so outraged
over the genocidal brutalities of Pol Pot to the extent that Canberra was pressured
to accept an empty seat in the United Nations which would only benefit the
Heng Samrin regime and Vietnam.35
Lee also did not think that the closer trade relations between some ASEAN
countries and China, as well as the Soviet Union, particularly noticeable by mid-
1980s, would necessarily lead to a quick resolution of the Kampuchean problem.
At best, it increased the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. In his prognosis, for
the next 10 years, the moves of Beijing and Moscow to increase trade links/ties
with ASEAN countries would not have a great impact on the peace and stability
of Southeast Asia (as long as the Americans remained in Subic Bay and/or
Clark airbase).36
The 1980s 61
On the Soviet policy shift on Asia
On 28 July 1986, Gorbachev delivered a significant speech at Vladivostok where
he signalled a change in Soviet policy towards Asia, and Sino–Soviet relations in
particular. In his speech, Gorbachev acknowledged that the continued Vietnamese
occupation of Kampuchea was an obstacle to improving Sino–Soviet relations.
Lee’s reaction to the speech was that given Vietnam’s increasing difficulty to
sustain her occupation and her dependence on the Soviet Union, the prospects
for an independent Cambodia now appeared brighter. However, it remained to be
seen whether Moscow would apply pressure on Vietnam to withdraw.
Lee remained wary of Soviet intentions. He saw Gorbachev as a man who was
“dedicated to the strength and success of the Soviet Union and the triumph of
communism”.37
Lee also disagreed with the view that Sihanouk should join up with the
Vietnamese-backed Hun Sen against the Khmer Rouge. Assuming that they
joined up,
Is the trouble over? Can Sihanouk and Hun Sen knock off the Khmer Rouge
still supported by China? He can’t … Let’s put it bluntly. The Chinese
cannot be seen to have made use of the Khmer Rouge and then discard them.
If they do that, they have betrayed the Khmer Rouge. Dissident groups all
over Asia will conclude China is not a trustworthy power unless Beijing sees
the Khmer Rouge through to an honourable conclusion.
The way forward was to let the Khmer Rouge partake in the election process. And
when they lose, then China could stop its support and “that’s an honourable
way out”.38
It would take another four years before the stalemate was eventually overcome
in 1990. As Lee noted “the good work done by the five Permanent Members of
the UN Security Council, especially the decisions of the Soviet Union and the
People’s Republic of China to put their influence behind the movement towards
peace, have resulted in a framework for a comprehensive political settlement”.39
The Paris Peace Agreements on Cambodia (which essentially solved the interna-
tional aspects of the conflict) was signed on 23 October 1991.
On the world in the 1980s

Lee scanned the horizon in a wide-ranging interview he gave at the beginning of
1981.40 He believed that the new Reagan administration (which began in January
1981) would pursue “more consistent policies designed to restore confidence in
American strength and stamina, especially in resisting Soviet expansionism”. This
was in contrast to the Carter years – Lee noted that “the most significant develop-
ment since the American withdrawal from Vietnam had been the swift and confi-
dent moves by the Soviet Union into the strategic areas vacated by the departing
Americans”.41 China would continue to focus on its four modernizations which
Lee described as a “colossal” task. China’s decision to modernize, to open up her
doors to trade, investment, technology and tourism was “a most significant factor
for peace, stability and growth in Asia”.42 But in the meantime, Sino–Soviet
hostility would continue – Deng Xiaoping had said that China’s first national task
for the 1980s was to oppose Soviet hegemony. Lee noted that both countries also
appreciated the incalculable consequences of a military confrontation. But both
Moscow and Beijing were engaged in a “sustained contest of will and power for
pre-eminent influence”. Unless one side found it burdensome and not worth the
cost, he believed there was little hope for peace.43
He was most critical of Soviet actions and policies to communize the world
which he described as “relentlessly consistent”. The Soviet leadership was able
to exploit every opportunity that was presented by the often disunited
non-communist world. Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan because Moscow
calculated that they could get away with it. Similarly, Moscow aided the
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea because they knew the West would do
nothing and China would be hesitant to intervene. He did not think the Soviet
communist empire was starting to crumble – a view he described as “wishful
thinking”. The Soviet will to empire was as strong as ever even though the resist-
ance to Soviet domination was also growing stronger. But he did believe that if
the West could match Soviet military forces, both strategic and conventional, then
the pressures on Soviet economic and social structures would become increas-
ingly intolerable. And if the free world could survive the next 20 years “without
a massive war or easy grabs of strategic territories containing oil or strategic
minerals by the Soviets”, the communist system would face a severe crisis.44
Turning to the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), Lee felt that the effectiveness of
NAM had been much diminished because having achieved independence, the issues
of decolonization and anti-imperialism were no longer unifying forces in the move-
ment. NAM countries were also beset with political and social problems brought
about by lack of economic development. Last but not least, the movement had been
dominated by pro-Soviet radicals. Lee believed that unless the United States with
the support of Western Europe and Japan got their act together, the Soviet Union
would continue to increase its strength and expand its influence world-wide.
On Japan’s role
This is perhaps an appropriate juncture to focus on Lee’s views on the role of
Japan. Although Lee never forgot his experience during the war years, he was
pragmatic. He recognized that Japan was Asia’s “most industrialized and techno-
logically sophisticated society”45 and that it made economic sense for Singapore
to look forward rather than back – “The past is the past and it is the future that
we are interested in”. Japan with its “surplus industrial energy and expertise”
needed ASEAN as much as the ASEAN countries needed Japan.46 Lee noted that
Japan’s primary interest in Southeast Asia was in security and freedom in naviga-
tion for her access to oil in the Gulf. A secondary interest was Japan’s access to
essential raw materials from, and exports of manufactures to, Southeast Asia.
The 1980s 63
Tokyo had set out to achieve these interests through trade and investments and
through political cooperation with the ASEAN countries. The Japanese had also
kept lines open to the communist Indochinese states.47 Although Tokyo had
supported ASEAN’s position on Kampuchea, Lee was critical of the visits of
Japanese parliamentary groups to Hanoi and Phnom Penh in 1981 because he felt
it sent the “wrong signals” to Vietnam. Japan “should continue to make clear to
Vietnam that there will be no development aid to Vietnam until it withdraws from
Cambodia and negotiates a political solution”.48
With regards to the role Tokyo could play in the security of the region, he was
of the view that Japan could contribute towards the peace and security of
Southeast Asia by not going nuclear and not having an independent (meaning:
separate and distinct from the allied or Western world forces in the area) large
naval task force. Lee was not opposed to the possibility of Japan contributing to
a regional task force.49 In his opening address at a conference dealing with
Southeast Asian security in May 1974, he raised the question of the future role of
Japan – “The riddle to which nobody knows the answer is: where does the power-
ful economic dynamo of Japan fit in? For, in another twenty years, it will not be
enough for Japan just to remain equidistant from the USSR and the PRC, with
close security and economic links with America, though one hopes that the
Japanese will still be using the American nuclear umbrella”.50 In 1980, Lee
continued to hold the view that Japan should achieve her security in alliance with
the United States.51 But he also anticipated that Japan would find it increasingly
difficult to pursue its economic objectives without a supporting political role as
the security and stability of the West Pacific and Indian Ocean regions could not
depend on the United States alone. Growing Soviet, and later Chinese, influence
in the region must be balanced by both the United States and Japan. Tokyo would
have to take a more active role in helping to maintain stability of the areas vital
to Japan – Western Pacific and northern part of the China Sea. In Southeast Asia
(where memories of World War II were still strong), such a role must be in
conjunction with the United States, Australia and New Zealand. There would be
no fear of a revival of Japanese militarism if Japan continued to operate within
the US nuclear umbrella.52 In a 1982 interview, he reiterated that Japan should
not become the protector of Southeast Asia. But Japan should be better able to
undertake her own defence and patrol her immediate waters, thereby freeing
American naval and air forces for responsibilities further afield.53 Lee was
however concerned that in the longer term, if the United States could not maintain
“her world position as anchorman of the non-communist world” and Japan loses
confidence in the United States as a dependable ally, Tokyo would pursue ‘total
self-defence” which would logically include nuclear weapons. That would not be
in the interest of world peace and stability.54
On the new balance in Asia

Turning specifically to the new balance of power in Asia in the 1980s, Lee
thought that there was “no ideal solution”. A line-up was discernible which
“leaves us with a sense of unease, but not undue alarm” as the United States was
still present in the region. Washington wanted Tokyo to be more active in guard-
ing the seas around Japan but the Japanese were reluctant to do more than the
barest minimum and also did not want to be in a de facto trilateral alliance with
the United States and China against the Soviet Union. So, Washington had little
choice but to depend on China as the main counterweight to the Soviet forces in
East Asia. Several Southeast Asian countries, however, viewed Sino–US ties
with unease. Because Beijing was unwilling to cut off ties with the communist
parties in Southeast Asia, it was difficult for ASEAN to believe that China’s
longer-term objectives in the region were benign. The Chinese were currently
acting with restraint because Beijing needed ASEAN support to check Soviet
presence in the region. Lee believed that if any of policies of the ASEAN coun-
tries conflicted with Chinese aims, then Beijing would not be inclined to exercise
restraint. Lee viewed the move by Washington to sell selected lethal weapons to
China with “disquiet”. It reflected, in his words, “an admission that America has
few options in maintaining the balance of power in East Asia … If American
weapons technology does not help China to build up an amphibious capacity,
Southeast Asia can live with it. If it does, then in 20–25 years, maintaining a
regional balance will become more complicated”.55 But for the time being, there
was the acceptance that Beijing performed “a valuable function, a most crucial
one” in checking the Vietnamese, which none of the ASEAN countries were able
to do. As he said, “had there been no Chinese “punishment” for Vietnam’s inva-
sion and occupation of Cambodia in 1979, the situation would have been disas-
trous for Thailand and the rest of Southeast Asia”.56 India was clearly on the side
of the Soviet Union and had recognized the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea
because New Delhi was dependent on Moscow. If it came to the worst, would it
be better to have a strong Japan or a strong China to help hold the balance in East
Asia? Lee’s answer was that he had no doubt that Japan had the capacity to be
strong. He also believed that “her strength this time can be benign influence on
the world”.57 At the dinner for Vice-President George Bush in 1982, Lee again
exhorted the United States not to overlook her strategic interest in Southeast
Asia – a view which he held steadfastly over the years. There was an ongoing
“long haul struggle in Southeast Asia between the Soviet Union through Vietnam
and the PRC”, he said. An adverse outcome would have grave consequences for
ASEAN and Japan, and Japan’s security (as Secretary of Defence Casper
Weinberger had said) was of key importance to the United States.58 In 1984, he
again expressed the pivotal role America played in the region as a counterweight
to the Soviet presence – “If there is no American presence in East and Southeast
Asia, we have a different world”.59
As early as 1982, Lee already detected possible shifts in the balance of power in
the region. In his opening speech at the opening of the 15th ASEAN Ministerial
meeting in June, Lee made the observation that relationships amongst the US,
Soviet Union and China were “more fluid and uncertain” than it was in 1981. The
assumption that US–China common interest in containing Soviet expansion would
make them de facto allies was premature. Despite the Kampuchea issue, Moscow
The 1980s 65
had been making overtures to Beijing for dialogue and accommodation which had
not been rejected. Thus, the non-communist Southeast Asian countries would have
to “carefully pick our way through the complexities of a new minefield of conflict-
ing great power interests in Indochina”.60 In early 1983, he observed that a new
balance in the region had still to be established. Washington was encouraging
Tokyo to increase her defence capability to balance the Soviet Union. Beijing, on
the other hand, was distancing herself from unqualified cooperation with Washington
to contain the Soviet Union, and was apparently charting out a separate role for
herself. It was thus fortunate that there was still peace and stability in the ASEAN
countries while the external powers sorted out their respective positions.61
The first four years of the Reagan Administration did not disappoint Lee. He
was more than pleased that Ronald Reagan won a second term in 1984. In fact,
he told Louis Kraar of Fortune Magazine that he liked Reagan and “we are going
to have a continuation of the present policy, which I think, is good. It’s upheld
the peace in Asian. The Vietnamese have been contained. The Soviets are
expanding their influence over Vietnam and their presence in Vietnam, and their
fleet in the Pacific is increasing. But the United States will maintain a countervail-
ing force”.62 “The Reagan years”, Lee told his audience “will surely be a notice-
able landmark in American history. You have restored American leadership in
the maintenance of a just and equitable world order”.63
It is worth recalling that Lee had always maintained that economics and poli-
tics were closely inter-related and that “good economics must be the basis of
good politics”.64 According to Lee (and he reiterated this premise on several
occasions), “trade and industry is as important to us as defence and security”,65
“defence and security is indivisible from trade and industry”.66 The promotion of
trade was thus a key objective of Singapore’s security (foreign and defence)
policy. Thus besides the military dimension of the balance of power, Lee also
paid considerable attention to the economic dimension of the Cold War –
“Economic development is the most effective inoculation against subversion and
revolution”.67 This is not surprising for a small country lacking in natural
resources like Singapore which had always and continue to depend on trade for
its survival. As Lee said, the most important external factor for the economic
development of Singapore “is the continuance of free trade under the rules of
GATT”.68 As we have noted above, Lee counted on the United States – “the
world’s most powerful country and the world’s largest economy”,69 Western
Europe and Japan to provide the economic leadership in “an ongoing Darwinism
between two competing social, economic and military systems”.70 He saw
ASEAN’s economic progress as “demonstration of the benefits of free trade and
free enterprise in bringing about development” having a positive effect on other
Third World countries.71 Also, the most important development to influence
peace and stability of Asia and the Pacific was China’s decision in 1980 to open
her door and modernize but if protectionism prevailed in the United States, “the
assumptions which led China to want to join the international trading system
become invalid”, he warned. While he noted that the Reagan Administration was
anti-protectionism, Lee was somewhat nervous about the mood in America.72
On scenarios for the 21st century
Lee painted two possible scenarios for the 21st century: A bleak scenario
whereby owing to domestic problems, Washington loses the will to maintain free
trade and thus abandon “the contest between democracy and the free market on
the one hand versus Communism and the controlled economy on the other, when
she has nearly won this contest for the hearts and minds of the Third World”. Lee
hoped that in the interests of peace and security, the United States “would uphold
the rules of international conduct which rewards peaceful cooperative behavior
and punishes transgressions of the peace” so that there would not be a replay of
the 1930s Depression which led to the Second World War. Lee emphasized that
it is America’s primary responsibility because of America’s position as the pre-
eminent economic, political and military power. America is “the anchor economy
of the free market economies of the world”. In her hands therefore lies “the future
of the world”.73 That said, Lee did not expect US economic dominance to remain
unchanged/in perpetuity. He expected it to lessen over time but “too rapid a
decline of US dominance will not give time for a readjustment of forces across
the Atlantic and the Pacific”, he warned.74 As early as the mid-1980s, Lee
predicted that the Pacific Basin would be the region with the greatest potential for
development and growth for the next 100 years75, with three caveats: (a) the abil-
ity of the United States to maintain a system of fair and open trade, (b) whether
Japan would continue her low defence posture and her reliance on the Japan-US
security treaty and (c) a possible upset in the tenure of US bases in the Philippines
as alternative bases as strategically sited would be hard to find.76
One of Lee’s most insightful speeches is the one he delivered at the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 198777, two years
before the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 and three years before the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. In this speech, Lee cut through
the “sound and fury of international political developments” to the essence – “the
on-going basic changes in East-West relations”. Lee noted that over the last 40
years after the end of the Second World War, the Cold War had been “a constant
in the ever-changing international political scene”. It was a bi-polar world – the
free world versus the communist world. The United States expedited the process
of decolonization of the European empires because of the fear of losing more
territories to the communists. Most issues were seen as either “black or white”. It
took two decades before the United States accepted that non-alignment need not
necessarily mean hostility to the West. In November 1956, Khrushchev said that
he would bury the West and that history was on his side. He further predicted that
the Soviet Union would exceed US production and consumption. Up to the 1970s,
there was doubt whether the West could win. It took nearly forty years before it
became clear that communism had failed to live up to the promises/expectations
of Khrushchev. The emergence of Gorbachev tacitly confirmed this. China and
now the Soviet Union had discovered that “in a nuclear world, military might
cannot be translated into territorial or economic gains. Nor has the supply of arms
brought them economic benefits. To gain influence they require economies as
The 1980s 67
strong and dynamic as those of the West”.78 However, the irony was that just as
the United States was winning against the Soviet Union, she found herself in rela-
tive decline. The United States was suffering from growing trade deficits, foreign
debts and Congressional pressures for protectionism. Lee asked the “crucial ques-
tion” whether Gorbachev implemented his policies to make the Soviet economy
more efficient with the ultimate aim to pursue supremacy for the Soviet Union or
whether he now acknowledged that nuclear weapons had ruled out a major war
with the United States, and as such, their rivalries would not be confined ‘to
expansion of influence over allies or satellites primary in the Third World”?
According to Lee, whatever the ultimate answer, he believed that Gorbachev’s
aim was not that the Soviet Union would be less communist. Even if all nations
become democratic or all became communist, Lee believed that “there will still
be conflicts of interests which will lead to alignments and grouping, and these
lead to conflict and wars”. He found the views of some American liberals who
believed that wars between nations would become rare or infrequent if only all
countries followed the American political model “naive”.
But in 1987, owing to developments in the Soviet Union, there was less fear of
imminent and acute conflict. Consequently, there was also less solidarity within
the two blocs. “The world” Lee noted “was becoming less bipolar and the great
powers less ideologically motivated” – “In short, we are already into a very
changed world”, he claimed, where there were no historical precedents on how to
maintain peace and stability and to ensure cooperation in a world of 160 nation
states. And “the age of instant communications and swift transportation, with
technology growing exponentially” made the situation even more complex. At
this point, Lee introduced the idea of multilateral cooperation – “In one inter-
dependent inter-related world, the decline in the relative dominance of the leaders
of the two blocs increases the likelihood of a multi-polar world, and with it the
difficulties of multilateral cooperation”. Multilateral cooperation was the “key to
development”
Hopes for a better life for our peoples depend on peace, stability and
economic development in the world. We need to avoid or resolve regional
wars and conflicts and to have international and regional economic coopera-
tion … Of course, each can survive without the other (referring to the devel-
oped and developing countries). But to grow, to thrive, and to flourish, we
need to work with each other.79
Lee repeated the above two ideas/themes two years later in 1989 when it
was much clearer that the confrontation between the communist and non-commu-
nist bloc since World War Two was over. While that might be so, he warned that
“the competition between big powers for influence and power in the world will go
on, in a multi-polar world. It has always been thus, whether it was the Three
Kingdoms in China or the Warring States in Japan. The Big wants to assure its
supremacy by growing bigger, and the Small tries to prevent this by alliances
between themselves to block the Big, and to make him smaller …”. The competi-
tion between nations was likely to concentrate on economics.80 In his October
1989 CHOGM speech, one month before the fall of the Berlin Wall, he observed
that “as the balance between the major powers changes, other states in the world
have little choice but to adjust. But not all these developments are adverse. There
is a strong desire in the East and West, in the North and South, to concentrate
energies and resources on economic development, and to restrain expenditure on
arms. This could usher in an era of worldwide international cooperation through
multilateral institutions”. Towards the end of the era of the Cold War, Lee advo-
cated for the strengthening of multilateral institutions, starting with the UN and
its agencies.81
Part II
The post-Cold War years

4 The 1990s
“In future competition between industrialized nation states will be primarily

economic, and this competition will be worldwide”1
“The 1990s will be a decade of exciting changes in the world”2
“We are traversing new territory in search of stability and growth under very
different conditions. Multilateral security dialogues can build understanding and
confidence. But they are no substitute for a stable balance of power”3
“Good intentions alone have not always secured happy outcomes. Over the long
term, a balance of interests will serve better”4
“I’m not an ideologue, I’m a pragmatist. You can call me a Social Darwinist. I
believe you cannot prove any theory right or wrong until it is over…”5
Lee Kuan Yew resigned as Prime Minister on 28 November 1990 and assumed
the position of Senior Minister.6 In his memoir, he wrote that without the pres-
sures of daily decision making, he was able “to reflect on the bigger and longer-
term issues and contribute towards more rounded solutions”. He continued to
contribute in discussions both in cabinet and in one-on-one meetings with the
Prime Minister and other ministers.7 In speeches before and after he relin-
quished his position as Prime Minister, Lee appraised the strategic problems
that confronted the world after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of
the Soviet Union in 1991. He viewed the 1990s in the context of a new geopo-
litical configuration which posed new challenges and hazards for Asian coun-
tries. He highlighted the need for a new balance of power, but one that was
founded on economic strength rather than military power. He also foresaw the
shift in global balance to the Asia-Pacific with the inevitable rise of China
economically, followed by that of India. Lee believed that never had there been
a moment “so propitious in history” for the industrial democracies to shape a
system – along with the necessary institutions – to allow all countries
to develop in cooperation and in competition.8 Last but not least, he underlined
the need for the United States to maintain a presence in the region as a counter-
vailing power.
72 The post-Cold War years
On the end of the Cold War
In his last New Year message in 1990 as Prime Minister, Lee said the “tumultu-
ous” events of 1989, particularly the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Eastern
Europe, “marked the end of an epoch”. The familiar bi-polar world in which every
international issue was focused on the containment of the Soviet Union had ended.
Geopolitical relationships worldwide were altering. But he warned that it would
be too much to expect all countries to live happily ever after – “To maintain peace
in the world there must be a new balance of power”. In his analysis, in the near
term, the Soviet Union would be less menacing as it had to grapple with economic
and political reforms while China was preoccupied with leadership transition. Lee
identified three major issues of concern for the 1990s: (a) developments in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union; (b) environmental issues – according to Lee, “envi-
ronmental problems move much more slowly although the eventual impact could
be much greater”, citing climate change as one important issue; and (c) develop-
ments in Asia and the integration of the newly industrialized economies (NIEs)
into the world economy.9 In the post-Cold War world, Lee predicted that future
competition between industrialized countries would be “primarily economic, and
this competition will be worldwide”. He believed that this development was
“inexorable, driven by the logic of technological discovery, especially in transport
and communication”. He warned that there should be some generally accepted
method of making adjustments between societies moving at different speed.
Otherwise, it could lead to a return to the conventional and traditional way, where
instead of competition for markets, there was competition for territories, empires,
spheres of interests and exclusive markets. Where does Singapore fit into this new
world? Singapore’s role, according to Lee, had been that of “a catalyst” and “a
convenient spring board for the extension of MNC investments into ASEAN”.10
Lee also noted a change in the international community’s response to the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, which was reversed by an international coali-
tion of armed forces from 35 countries led by the United States in February 1991.
He said the unanimity of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council
in responding to the Iraqi occupation gave grounds for hope. In Lee’s words, “their
support for a world governed by the rule of law was a dramatic break from the cyni-
cal calculations of great power interests in the Cold War years”. The world was “at
a crossroads” and for a brief period, Lee thought there was now “real hope” that the
UN would have a positive and decisive role in the resolution of international
conflicts.11 But by May 1991, Lee noted that the “tremendous optimism” after the
fall of the Berlin Wall after 9 November 1989 had proved to be “excessive”.12 Even
if the Soviet Union ceased to be a threat, there were still many “deep-rooted prob-
lems” in the world which could upset world peace of which Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait was only one of them. These threats, according to Lee, made the UN more
important than ever. The dozen United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolu-
tions on Iraq showed that the UN could play an increased role in upholding world
peace. Lee, however, warned that Soviet reasonableness could not always be
assumed. Peace and security in the world still depended on “a balance of power”.13
The 1990s 73
On the United States
There was an on-going debate about American decline which had been the subject
of another cottage industry since the publication of Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and
Decline of Great Powers in 1989. In Lee’s analysis, a US military presence in
both Europe and the Pacific was still very essential but he warned that “unless the
US economy becomes more dynamic and less debt-ridden, this presence will be
much reduced by the end of the decade”. Even if the US deficits were reduced,
productivity and exports increased, the US could not afford and would not be
willing to bear the whole cost of the global security burden. Thus, other nations
– particularly Germany and Japan – must take a more active role in international
security.14 One critical question was thus whether the United States could
continue its role as a key security and economic player in the Pacific beyond the
year 2000. Lee hoped Washington could and would;
No alternative balance can be as comfortable as the present one with the US as

a major player. But if the US economy cannot afford a US role, then a new
balance it will have to be … However, the geopolitical balance without the US
as a principal force will be very different from that which it now is or can be if
the US remains a central player. My generation of Asians, who have experi-
enced the last war, its horrors and miseries, and who remember the US role in
the phoenix-like rise from the ashes of that war to prosperity of Japan, the NIE’s
and ASEAN, will feel a sense of regret that the world will become so vastly
different because the US becomes a less central player in the new balance.15
He believed that “thinking Americans who understand power and their relations,
the equation between power and American economic well-being” would want to
remain in the region.16
So strongly did Lee feel the need for an American presence to remain in Asia,
when the Philippine Congress in 1991 voted to shut down the American bases
there, Singapore offered to upgrade its naval base to service the US fleet and as a
transit point for US naval operations in the region. Lee explained:
Nature does not like a vacuum. And if there is a vacuum, we can be sure that
somebody will fill it. I don’t see Japan particularly wanting to fill that space
unless it feels that its trade routes and access to Gulf oil are threatened. If the
Americans are not around, they (the Japanese) cannot be sure who will
protect their oil tankers. So they have to do something themselves. That will
trigger the Koreans, who fear the Japanese, then the Chinese. Will India then
come down to our seas with two aircraft carriers? It could be a disastrously
unstable state of affairs. So why not stick with what has worked so far? The
US presence has maintained peace on the high seas of the Pacific since 1945.
The American presence, in my view, is essential for the continuation of
international law and order in East Asia.17
Lee identified three potential powers that were likely in time to challenge
American supremacy. (a) The Russian Federation which Lee had never written
off and had to be taken seriously. He believed that in 20–30 years, and if not in
30 years, then 50 years, the Russians would be back; (b) The Islamic world – He
was most prescient in stating that as long as the Arab–Palestinian–Israeli conflicts
dragged on, “the Islamic world will continue to be in turmoil, stirring unfriendly
Islamic states to acts of revenge and making friendly Islamic states reluctant to
align themselves openly with America and the West” and (c) the third potential
power would stem from the slow but inexorable rise of China.18
On the role of Japan

He also acknowledged the role of the secondary level powers. Many of his
speeches and interviews in the 1990s focused on the role of Japan. Japan had the
second largest economy in the world and to Lee, “she cannot act as she has been
doing”.19 Together with the United States and the European Community, Tokyo
had to “share the responsibility for maintaining the global system of security and
economic cooperation”. Lee was very concerned about trade frictions between
Japan and the United States – Japan bashing and American protectionism. The
worst case scenario which Lee described “dreadful and dangerous” was where
US–Japan trade and economic relations deteriorate so much that mutual security
ties became “weakened and ruptured”.20 Lee predicted that in another 20 years,
the US would not be able to hold the balance against China on its own. “Without
Japan, the countries of Asia will not believe it can be balanced, for 30 or more
years”.21 It was inevitable that the US and Japan had to get along. As he said in
one interview, “you can’t attack China and also attack Japan at the same time.
You have to make up your mind. You must have one or the other on your side.
The way events have developed, it has to be Japan, you hardly have a choice”.22
Lee elaborated on the consequence of this scenario in a 1992 speech: If after
10 years, the US had still not recovered its economic health, defence expenditure
would become a domestic political issue. There would be questions as to why the
US should continue to pay for the stability of East and Southeast Asia when the
benefits accrue not to the United States but Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
China and Southeast Asia. Japan would be gradually forced to carry more of its
own defence responsibility. Any Japanese defence build-up would be seen as
re-militarization by the two Koreas (which Lee speculated would eventually be
unified) and China. Although Lee felt that fear of Japan’s re-militarization was
“more emotional than rational” as the situation in East and Southeast Asia was
unlike the 1930s and 1940s, emotional as it might be, it influenced attitudes in
many East Asian countries and therefore could not be easily ignored. The conse-
quence of these developments would be “to divert the focus the rest of East Asia
from economic development towards defence. Growth would be sacrificed for
security. Increased defence forces will lead to increased suspicions and tensions.
The result will be bad for all”.23 He was, however, hopeful that both Washington
and Tokyo would do their utmost to avoid this scenario.24
The 1990s 75
There are four forms of power, accordingly to Lee, which enable a country to
play a major regional or international role – military, diplomatic, financial and
industrial. For the Asia-Pacific region, Lee’s ideal arrangement was for Japan’s
financial and industrial power to complement US military and diplomatic power.
It would not be easy for Japan (compared to Germany). Unless Japan was
accepted by her neighbours as one of the leaders of the region, a global role
would not come easily. In this aspect, Lee felt that Japan had “a longer road to
travel” to change the perceptions of her neighbours than Germany because the
Germans had openly acknowledged their mistakes in World War II and they
also had a less insular culture. He highlighted Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu’s
speech in Singapore on 3 May 1991 when for the first time a Japanese Prime
Minister officially expressed his “sincere contrition” for the “unbearable suffer-
ings and sorrow” of many people in Asia caused by Japan. Lee felt that it was
“a good beginning for a catharsis … However, young Japanese in schools
must be part of this catharsis through their teachers and textbooks. When this is
done Japan will be able to play a fuller role for peace and stability in the world,
especially in Southeast Asia”.25 In sum, Japan “must put an end to the equivoca-
tion and the ambiguity about its role in the last war”.26 He did not think that
Japan could play a leading political and security role in the region on its own as
long as it was unable “to square its accounts over the last war”.27 One of the most
memorable remarks made by Lee on allowing the Japanese Self-Defence Forces
abroad is when he compared it to “giving a chocolate liqueur to an alcoholic”.
According to him, once the Japanese get off the wagon, it will be hard to stop
them. While he thought the values of the younger generation of Japanese had
changed, “what proof have we that, if they get into a desperate situation… they
wouldn’t set out with the same zeal as their grandfathers did?” So, it was best if
the American security alliance remained, leaving Japan to “concentrate on high-
definition television”.28
On the international economy and other

long term problems
On the whole, in the early 1990s, Lee was of the view that the mood throughout
most of East Asia (and this term includes Southeast Asia) was for cooperation
and quick economic growth. East Asia had entered a period of stability and confi-
dence. Twenty five years after the formation of ASEAN, the organization
now agreed to an ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA) to be reached gradually over
15 years. As Lee put it, “measured by the speed of EC integration, ASEAN’s pace
is glacial. But it was a momentous turning point. Only 10 years ago, it would have
been unthinkable”. He envisaged that East Asia would remain the most dynamic
region of the world for the next 20–30 years.29 That said, several things could go
wrong. Stability and security which are the “preconditions for economic growth”
could be upset by: (a) tensions across the Taiwan Straits which Lee believed
would not decrease until Beijing was satisfied that Taiwan would not seek inde-
pendence. Related to this is US-China relations – “If that goes sour, it will affect
the whole of Asia, indeed the whole world”30; (b) the imminent nuclear capability
of North Korea, although this was mitigated by the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and Chinese interest to have stability in the Korean Peninsula and an envi-
ronment conducive for economic growth. Nevertheless, the combination of
Pyongyang’s aggressive posture and the acute economic situation in North Korea
posed a dangerous situation. The only thing to do was “to keep up the pressure
and remain patient” and the Chinese must be brought on board;31 and (c) the
overlapping claims over the Spratlys.32 In the 1990s, the Taiwan Straits and the
Korean Peninsula were often described as the “flashpoints” in Asia. Lee thought
that the danger was more acute in North Korea because “you’re dealing with a
regime that does not calculate in the terms you and I calculate. Taipei, Beijing
and Washington are calculators. There’s so much to lose on all sides that I think
alternatives will be sought, will be explored and, after some anguish and probably
near-collisions, an alternative will emerge”. Lee was banking on all three parties
calculating to avoid very high costs which would be borne by the rest of Asia.33
But he had no doubt that China and Taiwan would be reunited someday but “my
wish is that it won’t come too soon, because it could be a catastrophe”.34 On
another occasion, Lee said that there would be “a timetable for some reunification
50 years down the road, in gradual stages”.35
In one of his rare longer-term projections, Lee predicted that by 2050 the emer-
gence of a mega-economy in China and several large ones in India, Japan and
Indonesia would change the balance of power. That Asia was presently (in 1995)
over-dependent on the US market would not be a long-term problem. Asia would
be the “locomotive for the world economy”.36 In the short term, he did not think
India could be influential because she lacked the economic strength – “… when
you are not in a position to give investments or aid or carry your weight, then it’s
difficult to play a big role and that affects India’s political influence”.37
Lee’s premise was that in the 21st century, competitions between nations
would increasingly be in realm of economics, which explains why the subject of
economics is a recurring theme of many of his post-Cold War speeches. In his
words, “except in crisis situations, economic power already gives a country more
influence and leverage than military power, as the experience of Soviet Union has
shown”.38 He argued that global economic integration was unavoidable because
the rapid advancement of technology had brought the world together “irrevoca-
bly”. On another occasion, he said that the world had become too integrated by
science and technology to be kept divided by ideology, religion, culture or race
and we had become “one inter-dependent and mutually destructible world”. He
was acutely concerned about protectionism and the world sliding into trade
blocs – “There is no viable alternative to global integration. Protectionism
disguised as regionalism will sooner or later lead to conflicts and wars between
the regional blocs as they compete for advantage in non-bloc areas … Globalism
is the only answer that is fair, acceptable, and will uphold world peace”.39 If we
do not allow societies to mesh with each other through trade and the exchange of
goods and services through investments, trade and tourism, we go back to territo-
rial conquests and spheres of influence, conflicts and wars.40
The 1990s 77
Lee highlighted how during the Great Depression, European empires in a
“misguided attempt” to alleviate their unemployment problems, pursued
protectionist policies which led to the rise of Fascism in Italy, Nazism in
Germany and militarism in Japan and World War II. Having learnt the lesson,
after World War II, at Bretton Woods, the victors laid the framework for reha-
bilitation, recovery and mutual prosperity. But after the end of the Cold War in
1991, he noted that the victors of the Cold War had unfortunately not tried to
formulate a structure for economic cooperation and mutual prosperity. There had
been no serious exploration of the long term problems of the world’s economy.
He recommended that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank, which had “the advantage of not being beholden to any national constitu-
ency” as their membership included all the developing and OECD countries,
should take on this responsibility and recommend possible solutions. He spoke
approvingly of the goals of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and
of President Clinton’s informal summit of APEC leaders in Seattle (November
1993) as a “significant initiative” which would focus American and Asian think-
ing on the future of the Asia-Pacific and “crystallize their ideas on how to get the
economies of the region to be in greater harmony and synergy”.41 But not long
after, Lee noted that the largeness of spirit which the US displayed after World
War II had been replaced by “a certain meanness of spirit” by its treatment of
Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia and China because of its economic problems and
domestic uncertainties. He was particularly critical of the US in his 19 May 1994
speech to the Asia Society. “East Asia was disappointed that the US was so ready
to abandon long term benefits and high moral ground for short term gains”,
Lee said.42 US interest in the region revived in 1996 in response to the tensions
between China and Taiwan during the run up to the Taiwanese elections in
March. But as Lee put it, it “is not as if the US planned to bring about this renewal
of its security interests. It happened by accident”. He fretted that too much of
what happened in US policy towards the region was “not thought and not
planned” when it should be.43
On the outlook of the Asia-Pacific and

the emergence of China
In Lee’s analysis and projection, the shifts in economic power would redefine the
political configurations of the Asia-Pacific. What happened in China, Japan and
the rest of East Asia would decide the kind of world we live in. In the early post-
Cold War years, the situation remained fluid: While most Asia-Pacific countries
wanted the US to stay engaged in the region both economically and militarily,
they expect a draw-down in the level of US forces. But with access to the region,
Lee calculated that an adequate US presence should be affordable for the next
decade. The key unknown was how the US economy would pan out. This is a
significant issue as “only a robust US economy can support its role in the Asia-
Pacific”. As for Japan, all expect Tokyo to play a bigger political role but the
question was whether Japan’s role would be in conjunction or independent of the
US. In Lee’s view, it would be a setback if after becoming a “normal country”
Japan went nuclear. All East Asian countries continued to support the basic US
policy since 1945 that Japan would be protected under the US nuclear umbrella.
Lee warned that “any sign that this umbrella is not completely reliable will lead
the Japanese further along this road to a total defence capability” which would
lead to “a more complicated and a more dangerous world”.44 Should Japan decide
to go nuclear, “there would be serious rethinking among neighbouring countries,
and a strategic realignment in the rest of Asia. I, for one, would be deeply
concerned”.45
One imponderable threat to security and stability in the region that could derail
East Asia’s economic prospect was China. In the early 1990s there emerged what
has been described as “a small cottage industry predicated on forecasts about
growing regional insecurity and in particular, on China as a great power threat”.46
While it may have started as a “small cottage industry”, it was influential. Indeed,
the debate amongst people in academia and government as whether or not China
is a threat is even more vigorous today than before. Apart from the United States
and Japan, developments in China continued to loom large in Lee’s radar screen
through the 1990s and constitute the third principal theme of many of his
speeches and interviews.
The central challenge for the region would be China’s emergence as a great
power in the coming decades. Beijing wanted a peaceful international environ-
ment for China’s modernization which was expected to take 20–30 years. Within
this period, it was expected that China would gradually acquire power projection
capabilities (though he did not think China even at the end of the 22nd century
would have the “soft attractive side of power” which the Americans possessed or
“the cultural resonance of the US around the globe”)47. China’s growth into a
global power could be slowed by US actions, such as cutting off China’s Most
Favoured Nation (MFN) status or an economic embargo,48 but it could not be
stopped. In Lee’s view, it would not benefit the US to thwart China’s growth or
to isolate the country.49 “The last thing Asia wants is containment.50 First, it will
not succeed. Second, you will have absolutely no influence on how China – and
its attitudes – develop: it will be hostile and xenophobic to the West, and that’s
no good for us [in Southeast Asia] because we are linked up with the West. But
we are concerned about what kind of China will emerge …” Lee said.51 The
better approach would be to engage China and influence it at the early and
formative stage of its economic development. China’s neighbours were not
convinced by “China’s ritual phrases” that all countries big and small were equal
or that China would never seek hegemony. Lee felt that that China, “as a nascent
power, conscious of its enormous potential”, could afford to do very much more
to reassure its Southeast Asian neighbours that it is a friendly and non-expansion-
ist power, for example by being more open and transparent and by being more
sensitive to the apprehensions of its neighbours. Even then, it would take many
years before smaller neighbours would be fully persuaded by China’s words and
deeds. Beijing’s handling of the South China Sea issue would shape the attitudes
of the region to China. In a 1998 interview in the wake of the Asian Financial
The 1990s 79
Crisis, Lee was somewhat positive of the situation in the South China Sea:
“I don’t think the South China Sea is going to exercise our minds, because I don’t
see China wanting to change the status quo and occupy more sandbanks and
rocks”.52 Lee noted that China had committed to observing the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea since 1995.53
On the US–Japan–China triangle

Lee believed that as long as US–Japan–China relations were kept in balance,
stability would prevail in the region. Lee lamented that unfortunately with the end
of the Cold War, US policies towards China, Japan and the East Asian countries
had not been guided by strategic and economic considerations as they used to be
but by issues of human rights and democracy. This, according to Lee, had
“distracted attention away from the major challenge the world faces in the
century, namely whether China will become a constructive and cooperative part-
ner of the US, Europe and Japan in maintaining world peace, stability and pros-
perity”. The small and medium countries in the region would have to live with
the consequences of an “aroused and xenophobic” China.54 In the triangular
relationship between the three countries which he described as an “isosceles
triangle”,55 China and Japan, for the first time in history, would be strong powers
at the same time and how they relate to each other would have a “profound influ-
ence” on Asia and the world.56 But the US–China leg was “the most important
for stability in East Asia”. US–China relations would set “the tone, structure and
context” for all other relationships in the region. A stable US–China relationship
would mean stability and growth. An ad hoc and spasmodic relationship would
cause uncertainty, instability and inhibit growth in the region.57 While the current
state of the triangular relationship was “not perfect”, nevertheless it underpinned
the relative peace and stability of the region. Over time, he expected new arrange-
ments to evolve. But for the next 10–20 years, he saw no alternative to the
prevailing order.58 Lee predicted that in 20–30 years time, the geo-strategic land-
scape of the region would be weighted less on the American side and more on the
Japanese, Chinese and even the Russian side.59
Lee envisaged a division of Asia into three camps if US–China relations turned
bad – the worst-case scenario for political, security and economic development
in Asia over the next 20 years: (a) those who openly identify themselves with
America, for example, Taiwan and Japan (“however reluctant Japan may be to
get involved …”); (b) those who want to be in between the two so they can
choose issue by issue which side they will support. Most of the ASEAN countries
would fall into this category. Lee’s observations on ASEAN deserve to be quoted
in full:
Every time an issue crops up, ASEAN will need a series of meetings, some
saying let’s go this way, some saying let’s go the other way. It makes life
more difficult. I can see within ASEAN, Vietnam on the one end, from its
historic perspective unlikely to be on the Chinese side, and on the other hand,
Thailand likely to be with China and against Vietnam. The Thais cannot
forget what has happened in their history, including the 1978 invasion of
Cambodia by Vietnam followed by the Chinese attack on Vietnam in 1979.
Singapore is further down south and can afford to be more dispassionate. But
frankly, we wouldn’t like to be caught taking one side or the other perma-
nently. For that matter, I don’t see any ASEAN country doing that. Because
forever is a very long time. If we were quite sure the US would be here
forever, that’s different.
And, (c) a few countries such as Myanmar which would support China openly.
However, he did not think the two nuclear powers would go to war – “The US
and China have got to live with each other”.60 On a separate occasion, Lee stated
that where ASEAN’s interests were not involved – Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong
– ASEAN would not back an American challenge. Over the Spratlys, ASEAN
could not remain neutral. But on other issues, ASEAN would likely “to be torn
between two strong pulls: the need to retain American presence and the need to
develop a viable long-term relationship with a huge neighbor, China …”61.
Lee was supportive of the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum
(ARF) which for the first time would bring together Russia, China, Vietnam, the
US and Japan. APEC and the ARF were the only two settings in which ASEAN
countries could engage China on issues of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific.
But he cautioned that while multilateral security dialogues could build under-
standing and confidence, they could not replace a stable balance of power.62
A stable balance of power required the US maintaining a presence in the region.
As Lee put it,
There is no way for Asia by itself, without the Americans, to find a balance.
If you remove the Americans from the equation, even if you combine Japan
and Korea, the other countries in Southeast Asia, Vietnam, ASEAN,
Australia, New Zealand, they still can’t balance China. The difference in
weight is disproportionate, unless the Japanese decide to become nuclear and
rearm in a big way. That would be a very dangerous world.63
Asked whether he did not think Beijing would view US–Japan ties as two power-
ful countries ganging up against China, Lee thought that for the next 10–15 years,
it would be fine as the US and Japan working together provided the assurance and
comfort that the Japanese would not rearm.64 From the world and US point of
view, the greatest danger is if the Japanese rearm and had nuclear weapons.
“Then, we have another joker in the pack”. Lee believed that the Chinese,
although they would not say so openly, knew that it would be in greater danger
if the US withdrew from Asia.65
Sino–US relations improved in 1997. Commenting on the impending meeting
of President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton in Washington (October 1997),
Lee said that if all went well, the world would be less troubled. He reiterated that
“no single bilateral relationship will influence the future as the US–China
The 1990s 81
relationship”.66 He believed that many of the post-Cold War problems were not
intractable if intelligently managed. Confrontation was not inevitable as both
Washington and Beijing wanted to avoid confrontation and its costly conse-
quences. “In the longer term, it is not inconceivable that a stable Pacific relation-
ship could underpin stability and growth in the region after the Cold War”, Lee
opined.67 The agreement for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization
(WTO) in 1999 was, in Lee’s view, “a strategic decision on both sides”. More
important than the economic aspect, “a decision by the Chinese leadership that
they want to participate and abide by the rules and a decision by the Americans
that despite all the rhetoric in the media and in Congress, the American
Administration, Clinton, in particular, as President, decided that the long-term
interest of America and probably the world was better served by having China
working within the system”.68
In sum, Lee was generally more optimistic about the future of international
relations than he was in 1986. This was because in his words, he
could not foresee at the time that with the end of communism would come
the realization that there was no alternative to linking up with the advanced
world, to get technology, get knowledge, get markets. Let’s get prosperous
together. This generation of Asians, especially their leaders, have learned
their lesson: whatever your quarrels, if you go to war, you will be pauper-
ized. By all means, let’s argue, but at the end of the day let’s work together.
Let’s trade. Let’s get on with it. You grow, I grow. That’s the best.69
Indeed, he felt more optimistic about Singapore than in 1965 because “recent
experience had showed that those who crossed national boundaries “paid heav-
ily” for it. This created a rule of international law which would help small states
like Singapore”.70
On the Asian values debate and clash of civilizations

This is perhaps a good point to introduce another big debate in the early post-
Cold War years besides the China Threat debate described earlier. Soon after the
end of the Cold War, the United States and many Western opinion-makers began
to pay even greater attention to the promotion of democracy and human rights. In
the summer of 1993, the influential journal Foreign Affairs published an article
by political scientist Samuel Huntington entitled, “The Clash of Civilisations?”
which apparently generated more discussions than any other article the journal
had published since the 1940s.71 Huntington’s aim was to present a “framework,
a paradigm” for viewing post-Cold War global politics “that would be meaning-
ful to scholars and useful to policymakers”. In a nutshell, Huntington’s hypoth-
esis is that future global conflicts would be between civilisations, fought on
cultural rather than ideological fault lines. In 1994, the same journal published an
interview with Lee Kuan Yew by its managing editor Fareed Zakaria entitled
“Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew” where Lee spoke about
the differences between Confucianism and Western values, the positive attributes
of East Asian values. One of Lee’s main points in the interview was that the
Western system or set of values cannot and should not be foisted on other socie-
ties.72 Lee is often named as one of the key proponents of “Asian values”. The
“Asian Values Debate”, as it was called, generated a lot of discussion which need
not delay us here as it has more to do with issues of governance. In so far as
Strategic Thought is concerned, it is important to note Lee’s views of Huntington’s
thesis. Huntington had sent Lee a copy of his Foreign Affairs article. Lee told
Huntington when they met that he agreed with him only with regards to the
Muslims. According to Lee, speaking some years before 2001,
Hinduism, Chinese Confucianism or Communism, Japanese Shintoism, they

are really secular. They know that to progress, you must master science and
technology, and that’s where they are going to compete with you in the end.
But the Muslims believe that if they mastered the Quran and they are
prepared to do all that Muhammad has prescribed, they will succeed. So, we
can expect trouble from them ….73
Even before Huntington first expounded his thesis in October 1992, Lee had
expressed his view on the probability of an East–West conflict, “between East
Asian ‘communitarian’ capitalism and American-style individualistic capital-
ism”. While he lauded East Asian values, he did not see the conflict as “between
two closed systems”. Rather, it would be “a process of interaction and change”.
He did not think the Americans would stick to a losing formula – “This is a differ-
ent Wild West. The ‘Lone Ranger’ approach is no longer the way to conquer the
world. What is needed instead is a regularly constituted cavalry instead of an ad
hoc lone ranger”. He was certain that the Americans would change because they
did not want to lose.74
On the Asian Financial Crisis

To Lee, the Asian Financial Crisis which began in July 1997 was “a considerable
setback to what was an extremely promising trend of more growth and stability,
increasing cooperation, freer trade and better international coordination”. He
expected individual countries to turn inwards as they grappled with their own
economic and social problems. But Lee was optimistic that Asia would recover
although not all countries at the same pace75, and that after overcoming the shock
of the Asian Financial Crisis – after perhaps two to five years – ASEAN would
again coalesce as a grouping to maintain the geo-political balance in the region.76
Similarly, for the other affected countries – “…there is no reason why we can’t
overcome what is a man-made disaster. This was not an act of God”, he said.77
Asked whether the Pacific renaissance or the Age of the Pacific was ending even
before it started as a result of the Asian Financial Crisis, Lee replied, “No, how
can it be? You have the first typhoon and you see it is over. Typhoon is very
unsettling but it brings a lot of rain, cleanse out the rivers. It will subside and new
The 1990s 83
crops will grow”.78 In another interview, he described the Asian crisis as “a blip
on a long-term trend”.79
The Financial Crisis obviously made it even more difficult for the Southeast
Asian countries to compete with China economically. ASEAN had no choice –
“… getting together was because we needed that added weight to deal on equal
terms with big countries in the old days with the US, with Europe and with Japan.
Now we’ve got to deal with China. One by one, the ten of us will be feather-
weights, I mean, against the scale of a country like China. Even the ten of us put
together isn’t of the same balance, but at least we’ll have greater weight…”.80 He
observed that after the severe financial and economic setback, none of the
ASEAN countries “got time for ideological or expansionist issues”. Moreover,
China’s entry as a dominant claimant in the Spratlys “had muted territorial quar-
rels between ASEAN states”. ASEAN countries now felt the need to close ranks
and negotiate together, “a natural defensive move”.81
At the close of the 20th century, Lee once more highlighted the need to take
note of China’s growing influence and “weigh the consequences”. He anticipated
that China “would inevitably demand a greater voice in the way things are, in the
dispensation of the region”. He hoped that by joining the WTO and participating
in the ARF, China would develop “a certain acceptance of present rules and
present conventions” which would in turn make the adjustment process less
awkward. He reiterated that a balance must be struck between the US and Japan
on one side and China on the other “to allow stability and growth to take place”.82
5 The new millennium
“As a small country whose destiny is determined as much by the external events as
by internal policies, Singapore has become acutely sensitive to future trends in the
East Asia region. How we see the future determines our stance and our policies”1
“There is no question that China will cause a major displacement in the balance
of power when she finally arrives as a major player on the world scene, say
30 years hence”2
“We have our interests, China has its interests, America has its interests”3
“They are broadening the appeal to all Muslims worldwide to fight on their behalf
against all others who are against the Taleban…This is one huge propaganda
assault to intimidate all the moderates in the Muslim World into silence so that
they become the voice of the Muslim World … Are we exempt from this? If you
believe that, you’re sadly mistaken”4
“… No one can accurately foretell the future because no one can predict what
technological breakthroughs will take place and have the most fundamental
effects on human life and the economies of nations”5
“This is an unfair world. But the world has never been fair. One tribe is stronger,
it has bigger people, more people, better soil, a better climate, and they also have
better luck”6
“The Cold War is over, but there has been no peace dividends”7
“I am saying what I am saying not because I am Chinese or because I am anti-
China, but because I represent Singapore and this is my national interest …”8
There were broadly two big challenges and concerns in the early phase of the new
millennium. The first concerns the distribution of power. How might the existing
distribution of power change? The other relates to sovereignty and globalisation,
grasping the nexus between economics and security. More than 20 years after the
end of the Cold War, the global order remains fluid. Rising and existing great powers
are reassessing and recalculating their interests without the overriding framework of
bipolar politics that characterized the Cold War, making for a more complicated
international order with uncertain configurations of geopolitical power.9 There is the
general view that the world is facing a “global leadership vacuum” as the “unipolar
moment of the US” has passed and no country is yet able to replace it.10 And as
The new millennium 85
Jeffrey D Sachs put it, while the shift to a multi-polar world means that no single
country or bloc can dominate the others, it also means that major global issues go
unresolved because there is no leadership to coordinate a global response.11
Lee Kuan Yew was positive about the prospect for East Asia’s growth in the 21st
century notwithstanding setbacks arising from the Financial Crisis of the late 1990s
that dampened expectations that Northeast and Southeast Asia would become “an
industrialized and advanced belt of nations” by the mid-21st century. Lee’s positive
outlook was not because of the sharp rebound of the crisis-hit economies, which in
his view came about somewhat too early before structural reforms were completed,
but was based on his understanding of “the way their (Asian) societies are organ-
ized, their histories and cultures, and their openness to technology”.
Lee acknowledged that the Financial Crisis had been a setback for ASEAN with
Indonesia being the worst hit country. He said that “a thriving Indonesia brightened
prospects for the whole region and acted as the anchor country in ASEAN; an ailing
Indonesia makes ASEAN a less attractive economic partner of Europe or America”.
Lee believed that Malaysia and Singapore, although each had taken different paths
to economic development and had successfully managed the Financial Crisis in
their own ways, were “in a position, together with the other original ASEAN
members to help restore ASEAN’s standing as an economic partner of the G7
countries”.12 When he addressed the Singapore Press Club and Foreign
Correspondents’ Association, Lee sought to dispel the conventional wisdom that
Southeast Asia was in a poor state and had been bypassed by Northeast Asia. While
he did not deny that Southeast Asia was not doing as well as Northeast Asia, he felt
that the comparison was unfair and was concerned that if this perception was
allowed to spread unchallenged, it could lead to “a certain fulfilment of worse fears
in government”. Declaring the Singapore Government’s long-term stakes in the
region, he said “It is our interests to help cut through this difficult period”. Although
“it’s taken more than it could carry when it admitted new members just on the eve
of a major crisis”, Lee also affirmed his belief in ASEAN’s role when he said that
though its anchor member “is unable to pull its weight as it used to”, among the
core original five, three are standing up: Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore with
Brunei … with a bit of coordination with the leaders, these four could make up for
the loss of weight that Indonesia used to bring to that organization …”.13
On China and the United States

If China stays on its current development trajectory, Lee projected that by 2050, it
could be the second largest trading nation in the world. By 2040, China and Japan’s
combined GDP would exceed that of the United States. This would result in the
move of the “economic centre of gravity of the world from the Atlantic to the
Pacific”. This was, however, not inevitable given the “deep-seated rivalries” between
the Chinese, Japanese and Koreans. According to Lee, the “latent suspicions” among
those countries could degenerate into conflicts “if there is no assurance
of a big power balance such as one with America and Japan on one side and China
on the other”. The most serious imponderable was “the danger of a conflict
between China and the US over Taiwan’s drift, or move towards independence”.14
86 The post-Cold-War years
Lee continued to hold the view that the US had a “critical”/“crucial” role to
play as the “balancer” in the region because “it is not possible to work out an
indigenous East Asian balance”. He explained:
If you extrapolate what’s been happening in China over the last 21 years
since they opened up, in another 21, or let’s say 50 years, we will have an
enormous giant of an economy in China and with it, the concomitant techno-
logical and military capabilities. I don’t see Japan, Korea – North and South
combined… and ASEAN being able to be on the other side of the scales.15
The Russian Federation would not be a major player for another 20 years.
In a 2010 interview with the editor-in-chief of Asahi Shimbun, Yoichi
Funabashi, Lee shared his analysis of US military presence and alliance structure.
He argued that power projections cannot depend solely on aircraft carriers which
are vulnerable to submarine attacks. The US would need bases. While he empa-
thized with the feeling of the Okinawans, he said the Japanese would have to
decide where their long-term interests lay – Japanese security or the convenience
of the Okinawans. If all American bases were removed, Japan and other Asian
countries would be weaker strategically because “Japan alone cannot be a coun-
terweight to China”. Lee recalled that around the 1990s, when Indonesia thought
it could “carve out an area of influence for itself, when the US forces left Subic
Bay”, there were protests when Singapore gave US access to its naval base and
allowed the Americans to maintain a logistic support unit in Singapore. But after
the Mischief Reef incident, it was not only Manila who belatedly realized that
closing the US bases in the Philippines did not contribute to the security of their
country; “attitudes towards the American access to Singapore bases underwent a
silent change” although it was not unanimous. According to Lee, South Korea,
Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia saw the
need for the US as a balancer. Malaysia took a contrary view. The mainland
Southeast Asian countries also had different views.16 Indeed, Lee believed that
the importance of the US presence in the region would only increase rather than
recede in the future when China becomes an economic power. As he said, “a
country such as the US which had risen to the pinnacle of the world, would not
easily give up its super-power position”. The US would want to remain “the
world’s top player for as long as possible”.17 At the same time, the Chinese know
that the US would yield to “any extension of Chinese influence reluctantly, and
only when they have to …”.18 On another occasion, he put it more starkly – “As
a rising power, China cannot be expected to acquiesce in the status quo if it is
against its interests. As the pre-eminent global power, US interest is the preserva-
tion of the status quo. The fundamental difference of interests cannot be wished
away”.19 China is very conscious of being encircled by the United States and its
allies. But Lee did not believe that China has intentions to challenge the US mili-
tarily as they are aware of the wide technology gap between them and the US.
Chinese strategy in the near term is to “build up the military capability to make
it expensive for America to intervene if they decide they have to use force on
Taiwan … not to win, but to deter the Americans … What will happen in 50
years, I don’t know”.20 It is expected that China and America will be rivals but
“not necessarily enemies”21 as “the world’s monetary and political problems
require both countries to take parallel paths”. Cooperation and competition
between the two countries will continue, relations will move forward, regardless
of occasional conflicts.22
Asked what he thought was a viable global security system in East Asia in the
next 50 years of the 21st century, Lee said that
what existed since World War II has evolved. It was frozen by the Cold War.
Lines were clear … We are gradually moving toward a very different system,
in which China becomes the largest player on this side of the Pacific. Not
suddenly, but over two or three decades. Like Europe, where they could not
possibly balance the Soviet Union and therefore NATO was necessary with
America and Canada, we are now in a similar position.23
Besides China, India was also expected to challenge the status quo. The
rapprochement between the US and India was also aimed to balance China’s
growing geopolitical clout. Lee thought it made “good geopolitical sense”. India
had lost 40 years by aligning with the Soviet Union during the Cold war and
accordingly to Lee, the Indians “now realize it”.24 Lee however did not think
India could contribute militarily to the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific
region as the Indian military at most can project its forces into the Straits of
Malacca because it is near the Andaman Islands but not beyond Singapore into
the Pacific.25
That said, Lee believed that the West should engage China in a competition on
“software” instead of “an unnecessary contest to see who could have more
missiles” – “Do we compete in military muscle, then in firepower, then in influ-
ence around the world? Or is the competition more about software: Who is
admired more by the other nations of the world because they have their people a
lifestyle and a standard of living and a kind of society that others aspire to? Such
a move would ensure peaceful co-existence for a long time”.26 Lee was however
concerned about the rising worldwide discontent over US unilateralism.27
He did not think that within the next 20 years, China could swallow up
economically much of Southeast Asia. The dominant economic partner for
Southeast Asia is still Japan.28 Lee reiterated the need for Japan “to acknowledge
its past military history with other Asian countries, especially China” in order to
play a more positive role in the region. In his view, Japan should have resolved
this problem “a long time ago” but chose to evade the issue. However, it is still
not too late to do so, so that her Asian neighbours would have the confidence that
past mistakes would not recur. At present, a Japanese navy could not sail to
Southeast Asia “as it would cause a global uproar”. He compared Japan to
Germany, which unlike Japan had come to terms with its past, and which had
since been accepted as a factor for stability in determining the shape and direction
of Europe. The Japanese also need to be less “introverted” and explain clearly and
convincingly to its neighbours that its initiatives, such as the Official Development
Aid (ODA) policy, were not tailored just for the benefit of Japan but for the
recipients as well. In sum, if Japan aspired to a leadership role in Asia, she would
need to “first win the confidence of the other Asian countries”. He believed the
Japanese economy would return to strength in the future and Tokyo “won’t allow
grass to grow under their feet and let the Chinese and Europeans take over
Southeast Asia”.29
On Northeast Asia
With regards to Sino–Japanese relation, Lee believed that it is similar to that of
Japan’s relations with the Southeast Asian countries, except that that it was worse
as China and Korea felt more resentment about the past. A new bilateral relation-
ship with China could possibly be developed in 10–15 years “with a new genera-
tion that could be more open and frank”. He did not think that Japanese leaders,
particularly the Prime Minister, visiting the Yakasuni shrine was a wise move;
When you say in a ritualistic way, “we are sorry, we apologise” and then the
leader goes to the Yakasuni shrine. It is a never-ending problem … Is
it necessary? It cannot be repeated. China has nuclear bombs. Even if Japan
has a nuclear bomb, it cannot be used. You cannot attack China anymore.
You cannot even attack Korea. So why not close the subject? I do not under-
stand this …30
On another occasion, Lee said that “we cannot for the rest of time just allow rela-
tions between the two countries to always revolve around these horrendous
deeds”. However, he did not think Japan would follow Germany’s footsteps with
full accounting of the war.31 The war issues would slow down the pace of East
Asian integration but they are not “not too overwhelming an obstacle … more a
psychological problem”.32 In Lee’s assessment, regardless of the ups and downs
in Sino–Japanese relation, Tokyo would try its utmost to avoid conflict with
China as “it would take too long for both sides to make up afterwards”. He related
what a Japanese leader had told him: “If the Americans fight the Vietnamese as
they did, after 20 years they can shake hands again. If the Americans fight China,
after 30 years, China and America can shake hands again. But if Japan fights
China, after 100 years, we cannot shake hands”.33 He projected that assuming
China continued with her economic reform trajectory, the Chinese economy
would surpass that of the Japanese in 30 years. China had the potential to grow
into an economic powerhouse five to six times the size of Japan. Thus, the trans-
formation of China “from a sleeping dragon into a roaring economy” is a process
that Singapore could not ignore.34
On the Taiwan issue, Lee cautioned that “there is a point beyond which no
Chinese leader can survive if Taiwan is seen to be drifting away under his watch”.
Regional countries all support the one-China policy because they want to avoid
“a costly and unnecessary conflict”. Lee compared the Taiwan issue with
Indonesia suffering the consequences of the Financial Crisis. In his view, “any
fallout from problems in Indonesia is minor compared to the consequences of a
clash of arms across the Taiwan Straits” which “could change the course of
developments in the whole of the Asia-Pacific”. Thus, with a new Taiwanese
president whose party stood for Taiwanese independence, “the danger has
increased”. The Taiwan issue was “an unwanted distraction”. But while it had
always been “delicate and difficult”, war is not inevitable. He had no doubt that
the powers lined up on both sides of the Taiwan issue “know the horrendous
consequences of conflict”.35
With regards to US support of Taiwan, Lee’s view was that if the US could
keep Taiwan separate from China eternally, “the Taiwanese would be eternally
grateful”. But if the US could not, then “it’s cruel to let them (Taiwanese) believe
that they can”. (In a 2008 interview, Lee estimated that by 2030, the US will not
be able to intervene in Taiwan because it will be “too costly”).36 This belief in the
American backing and support had resulted in the deliberate emphasis on a sepa-
rate and different Taiwanese identity distinct from that of mainland China which
started during the Lee Teng-hui administration and continued by the Chen Shui-
bian administration. Lee did not think the US could defend Taiwan indefinitely.
In his view, the US could choose to fight and probably could defend Taiwan for
another 10–20 years. But he was sceptical whether the Americans were prepared
to pay the price that China was ready to pay. “So all this will end up in tears.
It’s a cruel game to play with the Taiwanese. Their spirits will be crushed”. Lee’s
advice was not hold out false hopes that could lead to miscalculation by Taiwan’s
leaders.37 To Lee, while the Taiwanese “see little to gain by becoming a part of
China but, unfortunately, becoming a part of China is what will happen if China
doesn’t disintegrate”. In a nutshell, he “did not see any country being able to
prevent that reunification” – In a 2006 interview with Taiwan’s Commonwealth
magazine, he pointed out bluntly that “whether or not you are going to remain
ROC for the next five, 10, 15 or even 50 years, that is not in Taiwan’s hand. That
is in the hand of what happens in China and what happens in the United States.
They will decide Taiwan’s future”.38 Thus, the Americans should encourage a
peaceful resolution of the problem, which would take time as “a 50-year old
problem cannot be solved without a process taking many years”.39 He recalled a
conversation with Chiang Ching-kuo in mid-1980s when he asked Chiang why
he was stopping the Taiwan Chinese from travelling to the mainland. Lee told
Chiang that until he visited China in 1976 and saw the country for himself, he
made the same mistake in believing in intelligence reports that Singaporeans
would be subverted if they visit China. “Any Singaporean visiting China would
know it’s not for him”. He told Chiang that the Taiwanese had the opportunity to
influence China’s evolution and the next generation. “They will change to fit into
the world”.40 To Lee, the debate over “one country, two systems” was a “futile,
metaphysical question because “it would not be resolved, as ultimately Taiwan
have to contend with China’s rising might, its growing integration with the world
and a different relationship between China and the United States”. He felt that
Taiwan should make use of the time when the US is still around to protect the
island “to make the best of its economic opportunities”.41 Stating that he spoke as
an “old friend who wishes Taiwan well”, he reiterated in 2007 that it would be
“counter-productive” for Taiwan to continue to project itself as an independent
entity and/or apply to be a member of the United Nations. It would damage both
Taiwan and the region.42
Lee’s comparison of the defence of Taiwan with that of Singapore is worth
citing in full:
Singapore has our own defence forces. Whether Singapore will be able to live
peacefully in Southeast Asia depends not on Singapore alone, but on the
balance of power which enables international rules to be observed. It depends
on the United Nations Security Council, the US, Japan and other big powers
… Our defence forces can defend Singapore against a sneak sudden attack.
But if the enemy puts us under siege and blocks the Malacca Straits, how can
we survive? The destiny of Singapore depends on the international condition.43
Lee also did not expect North and South Korea to be reunified anytime soon. In
fact, while relations might have improved somewhat in 2000, Lee did not share
the euphoria over the recent rapprochement between the North and the South. As
he told his audience during a discussion at the Council of Foreign Relations, the
recent détente between the two Koreas would increase China’s importance to
both South Korea and Japan as Beijing had more influence over Pyongyang than
any other country in the world. He believed that the Korean issue “could drag on
for many years” – North Korea did not want to be absorbed by the South, and
China did not want to lose a buffer state.44 He described the North Korean nuclear
threat as a “spiky” problem and Pyongyang as an “extremely ruthless and calcu-
lating regime” that would stop at nothing if its survival was at stake. Lee expected
that the regime would use whatever leverage at its disposal: missiles, nuclear
proliferation and the danger of collapse, to extract as much as it could from South
Korea and the US, giving the minimum as quid pro quo.45 Because the four
parties most closely involved with North Korea have different objectives, Lee
told his audience at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2003, “a neat solution is not obvi-
ous”.46 But while Pyongyang plays “a game to get the world’s attention”, he
believes that “it is well aware that there is a line it cannot cross”. The North
Koreans know that if they go over the limit, “that’s the end of them”. So, they are
“playing a game to get attention and to blackmail, that’s all”.47 Lee further noted
that the danger was not in North Korea dropping a nuclear bomb but Pyongyang’s
sale of nuclear knowledge and/or bomb parts to rogue states. To Lee, if North
Korea dropped a bomb, it would not alter the balance of power in Asia. But if Iran
did so, “a drastic shift of power would occur”.48 He also did not believe China
would get the North Koreans to give up the bomb – “The North Koreans may be
prepared to put the bomb in a glass box – and break (the glass) only in emergen-
cies – provided you pay them a handsome fee. But to give up (the bomb) – no,
because that’s regime survival”, Lee told diplomats and academics during a
dialogue at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS, London).49
On the two biggest threats

In an August 2001 interview, Lee said that the biggest threat to the status quo was
the seemingly “inexorable” rise of China and India – “two old civilisations that
are poised to rise again and will return to their global dominance in a few
decades”. He had always taken a keen interest in China and India and since the
1950s had tried to forecast which of the two giants “would make the higher
grade”. He felt that India must deal with its bureaucracy and infrastructure if “its
tryst with destiny” is not to be delayed.50 He warned that the two giants should
not end up in opposing camps – “As you go back to the old balance, Chinese and
Indian influence will meet in Southeast Asia, and they should meet in a coopera-
tive and positive competitive mode, not in an adversarial mode, then all will
prosper”.51 Lee predicted that while the US would continue to dominate the first
half of the 21st century, it would have to “start making space” for China and India
in the second half.52 He also predicted that an India-China clash was unlikely in
the short to medium term as both countries wanted to focus on economic
growth.53
The second biggest threat, in his view, would be the situation in the Gulf of
Arabia “when those regimes change over the next few years, a transition that will
be aggravated by the Israeli-Palestinian crisis”. Lee described it as “the real
tinderbox in the foreseeable future” – “The Muslim nuclear weapon – which
already exists in Pakistan – will travel to other Muslim countries in the years to
come. Rational people don’t worry me. China is rational, so is India, America,
Europe and the rest of the world. But not the fundamentalist extremists”. Lee was
particularly concerned because “this fanaticism is growing in Indonesia, which is
next to us”.54 When asked about Islamic extremism, Lee’s reply was that “to call
it a threat antagonizes the majority of Muslim moderates, the very people we
should convince to be part of the mainstream”.55 This was four months before
September 11 which Lee subsequently described as “the defining moment after
the Cold War”.56
On the world post 9-11

Lee’s earliest thoughts after the September 11 attacks occurred were: (a) While
the US government had first to satisfy its own people that it had the wherewithal
to strike back and protect its own, Washington should not only rely on Western
and NATO countries, but also draw from Muslim nations and the Third World
into its broad coalition to counter the terrorists who attacked New York and
Washington. This was because countries of the latter groups would be especially
apprehensive about retaliatory strikes by the US. Washington should ensure that
it did not alienate more governments and people than absolutely necessary. (b)
He predicted that it would not be a “one-off strike and counterstrike” – “a
remarkably complex problem” which could turn into a “long-drawn trading of
blows”; (c) Not every Asian country had the luxury of saying unequivocally that
it could help the US in its battle against the perpetrators. “Each country has its
own domestic constituency, even those friendly to the US” – “groundswells” of

support for the Arab world, and resentment towards American policies in the
Middle East. “You can’t divorce the link”. Leaders had to do their own cold
calculations.57
The September 11 attacks had, in Lee words, “re-ordered priorities and muted
great power frictions”. The immediate threats to security shifted from “state-
related tensions or dangers of conflicts” (such as between US and China partic-
ularly during the early days of the Bush administration) to “non-state terrorists
Islamic groups”. Comparing a Muslim terrorist to a communist terrorist, Lee
believed that the former is “more potent operating trans-nationally”. He
explained that the communist terrorist would find it difficult to transcend ethnic-
ity and nationalism whereas “Al-Qaeda and similar Muslim terrorists share a
deeply-felt sense of Islamic brotherhood that transcends ethnicity and national
boundaries”. Lee was, however, careful to emphasize that the war against terror-
ism is not a war against Islam. The majority of Muslims are not associated with
terrorism or extremism. However, militant groups have “hijacked Islam as their
driving force and have given it a virulent twist”. External events had radicalized
many Southeast Asian Muslims and “the greatest challenges and highest stakes
are in Indonesia”. More than ever before, the stability of Indonesia, which has
the largest Muslim population in the world, was crucial to the future of
Southeast Asia.58
With regards to Washington’s plan to attack Iraq, Lee said, “If you don’t do
it, you are in trouble. If you do it without international support, you’re in trou-
ble, but less trouble than having a few hundred thousand people killed …
Overriding force must shake the confidence of his (Saddam Hussein’s) staunch-
est supports. This is a battle he cannot win …”.59 Lee predicted that American
attack of Iraq would inevitably arouse more anti-American sentiments amongst
Asian Muslims. The Iraq War would “further complicate relations” between
the US and countries with Muslim populations, especially if victory was not
swift and decisive.60 In a closed-door dialogue with PAP Members of
Parliament and activists, he revealed that Singapore could have “quietly
ducked” on the issue of the US-led war against Iraq. But that would run against
Singapore’s interest. “We have to think long term. We have to decide what’s in
our national interests. We cannot allow emotions and sentiments to decide our
policies”. Without the US, terrorism all over the world cannot be stopped.
While Lee supported the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime, he was not
enthusiastic about the US intention to remake Iraq which he expected would be
harder than many had predicted.61 He also thought that while the capture of
Saddam Hussein – “a supreme moment of American supremacy” – would make
“a profound difference psychologically not just in Iraq but in the Middle East”,
it would not profoundly change the course of the War on Terror or the danger
of conflict in Iraq.62 While Lee supported the US decision to invade Iraq, he did
not believe that with the time which the Americans have at their disposal, they
could bring about democracy in Iraq considering the fact that they took more
than ten years to bring democracy to Japan as well as Germany after the Second
World War.63
The US emerged as the pre-eminent power after the end of the Cold War. This
was affirmed by the 21-day war against Iraq which showcased its advanced mili-
tary capabilities. But the decision to support the Americans and be named as a
member of the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq had its risks. As
Lee explained, “If America had lost, or got in long battles or street fighting with
many casualties, we would be in deep trouble”.64 At the same time, Lee also
recognized that continued US pre-eminence is not a given. He opined that
“throughout history, every force has generated a counter-force”. For the present,
Russia, China, the European Union and other countries want to maintain good
relations with the United States. Washington should tend these relations in order
to prolong its pre-eminence. “Not to do so”, he warned “may persuade more
nations that the way to restrain American unilateralism is to join a group of all
those opposed to it”.65
Lee was worried that “the world was in for a period of great uncertainty and
danger, with no one knowing how religious extremism will peter out” but he was
also optimistic that “terrorism cannot win because they do not have the power,
economic might or the science and technology to prevail” – “They will fail.
That’s the comforting conclusion we can draw”, he emphasized.66 He believed
that Asian economies would continue to grow despite the terrorism threat, but it
would not be easy for the Southeast Asian governments to manage political and
economic change in the post-September 11 atmosphere.67 He did not think the
Iraq War would change the “strategic equation in East Asia”. Whatever happened
in the Gulf, the key strategic issue in East Asia is “managing a rising China”
because “in the long run (in 20–40 years), a powerful China must want to exercise
its influence in the world, beyond its shores”. Thus, the “innate contest for pre-
eminence” will remain making “Sino–US relations the “overarching issue for
East Asia”.68
In this aspect, Lee did not expect any change in Sino-US relations during the
tenure of Hu Jintao who assumed the position of General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China in November 2002. Lee did
not expect any radical policy changes in China because Chinese leaders were
chosen to provide continuity “which is what the present team wants, and what the
next team wants”. In this case, Hu Jintao and his team had worked with his prede-
cessor, Jiang Zemin and his team, for more than a decade and were “well assim-
ilated into the latter’s thinking”. He also noted that China was in a period of rapid
expansion. The first 10–15 years was the “easy phase” because the country was
catching up from a very low base. Chinese society would inevitably become more
capitalistic. He projected that China’s GDP might equal that of the United States
in 50 years but China’s size would hinder its ability to reach superpower status,
because unlike Europe and the US which had no “backward” provinces, China
would be slowed down by its inland regions, which cannot keep pace with the
coastal provinces.69
On three trends
Lee Kuan Yew’s remarks at a Nanyang Technological University Forum in
February 2003 are worth recalling for his prediction of the trends that would
shape the world in the next few decades.70 Three points are particularly relevant
to this study: On the subject of radical Islam, Lee believed that while the Muslim
terrorists could cause damage and kill large numbers of people, infuse fear and
give people a sense of insecurity, they cannot conquer and subdue their oppo-
nents, destroy a country or take over a country, not unless they have “weapons of
mass destruction, nuclear or radioactive materials, chemical and biological”.
Unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, they do not have the military
wherewithal to defeat America, Israel and the West. Gradually (and this could
take a decade or more – a long and slow process), terrorism would be reduced as
the excesses of Muslim extremists would antagonize more and more people in the
developed world. Saudi Arabia would be persuaded to stop exporting Wahabism
and terrorist groups would find it more difficult to find funding as well as breed-
ing ground. Lee expected them to lose eventually. Although it may look on the
surface to be simply a struggle between Muslim extremist radicals on the one side
and America–Israel–Western allies on the other, but in fact at its heart, it is a
struggle about what Islam means between extremist and rationalist Muslims,
between fundamentalist and modernist Muslims.
On the global balance of power, Lee did not expect any dramatic shifts. The
US, by virtue of “its advances in science and technology and their contribution to
its economic and military might” would remain the sole superpower although “in
50 to 100 years, the supremacy of the United States … might not be what it is
today”. The rise of China “is almost inexorable” and so too is “the growing
capacity of India”. Lee saw China as well as India as “rationalists” and “modern-
ists” having the determination and ability to catch up with the United States in all
areas of strategic weaponry. China’s “peaceful emergence” or “peaceful rise” is
in everyone’s interest. An “unpeaceful rise” will mean conflict and chaos in the
entire Asia-Pacific region.71
At the point of writing, the world is very much seized by the US debt crisis.72
The US is struggling to contain the fallout of its massive deficit and historic
downgrade of its credit rating by Standard & Poor’s. In 2004 when there was
much concern about the US budget and fiscal deficit, Lee did not think of the
American debt as an immediate problem but a longer term one. In Lee’s view,
“Eventually … there will be internal problems, not because Japan and China
decide not to keep US dollars, but because in America, another bubble may be
created. Sooner or later, excesses will have to be blown off and washed away.
That’s a different problem. It’s not an international collapse …”.73 He did not
share the “apocalyptic” view in 2004 but added that he might have to change his
mind “if two years from now, I see the same spending habits in America and the
same reckless disregard of the size of the budget deficit and the fiscal deficit”. He
was hopeful that Americans would display good sense.74 While he expected an
economic shift “from the Atlantic to the Pacific” in 20 years, he thought that those
who bet against the US economy may “regret it”.75 To Lee, the US is indeed very
important. As he told Tom Plate, “our fate does not depend just on what goes on
in Johor or in Indonesia or in ASEAN. It depends on what happens in America in
this new order now”.76
Referring to the 2002 National Security Strategy of the Bush Administration,
Lee said, “I understand the sentiments of the American leaders … that they would
not allow any country to overtake the US. That must be the aim, their ambition.
Is it achievable? If it is, then empires would have stopped with the Romans, or
with the Moguls, or with the Ming or Qing, or with the Czars. There are cycles
in human history”. But he did not think “the cycle of American hegemony” is
about to end soon. 77 In an interview with television journalist Charlie Rose in
October 2009, Lee expressed confidence that the US would still be the dominant
power in the first half of the 21st century with two caveats: (a) the 21st century
will be a contest of supremacy in the Pacific because that is where the growth will
be. The US thus has to be able to hold its ground in the Pacific or risk losing its
world leader status; and (b) in order to hold its ground in the Pacific, the US has
to rein in its soaring fiscal deficit. He warned that investors would start moving
their assets from the US if they felt that the American economic woes were
getting too big or if Washington lacked the political will to tackle them.78
To Lee, what was most significant and would affect lives more profoundly than
any other factor would be the “speed of scientific and technological change”. From
human genome to GM foods to expansion of global trade and investment – all
have positive and negative impacts on lives and societies. While the scientific and
technological developments could lead to economic growth and prosperity,
longer and healthier lives, they also bring about climate changes, more friction
and conflict over limited and finite resources and space, drug smuggling, illegal
migration and global mafias. These are as Lee put it “part and parcel of the
globalized world, like global terrorism”.
Lee believed that terrorism and China were “the two great challenges” facing
East Asia and the rest of the world. With regards to terrorism which he described
as a “new, globalized menace”, he felt that despite US military dominance,
America’s purely military approach would not be able to stamp out the militant’s
breeding ground – “you can kill the suicide bombers. There are hundreds of them
but they are worker bees. The queen bees are the madrasahs”. In his analysis, it
is a long-term problem which requires the cooperation between developed coun-
tries and moderate Muslims. But in the end, the problem can only be solved
by the Muslims themselves. He was however critical of American domestic
opposition to US commitment in Iraq as well as the European thinking that the
terrorist threat could be contained by taking “a localised, kid-gloved approach”.
To Lee, the battle against radical Islam would be won and lost in the Middle East.
He saw Iraq as a “very grave” problem” for if the jihadist won there, “I’m in
trouble here”. He highlighted the psychological dimension of the conflict: “Their
attitude would then be, “we’ve beaten the Russians in Afghanistan, we’ve beaten
the Americans and the coalition in Iraq. There’s nothing we cannot do. We can
fix Southeast Asia too. There will be such a surge of confidence for all jihadists”.
Lee was slightly more positive in 2005 than he was in 2002–2003 about the issue
of containing the terrorist problem in Southeast Asia.79 In a 2006 speech at the
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars when he was the first
Southeast Asian leader to be conferred the Woodrow Wilson Award for Public
Service, he reiterated his point that if the US left Iraq prematurely, Muslims
extremists worldwide would be emboldened to take the battle to America and her
allies. In the same speech, he weighed in on the comparison of the war in Iraq and
the Vietnam War made by the media and also in academic circles. “The conven-
tional wisdom in the media now” Lee said, “is that the war in Iraq is an unmiti-
gated disaster. Conventional wisdom in the 1970s assumed that the war in
Vietnam was similarly an unmitigated disaster”. It has been proven wrong
because the Vietnam War “bought the time and created the conditions that
enabled non-communist East Asia to follow Japan’s path and develop into the
four dragons, followed by the four tigers”. The Vietnam War thus brought
“collateral benefits” for Asia. He believed that if Washington remained resolute
in creating a stable Iraq, it similarly could transform the Middle East for the
better.80 But if the US were to leave Iraq “in a mess” after going in to put it right,
the US would “never live this down” – the US would have “trouble throughout
the Middle East”.81
That said, Lee argued that the longer-term strategic challenges for the US are
not Iraq or Afghanistan but the resurgence of China and India. He described the
imbroglio in Iraq and Afghanistan as “distractions”. In his words, “they are not
going to change the world, whatever happens there, because the major change
taking place is the recovery of China, and to a lesser extent India”. Lee felt that
the US should not get itself entangled in the internal strife particularly of
Afghanistan – “There was no country in the last 30 years to 40 years. They’ve
just been fighting each other since the last king was chased out. How on earth are
you going to put these little bits together? It’s not possible”.82
As for China, given its powerful engine of growth, it would mean that every-
thing that economies like Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan could do, China
would be able to do better. Thus, ASEAN, in order to compete, would have no
option but “to get together, integrate, offer a better alternative, some alterna-
tive”.83 In Lee’s assessment, China, and not Indonesia or Malaysia, is “Singapore
main economic challenge in the long term”.84 He believed that the rise of China
will be peaceful because he believed the Chinese wanted to have a “peaceful
rise”.85 The Chinese are in no hurry because “they are quite comfortable” and
“every year, they are in a stronger position”.86 For example, Beijing also put aside
its reservations about bilateral and regional free trade agreements to initiate FTA
talks with ASEAN which Lee described as a “strategic move” on the part of
China “to incorporate ASEAN so that ASEAN can see China’s growth as an
opportunity and not as a threat”.87 That said, Lee is realistic about China. As he
told his audience at the S Rajaratnam Lecture 2009, the Chinese always say all
countries, big and small are equal. But when you displease them, they never fail
to remind you that you have displeased 1,300 million people. Lee explained:
The realism is that China is not yet strong. They will take a long time to get
strong. They have waited for this opportunity to catch up with the developed
world so why be hurry and have this gradual rise aborted?... Three genera-
tions from now, say forty years’ time, a generation may come into office, a
leadership that feels they have got enough muscles, then they will come to
… So, we wait. I wouldn’t live to see that, but our children, my children, or
your grandchildren, my grandchildren will see how it will evolve.88
Lee was, however, not optimistic that an East Asian Community similar to the
European Community could be formed anytime soon for two reasons: (a) The
war issues that have soured Japan’s relations with China and South Korea would
slow down the pace of integration of East Asia. This was more a “psychological
problem” and was by no means “too overwhelming an obstacle”89 and (b) The
differences in economic growth of countries in the region. He estimated that it
would take “many decades” – 50, 100 years. “How can we have a common
currency?” he asked. In his view, agreement on more swop arrangements and
perhaps trading in some major Asian currencies, for example, yen, yuan or rupee
was a possibility. He believed that Asia would become the world’s largest
economic region by 2050 or earlier as the economies of China and India would
eclipse those of America, Japan and the EU. He thought a common market might
be possible in 50 years or less but not a political union. An East Asian Community
would eventually come about only when it serves the economic interests of the
region and not whether China and Japan could see eye to eye with each other.
Despite the fact that Japan has been struggling with its economy for more than a
decade, he continued to believe in Japan’s potential describing it as “a nation that
has high standards of excellence in its innovative products, always on the leading
edge of technology”. But Japan would need to keep that up if it wants to remain
an economic leader in the region.90 But he also cautioned that while regional
integration in Asia is the “way to ahead”, the rest of the world should not be
neglected. Asia should not focus on regionalism at the expense of globalization.
What Asia needs to pursue is “open regionalism” as “the sustained well-being
and vibrancy of East Asia depends on its links with the other parts of the world,
such as the United States, Europe and the Middle East”.91 In summary, Lee does
not oppose regional integration but advised taking “cautious steps” in that direc-
tion. He warned that if the region expanded too quickly, it could face problems
just like the Europeans are facing. This advice is particularly pertinent at the time
of this writing when the European Community is facing its worst economic
crisis.92 He believes that the European leaders would do their utmost to prevent
the collapse of the currency union/Euro zone but did not think they will succeed.93
On Singapore and the security of small states

According to Lee, “a small country must seek a maximum number of friends,
while maintaining the freedom to be itself as a sovereign and independent
nation”. Both aspects are equally important and inter-related. How can a small
state such as Singapore ensure that it does not get pushed around by bigger coun-
tries?94 Small countries cannot “change the balance of bargaining or the tussle
between the interest of a big developed party and a small underdeveloped party.
It will always be like that”. Small countries try to gather more weight by combin-
ing together, for example, the non-aligned nations. While that was possible
during the Cold War, when the smaller countries could play off the Soviet bloc
against America and the West, that strategy is not applicable anymore now that
the United States is the sole superpower. So, in Lee’s words, “quite simply,
Singapore takes the position that we are price-takers; we are not price-makers.
Our strategy simply is to make ourselves relevant to all the countries that matter
to us”.95 Being small is to be vulnerable to predators but as long as there is
balance in the triangular US–Japan–China relationship, ensuring international
order and giving the region the advantage to grow and prosper, Singapore has the
international space to extend its economy globally.96 Singapore needs to have
good relations with both US and China. Lee acknowledged that “sometimes, it’s
not easy resolving this dilemma”.97
In a 2008 speech he delivered at the inauguration of the Investment Corporation
of Dubai, Lee reminded his audience of a Chinese saying – “Big fish eat small
fish and small fish eat shrimp”. He described Singapore and Dubai as “shrimps”.
Elaborating, he said that small cities would always be vulnerable to global events,
“which today have a much bigger impact due to the highly interconnected
globalized environment”. Small states are usually weak and vulnerable, “not
masters of their own destiny”, perform no irreplaceable functions in the interna-
tional system “because if they do not exist, the world will carry on as before”. He
cited Athens, Sparta and Venice as examples of city-states which “all ended up
being absorbed into the bigger land mass of Greece or Italy”. Hence, small states
have to “better organized, alert and nimble to counter or evade threats and seize
opportunities”, which is what Singapore has done and continues to do.98
What is most significant for Singapore in the long term is whether it can
survive in a multi-polar world which Lee believed would come about regardless
of the American wish to remain the sole superpower. It might take 50 to 60 years
but definitely by the end of the century, the world will be multi-polar – US,
China, Europe – “maybe not a military power but definitely an economic power
and a separate power in foreign policy”, and perhaps India, Brazil and a few
others.99 Delivering the S. Rajaratnam Lecture in 2009, he told the audience that
“friendship in international relations is not a function of goodwill or personal
affection. We must make ourselves relevant so that other countries have an inter-
est in our continued survival and prosperity as a sovereign and independent
nation”. Singapore cannot take its relevance for granted because “small countries
perform no vital or irreplaceable functions in the international system”. In the
case of Singapore, unlike her neighbours with more land, labour and natural
resources and thus investment potential, Singapore is of no intrinsic interest to
any developed country.100
If one broadens the landscape, it is not just Singapore. It is true for the other
ASEAN countries as well. Lee explained that ASEAN was hoping that its
separate FTAs with China, Japan, South Korea and other regional players would
eventually overlap to become one big FTA that would increase the region’s
bargaining power in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In his words, “As
individual countries in Asia, we will not carry weight. But if we are one big free
trade area, I think in WTO our position will be better”.101 But he estimated that
ASEAN countries would take 50 years or more – when they “rise and converge
to a more common level”102 – to reach a level of economic integration like that
of the European Union.
This is perhaps a good place to record Lee’s views on Singapore’s relations
with Malaysia and Indonesia in the first decade of the 21st century – always the
two most important relationships in Singapore’s foreign policy. “We always
have ups and downs in relations with Malaysia and Indonesia”, Lee said in a 2
July 2007 interview. With Malaysia, Lee pointed that “for historical reasons”,
problems with Malaysia were bound to happen occasionally “given some basic
and fundamental differences” in the way both countries manage their multicul-
tural societies. Lee made the same point regarding Singapore and Malaysia in the
S. Rajaratnam Lecture 2009 which he delivered when he said that it is not
“historical baggage” which could be discarded but “basic differences in political
and social systems” which cannot be changed so easily.103 He continues to hold
the view he expressed in his 1981 speech that the differences between the two
countries could be managed and could “even bring mutual benefits if we know
how to use the comparative advantage we enjoy in our different fields to comple-
ment each other’s economic development”.104 While relations during the tenure
of Prime Minister Mahathir was rocky, Lee was fairly positive/hopeful that bilat-
eral relations would be better under the Abdullah Badawi administration
(October 2003–April 2009) and also that of his successor Najib Razak. He was
of the view that “the more connectivity there is between the two countries, the
more both will prosper”.105 He did not think that after over 40 years of separation,
both countries can easily re-unite and it is impossible to return to the pre-Sepa-
ration situation. But both countries can “come together in the wider context of
ASEAN” – starting with a free trade area, followed by a community whereby
there is an “easy flow of people, ideas, goods, capital”, and eventually, perhaps
50, 100 years or more down the road to become something similar to the
European Union. Within this wider context, he believed that Malaysia and
Singapore could do a lot for each other.
As for Indonesia, he felt that the post-Suharto domestic politics has made
Singapore–Indonesia relation more difficult to manage. Singapore–Indonesia
relations during the Suharto administration was generally good. He was appre-
ciative of Suharto. He recalled that for many years a confident Indonesia under a
Suharto government provided Singapore military training facilities and there was
never any question of Singapore violating the sovereignty of Indonesia because
“a confident Indonesia never saw Singapore, a small island, as a threat”.106
Referring to his calling on the ex-President in Jakarta in 2007, Lee explained, “I
visit him because I’ve known him for nearly 30 years, we have worked together
and whatever his faults, he presided over an Indonesia that was peaceful, and
stable. It was growing, though many things were done somewhat in a peremptory
way. And he gave ASEAN the space of 30 years to grow together and get
together. And I think if I’m there it would be remiss on my part not just to shake
hands and say hello. I’ve not forgotten him”.107 Way back in 1986, Lee said this
of Suharto: “In retrospect, no event has had a more profound influence on the
development of the region than the character and outlook of Suharto…His poli-
cies made it possible for ASEAN to become an organisation for constructive and
cooperative relationships between members, and for the solidarity of its members
in meeting external problems”.108
As for the management of relations with both neighbours in the future, Lee
said, “Singaporeans have got used to these ups and downs over many years. They
will not be rattled. Singapore will stick to international law and all agreements we
have with other countries, and work patiently for better relations with our neigh-
bours”.109 At the same time, Singapore needs to also maintain its defence capabil-
ity to prevent any harassment by its neighbours.110
Lee retired from the Singapore cabinet on 14 May 2011 but continues to be an
elected Member of Parliament. Since then, he has given fewer public speeches
and interviews on international affairs. On 8 May 2012, it was reported that he
will be co-writing a book on international affairs with former West German chan-
cellor Helmut Schmidt which would be published in December 2012. Schmidt
had flown to Singapore to meet Lee where they had three days of private discus-
sions on global issues ranging from geopolitics and economics to society which
would form the subject of the book.111
Conclusion
This is the first systematic treatment of Lee’s lifetime of thoughts on international

affairs which had been shaped and continues to be shaped by both contemplation
and experience. It has been said that one can always survive a mistake in domes-
tic affairs but can get killed by one made in foreign policy.1 Lee has this uncanny
ability to foresee the political trends which must have helped Singapore to be so
nimble in the conduct of its foreign relations. It might be worth reading this book
in conjunction with Lee’s memoir.2 While the memoir, written many years after
the events it describes, is definitely more reflective and had been processed by
Lee’s summing up of his experience, this book by allowing his words to speak
for themselves and by letting his thoughts then come alive, hopefully will illumi-
nate the framework of one aspect of his Singapore story – Singapore’s interna-
tional relations. It is said that ideas have impact on policy by acting as roadmaps
or as H.W. Brands put it, “Force may be how international affairs are waged;
ideas are why?”3 To understand Singapore’s foreign policy, it is imperative to
understand Lee Kuan Yew’s thoughts and ideas.
In addition, it is worthwhile documenting/re-visiting Lee’s thoughts on inter-
national affairs because his sense of history and geopolitical reality attested to by
many, coupled with his long and sustained political career – the longest of any
Southeast Asian leader – offers a useful lens to understanding the post-World
War Two international relations of Southeast Asia.
This book hopefully provides a different way of understanding Singapore’s
foreign policy – not so much at the operational level or the decision-making
process which unfortunately is still not possible to reconstruct because of lack of
access to the relevant archives. As Louis Halle said, “what the foreign policy of
any nation addresses itself is the image of the external world in the minds of the
people who determine the policy of that nation”.4 In the case of Singapore, it is
surely the worldview of Lee Kuan Yew that had been most influential. This book
thus attempts to identify and contextualize the principles and concepts that under-
pin Lee Kuan Yew’s thoughts on international relations and foreign policy in a
chronological fashion from Singapore’s pre-independence to the present. It
attempts to discover Lee’s ‘operational code’, the assumptions he held which
shaped the way he responded to crises and the strategies he crafted to ensure
Singapore’s security. It covers Lee’s thoughts and ideas ranging from the practice
102 Conclusion
of foreign policy, international relations, the evolving security architecture, the
importance of understanding geography and history in diplomacy, to more
specific issues such as Singapore–Malaysia–Indonesia relations, the Vietnam
War, the Non-Aligned Movement, the role of China as well as the other super-
powers in Southeast Asia over almost six decades.
I have deliberately adopted a chronological rather than a thematic approach.
By contextualizing his thoughts as they evolved is also to acknowledge that
human beings would always be unable to completely distance themselves from
the emotionally and politically charged atmosphere of their time. As the saying
goes, “where you stand is where you sit”. On more than one occasion, Lee had
said that he is not an ideologue but a pragmatist and that his thinking and world-
view were not shaped by any particular theory but “the result of a gradual grow-
ing up from a child to adolescent to a young student to a mature adult”.5 In this
sense, he is rather Lockean in affirming that knowledge comes from experience.
In his conversation with Tom Plate, he said,
I am not great on philosophy and theories. I am interested in them, but my

life is not guided by philosophy or theories, I get things done and leave
others to extract the principles from my successful solutions. I do not work
on a theory. Instead I ask: what will make this work?... So Plato, Aristotle,
Socrates, I am not guided by them. I read them cursorily because I was not
interested in philosophy as such. You may call me a ‘utilitarian’ on what-
ever. I am interested in what works.6
In response to a question that his views were quite Darwinian, Lee’s reply was
“it’s not quite Darwinian. It’s something that I’ve observed empirically. I didn’t
start off with any theory. I didn’t start off with Edward Wilson. Wilson just gave
me an intellectual basis and an example, but I’ve observed this”. Note that Lee
did not deny that he held certain Darwinian views. It is worth noting the similar-
ity of his 24 March 1965 speech in Chapter 1 and what he said in 2008–2009 in
reply to a question about the overarching framework which shapes his under-
standing of international relations – “It’s always been the same from time imme-
morial. A tribe wants more space, wants to take over the territory of other tribes,
they fight and they expand. Even when it is part of them and they become a
different unit, they still fight, for supremacy…”.7 Bringing this to its logical
conclusion, Lee predicts that by the 22nd century, China and the United States
would either have to learn to co-exist or destroy each other. Although Lee claims
that he does not adhere to any theory or philosophy of foreign policy, and while
he might not have started off with any theory in mind, his overall thinking does
resemble that of a “soft realist”.8
Lee’s life-long preoccupation was the survival of Singapore. This was his
perennial foreign policy challenge – How to “seize opportunities that come with
changing circumstances or to get out of harm’s way”. In his view, to achieve this
would require “a prime minister and a foreign minister who are able to discern
future trends in the international political, security and economic environment
Conclusion 103
and position ourselves (Singapore) bilaterally or multilaterally to grasp the oppor-
tunities ahead of others”. While foreign ministry officers or diplomats can give
insightful recommendations, “it is ultimately the prime minister and other key
ministers who decide on change in policies”.9
Now in his late 80s, Lee remained concerned “that a younger generation of
Singaporeans no longer regarded his views with the same weight and relevance
as older citizens who had rallied around him unwaveringly in the country’s
tumultuous journey to nationhood”. He felt an urgent need to find a way to
“engage” the younger generation. The result was a third book Hard Truths To
Keep Singapore Going culled from 16 lengthy interviews he gave between
December 2008 and October 2009.10
As the previous chapters have shown, it is noteworthy that even before
Singapore became independent, Lee Kuan Yew had formed a broad strategic
outlook of international affairs, forged by his experience of the Japanese occupa-
tion during World War II, and his observation of the post-war developments and
British response to the Cold War division of Europe and the formation of the
US-led military blocs to counter and contain the Soviet-led communist bloc
(NATO, CENTO, SEATO versus WARSAW PACT, SINO–SOVIET TREATY,
COMINTERN). While Lee noted the positive impetus that the Soviet challenge
to European imperialism gave to the decolonization of British and French colo-
nies, particularly in South and Southeast Asia, he also saw how the nationalist
struggle for independence in the colonies were driven by the competing appeals
of communism and communalism and he was keenly alive to how communal
conflicts underpinned regional conflicts over disputed territory such as that of
India–Pakistan.
Lee was aware of the psychological dimension of international events and big
power politics, for example, the US intervention in Indochina and the UK mili-
tary withdrawal from east of Suez. He was prescient in projecting the shifting
balance of power from a European-western dominance of the period from the
1500s to the 1900s, to one in which China and India, and Asia in general, would
become dominant once again in the 2lst century. He foresaw the rise of Asia in
the 21st century, anticipated the inexorable rise of China and to a lesser extent
India, with the relative reduction of influence of the western world. Take for
example his speeches in 1985 which painted two possible scenarios in the 21st
century described in Chapter 3.
Lee was impressed by the realities of power behind the formalism in the United
Nations and other international organizations and the importance of having the
ability to enforce sanctions to uphold international law. He saw the need for small
states to arrange relationships with bigger countries to ensure their independence
and to exercise indirect influence. At the same time, he had a clear vision of the
possibilities and limits of multilateral organisations such as the Afro–Asian
Solidarity Organisation and Movement of Non-Aligned Nations and the
Commonwealth of Nations. While acknowledging the need for Singapore to join
these organisations to gain acceptance, Lee was realistic about their ability to
protect and promote the interests of members against the efforts of the superpowers
104 Conclusion
to divide and patronize them.11 He always stressed the need for Singapore to be
nimble and alert to ensure that in any arrangement or shifts in the balance of
power it had the preponderant force on its side.
Lee was equally conscious of the important nexus between economics and
politics. He had addressed this issue as early as 1966 and on various occasions
throughout his political career. Many of his speeches and interviews particularly
after the end of the Cold War were on the international political economy. He has
also shown an interest in technological change and its implications on global
politics. In the post-Cold War period, he has also addressed, albeit briefly, on
non-traditional security issues such as climate change.
Almost 50 years after his first speech on the future of Malaysia (Chapter 1),
Lee Kuan Yew has continued to espouse a clear vision of global trends and
geostrategic developments in an ever-changing world. Starting from first princi-
ples, he saw the survival of small states like Singapore as being intertwined with
the stability and well being of their regional neighbourhood and the dynamic
balance and economic interaction of the global powers.
Readers would agree that Lee Kuan Yew has been very committed to the
fundamentals of his philosophy of foreign policy. He has also been remarkably
consistent in his views about the balance of power, the inter-relationship between
economics and politics and the role of the great powers in the international
system. He is certainly one who could catch the first whiff of change in the air,
for example, the need to cultivate the Americans when the British could no longer
be counted on, the rise of China. But for all the accolades that had been heaped
on him, he professed that he did not know when he started his political life in the
1950s that he would be on the winning side of the Cold War and that Singapore
would be what it is today,12 an implicit reminder of the role of contingency in
the study of history even though this study has focused on the perception and role
of one man.
Notes
Introduction
1 Arthur Marwick, The Nature of History (London: Macmillan Education Limited,
1987), pp. 47–48.
2 See “History as Biography: Carlyle” in Fritz Stern (ed.), The Varieties of History from
Voltaire to the Present (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), Chapter 6.
3 William James, “Great Men, Great Thoughts and the Environment” in Atlantic Monthly,
46(276), October 1880, pp. 441–459. http://www.cscs.umich.edu/ crshalizi/James/
great_men.html
4 See Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, with new chapters by Valerie
M. Hudson, Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier, Foreign Policy Decision Mak-
ing (Revisited) (London: Macmillan Palgrave, 2002).
5 Ibid, pp. 169–172.
6 Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq (eds), The Prophetic and the Political: Selected
Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1987), pp. 485–
486.
7 Michael Leifer, Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability (London:
Routledge, 2000), p. 7. This is by far the best book on Singapore’s foreign policy.
8 Sonny Yap, Richard Lim and Leong Weng Kam, Men in White: The Untold Story
of Singapore’s Ruling Political Party (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings Limited,
2009), p. 409.
9 Ibid, p. 408.
10 Asad-ul Iqbal Latif, Three Sides in Search of A Triangle: Singapore-America-India
Relations (Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), p. 34.
11 See S. Rajaratnam’s observation that Singaporeans were on the whole indifferent to-
wards foreign policy issues in Chan Heng Chee and Obaid ul Haq (eds), The Prophetic
and the Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam (Singapore: Gra-
ham Brash, 1987), pp. 485–486.
12 Alexander L. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of
Political Leaders and Decision-Making”. International Studies Quarterly, 13(2), June
1969, pp. 190–222.
13 None of the reviews of Lee’s memoir, The Singapore Story has much to say about his
foreign policy.
14 John Chipman in his introduction to Lee Kuan Yew’s address to the International In-
stitute of Strategic Studies (London), 23 September 2008, http://www.iiss.org/recent-
key-addresses/lee-kuan-yew-address/
15 James Schlesinger’s introductory remarks at the 1996 Architect of the New Century
Dinner Honouring Lee Kuan Yew, http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/YEW96.
html
106 Notes
16 Henry Kissinger’s introductory remarks at the 1996 Architect of the New Century Din-
ner Honouring Lee Kuan Yew, http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/YEW96.html
17 Richard M. Nixon, Leaders (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1982), p. 309. For Lee’s
response to the comparison, see full transcript of interview with Senior Minister Lee
Kuan yew by Hong Seok Hyun (Publisher-President) and Kim Young Hie (Editor-at-
Large), joogang Ilbo, South Korea, 23 February 1998.
18 Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft: Strategies for a Changing World (London: HarperCol-
lins Publishers, 2002), p. 117.
19 “Quick and short recovery for US? Not likely; much will depend on decisions of
Obama’s team, says MM” in The Straits Times, 3 December 2008.
20 See http://app.mfa.gov.sg/pr/read_script.asp?View, 82
21 “US leaders urged to seek Mr Lee’s views” in The Straits Times, 21 October 2000.
22 Email correspondence with Professor Bernard Loo of the S. Rajaratnam School of
Strategic Studies (RSIS), Singapore on 16 October 2009.
23 Raymond Aron, “The Evolution of Modern Strategic Thought” in Alistair Buchan
(ed.), Problems in Modern Strategy (London: Chatto and Windus, 1970). It was first
published as an Adelphi Paper, Number 54, February 1969, p. 7.
24 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times
Editions, Singapore Press Holdings, 1998) and From Third World to First: the Singa-
pore Story: 1965–2000, Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions, Singa-
pore Press Holdings, 2000).
25 See for example, Ang Cheng Guan, “Malaysia, Singapore and the Road to the Five
Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), July 1970–November 1971”. War & Society,
30(3), October 2011.
26 http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/. In October 2011, the National Archives of Sin-
gapore with Gale* Asia-CENGAGE Learning published a 10-volume compilation of
Lee’s speeches, interviews and dialogues from 1950 to 1990 entitled The Papers of Lee
Kuan Yew Speeches, Interviews and Dialogues. My study was completed before the 10
volumes were published.
27 Mirian Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann (eds), Reading Primary Sources: The Interpre-
tation of Texts from Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century History (London: Routledge,
2009), Chapter 12: Speeches.
28 Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, with new chapters by Valerie M.
Hudson, Derek H. Chollet and James M. Goldgeier, Foreign Policy Decision Making
(Revisited) (London: Macmillan Palgrave, 2002), p. 169.
29 In Search of the National Interest, Programme Four, Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister,
Singapore, 28 January 1996 (transcript), http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
30 Senior Minister’s interview by Robert Dowling of Business Week, Istana, 15 April
1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; in the late-1990s, Lee became more guarded
when he spoke in public. “…I am conscribed by the necessities of international rela-
tions from speaking my mind. I mean, I’m not a commentator. I am part of the Govern-
ment of Singapore. I may no longer be the Prime Minister, but my words cannot be
dissociated from that of the Government and, therefore, I have to mind my Ps and Qs.
I have to do that. It’s necessary”. See Unedited transcript of Senior Minister Lee Kuan
Yew’s Live Interview via satellite with Tony Jones of ABC’s Lateline Programme,
TCS, 15 April 1999.
31 Mirian Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann (eds), Reading Primary Sources: The Interpre-
tation of Texts from Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century History (London: Routledge,
2009), Chapter 12: Speeches.
32 Address by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the Asia Society Din-
ner, New York Hilton, 12 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0512a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
33 Face the Nation (produced by CBS News, Washington D.C, 11 May 1975, lky/1975/
lky0511.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
Notes 107
34 Niall Ferguson (ed.), The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Belknap
Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 3.
35 Lee Kuan Yew, The Fundamentals of Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Then and Now, S
Rajaratnam Lecture 2009 (Singapore: MFA Diplomatic Academy, 2009), p. 5. Lee
recalled that the most difficult years were between 1965 and 1971. See Lee Kuan Yew,
From Third World To First: The Singapore Story: 1965–2000 (Singapore: Singapore
Press Holdings, 2000), p. 763.
1 From the 1950s to the mid-1970s

1 Transcript of a speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at a seminar on ”In-
ternational Relations”, held at the University of Singapore, 9 October 1966, lky/1966/
lky1009a.doc
2 Transcript of an interview given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, to Mr. Ali
Hamdl El Gamal, Chief Editor of the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram, Istana Annex, 7
March 1977, lky/1977/lky0307.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
3 For details, see Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story (Singapore, Times Editions,
1998).
4 Peter Boyce, “Policy without Authority: Singapore’s External Affairs Power”. Journal
of Southeast Asian History, 6(2), Modern Malaysia (September 1965), pp. 87–103.
5 The Year Ahead, lky\1956\lky1200.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
6 Speech of Singapore’s Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, during the debate on cut-
motion on the provision of External Affairs Ministry in the Dewan Ra’ayat, 16 Decem-
ber 1964, lky\1964\lky1216.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
7 Transcript of ‘The Future of Malaysia’, a speech given by the Prime Minister of Sin-
gapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at Assembly Hall, Melbourne, Australia, 24 March 1965
to the Institute of International Affairs, lky\1965\lky0324a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
to the Institute of International Affairs, lky\1965\lky0324a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/; Lee’s view has been most consistent. See Lee’s 2008-09 interview in Lee
Kuan Yew, Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times Press,
2011), p. 307.
9 Address by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the 3rd International Forum of
the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung in Tokyo, 22 March 1967, lky/1967/lky0322.doc, http://
stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
10 Text of interview with the Prime Minister by Kenneth Randall of the Sunday Austra-
lian and Douglas Brass of the New Nation, 26 January 1971, lky\1971\lky0126b.doc,
http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
11 Transcript of speech by the Prime Minister at the Foreign Correspondents Associa-
tions’ Dinner in Tokyo, 21 March 1967, lky/1967/lky0321.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/; Address by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the 3rd Inter-
national Forum of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung in Tokyo, 22 March 1967, lky/1967/
stars/public/
13 The Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s address at the Parliamentary Luncheon,
Wellington, 4 April 1975, lky/1975/lky0404.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
14 Extracts from a transcript of an address by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew when he received an
honorary doctorate of law from the Royal University at Phnom Penh, 8 December
1967, lky/1967/lky1208b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
108 Notes
15 The Year Ahead, lky\1956\lky1200.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
16 Address by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the 3rd International Forum of
the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung in Tokyo, 22 March 1967, lky/1967/lky0322.doc, http://
17 Sonny Yap, Richard Lim and Leong Weng Kam, Men in White: The Untold Story
of Singapore’s Ruling Political Party (Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings Limited,
2009), pp. 34–35.
18 Prime Minister meets foreign correspondents at Television Singapore, 5 November
1967, lky/1967/lky1105a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
19 Meet the Press, produced by Lawrence E. Spivak, 22 October 1967, lky/1967/lky1022.
doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
20 Prime Minister’s Speech for Foreign Correspondents’ Association, 16 September
1959, lky/1959/lky0916.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
21 Prime Minister’s Speech at the State Banquet, lky/1960/lky0119b.doc, http://stars.nhb.
gov.sg/stars/public/
22 Prime Minister’s Speech for the Chinese Chamber of Commerce Reception to be held
on 8 August 1959, lky/1959/lky0808.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Lee re-
iterated this point in Transcript of the question and answer session following the ad-
dress by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club,
19 February 1970, lky\1970\lky0219b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
23 Prime Minister’s Speech for the Chinese Chamber of Commerce Reception to be held
on 8 August 1959, lky/1959/lky0808.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
24 Prime Minister’s Speech at the State Banquet, lky/1960/lky0119b.doc, http://stars.nhb.
25 Text of the Prime Minister’s Address to Foreign Correspondents at the Adelphi, 25
October 1963, lky\1963\lky1025.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
26 Text of the Prime Minister’s Address to Foreign Correspondents at the Adelphi, 25 Oc-
tober 1963, lky\1963\lky1025.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; For a further
exposition of the Confrontation by Lee Kuan Yew, see Transcript of Speech by the
Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, to students of Canterbury Univer-
sity, Christchurch, New Zealand, 15 March 1964, lky/\1964\lky0315b.doc, http://stars.
nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
27 Speech of Singapore’s Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, during the debate on cut-
motion on the provision of External Affairs Ministry in the Dewan Ra’ayat, 16 Decem-
ber 1964, lky\1964\lky1216.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
28 Transcript of an interview of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew with a staff member of ABC, Alan
Ashbolt recorded in Canberra TV Studios, 17 March 1965 broadcast by Radio Malay-
sia, Singapore, 24 March 1965, lky\1965\lky0324c.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/; Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the opening session of
the 1965 Asian Socialist Conference in Bombay, 6 May 1965, lky\1965\lky0506.doc,
29 The Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s own impressions on his tour recorded by
BBC for Radio Singapore, to be broadcast at 10 pm, Sunday, 20 May 1962, lky/1962/
30 Speech by Singapore Prime Minister and Secretary-General of the People’s Action
Party, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, in the debate on East-West Relations at the Socialist In-
ternational Conference Council, Brussels, 3 September 1964, lky\1964\lky0903.doc,
BBC for Radio Singapore,to be broadcast at 10 pm, Sunday, 20 May 1962, lky/1962/
BBC for Radio Singapore,to be broadcast at 10 pm, Sunday, 20 May 1962, lky/1962/
Notes 109
33 Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, on the motion on National Service
at the Legislative Assembly, 5 November 1964, lky/1964/lky1105a.doc, http://stars.
34 Prime Minister’s Press Conference held on 26 August 1965 at City Hall, lky\1965\
35 Transcript of a press conference of the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, gave to
a group of Foreign correspondents at the Television Singapura Studio, 11 December
1965, lky\1965\lky1211b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
36 Translations of the Prime Minister’s speech in Hokkien at the 1st Anniversary Cel-
ebrations of the Upper Serangoon Community Centre, 26 September 1965, lky\1965\
37 Transcript of Speech by the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, to stu-
dents of Canterbury University, Christchurch, New Zealand, 15 March 1964, lky/\1964\
lky0315b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
39 Translations of the Prime Minister’s speech in Hokkien at the 1st anniversary celebra-
tions of the Upper Serangoon Community Centre on 26 September 1965, lky\1965\
40 “One hundred Days of Singapore’s Independence”, Transcript of an interview with the
Prime Minister by Jackie Sam of the Straits Times Press and Wu Shih of Sin Chew Jit
Poh, held at the Prime Minister’s Office, 16 November 1965, lky\1965\lky1116a.doc,
41 Transcript of a television interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by
three foreign press correspondents, Mr. Creighton Burns of the Melbourne Age, Mr.
Nihal Singh of the Statesman of India, and Mr. Dennis Bloodworth of the London
Observer, recorded at the studios of Television Singapura, 28 July 1966, lky/1966/
42 Broadcast Excerpts from an address given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
on “Changing Values in a Shrinking World” at the Political Study Centre, 13 July
46 Transcript of a Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the Chinese Cham-
ber of Commerce, 4 July 1966, lky/1966/lky0704.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
47 Transcript of a press conference given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
Hydrabad House, New Delhi, 3 September 1966, lky/1966/lky0903c.doc, http://stars.
48 Transcript of a speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at a seminar on
“International Relations”, held at the University of Singapore, 9 October 1966,
lky/1966/lky1009a.doc
49 S R Nathan, An Unexpected Journey: Path to the Presidency (Singapore: Editions
Didier Millet, 2011), p. 292.
50 Speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. S Rajaratnam) delivered in Parlia-
ment on 16 December 1965 in Parliamentary Debates, Republic of Singapore, Official
Report, First Session of the First Parliament, Part 1 of First Session, Volume 24.
110 Notes
lky0826.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; For an overview of the basic thrust
and philosophy of Singapore’s foreign policy, see Speech by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs (Mr. S Rajaratnam) delivered in Parliament on 16 December 1965 in Parlia-
mentary Debates, Republic of Singapore, Official Report, First Session of the First
Parliament, Part 1 of First Session, Volume 24; Transcript of a television interview
with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by three foreign press correspondents,
Mr. Creighton Burns of the Melbourne Age, Mr. Nihal Singh of the Statesman of
India, and Mr. Dennis Bloodworth of the London Observer, recorded at the studios
of Television Singapura, 28 July 1966, lky/1966/lky0728.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
55 Transcript of Television interview – The Prime Minister being interviewed by Derek
Round, Reuters; John Hughes, Christian Science Monitor; and Ken Jalleh, Hong Kong
Standard at the Peninsula Hotel, Hong Kong, 14 October 1968, lky\1968\lky1014.doc,
56 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the welcoming banquet for Dato Seri Dr
Mahathir Mohamad and Datin Seri Siti Hasmah, Istana, 17 December 1981, lky/1981/
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Broadcast excerpts from an address given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
1966, lky/1966/lky0713.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Also see, Transcript
of a speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at a seminar on ”International
Relations”, held at the University of Singapore, 9 October 1966, lky/1966/lky1009a.
doc
64 Transcript of a television interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by
three foreign press correspondents, Mr. Creighton Burns of the Melbourne Age, Mr.
Nihal Singh of the Statesman of India, and Mr. Dennis Bloodworth of the London
Observer, recorded at the studios of Television Singapura, 28 July 1966, lky/1966/
lky0728.doc; Transcript of a speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at a
seminar on ”International Relations”, held at the University of Singapore, 9 October
65 Transcript of Press Conference given by the Prime Minister at the Singapore Airport
prior to his departure on a two-month tour, 11 April 1966, lky/1966/lky0411.doc,
Notes 111
66 Transcript of a talk given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, on the subject
“Big and Small Fishes in Asian Waters” at a meeting of the University of Singapore
Democratic Socialist Club at the University campus, 15 June 1966, lky/1966/lky0615.
Hydrabad House, New Delhi, 3 September 1966, lky/1966/lky0903c.doc, http://stars.
68 Transcript of interview on Vietnam and regional grouping given by Prime Minister
to Peter Simms of New York Times and Louis Kraal of the Time Magazine, 11 April
69 Transcript of the question and answer session following the address by the Prime Min-
ister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club, 19 February 1970,
lky\1970\lky0219b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
71 Interview with the Prime Minister by Mr. Henry Kamm, New York Times correspon-
dent for Asia, 26 May 1971, lky\1971\lky0526.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/pub-
lic/
72 Transcript of an interview given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at NZBC
House, 11 March 1965, lky\1965\lky0311.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
74 Transcript of TV press interview of the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at Palam
Airport, New Delhi, 25 November 1971, lky\1971\lky1125.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/; See also, Transcript of ITV Colour Television interview with the
Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr. Emmon Andrews, London, 27 Novem-
ber 1972, lky/1972/lky1127.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/. Asked whether
he welcomed the fact that China was now taking a greater place in world affairs, Lee
replied that it had to come and the earlier it came about, the better for the rest of the
world; and the world got to adjust to the fact that there is this power.
Prime Minister by Jackie Sam of the Straits Times Press and Wu Shih of Sin Chew
Jit Poh, held at the Prime Minister’s Office, 16 November 1965, lky\1965\lky1116a.
doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Also see, Transcript of question and answer
session following the Prime Minister’s Luncheon Address at the reception given him
by the French Diplomatic Press Association, at Hotel George V, Paris, 25 September
1970.
at City Hall to local and foreign correspondents, 2 June 1966, lky/1966/lky0602.doc,
77 Transcript of general press conference given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan
Yew, at TV Centre, 21 December 1968, lky\1968\lky1221c.doc. http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/
78 Transcript of question and answer session following the Prime Minister’s Luncheon
Address at the reception given him by the French Diplomatic Press Association, at
Hotel George V, Paris, 25 September 1970
79 Transcript of press conference given by the Prime Minister in Tokyo, 11 May 1973,
lky/1973/lky0511.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
80 Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr. An-
thony Rendell, recorded in London by the Australian Broadcasting Commission, 17
September 1966, lky/1966/lky0917.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
81 Meet the Press, produced by Lawrence E. Spivak, 22 October 1967, lky/1967/lky1022.
112 Notes
82 Ibid.; See also, Interview with the Prime Minister by Mr. Henry Kamm, New York
Times correspondent for Asia, 26 May 1971, lky\1971\lky0526.doc, http://stars.nhb.
gov.sg/stars/public/ for a very detailed analysis of China by Lee.
84 Excerpts of address by Singapore’s Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, on the Change
in Great Power Relations at the Commonwealth meeting in Ottawa, 3 August 1973,
85 Prime Minister’s speech at the opening of the seminar on economic co-operation be-
tween South and Southeast Asian nations at the University of Singapore, 15 February
1968, lky\1968\lky0215.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Lee reiterated the
maxim that without security and stability, economic development is difficult to achieve
on many occasions. See, Jacob Blaustein Lectures: Lecture II: Decolonisation and the
Non-Economic Factors of Development in New Countries in Southeast Asia, lky/1973/
lky0401.doc
86 Prime Minister Interviewed at Television Singapura, 8 November 1967, lky/1967/
87 Transcript of Speech made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at a gathering
of Singapore and Malaysian students at the International Students House in London,
22 April 1966, lky/1966/lky0422, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
at City Hall to local and foreign correspondents, 2 June 1966, lky/1966/lky0602.doc,
90 Transcript of a press conference given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Hy-
drabad House, New Delhi, 3 September 1966, lky/1966/lky0903c.doc, http://stars.nhb.
gov.sg/stars/public/; Broadcast Excerpts from an address given by the Prime Minister,
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, on “Changing Values in a Shrinking World” at the Political Study
Centre, 13 July 1966, lky/1966/lky0713.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
93 For Lee’s views on the British withdrawal and the formation of the FPDA based on de-
classified archival sources, see Ang Cheng Guan, “Malaysia, Singapore, and the Road
to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), July 1970-November 1971”. War
and Society, 30(3), October 2011, pp. 207–225.
95 Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the Royal Society of Interna-
tional Affairs, London, May 1962, lky/1962/lky0500.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
96 Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, on the motion on National Service
at the Legislative Assembly, 5 November 1964, lky/1964/lky1105a.doc, http://stars.
97 Press Conference given by the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, in
Sydney, 6 March 1965, lky\1965\lky0306.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
Notes 113
98 Transcript of an interview of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew with a staff member of ABC, Alan
Ashbolt recorded in Canberra TV Studios, 17 March 1965 broadcast by Radio Malay-
sia, Singapore, 24 March 1965, lky\1965\lky0324c.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
99 Ibid.
100 Transcript of an interview by foreign correspondents with the Prime Minister of Sin-
gapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, held at TV Singapura at 1130 hours, 30 August 1965,
lky\1965\lky0830.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
101 Ibid.
102 Transcript of Press Conference given by the Prime Minister at the Singapore Airport
prior to his departure on a two-month tour, 11 April 1966, lky/1966/lky0411.doc,
103 Statement to the Press in London made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, 1
July 1967, lky/1967/lky0701.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
104 Transcript of Television interview – The Prime Minister being interviewed by Derek
Round, Reuters; John Hughes, Christian Science Monitor; and Ken Jalleh, Hong Kong
Standard at the Peninsula Hotel, Hong Kong, 14 October 1968, lky\1968\lky1014.
105 Transcript of an interview by foreign correspondents with the Prime Minister of Sin-
gapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, held at TV Singapura at 1130 hours, 30 August 1965,
106 Ibid. In this interview, Lee recounted his three rather unfortunate experiences with the
Americans. See also, “Singapore: Blasting Off” in Time, 10 September 1965; Lee Kuan
Yew, From Third World to First: the Singapore Story: 1965–2000, Memoirs of Lee
Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions, Singapore Press Holdings, 2000), Chapter 28.
107 Meet the Press, produced by Lawrence E. Spivak, 22 October 1967, lky/1967/
108 Transcript of speech by the Prime Minister at the Foreign Correspondents Associa-
tions’ Dinner in Tokyo, 21 March 1967, lky/1967/lky0321.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/
109 Transcript of interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mims Thomson, UPI,
19 March 1971, lky\1971\lky0319.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
110 Transcript of a BBC programme, “Forum”, recorded in London, 3 November 1971,
111 “S’pore has important role ahead, say SM” in The Straits Times, 29 March 1999.
112 Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the Royal Society of Inter-
national Affairs, London, May 1962, lky/1962/lky0500.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
113 For Lee’s view on the Vietnam War based on declassified archival sources, see Ang
Cheng Guan, “Singapore and the Vietnam War”. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,
40(2), June 2009, pp. 353–384.
to the Institute of International Affairs, lky\1965\lky0324a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/
115 Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the opening session of the 1965
Asian Socialist Conference in Bombay, 6 May 1965, lky\1965\lky0506.doc, http://
116 Transcript of the Prime Minister’s interview with Dennis Bloodworth of Observer,
London, John Bennetts of The Age, Melbourne, and Canberra Times, and Peter Hol-
lingshead of ABC and VisNews at Television Singapura, 5 July 1967, lky/1967/
114 Notes
118 Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the Royal Society of Inter-
national Affairs, London, May 1962, lky/1962/lky0500.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
119 Transcript of Speech by the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, to
students of Canterbury University, Christchurch, New Zealand, 15 March 1964,
lky/\1964\lky0315b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
120 Speech by Singapore Prime Minister and Secretary-General of the People’s Action
Party, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, in the debate on East-West Relations at the Socialist In-
ternational Conference Council, Brussels, 3 September 1964, lky\1964\lky0903.doc,
121 Speech of Singapore’s Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, during the debate on
cut-motion on the provision of External Affairs Ministry in the Dewan Ra’ayat, 16
December 1964, lky\1964\lky1216.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
123 Ibid.
lky1022.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Lee’s review remained unchanged
in November 1971. See Transcript of a BBC programme, “Forum”, recorded in Lon-
don, 3 November 1971, lky\1971\lky1103.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
125 Press Conference given by the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, in
Sydney, 6 March 1965, lky\1965\lky0306.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
126 Ibid.
127 Prime Minister Interviewed at Television Singapura, 8 November 1967, lky/1967/
128 Transcript of Speech made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at a gathering
of Singapore and Malaysian students at the International Students House in London,
22 April 1966, lky/1966/lky0422, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
129 Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the opening session of the 1965
Asian Socialist Conference in Bombay, 6 May 1965, lky\1965\lky0506.doc, http://
1965, lky\1965\lky1211b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of a
press conference given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at City Hall to lo-
cal and foreign correspondents, 2 June 1966, lky/1966/lky0602.doc, http://stars.nhb.
131 Transcript of interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mims Thomson, UPI,
19 March 1971, lky\1971\lky0319.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
133 Ibid.
136 Prime Minister meets foreign correspondents at Television Singapore, 5 November
137 Interview with the Prime Minister by Mr. Henry Kamm, New York Times corre-
spondent for Asia, 26 May 1971, lky\1971\lky0526.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
Notes 115
138 Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr.
Anthony Rendell, recorded in London by the Australian Broadcasting Commission,
17 September 1966, lky/1966/lky0917.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
139 Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister on board an aircraft by Mr.
Bernard Kalb, 19 March 1967, lky/1967/lky0319.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
140 Ibid.; Meet the Press, produced by Lawrence E. Spivak, 22 October 1967, lky/1967/
141 Transcript of interview on Vietnam and regional grouping given by Prime Minis-
ter to Peter Simms of New York Times and Louis Kraal of the Time Magazine,
11 April 1967, lky/1967/lky0411.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Also see,
Transcript of the Prime Minister’s interview with Dennis Bloodworth of Observer,
lky0705.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of the Prime Minister’s
interview with Dennis Bloodworth of Observer, London, John Bennetts of The Age,
Melbourne, and Canberra Times, and Peter Hollingshead of ABC and VisNews at
Television Singapura, 5 July 1967, lky/1967/lky0705.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
142 Transcript of interview on Vietnam and regional grouping given by Prime Minister to
Peter Simms of New York Times and Louis Kraal of Time Magazine, 11 April 1967,
143 Statement to the Press in London made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
1 July 1967, lky/1967/lky0701.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Also see,
Transcript of the Prime Minister’s interview with Dennis Bloodworth of Observer,
144 Statement to the Press in London made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
1 July 1967, lky/1967/lky0701.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
145 Exclusive interview given by the Prime Minister to Ray Herndon, UPI Southeast Asia
correspondent, 21 December 1968, lky\1968\lky1221a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
146 Transcript of interview given by the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
at the “Meet the Press” – NBC’s TV press conference on the air, New York, 11 April
147 Face the Nation (produced by CBS News, Washington D.C, 11 May 1975, lky/1975/
148 Interview with the Prime Minister by Max Vanzi of United Press International, 28
October 1972, lky/1972/lky1028.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
149 Transcript of interview given by the Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
at the “Meet the Press” – NBC’s TV press conference on the air, New York, 11 April
150 Ibid.
Wellington, 4 April 1975, lky/1975/lky0404.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/;
Address by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew at the Press Club Luncheon, 7 April 1975, Wellington,
lky/1975/lky0407a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
152 For a detailed exposition of the different scenarios, see Jacob Blaustein Lectures:
Lecture III: Security and Stability Essential for Development of New Countries in
Southeast Asia, lky/1973/lky0402.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
153 Reply by Prime Minister Lee Kuan yew to Statements made by the Australian Prime
Minister, Mr. Whitlam, on BBC programme ‘Midweek’, 9 August 1973, lky/1973/
lky0809a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
116 Notes
154 Speech by the Prime Minister in reply to H.E. Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn,
Prime Minister of Thailand at a dinner, 8 January 1973, lky/1963/lky0108b.doc,
156 Speech by the Prime Minister in reply to H.E. Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn,
Prime Minister of Thailand at a dinner, 8 January 1973, lky/1963/lky0108b.doc,
157 Speech by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister, at a dinner in honour of his Excellen-
cy, Mr. Dzemal Bijedic, President of the Federal Executive Council, Socialist Federal
Republic of Yogoslavia, 17 March 1973
158 Excerpts of address by Singapore’s Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, on the
Change in Great Power Relations at the Commonwealth meeting in Ottawa, 3 August
159 Speech by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister, at a dinner in honour of his Excellen-
cy, Mr. Dzemal Bijedic, President of the Federal Executive Council, Socialist Federal
Republic of Yogoslavia, 17 March 1973, lky/1973/lky0317a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/
160 Jacob Blaustein Lectures: Lecture: Southeast Asian View of the New World Pow-
er Balance in the Making, lky/1973/lky0330.doc; Lecture II: Decolonisation and
the Non-Economic Factors of Development in New Countries in Southeast Asia,
lky/1973/lky0401.doc; Lecture III: Security and Stability Essential for Development
of New Countries in Southeast Asia, lky/1973/lky0402.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/Lee delivered the 8th in the series of Jacob Blaustein lectures on interna-
tional relations.
161 Excerpts of address by Singapore’s Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, on the
Change in Great Power Relations at the Commonwealth meeting in Ottawa, 3 August
162 The Prime Minister’s Opening Address at the Conference on Southeast Asian Secu-
rity, 31 May 1974, lky\1974\lky0531.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
163 Address by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew at the Press Club Luncheon, 7 April 1975, Welling-
ton, lky/1975/lky0407a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; For the point that
Southeast Asian countries would want to avoid being “caught in any competitive
clash of interests” between the two communist powers, see also, Transcript of press
conference given by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Tokyo, 22 May 1975, lky/1975/
lky0522a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
164 Excerpts of speech by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew at the Commonwealth Heads of Govern-
ment, Kingston, 30 April 1975, lky/1975/lky0430.doc. http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/; Lee gave many interviews on the fall of Vietnam and its implications for
Southeast Asia at Jamaica, and also after the Commonwealth Heads of Government
meeting, see: Some views expressed by the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew when
interviewed by Barry Jordan of New Zealand Television and David Cox of London
Weekend Television, Kingston, early May 1975, lky\1975\lky050b.doc, http://stars.
nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew by Barry Jordan of New Zealand TV, Kingston, Jamaica, May 1975, lky/1975/
lky050g.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of a television interview
with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Ken Begg and Paul Kelly of the Australian
Broadcasting Commission and Warwick Blood of “Channel 10”, Australia, Kingston,
Jamaica, May 1975, lky/1975/lky050e.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Tran-
script of interview with the Prime Minister by Robin day of the BBC for “News Day”,
a BBC programme, Kingston, Jamaica, lky\1975\lky050c.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/; Transcript of a press conference held by Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew at the end of the Commonwealth Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, first week
of May 1975, lky/1975/lky050a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Mr. Lee
Notes 117
Kuan Yew’s speech at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, Kingston,
5 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0505.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Face the Na-
tion (produced by CBS News, Washington D.C, 11 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0511.doc,
http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/: Excerpts of an interview with the Prime Minister,
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Adrian Porter, BBC Southeast Asia correspondent, 14 Sep-
tember 1976, lky/1976/lky0914.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript
of Question and Answer session following Prime Minister’s address at the Asia Soci-
ety dinner, New York Hilton, 12 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0512b.doc, http://stars.nhb.
gov.sg/stars/public/; Address by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore,
at the Asia Society Dinner, New York Hilton, 12 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0512a.doc,
http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/: Transcript of press conference given by Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Tokyo, 22 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0522a.doc, http://stars.
nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan
yew by Chuo Koron, a leading Japanese monthly journal of philosophy and politics,
Tokyo, 22 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0522b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
2 1975–1979
1 Lee Kuan Yew on the fall of Saigon, Face the Nation (produced by CBS News,
Washington D.C, 11 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0511.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
2 Lee Kuan Yew on the fall of Saigon, Transcript of an interview with Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew by Barry Jordan of New Zealand TV, recorded in Kingston, Jamaica, May
1975, lky/1975/lky050g.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
3 Address by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the Asia Society Dinner,
New York Hilton, 12 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0512a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
4 Interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Michael Richardson, Southeast Asian
Correspondent for The Age, Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian Financial
Review, 8 November 1975, lky/1975/lky1108.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
5 Transcript of interview with the Prime Minister by Robin day of the BBC for “News
Day”, a BBC programme, Kingston, Jamaica, lky\1975\lky050c.doc, http://stars.nhb.
6 Transcript of a television interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Ken Begg
and Paul Kelly of the Australian Broadcasting Commission and Warwick Blood of
“Channel 10”, Australia, Kingston, Jamaica, May 1975, lky/1975/lky050e.doc, http://
7 Excerpts of a speech by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew at the Commonwealth Heads of Government,
Kingston, 30 April 1975, lky/1975/lky0430.doc. http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/;
Lee gave many interviews on the fall of Vietnam and its implications for Southeast Asia
at Jamaica, and also after the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, see: Some
views expressed by the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew when interviewed by Barry Jordan
of New Zealand Television and David Cox of London Weekend Television, Kingston,
early May 1975, lky\1975\lky050b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript
of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Barry Jordan of New Zealand
TV, Kingston, Jamaica, May 1975, lky/1975/lky050g.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/; Transcript of a television interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Ken
Begg and Paul Kelly of the Australian Broadcasting Commission and Warwick Blood
of “Channel 10”, Australia, Kingston, Jamaica, May 1975, lky/1975/lky050e.doc, http://
stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of interview with the Prime Minister by Robin
day of the BBC for “News Day”, a BBC programme, Kingston, Jamaica, lky\1975\
lky050c.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of a press conference
held by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the end of the Commonwealth Conference,
118 Notes
Kingston, Jamaica, first week of May 1975, lky/1975/lky050a.doc, http://stars.nhb.
gov.sg/stars/public/; Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s speech at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting, Kingston, 5 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0505.doc, http://stars.nhb.
gov.sg/stars/public/; Face the Nation (produced by CBS News, Washington D.C, 11
May 1975, lky/1975/lky0511.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/: Excerpts of an
interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Adrian Porter, BBC South-
east Asia correspondent, 14 September 1976, lky/1976/lky0914.doc, http://stars.nhb.
gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of Question and Answer session following Prime Min-
ister’s address at the Asia Society dinner, New York Hilton, 12 May 1975, lky/1975/
lky0512b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Address by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
Prime Minister of Singapore, at the Asia Society Dinner, New York Hilton, 12 May
1975, lky/1975/lky0512a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/: Transcript of press
conference given by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Tokyo, 22 May 1975, lky/1975/
lky0522a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of an interview with
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Chuo Koron, a leading Japanese monthly journal of
philosophy and politics, Tokyo, 22 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0522b.doc, http://stars.nhb.
9 Laos fell to the communists in December 1975; See also, Transcript of Question and
Answer session following Prime Minister’s address at the Asia Society dinner, New
York Hilton, 12 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0512b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
10 Transcript of press conference given by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Tokyo, 22
May 1975, lky/1975/lky0522a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
Correspondent for The Age, Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian Financial Re-
view, 8 November 1975, lky/1975/lky1108.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/;
Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by the Nip-
pon-TV Network correspondent, Katsuhiro Masukata, Istana, 17 April 1976, lky/1976/
view, 8 November 1975, lk lky/1975/lky1108.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
13 Excerpts of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan yewm by Adrain Por-
ter, BBC Southeast Asia correspondent, 14 September 1976, lky/1976/lky0914.doc,
14 Ibid.
15 Some views expressed by the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew when interviewed by Bar-
ry Jordan of New Zealand Television and David Cox of London Weekend Television,
Kingston, early May 1975, lky\1975\lky050b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/;
Transcript of interview with the Prime Minister by Robin day of the BBC for “News
16 Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s speech at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting,
Kingston, 5 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0505.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/;
Address by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the Asia Society Din-
stars/public/
17 Transcript of Question and Answer session following Prime Minister’s address at the
Asia Society dinner, New York Hilton, 12 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0512b.doc, http://
Hamdl El Gamal, Chief Editor of the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram, Istana Annex,
7 March 1977, lky/1977/lky0307.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
Notes 119
19 Transcript of interview with the Prime Minister by Robin day of the BBC for “News
20 Excerpts of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew by Adrain Porter,
BBC Southeast Asia correspondent, 14 September 1976, lky/1976/lky0914.doc, http://
stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Excerpts of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr.
Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr. Robert Kroon of Netherlands TV Tros, 17 September 1976,
21 Some views expressed by the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew when interviewed by Bar-
ry Jordan of New Zealand Television and David Cox of London Weekend Television,
Kingston, early May 1975, lky\1975\lky050b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
22 Excerpts of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr. Guenther
Scholz, Head of the Bonn office of the German Radio Service, Deutsche Welle (Ger-
man waveband), Istana Annex, 15 April 1977, lky/1977/lky0415.doc, http://stars.nhb.
stars/public/; Transcript of press conference given by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew,
Tokyo, 22 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0522a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
25 Mr. Lee Kuan Yew’s speech at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting,
Kingston, 5 May 1975, lky/1975/lky0505.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
stars/public/
27 Transcript of an interview the Prime Minister accorded to Mr. Crocker Snow of the
Boston Globe, Istana, 16 March 1976, lky/1976/lky0316b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
28 Excerpts of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr. Robert
Kroon of Netherlands TV Tros, 17 September 1976, lky/1976/lky0917.doc, http://stars.
nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee
Kuan Yew, by Mr. Motoo Kaede, Chief editorial writer, Tokyo Shimbun and Chun-
chi Shimbun, 27 November 1976, lky/1976/lky1127.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/. In another interview, he described the Sino-Soviet competition for influence
as “inevitable”. See Excerpts of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan
Yew, by Mr. Guenther Scholz, Head of the Bonn office of the German Radio Service,
Deutsche Welle (German waveband), Istana Annex, 15 April 1977, lky/1977/lky0415.
29 Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr. Motoo
Kaede, Chief editorial writer, Tokyo Shimbun and Chunchi Shimbun, 27 November
30 Transcript of an interview the Prime Minister accorded to Mr. Crocker Snow of the
Boston Globe, Istana, 16 March 1976, lky/1976/lky0316b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
31 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000 (Singa-
pore: Times Editions, 2000), p. 369; Shee Poon-Kim, “A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-
1977”. Asian Survey, 17(7), July 1977.
view, 8 November 1975, lky/1975/lky1108.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
33 Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting, London, 8 June 1977, lky/1977/lky0608.doc, http://stars.nhb.
120 Notes
Wellington, 4 April 1975, lky/1975/lky0404.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/pub-
lic/; excerpts of speech by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew at the Commonwealth Heads of Gov-
ernment, Kingston, 30 April 1975, lky/1975/lky0430.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
stars/public/
37 Excerpts from a conversation Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had with a group of visit-
ing Financial editors/writers from seven European countries, Istana, 25 October 1975,
39 Excerpts from a conversation Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had with a group of visit-
ing Financial editors/writers from seven European countries, Istana, 25 October 1975,
41 Interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr. Padraic Fallow, Edi-
tor, Euromoney, 2 May 1978, LKY/1978/LKY0502.DOC, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
42 Excerpts of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr. Moham-
mad Nahar, Managing Director and Chief Editor of Antara News Agency, Istana, 19
November 1975, lky/1975/lky1119.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
Hamdl El Gamal, Chief Editor of the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram, Istana Annex, 7
March 1977, lky/1977/lky0307.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
44 Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, accorded
to Don Holt and Richard Smith of the Newsweek Magazine, Istana, 2 March 1976,
lky/1976/lky0302b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
45 Address by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, at the Opening Session
of the ASEAN Summit, Bali, 23 February 1976, lky/1976/lky0223.doc, http://stars.
46 Excerpts of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr. Moham-
mad Nahar, Managing Director and Chief Editor of Antara News Agency, Istana, 19
November 1975, lky/1975/lky1119.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
lky/1976/lky0302b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
stars/public/
49 Transcript of a Press Conference given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,
Bali, 25 February 1976, lky/1976/lky0225.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
lky/1976/lky0302b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; See also, Transcript of an
interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Francois Nivolon, Le Figaro,
Istana, 20 July 1979, lky\1979\lky0720.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
Notes 121
51 Address by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the opening of the Tenth ASE-
AN Ministerial meetng, Shangri-la Hotel, 5 July 1977, lky/1977/lky0705.doc, http://
52 Joint Communiqué The Second ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Kuala Lum-
pur, 4–5 August 1977, http://www.aseansec.org/1674.htm
53 Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Michael
Richardson, Southeast Asia correspondent for The Melbourne Age, Sydney Morning
Herald and The Australian Financial Review, 6 May 1977, lky/1977/lky0506.doc,
54 See ‘Linkages outside the Region’, http://www.aseansec.org/11849.htm
55 Address by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the opening of the ASEAN
Heads of Government meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 4 August 1977, lky/1977/lky0804.doc,
56 Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew by four journal-
ists from the Asian Wall Street Journal (ASWJ), Istana, 9 February 1979, lky\1979\
57 Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting, London, 8 June 1977, lky/1977/lky0608.doc, http://stars.nhb.
stars/public/
lky0209.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of an interview given by
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to Dr Olaf Ihlau of “Suddeutsche Zeitung”, Istana, 2
June 1979, lky\1979\lky0602.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Lee reiterated
this point in a 1981 speech. See, Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, at
the Commonwealth Head of Government meeting (CHOGM), Melbourne, Australia, 1
October 1981, lky/1981/lky1001A.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
lky0209.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; See also, Keynote speech by the
Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, on the agenda item “World Political Scene” at
the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, Lusaka, 1 August 1979, lky\1979\
61 Transcript of a interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Michael
Herald and The Australian Financial Review, 3 February 1978, LKY/1978/LKY0203.
DOC, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
62 Interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by the US News & World Re-
port in Washington, 10 October 1977, lky/1977/lky1010.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/; Interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr. Padraic
Fallow, Editor, Euromoney, 2 May 1978, LKY/1978/LKY0502.DOC, http://stars.nhb.
63 Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the dinner in honour of His Ex-
cellency Mr Deng Xiaoping, Vice-Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Istana,
12 November 1978, LKY/1978/LKY1112.DOC, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
64 Transcript of an interview with Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Adrian Porter
of the BBC, recorded at the Istana, 6 February 1979, lky\1979\lky0206.doc, http://
stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; See also, Transcript of an interview with Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Francois Nivolon, Le Figaro, Istana, 20 July 1979, lky\1979\
122 Notes
65 Transcript of a interview with the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, by Michael
Herald and The Australian Financial Review, 3 February 1978, LKY/1978/LKY0203.
66 Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister Mr. Lee Kuan Yew by three Indian
correspondents, Mr. E M Rasheed of United News of India, Mr V T Sambandan of The
Hindu (Madras) and Mr K S C Pillai of Deccan Herald (Bangalore), 6 December 1978.
LKY/1978/LKY1206.DOC; http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
67 Speech by Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, at the dinner hosted by the Indian Prime
Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai, New Delhi, 13 December 1978, LKY/1978/LKY1213.
68 Transcript of an interview with Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Adrian Porter of
the BBC, recorded at the Istana, 6 February 1979, lky\1979\lky0206.doc, http://stars.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Marsh
Clark and Mr Karsten Prager, Time Magazine, Istana, 27 March 1979, lky\1979\
74 Ibid.
75 Text of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Peter Ha-
zelhurst, Asia correspondent of London Times, Istana Annexe, 21 November 1979,
76 Text of an interview given by the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, to Mr Derek
Davies, Editor of Far Eastern Economic Review, Istana Annexe, 12 October 1979,
lky\1979\lky1012.doc.
77 Transcript of an interview with Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Adrian Porter of
the BBC, recorded at the Istana, 6 February 1979, lky\1979\lky0206.doc, http://stars.
nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr Lee
Kuan Yew by four journalists from the Asian Wall Street Journal (ASWJ), Istana, 9
February 1979, lky\1979\lky0209.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
82 Keynote speech by the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, on the agenda item “World
Political Scene” at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, Lusaka,
1 August 1979, lky\1979\lky0801.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
84 Transcript of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Francois Nivo-
lon, Le Figaro, Istana, 20 July 1979, lky\1979\lky0720.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/. With regards to economics, Lee said that “we have gone as far as practical
Notes 123
in economic cooperation. It’s slow, it’s laborious; we can only go at a pace and in a
manner which suits all the five countries”.
85 Transcript of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Francois Nivo-
lon, Le Figaro, Istana, 20 July 1979, lky\1979\lky0720.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
88 Transcript of press conference held by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Bonn, 12 June
1979, lky\1979\lky0612.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
89 Text of an interview with the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Peter Ha-
zelhurst, Asia correspondent of London Times, Istana Annexe, 21 November 1979,
92 Unedited transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew by BBC
Senior Reporter, Mr Tom Mangold, 3 July 1979, lky\1979\lky0703.doc, http://stars.
93 Transcript of press conference held by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Bonn, 12 June
1979, lky\1979\lky0612.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of a press
conference held by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, London, 21 June 1979, lky\1979\
94 Unedited transcript of an interview with the Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew by BBC
Senior Reporter, Mr Tom Mangold, 3 July 1979, lky\1979\lky0703.doc, http://stars.
3 The 1980s
1 Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, at the Commonwealth Head of
Government meeting (CHOGM), Melbourne, Australia, 1 October 1981, lky/1981/
lky1001A.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
2 Transcript of the extempore remarks made by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the
Commonwealth Head of Government meeting (CHOGM), Melbourne, Australia,
1 October 1981, lky/1981/lky1001B.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
3 Text of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Peter Hastings,
Associate and Foreign Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, Istana Office Wing,
19 December 1981, lky/1981/lky1219.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
124 Notes
4 Lecture by the Prime Minister of Singapore to the Thai National Defence College,
Oriental Hotel, Bangkok, 19 September 1989, lky/1989/lky0919.doc, http://stars.nhb.
5 Interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Amir Daud, Senior Editor, and
Mr Zulkifly Lubis, journalist, of TEMPO, Istana Annex, 27 June 1980, lky/1980/
6 Ibid.
7 “Viet minister call on PM Lee in Davos, The Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition,
10 February 1990.
8 Press Statement by Prime Minister’s Office on Recognition of Democratic Kampuchea,
9 Text of interview with the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by the General Manager
of the ANTARA News Agency, Major-General Agus Marpaung, Istana Annex,
11 August 1980, lky/1980/lky0811B.doc
10 Press Statement by Prime Minister’s Office on Recognition of Democratic Kampu-
chea, lky/1980/lky0910.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
11 Text of interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Derek Davies, Editor of
Far Eastern Economic Review, Istana Annexe, 22 September 1980, lky/1980/lky0922.
12 Text of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Derek Davies, Editor,
and Mr Susmu Awanohara, Correspondent of Far Eastern Economic Review, Istana Of-
fice Wing, 16 October 1981, lky/1981/lky1016.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
13 Text of an interview with Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew by Asahi Shimbun’s
Foreign Editor, Mr Kensaku Shirai, and Chief Correspondent (Asian General Bureau),
Mr. Teruo Kunugi, Istana Annexe, 5 January 1981, lky/1981/lky0105.doc, http://stars.
nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ The International Conference on Kampuchea was held 13–
17 July 1981 and the resolution was incorporated into the UNGA resolution 36/5 on
27 October 1981. The resolution called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, an in-
ternational peace-keeping force to facilitate a peaceful withdrawal and UN-supervision
of free elections.
14 Interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Amir Daud, Senior Editor, and
Mr Zulkifly Lubis, journalist, of TEMPO, Istana Annex, 27 June 1980, lky/1980/
15 Text of interview with the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by the General Manag-
er of the ANTARA News Agency, Major-General Agus Marpaung, Istana Annex,
11 August 1980, lky/1980/lky0811B.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/l Text of
an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Derek Davies, Editor, and Mr
Susmu Awanohara, Correspondent of Far Eastern Economic Review, Istana Office
Wing, 16 October 1981, lky/1981/lky1016.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
18 Text of interview with the Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by the General Manag-
er of the ANTARA News Agency, Major-General Agus Marpaung, Istana Annex,
11 August 1980, lky/1980/lky0811B.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Text of
interview with Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Kazuo Nishi, Managing Edi-
tor of Mainichi Shimbun, Istana Annexe, 12 September 1980, lky/1980/lky0912.doc,
19 Text of interview with Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Kazuo Nishi, Man-
aging Editor of Mainichi Shimbun, Istana Annexe, 12 September 1980, lky/1980/
lky0912.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/;Text of interview with Prime Minister
Notes 125
Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Derek Davies, Editor of Far Eastern Economic Review, Ista-
na Annexe, 22 September 1980, lky/1980/lky0922.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/; Text of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Peter Hast-
ings, Associate and Foreign Editor of Sydney Morning Herald, Istana Office Wing,
19 December 1981, lky/1981/lky1219.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
20 Text of Prime Minister’s answers to the questions submitted by Asahi Shimbun,
30 October 1982, lky/1982/lky1030.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
21 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at dinner given in honour of H.E. Mr Zhao
Ziyang, Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Istana, 11 August 1981, lky/1981/
lky0811.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ Although in Lee’s discussions with
Deng Xiaoping in November 1980, Deng had stated clearly that China was not inter-
ested in restoring communist or Khmer Rouge rule in Phnom Penh, Chinese actions
at the International Conference on Kampuchea in July 1981 showed otherwise. Pre-
mier Zhao Ziyang however reiterated Deng’s statement when he visited Singapore in
August 1981 which Lee described as “a most important restatement”. See, Text of an
interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Derek Davies, Editor, and Mr
Susmu Awanohara, Correspondent of Far Eastern Economic Review, Istana Office
Wing, 16 October 1981, lky/1981/lky1016.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
22 Text of an interview with the Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew by Mr David Bonovia
of the Far Eastern Economic Review, Beijing, 13 November 1980, lky/1980/lky1113B.
doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; See also, Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr
Lee Kuan Yew, at the Commonwealth Head of Government meeting (CHOGM),
Melbourne, Australia, 1 October 1981, lky/1981/lky1001A.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/; Transcript of the extempore remarks made by Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew at the Commonwealth Head of Government meeting (CHOGM), Mel-
bourne, Australia, 1 October 1981, lky/1981/lky1001B.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
23 Transcript of the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew’s discussion with five foreign cor-
respondents, recorded at SBC, 9 October 1984, lky/1984/lky1009.doc, http://stars.nhb.
24 Text of interview with Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Ian Mackenzie, cor-
respondent of Reuters, Beijing, 12 November 1980, lky/1980/lky1113A.doc, http://
25 Text of an interview with Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew, by Singapore journal-
ists, Xiamen, 23 November 1980, lky/1980/lky1123.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
26 See for example, Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the banquet hosted by
His Excellency Mr Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Beijing,
19 September 1985, lky/1985/lky0919.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
27 Text of an interview with the Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew by Mr David Bo-
novia of the Far Eastern Economic Review, Beijing, 13 November 1980, lky/1980/
lky1113B.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
28 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at dinner given in honour of H.E. Mr Zhao
Ziyang, Premier of the People’s Republic of China, Istana, 11 August 1981, lky/1981/
30 Ibid.
31 See for examples, Address by the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, at the opening of
the 9th meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers, 21 April 1980, lky/1980/lky0421.
doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Text of interview with Prime Minister, Mr
Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Kazuo Nishi, Managing Editor of Mainichi Shimbun, Istana An-
nexe, 12 September 1980, lky/1980/lky0912.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
126 Notes
32 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to the National Press Club, Canberra, Aus-
tralia, 16 April 1986, lky/1986/lky0416A,doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
34 Text of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Lester Tanzer, Manag-
ing Editor of the US News & World Report, Istana Office Wing, 7 December 1981,
35 Text of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Peter Hastings, Associ-
ate and Foreign Editor of Sydney Morning Herald, Istana Office Wing, 19 December
36 Text of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by chief correspondent, Mr
Makoto Yoshida, and correspondent, Mr Masayuki Doi, of the Asahi Shimbun’s Asian
General Bureau, Istana, 16 November 1985, lky/1985/lky1116.doc, http://stars.nhb.
37 Text of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by the Japanese journalists
based in Singapore, before the Prime Minister’s departure for Japan, 14 October 1986,
lky/1986/lky1014.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Text of an interview with
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by chief correspondent, Mr Makoto Yoshida, and cor-
respondent, Mr Masayuki Doi, of the Asahi Shimbun’s Asian General Bureau, istana,
16 November 1985, lky/1985/lky1116.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
38 PM Lee’s interview with the Asian Wall Street Journal in The Straits Times Weekly
Overseas Edition, 4 November 1989.
39 Speech by Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew, at the banquet hosted by His Excellency
Mr Nikolai I Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Moscow,
24 September 1990, lky\1990\lky0924.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; “Viet
minister calls on PM Lee in Davos’’ in The Straits Times Weekly Overseas Edition, 10
February 1990.
41 See Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, at the Commonwealth Head
of Government meeting (CHOGM), Melbourne, Australia, 1 October 1981, lky/1981/
42 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the joint meeting of the United States
Congress, Washington, DC, 9 October 1985, lky/1985/lky1009.doc, http://stars.nhb.
43 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the opening of the 15th ASEAN Ministe-
rial meeting, DBS Auditorium, 14 June 1982, lky/1982/lky0614.doc, http://stars.nhb.
44 Text of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Peter Hastings, Associ-
ate and Foreign Editor of Sydney Morning Herald, Istana Office Wing, 19 December
45 Speech by the Prime Minister at the State banquet for the Japanese Prime Minister, 25
September 1967, lky/1967/lky0925b.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
46 Transcript of general press conference given by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan
Yew, at TV Centre, 21 December 1968, lky\1968\lky1221c.doc. http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/; See also, Transcript of Television interview – The Prime Minister be-
ing interviewed by Derek Round, Reuters; John Hughes, Christian Science Monitor;
and Ken Jalleh, Hong Kong Standard at the Peninsula Hotel, Hong Kong, 14 October
1968, lky\1968\lky1014.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Text of an inter-
view with Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew by Asahi Shimbun’s Foreign Editor, Mr
Kensaku Shirai, and Chief Correspondent (Asian General Bureau), Mr. Teruo Kunugi,
Notes 127
Istana Annexe, 5 January 1981, lky/1981/lky0105.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
48 Text of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Takuhiko Tsuruta, Exec-
utive Editor of nihon Keizai Shimbun, Istana Office Wing, 25 November 1981, lky/1981/
lky1125.doc, Speech by the Prime Minister, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
49 Transcript of press conference given by the Prime Minister in Tokyo, 11 May 1973,
50 The Prime Minister’s Opening Address at the Conference on Southeast Asian Security,
31 May 1974, lky\1974\lky0531.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
51 Text of interview with Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, by Mr Kazuo Nishi, Man-
aging Editor of Mainichi Shimbun, Istana Annexe, 12 September 1980, lky/1980/
53 Text of Prime Minister’s answers to the questions submitted by Asahi Shimbun, 30
October 1982, lky/1982/lky1030.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
55 Text of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Derek Davies, Editor,
and Mr Susmu Awanohara, Correspondent of Far Eastern Economic Review, Istana Of-
fice Wing, 16 October 1981, lky/1981/lky1016.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
lky1001A.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of the extempore re-
marks made by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the Commonwealth Head of Govern-
ment meeting (CHOGM), Melbourne, Australia, 1 October 1981, lky/1981/lky1001B.
doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ Text of an interview with Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew by Mr Derek Davies, Editor, and Mr Susmu Awanohara, Correspondent
of Far Eastern Economic Review, Istana Office Wing, 16 October 1981, lky/1981/
lky1016.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Text of an interview with Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Lester Tanzer, Managing Editor of the US News &
World Report, Istana Office Wing, 7 December 1981, lky/1981/lky1207.doc, http://
58 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at dinner for Vice-President George Bush &
Mrs Bush, Istana, 27 April 1982, lky/1982/lky0427.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
60 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the opening of the 15th ASEAN Ministe-
rial meeting, DBS Auditorium, 14 June 1982, lky/1982/lky0614.doc, http://stars.nhb.
61 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the dinner given in honour of the
Honorable Pierre Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, Istana, 8 January 1983, lky/1983/
128 Notes
62 Transcript of an interview with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Mr Louis Kraar,
Asian editor of the Fortune magazine, Istana Annexe, 23 November 1984, lky/1984/
lky1123.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Toast by Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew at the dinner hosted by President and Mrs Reagan, White House, 8 October 1985,
lky/1985/lky1008C.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
63 Toast by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the dinner hosted by President and Mrs
Reagan, White House, 8 October 1985, lky/1985/lky1008C.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/
67 Speech by Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the dinner in honour of the Prime
Minister of Japan, Mr Zenko Suzuki, and Mrs Sachi Suzuki, Istana, 13 January 1981,
68 Text of Prime Minister’s answers to the questions submitted by Asahi Shimbun, 30
October 1982, lky/1982/lky1030.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Speech by
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the National Press Club Luncheon, Washington, DC,
10 October 1985, lky/1985/lky1010.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
69 Arrival Ceremony speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, White House Lawn, 8
October 1985, lky/1985/lky1008A.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
71 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at dinner for Vice-President George Bush &
Mrs Bush, Istana, 27 April 1982, lky/1982/lky0427.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
72 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the National Press Club Luncheon, Wash-
ington, DC, 10 October 1985, lky/1985/lky1010.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
73 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the joint meeting of the United States
Congress, Washington, DC, 9 October 1985, lky/1985/lky1009.doc, http://stars.nhb.
74 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the opening of the 20th ASEAN Minis-
terial meeting, Marina Mandarin Hotel, 15 June 1987, lky/1987/lky0615.doc, http://
75 Lee would constantly return to this theme in his speeches in the 1990s. See for ex-
amples his speeches in 1990 where the focus was mainly on economics and business:
Speech by Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew, at the Businessmen Roundtable Dis-
cussion, Stuttgart, Baden-Wuerttemberg, 1 June 1990, lky\1990\lky0601a.doc, http://
stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Closing address by Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew
at the Global Strategies conference, Raffles City Convention Centre, 6 June 1990,
76 Written replies by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to questions submitted by Mainichi
Shimbun, (no date, 1986), lky/1986/lky0503.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/pub-
lic/; Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the International Herald Tribune
Centennial Conference “Pacific 2000: Global Challenge”, Westin Plaza Hotel,
11 November 1987, lky/1987/lky1111.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
Notes 129
77 Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, opening the discussion
on “World Political Scene: Global Trends and Prospects”, Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting, Vancouver, Canada, 13 October 1987, lky/1987/lky1013.doc,
78 Lee maintained this view even after the June 4 Tiananmen incident. According to Lee,
whatever the Chinese leadership, “there is no way any leadership can close the doors
on the world….There’s no shutting out the outside world. Any government that tries
to cut out the outsider world will fail. Therefore, the open door policy must carry on”.
See, Transcript of an interview by the Hong Kong Standard, 21 November 1989 in
Singapore reproduced in Lianhe Zaobao (ed.), Lee Kuan Yew on China and Hong
Kong after Tiananmen (Singapore: Shing Lee Publishers, 1990), pp. 31-34; See also,
Speech by Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the banquet hosted by the Lard Mayor
of London, United Kingdom, 24 May 1990, lky\1990\lky0524.doc, http://stars.nhb.
79 Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore, opening the discussion
on “World Political Scene: Global Trends and Prospects”, Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting, Vancouver, Canada, 13 October 1987, lky/1987/lky1013.doc,
80 Lecture by the Prime Minister of Singapore to the Thai National Defence College,
Oriental Hotel, Bangkok, 19 September 1989, lky/1989/lky0919.doc, http://stars.nhb.
81 Toast by the Prime Minister at a dinner for Commonwealth Heads of Government,
Shangri-La Hotel, 25 October 1989, lky/1989/lky1025.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
4 The 1990s
1 Speech by Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the banquet hosted by the Lard Mayor
2 Speech by Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club,
Hong Kong, 26 October 1990, lky\1990\lky1026.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
3 Speech by Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the AMEX Bank Review Awards
Global Forum, Shangri-La Hotel, 15 November 1993, lky\1993\lky1115.doc, http://
4 Speech by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the International Institute for Strategic
Studies Conference, Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, 12 September 1997, http://stars.nhb.
5 Transcript of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Max Christern of NRC
Handelsblad, Istana, 30 July 1999, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
6 Lee was Senior Minister until August 2004 when he assumed the position of Minister
Mentor.
7 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965–2000 (Singapore:
Times Editions, 2000), pp. 735, 745.
8 “Never has there been a moment so propitious in history: PM” in The Straits Times
Weekly Overseas Edition, 10 February 1990.
9 Speech by Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the dinner hosted by the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry of Paris (CCIP), France, 21 May 1990, lky\1990\lky0521b.
10 Speech by Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the banquet hosted by the Lard Mayor
130 Notes
11 Speech by Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew, at the banquet hosted by His Excellency
Mr Nikolai I Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Moscow,
24 September 1990, lky\1990\lky0924.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
12 Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, at Asahi Shimbun Sym-
posium, Tokyo, 9 May 1991, lky\1991\lky0509a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/pub-
lic/
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, at the Harvard-Fairbank
Center Conference in New York: “East Asia in the New Era: The Prospects of Co-
operation”, 11 May 1992, lky\1992\lky0511.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/;
Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, 1992 Pacific Rim Forum,
San Diego, 13 May 1992, lky\1992\lky0513.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
16 In Search of the National Interest, Programme Four, Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister,
Singapore, 28 January 1996 (transcript), http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
17 “Why American economic and security presence vital for Asia” in The Straits Times,
17 December 1991.
gov.sg/stars/public/; Full transcript of Interview with Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew,
Singapore, by Hong Seok Hyun (Publisher-President) and Kim Young Hie (Editor-
at-Large), Joogang, Ilbo, Seoul, Korea, 23 February 1998; SM Lee’s interview with
Asiaweek, “East Asia peace hinges on ties between US, Japan, China” in The Straits
Times, 15 May 1999.
19 Lee had much advice for the Japanese regarding their economic policy. See for ex-
amples, Keynote Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, Kanzai
Zaikai Seminar, Kyoto, 13 February 1992, lky\1992\lky0213.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/; Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore for the
Asahi Forum, Tokyo, 29 October 1993, lky\1993\lky1029.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
20 Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, at Asahi Shimbun
Symposium, Tokyo, 9 May 1991, lky\1991\lky0509a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
21 Edited transcript of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Tom Brokaw,
Anchor NBC, at the Business Council Meeting, Williamsburg Lodge and Conference
Center, Willaimsburg, Virginia, 10 May 1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
22 Excerpts from Notes taken from Interview with Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan
Yew by Los Angeles Times columnist Tom Plate, Istana, 27 September 1996, http://
23 For the danger of poor US–Japan economic relations spreading over into security, see
Keynote Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, Kanzai Zai-
kai Seminar, Kyoto, 13 February 1992, lky\1992\lky0213.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
stars/public/
25 Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, at Asahi Shimbun Sym-
posium, Tokyo, 9 May 1991, lky\1991\lky0509a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/; For a reiteration and expansion of this point, see Keynote Speech by Mr Lee
Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, Kanzai Zaikai Seminar, Kyoto, 13 February
1992, lky\1992\lky0213.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of Senior
Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Karsten Prager of Time Magazine, Istana,
9 February 1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
Notes 131
26 See “Japan’s Role in the 21st Century” – Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister
of Singapore at the “Create 21”, Asahi Forum, Tokyo, 17 November 1994, lky\1994\
27 “Japan’s transformation will take 4 to 5 years” in The Straits Times, 20 October 1999.
17 December 1991.
30 Transcript of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Urban Lehner of Asian
Wall Street Journal, Istana, 3 June 1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
31 Interview: Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, “Frank Words for America”,
Time, 18 April 1994.
32 Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, at the Harvard-Fairbank
Center Conference in New York: “East Asia in the New Era: The Prospects of Co-
operation”, 11 May 1992, lky\1992\lky0511.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/;
Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore, 1992 Pacific Rim Forum,
San Diego, 13 May 1992, lky\1992\lky0513.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/;
Speech by Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the AMEX Bank Review Awards
stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister, Singa-
pore, at the Create 21 Asahi Symposium, Tokyo, 18 December 1995, http://stars.nhb.
gov.sg/stars/public/; Transcript of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with
Urban Lehner of Asian Wall Street Journal, Istana, 3 June 1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/
33 Transcript of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Karsten Prager of Time
Magazine, Istana, 9 February 1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Lee: “The Chi-
nese are not stupid. Taiwanese are not stupid. Washington is not stupid either. You can’t
go by the popular media on this”. See Transcript of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s
interview with Urban Lehner of Asian Wall Street Journal, Istana, 3 June 1996, http://
stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; “Asia and the World in the 21st Century”: Speech by Mr
Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister, at the 21st Century Forum, Beijing, 4 September 1996,
34 Interview of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Alain Peyrefitte (Mission’s transla-
tion), 28 February 1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
36 Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister, Singapore, at the Create 21 Asahi
Symposium, Tokyo, 18 December 1995, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
37 SM Lee fields Wide-Ranging Questions from CNN Viewers, CNN (English), Q&Q
Asia, 22 hours, 11 December 1998 (transcript).
stars/public/
39 Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore for the Asahi Forum,
Tokyo, 29 October 1993, lky\1993\lky1029.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/;
Speech by the Senior Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew – World Economic Forecast for the
remaining years of the 20th Century, CITIC International Economic Forum II, Beijing,
5 October 1994, lky\1994\lky1005a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; See also
his comments on the dangers of forming trade blocs and protectionism in “Why Ameri-
can economic and security presence vital for Asia” in The Straits Times, 17 December
1991 and “Asia’s outlook promising if US stays on course” in The Straits Times,
23 December 1991.
132 Notes
40 “The spectre of trade blocs” in The Straits Times, 23 December 1991; Speech by Mr
Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore for the Asahi Forum, Tokyo, 29 October
1993, lky\1993\lky1029.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
41 Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister of Singapore for the Asahi Forum,
Tokyo, 29 October 1993, lky\1993\lky1029.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
42 For examples of this “meanness of spirit”, see Speech by Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan
Yew at the Asia Society Conference, 19 May 1994, lky\1994\lky0519.doc, http://stars.
43 “US–Japan move on security ‘positive’, The Straits Times, 3 June 1996; “US needs
consistent policy towards Asia”, The Straits Times, 5 June 1996.
stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Speech by Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the
Asia Society Conference, 19 May 1994, lky\1994\lky0519.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/; Speech by the Senior Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew – World Economic
Forecast for the remaining years of the 20th Century, CITIC International Economic
Forum II, Beijing, 5 October 1994, lky\1994\lky1005a.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
45 “Japan not likely to go nuclear, says SM Lee” in The Straits Times, 24 October 1999.
46 See Gary Klintworth, “Greater China and Regional Security”. Australian Journal of
International Affairs, 48(20), pp. 211–218.
47 Interview of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew by Alain Peyrefitte (Mission’s transla-
tion), 28 February 1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Speech by Senior Min-
ister Lee Kuan Yew at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Conference,
Shangri-La Hotel, Singapore, 12 September 1997, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
48 For Lee’s views on trade embargo of China, see Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s inter-
view with Peter Seidlitz of Handelsblatt, Germany, Istana, 22 November 1995, http://
49 For the cost of isolating China, see Speech by the Senior Minister, Mr Lee Kuan
Yew – World Economic Forecast for the remaining years of the 20th Century, CITIC
International Economic Forum II, Beijing, 5 October 1994, lky\1994\lky1005a.doc,
50 For Lee’s view of containing China, see Transcript of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s
interview with Urban Lehner of Asian Wall Street Journal, Istana, 3 June 1996, http://
Magazine, Istana, 9 February 1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
52 Interview, “How to Survive a “Folly of Man”, Newsweek, 16 March 1998.
53 “China had little reason to devalue yuan, says SM” in Business Times, 1 February
1999.
55 “China had little reason to devalue yuan, says SM” in Business Times, 1 February
1999.
56 Speech by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the Create 21 Asahi Symposium, Osaka,
19 November 1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
57 “America and Asia”: Speech by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the Architect of the
New Century Award Ceremony, Washington DC, 11 November 1996, http://stars.nhb.
gov.sg/stars/public/; See also SM Lee’s interview with Asiaweek, “East Asia peace
hinges on ties between US, Japan, China” in The Straits Times, 15 May 1999.
Notes 133
59 Full transcript of Interview with Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore, by Hong
Seok Hyun (Publisher-President) and Kim Young Hie (Editor-at-Large), Joogang,
Ilbo, Seoul, Korea, 23 February 1998.
stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Speech by Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the
Asia Society Conference, 19 May 1994, lky\1994\lky0519.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/ The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was formed in July 1994; Transcript
of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with William Echikson of World Media
Network, Istana, 28 November 1995, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
63 Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Peter Seidlitz of Handelsblatt, Ger-
many, Istana, 22 November 1995, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; See also, In
Search of the National Interest, Programme Four, Lee Kuan Yew, Senior Minister,
Singapore, 28 January 1996 (transcript), http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/ where
Lee said, “I have not any doubts at all that there’s no leader in Southeast Asia that
believes that if we all combine we’ll be able to balance China”; Transcript of Senior
Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Karsten Prager of Time Magazine, Istana,
9 February 1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; Senior Minister’s interview
by Robert Dowling of Business Week, Istana, 15 April 1996, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
65 Excerpts from Notes taken from Interview with Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan
Yew by Los Angeles Times columnist Tom Plate, Istana, 27 September 1996, http://
68 SM Lee Reflects on Regional Regional Developments, BBC London (English), East
Asia Today, 2200 hours, 23 December 1999 (transcript).
70 SM Lee’s interview with CNBC in The Straits Times, 13 December 1999; See also,
Lee: “… as long as the rule of international law prevailed and not brute force” in
“S’pore has important role ahead, say SM” in The Straits Times, 29 March 1999.
71 See Preface of Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of
World Order (New York: Touchstone Books, 2008).
72 Fareed Zakaria, “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew”. Foreign
Affairs, 73(2), 1994.
73 See Tom Plate, Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish
Editions, 2011), pp. 116–121. Lee told Tom Plate, “I should have written it in a piece
or in a letter to him, my thought turned out prophetic”.
17 December 1991.
75 “Asia will recover, but not at same pace: SM” in The Straits Times, 27 March 1999.
134 Notes
76 Main Points of Senior Minister’s Address to the Council of Foreign Relations,
13 October 1998, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; SM Lee fields Wide-Ranging
Questions from CNN Viewers, CNN (English), Q&A Asia, 22 hours, 11 December
1998 (transcript).
77 Interview, “How to Survive a “Folly of Man”, Newsweek, 16 March 1998.
78 Full transcript of Interview with Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore, by Hong
Seok Hyun (Publisher-President) and Kim Young Hie (Editor-at-Large), Joogang,
Ilbo, Seoul, Korea, 23 February 1998.
79 “Asian crisis ‘a blip on long-term trend’” in The Straits Times, 11 December 1999.
80 SM Lee fields Wide-Ranging Questions from CNN Viewers, CNN (English), Q&Q
Asia, 22 hours, 11 December 1998 (transcript); See also “S-E Asia will have a tough
time against China” in The Straits Times, 27 March 1999.
81 “East Asia peace hinges on ties between US, Japan, China” in The Straits Times,
15 May 1999.
82 “Asian crisis ‘a blip on long-term trend’” in The Straits Times, 11 December 1999.
5 The new millennium

1 Address by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew to the Asia Society Australasia Centre An-
nual Dinner, 20 November 2000, Sydney, Document 20000112103, http://stars.nhb.
2 Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, UPI Interna-
tional’s editor-at-large on 11 May 2001, Document 2001052208, http://stars.nhb.gov.
sg/stars/public/, The Business Times, 19 May 2001 & The Sunday Times, 20 May 2001.
3 “No change in S’pore policy on Taiwan military training, US bases” in The Straits
Times, 14 June 2001.
4 “Osama attacks – same story, many views” in The Straits Times, 16 October 2001.
5 “What does the future hold?” in The Straits Times, 20 February 2003.
6 “Protectionism won’t work, job migration unstoppable” in The Straits Times,
4 February, 2004.
7 “More globalized, more troubled” in The Straits Times, 10 October 2007.
8 “On power and stabilizing forces” in The Straits Times, 17 May 2010.
9 See Brad Glosserman, Peter Waikenhorst and Ting Xu, “Concert or Cacopho-
ny? Searching for the Foundations of a New International Order”, PacNet #27,
19 April 2012.
10 “Small can be pivotal with G-Zero” in The Straits Times, 8 May 2012.
11 “A multipolar world adrift, seeking free rides” in Today, 27 April 1012.
12 Address by Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the Institute of Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (ISIS) Malaysia Forum, 16 August 2000, Kuala Lumpur, Document
2000081603, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
13 “Core of ASEAN must pull together: SM” in The Straits Times, 28 October 2000.
14 Address by Senior Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew at the Institute of Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (ISIS) Malaysia Forum, 16 August 2000, Kuala Lumpur, Document
2000081603, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
15 Transcript of interview with SM Lee Kuan Yew, BBC London (English), East Asia
Today, 2200 hours, 13.10.00, Item 6; See also “MM calls on US to retain key role in
East Asia” in The Straits Times, 29 October 2009; “On power and stabilizing forces”
in The Straits Times, 17 May 2010; “MM Lee: US base in Japan boosts stability” in
The Straits Times, 21 May 2010; “Only US can balance China” in The Straits Times,
27 May 2011.
16 Address by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew to the Asia Society Australasia Centre
Annual Dinner, 20 November 2000, Sydney, Document 20000112103, http://stars.
Notes 135
nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; “On power and stabilizing forces” in The Straits Times,
17 May 2010.
17 “US presence in E. Asia will become more vital, says SM” in The Straits Times,
23 January 2001.
19 Address by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the 1st International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies Asia Security Conference, 31 May 2002, Shangrila Hotel, Singapore,
Document 2002053105, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/
20 “Will Japan fall behind China?” in The Straits Times, 13 August 2005.
21 “‘I saw it coming…’” in The Straits Times, 12 August 2005.
22 “China and the US need each other” in The Straits Times, 8 April 2010.
23 Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, UPI In-
ternational’s editor-at-large on 11 May 2001, Document 2001052208, http://stars.
nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/, The Business Times, 19 May 2001 and The Sunday Times,
20 May 2001.
25 “On power and stabilizing forces” in The Straits Times, 17 May 2010.
26 “LKY on Asia Ahead” in Asiaweek, 9 June 2000.
27 Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, UPI In-
ternational’s editor-at-large on 11 May 2001, Document 2001052208, http://stars.
nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/, The Business Times, 19 May 2001 and The Sunday Times,
20 May 2001.
28 BBC London (English), East Asia Today, 2200 hours, 13.10.00, Item 6.
29 Not too late to admit past wrongs, SM Lee tells Japan” in The Straits Times,
20 February 2000; “Japan needs to open up, says SM Lee” in The Straits Times,
23 January 2001; “Japan will be back in strength in S-E Asia” in The Straits Times,
31 January 2001.
30 “For richer, for poorer, world order is changing” in The Straits Times Interactive,
15 August 2005; See also, “Will Japan fall behind China?” in The Straits Times,
13 August 2005; “Japan ‘should learn from Germany’s example” in The Straits Times,
20 June 2005; “MM Lee says: Japan’s PM change could lead to better China ties” in
The Straits Times, 27 May 2006.
31 “China’s young must have right values: MM” in The Straits Times, 23 April 2005;
“MM Lee says: Japan’s PM change could lead to better China ties” in The Straits
Times, 27 May 2006.
32 “War issues will ‘slow East Asia’s integration’” in The Straits Times, 26 May 2006.
33 “Tokyo won’t risk its relations with Beijing” in The Straits Times, 20 June 2005.
34 “Not too late to admit past wrongs, SM Lee tells Japan” in The Straits Times,
20 February 2000’ “Navigating Singapore as China rises” in The Straits Times,
16 October 2001.
gov.sg/stars/public/; See also “Why Lien’s visit has backing of Taiwanese” In The
Straits Times, 30 April 2005; “Revive golden ages, MM Lee urges China” in The Sun-
day Times, 24 April 2005.
36 Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s interview by UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave on
2 February 2008 in The Straits Times, 14 February 2008.
37 “Lee: The Cruel Game” in Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 June 2000.
38 “Taiwan must accept the rise of China” in The Straits Times, 24 June 2006.
136 Notes
39 “LKY on Asia Ahead” in Asiaweek, 9 June 2000; For a very comprehensive account of
Lee’s view on the Taiwan issue, see excerpts of transcript of his interview to Taiwan’s
China Television Company (CTV) on 19 September 2000 in The Strait Times Interac-
tive, 22 September 2000, http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/analysis/cpe1_0922_prt.html
40 “Lee: The Cruel Game” in Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 June 2000; Senior Minis-
ter Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, UPI International’s editor-
at-large on 11 May 2001, Document 2001052208, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/,
The Business Times, 19 May 2001 and The Sunday Times, 20 May 2001.
41 “SM’ take on N. Korea, Taiwan and Arnie” in The Straits Times, 15 October 2003.
42 “MM: Taiwan independence damaging for itself, region” in The Straits Times,
13 August 2007; MM’s interview with Taiwan’s Central News Agency; “New leader-
ship opens doors to China-Taiwan cooperation” in The Straits Times, 9 May 2008.
43 “Taiwan must accept the rise of China” in The Straits Times, 24 June 2006.
44 “New economy is main concern of China, says SM” in The Straits Times, 21
October 2000.
46 “US needs to nurture its relations with the world” in The Straits Times, 31 May 2003;
“‘Queen bees’ of terror hard to stop, says SM” in The Straits Times, 14 October 2003.
47 “N. Korea knows limits of game it’s playing, says MM” in The Straits Times, 23
June 2006.
48 “China’s rise inevitable, witness its soft power” in The Straits Times, 2
September 2006.
49 “Navigating the new world order” in The Straits Times, 27 September 2008.
sg/stars/public/, The Business Times, 19 May 2001 & The Sunday Times, 20 May 2001;
“Three challenges facing the world” in The Straits Times, 19 December 2005; “China
and India will dominate: MM Lee” in The Straits Times Interactive, 7 December 2005;
“India’s next tryst with destiny” in The Straits Times Interactive, 22 November 2005;
“N. Korea knows limits of game it’s playing, says MM” in The Straits Times, 23 June
2006; “Urbanise quickly, MM urges India” and “National Politics must trump party
politics: MM” in The Straits Times, 11 October 2008.
51 “Overseas Indians can spur India’s rise: MM Lee” in The Straits Times, 18 September
2005; See also, “For richer, for poorer, world order is changing” in The Straits Times
Interactive, 15 August 2005; “Rise of China and India” in The Straits Times, 5 August
2005; “A tale of two aspiring nations” in The Straits Times, 19 December 2007; “Mr
Lee optimistic over China’s development” in The Straits Times, 12 July 2011.
52 “Obama’s team of rivals impresses MM” in The Straits Times, 24 October 2009.
53 “India-China clash unlikely, says MM” in The Straits Times, 17 December 2009.
sg/stars/public/, The Business Times, 19 May 2001 and The Sunday Times, 20 May
2001; “Three challenges facing the world” in The Straits Times, 19 December 2005;
“China and India will dominate: MM Lee” in The Straits Times Interactive, 7 Decem-
ber 2005. On the Islamic bomb, Pakistan’s support of terrorists, see Minister Mentor
Lee Kuan Yew’s interview by UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave on 2 February 2008 in The
Straits Times, 14 February 2008.
55 Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s interview with Arnaud de Borchgrave, UPI Inter-
national’s editor-at-large on 11 May 2001, Document 2001052208, http://stars.nhb.
gov.sg/stars/public/, The Business Times, 19 May 2001 and The Sunday Times, 20
May 2001
Notes 137
56 Speech by Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Minister Mentor, at the ceremony for conferment
of Honorary Doctorate of Laws Degree by the Australian National University,
Canberra, 26 March 2007, Document 20070328977, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/
public/
57 “US must seek broader support: SM” in The Straits Times, 20 September 2001.
58 Address by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the 1st International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies Asia Security Conference, 31 May 2002, Shangrila Hotel, Singapore,
Document 2002053105, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/stars/public/; “What went Wrong?” in
Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 December 2002.
59 “The terrorists wouldn’t win, says SM Lee” in The Straits Times, 28 September 2002.
60 “If US attacks Iraq, it’ll be before March: SM Lee” in The Business Times, 24 Sep-
tember 2002; “SM Lee sees US-China ties as key to East Asia’s future” in The Straits
Times, 24 September 2002; Transcript of “SM Lee on Possible Impact on Southeast
Asia of War in Iraq”, CNBC (English), Squawk Box, 0745 hours, 25.11.02; Transcript
of “SM Lee on Likely Backlash of US-Iraq Conflict on Asia”, CNBC (English), Asian
Wall Street Journal, 1910 hours, 25.11.02.
61 “Two different scourges, two ongoing battles” in The Straits Times, 26 July 2003.
62 “Why world must help US succeed in Iraq” in The Straits Times, 17 December 2003.
63 “US success in Iraq crucial to Asia: SM” in The Straits Times, 4 June 2004.
64 “Terrorism threat will last longer than Sars” in The Straits Times, 12 May 2003.
65 “US needs to nurture its relations with the world” in The Straits Times,
31 May 2003.
66 The terrorists wouldn’t win, says SM Lee” in The Straits Times, 28 September 2002;
“Why terrorists cannot succeed” in Today, 26 November 2002.
67 “SM urges Europe to work with East Asia” in The Sunday Times, 9 June 2002; Lee
Kuan Yew, “The World After September 11” distributed to participants of the First
Munich Economic Summit, 6 June 2002.
68 “If US attacks Iraq, it’ll be before March: SM Lee” in The Business Times,
24 September 2002; “SM Lee sees US-China ties as key to East Asia’s future” in The Straits
Times, 24 September 2002; “What went Wrong?” in Far Eastern Economic Review,
12 December 2002.
69 “Hu won’t make radical changes: SM Lee” in The Straits Times, 3 January 2003.
70 “What does the future hold?” in The Straits Times, 20 February 2003; See also,
“For richer, for poorer, world order is changing” in The Straits Times Interactive,
15 August 2005.
71 “China’s ‘peaceful rise’ strategy is in everyone’s interest” in The Straits Times,
30 April 2005; “On power and stabilising forces” in The Straits Times, 17 May 2010.
72 As early as 2008, Lee assessed that it would not be possible for the US to see a ‘quick
and short’ recovery from its worst financial crisis in decades. See, “Quick and short
recovery for US? Not likely; much will depend on decisions of Obama’s team, says
MM” in The Straits Times, 3 December 2008.
4 February 2004.
74 “SM sees ‘soft landing’ for US economy” in The Straits Times, 5 June 2004.
75 “MM Lee’s contrarian outlook for the US” in The Straits Times, 8 December 2004.
76 Tom Plate, Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Edi-
tions, 2010), p. 69.
4 February 2004.
78 “US has to rein in massive deficits, says MM” and “Obama’s team of rivals impresses
MM” in The Straits Times, 24 October 2009.
79 “MM more optimistic that terror can be contained” in The Sunday Times, 1 May 2005.
80 “MM Lee: US should stay course in Iraq” in The Straits Times, 13 October 2006.
138 Notes
81 While Lee strongly believed the US must stay its course in Iraq, he was extremely criti-
cal of the neo-cons. See Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s interview by UPI’s Arnaud
de Borchgrave on 2 February 2008 in The Straits Times, 14 February 2008; see also,
“The cost of US retreat from Iraq” in The Straits Times, 11 March 2008.
82 “Obama’s team of rivals impresses MM” in The Straits Times, 24 October 2009.
83 “‘Queen bees’ of terror hard to stop, says SM” in The Straits Times, 14 October 2003;
“Europe hasn’t faced up to ‘new terror’” in The Straits Times, 25 November 2003;
“Why world must help US succeed in Iraq” in The Straits Times, 17 December 2003;
“Region in trouble if radicals win in Mid-East” in The Straits Times, 5 December 2005;
“The Man Who Saw It All” in Time Asia, 12 December 2005; http://www.time.com/
time/asia/magazine/printout/0,13675,501051212-1
84 “China ‘is Singapore’s main challenger’ in The Straits Times, 22 June 2004; “Three
challenges facing the world” in The Straits Times, 19 December 2005; See also, “’I saw
it coming …’” in The Straits Times, 12 August 2005.
85 See “China’s soft-power success” in The Straits Times, 18 June 2007 and “China seeks
peaceful rise: MM Lee” in The Straits Times, 20 June 2007.
86 Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew’s interview by UPI’s Arnaud de Borchgrave on
2 February 2008 in The Straits Times, 14 February 2008; “Inexorable shift in the
world’s centre of gravity” in The Straits Times, 11 July 2008; “Robust Russia, low-
profile China” in The Straits Times, 11 September 2008; “Navigating the new world
order” in The Straits Times, 27 September 2008; “Next, China can put the world at
ease” in The Straits Times, 12 October 2008.
87 “Beijing’s race to engage ASEAM a ‘strategic’ move” in The Straits Times, 17 Decem-
ber 2008. The possibility of a China-ASEAN FTA was raised by then-Chinese Prime
Minister Zhu Rongji in 2000 and formal talks started in 2002.
88 Lee Kuan Yew, The Fundamentals of Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Then & Now, S
Rajaratnam Lecture 2009 (Singapore: MFA Diplomatic Academy, 2009), pp. 47–48.
90 “Economy first for East Asian bloc: MM Lee” in The Straits Times, 10 December
2005; See also, “Will Japan fall behind China?” in The Straits Times, 13 August 2005;
“Difficult for Asia to go the EU way: MM” in The Straits Times, 26 May 2006; “Japan
secure in tech dominance: MM” in The Straits Times, 27 May 2006; “MM Lee on
US-Sino ties, the yuan, Japan” in The Straits Times, 23 June 2006.
91 “Regionalism’s ok, but don’t forget the world, MM urges” in The Straits Times, 20
May 2006.
92 “East Asia ‘must learn from Europe’” in The Straits Times, 25 May 2007; “Political
strife in east Asia; euro in crisis” in The Straits Times, 9 July 2010; See also, Lee’s
comments in “Euro zone cannot be saved, says Mr Lee” in The Straits Times, 15 Sep-
tember 2011 where he said that the collapse of the currency union would be a “very
painful business” but a one-tier Europe was too hard to achieve.
93 “In Conversation: Mr. Lee Kuan Yew at LKY School of Public Policy’s 7th
anniversary” (on 14 September 2011) in Alumnus, Jan-March 2012, Issue 88, p.4;
“Euro zone cannot be saved, says Mr Lee” in The Straits Times, 15 September 2011.
94 Lee Kuan Yew, The Fundamentals of Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Then & Now,
S Rajaratnam Lecture 2009 (Singapore: MFA Diplomatic Academy, 2009), p. 5.
95 “Political, economic reforms ‘need not go hand in hand’” in The Straits Times,
17 August 2004.
96 “Tales from a 50-year journey” in Today, 22 November 2004.
97 “Culturally Chinese, politically Singaporean” in The Straits Times, 23 July 2005.
98 “Sovereign wealth funds ‘useful for small states’” in The Straits Times, 3 March 2008;
“Survival of ‘shrimps’ in the ocean” in The Straits Times, 4 March 2008.
99 “Changing face of political leadership, through MM’s eyes” in The Straits Times,
2 April 2005.
Notes 139
S Rajaratnam Lecture 2009 (Singapore: MFA Diplomatic Academy, 2009), pp. 5, 7.
102 “S’pore fine for next 5 to 10 years” in The Straits Times, 8 January 2008.
S Rajaratnam Lecture 2009 (Singapore: MFA Diplomatic Academy, 2009), p. 16.
104 Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the welcoming banquet for Dato Seri
Dr Mahathir Mohamad and Datin Seri Siti Hasmah, 17 December 1981, lky/1981/
105 “Friction with KL just ‘little blip on horizon’” in The Straits Times, 23 October 2006;
See also Lee’s reply to a question on Singapore-Malaysia relation at a forum at the
Nanyang Technological University on 5 September 2011, The Straits Times, 6 Sep-
tember 2011.
106 “Non-stop politicking in bid to deny credit to leaders” in The Straits Times, 2 July
2007.
107 MM Lee at ISEAD Dialogue: “Healing a stiff shoulder: MM’s tale on locking in
Know-how” in The Straits Times, 20 October 2007; See also “MM Lee flies to Jakarta
to visit Suharto in hospital” in The Straits Times, 14 January 2008; “Economics of
survival and rules of the game” in The Straits Times, 8 May 2008.
108 See also Speech by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew to the National Press Club in
Canberra, Australia, 16 April 1986, lky/1986/lky0416A.doc, http://stars.nhb.gov.sg/
stars/public/
109 “Non-stop politicking in bid to deny credit to leaders” in The Straits Times, 2 July
2007.
110 Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times
Press, 2011), p. 322.
111 “’Old friends reminisce during book interview” in The Sunday Times, 6 May 2012
and “Mr Lee to pen international affairs book with ex-West German chancellor” in
The Straits Times, 8 May 2012.
Conclusion
1 Attributed to J.F. Kennedy. Charles W. Freeman Jr., The Diplomat's Dictionary
(Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, p. 154.
2 See also Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits
Times Press, 2011), Chapter 8.
3 See Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993) and H.W.
Brands, “Ideas and Foreign Affairs” in Robert D. Schulzinger (ed.), A Companion to
American Foreign Relations (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), Chapter 1.
4 Louis J. Halle, American Foreign Policy: Theory and Reality (London: Bradford &
Dickens, 1960), p. 316.
5 Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times Press,
2011), p. 308; “MM sends his condolences” in The Straits Times, 16 June 2005.
6 Tom Plate, Conversations with Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2010),
p. 46.
7 Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times Press,
2011), p. 307.
8 Email correspondence with Associate Professor Tan See Seng, 20 April 2012. I thank
Professor Tan for clarifying the difference between “hard realists” and “soft realists”.
The former would likely refer to those who hold uncompromisingly to realist principles
and assumptions about the nature of power, states’ unrelenting quest for power, reliance
on national military might and economic nationalism to advance their own interests,
140 Notes
The latter, while they hold for the most part to the above principles, ‘soften’ the edges
by expanding options to include some liberal/idealist oriented perspectives and/or
means and modalities to supplement their realist core. In sum, sofr realism is a con-
venient conceptual device for the analyst or strategic think who wants to retain true to
realism, while explaining or accommodating certain elements of a state’s behaviour or
policy, that, at first glance does not look particularly realist.
9 Lee Kuan Yew, The Fundamentals of Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Then & Now
(Singapore: MFA Diplomatic Academy, 2009), pp. 14, 16.
10 Chapter 8 of the book focuses on International Relations.
11 Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times
Press, 2011), p. 311.
12 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965–2000
(Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings, 2000), pp. 762–763.
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Shee, Poon-Kim. “A Decade of ASEAN, 1967-1977”. Asian Survey, 17:7, July 1977.
Zakaria, Fareed. “Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew”. Foreign
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Bibliography 143
Newspapers
Asiaweek
Business Times
Far Eastern Economic Review
Lianhe Zaobao
Newsweek
The Straits Times
Time
Today
Index
Afghanistan, Soviet invasion 57, 62, 95 Britain see United Kingdom

Afro–Asian bloc see non-aligned Bruck, H.W. 1
countries Brunei 85
Afro–Asian unity 25–6 Burma 16
agency 2 see also Myanmar
Al-Qaeda 91–2 Bush, George 64, 92
Aron, Raymond 4 Bush, George W. 95
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) 77, 80 Cambodia 24, 34
Asian Financial Crisis 82–3, 855 and China 40, 41
Asian Values Debate 81–2 communism 45
Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) 21 and the Soviet Union 41, 45
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Vietnam 41
(ASEAN) 21, 35, 43–6, 96 Vietnam War 31, 32
Asian Financial Crisis 82–3, 85 see also Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict
and China 58–9 Carlyle, Thomas 1
Declaration 45 Carter, Jimmy 61
economic development 43–6, 65, 73 change as the only constant 25–6
free trade area 45, 75, 99 “Changing Values in a Changing
and Indochina 39–40 World” 18
and Japan 44, 62–3 Chen Shuibian 89
members’ common interests 36 Chiang Ching-kuo 89
neutralists 24 China 12
objectives 45 and ASEAN 58–9
Regional Forum (ARF) 80, 83 ASEAN Regional Forum 80, 83
summits 38, 44–5, 46 and Cambodia 40, 41
US-China relations 79–80 capitalism 93
Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict 49–50, Cold War 22–3
51–2, 53, 55, 56–60 communism 47
Australia 27, 46, 60, 86 Confrontation 22
Cultural Revolution 33
Badawi, Abdullah 99 death of Mao Zedong 42–3
Bandung Conference (1955) 17, 26 economy 66–7, 71, 85–6, 93, 96–7
“Big and Small Fishes in Asian Waters” emergence into global community 38
25, 32, 98 four modernizations 59, 61–2
birth-rate 43 global power 78–9, 84, 87
Borchgrave, Arnaud de 3 and India 91
Brazil 98 and Indonesia 30
Bretton Woods system 77 industrialization 48
Index 145
inexorable rise 74, 83, 84, 85–7, 91, 93, security of small states 98
94, 96–7 Soviet bloc 46
and Japan 85, 86, 88, 97 third party proxies 39
Khmer Rouge 57 see also communism
and Korean Peninsula 76, 85, 90 communism
and Malaya 23 accretion from contiguous areas 35
military capability 86 Cambodia 45
Mischief Reef incident 86 China’s ties with Southeast Asia 64
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status 78 Domino Theory 28, 29, 31
and Myanmar 80 economic dimension of the
Nixon’s visit 35–6 Cold War 65
post-Cold War 71, 78 economic weakness of communist
and Singapore 23, 48, 96, 98 states 47
Sino-Vietnamese War 38, 49 influence in non-communist
size 93 countries 46
South China Sea 78–9 insurgents in Southeast Asia 40–1,
and Southeast Asia 22–4, 32, 37, 41, 42 43–4, 49, 55
and the Soviet Union 39, 42–3, 47–8, Laos 45
57, 58–9, 61–2 Malaysia 42
Spratly Islands 83 monolithic 25–6
Taiwan 23, 75–6, 77, 79, 85, 87, 88–90 post-Confrontation 15
and Thailand 41–2 post-independence Singapore 27
“Two Chinas” policy 23 scenarios for the 21st century 66–7
and the UK 29 Singapore’s non-communism 15
UN membership 23, 36 Soviet Union 10
US arms sales 64 Thailand 41–2
US-China power balance 74, 78, 79–81, Vietnam 5, 45
85–6 Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict 48–61
US-China relations 35–6, 43, 50, 54, 64, see also Cold War; Vietnam War
75–6, 79–81, 85–8, 93 Confrontation 14–15, 16, 24
US-Japan-China triangle 79–81, 83, 98 bilateral negotiations 20
and Vietnam 40–1 China 22
Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict 48–61, end 21
64, 80 Gestapu affair 21
Vietnam War 30, 32–3, 35 UK bases in Singapore 27
World Trade Organization 81, 83 Cook, Arthur 27
Chollet, Derek H. 1 Czechoslovakia 46, 49
climate change 72, 95
Clinton, Bill 3, 77, 80–1 Davies, Derek 51
Cold War 4, 5, 87 decolonization 25
Berlin blockade 16 democracy and the Asian Values Debate
decline in US power 46 79, 81–2
economic dimension 65 Deng Xiaoping 50, 62
end 54, 67–8, 71–2 Detente Minus 38
fall of Saigon 38–9 developing countries
India 87 power 10
Indo-China 12–13 role in world politics 11–12
Malaya 12–13 Dien Bien Phu 35
military alliances 14 Djilas, Milovan, Conversations with
monolithic communism 25–6 Stalin 24
non-aligned countries 15–16 Domino Theory 28, 29, 31
non-aligned movement 15–17 Dubai 98
regional cooperation during 21 Dulles, John Foster 35
146 Index
Eastern European George, Alexander 2
fall of Berlin Wall 72 Germany 30
post-Soviet era 72 security role 73
Soviet bloc 46 Gestapu affair 21
economy global leadership vacuum 84–5
1990s international economy 75 globalization 54, 76, 84, 95, 97
ASEAN economic development global mafias 95
43–6, 75 terrorism 95
Asia as locomotive 76 Goh Chok Tong 2
Asian dependence on US economy 76 Goh Keng Swee 1
Asian Financial Crisis 82–3, 85 Goldgeier, James M. 1
Bretton Woods system 77 Gorbachev, Mikhail 61, 66–7
communist states 47 Gulf of Arabia 91–2
East Asia 75, 97
economic autarky 21 Heng Samrin 53, 55, 56, 60, 64
economic dimension of the Heraclitus of Ephesus 25
Cold War 65 history, study of 10–11
economic power 75, 76 Ho Chi Minh 30
free trade 65, 66 Hong Kong 80
globalization 54, 76 Hu Jintao 93
Northeast Asia 85 Hua Guofeng 48
oil crisis (1973) 46 human rights and the Asian Values
and politics 18, 65 Debate 79, 81–2
protectionism 76–7 Hun Sen 61
Southeast Asian cooperation 24 Hungary, Soviet invasion 9, 10
Soviet Union 47 Huntington, Samuel, “The Clash of
United States 46 Civilisations?” 81–2
US debt crisis 94–5
Egypt 16 Im Tan 56
Suez Crisis 9–10 independence 9, 16–17, 20
environmental issues 72 recognition by Afro-Asian bloc 16–17
European Economic Community (EEC) 44 relations with Malaysia and Indonesia
following 24–5
Ferguson, Niall 5 UK/Commonwealth presence following
Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) 26–7
28–9, 48 India 12, 16, 25
foreign policy bureaucracy 91
effect of migration 18–19 and China 91
on independence 17–18 Cold War 87
Indonesia 19 economy 76, 97
Malaysia 19 inexorable rise 91, 94, 96
power as objective 19 infrastructure 91
promotion of trade 18 military capability 87
regional interdependence 19–21 political influence 76
regional power-interests 18–19 and the Soviet Union 64
Singapore–Malaysia–Indonesia relations US-India relations 87
19–21 Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict 64
Thailand 19 Indochinese refugees 52–3
types identified 18 Indonesia
Funabashi, Yoichi 86 Asian Financial Crisis 85
and China 30
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Islamic fundamentalism 91, 92
(GATT) 65 Kuantan Declaration 59
Index 147
post-Separation 24–5 Kaifu, Toshiki 75
relations with Singapore 19–21, 23, Kampuchea
24–5 Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict 38,
Singapore-Malaya-Indonesia relations 48–61, 80
13–15, 99–100 see also Cambodia
and the Soviet Union 30 Kennedy, John F. 14, 28
threat of insurgency 42 Kennedy, Paul, The Rise and Decline
US bases 86 of Great Powers 73
US regional presence 86 Khieu Samphan 60
Indonesia-Malaysia Confrontation see Khmer Rouge 56, 57, 58, 60, 61
Confrontation Khrushchev, Nikita 15, 66
international law 11 Kissinger, Henry 3
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 77 China 35
international politics, nature of 17–19 and Le Duc Tho 36
“International Relations” 18–19, 21 Kraal, Louis 34, 65
Iraq War 92–3, 95–6 Kuantan Declaration 59
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 72 Kuwait, Iraqi invasion 72
Islam 82
Arab–Palestinian–Israeli conflict 74, 91 Laos 32, 34, 39, 41
Indonesia 91, 92 communism 45
Iraq War 92–3, 95–6 and the Soviet Union 45
Islamic fundamentalism 84, 91–2, 94, Latif, Asad 2
95–6 Lauterpacht, Hirsch 11
Islamic states 74 Le Duc Tho 36
Muslim nuclear weapons 91, 94 Lee Kuan Yew 1
Saudi Arabia 94 education 9, 11
September 11 attacks 91–2 Lee Teng-hui 89
Israel, Arab–Palestinian–Israeli conflict Lim Chee Onn 2
74, 91 Lon Nol 56
Loo, Bernard 3–4
Jacob Blaustein lectures (1973) 36
James, William 1 Macapagal, Diosdado 14
Japan 47–8, 77–8 McGovern, George 35
and ASEAN 44, 46, 62–3 Mahathir bin Mohamad 20, 99
ASEAN Regional Forum 80 Malaya
and China 85, 86, 88, 97 and China 23
defence capacity and posture 65, 66, Cold War 12
74–5, 80 ethnic Chinese 13
economy 46, 54, 73, 74, 85, 87–8, 97 Sabah 21
industrialization 62 Singapore-Malaya-Indonesia relations
introversion 8708 13–15, 99–100
nuclear capability 78 Malaysia
Official Development Aid (ODA) 88 Asian Financial Crisis 85
past military history 75, 87, 88, 97 communism 42
re-militarization 74–5, 80 Confrontation see Confrontation
role 62–3, 74–5, 87 economy 85
security role 63, 64, 73, 74–5 Federation of 9, 13–14, 20
and South Korea 88, 97 Kuantan Declaration 59
US-Japan-China triangle 79–81, 83, 98 relations with Singapore
US trade friction 74, 77 19–21, 24–5
Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict 63 Separation 20, 23, 24–5
Yakasuni shrine 88 US regional presence 86
Jiang Zemin 80, 93 Mao Zedong 42–3
148 Index
MAPHILINDO 21 Plate, Tom 95
Minister Mentor 4, 5 Pol Pot 53, 55, 56, 60
Mischief Reef incident 86 Poland 57
Mondale, Walter 50 Ponchaud, Francois 55–6
multilateral cooperation 67 population 43, 52
Muslims see Islam power
Myanmar 80 China and the US 85–8
desire for 11
Najib Razak 99 economic 75, 76
Nasser, Gamal Abdel 16 fluidity of global order 84–5
Nathan, S. R. 26, 29 as foreign policy objective 19
Netherlands 30 forms of 75
neutralists 15 global leadership vacuum 84–5
New Zealand 27, 46, 86 multi-polar 98
newly industrialized economies (NIEs) Northeast Asia 88–90
72, 73 regional juxtaposition of power-interests
Nixon, Richard M. 3 18–19
China 35–6 Prague Spring 46, 49
Soviet Union 36 Preah Vihear temple dispute 11
Vietnam War 34, 36 Prime Minister 4, 5
non-aligned movement 15–17, 24, 62 protectionism 76
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) 87 Rahman, Tengku Abdul 14
North Korea 90 Rajaratnam, S. 1, 2, 17, 19, 55
economy 76 Reagan, Ronald 61, 65
future reunification 74, 76, 90 realpolitik 25
nuclear capability 76, 90 refugee problem 52–3
Northeast Asia 88–90 regional co-operation 11–12, 21
economy 85 regional interdependence 19–21
nuclear weapons 39, 46, 53, 63, 66–7 regional power-interests 18–19
Japan 78 regionalism 97
Muslim countries 91, 94 Rhodesia 11
North Korea 76, 90 “Role of Developing Countries in World
Politics” 11–12
oil crisis (1973) 46 Rose, Charlie 95
Okinawa 86 Russian Federation 74, 79, 86
ASEAN Regional Forum 80
Pakistan, nuclear capability 91 see also Soviet Union
Palestinians 74, 91
Paris Peace Accords (1973) 34, Sabah 21
35, 36 Sachs, Jeffrey D 84–5
Paris Peace Agreement (1991) 61 Saddam Hussein 92
Pathet Lao 39 Sapin, Burton 1
People’s Action Party (PAP) 9 Saudi Arabia 94
People’s Republic of China Schmidt, Helmut 100
see China Second Generation 2
Philippines security
communism 35 economic viability 18
Mischief Reef incident 86 political structure 18
Sabah 21 small states 97–100
threat of insurgency 42 Senior Minister 4, 5, 71
US bases 66, 73, 86 Sihanouk, Norodom 41, 56, 60, 61
US regional presence 86 Simms, Peter 34
Index 149
Singapore Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict
Asian Financial Crisis 85 48–61, 62
and China 23, 48, 96, 98 Vietnam War 33
defence 90 see also Russian Federation
defence policy on independence 17–18 Spratly Islands 76, 80, 83
economy 85 Stalin, Joseph 24
Federation of Malaysia 9, 13–14 Subandrio 14, 20
independence see independence Suez Crisis 9–10
internal self-government 9 Suharto 60, 99–100
post-Cold War role 72 Sukarno 14
security of small states 97–100 superpowers
Singapore-Malaya-Indonesia relations and Southeast Asia 22–6, 36–7
13–15, 99–100 third party proxies 39
size 26 United States 86, 94–5, 98
UK bases 16, 27–8
Sino-Vietnamese War 38, 49 Taiwan 23, 75–6, 77, 79, 80, 85, 87, 88–90
Snyder, Richard 1 US support 89–90
Social Darwinism 71 terrorist threat 91–2, 94, 95
Son Sann 56, 60 Tet Offensive 29, 34
South China Sea 78–9 Thailand 24, 31, 32
South Korea 76, 85 ASEAN 85
future reunification 74, 76, 90 buffer role 34–5
and Japan 88, 97 and China 41–2
US regional presence 86 civilian administration 35
Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation communist insurgents 41–2, 49
(SEATO) 12 realpolitik 25
Soviet Union Singapore’s foreign policy 19
Berlin blockade 16 US bases 42
and Cambodia 41, 45 US-China relations 80
and China 39, 43, 47–8, 57, Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict 49–50,
58–9, 61–2 51, 55, 64
communism 66–7 Vietnam War 42
dissolution 54, 71, 72, 76 Thatcher, Margaret 3
Eastern European states 46, 72 Tibet 80
economy 47, 66–7 Tito, Marshal 24, 30
Gorbachev 61, 66–7 Toh Chin Chye 17
increasing military strength 46 Tonkin Gulf incident 30
and India 64 trade
and Indonesia 30 and defence policy 65
invasion of Afghanistan 57, 62, 95 free trade 65, 66
invasion of Hungary 9, 10 importance to Singapore 18
and Laos 45 Southeast Asian trade patterns 13
naval expansion 22 “Two Chinas” policy 23
Nixon’s visit 36
nuclear weapons 46 United Kingdom
policy shift on Asia 61 bases in Singapore 16, 27–8
post-Cold War 72 and China 29
Prague Spring 46, 49 Singapore’s reliance on 26–8
scenarios for the 21st century 66–7 withdrawal east of Suez 26–9, 33
and Southeast Asia 22, 28, 32, 37, 42, United Nations 11, 25, 40
58, 64 China’s admission 23, 36
and the United States 39, 43 Convention on the Law of the Sea 79
and Vietnam 40–1, 45, 65 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 72
150 Index
United Nations (Continued) and China 40–1
Kampuchea 55, 56 communism 45
permanent members 25, 72 invasion of Kampuchea 38
Security Council 90 Sino-Vietnamese War 38, 49
Vietnam’s membership application 40 and the Soviet Union 40–1, 45, 65
United States UN membership application 40
arms sales to China 64 US-China relations 79–80
ASEAN Regional Forum 80 Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict 48–52,
Asian dependence on US economy 76 54–60, 80
China-US power balance 74, 78, 79–81, ASEAN 49–50, 51–2, 53, 55, 56–60
85–6 China 64, 80
China-US relations 35–6, 43, 50, 54, 64, Japan 63
75–6, 79–81, 85–8, 93 Kuantan Declaration 59
debt crisis 94–5 long term danger 55
decline in US power 46, 73, 84 refugee problem 52–3
economy 46, 67, 73, 74, 76, 77, 94–5 Sino-Soviet rivalry 54, 55,
free market 66 58–9, 62
global leadership vacuum 84–5 Soviet policy shift on Asia 61
global security burden 73, 74, 85–7 Thailand 49–50, 51, 55
Iraq War 92–3, 95–6 UN conference 56–7
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 72 UN resolution 55
Lee’s view on Americans 28 Vietnam War
Nixon’s visit to China 35–6 China 30, 32–3, 35
regional presence 71, 73, 77–8, collateral benefits for Asia 96
80, 85–8 Domino Theory 28, 29, 31
scenarios for the 21st century 66 fall of Saigon 5, 38–9, 43
September 11 attacks 91–2 Nixon 34, 36
and Southeast Asia 22, 28, 46, 47–8, Paris Peace Accords 34, 35, 36
50–1, 64, 77–8, 85–6, 95 Tet Offensive 29, 34
and the Soviet Union 39, 43 Tonkin Gulf incident 30
superpower status 86, 94–5, 98 UK bases in Singapore 27
support for Taiwan 89–90 UN weakness 11, 50
trade friction with Japan 74, 77 US involvement 24, 28–35, 36, 37, 53
unilateralism 87, 92 US weaponry in aftermath 39
US bases in Southeast Asia 28, 29, 33,
38, 42, 47–8, 60, 66, 86 Woodrow Wilson Award 96
US-India relations 87 World Bank 77
US-Japan-China triangle 79–81, World Trade Organization (WTO)
83, 98 81, 83, 99
Vietnam War 24, 28–35, 36, 37, 38, 50, World War II 77
53, 96
USSR see Soviet Union Yugoslavia 16, 24, 30
Vietnam Zakaria, Fareed, “Culture is Destiny:

ASEAN Regional Forum 80 A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew”
and Cambodia 41 81–2

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Lee Kuan Yew’s Strategic Thought

1 The Police in Occupation Japan 8 Religion and Nationalism in India

16 Women’s Suffrage in Asia 25 The British Empire and Tibet

53 Communist Indochina 62 The International History of

57 Japanese and Hong Kong Film 66 National Pasts in Europe and

71 Science, Public Health and the 76 Status and Security in

Ang Cheng Guan

ISBN: 978-0-415-65855-3 (hbk)

1 From the 1950s to the mid-70s 9

4 The 90s decade 71

As Lee is so inﬂuential in the making of Singapore’s foreign policy – indeed one

Not only had Mr Lee transformed Singapore economically beyond what

The Cold War years

On the nature of international politics pre-August 1965

As a young lawyer, Lee assisted in defending the members of the University

In sum, “cooperation and not competition is what is needed between Singapore

the alternative to peaceful co-existence is for a very small power in Southeast

On the non-aligned movement

the ﬁrst bloom of Afro–Asian solidarity against Western domination in the

On the nature of international politics

… But I think we would be dishonest to ourselves if we did not express

The Thais had a “keen sense of anticipation of history”.

On the British withdrawal east of Suez93

On the United States and the Vietnam War113

then in a matter of a decade or even less if some of the intervening states

If the Americans decide to pack it up because the position is untenable in

He subsequently elaborated on this conundrum in a May 1965 speech which is

We know that if the Communists are able to advance their frontiers to

From August to December 1965, the situation in Vietnam changed considera-

On the nature of international politics (1971–1975)

On the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saigon

We got to live with it (fall of Saigon). Yesterday is over and is important

On Changing power relations and Southeast Asia

On Vietnam and Kampuchea conflict

On the Indochinese refugees problem

It is impossible to be detached when faced with human tragedy. After the

On another occasion, Lee was accused of having “a very unsentimental attitude”

“All in all, the 1980s promise to be an intensely exciting decade”1

On Resolving the Kampuchea Issue

Lee explained the beneﬁts of forming a coalition government: By forming a

On the interests of China, the Soviet Union and Vietnam

our best policy is to demonstrate to the three communist countries directly

On ASEAN and Kampuchea

no one can commit ASEAN to a change of policy through bilateral dialogue.

On the world in the 1980s

On the new balance in Asia

The post-Cold War years

“In future competition between industrialized nation states will be primarily

No alternative balance can be as comfortable as the present one with the US as

On the role of Japan

On the international economy and other

On the outlook of the Asia-Pacific and

On the US–Japan–China triangle

On the Asian values debate and clash of civilizations

Hinduism, Chinese Confucianism or Communism, Japanese Shintoism, they

On the Asian Financial Crisis

On China and the United States

On the two biggest threats